ADVERTISEMENT
Bombay High Court
Shaikh Arbaaz Alias T Baba Jafar Shaikh vs The State Of Maharashtra And Others on 18 July, 2026
2026:BHC-AUG:29252-DB
342.2026WP1.odt
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO. 342 OF 2026
Shaikh Arbaaz @ T Baba Jafar Shaikh
Age : 24 years, Occ : Labour,
R/o Valimamu Dargah, Jalna
Tq. & Dist. Jalna.
... PETITIONER
VERSUS
1. The State of Maharashtra
Through Section Officer,
Home Department (Special),
2nd Floor, Mantralaya, Mumbai
2. The District Magistrate,
Jalna, Collector Office,
Jalna.
3. The Superintendent,
Central Prison, Harsool,
Aurangabad.
... RESPONDENTS
...
Mr. Ravindra V. Gore, Advocate for the Petitioner
Mr. Govind A. Kulkarni, APP for Respondent nos.1 to 3.
...
CORAM : SANDIPKUMAR C. MORE &
VAISHALI PATIL-JADHAV, JJ.
RESERVED ON : 1st July, 2026
PRONOUNCED ON : 18th July, 2026
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JUDGMENT [Per Vaishali Patil-Jadhav, J.] :
. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. Heard
finally at the admission stage with the consent of learned
Advocates for the parties.
2. By this petition, the petitioner challenges the
detention order dated 11.12.2025 bearing No. 2025/RB-
Desk-1/Pol-1/MPDA/Kavi-224, passed by Respondent No.
2-District Magistrate, Nanded, in exercise of the powers
under Section 3(1) of the Maharashtra Prevention of
Dangerous Activities of Slumlords, Bootleggers, Drug-
offenders, Dangerous Persons, Video Pirates, Sand
Smugglers, Persons Engaged in Black-Marketing of
Essential Commodities, Illegal Gambling, Illegal Lottery and
Human Trafficker Act, 1981 (hereinafter referred to as
"MPDA") and the confirmation order dated 11.02.2026
bearing No. MPDA-1225/CR-711/Spl-3B, passed by
Respondent No. 1-State Government in exercise of the
powers under Section 12(1) of the MPDA. By the impugned
detention order, the petitioner is directed to be detained for
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a period of 12 months on the ground that the petitioner is
a "dangerous person" within the meaning of Section 2(b-1)
of the MPDA.
3. The impugned detention order is passed on a
proposal submitted by Police Inspector, Police Station,
Sadar Bazar, Jalna. The proposal was routed through Sub-
Divisional Police Officer, Jalna, Sub-Division, Jalna and
Superintendent of Police, Jalna and eventually placed
before the respondent No.2 - District Magistrate, Jalna,
who claims to have arrived at a subjective satisfaction that
the petitioner's detention is necessary to prevent him from
acting in a manner prejudicial to public order. The record
reflects registration of eleven (11) past criminal cases, two
preventive actions and one preventive detention order
passed under the MPDA against the petitioner, which was
confirmed by this Court by order dated 22.08.2024 in
Criminal Writ Petition No.1093 of 2024. The reference chart
showing criminal record of the petitioner, is reproduced
hereunder :-
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Sr. Police C.R. No. Under Section Date of filing Present Status
No. Station
1. Sadar 235/2021 324, 504, 34 of IPC 29.03.2021 Pending
Bazar Adjudication
2. Sadar 324/2021 307, 353, 333, 143, 11.05.2021 Pending
Bazar 145, 147, 148, 149, Adjudication
427, 188, 269, 270 of
IPC r/w Section 4/25
of Indian Arms Act,
Section 51(b) of
Disaster Management
Act and Sections 3 and
4 of Public Property
Damage Act
3. Sadar 325/2021 324, 504, 506, 34 of 11.05.2021 Pending
Bazar IPC Adjudication
4. Sadar 984/2021 324, 323, 504, 506, 23.07.2021 Pending
Bazar 143, 147, 148, 149 of Adjudication
IPC
5. Sadar 319/2022 143, 145, 146, 147, 15.04.2022 Pending
Bazar 149, 153, 120(b) of IPC Adjudication
r/w Section 135 of
Bombay Police Act
6. Sadar 801/2022 143, 147, 148, 149, 08.10.2022 Under
Bazar 427, 504, 506 of IPC Investigation
r/w Section 4/25 of
Indian Arms Act.
7. Sadar 343/2023 324, 323, 34 of IPC 03.05.2023 Pending
Bazar Adjudication
8. Sadar 408/2023 324, 34 of IPC 03.05.2023 Pending
Bazar Adjudication
9. Sadar 685/2023 307, 34 of IPC 27.08.2023 Pending
Bazar Adjudication
10. Sadar 687/2023 143, 147, 148, 149, 28.08.2023 Pending
Bazar 324, 294, 336, 337 of Adjudication
IPC r/w 4/25 of the
Indian Arms Act.
11. Sadar 750/2025 189, 191(1), (2), 02.09.2025 Under
Bazar 324(4), 125 of B.N.S. Investigation
r/w Section 4/25 of
IPC
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Preventive Actions :-
Sr. Police Station Chapter Section Date
No. Case No.
1. Sadar Bazar, 121/2022 107 CRPC 28.04.2022
Jalna
2. Sadar Bazar, 39/2023 110 (e) (g) 27.05.2023
Jalna CRPC
Detention Action :-
Sr. Police Station Detention Order Under Disposal
No. No. Section
1. Sadar Bazar, Proposal No. Section As per the order of
Jalna 01/23, District 3(1) the District
Magistrate MPDA Magistrate, Jalna,
Office, Jalna; No. Order No. 2023/RB-
2023/RB-Desk- Desk-1/Pol-1/Kavi-
1/Pol-1/Kavi- 250, dated
250, dated 27.12.2023, detained
27.12.2023 for one year at
Central Prison,
Harsul, Chhatrapati
Sambhajinagar
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit
that although eleven crimes are registered against the
petitioner, eight cases are triable by the Court of J.M.F.C.
Only two cases are serious, which are punishable under
section 307 of the IPC. All cases are pending adjudication.
He would further submit that the detention order is passed
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after considering crime No.750/2025 only and two in-
camera statements.
5. Learned counsel would further submit that the
impugned detention order suffers from procedural as well
as substantive infirmities and it was passed without there
being subjective satisfaction on the part of the detaining
authority. The impugned order is challenged mainly on the
following grounds :-
(I) That the Advisory Board failed to submit its
report within the period prescribed under Section
11(1) of the MPDA, thereby violating the mandatory
statutory timeline.
(II) That the procedure contemplated under
Section 10 of the MPDA was not complied with.
(III) That the in-camera statements of Witnesses
'A' and 'B', are vague, stereotyped and identical,
which fail to disclose the precise date of the alleged
incidents, and, even if accepted, only disclose
issues relating to law and order situation and not
public order.
(IV) That the present detention order is passed on
the same grounds on which the previous detention
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order was passed, for which the petitioner has
already completed his detention.
(V) That there is no live link between the old
cases and the order of detention.
The petitioner has been falsely detained and as
such, the impugned order deserves to be quashed and
set aside.
Learned Advocate for the petitioner in support of
his contentions relied on the judgment in the case of
Shaikh Mehboob @ Goru s/o. Shaikh Babu Vs. State
of Maharashtra & others in Criminal Writ Petition
No.1516 of 2025, decided on 10.03.2026.
6. Per contra, learned APP supported the
impugned order and submitted that it is passed strictly in
accordance with the provisions of the MPDA, on due
application of mind and on recording the requisite
subjective satisfaction. Learned APP submitted that the
petitioner is a "Dangerous Person" as defined under the
MPDA, considering his criminal antecedents. Learned APP
resisted the petition on the following grounds:
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(I) That the detention order was passed well
within the statutory period prescribed under the
MPDA.
(II) That the Detaining Authority, having
considered the petitioner's criminal antecedents,
the earlier preventive measures taken under
Section 107 and Section 110 (e),(g) of the CRPC,
his release from preventive detention in January
2025 after completion of one year of detention,
and his subsequent involvement in a crime
registered in September 2025, was subjectively
satisfied that there existed a real likelihood of the
petitioner indulging in further activities
prejudicial to the maintenance of public order
unless detained.
(III) That the two in-camera statements of
witnesses - `A' and `B' disclose acts of
intimidation and terror creating an atmosphere of
fear in the locality, thereby affecting public order
and not merely law and order.
Lastly, learned APP prayed that the writ petition be
dismissed.
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Learned APP in support of his submissions relied on
the judgment in the case of Phulwari Jagdambaprasad
Pathak v. Shri R.H. Mendonca & Ors., reported in (2000)
6 SCC 751.
7. Heard learned Advocate Mr. Ravindra V. Gore for
the petitioner and learned APP Mr. Govind A. Kulkarni for
the State. With the assistance of the learned Advocates, we
have perused the record so also the citations relied upon by
both the sides.
8. Before dealing with other contentions regarding
the detention order, the contention raised on behalf of the
petitioner that the statutory timeline prescribed under the
MPDA has not been adhered to needs to be dealt with first.
This contention deserves to be examined in the light of
Section 11 of the MPDA Act. Here, it will be apposite to
advert to the provision of Section 11 of the MPDA which
reads as under:
"11. Procedure of Advisory Boards:
(1) The Advisory Board shall, after considering the materials
placed before it and, after calling for such further information as
it may deem necessary from the State Government or from any
person called for the purpose through the State Government or
from the person concerned, and if, in any particular case, the
Advisory Board considers it essential so to do or if the person
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concerned desires to be heard, after hearing him in person,
submit its report to the State Government, within seven weeks
from the date of detention of the person concerned.
(2) The report of the Advisory Board shall specify in a separate
part thereof the opinion of the Advisory Board as to whether or
not there is sufficient cause for the detention of the person
concerned.
(3) When there is difference of opinion among the members
forming the Advisory Board, the opinion of the majority of such
members shall be deemed to be the opinion of the Board.
(4) The proceedings of the Advisory Board and its report,
excepting that part of the report in which the opinion of the
Advisory Board is specified, shall be confidential.
(5) Nothing in this section shall entitle any person against whom
a detention order has been made to appear by any legal
practitioner in any matter connected with the reference to the
Advisory Board."
Section 11 prescribes time limit within which the
Advisory Board is required to submit its report. A plain
reading of Section 11 indicates that the Advisory Board
must submit its opinion within seven weeks from the date
of the detention order.
Significantly, while the Act mandates that the
proceedings before the Advisory Board and submission of
its opinion must be completed within the aforesaid
statutory period of seven weeks, no separate period is
prescribed for confirmation of the detention order by the
State Government after receipt of the opinion of the
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Advisory Board. Such confirmation, therefore, is required to
be made within a reasonable time.
In the present case, the in-camera statements of
Confidential Witnesses 'A' and 'B' were recorded on
10.10.2025 and 11.10.2025 respectively and were duly
verified by the Sub-Divisional Police Officer on 16.10.2025
and 17.10.2025. Thereafter, the Superintendent of Police,
Jalna forwarded the proposal to the Detaining Authority on
24.10.2025. Upon considering the proposal and the
material placed before it, the Detaining Authority passed
the impugned detention order on 11.12.2025.
Thereafter, the proposal was forwarded to the State
Government on 16.12.2025 and the State Government
approved the detention order and referred the matter to the
Advisory Board on 19.12.2025. The Advisory Board heard
the petitioner on 22.01.2026 and submitted its opinion on
27.01.2026, which was well within the statutory period of
seven weeks from the date of detention, thereby complying
the mandate of Section 11 of the MPDA.
On 11.02.2026, the State Government confirmed the
detention order i.e., within fifteen days from the date of
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receipt of the opinion of the Advisory Board, which, in the
absence of any prescribed statutory period, cannot be said
to be unreasonable. Thus, the entire procedure
contemplated under the MPDA has been duly adhered to
and thus, the contention advanced on behalf of the
petitioner that the statutory timeline has not been followed
cannot be considered.
9. Before turning to the merits of the matter, it
would be apposite to refer to the provisions of MPDA and
the principles regarding preventive detention as laid down
by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in various judgments.
10. Section 3 of the MPDA reads as under :-
"3. Power to make orders detaining certain persons.
(1) The State Government may, if satisfied with respect to
any person that with a view to preventing him from acting
in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public
order, it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that
such person be detained.
(2) If, having regard to the circumstances prevailing or
likely to prevail in any area within the local limits of the
jurisdiction of a District Magistrate or a Commissioner of
Police, the State Government is satisfied that it is
necessary so to do, it may by order in writing, direct, that
during such period as may be specified in the order such
District Magistrate or Commissioner of Police may also, if
satisfied as provided in sub-section (1), exercise the powers
conferred by the said sub-section :Provided that the period
specified in the order made by the State Government under
this sub-section shall not, in the first instance, exceed six
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months, but the State Government may, if satisfied as
aforesaid that it is necessary so to do, amend such order to
extend such period from time to time by any period not
exceeding three months at any one time.
(3) When any order is made under this section by an
officer mentioned in sub-section (2), he shall forthwith
report the fact to the State Government, together with the
grounds on which the order has been made and such other
particulars as, in his opinion, have a bearing on the matter,
and no such order shall remain in force for more than
twelve days after the making thereof, unless, in the
meantime, it has been approved by the State Government."
11. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
Nenavath Bujji Etc. Vs. State of Telangana, [AIR 2024
SC 1610] has discussed the distinction between Public
Order and Law and Order by observing that :-
"32. The crucial issue is whether the activities of the
detenu were prejudicial to public order. While the
expression 'law and order' is wider in scope inasmuch
as contravention of law always affects order, 'Public
order' has a narrower ambit, and could be affected by
only such contravention, which affects the community or
the public at large. Public order is the even tempo of life
of the community taking the country as a whole or even
a specified locality. The distinction between the areas of
'law and order' and 'public order' is one of degree and
extent of the reach, of the act in question on society. It is
the potentiality of the act to disturb the even tempo of life
of the community which makes it prejudicial to the
maintenance of the public order. If a contravention in its
effect is confined only to a few individuals directly
involved as distinct from a wide spectrum of public, it
could raise problem of law and order only. In other
words, the true distinction between the areas of law and
order and public order lies not merely in the nature or
quality of the act, but in the degree and extent of its
reach upon society. Acts similar in nature, but committed
in different contexts and circumstances, might cause
different reactions. In one case it might affect specific
individuals only, and therefore touches the problem of
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law and order only, while in another it might affect
public order. The act by itself, therefore, is not
determinant of its own gravity. In its quality it may not
differ from other similar acts, but in its potentiality, that
is, in its impact on society, it may be very different."
12. In the case of Shaik Nazneen Vs. The State
of Telangana and Ors. [(2023) 9 SCC 633], the Apex
Court has observed that :-
"19. In any case, the State is not without a remedy,
as in case the detenu is much a menace to the society
as is being alleged, then the prosecution should seek for
the cancellation of his bail and/or move an appeal to
the Higher Court. But definitely seeking shelter under
the preventive detention law is not the proper remedy
under the facts and circumstances of the case."
13. Keeping this legal position in mind, this Court
is required to examine whether there existed relevant
material on the basis of which subjective satisfaction
could reasonably be reached.
14. The impugned detention order is passed on
the basis of one recent crime i.e. Crime No. 750 of 2025
registered for the offences punishable under sections 189,
191(1), (2), 324(4), 125 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita
read with Section 4/25 of the Indian Arms Act and on the
basis of the in-camera statements of Confidential
Witnesses 'A' and 'B'.
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15. Though, the detention order refers to eleven
criminal cases registered against the petitioner, a majority
of those offences are committed between the years 2021
and 2023. Those incidents had become part of the
petitioner's criminal history, which was considered while
passing the earlier order of preventive detention dated
27.12.2023. It is evident from the record that after
completion of the earlier period of preventive detention in
January, 2025, no material has been placed before the
detaining authority to demonstrate any continuous course
of criminal conduct except crime no.750/2025 and the two
in-camera statements. In such circumstances, the old
criminal cases which had already been taken into
consideration while passing the earlier detention order
cannot be considered so as to bridge the gap between the
petitioner's release and passing of the present detention
order.
Preventive detention is based upon the necessity of
preventing imminent prejudicial activities and not for
punishing a person for his past conduct. The stale
incidents relied upon have no live and proximate link with
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the offence committed by the petitioner in September, 2025,
which is the only offence considered while passing the
present detention order so as to arrive at the requisite
subjective satisfaction.
16. Another significant aspect is that the present
detention order is substantially founded on the same
grounds that had already formed the basis of the earlier
detention order dated 27.12.2023. Except for crime
no.750/2025 and the two in-camera statements, no
independent or fresh material is placed before the
detaining authority.
17. Upon perusal of the in-camera statements of
witnesses 'A' and 'B', we find that they are stereotype in
nature. A bare reading of the statements reveals that the
incidents narrated therein are of a personal nature
involving the individual witnesses and the petitioner. The
statements do not disclose any incident which would have
an impact on the broader community or the general
public. Thus, the statements which form the basis of
subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority, are not
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sufficient to arrive at the conclusion that the petitioner is
a dangerous person for the public at large and because of
him, there is constant fear and issue of public order
arose. Also, we find that the in-camera statements of
witnesses 'A' and 'B' do not mention the day and date of
incident. The absence of such essential particulars casts
a serious doubt on the reliability and veracity of the
statements.
18. There is no dispute with the ratio laid down in
the case of Phulwari (supra) that an order of preventive
detention can be founded even on a single offence or on the
basis of in-camera statements of confidential witnesses,
provided the material is sufficient to satisfy the detaining
authority that the activities of the detenu are prejudicial to
the maintenance of public order. In the present case, the
role of the petitioner in the offence relied on and the
incidents stated in confidential statements of witnesses 'A'
and 'B' disclose incidents affecting individuals only and not
such as affecting the public at large. Therefore, the reliance
placed by the learned APP on Phulwari (supra) is of no
assistance.
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19. In view of the above, we are of the considered
view that the detaining authority failed to apply its mind
independently to the present grounds of detention. The
mere fact that the petitioner has a criminal history does
not, by itself, justify an order of preventive detention unless
the activities in question are shown to be prejudicial to the
maintenance of public order.
20. The petitioner may be a person against whom
several criminal cases are registered, but that alone does
not make him a "dangerous person" within the meaning of
Section 2(b-1) of the MPDA Act.
21. On a careful examination of detention order, the
crimes considered for passing the detention order,
statements of witnesses "A" and "B" and law laid down in
the aforementioned authorities, we are of the view that the
petitioner had at the most created law and order situation
and no disturbance to the public order. Though the
Advisory Board had approved the detention of the
petitioner, yet we are of the opinion that there was no
material before the detaining authority for arriving at a
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subjective satisfaction to detain him being a dangerous
person.
22. For the aforesaid reasons, the petition deserves
to be allowed. Hence, the following order is passed :-
ORDER
(i) The Writ Petition stands allowed.
(ii) The detention order dated 11.12.2025 bearing
SPONSORED
No.2025/RB-Desk-1/Pol-1/MPDA/Kavi-224, passed by
Respondent No. 2-District Magistrate, Nanded and the
confirmation order dated 11.02.2026 bearing No. MPDA-
1225/CR-711/Spl-3B, passed by Respondent No. 1-State
Government are hereby quashed and set aside.
(iii) The Petitioner- Shaikh Arbaaz @ T Baba Jafar Shaikh
shall be released forthwith, if not required in any other
offence.
(iv) Rule is made absolute in the above terms.
[VAISHALI PATIL-JADHAV] [SANDIPKUMAR C. MORE]
JUDGE JUDGE
sga
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