Chattisgarh High Court
Smt. Basanti Bai Jain vs Central Bank Of India on 21 May, 2026
Author: Narendra Kumar Vyas
Bench: Narendra Kumar Vyas
Page 1 of 10
2026:CGHC:23425
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WPC No. 2651 of 2026
Smt. Basanti Bai Jain W/o Shri Shubash Chand Jain Aged About 65 Years
Navkar Parishar, Azad Ward No. 37 Ganjpara Chowk, Tahsil- Durg District-
Durg (C.G.), Chhattisgarh
... Petitioner(s)
versus
1 - Central Bank Of India Through Its Power Of Attorney Holder, Rajiv Singh,
Posted As Chief Manager, Central Bank Of India Branch Civil Lines Raipur
(C.G.)
2 - The Branch Manager Central Bank Of India, Radhika Nagar, District- Durg
Digitally
AKHILESH signed by
KUMAR AKHILESH
(C.G.)
3 - R.S. Enterprises Through Its Proprietor Subhash Chand Jain Navakar
DEWANGAN KUMAR
DEWANGAN
Parishar Ganjpura District- Durg (C.G.)
4 - Subhash Chand Jain S/o Shri Heeralal Jain Navakar Parishar Ganjpura
District- Durg (C.G.)
... Respondent(s)
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Gyan Prakash Shukla, Advocate.
For Respondent(s) : None.
Hon'ble Shri Justice Narendra Kumar Vyas
Order on Board
21/05/2026
1. The petitioner who is guarantor towards the loan obtained by borrower
i.e. respondent No. 4-Mr. Shubhas Chand Jain, has preferred the
present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for
assailing the notice dated 23.01.2026 issued by the
respondents/Central Bank of India under Rule 8(a) of Securitization
and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security
Interest Act, 2002 (for short "the SARFAESI Act") against the borrower
as well as the guarantor towards recovery of loan.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that as per Balance
Page 2 of 10
Confirmation communication (Annexure P/11) issued from the Central
Bank of India, Branch - Radhikanagar, the petitioner who is the
guarantor is liable for payment of guarantee dated 11.03.2015 to the
extend of Rs.13,30,000/-, whereas the Central Bank of India has
issued notice (Annexure P/11) by which it has exceeded its jurisdiction
under the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993, under Section
1(4) which explicitly mandates minimum pecuniary threshold of
Rs.20,00,000/-. Therefore, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction / authority to
entertain the dispute raised by the petitioner as it is below its
pecuniary limit.
3. He would further submit that the Central Bank of India has preferred
an application bearing O.A. No.684/2025 (Annexure P/9) against one
R.S. Enterprises (borrower), through its Proprietor, Subhash Chand
Jain and his wife, Basanti Bai Jain (guarantor), wherein it has
mentioned in para No.3 that the claim in respect of amount due from
the defendants exceeds Rs.20,00,000/-. However, it is submitted by
the petitioner that by the notice (Annexure P/11) issued on 12.09.2017
it is quite clear that the petitioner is a guarantor to the extend of
Rs.13,30,000/- and further after that, nothing has been placed on
record to demonstrate whether the guarantor period has been
extended or not.
4. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the
documents placed on record.
5. The point to be determined by this Court is:-
"Whether the instant writ petition is maintainable against the
impugned notice or not?
6. To ascertain the Point of determination, this Court has to examine the
Page 3 of 10
general scope and limits of the High Court‟s powers and discretion
under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution o India in relation to
proceedings arising out of the DRT and DRAT.
7. Hon‟ble Supreme Court in case of M.S. Sanjay Vs. Indian Bank
[2025 SCC OnLine SC 368] has summarized the governing principles
for the exercise of such jurisdiction and has held as under:-
""9. It is well settled that interference by the Writ Court for
mere infraction of any statutory provision or norms, if such in-
fraction has not resulted in injustice is not a matter of course.
In the case of Shiv Shanker Dal Mills v. State of Haryana,
(1980) 2 SCC 437, the dealers in that case had paid market
fees at the increased rate of 3%, which was raised from the
original 2 per cent under Haryana Act 22 of 1977. The excess
of 1 per cent over the original rate was declared ultra vires by
this Court in the case of Kewal Krishna Puri v. State of
Punjab, (1980) 1 SCC 416. The excess of 1 per cent over the
original rate having been declared ultra vires, became
refundable to the respective dealers from whom they were
2025 SCC OnLine SC 368 recovered by the Market
Committee concerned. The demand for refund of the excess
amounts illegally recovered from them not having been
complied with, the dealers filed Writ Petitions under Article 32
and Article 226 of the Constitution for a direction to that effect
to the Market Committee concerned. The Market Committees
contended that although the refund of the excess collections
might be legally due to the dealers, many of them had in turn
recovered this excess percentage from the next purchasers.
While disposing of the petition and laying down guidelines,
this Court held as under:
"Article 226 grants an extraordinary remedy, which is
essentially discretionary, although founded on legal injury.
It is perfectly open for the court, exercising this flexible
power, to pass such order as public interest dictates and
equity projects. Courts of equity may, and frequently do,
go much further both to give and withhold relief in
furtherance of the public interest than they are
accustomed to go where only private interests are
involved. Accordingly, the granting or withholding of relief
may properly be dependent upon considerations as of
public interest."
10. It has been rightly observed that legal formulations
cannot be enforced divorced from the realities of the fact
Page 4 of 10
situation of the case. While administering law it is to be
tempered with equity and if the equitable situation
demands after setting right the legal formulations not to
take it to the logical end, the High Court would be failing in
its duty if it does not notice equitable consideration and
mould the final order in exercise of its extraordinary
jurisdiction. Any other approach would render the High
Court a normal Court of Appeal, which it is not. It is a
settled principle of law that the remedy under Article 226
of the Constitution of India is discretionary in nature and in
a given case, even if some action or order challenged in
the petition is found to be illegal and invalid, the High
Court while exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction
thereunder can refuse to upset it with a view to doing
substantial justice between the parties." (Emphasis
supplied) "
8. Again a three-Judge Bench of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in case of
PHR Invent Educational Society v. UCO Bank (2024 SCC OnLine
SC 528] has emphatically reiterated that the High Courts should
ordinarily refrain from entertaining petitions arising from the
proceedings under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial
Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 and the
Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993, since both statutes
constitute self-contained codes providing efficacious alternative
remedies. The Apex Court clarified that the writ jurisdiction may be
invoked only in exceptional contingencies such as lack of jurisdiction,
violation of fundamental judicial procedure, reliance on repealed
provisions, or breach of natural justice. Hon'ble the Supreme Court
has held as under:-
""23. It could thus be seen that, this Court has clearly held that
the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under
Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available
to the aggrieved person. It has been held that this rule applies
with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess,
fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and
other financial institutions. The Court clearly observed that,
Page 5 of 10
while dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action
taken for recovery of the public dues, etc. the High Court must
keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and
State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are a code unto
themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive
procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage
constitution of quasi-judicial bodies for redressal of the
grievance of any aggrieved person. It has been held that,
though the powers of the High Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution are of widest amplitude, still the courts cannot be
oblivious of the rules of self-imposed restraint evolved by this
Court. The Court further held that though the rule of exhaustion
of alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of
compulsion, still it is difficult to fathom any reason why the High
Court should entertain a petition filed under Article 226 of the
Constitution.
24. The view taken by this Court has been followed in
Agarwal Tracom (P) Ltd. v. Punjab National Bank.
25. In State Bank of Travancore v. Mathew K.C., this Court
was considering an appeal against an interim order passed
by the High Court in a writ petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution staying further proceedings at the stage of
SARFAESI RDB Act Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act. After
considering various judgments rendered by this Court, the
Court observed thus : (SCC p. 94, para 16) "16. The writ
petition ought not to have been entertained and the interim
order granted for the mere asking without assigning special
reasons, and that too without even granting opportunity to the
appellant to contest the maintainability of the writ petition and
failure to notice the subsequent developments in the
interregnum. The opinion of the Division Bench that the
counter-affidavit having subsequently been filed,
stay/modification could be sought of the interim order cannot
be considered sufficient justification to have declined
interference."
26. The same position was again reiterated by this Court in
Phoenix ARC (P) Ltd. v. Vishwa Bharati Vidya Mandir.
27. Again, in Varimadugu Obi Reddy v. B. Sreenivasulu, after
referring to earlier judgments, this Court observed thus :
(SCC pp. 181-82, para 34) "34. The order of the Tribunal
dated 1-8-2019 was an appealable order under Section 18 of
the SARFAESI Act, 2002 and in the ordinary course of
business, the borrowers/person aggrieved was supposed to
avail the statutory remedy of appeal which the law provides
under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002. In the absence
Page 6 of 10
of efficacious alternative remedy being availed, there was no
reasonable justification tendered by the respondent borrowers
in approaching the High Court and filing writ application
assailing order of the Tribunal dated 1-8-2019 under its
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution without
exhausting the statutory right of appeal available at its
command."
28. It could thus be seen that this Court has strongly
deprecated the practice of entertaining writ petitions in such
matters.
29. Recently, in Celir LLP, after surveying various judgments
of this Court, the Court observed thus : (SCC p. 81, para 101)
"101. More than a decade back, this Court had expressed
serious concern despite its repeated pronouncements in
regard to the High Courts ignoring the availability of statutory
remedies under the RDBFI Act and the SARFAESI Act and
exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.
Even after the decision of this Court in Satyawati Tondon, it
appears that the High Courts have continued to exercise its
writ jurisdiction under Article 226 ignoring the statutory
remedies under the RDBFI Act and the SARFAESI Act."
30. It can thus be seen that it is more than a settled legal
position of law that in such matters, the High Court should not
entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution
particularly when an alternative statutory remedy is available.
***
37. It could thus clearly be seen that the Court has carved out
certain exceptions when a petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution could be entertained in spite of availability of an
alternative remedy. Some of them are thus:
(i) where the statutory authority has not acted in accordance
with the provisions of the enactment in question;
(ii) it has acted in defiance of the fundamental principles of
judicial procedure;
(iii) it has resorted to invoke the provisions which are
repealed; and
(iv) when an order has been passed in total violation of the
principles of natural justice.
38. It has however been clarified that the High Court will not
entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an
effective alternative remedy is available to the aggrieved
person or the statute under which the action complained of
has been taken itself contains a mechanism for redressal of
Page 7 of 10
grievance.
***
41. While dismissing the writ petition, we will have to remind
the High Courts of the following words of this Court in
Satyawati Tondon since we have come across various
matters wherein the High Courts have been entertaining
petitions arising out of the DRT Act and the SARFAESI Act in
spite of availability of an effective alternative remedy : (SCC
p. 128, para 55) “55. It is a matter of serious concern that
despite repeated pronouncement of this Court, the High
Courts continue to ignore the availability of statutory remedies
under the DRT Act and the SARFAESI Act and exercise
jurisdiction under Article 226 for passing orders which have
serious adverse impact on the right of banks and other
financial institutions to recover their dues. We hope and trust
that in future the High Courts will exercise their discretion in
such matters with greater caution, care and circumspection.”
42. In the result, we pass the following order:
(i) The appeal is allowed;
(ii) The impugned order dated 4-2-2022 passed by the High
Court in M.V. Ramana Rao v. UCO Bank [M.V. Ramana Rao
v. UCO Bank, 2022 SCC OnLine TS 3479] is quashed and
set aside; and
(iii) Writ Petition No. 5275 of 2021 is dismissed with costs
quantified at Rs 1,00,000 imposed upon the borrower.””
9. Hon‟ble the Supreme Court again in case of Celir LLP Vs. Bafna
Motors (Mumbai) (P) Ltd. has reiterated that the High Courts should
ordinarily refrain from exercising their writ jurisdiction where effective
and efficacious statutory remedies exist, particularly under specialized
legislations such as the SARFAESI Act and the RDB Act. Entertaining
writ petitions without exhaustion of such remedies not only frustrates
the legislative intent but also adversely impacts the recovery rights of
banks and financial institutions. Hon’ble the Supreme Court has held
as under:-
“97. This Court has time and again, reminded the High Courts
that they should not entertain petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved
person under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act. This Court in
Page 8 of 10United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon, (2010) 8 SCC 110
made the following observations: (SCC pp. 123 & 128, paras
43-45 & 55) “43. Unfortunately, the High Court [Satyawati
Tondon v. State of U.P., 2009 SCC OnLine All 2608] overlooked
the settled law that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a
petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective
remedy is available to the aggrieved person and that this rule
applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes,
cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks
and other financial institutions. In our view, while dealing with
the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery
of the public dues, etc. the High Court must keep in mind that
the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures
for recovery of such dues are a code unto themselves inasmuch
as they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery
of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi-judicial
bodies for redressal 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1209. of the
grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in all such cases,
the High Court must insist that before availing remedy under
Article 226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the
remedies available under the relevant statute.
44. While expressing the aforesaid view, we are conscious that
the powers conferred upon the High Court under Article 226 of
the Constitution to issue to any person or authority, including in
appropriate cases, any Government, directions, orders or writs
including the five prerogative writs for the enforcement of any of
the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose are very
wide and there is no express limitation on exercise of that power
but, at the same time, we cannot be oblivious of the rules of
self- imposed restraint evolved by this Court, which every High
Court is bound to keep in view while exercising power under
Article 226 of the Constitution.
45. It is true that the rule of exhaustion of alternative remedy is a
rule of discretion and not one of compulsion, but it is difficult to
fathom any reason why the High Court should entertain a
petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution and pass
interim order ignoring the fact that the petitioner can avail
effective alternative remedy by filing application, appeal,
revision, etc. and the particular legislation contains a detailed
mechanism for redressal of his grievance.
***
55. It is a matter of serious concern that despite repeated
pronouncement of this Court, the High Courts continue to ignore
the availability of statutory remedies under the DRT Act and the
SARFAESI Act and exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 for
Page 9 of 10passing orders which have serious adverse impact on the right
of banks and other financial institutions to recover their dues.
We hope and trust that in future the High Courts will exercise
their discretion in such matters with greater caution, care and
circumspection.”
100. In Varimadugu Obi Reddy v. B. Sreenivasulu, (2023) 2
SCC 168, it was held as under: (SCC p. 183, para 36) “36. In
the instant case, although the respondent borrowers initially
approached the Debts Recovery Tribunal by filing an application
under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, but the order of
the Tribunal indeed was appealable under Section 18 of the Act
subject to the compliance of condition of pre-deposit and without
exhausting the statutory remedy of appeal, the respondent
borrowers approached the High Court by filing the writ
application under Article 226 of the Constitution. We deprecate
such practice of entertaining the writ application by the High
Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution without exhausting the alternative statutory remedy
available under the law. This circuitous route appears to have
been adopted to avoid the condition of pre-deposit
contemplated under the second proviso to Section 18 of the
2002 Act.”
101. More than a decade back, this Court had expressed
serious concern despite its repeated pronouncements in regard
to the High Courts ignoring the availability of statutory remedies
under the RDBFI Act and the SARFAESI Act and exercise of
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Even after, the
decision of this Court in United Bank of India v. Satyawati
Tondon, (2010) 8 SCC 110, it appears that the High Courts have
continued to exercise its writ jurisdiction under Article 226
ignoring the statutory remedies under the RDBFI Act and the
SARFAESI Act.”
10. From perusal of record, it is quite vivid that respondent No.1 / Central
Bank of India has already preferred an original application bearing
O.A. No.684/2025 before the Tribunal, wherein the respondent Nos. 3
and 4 (borrower) and petitioner (guarantor) are parties and the
proceedings have already started and it is well-settled provision of law
that once the proceedings under the Debt Recovery Tribunal has
commenced, the writ petition under Article of 226 of the Constitution of
India cannot be entertained by the High Court in view of the alternative
Page 10 of 10
and efficacious remedy available to the petitioner as held by Hon’ble
the Supreme Court as aforestated.
11. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the law laid
down by Hon’ble the Supreme Court as aforestated and also the fact
that the petitioner has alternate and efficacious remedy, I am of the
view that the instant petition is not maintainable at this stage.
12. Accordingly, the present writ petition is dismissed as not
maintainable.
Sd/-
(Narendra Kumar Vyas)
Judge
Akhil
