Delhi High Court
Shalimar Paints Ltd & Anr vs M/S Phelps And Company Pvt Ltd on 6 July, 2026
Author: Amit Sharma
Bench: Amit Sharma
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* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Reserved on: 7th May, 2026
Pronounced on: 6th July, 2026
+ RC.REV. 76/2026 & CM APPL. 16941/2026
SHALIMAR PAINTS LTD & ANR. .....Petitioners
Through: Mr. Rajesh Yadav, Senior
Advocate with Mr. Mahir
Malhotra, Ms. Prerna Chaubey,
Ms. Nagma Khan and Ms. Nitya
Vig, Advocates.
versus
M/S PHELPS AND COMPANY PVT LTD .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Pawan S.B., Senior Advocate
with Ms. Pavitra Kaur and Ms.
Shreya Mishra, Advocates.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AMIT SHARMA
JUDGMENT
AMIT SHARMA, J.
1. The present petition under Section 25B(8) of the Delhi Rent
Control Act, 19581, seeks the following prayers: –
“A. Call for records in the Eviction Petition bearing No.
RC/ARC/18/2024 titled as M/s Phelps and Company Pvt. Ltd vs
M/S Shalimar Paints Ltd & Anr.
B. Set aside the impugned order dated 06.11.2025 passed by the
Court of Sh. Ashwani Panwar, Ld. Senior Civil Judge cum Rent1
DRC ActSignature Not Verified
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Controller, New Delhi District, Patiala House Courts and
consequently allow the application of Leave to Defend of the
Petitioners.
C. AND/OR pass any other order/directions in the present facts and
circumstances of the case that the Hon’ble Court may deem fit in
favour of the Petitioner.”
2. The present petition has been preferred on behalf of the Petitioners
(tenant), assailing the judgment dated 06.11.20252 passed by the learned
ACJM-04, RACC, New Delhi District, Rouse Avenue Courts, New
Delhi3, in RC ARC No. 18/20244, whereby an eviction order was passed
against the present Petitioners qua the tenanted premises being property
No. 9-A, First Floor, Inner Circle, Connaught Place, New Delhi-
110001 5 , forming part of property No. 9A, Connaught Place, Delhi-
1100016.
3. The Respondent (landlord) had preferred the eviction petition
before the learned ARC qua the tenanted premises, on the ground of
bona fide requirement under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act. It was
stated in the eviction petition that the Respondent is a family run private
company and the tenanted premises were required for expansion of its
new art business wing, operating under the trademark “The Biv”. It was
stated that the said art business wing dealt with curating, managing and
running art galleries for exhibition of art and further dealt in paintings,
art products, artifacts and decorative arts. It was further stated that Ms.
2
Impugned Judgment
3
Learned ARC
4
Eviction Petition/Eviction Proceedings
5
Tenanted Premises
6
Subject Premises
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Niamat Singh and Mr. Fateh Singh, being directors of the Respondent
company, possessed necessary qualifications to expand the said art
business wing. It was further stated that due to expansion of the said art
business wing, the tenanted premises were required for display of
paintings, meetings with buyers and artists, storage, and allied business
activities. It was further stated that one of the directors of the Respondent
company operated from a single-room office adjacent to the tenanted
premises and considering the common wall between the said office and
the tenanted premises, the Respondent intended to remove the said wall,
so as to create a larger display and storage area along with smaller
cabins, and thereafter, shift the director’s office towards the rear portion
of the premises. It was stated that a proposed site plan qua the said
arrangement was also filed along with the eviction petition.
4. It was further stated in the eviction petition that the Respondent
had been conducting exhibitions qua the said art business wing, from the
third floor and terrace of the subject premises; however, the same had
resulted in disruption and financial losses to the co-working business
operating therefrom. It was stated that due to lack of adequate space for
display, meetings, storage and business operations, the Respondent
required a permanent commercial space for expansion of the said art
business wing. Qua suitability of the tenanted premises, it was stated that
the same had access from Connaught Place’s inner circle, which enjoys
higher commercial visibility and footfall, whereas the third floor and the
terrace of the subject premises were accessible only from Connaught
Place’s middle circle. It was further stated that Petitioner No. 1 had
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ceased its business operations from the tenanted premises and had,
without consent of the Respondent, sub-let and parted possession of the
same in favour of Petitioner No. 2.
5. The Petitioners, in their leave to defend application filed in the
eviction proceedings, had contended that the Respondent had concealed
material facts qua availability of alternate accommodation available with
it, and had approached the learned ARC with mala fide intentions. It was
contended that the Respondent had itself admitted in the eviction petition
that the said art business wing was already being operated from the third
floor of the subject premises and as per the official website of the said
venture, substantial commercial space comprising of reception area,
library, camper area (workspace), tent area (cabin space) and board room
was already available with the Respondent, which was sufficient for
conducting the said business and organising exhibitions. It was further
contended that the Respondent had intentionally not disclosed the exact
area available with it in the subject premises, details of the other tenants
occupying the building and the total commercial space already under its
possession. The Petitioners had further alleged that the actual intention
of the Respondent was to evict the Petitioners from the tenanted
premises and thereafter re-let the same at a higher rent.
6. The Respondent, in its reply to the leave to defend application,
had denied the aforesaid averments and had stated that no alternate
commercial accommodation was available with it in Delhi NCR. It was
further stated that the ground floor of the subject premises was occupied
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by ICICI Bank, whereas on the first floor only one room was in
occupation of one of the directors of the Respondent company and the
remaining portion was occupied by Petitioner No. 2. It was further stated
that the first floor of the subject premises was the only portion accessible
from Connaught Place’s inner circle and the third floor and the terrace of
the subject premises were accessible only from the middle circle. It was
further stated that the said upper floors were already being utilised for
co-working operations, and therefore, the same were not suitable for the
bona fide requirement. The said leave to defend application was
dismissed by the learned ARC and the impugned judgment came to be
passed against the petitioners; hence, the present petition.
SUBMISSIONS OF BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS:
7. At the outset, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the
Petitioners submitted that the learned ARC had failed to appreciate the
triable issues raised by the Petitioners in the leave to defend application.
It was submitted that the learned ARC had failed to appreciate that the
Respondent was already in possession of approximately 7,500 sq. fts. of
commercial space, across the two floors of the subject premises, and the
said fact had been specifically pleaded by the Petitioners in their leave to
defend application. It was further submitted that as per the official
website of the Respondent’s art business venture, the Respondent was
already operating from a substantial commercial space comprising of
reception area, library, camper area (workspace), tent area (cabin space),
board room and terrace garden, which clearly reflected that alternate
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suitable accommodation was already available with the Respondent for
the alleged bona fide requirement.
8. Attention of this Court was drawn to the following paragraph of
the leave to defend application, filed by Petitioners to contend that the
challans, as filed by the Respondent in the eviction petition, were forged
and fabricated, and the said contention was not dealt by the learned ARC
while rendering the impugned judgment: –
“15. That it is submitted that the Petitioner has filed certain
Challans from Pages 30 to 33 of the Petition. A bare perusal of the
same would suggest that the said Challans appear to be bogus and
fabricated, as can be clearly seen from the Serial Number and Dates
mentioned on them. For instance, Challan No. 219 Is dated
12.01.2023 whereas Challan No. 216 is dated 17.01.2023.”
It was submitted that the learned ARC had failed to consider that
the said challans were forged and fabricated, as the serial numbers and
dates mentioned on them were inconsistent. It was submitted that challan
No. 219 was dated 12.01.2023, whereas challan No. 216 was dated
17.01.2023, and thus, the challans did not mention any payment mode or
GST details or mode of payment. The said challans are reproduced as
under: –
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9. Learned Senior Counsel further drew attention of this Court to the
reply filed on behalf of the Respondent to the leave to defend
application, and particularly on the following portion, to contend that theSignature Not Verified
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Respondent had failed to rebut to the said allegation of the challans
being forged and fabricated: –
“15. That the contents of paragraph no. 15 are false and hence denied.
It is denied the said Challans are bogus or fabricated. The respondents
have failed to peruse the said challans carefully. A bare perusal would
reveal that the challan numbers are in fact irrelevant as the challan is a
continuous document with articles added on two dates i.e 12.01.2023 and
17.01.2023. The three pages are one continuous invoice of 26 articles.”
It was further submitted that no findings were given by the learned
ARC qua the said contention of the challans being forged and fabricated.
10. Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioners further drew attention
of this Court to the following portion of the leave to defend application
to contend that the Respondent had admitted in the eviction petition that
the said art business wing was already being operated from the third
floor of the subject premises. It was further submitted that as per the
official website of the Respondent’s said venture, namely “The Biv”, the
Respondent was operating from a substantial commercial space on the
third floor of the subject premises, which had ample area for conducting
the said business activities. The relevant portion of the leave to defend
application is reproduced as under: –
“8. That the Petitioner has filed the Eviction Petition with the
malafide Intention to harass the Respondents. The need of the
Petitioner is not bonafide as sufficient alternative accommodation is
available with the Petitioner for running its alleged “new stream of
operations”. The Petitioner has admitted in Para 18(a)(v) of the
Petition that the Petitioner is conducting the said business from the
Third Floor of Building No. 9-A, Connaught Place, New Delhi
110001. As per the Website of the new venture namely “The Biv” –
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thebiv.co.in, the Petitioner is operating in a huge space on the Third
Floor of Building No. 9-A, Connaught Place – which includes a
Reception Area, a Library, a “Camper” area (Work Space), a “Tent
area” (Cabin Space), a Board Room, which is more than sufficient
for the Petitioner to expand its business and conduct the Art
Exhibitions.”
11. Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioners submitted that in view
of the above, the alleged bona fide requirement set up by the Respondent
was merely a sham and the Respondent already had sufficient alternate
accommodation available with it for carrying out the said business
activities. Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner further drew
attention of this Court to the screenshots placed on record of the website
of the Respondent’s venture, i.e., “The Biv”, to demonstrate the
Respondent is in possession of a full-fledged office space, which is being
offered to general public for using the same for their office purposes.
The same has been depicted in the following manner: –
” THE SPACE
We have a solid 7,500 sq ft space spread across two floors that you
can call your office. This includes a great terrace garden that looks
straight on to an unfurling Indian flag dramatically set against an
open sky.”
12. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that there was no denial
of the fact by the Respondent that the latter was not in possession of
7,500 sq. fts. of space in the subject premises. It was further argued by
the learned Senior Counsel that the Respondent had taken contrary
stands qua bona fide requirement of the tenanted premises, as the latter
in the eviction petition had claimed that the tenanted premises were
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required for expansion of its art business wing, and the Respondent in its
reply to the leave to defend application had stated that the tenanted
premises were required for making additional space for other directors of
the Respondent company. The relevant portions of the eviction petition
and the reply to the leave to defend application are reproduced as under:
–
“Eviction Petition:
vi. That since the Petitioner’s business is expanding need for a
permanent physical space becomes indispensable. Dealing in paintings,
art products, artifacts, sculptures, and decorative arts, which are best
appreciated in person, necessitates a dedicated area for display.
Additionally, the Petitioner requires offices for meetings with buyers,
artists, and vendors, along with adequate storage space for these goods.
Reply to Leave to Defend:
12. That the contents of paragraph no, 12 are false and hence denied.
It is denied the Respondent No. 1 has not parted/sublet or assigned the
possession of the subject premises to the Respondent No. 2. The
Respondent No. 2 has duly reflected the subject premises as its registered
office on the website of the Ministry of the Corporate Affairs and
accordingly the Respondent are hereby falsely deposing that the
Respondent No. 2 is not in possession of the subject premises. It is
denied that the present petition is premises on false or flimsy grounds or
the petition is without merit. The subject premises are bonafide required
by the Petitioner for resolution of its need for the offices for the other
two directors as well as the display rooms for its art business wing,
accordingly the need of the subject premises is eminent, urgent and
bonafide.”
13. Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioners further submitted that
the Respondent, in the eviction petition, had stated that it was the owner
of the second and third floors of the subject premises; however, in its
reply to the leave to defend application, the Respondent had stated that
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the reference to the said second and third floors would actually mean the
third floor and the terrace of the subject premises. It was submitted that
the said inconsistent stand itself reflected that the Respondent was
uncertain and unclear qua the exact portions/floors available in the
subject premises. The relevant portions of the eviction petition and the
reply to the leave to defend application are reproduced as under: –
“Eviction Petition:
xi. That the Petitioner also owns the Second Floor and the Third
Floor, 9-A, Phelps Building, Connaught Place, New Delhi. However, the
entrances to these premises are from the middle circle, contrasting with
the said premises which benefits from an entrance in the inner circle. The
inner circle enjoys significantly higher foot traffic compared to the
middle circle, which is more suited for businesses not reliant on client
engagement. There are no other commercial premises owned by the
Petitioner. It is well settled law that a landlord is the best judge of his
needs and requirements and the Petitioner requires the premises in
question for its personal and bonafide use.
Reply to Leave to Defend:
17. That the contents of paragraph no. 17 are false and hence denied.
It is submitted that the reference to second floor and third floor in
paragraph 18 (a) (xi) is actually the third floor and terrace of the said
building and the same is in occupation of the co-working business. The
Floor above the subject premises and below the coworking space was
sold on 23.12.1993, 18.04.2000 and on 14.02.2017. The said floor is the
earliest floor which is accessible from the Middle Circle and the same is
not in possession of the Petitioner. It is further submitted that as has been
stated hereinabove the third floor and terrace of the said building is in
use and occupation by the co-working space business of the Petitioner.
The said business is generating goad revenue and occupies the entire
third floor as well as the terrace leaving no space for the office of the
directors or the display area for art business. In regard to the formation of
the middle circle and other businesses in the middle circle, it is submitted
that the Petitioner has no space to use even in the middle circle and the
law as has been laid down is clear on the fact that the Petitioner is the
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best and only judge of its needs and the tenant cannot be permitted to
dictate the terms.”
14. It was argued by the learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioners
that the Respondent had failed to place anything on record to show how
second and third floors of the subject premises were not being used by
the Respondent for the purposes of art business wing.
15. Learned Senior Counsel further argued that no material
whatsoever had been placed on record by the Respondent to demonstrate
that any exhibition, as stated in the eviction petition, had ever been
conducted from the subject premises. It was submitted that apart from
making bald averments qua the art business activities, no document had
been filed by the Respondent to substantiate the same and the entire plea
of bona fide requirement was merely a false narrative projected before
the learned ARC.
16. Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioners had placed reliance
upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Santosh
Devi Soni Vs. Chand Kiran7, to contend that where a landlord seeks
eviction for additional accommodation, and the tenant raises a dispute
qua availability of accommodation already in possession of the landlord,
the same would give rise to a triable issue. The relevant portion of the
said judgment is reproduced as under: –
“3 . The short question is whether in the light of the requirements put
forward by the Respondent-landlady who is a widow and is in
7
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occupation of the first floor of the building in which the suit premises are
situated leave to defend to the Defendant- Appellant could have been
refused. As this is a case for additional accommodation and looking to
the facts and circumstances of the case, especially in the light of the
additional accommodation which is subsequently made available to the
Respondent as mentioned by the Appellant, the question of Respondent’s
need was required to be thrashed out on merits by a full-fledged trial.
This Court in the case of Dr. S.M. Misra v. D.D. Malik Civil Appeal No.
120 of 1990, decided on 11.1.1990 has ruled that in the cases where
additional accommodation is asked for in proceedings under Delhi Rent
Control Act, normally leave to defend should not be refused.
4 . Considering the facts and circumstances of this case, therefore, we
deem it fit to grant leave to defend to the Appellant and consequently the
judgment and order passed by the Rent Controller and as confirmed by
the High Court are set aside and the proceedings are remanded to the
Rent Controller’s Court for deciding the proceedings on merits by
treating the Appellant to have been granted leave to defend. In view of
the pendency of the proceedings since years we direct the Rent
Controller to decide the remanded proceedings at the earliest and
preferably within four months from the receipt of a copy of this order at
his end.”
17. Learned Senior Counsel had further placed reliance upon the
judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Charan
Dass Duggal Vs. Brahma Nand 8 , to contend that at the stage of
deciding an application for leave to defend, the learned ARC shall only
examine whether the tenant has prima facie raised a triable issue or not.
The relevant portion of the said judgment is reproduced as under: –
“4. What should be the approach when leave to defend is sought? There
appears to be a mistaken belief that unless the tenant at that stage makes
out such a strong case as would non-suit the landlord leave to defend
cannot be granted. This approach is wholly improper, When leave to
defend is sought. The tenant must make out such a prima facie case8
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raising such pleas that a triable issue would emerge ant that in our
opinion should be sufficient to grant leave. The test is the test of triable
issue would emerge and that in our opinion should be sufficient to grant
leave. The test is the test of a triable issue and not the final success in the
action. At the State of granting the leave parties rely in support of their
rival contentions on affidavits and assertions and counter-assertions on
affidavits may not afford such incontrovertible evidence to lead to an
affirmative conclusion one may or the other. Conceding that when
possession is sought on the ground of personal requirement, an absolute
need is not to be satisfied but a mere desire equally is not sufficient. It
has to be something more than a mere desire. And being an enabling
provision, the burden is on the landlord to establish his case
affirmatively.
*** *** ***
8 . It is not for a moment suggested that leave to defend must be granted
on mere asking but it is equally improper to refuse to grant leave though
triable evidence for concluding the point one way or the other. It is not
for a moment suggested that leave to defend to grant leave though triable
issues are raised and the controversy can be properly adjudicated after
ascertainment of truth through cross-examination of witnesses who have
filed their affidavits. Burden is on the landlord to prove his requirement
and has ascertain is required to be tested more so when it is shown that
for long he is staying outside Delhi, that he has a building albeit standing
in the names of his sons and daughters where he is staying and at which
place he receives his normal correspondence. If in a such a situation one
can say that a triable issue is not raised, one is at a loss to find out where,
when and in what circumstances such an issue would arise. We are,
therefore, satisfied that this is a case in which triable issues were raised
and both the learned Rent Controller and the High Court were in error in
refusing to grant the leave.”
18. Attention of this Court was further drawn to the judgment passed
by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Inderjeet Kaur vs. Nirpal Singh9,
and it was submitted that burden placed on a tenant is of a light nature
and the latter is only required to show such facts as would disentitle the
9
2000 INSC 605
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landlord from obtaining an order of eviction. The relevant portions of the
said judgment are reproduced as under: –
“11. As is evident from Section 25B(4) & (5) of the Act, burden placed
on a tenant is light and limited in that if the affidavit filed by him
discloses such facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an
order for the recovery of the possession of the premises on the ground
specified in Clause (e) of the proviso to Section 14(1) of the Act, with
which we are concerned in this case, are good enough to grant leave to
defend.
*** *** ***
13. We are of the considered view that at a stage when the tenant seeks
leave to defend, it is enough if he prima facie makes out a case by
disclosing such facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an
order of eviction. It would not be right approach to say that unless the
tenant at that stage itself establishes a strong case as would non-suit the
landlord leave to defend should not be granted when it is not the
requirement of Section 25B(5). A leave to defend sought for cannot also
be granted for mere asking or in a routine manner which will defeat the
very object of the special provisions contained in Chapter IIIA of the
Act, Leave to defend cannot be refused where an eviction petition is filed
on a mere design or desire of a landlord to recover possession of the
premises from a tenant under Clause (e) of the proviso to Sub-section (1)
of Section 14, when as a matter of fact the requirement may not be bona
fide. Refusing to grant leave in such a case leads to eviction of a tenant
summarily resulting in great hardship to him and his family members, if
any, although he could establish if only leave is granted that a landlord
would be disentitled for an order of eviction. At the stage of granting
leave to defend, parties rely on affidavits in support of the rival
contentions. Assertions and counter-assertions made in affidavits may
not afford safe and acceptable evidence so as to arrive at an affirmative
conclusion one way or the other unless there is a strong and acceptable
evidence available to show that the facts disclosed in the application filed
by the tenant seeking leave to defend were either frivolous, untenable or
most unreasonable. Take a case when a possession is sought on the
ground of personal requirement, a landlord has to establish his need and
not his mere desire. The ground under Clause (e) of the proviso to Sub-
section (1) of Section 14 enables a landlord to recover possession of theSignature Not Verified
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tenanted premises on the ground of his bona fide requirement. This being
an enabling provision, essentially the burden is on the landlord to
establish his case affirmatively. In short and substance wholly frivolous
and totally untenable defence may not entitle a tenant to leave to defend
but when a triable issue is raised a duty is placed on the Rent Controller
by the statute itself to grant leave. At the stage of granting leave the real
test should be whether facts disclosed in the affidavit filed seeking leave
to defend prima facie show that the landlord would be disentitled from
obtaining an order of eviction and not whether at the end defence may
fail. It is well to remember that when a leave to defend is refused, serious
consequences of eviction shall follow and the party seeking leave is
denied an opportunity to test the truth of the averments made in the
eviction petition by crossexamination. It may also be noted that even in
cases where leave is granted provisions are made in this very Chapter for
expeditious disposal of eviction petitions. Section 25B(6) states that
where leave is granted to a tenant to contest the eviction application, the
Controller shall commence the hearing of the application as early as
practicable. Section 25B(7) speaks of the procedure to be followed in
such cases. Section 25B(8) bars the appeals against an order of recovery
of possession except a provision of revision to the High Court. Thus a
combined effect of Section 25B(6), (7) and (8) would lead to expeditious
disposal of eviction petitions so that a landlord need not wait and suffer
for long time. On the other hand, when a tenant is denied leave to defend
although he had fair chance to prove his defence, will suffer great
hardship. In this view a balanced view is to be taken having regard to
competing claims.”
19. Learned Senior Counsel further placed reliance upon the judgment
passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in Khem Chand and
Ors. Vs. Arjun Jain and Ors 10 , and particularly on the following
paragraphs: –
“39. It is not the thumb rule that in every case the landlord always is the
best judge and the court is helpless by not scrutinizing the stand of the
tenant while testing the reasonableness and suitability of the alternative
accommodation. Actually it depends upon the case to case basis. The
courts have otherwise also held consistently that even though the
10
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landlord is the best judge to decide his needs and he cannot be compelled
by the tenant to accommodate at the place which is lesser in any way
than the place which is sought to be evicted, still the court would
examine the reasonableness and suitability of the existing
accommodation by weighing what is available with the landlord vis-Ã –
vis the plea of the tenant.
*** *** ***
41. The Supreme Court in the case of MM. Quasim Vs. Manohar Lal,
MANU/SC/0473/1981 : AIR 1981 SC 1113 which is a three bench
decision passed by the court speaking through Hon’ble Desai, J. (as His
Lordship then was) has categorically flawed this approach of
mechanically stating that the landlord is the best judge without applying
a judicious approach in the matter. In the words of Hon’ble Desai, J. it
was observed thus:
Before turning to the next topic, a word about the judicial approach
to the question of personal requirement of the landlord under the
Rent Act would not be out of place. The learned judge of the first
appellate court while upholding the claim of personal requirement
of respondent 1 has observed as under:
It is for the plaintiffs to decide whatever they think fit and
proper. It is not for the defendant to suggest as to what they
should do. The defendant has led evidence to show that the
plaintiffs have got some more houses at Girdih…. The
defendant appellant has also filed certified copy of judgment
of one suit No. 47/73 which is Ext. only to show that plaintiffs
have got a decree for eviction with respect to the other house
at Giridih. I have already pointed out earlier that it is for the
plaintiffs to decide which of the houses is suitable for them. It
is not for the defendant to suggest that the house which will
fall vacant in the near future is most suitable house for the
plaintiffs.
This approach betrays a woeful lack of consciousness relatable to
circumstances leading to enactment of Rent Acts in almost all
States in the country. The time honoured notion that the right of re-
entry is unfettered and that the owner landlord is the sole judge of
his requirement has been made to yield to the needs of the societySignature Not Verified
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which had to enact the Rent Acts specifically devised to curb and
fetter the unrestricted right of re-entry and to provide that only on
proving some enabling grounds set out in the Rent Act the landlord
can re-enter. One such ground is of personal requirement of
landlord. When examining a case of personal requirement, if it is
pointed out that there is some vacant premises with the landlord
which he can conveniently occupy, the element of need in his
requirement would be absent. To reject this aspect by saying that
the landlord has an unfettered right to choose the premises is to
negative the very raison d’etre of the Rent Act. Undoubtedly, if it is
shown by the tenant that the landlord has some other vacant
premises in his possession, that by itself may not be sufficient to
negative the landlord’s claim but in such a situation the Court
would expect the landlord to establish that the premises which is
vacant is not suitable for the purpose of his occupation or for the
purpose for which he requires the premises in respect of which the
action is commenced in the Court. It would, however, be a bald
statement unsupported by the Rent Act to say that the landlord has
an unfettered right to choose whatever premises he wants and that
too irrespective of the fact that he has some vacant premises in
possession which he would not occupy and try to seek to remove
the tenant. This approach would put a premium on the landlord’s
greed to throw out tenants paying lower rent in the name of
personal occupation and rent out the premises in his possession at
the market rate. To curb this very tendency the Rent Act was
enacted and, therefore, it becomes the duty of the Court
administering the Rent Act to bear in mind the object and
intendment of the legislature in enacting the same. The Court must
understand and appreciate the relationship between legal rules and
one of necessities of life-shelter-and the way in which one part of
the society exacts tribute from another for permission to inhabit a
portion of the globe. In ‘The Sociology of Law’, edited by Pat
Carlen, the author examines the rent and rent legislation in England
and Wales and observes as under: “The prevailing paradigms of
neo-classical economics and empiricist political theory have
determined the conceptual insularity of law and legal institutions,
with the result that they and other social events appear as random
existences independent of their historical formation. The force of
any theory of law must of course lie in its explanatory power, and
this in turn depends on the wider image of social relations which
produces it.
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(Emphasis Supplied)
42. The aforesaid view of the Supreme Court in M.M. Quasim (supra)
and other views quoted above are consistently followed by the courts in
the country which make it clear that even the landlord is considered to be
the best judge to decide his need, the same should be merely a weighing
factor in order to decide the reasonableness and suitableness of the
alternative accommodation and ultimately the said question is to be
decided by the rent controller on objective standards and not on the
subjective will of the either party be it landlord or the tenant. As I have
indicated, the reasonableness and suitability of the available
accommodation is a question of fact, it has to be decided on case to case
basis by controller by examining the tenability of the pleas of the parties
rather than just believing the stand of either side. That is why, I have
indicated that the reasonableness and suitability is to be decide from the
glasses of man of ordinary prudence as what should be reasonable and
suitable in the given circumstances.
*** *** ***
44 . It has been argued that the first floor of the property is not suitable to
the respondent No. 1 as the same has entry from the backside of the lane
and thus the availability of the said space cannot be said to be reasonably
convenient premises. I find that the said aspect of entry from the back
lane and thus becoming a unreasonably suitable accommodation as a
disputed question of fact on which the finding cannot be arrived at by
giving a preference to the one set of facts over the other. It is to be tested
in trial as to whether the entry from front side could be available to the
respondent No. 1 for his convenience. Suffice it to say that in the area
like Sundar Nagar where the property rates are touching the sky and the
premise in the said area is almost beyond the purchasing power of
common man, the availability of the first floor of the property where
business can be conveniently carried out lawfully itself is a good ground
to doubt the non availability of the reasonable sufficient accommodation
when the respondent No. 1 is already carrying out jewellery business in
the ground floor of property No. 9A Sunder Nagar. The finding as to
entry from the back lane and it is inconvenient to the respondent No. 1 is
also a matter of fact finding. The same is to be tested in trial as the tenant
disputes the said position.”
20. In support of the aforesaid submissions, learned Senior Counsel
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had further placed reliance upon the following judgments: –
ii. Rajhans Realtors Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Rajinder Kumar Goyal and Ors.12,
(Para 5);
iii. Devinder Kumar Choudhry Vs. Rambir Singh13, (Paras 13-16);
iv. Sunil Kumar Jain Vs. Dinesh Bhatia14, (Para 13.3);
v. Deepak Gupta Vs. Sushma Aggarwal15, (Paras 9, 13-19, 23 & 25);
vi. Ashok Kumar Gupta Vs. Rajesh Kumar and Ors.16, (Paras 8-9).
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHLAF OF THE RESPONDENT
21. Learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent, submitted the
reference to the second and third floor of the subject premises in the
eviction petition ought to have been read as third floor and the terrace of
the subject premises. It was further submitted that the said portions are
presently being run as a business of co-working space. It was further
stated that the floor above the tenanted premises and below the third
floor was sold by the Respondent. It was further submitted that the said
fact was duly disclosed by the Respondent in the reply to the leave to
defend application filed by the Petitioners before the learned ARC and
the relevant portion of the said is reproduced as under: –
11
AIR 2001 SC 2655
12
2024: DHC: 8477
13
2025: DHC: 10802
14
2024: DHC:7952
15
2013: DHC:3580
16
2016 (154) DRJ75Signature Not Verified
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“That the contents of paragraph no. 17 are false and hence denied. It is
submitted that the reference to second floor and third floor in paragraph
18 (a) (xi) is actually the third floor and terrace of the said building and
the same is in occupation of the co-working business. The Floor above
the subject premises and below the coworking space was sold on
23.12.1993, 18.04.2000 and on 14.02.2017. The said floor is the earliest
floor which is accessible from the Middle Circle and the same is not in
possession of the Petitioner. It is further submitted that as has been stated
hereinabove the third floor and terrace of the said building is in use and
occupation by the co-working space business of the Petitioner. The said
business is generating good revenue and occupies the entire third floor as
well as the terrace leaving no space for the office of the directors or the
display area for art business. In regard to the formation of the middle
circle and other businesses in the middle circle, it is submitted that the
Petitioner has no space to use even in the middle circle and the law as
has been laid down is clear on the fact that the Petitioner is the best and
only judge of its needs and the tenant cannot be permitted to dictate the
terms.”
22. Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent
drew attention of this Court to the following portion of the eviction
petition, as filed before the learned ARC: –
“(ii) The Petitioner is family run private company and the Petitioner
is in urgent bona-fide requirement of the said premises for its Art
Business Wing. The shareholding of the Petitioner is as under:
Name of shareholder No. of shares
Mr. Vikramjit Singh 6500
Mrs. Soni Manjit Singh 7500
Mrs. Bhagwanti Singh 3000
Ms. Niamat Singh 1500
Mr. Fateh Singh 1500
(iii) The Petitioner Company through Ms. Niamat Singh and Mr. Fateh
Singh who are also the shareholder, children of the Promoter Managing
Director, Mr. Vikramjit Singh, as well as the employee of the Petitioner
established a new stream of operations i.e. Art Business Wing of the –
Petitioner Company under its trademark “the Biv” which is the business
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of curating, managing and running art galleries for exhibition of art and
deal in paintings, art produce, artifacts, sculpture, decorative arts,
furniture, textiles, costume, drawings, pastels, watercolors, collages,
prints, artist books, photographs, installation art for hosting and curating
art galleries being the Art Business Wing of the Petitioner Company. The
trademark registration of the Biv by the Petitioner is annexed hereto as
Annexure 4.
(iv) That Ms. Niamat Singh and Mr. Fateh Singh, both shareholders
and employees of the Petitioner Company, possess the necessary
qualifications to expand the Art Business Wing and create supplementary
revenue streams for the company. Ms. Niamat Singh holds a post-
graduate degree in International Relations with a specialization in the
History of Art, while Mr. Fateh Singh has graduated in Business
Administration.”
It was submitted that the Respondent had specifically disclosed in
the eviction petition that the tenanted premises were required for
expansion of its new art business wing, which was being operated under
the trademark “The Biv”. It was further submitted that the tenanted
premises were required for establishing office space for two directors of
the Respondent company, namely, Mr. Fateh Singh and Ms. Niamat
Singh, along with display area for paintings, storage and allied business
activities qua the said art business wing.
23. Learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent further drew attention
of this Court to the site plan, as filed before the learned ARC, and the
same is reproduced as under: –
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It was contended that the tenanted premises are situated on the
first floor of the subject premises and access thereto is only possible
from Connaught Place’s inner circle. It was further submitted that theSignature Not Verified
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contention advanced on behalf of the Petitioners that the third floor and
terrace of the subject premises were available with the Respondent and
the latter was already operating the said art business wing therefrom, is
unfounded. It was submitted that access to the third floor and the terrace
of the subject premises is only from Connaught Place’s middle circle and
it is a matter of common knowledge that the inner circle enjoys
substantially better commercial visibility and footfall as compared to the
middle circle. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the first
floor of the subject premises was best suited for the bona fide
requirement of the Respondent, as access thereto was directly from
Connaught Place’s inner circle. It was further submitted that the third
floor and the terrace of the subject premises were already occupied and
being utilised for co-working operations and were not in possession of
the Respondent, and therefore, the same could not have been utilised for
satisfying the bona fide requirement of the Respondent.
24. Learned Senior Counsel further drew attention of this Court to the
proposed site plan, trademark registration and brochure of the exhibition
carried out by the Respondent, as filed before the learned ARC, and the
same are reproduced as under: –
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It was submitted that the argument advanced on behalf of the
Petitioners that the Respondent did not intend to operate the said art
business wing from the tenanted premises, is devoid of merit, inasmuch
as the Respondent had already commenced operations qua the bona fide
requirement and the same was not a mere desire or wish. It was further
submitted that the trademark registration of the said venture had also not
been disputed by the petitioners. Qua the proposed site plan, learned
Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent submitted that the
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application, and no substantive material had been placed on record to
contradict the said proposed site plan.
25. Learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent further drew attention
of this Court to the challans, as reproduced hereinbefore, and submitted
that the plea of the said challans being forged and fabricated was never
taken by the Petitioners before the learned ARC and the same has been
raised for the first time before this Court. It was thus submitted that the
Petitioners cannot be permitted to raise a fresh plea at this stage.
26. In support of the aforesaid submissions, learned Senior Counsel
for the Respondent had placed reliance on Sunder Singh Talwar v.
Kamal Chand Dugar17, in particular the following paragraphs: –
“22. Even otherwise, the plea is misplaced and misconceived. It is
settled legal position in this regard that a landlord while filing an
eviction petition for bona fide need, need not specify the exact
business which is proposed to be carried out from the tenanted
premises for which the eviction has been sought. In fact, even if in
the eviction petition a particular purpose is stated, the landlord is
not bound by the said purpose and after an eviction order, can
change his mind and use the premises for a different kind of
business. It is settled by a catena of judgments that the landlord has
not to give an elaborate description of the business or the nature of
business that he seeks to carry out in the premises. In this context
reference may be had to the judgment of this court in Puran Chand
Aggarwal v. Lekh Raj, (2014) 1 RCR (Rent) 552 : (2014) 210
DLT 131, wherein the court held as follows:–
“26. As far as business is concerned, it is not necessary
that the landlord must show some evidence that he has
experience of said business. That is not the requirement of
law in order to file the eviction petition on the grounds of
17
2018 SCC OnLine Del 8376Signature Not Verified
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bonafide requirement.
27. The following judgments do help the case of the
respondent:
Start new business/no experience required
(i) In Ram Babu Agarwal v. Jay Kishan Das, (2009) 2
RCR (Rent) 455 : (2010) 1 SCC 164, it was observed
that “A person can start a new business even if he has no
experience in the new business that does not mean that his
claim for starting new business must be rejected on the
ground that it is a false claim. Many people start new
businesses even if they do not have experience in the new
business and sometimes they are successful in the new
business also.”
(ii) In Tarsem Singh v. Gurvinder Singh, (2010) 2 RCR
(Rent) 604 : (2010) 173 DLT 379, it was observed that
“If the landlord wants to start his own business in the
premises owned by him then by no stretch of imagination,
it can be said that the requirement of the landlord for the
premises is neither bonafide nor genuine.”
(iii) In Balwant Singh Chowdhary v. Hindustan
Petroleum Corporation Ltd., (2004) 1 RCR 487, it was
held that “It is not necessary for the landlord to plead and
prove the specific business he wants to set up, if the
landlord wanted the premises for business purposes.”
(iv) In Gurcharan Lal Kumar v. Srimati Satyawati,
(2013) 2 RCR (Rent) 120 it was observed that “Merely
because the exact nature of business has not been
described would not take away their bonafide need to
carry out a business (when admittedly both the sons are
dependent upon petitioner for this need). It was observed
that if the business need is not disclosed this would not
wipe away the bonafide need of the landlord as has been
pressed under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRCA, 1958.”
(v) In Raj Kumar Khaitan v. Bibi Zubaida Khatun,
(1995) 1 RCR (Rent) 495 : (1997) 11 SCC 411 : AIR
1995 SC 576, it was observed that “It was not necessary
for the appellants-landlords to indicate the precise nature
of the business which they intended to start in the
premises. Even if the nature of business would have been
indicated nobody would bind the landlords to start the
same business in the premises after it was vacated.”
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Hence, the legal position is quite clear. The landlord need not to
show evidence that he has experience of said business that he
proposes to start. In fact, it is not necessary for landlord to indicate
the precise nature of business which he intends to start in the
premises. Hence if for some reason there is an impediment in the
way of the petitioner/petitioner’s son from starting a computer shop
from the tenanted premises, the said petitioners would be free to
change the nature of business and use the suit property for carrying
on business which confirms to the legal requirements. There is no
merit in the contention of the petitioner that the need for starting a
computer shop is not bonafide requirement.”
23. Hence, it is settled law that the landlord need not show evidence
that he has experience of said business that he proposes to start. In
fact, it is not necessary for the landlord to indicate the precise
nature of business which he intends to start in the premises. There
is hence no merit in the said contention of the petitioner.”
27. Learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent had further placed
reliance on the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Anil Bajaj &
Anr. v. Vinod Ahuja18, in particular on the following paragraph: –
“6. In the present case it is clear that while the landlord (Appellant 1)
is carrying on his business from a shop premise located in a narrow
lane, the tenant is in occupation of the premises located on the main
road which the landlord considers to be more suitable for his own
business. The materials on record, in fact, disclose that the landlord
had offered to the tenant the premises located in the narrow lane in
exchange for the tenanted premises which offer was declined by the
tenant. It is not the tenant’s case that the landlord, Appellant 1, does
not propose to utilise the tenanted premises from which eviction is
sought for the purposes of his business. It is also not the tenant’s case
that the landlord proposes to rent out/keep vacant the tenanted
premises after obtaining possession thereof or to use the same is any
way inconsistent with the need of the landlord. What the tenant
contends is that the landlord has several other shop houses from
which he is carrying on different businesses and further that the
landlord has other premises from where the business proposed from18
(2014) 15 SCC 610Signature Not Verified
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the tenanted premises can be effectively carried out. It would hardly
require any reiteration of the settled principle of law that it is not for
the tenant to dictate to the landlord as to how the property belonging
to the landlord should be utilised by him for the purpose of his
business. Also, the fact that the landlord is doing business from
various other premises cannot foreclose his right to seek eviction
from the tenanted premises so long as he intends to use the said
tenanted premises for his own business.”
28. Learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent further placed
reliance on Sarwan Dass Bange v. Ram Prakash19, and particularly on
the following paragraph: –
“17. The Senior Counsel for the petitioner/landlord has in this
regard drawn attention to the judgment of the Supreme Court
in Baldev Singh Bajzva v. Monish Saini, (2005) 12 SCC 778.
Though that judgment was on the provisions of the East Punjab
Rent Restriction Act, 1949 relating to NRI’s but the law laid down
therein is of general application. The Supreme Court took up for
adjudication, the contentious issue relating to the standard of proof
required by the NRI landlord to prove his requirement of the
accommodation from which ejectment is asked for and the factors
to be considered at the stage of granting leave to defend. It was held
that the legislative intent is of expeditious disposal of the
application for ejectment of tenant filed on the ground of
requirement by the landlord of the premises for his own occupation;
a special category of landlords requiring the premises for their own
use has been created; if there is any breach by the landlord, the
tenant is given a right of restoration of possession; the landlord who
evicts a tenant on the ground of own requirement is not only
prohibited from letting out the premises or disposing of the same
but also required to use the same for his own residence only. It was
held that these restrictions and conditions inculcate in built strong
presumption that the need of the landlord is genuine; the conditions
and restrictions imposed on the landlord make it virtually
improbable for the landlord to approach the Court for ejectment of
tenant unless his need is bona fide–no unscrupulous landlord in all19
2010 SCC OnLine Del 351Signature Not Verified
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probability, under this section, would approach the Court for
ejectment of the tenant considering the onerous conditions imposed
on him. It was further held that this inbuilt protection in the Act for
the tenants implies that whenever the landlord would approach the
Court his requirement shall be presumed to be genuine and bona
fide. It was further held that a heavy burden lies on the tenant to
prove that the requirement is not genuine. The tenant is required to
give all the necessary facts and particulars supported by
documentary evidence if available to prove his plea in the affidavit
itself so that the Controller will be in a position to adjudicate and
decide the question of genuine or bona fide requirement of the
landlord; a mere assertion on the part of the tenant would not be
sufficient to rebut the strong presumption in the landlord’s favour
that his requirement of occupation of the premises is real and
genuine.”
29. Learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent further placed reliance
on the following portion of M/s A.K. Woolen Industries & Ors. v. Shri
Narain Gupta20: –
“19. The law to be applied in this regard has been laid down by the
Supreme Court in Ragavendra Kumar v. Firm Prem Machinery &
Co. (2000) 1 SCC 679, Sait Nagjee Purushotham & Co.
Ltd. v. Vimalabai Prabhulal (2005) 8 SCC 252 and Anil
Bajaj v. Vinod Ahuja (2014) 15 SCC 610. It has been held that even
if the landlord has other commercial premises available to him and
even if the landlord is carrying on other businesses, if it is found
that the landlord intends to use the premises in occupation of the
tenant for carrying on his business therefrom, the landlord is
entitled to an order of eviction and the Courts cannot intervene in
the same.”
30. Learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent further placed reliance
on A.M. Shah v. Pushpa Sood 21 , in particular on the following
paragraphs: –
20
2017 SCC OnLine Del 11363
21
2001 SCC OnLine Del 553Signature Not Verified
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“6. Mr. Kapur relied heavily on the decision of the Supreme Court
in Santosh Devi Soni v. Chand Kiran, JT 2000 (3) SC 397
and Inderjeet Kaur v. Nirpal Singh, 89 (2001) Delhi Law Times 27
(SC) : 2001 (57) DRJ 182, for his submission that leave to contest
the petition should have been granted. Even in Santosh Devi’s
case (supra), the Court has stated in its Order that normally leave
should be granted; and that in ‘considering the facts and
circumstances of this case, we deem it fit to grant leave to defend’.
It did not lay down a proposition calling for universal
application per se, that even if facts prima facie incredible in nature
were pleaded, they should like a password result in leave to contest
being granted. In Inderjeet Kaur‘s case (supra), a reading of the
following paragraph makes it evident that leave to contest should
be granted only where a prima facie case has been disclosed. In this
event, the Additional Rent Controller should grant leave to contest
and desist from entering into a final consideration of the grounds
disclosed on their possible merits. The Additional Rent Controller
should not obviate a trial at this stage, by giving into the merits of
the grounds, if a final conclusion is available only after evidence is
led in the Trial. The only possible exception may be where the
grounds raised are strictly legal in character, not necessitating the
holding of a trial. It should be borne in mind that a Trial is required
for establishing facts, and not law. The Apex Court opined
in Inderjeet Kaur‘s case (supra) as follows:–
“We are of the considered view that at a stage when the
tenant seeks leave to defend, it is enough if he prima
facie makes out a case by disclosing such facts as would
disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order of eviction.
It would not be a right approach to say that unless the
tenant at that stage itself establishes a strong case as
would non-suit the landlord leave to defend should not be
granted when it is not the requirement of Section 25B(5).
A leave to defend sought for cannot also be granted for
mere asking or in a routine manner which will defeat the
very object of the special provisions contained in Chapter
IIJA of the Act. Leave to defend cannot be refused where
an eviction petition is filed on a mere design or desire of a
landlord to recover possession of the premises from a
tenant under Clause (e) of the proviso to sub-section (1) ofSignature Not Verified
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Section 14, when as a matter of fact the requirement may
not be bona fide. Refusing to grant leave in such a case
leads to eviction of a tenant summarily resulting in great
hardship to him and his family members, if any, although
he could establish if only leave is granted that a landlord
would be disentitled for an order of eviction. At the stage
of granting leave to defend parties, rely on affidavits in
support of the rival contentions. Assertions and counter
assertions made in affidavits may not afford safe and
acceptable evidence so as to arrive at an affirmative
conclusion one way or the other unless there is a strong
and acceptable evidence available to show that the facts
disclosed in the application filed by the tenant seeking
leave to defend were either frivolous, untenable or most
unreasonable. Take a case when a possession is sought on
the ground of personal requirement, a landlord has to
establish his need and not his mere desire. The ground
under Clause (e) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of
Section 14 enables a landlord to recover possession of the
tenanted premises on the ground of his bona
fide requirement. This being an enabling provision,
essentially the burden is on the landlord to establish his
case affirmatively. In short and substance wholly
frivolous and totally untenable defence may not entitle a
tenant to leave to defend but when a triable issue is raised
a duty is placed on the Rent Controller by the statute itself
to grant leave. At the stage of granting leave the real test
should be whether facts disclosed in the affidavit filed
seeking leave to defend prima facie show that the landlord
would be disentitled from obtaining an order of eviction
and not whether at the end defence may fail. It is well to
remember that when a leave to defend is refused, serious
consequences of eviction shall follow and the party
seeking leave is denied an opportunity to test the truth of
the averments made in the eviction petition by cross-
examination. It may also be noticed that even in cases
where leave is granted provisions are made in this very
Chapter for expeditious disposal of eviction petitions.
Section 25B(6) states that where leave is granted to a
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practicable. Section 25B(7) speaks of the procedure to be
followed in such cases. Section 25B(8) bars the appeals
against an order of recovery of possession except a
provision of revision to the High Court. Thus a combined
effect of Sections 25B(6), (7) and (8) would lead to
expeditious disposal of eviction petitions so that a
landlord need not wait and suffer for long time. On the
other hand, when a tenant is denied leave to defend
although he had fair chance to prove his defence, will
suffer great hardship. In this view a balanced view is to be
taken having regard to competing claims.”
7. In Madan Lal Gupta v. Ravinder Kumar, (2001) 1 SCC 252, the
Apex Court declined to interfere in the concurrent refusal to grant
leave to contest even after referring to the cases of Santosh
Devi (supra) and Liaq Ahmed v. Habeeb-Ur-Rehman, (2000) 5 SCC
708 : 2000 (56) DRJ (Suppl) 217.
8. Returning to the case in hand, it is to be seen whether the
Additional Rent Controller could have arrived at the conclusion that
a prima facie case had not been made out by the Tenant. If his
conclusion is possible and not perverse, this Court would not
interfere even if it favoured a different view. The Additional Rent
Controller has opined that no accommodation was available to the
landlady on the 2nd Floor which was fit for her habitation. This
view is based on several precedents of this Court. It is well
entrenched that the landlord is the best Judge of his needs, and if
the demand is not absurd, the Court should desist from scrutinising
it minutely. The Additional Rent Controller was obviously and
correctly influenced by the size and temporary character of the
rooms, and that whilst the second floor may well be used for the
‘factory’ and as quarters for employees, it was not reasonably
suitable for the Landlady’s residential need. Keeping in perspective
the accommodation disclosed by both parties, the version of letting
to persons other than the present Tenant is mere moonshine. The
finding that the landlady/widow required the premises bona fide is
not open to revision as no jurisdictional error has been committed.”
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31. Learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent further placed reliance
on Nirmala Kumari & Ors. v. Girish Kakkar & Anr. 22, in particular
on the following paragraph: –
“69. The judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioners
are distinguishable.
i. Deepak Gupta (supra)- In this case, the Court was of the view that
if the tenant filed a leave to defend application along with an
affidavit questioning bona fide need of the landlord stating that he is
the owner of other two shops, the Rent Controller simply could not
have brushed aside these facts as inconsequential in nature, unless
plausible explanation comes from the landlord as to how the same
are not reasonably suitable accommodation. The Court also observed
that the Controller has a statutory duty to grant leave to defend if the
affidavit discloses such facts which could raise suspicion on the
genuine need of the landlord. In the present case, the respondents
have given a satisfactory explanation that the portion of the tenanted
premises which is available with them is insufficient to meet their
needs. I also have no doubts regarding the bona fide needs of the
respondents. In Deepak Gupta (supra), the Court was also of the
view that the proviso of section 14 of the DRC Act is an exception
and the tenants need protection from unjust and unreasonable
evictions. The said basic fulcrum of this judgment has undergone a
drastic change. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has stated that much
water has gone under the bridge with regard to the protection that
were required to be given to the tenants5. I have also held that the
DRC Act has somewhat outlived it’s utility6.
ii. Arjun Uppal (supra)- In this case, the learned ARC was of the
view that triable issues have been raised by the tenants, while in the
instant case, the learned ARC was of the view that no triable issue
has been raised by the tenants. In addition, in Sarla Ahuja (supra),
the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the need of the landlord is
to be presumed to be bona fide.
iii. Bharat Glass and Plywood Co. (supra)- In this case, one of the
reasons which weighed with the Court was that the need of the son of22
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the landlord was not in presenti, but upon “likelihood and in future”.
In present case, the need of the respondents and their family
members is in presenti.
iv. Khem Chand (supra)- In this case, the Court was of the view that
the need of the son and daughter of the landlord and their likelihood
of joining the landlord’s business was doubtful, which is not the case
here. The need of the landlords in this case is in presenti. No doubts
have been created regarding the bona fide need of the landlords.
v. Kishan Chand Rathi (supra)- This judgment is regarding the
business needs of the landlords. The Court was of the view that there
is no material to show that the business of the landlords had grown
thereby requiring the tenanted premises. In present case, the tenanted
premises are required by the landlords-respondents for their
residential purposes.
vi. Sanjay Chug (supra) and Vijay Nayyar (supra)- These judgments
also relate to business requirements of the landlords. In the present
case, the landlords require the tenanted premises for residential
purposes. The landlord is the best judge of his requirement and no
fetters can be put in this regard.”
32. Per contra, learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent had sought
to distinguish the judgments relied upon by the Petitioners. Qua Santosh
Devi (Supra), it was submitted that the observations contained therein,
were rendered in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the said case,
where additional residential accommodation had become available to the
landlord during the pendency of the eviction proceedings.
33. Qua the judgment of Charan Dass Duggal (Supra), it was
submitted by the learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent that same
was also distinguishable on facts, inasmuch as the landlord therein was
residing at Pathankot, whereas the tenanted residential premises were
situated in Delhi. Similarly, qua Inderjeet Kaur (Supra), it was
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submitted that the landlord therein was residing in the United Kingdom,
and he had sought eviction of the tenant from the premises situated at
Delhi.
34. Qua Khem Chand (Supra), it was submitted by the learned
Senior Counsel for the Respondent that the same was distinguishable on
facts, as the entire first floor of the subject premises therein, was lying
vacant and available with the landlord, and further, the sons for whose
requirement the eviction was sought, were not dependent upon the
landlord.
35. Qua Deena Nath (Supra), learned Senior Counsel for the
Respondent submitted that the said judgment is distinguishable on facts,
inasmuch as the landlord therein had failed to explain the non-utilisation
of a vacant showroom available with him. Qua Rajinder Kumar Goyal
(Supra), it was submitted that the facts of the said case were entirely
different, as the parties therein had consented to mediation and had
agreed that execution proceedings would not be initiated during the
pendency of the mediation proceedings.
36. Qua Rajhans Realtors Pvt. Ltd. (Supra), learned Senior Counsel
for the Respondent submitted that the said judgment, in fact, supports the
case of the Respondent, as the eviction petition therein had been allowed
on the ground of bona fide requirement.
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37. Qua Deepak Gupta (Supra), it was submitted that the landlord
therein had already obtained possession of two other properties in the
same vicinity through rent control proceedings and the said properties
were available for the alleged requirement.
38. Qua Ashok Kumar Gupta (Supra), learned Senior Counsel for the
Respondent submitted that the said judgment is distinguishable on facts,
as the landlord therein had taken contradictory stands with respect to the
alleged requirement in the legal notice as well as in the eviction petition.
REJOINDER SUBMISSIONS
39. Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioners submitted that the third
floor of the subject premises is admittedly in occupation of “The Biv”
and the said entity is already operating therefrom. It was thus submitted
that the question whether approximately 7,500 sq. ft. of space available
with the Respondent was sufficient or insufficient for the alleged bona
fide requirement, itself raises a triable issue which could not have been
decided without a trial.
40. Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioners further submitted that
objections qua the challans filed by the Respondent had already been
raised by the Petitioners in their leave to defend application itself and the
same formed part of the record before the learned ARC. It was submitted
that despite the said objections having been specifically raised, the
learned ARC had failed to deal with the same while rendering the
impugned judgment.
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41. Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner had further argued that
the learned ARC had failed to consider a substantial triable issue, as
raised by the Petitioners qua applicability of Section 22 of the DRC Act
in the present case. It was argued that the Petitioners had specifically
contended that the issue of maintainability of the eviction petition
required consideration in view of the order dated 17.03.2025 passed by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajinder Kumar Goyal v. Rajhans
Realtors Private Limited in SLP 4169/2025, wherein the Hon’ble
Supreme Court had stayed the judgment passed by the learned Single
Judge of this Court in Rajhans Realtors Pvt. Ltd. (Supra). It was
submitted that the issue regarding the applicability of Section 22 of the
DRC Act to eviction petitions filed by a company, which was considered
by the learned Single Judge of this Court in Rajhans Realtors Pvt. Ltd.
(Supra), is presently pending consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme
Court. It was contended that the said issue has not attained finality, and
therefore, constituted a substantial triable issue. It was further submitted
that despite the aforesaid contention having a direct bearing on the
maintainability of the eviction petition, no finding qua the same was
returned by the learned ARC in the impugned judgment.
42. In response to the aforesaid submission, learned Senior Counsel
for the Respondent had relied upon the judgment passed by the learned
Division Bench of this Court in K.S. Bhandari v. International
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Security Printers Private Limited23, and had submitted that a company
or any body corporate can file an eviction petition, invoking both Section
14 (1)(e) or Section 22 of the DRC Act. The relevant portion of the said
judgment is reproduced as under: –
“Answer to the questions referred vide order dated 22-12-2017
(K.S. Bhandari v. International Security Printers (P) Ltd. [K.S.
Bhandari v. International Security Printers (P) Ltd., 2017 SCC
OnLine Del 12520] )
80. Under these circumstances, the reference is answered as
under:
(i) Where the landlord is a Company or other body corporate or
any local authority or any public institution and the premises are
required for the use of employees of such landlord, whether such
landlord has a choice, whether to invoke Section 14(1)(e) or
Section 22 of the Act.
Answer — Yes, the landlord has a choice to invoke both Section
14(1)(e) and/or Section 22DRC Act, 1958 as may be applicable in
the facts.
(ii) Whether the Chairman, Directors, trustees, members of the
governing body and office-bearers, of a Company or other body
corporate or any local authority or any public institution qualify as
’employees, within the meaning of Section 22 of the Act and if not
whether such landlord for requirement of such persons is entitled to
invoke Section 14(1)(e) of the Act.
Answer — The question whether such persons would qualify as
employees or not, would depend upon the terms of employment
between the employer and the employee as also on the facts of each
case. The landlord is free to avail of remedies either under Section
14(1)(e) or Section 22DRC Act, 1958 as may be applicable. Each
case has to be decided on its own facts as it is possible that in some
cases, the employer-employee relationship may or may not exist,
depending upon the terms of employment.
(iii) Whether the tenant of such a landlord can be construed as
having acted in contravention of the terms under which he was
authorized to occupy the premises or be construed as in
23
2025 SCC OnLine Del 3438
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unauthorized occupation of the premises, within the meaning of
Sections 22(b) and (c) of the Act, on continuing in occupation after
determination of his tenancy under Section 106 of the Transfer of
property Act, 1882.
Answer — The question as to whether upon termination of a
tenancy under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 a
tenant is under unauthorized occupation or not, or in contravention
of the terms or not, would have to be determined on the basis of the
contract or agreement between the parties. The question as to what
the terms of the tenancy, whether there is a violation, whether there
is termination, whether the termination is lawful and whether tenant
is in unauthorized occupation, would have to be determined on the
facts.
(iv) Whether the commercial or industrial or other requirement
of a landlord, which/who is a Company or other body corporate or
any local authority or any public institution, of premises, by
allowing its employees to work or carry on its activities therein is
within the ambit of Section 22 of the Act and if not, whether for
such requirement such a landlord can invoke Section 14(1)(e) of
the Act.
Answer — The purpose of the tenancy i.e. whether the premises
is let for residential or non-residential purposes, would no longer be
relevant under Section 14(1)(e)DRC Act, 1958 in view of the
judgment, Satyawati Sharma v. Union of India [Satyawati
Sharma v. Union of India, (2008) 5 SCC 287] . The said judgment
would have equal applicability even in the case of Section 22DRC
Act, 1958.
(v) Whether a public charitable trust carrying on public
activities qualifies as a public institution.
Answer — No to the extent that a public charitable trust
carrying on public activities which is set up by private persons
would not be covered under Section 22DRC Act, 1958.
(vi) Whether a deity in a temple owning properties or a trust or
a society managing a place of worship qualifies as a public
institution.
Answer — Yes. So long as the trust or the society managing the
place of worship is not a private trust. Insofar as a deity is
concerned, if the society or trust or any other entity managing the
temple is controlled by the Government, State or local authority,
directly or indirectly, Section 22DRC Act, 1958 would apply.
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However, if the same is controlled by a private body/private trust, it
would not fall under the ambit of Section 22DRC Act, 1958.
(vii) Whether the choice if any with such a landlord, to invoke
either Section 14(1)(e) or Section 22 of the Act, is to the detriment
of the tenant and if so to what effect.”
Answer — The remedies provided under the statute to a
landlord or the protection extended to tenants under the statute,
have to be presumed to be in balance with each other. So long as
the remedies are availed by the landlord in terms of the provisions
DRC Act, 1958 the same cannot be construed as being to the
detriment of the tenant.”
43. Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioners had further refuted the
argument of the Respondent that the issue regarding the genuineness of
the challans was never raised before the learned ARC and it is only
before this Court that the said issue is being raised by the Petitioners for
the first time. It was submitted that the said issue was raised before the
learned ARC in the application seeking leave to defend, and despite the
said contention, the learned ARC had failed to return any findings qua
the same in the impugned judgment. The relevant portion of the said
application is reproduced as under: –
“15. That it is submitted that the Petitioner has filed certain
Challans from Pages 30 to 33 of the Petition. A bare perusal
of the same would suggest that the said Challans appear to be
bogus and fabricated, as can be clearly seen from the Serial
Number and Dates mentioned on them. For instance, Challan
No. 219 Is dated 12.01.2023 whereas Challan No. 216 is dated
17.01.2023.”
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ANALYSIS
44. Heard the learned Senior Counsels for the parties and perused the
record.
45. The relevant portion of the impugned judgment passed by the
learned ARC reads as under: –
“16. The bona fide requirement as stated by the
petitioner/landlord is that the tenanted premises are required
by it for expanding its business under art wing. The petitioner
averred that it is a family run private company comprising of
five shareholders and the premises are required bonafidely for
its art business wing which is a new stream of operation of the
petitioner company under its trademark ‘The Biv’. Ms. Niamat
Singh and Mr. Fateh Singh, both shareholders and employees
of the petitioner company possess the necessary qualifications
to expand the said business and create, supplementary revenue
streams for the company. The petitioner’s claim is that as the
art business wing is expanding, the lack of adequate business
space for meeting, storage, and sale are becoming increasingly
detrimental, resulting in significant work disruption. Due to
expansion of the petitioner’s art wing business, need for a
permanent physical space becomes indispensable as a
dedicated area is required for display of the painting art works
and additionally space is also required for storage of goods as
well as office meetings with buyers, artists and office vendors.
Petitioner’s requirement is adequately met from the premises
since one of the directors of the petitioner operates from a
single room office adjacent to the subject premises and
considering the shared wall of the above said premises, the
petitioner intends to expand by removing the wall, thereby
creating a large space for display and storage, alongwith
smaller cabins. Proposed site plan in support of the above said
averment is also filed with the petition and the same is
Annexure 6.
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17. The petitioner has been categorical in its averment that
the alternate accommodation in its possession is a third floor,
which is now insufficient due to expanding of business and
have resulted into financial losses for co-working space.
Further, as the art business wing is expanding, the lack of
adequate petitioner’s business space for meeting, storage, and
sale are becoming increasingly detrimental, resulting in
significant work disruption. It is also the petitioner’s averment
that the access to third floor is through middle circle at
Connaught place which has significantly less foot traffic than
the inner circle which has direct access to first floor i.e., the
tenanted premises. The petitioner has also shown that the first
floor already has one room of director of the petitioner
company and as per Annexure 6 same can very well be used
alongwith proposed office space for the petitioner’s business
operation at the tenanted premises. The Hon’ble High Court of
Delhi when faced with similar issue in Lalta Prasad Gupta
v. Sita Ram RC Rev. No.352/2017 dated 02.08.2017 held
that petitioner cannot be expected to climb stairs for alternate
accommodation when floors are ground or lower levels are
available. Similar observation was also made in M/s.
Metropolitan Book Co Pvt. Ltd. v. Ahay Rastogi, RC Rev.
484/2014, dated 13.07.2014.
18. Thus, the contention raised by the respondent that the
petitioner’s alternate accommodation at third floor or second
floor is sufficient, does not hold much water. With respect to
the issue under consideration, it is relevant to discuss the
authority laid down that a landlord is the best judge of his
requirement. In the case titled as Sudesh Kumar Soni & Ors.
Vs. Prabha Khanna & Ors. 153 (2008) DLT 652 it was
observed that:-
“24. It is often said by courts that it is not for the tenant to
dictate terms to the landlord as to how else he can adjust
himself without getting possession of the tenanted premises.
While deciding the question of bona fides of the requirement
of the landlord it is quite unnecessary to make an endeavour
as to how else the landlord could have adjusted himself.
25. Suitability has to be seen from the convenience of the
landlord and his family members and on the basis of the
circumstances including their profession, vocation style ofSignature Not Verified
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living, habits and background. Landlord is the best judge of
his residential requirement”
18.1 Thus, it is an established position of law that a landlord
is the best judge of his requirement and the court cannot
direct the landlord as to how and in what manner he should
live. It has been held that court must place itself in the shoes
of the landlord and decide whether in the given facts the need
of the landlord to occupy the premises can be said to be
natural, real, sincere, honest and that if the answer is in the
positive, the need is bona fide. Reliance has been placed upon
the authority laid down in case titled Shiv Swaroop Gupta
Vs. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta, 1999, SCC 222.
18.2 The tenant could not dictate as to how the landlord
should be using and enjoying his property. If the landlord
states that he seeks to use the tenanted premises for a
particular purpose, the tenant could not question and put his
own suggestions that the said premises could not reasonably
be used for the purpose as sought by the landlord. Besides
that, it is also the settled law that the petitioner is not required
to state the exact business which is proposed to be carried out
from the tenanted premises. Further, even if the purpose is
stated in the petition, petitioner is not bound by the same and
can later use the premises for some other purpose. Reliance
has been placed upon the judgment of the Hon’ble High Court
of Delhi in case titled Sunder Singh Talwar v. Kamal
Chand Dugar, 2018 SCC Online Del 8376.
19. Accordingly, in light of the above discussion, no triable
issue arises with respect to bona fide requirement of the
petitioners.
20 It has been contended by the respondent that petitioner
has not been true to aver the alternate accommodations
available to it. It is also the case of the respondent that second
floor and third floor above the tenanted premises are also
available with the petitioner.
21. The petitioner has already stated that, at the first floor
i.e., the tenanted premises, one room is already in its
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possession where one director has his office. The Annexure 6
goes on to show as to how the petitioner proposes to use the
said office with the rest of the premises once it is vacated.
Further, the petitioner would have access to its business
premises from the inner circle which has more footfall and
better visibility. The respondent has not presented a single
counter to said argument. The respondent has not denied that
petitioner has an office for one of its directors adjacent to the
premises in question. There is no counter from the respondent
that first floor access from inner circle is unfavourable as
compared to middle circle access to second floor
accommodation available in alternative to petitioner.
21.1 As discussed already, tenant cannot dictate terms to the
landlord as to how he should use the tenanted premises or
other premises available with him. It was held by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in case titled Shiv Sarup Gupta Vs. Dr.
Mahesh Chand Gupta, AIR 1999 SC 2507 that
“convenience and safety of landlord and his family members
would be relevant.” And, it was held by the Hon’ble High
Court of Delhi in case titled Metropolitan Book Company Ltd.
Vs. Ajay Rastogi that-
“Even assuming other properties available, and which
actually they are not as stated below, these other properties
situated far from the present residence of the respondent
no.1/landlord, and his family members, cannot be considered
as alternative suitable accommodation.”
21.2 Further, it was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
case titled “Sarla Ahuja Vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd.,
AIR 1999 SC 100 that-
“the crux of the ground envisages in clause (e) of Section
14(1) of the Act is that the requirement of the landlord for
occupation of the tenanted premises must be Bonafide. When
a landlord asserts that he requires his building for his own
occupation, the Rent Controller shall not proceed on
presumption that requirement is not bona-fide. When other
conditions of the clause are satisfied and when landlord
shows a prin-facie case, it is open to the Rent Controller to
draw a presumption that requirement of the landlord is bona-
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to dictate terms to the landlord as to how else he can adjust
himself without getting possession of the tenanted premises.
While deciding the question of bona- tides of requirement at
the landlord, it is quite unnecessary to make an endeavour as
to how else the landlord could have adjusted himself.”
22. Thus, it is the established position of law that tenant
cannot dictate terms as to how the landlord could use his
property. Also, the convenience of the landlord is to be given
due weightage. Moreover, the suitability of premises to be
assessed on basis of requirement of the landlord. Further,
availability of alternate space and its suitability are entirely
two different things. Therefore, it also stands established that
the petitioners do not have any reasonably suitable
accommodation available with them for the stated purpose.
46. Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioners had
stressed on the availability of approximately 7,500 sq. ft. of commercial
space across third floor and terrace of the subject premises being in
possession of the Respondent. It was submitted that the said space is a
suitable alternate accommodation already available with the Respondent
for the alleged bona fide requirement and that the present petition is
merely a sham in order to get the Petitioners to vacate the tenanted
premises. It was further submitted that in view of the aforesaid existing
commercial space, the alleged requirement of the Respondent for the
tenanted premises becomes a triable issue, and the learned ARC had
failed to appreciate the same.
47. At this stage, it would be apposite to refer to the averments made
by the Respondent in the eviction petition, qua the bona fide requirement
for the tenanted premises, and the same reads as under: –
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“(iii) The Petitioner Company through Ms. Niamat Singh
and Mr. Fateh Singh who are also the shareholder,
children of the Promoter Managing Director, Mr.
Vikramjit Singh, as well as the employee of the Petitioner
established a new stream of operations i.e. Art Business
Wing of the -Petitioner Company under its trademark
“the Biv” which is the-business of curating, managing and
running art galleries for exhibition of art and deal in
paintings, art products, artifacts, sculpture, decorative
arts, furniture, textiles, costume, drawings, pastels,
watercolors, collages, prints, artist books, photographs,
installation art for hosting and curating art galleries being
the Art Business Wing of the Petitioner Company. The
trademark registration of the Biv by the Petitioner is
annexed hereto as Annexure 4.
(iv) That Ms. Niamat Singh and Mr. Fateh Singh, both
shareholders and employees of the Petitioner Company,
possess the necessary qualifications to expand the Art
Business Wing and create supplementary revenue streams for
the company. Ms. Niamat Singh holds a post-graduate degree
in International Relations with a specialization in the History
of Art, while Mr. Fateh Singh has graduated in Business
Administration.
(v) That the Art Business Wing of the Petitioner Company
has successfully organized numerous exhibitions. Initially,
administrative operations were conducted from a small
office room belonging to the Director of the company and
the hosting of exhibitions at the other business premises
situated on the 3rd floor of the Phelps building has
resulted in demonstrable financial losses for the
coworking space. These losses primarily stem from
diminished foot traffic and hindered accessibility
experienced by potential buyers due to inadequate
parking facilities, compounded by limited visibility
resulting from ingress via the rear entrance. However, as
the Art Business Wing is expanding, the lack of adequate
space for meetings, storage, and sales became increasingly
detrimental, resulting in significant work disruptions. The
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raised on it are annexed hereto as Annexure 5.
(vi) That since the Petitioner’s business is expanding need for
a permanent physical space becomes indispensable. Dealing
in paintings, art products, artifacts, sculptures, and decorative
arts, which are best appreciated in person, necessitates a
dedicated area for display. Additionally, the Petitioner
requires offices for meetings with buyers, artists, and vendors,
along with adequate storage space for these goods.
vii) That presently, one of the Directors of the Petitioner
operates from a single-room office adjacent to the subject
premises. Considering the shared wall between the
Director’s Office and the premises, the Petitioner intends
to expand by removing the wall, thereby creating a larger
space for display and storage, along with smaller cabins.
The plan also involves relocating the Director’s office to
the rear section of the premises. The proposed site plan for
the Petitioner’s office is annexed herewith as Annexure 6.
xxx xxx xxx
(x) That the said Premises is the only suitable location for
the Petitioner offering superior display potential due to its
convenient accessibility from the Inner Circle of
Connaught Place, a prime area in Delhi. Its strategic
entrance ensures high visibility and easy access for the
public making it an ideal location for the Petitioner.
Additionally, the availability of parking further enhances
its appeal as an ideal location for the Petitioner’s business.
Furthermore, there are no other premises of similar
caliber available to the Petitioner, especially considering
that the mentioned premises share a common wall with
the Petitioner’s existing office. While the Respondents in
reply to the RC ARC 39 of 2020, has stated on oath that
neither is the Respondent No.1 nor is its sub-tenant using the
said premises. The Respondents have stated that they are
operating out of its registered office and corporate office at
Stainless Centre, 4th Floor, Plot No. 50, Sector 32, Gurugram-
122001, Haryana. The Petition filed by the Petitioner and
Written Statement filed by the Respondent is annexed
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herewith as Annexure – 8.
(xi) That the Petitioner also owns the Second Floor and the
Third Floor, 9-A, Phelps Building, Connaught Place, New
Delhi. However, the entrances to these premises are from the
middle circle, contrasting with the said premises which
benefits from an entrance in the inner circle. The inner circle
enjoys significantly higher foot traffic compared to the middle
circle, which is more suited for businesses not reliant on client
engagement. There are no other commercial premises owned
by the Petitioner. It is well settled law that a landlord is the
best judge of his needs and requirements and the Petitioner
requires the premises in question for its personal and bonafide
use.”
(Emphasis Supplied)
48. From the above, it is apparent that the Respondent had fully
disclosed the availability of the space on the third floor and terrace of the
subject premises and had justified the need of their bona fide
requirement for the tenanted premises, on the ground of it’s location as
well as additional space required for expansion of the art business wing.
In fact, in the reply to the leave to defend application filed on behalf of
the Petitioners, the Respondent had stated that it was suffering loss of
business on account of non-availability of adequate space for its art
business wing. It was further stated that exhibitions had been held
previously at the co-working space being operated on the third floor and
terrace of the subject premises; however, the same was not adequate for
such exhibitions. It was further pointed out that the said space is divided
into smaller cabins and rooms, and therefore, the same was not
appropriate for conducting art exhibitions.
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49. Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioners had
drawn the attention of this Court to a website pertaining to the aforesaid
space, under the trademark “The Biv”, as to show that the said space was
being utilised by the Respondent for offering “a place to camp out and
work hard”. It was submitted that the said space is being offered by the
Respondent for people to come and work in the following manner: –
“The space spread across two floors that you can call your
office. This includes a great terrace garden that looks straight
on to an unfurling Indian flag dramatically set against an open
sky”
50. Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent
had drawn the attention of this Court to the proposed site plan, trademark
registration and brochures of the exhibitions carried out by the
Respondent. A perusal of the aforesaid documents would reflect that the
Respondent is running an Art Business under the trademark of “The
Biv”. It is also a matter of record that the subject premises is located on
the first floor and the same can be accessed from Connaught Place’s
inner circle. It was rightly noted by the learned ARC that the tenanted
premises was situated at a location affording greater footfall and
enhanced visibility, owing to its access from the Connaught Place’s inner
circle. In fact, the screenshots placed on record by the Petitioners with
respect to property available with the Respondent itself shows that the
same is more in a nature of working stations and offices. The co-working
office being run by the Respondent is one it’s business venture and it
cannot be said that the same should be shut-down so that the space
utilised by it be then used for art exhibitions, while the Petitioners
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continue to retain possession of the tenanted premises. It is a well-settled
law that a tenant cannot dictate as to how the landlord has to utilise its
premises. The contention of the Petitioners that the space in possession
of the Respondent is sufficient to cater to the requirements of its
expanding art business wing cannot be accepted.
51. Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioners had submitted that the
learned ARC while passing the impugned judgment, had mechanically
applied the proposition that the landlord is the best judge to decide his
needs, and did not appreciate that present case is of additional
accommodation. In support of the said contention reliance was placed on
judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in Khem
Chand and Ors. (Supra) to argue that the question whether the
accommodation available, comprising of 7500 sq. feet, was sufficient,
suitable or reasonable for the Respondent to carry on its business had to
be examined.
52. The aforesaid judgment relied upon by learned Senior Counsel for
the Petitioners was rendered in the facts and circumstances of the said
case. In the said case, the demised premises for which eviction was
sought was located on ground floor of property No. 10, Sundar Nagar.
However, it had come on record that the landlord therein was already
running his office from ground floor of property No. 9A of Sundar
Nagar, and was also in occupation of the first floor of property No. 10,
Sundar Nagar, which was lying vacant. It was also noted by the learned
Single Judge in the said case that the proposed need of the landlord
therein, as stated in the eviction petition, was not a felt need, but one
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which could have been said to be farfetched, based on desire and
imagination. The relevant observation reads as under: –
“47. The learned Controller legally erred in the not testing the
case of both the parties on the objective standards which is the
requirement of the law for examining the reasonableness and
suitableness of the alternative accommodation. The learned
controller ought not have just simply observed that the
landlord is the best judge to decide his needs but should have
considered his plea non availability of reasonable
accommodation vis-Ã -vis the accommodation which the
respondent is enjoying presently which is property No. 9 A
Sunder Nagar and also coupled with his ownership of first
floor of the property No. 10 Sunder Nagar where such
business can be carried out in the event of any future
eventuality considering the business at the first floor is
permissible in the said area. The availability of the alternative
accommodation at the first floor of the Sundar Nagar property
should have been weighed with the proposed need of the
respondent no. 1 as defined in the eviction which is explained
in broad terms which by itself makes it apparent that the need
as defined is not a felt need but is the one which can said to be
far fetched or based on the desires and imagination. All these
facts clearly casts doubts on the on the stands of the
respondent no. 1, bonafides of the need of the respondent no.
1 and the conclusion that there is no availability of the
alternative reasonably suitable accommodation which cannot
be arrived atleast in the summarily manner warranting the
leave to defend.”
53. Similarly, the contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the
Petitioners, that the invoices placed on record are at variance with each
other, with respect to the dates, and therefore, the same becomes a triable
issue is again not tenable. A perusal of the challans placed on record by
the Respondent along with the eviction petition shows their GST details,
as well as further scrutiny of the said challans would indicate that the
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first two challans dated 12.01.2023 bearing serial nos. 218 and 219,
pertain to items listed from serial no. 1 to 14 and 15 to 24, respectively.
The next challan placed on record is dated 17.01.2023 bearing no. 216
but serial nos. of item contained therein start from serial no. 25 till 26,
and the fourth challan placed on record dated 20.01.2023 bearing no.
221 pertains to items listed at serial nos. 27 to 38. These challans have
been made separately on separate dates with separate items; however, the
continuity of the item numbers shows that they were bought in the same
time period, though on different dates. Merely because challan no. 216 is
dated 17.01.2023 whereas challan nos. 218 and 219 are dated
12.01.2023 cannot by itself give rise to any triable issue. The
Respondent, in the eviction petition, had also placed on record relevant
materials to show the previous exhibitions organised by them in
furtherance of their art business wing. Thus, even if the challans are
ignored, the fact that the Respondent is running an art business wing had
been brought on record.
54. In the considered opinion of this Court, as pointed out
hereinbefore, the bona fide need of the Respondent herein can neither be
stated to be one based on desire and imagination. Enough material had
been placed on record to demonstrate that Respondent is indeed running
an art business wing and had conducted exhibitions prior to the filing of
the eviction petition. The Respondent had categorially explained in its
eviction petition as to why the property in its possession is not sufficient
and that the tenanted premises is an alternate suitable accommodation to
run the art business wing. The other judgments relied upon by learned
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Senior Counsel for the Petitioners were rendered on their own peculiar
facts. The proposition of law in the said judgments is not in dispute;
however, the same have been adequately distinguished on facts by the
learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent, as noted hereinbefore.
55. It is noted that the location of the tenanted premises, having access
from Connaught Place’s inner circle, was not the only fact considered by
the learned ARC, and the same was read in context with the requirement
of tenanted premises for the Respondent to expand their art business
wing. The aforesaid business is not a proposed plan, and the same is
being run as demonstrated by the documents placed on record. It is not
the case of proposed business plan for which the tenanted premises is
required, but the same is required for expansion of an already running
business for which the concerned tenanted premises is suitable for the
Respondent.
56. In Anil Bajaj & Anr. (Supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court had
categorically reiterated the settled principle of law that it was not for the
tenant to dictate the landlord as to how the property belonging to the
landlord should be utilised for the purposes of his business, and also the
fact that the even if the landlord is doing business from various other
premises, the same cannot foreclose his right to seek eviction from the
tenanted premises, so long as he intends to use the same for his own
business. The case of the Respondent is on the same footing.
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57. With regard to the submission made on behalf of the learned
Senior Counsel for the Petitioners qua the applicability of Section 22 of
the DRC Act in the eviction petition, this Court finds no merits in the
same. As pointed out hereinabove, the Hon’ble Division Bench of this
Court in K.S. Bhandari (Supra), had already answered the said question
and has held that a company or a body corporate is not barred from
invoking the provisions of Section 22 or Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC
Act, as applicable to the facts of the said case. This Court further notes
that challenge to the said judgment had been dismissed by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court vide order dated 03.11.2025 passed in SLP(C) No.
32272/2025.
58. This Court has perused the record and considered the submissions
advanced on behalf of the parties. It is well settled that the powers of this
Court under Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act are limited and not as wide
as those of an Appellate Court. The scope of interference is confined to
examining whether the impugned order suffers from any illegality,
material irregularity or jurisdictional error. In Sarla Ahuja v. United
India Insurance Co. Ltd.24, the Hon’ble Supreme Court had observed
and held as under: –
“8. …… The satisfaction of the High Court when perusing the
records of the case must be confined to the limited sphere that
the order of the Rent Controller is “according to the law.” In
other works, the High Court shall scrutinize the records to
ascertain whether any illegality has been committed by the
Rent Controller in passing the order under Section 25B. It is24
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not permissible for the High Court in that exercise to come to
a different fact finding unless the finding arrived at by the
Rent Controller on the facts is so unreasonable that no Rent
Controller should have reached such a finding on the
materials available.”
59. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain
Dua25, has held that this Court, while exercising revisional jurisdiction
under Section 25B-(8) of the DRC Act, is not expected to substitute its
own view for that of the learned ARC’s and the scope of interference is
extremely limited. The relevant portion of the said judgment reads as
under: –
“Scope of revision
22. We are, in fact, more concerned with the scope and ambit
of the proviso to Section 25-B(8). The proviso creates a
distinct and unequivocal embargo by not providing an appeal
against the order passed by the learned Rent Controller over
an application filed under sub-section (5). The intendment of
the legislature is very clear, which is to remove the appellate
remedy and thereafter, a further second appeal. It is a clear
omission that is done by the legislature consciously through a
covenant removing the right of two stages of appeals.
23. The proviso to Section 25-B(8) gives the High Court
exclusive power of revision against an order of the learned
Rent Controller, being in the nature of superintendence over
an inferior court on the decision-making process, inclusive of
procedural compliance. Thus, the High Court is not expected
to substitute and supplant its views with that of the trial court
by exercising the appellate jurisdiction. Its role is to satisfy
itself on the process adopted. The scope of interference by the
High Court is very restrictive and except in cases where there
is an error apparent on the face of the record, which would
only mean that in the absence of any adjudication per se, the25
(2022) 6 SCC 30 : (2022) 3 SCC (Civ) 287 : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 419Signature Not Verified
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High Court should not venture to disturb such a decision.
There is no need for holding a roving inquiry in such matters
which would otherwise amount to converting the power of
superintendence into that of a regular first appeal, an act,
totally forbidden by the legislature.”
60. Thus, in view of the aforesaid, this Court is of the opinion that no
interference with the findings returned by the learned ARC in the
impugned judgment is warranted and the same is upheld.
61. The Petitioners-Tenants are directed to vacate and hand over
vacant, peaceful and physical possession of property bearing No. 9-A,
First Floor, Inner Circle, Connaught Place, New Delhi-110001, to the
Respondent-Landlord, forthwith, as the benefit of six months’ period as
per Section 14(7) of the DRC Act has already lapsed.
62. The present petition is dismissed and disposed of accordingly, in
the aforesaid terms.
63. Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.
64. Judgment be uploaded on the website of this Court, forthwith.
AMIT SHARMA
(JUDGE)
JULY 06, 2026/sn/db
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