Telangana High Court
Smt.D.Nalini Reddy vs The Government Of Telangana on 27 July, 2026
Author: Juvvadi Sridevi
Bench: Juvvadi Sridevi
HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA AT HYDERABAD
*****
WRIT PETITION No.8920 of 2015
BETWEEN:
Smt.D.Nalini Reddy ...Petitioner
AND
The Government of Telangana and two others ...Respondents
DATE OF ORDER: 27th JULY, 2026
SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL:
THE HONOURABLE SMT. JUSTICE JUVVADI SRIDEVI
1 Whether Reporters of Local
newspapers may be allowed to see Yes/No
the Judgment?
2 Whether the copies of judgment may
be marked to Law Reporters/Journals Yes/No
3 Whether HER Lordship wish to see
the fair copy of the Judgment? Yes/No
___________________
JUVVADI SRIDEVI, J
2 THE HON'BLE SMT. JUSTICE JUVVADI SRIDEVI
W.P.No.8920 of 2015
* THE HONOURABLE SMT. JUSTICE JUVVADI SRIDEVI
+ WRIT PETITION No.8920 of 2015
% Date: 27th July, 2026
BETWEEN:
Smt.D.Nalini Reddy ...Petitioner
AND
The Government of Telangana and two others ...Respondents
! Counsel for the Petitioner: Sri K.G. Krishna Murthy, learned Senior
Counsel representing Sri V. Maheshwar Reddy, learned counsel for
petitioner
! Counsel for the Respondents: Sri Santhapur Satyanarayana Rao,
learned Government Pleader appearing for the respondents
>HEAD NOTE:
? Cases referred:
1. Civil Appeal No.4134 of 2022 (arising out of Special Leave Petition (civil) No. 2946 of 2020)
2. Writ - A No. 1315 of 2024
3. (2023) 18 Supreme Court Cases 705
4. 2025 (3) ALD 693 (TS) (DB)
5. Common Judgment dated 13.12.2021
6. 1991 Supp (1) SCC 504
7. 2013 SCC Online AP 729
3 THE HON'BLE SMT. JUSTICE JUVVADI SRIDEVI
W.P.No.8920 of 2015
IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA AT
HYDERABAD
THE HONOURABLE SMT. JUSTICE JUVVADI SRIDEVI
WRIT PETITION No.8920 of 2015
DATED: JULY, 2026
BETWEEN:
Smt.D.Nalini Reddy ...Petitioner
AND
The Government of Telangana and two others ...Respondents
O R D E R:
The Writ Petition is filed by the petitioner with the following
prayer:
“to issue an appropriate writ or direction more particularly
one in the nature of writ of mandamus declaring the in/action
of the respondents in regularizing the service of the
petitioner with effect from 14.10.1996 instead of June, 1994
and issue a consequential direction to the respondents to
regularise the service of the petitioner in the aided post w.e.f.
June, 1994 with all benefits including seniority and pension
from the date of her first appointment i e June1994 and to
pass”
02. Heard Sri K.G. Krishna Murthy, learned Senior Counsel
representing Sri V. Maheshwar Reddy, learned counsel for petitioner
and Sri Santhapur Satyanarayana Rao, learned Government Pleader
appearing for the respondents and perused the record.
4 THE HON’BLE SMT. JUSTICE JUVVADI SRIDEVI
W.P.No.8920 of 2015
03.1. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the
petitioner is highly qualified, having obtained M.A. (Telugu) with
distinction, M.Phil., and Ph.D. from Osmania University, and had
served as a Lecturer in various reputed educational institutions even
prior to her appointment in the 3rd respondent-college. It is submitted
that the petitioner was appointed as a Telugu Lecturer in Nrupatunga
Junior College, Hyderabad, in June, 1994 against an aided leave
vacancy of a permanent lecturer in a sanctioned post. The said
permanent incumbent retired on 28.02.1995 on attaining the age of
superannuation and, consequently, the vacancy became a clear and
permanent aided vacancy. Therefore, according to the learned
counsel, the petitioner is entitled to have her services regularized from
the date of her initial appointment, i.e., June, 1994, instead of
14.10.1996.
03.2. It is further submitted that although the petitioner had been
continuously discharging her duties from June, 1994, the Board of
Intermediate Education, by proceedings in Rc.No.378/E1-2/96, dated
21.12.1996, approved her appointment only with effect from
14.10.1996 without assigning any valid or justifiable reason. It is
contended that the action of the respondents in fixing the date of
regularization from 14.10.1996 is arbitrary, illegal and contrary to the
5 THE HON’BLE SMT. JUSTICE JUVVADI SRIDEVI
W.P.No.8920 of 2015
factual position, inasmuch as the petitioner had been working in a
sanctioned aided post from the date of her initial appointment.
03.3. It is further submitted that the issue raised in the present
writ petition is no longer res integra. It is contended that in
W.P.No.19277 of 1999, this Court, by order dated 13.09.2000,
directed the respondents to count the services rendered by similarly
situated lecturers from the date of their initial appointment for the
purpose of service benefits, including pension. The said Judgment
was affirmed by the Division Bench in W.A.No.1492 of 2000 by
judgment dated 14.02.2005, and the Special Leave Petition in SLP
No.1258 of 2006 preferred by the Government was dismissed by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court on 17.02.2006. Consequently, the
Government implemented the said judgments by regularizing the
services of the petitioners therein from the dates of their initial
appointments and extending all consequential service benefits.
03.4. It is further submit that several similarly situated lecturers,
whose appointments were made under identical circumstances, were
subsequently granted the benefit of regularization from their initial
dates of appointment by issuance of appropriate Government Orders
in implementation of the aforesaid judicial pronouncements. It is
submitted that the petitioner stands on the very same footing and,
6 THE HON’BLE SMT. JUSTICE JUVVADI SRIDEVI
W.P.No.8920 of 2015
therefore, denial of identical relief to the petitioner amounts to hostile
discrimination and violates the guarantee of equality enshrined under
Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.
03.5. It is further submitted that the petitioner had submitted
detailed representations to the Director of Intermediate Education and
the Board of Intermediate Education, including a representation dated
16.03.2015, requesting correction of the date of regularization from
14.10.1996 to June, 1994. Along with the representations, the
petitioner also enclosed copies of the Government Orders issued in
favour of similarly situated lecturers. However, despite the lapse of
considerable time, the respondents failed to consider the petitioner’s
claim or pass any appropriate orders, thereby compelling the petitioner
to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226
of the Constitution of India.
03.6. It is contended that the petitioner has no other efficacious
alternative remedy and that the action of the respondents in not
regularizing the petitioner’s services from June, 1994 is arbitrary,
unreasonable, discriminatory and contrary to the law laid down by this
Court as affirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Learned counsel,
therefore, prayed that this Court may allow the writ petition by directing
the respondents to regularize the services of the petitioner with effect
7 THE HON’BLE SMT. JUSTICE JUVVADI SRIDEVI
W.P.No.8920 of 2015
from June, 1994, instead of 14.10.1996, and extend all consequential
service benefits, including seniority, pensionary benefits and all other
attendant benefits, on par with similarly situated lecturers who have
already been granted such relief.
03.7. In support of his contentions, the learned counsel for the
petitioner relied upon a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Rushibhai Jagdishchandra Pathak v. Bhavnagar Municipal
Corporation1 wherein it was held at Paragraph No.15 that:
“15. We are also inclined to grant interest to the appellants
on the arrears at the rate of 7% per annum, which would be
payable with effect from 1st September 2017. We have fixed
the said date for grant of interest as the respondent-
Corporation has accepted the interpretation of the Scheme
rendered on 16 th August 2016 in the Writ Petition preferred
by Mukeshbhai Jaswantrai Joshi. Normally, and as a model
employer, on accepting the said decision, the respondent-
Corporation should have uniformly applied and granted the
benefit to all its similarly situated employees affected by the
order dated 28th October 2010. This would have avoided
unnecessary litigation before the courts, as was held in State
of Uttar Pradesh and Others v. Arvind Kumar Srivastava and
Others:16 “22.1. The normal rule is that when a particular set
of employees is given relief by the court, all other identically
situated persons need to be treated alike by extending that
benefit. Not doing so would amount to discrimination and
would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
This principle needs to be applied in service matters more
emphatically as the service jurisprudence evolved by this
Court from time to time postulates that all similarly situated
persons should be treated similarly. Therefore, the normal
rule 16 (2015) 1 SCC 347 would be that merely because1
Civil Appeal No.4134 of 2022 (arising out of Special Leave Petition (civil) No. 2946 of 2020)
8 THE HON’BLE SMT. JUSTICE JUVVADI SRIDEVI
W.P.No.8920 of 2015other similarly situated persons did not approach the Court
earlier, they are not to be treated differently.
22.2. However, this principle is subject to well- recognised
exceptions in the form of laches and delays as well as
acquiescence. Those persons who did not challenge the
wrongful action in their cases and acquiesced into the same
and woke up after long delay only because of the reason
that their counterparts who had approached the court earlier
in time succeeded in their efforts, then such employees
cannot claim that the benefit of the judgment rendered in the
case of similarly situated persons be extended to them. They
would be treated as fence-sitters and laches and delays,
and/or the acquiescence, would be a valid ground to dismiss
their claim.
22.3. However, this exception may not apply in those cases
where the judgment pronounced by the court was judgment
in rem with intention to give benefit to all similarly situated
persons, whether they approached the court or not. With
such a pronouncement the obligation is cast upon the
authorities to itself extend the benefit thereof to all similarly
situated persons. Such a situation can occur when the
subject-matter of the decision touches upon the policy
matters, like scheme of regularisation and the like (see K.C.
Sharma v. Union of India). On the other hand, if the
judgment of the court was in personam holding that benefit
of the said judgment shall accrue to the parties before the
court and such an intention is stated expressly in the
judgment or it can be impliedly found out from the tenor and
language of the judgment, those who want to get the benefit
of the said judgment extended to them shall have to satisfy
that their petition does not suffer from either laches and
delays or acquiescence.”
03.8. Further, he relied upon a decision of High Court of
Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench in Manikant Singh v. State
9 THE HON’BLE SMT. JUSTICE JUVVADI SRIDEVI
W.P.No.8920 of 2015
of U.P. thru. Addl. Chief Secy. Prison Administration and Reform2
wherein it was held at Paragraph No.8 to 10 that:
“8. In this case, the delay of sixteen years would affect the
consequential claim for arrears. The High Court was not
justified in directing payment of arrears relating to 16 years,
and that too with interest. It ought to have restricted the relief
relating to arrears to only three years before the date of writ
petition, or from the date of demand to date of writ petition,
whichever was lesser. It ought not to have granted interest
on arrears in such circumstances.
9. The petitioner as per the law settled by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court is entitled for the increment and arrears for a
period of three years prior to the date of filing of the writ
petition but not for the entire period which is claimed in this
case for about a period of fourteen years.
10. Resultantly, the petition succeeds and is allowed in
terms of preceding paragraph 9 above at the admission
stage itself. Parties to bear their own cost.”
04.1. Learned Government Pleader appearing for the
respondents submitted that the writ petition is devoid of merit both on
facts and in law and is liable to be dismissed. It is submitted that the
petitioner is not entitled to seek regularization of her services with
retrospective effect from June, 1994, as her initial engagement was
not in accordance with the statutory rules governing appointments in
aided educational institutions.
04.2. It is further submitted that Nrupatunga Junior College,
Lingampally, Hyderabad, was admitted into Grant-in-Aid vide
G.O.Ms.No.1155, Education Department, dated 19.12.1977. The
2
Writ – A No. 1315 of 2024
10 THE HON’BLE SMT. JUSTICE JUVVADI SRIDEVI
W.P.No.8920 of 2015
petitioner was initially engaged as a Part-Time Junior Lecturer in
Telugu in June, 1994 in the leave vacancy of a regular Junior Lecturer,
namely Sri M. Sudershan Reddy, who had proceeded on medical
leave. It is contended that such appointment of the petitioner was
made by the management without obtaining the prior permission of the
competent authority, namely the Commissioner of Intermediate
Education, and therefore, the said engagement was dehors the
statutory rules.
04.3. It is further submitted that the Government had enacted
Act 2 of 1994 with effect from 25.11.1993 prohibiting appointments on
daily wage, temporary and part-time basis in Government
Departments as well as in private aided educational institutions.
Consequently, the petitioner’s engagement as a Part-Time Junior
Lecturer in June, 1994, after the coming into force of the said
enactment, was itself irregular and incapable of conferring any legal
right for claiming regularization from the date of such engagement.
04.4. It is further submitted that appointments to the posts of
Junior Lecturers in private aided junior colleges are governed by the
statutory Rules issued in G.O.Ms.No.12, Education Department, dated
10.01.1992. It is further submitted that the Government, by
G.O.Ms.No.275, Finance and Planning Department, dated 14.12.1995,
11 THE HON’BLE SMT. JUSTICE JUVVADI SRIDEVI
W.P.No.8920 of 2015
directed that no vacancies should be filled up by any recruiting agency
without obtaining prior permission from the Finance (SMPC)
Department. Therefore, any appointment made in contravention of the
said statutory provisions cannot be recognized for the purpose of
regularization or grant of retrospective service benefits.
04.5. It is further submitted that subsequently, the management
issued a public advertisement in the newspapers on 22.06.1996
inviting applications for the post of Junior Lecturer in Telugu. The
petitioner applied pursuant to the said notification, participated in the
selection process conducted by the duly constituted Selection
Committee on 05.10.1996, was selected on merit and was issued
appointment orders on 14.10.1996. She joined duty on the very same
day and her appointment was thereafter approved by the Secretary,
Board of Intermediate Education, vide proceedings Rc.No.378/E1-
2/1996, dated 21.12.1996. Consequent upon such approval, she was
admitted into Grant-in-Aid by proceedings dated 10.01.1997. It is,
therefore, contended that the petitioner’s appointment as a regular
Junior Lecturer commenced only from 14.10.1996 and not from June,
1994.
04.6. It is further submitted that the reliance placed by the
petitioner on the cases relating to Vijayanagar Junior College, Sri
12 THE HON’BLE SMT. JUSTICE JUVVADI SRIDEVI
W.P.No.8920 of 2015
Srinivasa Junior College, SVGS Junior College and other institutions is
wholly misconceived. It is submitted that those institutions were
admitted into Grant-in-Aid with effect from 01.04.1994 and the
teaching staff therein had entered service prior to 25.11.1993, i.e.,
before the coming into force of Act 2 of 1994. Initially, such staff were
extended the benefit of Minimum Time Scale under G.O.Ms.No.362,
Education Department, dated 17.10.1994, and thereafter their services
were regularized under G.O.Ms.No.328, Education Department, dated
15.10.1997. Upon subsequent litigation, this Court granted relief
directing regularization from the date on which the institutions were
admitted into Grant-in-Aid, which was ultimately implemented by the
Government in compliance with the judicial directions.
04.7. It is contended that the petitioner does not satisfy the
eligibility criteria prescribed under G.O.Ms.No.328, dated 15.10.1997,
nor was she one of the employees who had entered service prior to
the enactment of Act 2 of 1994. Unlike the employees in the aforesaid
institutions, the petitioner was not regularized from the cadre of Part-
Time Junior Lecturer under G.O.Ms.No.362, but was appointed afresh
through an open recruitment process pursuant to the newspaper
advertisement issued in June, 1996. Therefore, her case stands on an
13 THE HON’BLE SMT. JUSTICE JUVVADI SRIDEVI
W.P.No.8920 of 2015
entirely different factual and legal footing and cannot be equated with
those cases.
04.8. It is also submitted that G.O.Ms.No.32, Higher Education
(IE.II) Department, dated 20.03.2006, whereby the services of the
teaching staff of Vijayanagar Junior College were regularized from an
earlier date, was issued only as a special case in compliance with the
Judgments rendered by this Court and affirmed by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court. The said Government Order was issued under
special circumstances and cannot be treated as a precedent or as
conferring a general right upon all employees of private aided junior
colleges to seek similar retrospective regularization.
04.9. It is further submitted that acceptance of the petitioner’s
claim would amount to recognizing an appointment which was
admittedly irregular and contrary to the statutory provisions prevailing
at the relevant point of time. Granting retrospective regularization in
such circumstances would not only violate the statutory scheme
governing appointments but would also impose an enormous and
recurring financial burden upon the State exchequer and open the
floodgates for similar claims by other employees whose appointments
were not made in accordance with law. Learned Government Pleader
for the respondents submitted that the writ petition is not maintainable
14 THE HON’BLE SMT. JUSTICE JUVVADI SRIDEVI
W.P.No.8920 of 2015
either on facts or in law. It is submitted that the petitioner herself has
admitted in the writ affidavit that she was engaged only in a leave
vacancy from June, 1994 in place of a regular Junior Lecturer, Sri M.
Sudharshan Reddy, who subsequently retired from service on
attaining the age of superannuation on 28.02.1995.
04.10. It is further submitted that the petitioner’s appointment as
a regular Junior Lecturer was approved by the Chairman, Standing
Committee (Academic Affairs), Board of Intermediate Education, vide
proceedings Rc.No.378/E1-2/96, dated 21.12.1996, with effect from
14.10.1996. If the petitioner was aggrieved by the approval being
granted from 14.10.1996 instead of June, 1994, she ought to have
specifically challenged the said proceedings to that extent. In the
absence of any challenge to the approval proceedings dated
21.12.1996, the relief sought in the writ petition is not maintainable.
04.11. It is also submitted that the petitioner remained silent for
nearly nineteen years after the approval of her appointment and
submitted a representation only on 20.02.2015 seeking retrospective
regularization. It is contended that the writ petition, filed after an
inordinate and unexplained delay, is barred by the principles of delay
and laches and, therefore, is liable to be dismissed on that ground
alone. Hence, he prayed that the writ petition be dismissed.
15 THE HON’BLE SMT. JUSTICE JUVVADI SRIDEVI
W.P.No.8920 of 2015
04.12. In support of his contentions, he relied upon a decision of
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Director General, Doordarshan
Prasar Bharti Corporation of India and another v. Magi H. Desai3
wherein it was held at Paragraph Nos.1, 3 to 6 & 16 that:
“Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned
judgment and order dated 17-2-2022 [Magi (M.H. Desai) v.
Doordarshan Prasar Bharti Corpn. of India, 2022 SCC
OnLine Guj 2521] passed by the High Court of Gujarat at
Ahmedabad in R/Special Civil Application No. 14592/2021,
by which the Division Bench of the High Court has allowed
the said writ petition preferred by the respondent herein and
has directed that the services of the respondent herein–
original writ petitioner rendered as contractual shall be liable
to be counted as temporary service for the purpose of
calculating the qualifying service for pensionary/retiral
benefits, the Director General, Doordarshan Prasar Bharti
Corporation of India and another have preferred the present
appeal.
3. That the respondent herein–original applicant was
engaged as a General Assistant on contract/casual basis in
the year 1985. The services of the respondent as General
Assistant on contract/casual basis were thereafter extended
from time to time, however, with break of few days. The
original applicant thereafter filed Original Application No.
32/1987 before the Central Administrative Tribunal,
Ahmedabad Bench, Ahmedabad (for short “the Tribunal”).
The said OA was partly allowed vide order dated 30-8-1990
with a direction to the department–appellants herein to pay
her the same salary and allowances that were being paid to
other regular General Assistants/Clerks from October 1990
with arrears.
4. That thereafter, pursuant to the decision of the Principal
Bench of the Central Administrative Tribunal, New Delhi to
regularise casual employees by way of framing of scheme,
the services of the original applicant came to be regularised
as Lower Division Clerk w.e.f. 31-3-1995 pursuant to the3
(2023) 18 Supreme Court Cases 705
16 THE HON’BLE SMT. JUSTICE JUVVADI SRIDEVI
W.P.No.8920 of 2015Scheme of Regularisation of Casual Staff Artists of
Doordarshan, 1992/94. The original applicant was given the
regular scale of Lower Division Clerk from the date of
regularisation on the said post.
5. That thereafter the original applicant approached the
Tribunal seeking consideration of her past service. The said
OA came to be dismissed, which was the subject-matter of
writ petition before the High Court. The High Court was
pleased to permit the original applicant to submit
representation to the department. That thereafter the
respondent–original applicant submitted representation
dated 11-4-2014. Vide order dated 18-9-2014, the
department rejected the representation of the respondent for
giving her the benefit of casual/contractual services rendered
by her from 1985 till 31-3-1995 for calculating the
pensionary/service benefits.
6. That thereafter, the original applicant filed another OA No.
446/2014 before the Tribunal. By a detailed judgment and
order dated 8-9-2021 [Magi v. Doordarshan Prasar Bharti
Corpn. of India, 2021 SCC OnLine CAT 10881] , the Tribunal
dismissed the said OA by observing that the services
rendered by the respondent as contractual/casual cannot be
treated and/or considered as temporary service and
therefore the services rendered as such shall not be counted
for the purpose of retiral benefits/service benefits. The
judgment and order passed by the Tribunal dismissing the
OA was the subject-matter of writ petition before the High
Court.”
04.13. Further, he relied upon a decision of a Hon’ble Division
Bench of this Court in A.R. Vilasitha v. State of Telangana and
others4 wherein it was held at Paragraph Nos.8, 9 and 13 that:
“8. It is by now well settled proposition of law that though for
filing a Writ Petition no fixed period of limitation is prescribed,
nonetheless it has to be filed promptly, if not within a
reasonable period of time. In the said circumstances when a
petition, that too, of an Ex-Judicial Officer who is fully4
2025 (3) ALD 693 (TS) (DB)
17 THE HON’BLE SMT. JUSTICE JUVVADI SRIDEVI
W.P.No.8920 of 2015conversant of the laws and the legal remedies available to
her, approaches Writ Court after a gap of more than 5½
years agitating her dismissal from service it clearly reflects
the petitioner to be guilty of delay laches. The Writ remedy
should not be permitted to be invoked by such indolent
person and cannot now be permitted to take advantage of
her own deliberate act of not approaching the Court promptly
that too at this belated stage. The Writ remedies are always
available to somebody who is ever vigilant and not indolent
at all.
9. It would be relevant at this juncture to refer to the
judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board
and Others vs. T.T. Murali Babu 1 wherein the Hon’ble
Supreme Court dealing with the aspect of delay laches in
paragraph No.16 has held as under, viz., “16. Thus, the
doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed
aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation
offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should
bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and
equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty
to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to
keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an
aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the
court at his own leisure or pleasure, the court would be
under legal obligation to scrutinise (2014) 4 SCC 108
whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or
not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain
circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most
circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for
the litigant who knocks at the doors of the court. Delay
reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant – a
litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely,
“procrastination is the greatest thief of time” and second, law
does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay
does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis.”
13. In view of the judicial precedents touching the aspect of
delay latches referred to in the preceding paragraphs and
upon seeing the inordinate delay of more than 5½ years,
coupled with the fact, the weak justification and explanation
which is not plausible or satisfactory in any manner forces
18 THE HON’BLE SMT. JUSTICE JUVVADI SRIDEVI
W.P.No.8920 of 2015
this Bench to hold that the instant Writ Petition suffers from
delay laches and deserves to be dismissed.”
04.14. Further, he relied upon the Judgment of a Hon’ble
Division Bench of this Court in Writ Appeal Nos.1660 of 2018 and
593 of 20165, wherein, while referring to the decisions of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Kulwant Singh Gill v. State of Punjab 6 and the
Hon’ble Full Bench of this Court in P.V.Narayana v. APSRTC,
Hyderabad and Others7, it was held as follows:
“This Court has carefully gone through the Judgment
delivered by the Full Bench. Before the Full Bench, the
employees came up before this Court has relied upon the
judgment delivered in the case of Kulwant Singh (1 Supra)
and the Full Bench in paragraphs 71 to 77 has held as
under:
“71. On the basis of the decisions of the
Supreme Court referred to above, the relevant
considerations that may be taken into account in
determining the issue of delay and laches may
be summarized thus:
(1) Though no period of limitation is prescribed
for the writ Courts to exercise their powers under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India or to file a
writ petition, a person aggrieved should approach
the Court without loss of time. In appropriate
cases, where there is delay and the same has
properly been explained with cogent reasons,
Court may condone the delay as an exception to
meet the ends of justice. But, it would be a sound
and wise exercise of discretion for the Courts to
refuse to exercise their extraordinary powers
under Article 226 in the case of persons who do
not approach it expeditiously for relief and who
stand by and allow things to happen and then5
Common Judgment dated 13.12.2021
6
1991 Supp (1) SCC 504
7
2013 SCC Online AP 729
19 THE HON’BLE SMT. JUSTICE JUVVADI SRIDEVI
W.P.No.8920 of 2015approach the Court to put forward stale claims
and try to unsettle settled matters.
(2) Courts have evolved rules of self-imposed
restraints or fetters where the High Court may hot
enquire into belated or stale claim and deny relief
to a party if he is found guilty of laches. One who
is tardy, not vigilant and does not seek
intervention of the Court within a reasonable time
from the date of accrual of cause of action or
alleged violation of the constitutional, legal or
other right, is not entitled to relief under Article
226.
(3) No hard and fast rule can be laid down for
universal application and every case shall have
to be decided on its own facts.
(4) There is no inviolable rule of law that
whenever there is a delay, the Court must
necessarily refuse to entertain the petition; it is a
rule of practice based on sound and proper
exercise of discretion, and each case must be
dealt with on its own facts.
(5) There is no lower limit or upper limit and it will
all depend on what the breach of the
fundamental right and the remedy claimed are
and how the delay arose.
(6) The principle on which the Court refuses relief
on the ground of laches or delay is that the rights
accrued to others by the delay in filing the
petition should not be disturbed, unless there is a
reasonable explanation for the delay, because
Court should not harm innocent parties if their
rights had emerged by the delay on the part of
the petitioners.
(7) Where there is remiss or negligence on the
part of a party approaching the Court for relief
after an inordinate and unexplained delay, in
such cases, it would not be proper to enforce the
fundamental right As a general rule if there has
been unreasonable delay the Court ought not
ordinarily to lend its aid to a party in exercise of
the extraordinary power of mandamus.
(8) There is no waiver of fundamental right But
while exercising discretionary jurisdiction Court
20 THE HON’BLE SMT. JUSTICE JUVVADI SRIDEVI
W.P.No.8920 of 2015can take into account delay and laches on the
part of the applicant in approaching a writ Court
(9) Though the High Court in exercise of the
power under Article 226 in its discretion grant
relief in cases where the fundamental rights are
violated, but, in such cases also, High Court, to
meet the ends of justice, shall refuse to exercise
its high prerogative jurisdiction in favour of a
party who has been guilty of laches and where
there are other relevant circumstances which
indicate that it would be inappropriate to exercise
the discretionary jurisdiction.
(10) The maximum period fixed by the
Legislature as the time within which the relief by
a suit in a civil Court must be brought may
ordinarily taken to be a reasonable standard by
which delay in seeking remedy under Article 226
can be measured.
(11) If a person entitled to a relief chooses to
remain silent for long, he thereby gives rise to a
reasonable belief in the mind of others that he is
not interested in claiming that relief. Courts have
applied the rule of delay with greater rigor in
service matters.
(12) The benefit of a judgment cannot be
extended to a case automatically. The Court is
entitled to take into consideration the fact as to
whether the petitioner had chosen to sit over the
matter and wake up after the decision of the
Court If it is found that the petitioner approached
the Court with unreasonable delay, the same
may disentitle him to obtain a discretionary relief.
Long Delay disentitles a party to the discretionary
relief under Articles 32 and 226 and persons who
had slept over their rights for long and elected to
wake up when they had the impetus from the
judgment of similarly placed persons.
(13) Where during the intervening period rights of
third parties have crystallized, it would be
inequitable to disturb those rights at the instance
of a person who has approached the Court after
long lapse of time and where there is no cogent
explanation for the delay.
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W.P.No.8920 of 2015
(14) Where the appellate authority acting within
its jurisdiction condoned the delay after being
satisfied with the facts stated in relation thereto,
the High Court in exercise of its powers under
Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution should not
ordinarily interfere with the order.
72. An analysis of the case law discussed above
would amply make it clear that issue of a writ of a
mandamus or certiorari is largely a matter of
sound discretion and will not be granted if there
is negligence or omission on the part of the
person to assert his right as, taken in conjunction
with the lapse of time and other circumstances,
causes prejudice to the adverse party. Therefore,
burden lies on the workman who has to establish
that in spite of his best efforts and diligence he
was prevented from approaching the authority
within the period of limitation provided for or the
writ Court within a reasonable period of time. If
the workman is not able to satisfactorily explain
with cogent reasons for the delay he is not
entitled to seek for condonation of the delay. It is
true that the punishment imposed cannot be
sustained in law because of the illegality crept in
it in not conducting a prior enquiry. But, still the
workman is under a statutory obligation to
challenge the same within the time provided by
the statutory rules or regulations or within a
reasonable period of time before the writ Court If
delay of 5 to 18 years is condoned, for no reason
or fault on the part of the authority, the
proceedings which had attained finality are to be
set aside. Setting aside of such order at a
belated stage and allowing of a stale claim, may,
as rightly held by the Division Bench in Esa Ali’s
case (supra), inspire the workman to seek for
consequential benefits of promotion as well, in
which event, the rights of the third parties would
adversely be affected for no fault of theirs. A
workman who is tardy and not diligent for years
in availing a statutory remedy or in approaching
the Court of law, in our view, cannot be
encouraged or permitted to contend that in view
of the decision of the Supreme Court the
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W.P.No.8920 of 2015
punishment cannot be sustained in law,
therefore, delay to any extent is to be condoned
automatically in exercise of the power conferred
on the appellate or revisional authorities or by the
writ Courts in exercise of the discretionary
powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India. Courts can come to the aid of a person
who is diligent and vigilant but unable to
approach the authority or Court of law for
redressal of his grievance in spite of his best
efforts and reasons beyond his control but not to
a person who is tardy and negligent or slept over
the matter in availing the statutory or legal
remedies.
73. No doubt in the present cases the
punishment awarded cannot be sustained in law
in view of the law laid down by the Supreme
Court in Kulwant Singh Gill‘s case (supra) and in
the light of the Regulations, but, a specific period
having been prescribed in the Regulations of the
Corporation, as stated earlier, the same need to
be adhered to. The proviso under Regulation 23
empowers the appellate authority to entertain an
appeal even after expiry of the period of limitation
provided if it is satisfied that the appellant had
sufficient cause for not submitting the appeal in
time. A similar power may also be exercised
under Regulation 29. If the authority is not
satisfied with the explanation offered by the
workman in challenging the orders of
punishment, this Court, in exercise of the
jurisdiction under Article 226, cannot interfere
unless the conclusion arrived at by the authority
that the explanation offered by the workman is
not justified or germane or no prudent person
would have come to such a conclusion. In
appropriate cases where the appeal or revision is
filed within a reasonable period of delay, it is
always open to the appellate or revisional
authority to condone the delay on valid
explanation putforth by the workman in not
approaching the authorities within the time
specified, in which event, the writ Court should
not interfere with the order. In our opinion, when
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W.P.No.8920 of 2015
Regulations provided a period of two months for
filing an appeal and six months for a revision,
delay of 5 to 18 years in approaching the
authority would certainly be fatal to the case of a
workman unless properly explained with cogent
reasons.
74. It is true mat in some cases where the delay
is five years or so the Supreme Court inclined to
condone the delay but under different
circumstances. When the fundamental rights are
violated or where the delay is not directly
attributable to the party seeking the relief or
where the rights of the third parties are not
intervened or in matters where seniority of
employees is not finalized, the Court, would be
justified to grant the relief; but not as a general
rule of practice. Therefore, in our considered
opinion, Kulwant Singh Gilll‘s case (supra), does
not confer or clothe an automatic right with the
employee to challenge the order of the authority
at any time or whenever he wishes. The
principles laid down by the Apex Court governing
the condonation of delay will certainly and
equally have application even in cases where
challenge is made to an order imposing the
punishment contrary to the Regulations or the
ratio in Kulwant Singh Gill‘s case (supra), where
the employee had slept over the matter and had
not chosen to challenge it within a reasonable
period of time. It may also be noticed that in
service matters, the Courts have applied the rule
of delay with greater rigor.
75. We, therefore, agree with the view taken by
the Division Bench in Sd. Esa Ali’s case (supra).
76. We answer the reference accordingly.
77. As already noted, in some cases, it was
urged that no orders are passed on the appeals
or revisions filed by the petitioners. In the light of
the conclusions drawn above, the writ appeal and
the respective writ petitions are to be disposed of
by the appropriate Benches. Registry may place
the matters before the appropriate Benches for
disposal in accordance with law and in the light of
the principles laid down in this judgment.”
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The delay of 5 to 18 years was held to be inordinate
delay in preferring a writ petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India. In the considered opinion of this Court,
on the issue of delay and laches, as has been considered by
the Full Bench, as there was certainly an inordinate delay of
17 years in approaching this Court, the order passed by the
learned Single Judge is hereby set aside.
Accordingly, the writ appeals are allowed.
This Bench in some of the cases has taken a contrary
view on the issue of delay and laches, but the fact remains
that the judgment of the Full Bench has been brought to our
notice for the first time today and therefore, the order has
been passed in the light of the judgment delivered by the Full
bench.”
05.1. In reply, learned counsel for the petitioner denied the
submissions advanced on behalf of the respondents and submitted
that the petitioner is a highly qualified academician, having obtained
M.A. (Telugu), M.Phil. and Ph.D. from Osmania University, and had
been rendering continuous teaching service much prior to her
appointment in the 3rd respondent-college. It is submitted that the
petitioner worked as a Part-Time Lecturer in R.B.V.R.R. Women’s
College, Narayanaguda, Hyderabad from 1985 to 1987, thereafter
served as a Lecturer under the University Grants Commission
Fellowship Scheme in University College for Women (Autonomous),
Koti, Hyderabad from 1987 to 1990, and again worked as a Lecturer in
R.B.V.R.R. Women’s College from 1991 till her appointment as Junior
Lecturer in the 3rd respondent-college in June, 1994. Therefore,
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according to the learned counsel, the petitioner had already rendered
more than five years of teaching service as on 25.11.1993.
05.2. It is further submitted that the respondents have
erroneously invoked the provisions of Act 2 of 1994 to deny the
petitioner’s claim. It is contended that the petitioner’s claim is not
founded upon an illegal appointment made after the enactment of Act
2 of 1994, but is based on the continuous teaching service rendered
by her from the year 1985 onwards and her appointment against a
clear aided vacancy in the 3rd respondent-college. Therefore, the
reliance placed by the respondents on Act 2 of 1994 is wholly
misconceived and cannot defeat the petitioner’s legitimate claim for
reckoning her service from the date of her initial appointment in June,
1994.
05.3. It is further submitted that the petitioner’s appointment in
June, 1994 was made against the leave vacancy of a permanent
Junior Lecturer, who subsequently retired on 28.02.1995, thereby
converting the vacancy into a clear and permanent aided vacancy.
The petitioner continued to discharge her duties uninterruptedly, and
therefore there was no justification for the respondents to regularize
her services only from 14.10.1996.
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05.4. It is further submit that the respondents have erroneously
sought to distinguish the petitioner’s case from that of the teaching
staff of Vijayanagar Junior College, Sri Srinivasa Junior College and
other similarly situated institutions. It is contended that several
lecturers, who were similarly placed, were granted the benefit of
regularization from the dates of their initial appointments pursuant to
the judgments of this Court and the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The
petitioner’s case stands on the same footing and, therefore, denial of
identical relief amounts to hostile discrimination and violates the
guarantees of equality under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of
India.
05.5. It is further submitted that the respondents are not justified
in contending that the petitioner does not satisfy the conditions
prescribed under G.O.Ms.No.328, dated 15.10.1997. It is submitted
that G.O.Ms.No.328 itself refers to G.O.Ms.No.362 and merely
prescribes revised guidelines. The contention that the petitioner is
ineligible under the said Government Orders is, therefore, factually
incorrect and legally unsustainable.
05.6. It is also submitted that the respondents have incorrectly
relied upon the petitioner’s selection through the Selection Committee
held on 05.10.1996 to deny the benefit of counting her previous
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W.P.No.8920 of 2015
service. It is contended that the issue of selection through a duly
constituted Selection Committee is entirely distinct from the issue of
reckoning the petitioner’s earlier continuous service rendered in the
aided vacancy. The subsequent selection and approval cannot
extinguish or nullify the petitioner’s entitlement to seek regularization
from the date of her initial appointment.
05.7. It is further contended that G.O.Ms.No.32, Higher
Education (IE-II) Department, dated 20.03.2006, cannot be treated as
a one-time or isolated concession. It is submitted that the said
Government Order was issued only in implementation of the
judgments rendered by this Court, which were ultimately affirmed by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Once the benefit flowing from the judicial
pronouncements has been extended to similarly situated employees,
the respondents cannot deny the same benefit to the petitioner by
describing the said Government Order as a “special case”. Such
differential treatment, according to the learned counsel, is arbitrary,
discriminatory and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of
India.
05.8. It is further submitted that the 3rd respondent-college is a
recognized linguistic minority educational institution governed by the
Minority Educational Institutions Rules, 1988. Under the constitutional
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W.P.No.8920 of 2015
protection guaranteed under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India,
minority educational institutions enjoy autonomy in matters relating to
the appointment of teaching and non-teaching staff, subject only to the
prescribed qualifications. It is, therefore, contended that the
restrictions sought to be imposed by the respondents by placing
reliance upon Act 2 of 1994 and the subsequent Government Orders
cannot override the constitutional protection available to minority
educational institutions.
05.9. In support of the above submission, learned counsel
placed reliance upon the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court
relating to the rights of minority educational institutions, including the
decision in the Sindhi Education Society case, wherein it was held that
the grant of financial aid does not authorize the Government to
interfere with the essential right of administration guaranteed to
minority institutions under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India, nor
can such aid be made a ground to dilute or impair their linguistic
minority character.
05.10. It is further submitted that the respondents themselves
had regularized the services of certain members of the teaching staff
working in the very same 3rd respondent-college, thereby
demonstrating that the Government had not consistently applied the
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W.P.No.8920 of 2015
stand now sought to be taken in the present case. The petitioner,
therefore, cannot be singled out and denied similar treatment.
05.11. It is further submitted that the consistent view taken by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court and this Court is that part-time lecturers
and similarly situated teachers, who have rendered continuous service
and whose appointments were subsequently regularized, are entitled
to have their earlier service appropriately reckoned for service benefits
wherever the facts so warrant. Therefore, the respondents are not
justified in refusing to count the petitioner’s service from June, 1994.
Hence, he prayed to allow the writ petition by directing the
respondents to regularize the petitioner’s services with effect from
June, 1994 instead of 14.10.1996, extend all consequential benefits
including seniority and pensionary benefits.
06. Having regard to the rival submissions advanced by the
learned counsel appearing on either side and upon careful perusal of
the material available on record, the principal contention of the
petitioner is that she was initially appointed as a Junior Lecturer in
Telugu in June, 1994 against an aided leave vacancy, which
subsequently became a clear substantive vacancy upon the retirement
of the permanent incumbent on 28.02.1995. It is her specific case
that, having continuously discharged her duties from the date of her
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initial appointment, she is entitled to regularization of her services with
effect from June, 1994. According to the petitioner, similarly situated
lecturers were extended the benefit of regularization from the date of
their initial appointments pursuant to judicial pronouncements, and
therefore, denial of identical relief to her is arbitrary, discriminatory and
violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. On the other hand,
the respondents contend that the petitioner’s initial engagement in
June, 1994 was merely as a Part-Time Junior Lecturer against a leave
vacancy and that such engagement was made without obtaining the
prior permission of the competent authority, as mandatorily required
under the statutory rules governing appointments in aided educational
institutions. It is further contended that, consequent upon the coming
into force of Act 2 of 1994, appointments on temporary, part-time or ad
hoc basis stood prohibited and, therefore, the petitioner did not acquire
any legal or enforceable right on the strength of such initial
engagement. According to the respondents, the petitioner was
appointed to a regular aided post only after a duly notified recruitment
process, pursuant to the public notification issued in June, 1996,
wherein she participated, was selected by the duly constituted
Selection Committee on 05.10.1996, and was appointed as Junior
Lecturer on 14.10.1996. The said appointment alone was approved
by the Board of Intermediate Education through proceedings dated
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21.12.1996. Accordingly, the respondents maintain that the
petitioner’s claim for regularization from June, 1994 is contrary to the
applicable statutory provisions and devoid of any legal merit.
07. As evident from the material available on record, it is not in
dispute that the petitioner’s appointment as a regular Junior Lecturer
was approved by the competent authority only through proceedings in
Rc.No.378/E1-2/96, dated 21.12.1996, with effect from 14.10.1996.
Significantly, the petitioner has not challenged the validity or
correctness of the said proceedings insofar as they accord approval
only from 14.10.1996. In the absence of any specific challenge to the
approval proceedings and without seeking to have the same set aside
or modified, no consequential direction can be issued by this Court
directing regularization of the petitioner’s services from an anterior
date. So long as the approval proceedings dated 21.12.1996 remain
operative and binding, the relief sought by the petitioner for
retrospective regularization from June, 1994 cannot be granted.
Consequently, the writ petition suffers from a fundamental legal
infirmity, rendering the relief claimed unsustainable.
08. Further, the material on record discloses that after the
approval of her appointment by the competent authority through
proceedings dated 21.12.1996, with effect from 14.10.1996, the
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petitioner accepted the said appointment without any protest or demur
and continued in service on the said basis. It was only in the year
2015, after nearly nineteen years, that she submitted a representation
seeking retrospective regularization of her services from June, 1994
and thereafter instituted the present writ petition. Thus, there is an
inordinate and unexplained delay of almost nineteen years in asserting
the alleged right. The petitioner has neither pleaded nor placed any
material on record to satisfactorily explain such extraordinary delay
and laches. It is a well-settled principle of law that a person who
sleeps over his or her alleged rights for an unreasonable length of time
cannot invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article
226 of the Constitution of India as a matter of course. In the absence
of any satisfactory explanation for the prolonged delay, the claim of the
petitioner is liable to be rejected on the ground of delay and laches
alone.
09. It is well settled that though no statutory period of limitation
is prescribed for invoking the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, the discretionary jurisdiction of this Court cannot
ordinarily be exercised in favour of a person who has slept over his or
her alleged rights for an inordinate period. The principles governing
delay and laches have repeatedly been reiterated by the Hon’ble
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W.P.No.8920 of 2015
Supreme Court as well as by this Court. The Hon’ble Full Bench of
this Court in P.V.Narayana‘s case cited supra, and the Hon’ble
Division Bench in W.A.Nos.1660 of 2018 and 593 of 2016 have
categorically held that stale service claims cannot ordinarily be
entertained after long and unexplained delay. Likewise, in A.R.
Vilasitha and Magi H. Desai cases cited supra, it has been held that
service benefits cannot be reopened after inordinate delay and that
writ jurisdiction is intended for vigilant litigants and not for those who
acquiesce for years. The ratio laid down in the aforesaid judgments
squarely applies to the facts of the present case.
10. Even otherwise, on a consideration of the matter on
merits, the material available on record does not support the
petitioner’s claim, as it is evident that the petitioner’s initial
engagement in June, 1994 was only as a Part-Time Junior Lecturer
against an aided leave vacancy. Such engagement was neither
preceded by a regular recruitment process nor made after obtaining
the prior approval of the competent authority, as required under the
governing statutory framework. The respondents have specifically
pleaded that appointments to aided Junior Colleges are regulated by
G.O.Ms.No.12, Education Department, dated 10.01.1992, and that
after the coming into force of Act 2 of 1994, read with G.O.Ms.No.275,
34 THE HON’BLE SMT. JUSTICE JUVVADI SRIDEVI
W.P.No.8920 of 2015
Education Department, dated 14.12.1995, appointments could be
made only in accordance with the prescribed statutory procedure. The
petitioner has not placed any material on record to establish that her
initial engagement in June, 1994 was made in conformity with the said
statutory provisions or that it was against a duly sanctioned post after
following the prescribed procedure. On the contrary, the record
reveals that the management, upon the availability of a regular aided
vacancy, issued a public notification in June, 1996, invited applications
from eligible candidates, conducted a regular selection through a duly
constituted Selection Committee, and appointed the petitioner as a
regular Junior Lecturer on 14.10.1996. It was only thereafter that the
competent authority approved her appointment through proceedings
dated 21.12.1996 with effect from 14.10.1996. Thus, the petitioner’s
entry into regular aided service can legally be traced only to
14.10.1996, and not to her earlier part-time engagement in a leave
vacancy. Consequently, the claim for regularization with retrospective
effect from June, 1994 is devoid of any statutory or legal foundation.
11. It is also well settled that the mere existence or
subsequent availability of a substantive vacancy does not, by itself,
validate an earlier irregular or unauthorized appointment, nor does it
confer upon the incumbent a vested or enforceable right to claim
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W.P.No.8920 of 2015
regularization from the date of such engagement. Regularization
cannot be claimed as a matter of right unless the initial appointment
itself was made in accordance with the applicable statutory provisions
and the prescribed recruitment procedure. An appointment made
against the statutory rules does not acquire legality merely because
the post subsequently becomes a clear or permanent vacancy.
Therefore, the petitioner’s contention that the leave vacancy against
which she was initially engaged became a substantive vacancy upon
the retirement of the permanent incumbent on 28.02.1995 does not
merit her case. In the absence of a valid appointment made in
accordance with law, the subsequent occurrence of a permanent
vacancy cannot relate back to validate the earlier engagement or
entitle the petitioner to seek retrospective regularization from June,
1994.
12. It is the case of the petitioner that the services of certain
Junior Lecturers working in other aided educational institutions were
regularized with effect from their initial dates of appointment pursuant
to judicial directions, and therefore, she is also entitled to similar
treatment. However, the respondents have specifically distinguished
those cases by demonstrating that the employees concerned had
entered service prior to the enforcement of Act 2 of 1994, were
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W.P.No.8920 of 2015
extended the benefit of Minimum Time Scale under G.O.Ms.No.362,
Education Department, and were thereafter regularized under
G.O.Ms.No.328. Their cases, therefore, stood on an altogether
different factual and legal footing. In contrast, the petitioner was
appointed as a regular Junior Lecturer only pursuant to an open
recruitment process conducted in accordance with the prescribed
procedure, culminating in her appointment on 14.10.1996, which was
subsequently approved by the competent authority. The petitioner has
not placed any material on record to demonstrate that the factual
matrix or the legal circumstances governing her appointment are
identical to those of the employees whose cases culminated in the
issuance of G.O.Ms.No.32, dated 20.03.2006. It is a settled principle
of constitutional law that the guarantee of equality under Article 14 of
the Constitution contemplates equal treatment only amongst persons
who are similarly situated in law and on facts. Where the factual
foundation or the governing legal framework is materially different, the
doctrine of equality cannot be invoked to claim parity. In the absence
of any cogent material establishing that her case is factually and
legally identical to those relied upon by her, the petitioner cannot claim
the benefit of the orders passed in favour of other employees as a
matter of right. Consequently, this Court is of the considered view that
the petitioner has failed to establish that she stands on the same
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W.P.No.8920 of 2015
footing as the beneficiaries of G.O.Ms.No.32, dated 20.03.2006, and
therefore, no claim of discrimination or hostile treatment can be
sustained.
13. In view of the foregoing discussion and the findings
recorded hereinabove, this Court is of the considered opinion that the
petitioner has failed to establish any legal or enforceable right to claim
retrospective regularization of her services with effect from June,
1994. On the contrary, the material available on record unequivocally
establishes that the petitioner was appointed to the regular aided post
only after undergoing the prescribed recruitment process, pursuant to
a public notification, selection by a duly constituted Selection
Committee, and approval of her appointment by the competent
authority through proceedings dated 21.12.1996 with effect from
14.10.1996. The petitioner has also failed to challenge the approval
proceedings limiting her appointment to 14.10.1996, and in the
absence of any such challenge, no consequential direction for
retrospective regularization can be granted. Further, the writ petition
suffers from gross, inordinate and unexplained delay and laches of
nearly nineteen years in asserting the alleged right, which, by itself,
constitutes a valid and sufficient ground to decline the discretionary
relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner has
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W.P.No.8920 of 2015
also failed to establish that her case is factually and legally
comparable to those of other lecturers who were extended the benefit
of retrospective regularization under different statutory and factual
circumstances. Consequently, this Court finds no arbitrariness,
illegality or infirmity in the action of the respondents warranting
interference in exercise of its extraordinary writ jurisdiction.
Accordingly, the Writ Petition is devoid of merit and is, therefore, liable
to be dismissed.
14. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is dismissed. There shall be
no order as to costs.
As a sequel, pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall
stand closed.
__________________
JUVVADI SRIDEVI, J
Date: 27-JUL-2026
KHRM
