Shri. B. Sreenivasa Gandhi vs Government Of India on 10 July, 2026

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    Telangana High Court

    Shri. B. Sreenivasa Gandhi vs Government Of India on 10 July, 2026

    Author: P.Sam Koshy

    Bench: P.Sam Koshy

    IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA
                    AT HYDERABAD
    
           THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE P.SAM KOSHY
                            AND
     THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE NARSING RAO NANDIKONDA
    
                          W.P.No.4497 of 2026
                                10.07.2026
    Between:
    Mr.B.Sreenivasa Gandhi and others.
                                                           ...Petitioners
                                   AND
    
    Government of India through Adjudicating
    Authority Prevention of Money Laundering Act
    Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, New Delhi and another.
    
                                                         ...Respondents
    ORDER:

    (per Hon’ble Sri Justice P.Sam Koshy)

    Heard Mr.Mir Mukarram Ali, learned counsel for the

    SPONSORED

    petitioners and Mr.Dominic Fernandes, learned Standing Counsel

    for Enforcement Directorate, for respondent No.2 and perused the

    record.

    2. The instant is the Writ Petition, which has been filed

    assailing the order passed by the Adjudicating Authority under the

    Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (for short

    “the PMLA Act“) in PAO No.30/2025, dated 06.08.2025,

    ECIR/HYZO/19/2019, decided on 23.01.2026 Vide the impugned
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    order, the Adjudicating Authority has confirmed the order of

    provisional attachment, dated 06.08.2025.

    3. Learned counsel for the petitioners referring to the

    provisions of Sections 26 and 35 of the PMLA Act submits that

    there are sufficient materials produced by the petitioners before

    the adjudicating authority, which has not been properly

    appreciated and considered in the course of passing the

    confirmation order under Section 8. The possibility of the remand

    is strongly made out, which power is not vested with the appellate

    Tribunal and therefore, he has preferred the instant writ petition.

    4. Learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon the decision

    of Karnataka High court, in support of his contention, in the case

    of Joint Director, Enforcement Directorate v. M/s.Devas

    Multimedia Pvt Ltd., in Miscellaneous Second Appeal No.24 of

    2020 decided on 25.09.2025, wherein, there is an observation

    made by the learned Division Bench of Karnataka High Court

    holding that in the absence of specific power of remand, the

    Tribunal could not have remanded the matter to the adjudicating

    authority. Learned counsel for the petitioners also relied upon the
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    decision of Madras High Court in the case of Dr.V.M.Ganesan v.

    the Joint Director, Directorate of Enforcement, (Prevention of

    Money Laundering Act &FEMA), Government of India,

    Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, Chennai and

    connected matters 1 indicating the same principle in the course of

    his argument.

    5. Per contra, the learned Standing Counsel for the

    Enforcement Directorate, appearing for respondent No.2,

    opposing the petition submits that the petitioners,

    at the first instance, has not enclosed the judgment rendered by

    this Court in WP.No.40454 of 2025, dated 08.01.2026, in respect

    of the petitioners, wherein, the petitioners had challenged the

    show-cause notice issued by the adjudicating authority under

    Section 8 of PMLA Act. In the said petition itself, this Court had

    infact emphatically held that since statutory remedy available with

    the petitioners, the petitioners should avail the same, rather than,

    invoking the powers of this Court under Article 226 of the

    Constitution of India. Learned Standing counsel for the

    1
    2014 SCC OnLine Mad 10702
    4

    Department has also referred to the recent decision of the

    Supreme Court in the case of Crl.A.No.4183-4184/2025,

    dated 07.10.2025, in the case of JSW Steel Limited ETC., v.

    Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement, wherein also, the

    Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the PMLA provides a

    comprehensive and self contained adjudicating mechanism, the

    appellants are required to undertake the said mechanism before

    approaching the writ Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.

    In addition, the judgment of Kerala High Court in Saidalvi Alias

    Bava v. Union of India, rep.by Secretary, Ministry of Finance,

    North Block New Delhi and others 2 was relied upon to further

    strengthen his argument on the aspect of there being adjudicating

    mechanisms available to the petitioners in the present writ

    petition. From the perusal of provisions of law that which is

    reflected under Section 35 of the PMLA Act which lays down the

    procedure and powers of the Appellate Tribunal, which for ready

    reference reproduced hereunder:

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    WP (Crl) No.1189 of 20205,dated 17.09.2025
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    Section 35: Procedure and powers of Appellate Tribunal:

    (1) The Appellate Tribunal shall not be bound by the procedure laid
    down by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), but shall be
    guided by the principles of natural justice and, subject to the other
    provisions of this Act, the Appellate Tribunal shall have powers to
    regulate its own procedure.

    (2) The Appellate Tribunal shall have, for the purposes of
    discharging its functions under this Act, the same powers as are
    vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of
    1908) while trying a suit, in respect of the following matters,
    namely:–

    (a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and
    examining him on oath;

    (b) requiring the discovery and production of documents;

    (c) receiving evidence on affidavits;

    (d) subject to the provisions of sections 123 and 124 of the Indian
    Evidence Act, 1872, (1 of 1872), requisitioning any public record or
    document or copy of such record or document from any office;

    (e) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses or
    documents;

    (f) reviewing its decisions;

    (g) dismissing a representation for default or deciding it ex parte;

    (h) setting aside any order of dismissal of any representation for default
    or any order passed by it ex parte; and

    (i) any other matter, which may be, prescribed by the Central
    Government.

    (3) An order made by the Appellate Tribunal under this Act shall be
    executable by the Appellate Tribunal as a decree of civil court and,
    for this purpose, the Appellate Tribunal shall have all the powers of a
    civil court.

    (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (3), the
    Appellate Tribunal may transmit any order made by it to a civil court
    having local jurisdiction and such civil court shall execute the order
    as if it were a decree made by that court.

    (5) All proceedings before the Appellate Tribunal shall be deemed to
    be judicial proceedings within the meaning of sections 193 and 228
    of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860) and the Appellate
    Tribunal shall be deemed to be a civil court for the purposes of
    sections 345 and 346 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of
    1974).

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    6. A perusal of the aforesaid provision would by itself

    establishes that the framers of law had taken this aspect into

    consideration and given wide powers on the appellate authority to

    decide own orders under challenge before the Tribunal under

    Section 26 of PMLA Act. Only because, there is no reference of

    the power of remand under the statute that itself would not be a

    strong ground for reaching to the conclusion that the appellate

    Tribunal does not have sufficient powers to adjudicate upon the

    authority to test the veracity of the order passed by the

    adjudicating authority, particularly, in the teeth of powers that are

    vested and enumerated under Section sub-Section (2) of Section

    35 of PMLA Act.

    7. For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the considered opinion

    that the writ petition in the given factual matrix, at this juncture,

    would not be maintainable on the ground of there being an

    alternative statutory remedy available to the petitioners.

    8. Reserving right of the petitioners to avail the remedy,

    in accordance with law, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. There

    shall be no order as to costs.

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    Miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall stand
    closed.

    _____________________
    P.SAM KOSHY, J

    _________________________________
    NARSING RAO NANDIKONDA, J
    10.07.2026
    Nvl



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