Telangana High Court
Shaik Fakruddin vs Mrs. Beena Agarwal on 28 July, 2026
Author: P.Sam Koshy
Bench: P.Sam Koshy
IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA
AT HYDERABAD
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE P.SAM KOSHY
CIVIL REVISION PETITON No.1726 of 2026
DATE: 28.07.2026
Between:
Shaik Fakruddin, S/o. Shaik Yaqub.
...Petitioner
AND
Mrs. Beena Agarwal, W/o. Bajranglal Agarwal.
...Respondent
ORDER:
Heard Mr. Sunil B. Ganu, learned Senior Counsel representing
Mr. Ashish Kale, learned counsel for the petitioner; and Mr. R.A.
Achutanand, learned counsel for respondent.
2. The instant Civil Revision Petition under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India has been filed by the petitioner assailing the
order dated 16.06.2026, in E.A.No.197 of 2019 in E.P. No. 5 of 2015,
passed by the III Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad.
3. Vide the impugned order, the Court below has dismissed the
aforesaid E.A.No.197 of 2019 filed by the petitioner herein under
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Order XXI Rule 29 read with Rule 26 of the C.P.C. and directed the
petitioner to vacate the suit schedule premises within a period of two
months from the date of the judgment.
4. It is the case of the petitioner are that the respondent herein
had instituted O.S.No.81 of 2010 against the petitioner seeking his
eviction from the suit schedule property under Section 106 of the
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (for short, ‘the Act’) on the basis of the
landlord-tenant relationship subsisting between the parties. The said
suit came to be decreed by the Trial Court vide judgment and decree
dated 31.12.2014. The petitioner, aggrieved thereby, carried the
matter in appeal before this Court in City Civil Court Appeal No.56 of
2015, which came to be dismissed vide judgment dated 26.04.2018,
thereby attaining finality to the decree of eviction.
5. It is the further case of the petitioner that during the pendency
of the said appeal, the petitioner and the respondent entered into a
Memorandum of Understanding (for short ‘MoU’) dated 03.12.2017,
whereunder the petitioner agreed to pay Rs.28,50,000/- towards
arrears of rent in full and final satisfaction of the claim for recovery of
arrears and to hand over the keys of the subject flat to the respondent
upon such payment. In or around December, 2018 the respondent
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offered to sell the very same suit schedule property to the petitioner
for a total sale consideration of Rs.1,04,50,000/- and that in
furtherance thereof, the petitioner paid a total sum of Rs.94,50,000/-
to the respondent, of which Rs.28,50,000/- payable under the earlier
MoU was adjusted, and the balance of Rs.66,00,000/- was paid
towards advance sale consideration as on 26.01.2019, evidenced by a
receipt / acknowledgment executed by the respondent’s husband on
the said date. A further sum of Rs.5,00,000/- was, according to the
petitioner, paid to the respondent’s son at her instance, to be adjusted
towards part sale consideration, thereby taking the total payments to
Rs.71,00,000/- as on March, 2019.
6. It is the petitioner’s grievance that having received the aforesaid
amounts, the respondent, after the demise of her husband resiled
from the alleged agreement to sell and commenced demanding
amounts in excess of what was agreed. This led the petitioner to
institute O.S.No.852 of 2019 before this Court, seeking specific
performance of the alleged oral agreement of sale dated 26.01.2019,
which is stated to be pending adjudication.
7. On this basis, the petitioner contended before the Court below
that his possession over the suit schedule property was no longer that
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of a tenant or judgment-debtor, but that of an agreement-holder
entitled to protection under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property
Act, 1882 and accordingly sought stay of the execution proceedings in
E.P.No.5 of 2015 pending disposal of O.S.No.852 of 2019, by way of
E.A.No.197 of 2019 under Order XXI Rule 29 read with Rule 26 of
C.P.C. The said application came to be dismissed by the Court below
vide the impugned order dated 16.06.2026, giving rise to the instant
Civil Revision Petition.
8. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner assailed the impugned
order primarily on two grounds, firstly, that the Court below erred in
failing to appreciate that the oral agreement of sale, being a
subsequent event arising after institution of E.P.No.5 of 2015, ought to
have been taken into account instead of being brushed aside on a
hair-splitting technicality; and secondly, that the findings recorded in
the impugned order are erroneous inasmuch as the Court below lost
sight of the fact that the parties, subsequent to the decree in
O.S.No.81 of 2010, had entered into a fresh oral arrangement for sale
of the very same property, non-compliance of which by the
respondent compelled the petitioner to institute O.S.No.852 of 2019,
and that pendency of the said suit warranted stay of the execution
proceedings.
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9. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, in support of his
contentions, relied upon the following decisions:
b) M. Venkataramana Hebbar (Dead) by LRs. vs. M.
Rajagopal Hebbar and Others 2
10. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent contended that
on a perusal of the records, it is seen that the decree of eviction
passed in O.S.No.81 of 2010 attained finality upon dismissal of City
Civil Court Appeal No.56 of 2015 as far back as 26.04.2018, and that
the alleged agreement to sell the suit schedule property is said to
have been entered into in December, 2018 and culminating in the
receipt dated 26.01.2019, is admittedly oral, unregistered, and has,
till date, not fructified into a registered sale deed despite the
petitioner claiming to have paid a substantial part of the sale
consideration as far back as March, 2019, a period of over seven years
prior to the impugned order.
11. Learned counsel for the respondent, in support of his
contentions, relied upon the following decisions:
a) M. S. Ananthamurthy & Anr. vs. J. Manjula Etc. 3
1
1963 SCC OnLine SC 9
2
(2007) 6 Supreme Court Cases 401
3
2025 INSC 273
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e) Subhas Kumar Singh and Others vs. Sheo Balak Singh
and Others 7
f) Quazi Toufiqur Rahman vs. Mst. Nurbanu Bibi 8
12. Having heard the contentions put forth on either side and on
perusal of records, the question that falls for consideration is ‘whether
an unregistered oral agreement of sale, said to have been entered into
subsequent to a decree of eviction that has attained finality, and part-
performance whereof is claimed on the strength of receipts of
payment, entitles the judgment-debtor to a stay of execution
proceedings under Order XXI Rule 29 of C.P.C. on the plea of
protection under Section 53A of the Act?’
13. It would be relevant at this juncture to take note of Section 53A
of the Act, which for ready is reproduced hereunder, viz.,
“53A. Part performance.–
Where any person contracts to transfer for consideration any
immoveable property by writing signed by him or on his behalf from
4
C.R.P.(NDP)No.3287 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012,
decided on 22.11.2012, by the Madras High Court
5
CM (M) 2442/2025 & Batch, decided on 18.11.2025
by the Delhi High Court
6
2004 (AIR) KAR 336
7
1975 SCC OnLine Pat 89
8
1975 SCC OnLine Gau 20
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which the terms necessary to constitute the transfer can be
ascertained with reasonable certainty,
and the transferee has, in part performance of the contract, taken
possession of the property or any part thereof, or the transferee,
being already in possession, continues in possession in part
performance of the contract and has done some act in furtherance
of the contract,
and the transferee has performed or is willing to perform his part of
the contract,
then, notwithstanding that where there is an instrument of transfer,
that the transfer has not been completed in the manner prescribed
therefor by the law for the time being in force, the transferor or any
person claiming under him shall be debarred from enforcing against
the transferee and persons claiming under him any right in respect
of the property of which the transferee has taken or continued in
possession, other than a right expressly provided by the terms of
the contract:
Provided that nothing in this section shall affect the rights of a
transferee for consideration who has no notice of the contract or of
the part performance thereof.”
A bare perusal of the aforesaid provision makes it amply clear
that the contract for transfer of immovable property should be in
writing, signed by the transferor or on his behalf, and that the
transferee has, in part-performance thereof, taken possession or
continued in possession and has done some act in furtherance of the
contract. An oral agreement, howsoever it may be sought to be
evidenced through subsequent receipts, part-payments, or conduct of
the parties, does not satisfy the foundational requirement of Section
Page 8 of 1153A of the Act, which is a written and signed contract. The petitioner’s
reliance on Section 53A of the Act is therefore misconceived at the
very threshold.
14. At the outset, what also needs to be appreciated is that the
decree of eviction dated 31.12.2014 has not merely attained finality
before this Court in City Civil Court Appeal No.56 of 2015, but has
been taken up to, and dismissed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a
Special Leave Petition. Therefore, there is no residual doubt or dispute
as to the decree holder’s entitlement to execute the decree. What
stands in the way, according to the petitioner, is a wholly subsequent
and disputed transaction.
15. Quite apart from this, the possession that the petitioner is
admittedly seeking to protect is possession that has already been
adjudicated upon and concluded against him as a tenant liable to be
evicted under Section 106 of the Act by a decree that has attained
finality up to this Court. It is not open to a judgment-debtor to seek to
unsettle a final decree of eviction by setting up years after the decree
attained finality, an oral arrangement said to have been arrived at for
the very same property, and thereafter institute a fresh suit for
specific performance as a device to indefinitely forestall execution. If
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the petitioner was indeed put in possession of monies paid towards
sale consideration to the extent claimed, a substantial sum of over
Rs.71,00,000/- as far back as March, 2019 the prudent and legally
sanctioned course open to him was to have had the sale deed
registered, or at the least, to have secured a written and registered
agreement of sale safeguarding his interest. Having chosen instead to
proceed on the strength of a MoU and subsequent oral arrangements
and informal receipts, the petitioner cannot now complain that the
fruits of a validly obtained decree should be kept in abeyance on the
basis of such an inchoate and unregistered claim.
16. What weighs further in the mind of this Court is the timeline.
The decree holder obtained her decree in 2014 after contesting the
suit for four years since 2010; the decree was confirmed by this Court
in 2018 and by the Hon’ble Supreme Court thereafter; and even so,
despite the E.P. having been filed in the year 2015, the decree
remains unexecuted after more than a decade, with the decree holder
yet to enjoy the fruits of a decree that has stood the test of every
appellate and revisional forum available in law. To permit the
execution to be stayed indefinitely at this stage, on the strength of a
disputed oral transaction raised for the first time years after the
decree attained finality, would reduce the decree holder’s hard-won
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decree to a mockery of justice. This Court cannot help but observe
that the petitioner’s conduct invoking a settlement to close one E.P. in
2018, only to set up an entirely new and disputed oral transaction to
resist a second, and thereafter instituting a suit for specific
performance years after the decree attained finality bears the
unmistakable imprint of successive and calculated attempts to prolong
his continuance in the suit schedule property, rather than a bona fide
assertion of rights flowing from a genuine transaction.
17. Further, the institution of O.S.No.852 of 2019 and the
consequent application for stay of execution, in the considered view of
this Court, is little more than another attempt by the petitioner to
prolong his stay over the suit schedule property, notwithstanding a
decree of eviction that has attained finality long back. Moreover, mere
pendency of a subsequent suit for specific performance, founded on
an oral and unregistered agreement, cannot by itself operate as a
valid ground to stay execution of a decree that is otherwise
executable, more so when the decree-holder’s right to execute has, at
every stage, been sought to be stalled by successive rounds of
litigation at the instance of the judgment-debtor.
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18. This Court, therefore, finds no infirmity in the order of the Court
below dismissing E.A.No.197 of 2019 and as such no case is made out
warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its supervisory
jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The question
of law framed is accordingly answered against the petitioner.
19. The instant Civil Revision Petition thus fails, and is accordingly,
dismissed.
20. As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions pending if any, shall stand
closed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.
_____________
P.SAM KOSHY, J
Date: 28.07.2026
GSD
