Delhi High Court
Sh. Rajpal Naurang Yadav & Anr vs M/S. Murli Projects Pvt. Ltd & Anr on 10 July, 2026
Author: Swarana Kanta Sharma
Bench: Swarana Kanta Sharma
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* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment reserved on: 02.04.2026
Judgment pronounced on: 10.07.2026
Judgment uploaded on: 10.07.2026
+ CRL.M.C. 4870/2024 & CRL.M.A. 18570/2024, CRL.M.A.
31260/2025 & CRL.M.(BAIL) 338/2026
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CRL.M.C. 4870/2024 & connected matters Page 1 of 108
Digitally Signed
By:ZEENAT PRAVEEN
Signing Date:10.07.2026
15:43:18
SH. RAJPAL NAURANG YADAV & ANR. .....Petitioners
Through: Mr. Saurabh Trivedi, Mr.
Bhaskar Upadhaya, Mr.
Kautilya Kumar Singh and Mr.
Surya Pratap Singh, Advocates
versus
M/S. MURLI PROJECTS PVT. LTD & ANR. .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Avneet Singh Sikka and
Mr. S.K. Sharma, Advocates
for R-1.
Mr. Naresh Kumar Chahar,
APP for the State
CORAM:
HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE SWARANA KANTA SHARMA
JUDGMENT
Index to the Judgment
FACTUAL BACKGROUND ………………………………………………………… 3
A. Agreements between the Complainant and the Convicts…………………… 3
B. Civil & Criminal Proceedings Instituted by the Complainant…………… 19
C. The Present Proceedings …………………………………………………………………. 50
SUBMISSIONS BEFORE THE COURT …………………………………….. 50
A. On Behalf of the Petitioners/Convicts ……………………………………………. 50
B. On Behalf of the Complainant/Respondent No. 1 …………………………. 58
ANALYSIS & FINDINGS ………………………………………………………….. 64
A. Criminal Revision Petitions challenging the Judgment of
Conviction dated 13.04.2018 and 21.01.2019 ………………………………………. 66
(i) Revision Petitions filed before Sessions Court……………………………… 67
(ii) Writ Petition No. 360/2022 filed before this Court ……………………. 70
(iii) Whether ‘sufficient cause’ has been demonstrated by the
petitioner?…………………………………………………………………………………………. 73
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(iv) The Conduct of Petitioner no. 1 before this Court …………………….. 79
(v) Conclusion ……………………………………………………………………………….. 83
B. Criminal Miscellaneous Petitions challenging the Judgment
dated 29.05.2024 and for Quashing of Complaint Cases …………………. 84
(i) Whether the Complaint Cases under Section 138 of NI Act deserve
to be quashed? ………………………………………………………………………………….. 85
(ii) Whether there is any infirmity in the impugned judgment dated
29.05.2024?……………………………………………………………………………………….. 95
(iii) Conclusion ……………………………………………………………………………….105
C. Final Order …………………………………………………………………………………..107
DR. SWARANA KANTA SHARMA, J
1. The present batch of twenty-one petitions emanates from seven
complaints instituted under Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act, 1881 [hereafter ‗NI Act‘] wherein the petitioners
stand convicted and sentenced. As the petitions arise from a common
factual matrix and raise identical issues, they are being adjudicated
and disposed of by this common judgment.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. Agreements between the Complainant and the Convicts
2. The brief facts of the case, as borne out from the record and
the petitions, are that in the year 2010, the CEO of the complainant
company, namely M/s Murli Projects Private Limited, had
approached petitioner no. 1, Rajpal Yadav, on behalf of M/s Shree
Naurang Godavari Entertainment Limited, as both belonged to the
same district in Uttar Pradesh. It is the case of the petitioners that the
complainant had expressed his desire to finance a film titled ‗Ata
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By:ZEENAT PRAVEEN
Signing Date:10.07.2026
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Pata Lapata’ [hereafter ‗the Film’], which was being produced by
M/s Shree Naurang Godavari Entertainment Limited and was then
nearing completion. According to the petitioners, the complainant
company, through its CEO, Shri Madho Gopal Aggarwal, invested a
sum of ₹5,00,00,000/- in the Film as one of its financiers and, in
return, sought a profit of ₹3,00,00,000/-, to which M/s Shree Naurang
Godavari Entertainment Limited had agreed. It is further the case of
the petitioners that, following the aforesaid investment, the
complainant company got M/s Shree Naurang Godavari
Entertainment Limited to execute a written agreement dated
30.05.2010, stipulating repayment of a total amount of ₹8,00,00,000/-
, inclusive of ₹3,00,00,000/- towards profit, within ten months, i.e. by
30.03.2011, contingent upon the release of the Film. The agreement
was executed by M/s Shree Naurang Godavari Entertainment
Limited, while petitioner no. 1, Rajpal Naurang Yadav, and petitioner
no. 2, Radha Rajpal Yadav, signed the same as guarantors. The
petitioners contend that, although the agreement was essentially an
investment agreement, it was inadvertently or deliberately titled as an
‗Inter Corporate Loan Agreement’ by the complainant. A copy of the
principal agreement dated 30.05.2010 is extracted hereunder:
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By:ZEENAT PRAVEEN
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3. Further, owing to unforeseen delays in the release of the Film,
it is stated that the parties extended the deadline for repayment from
31.03.2011 to 31.12.2011 and revised the amount payable to
₹9,38,06,332/- by way of a First Supplementary Agreement dated
21.09.2011. The said agreement is extracted hereunder:
Signature Not Verified
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By:ZEENAT PRAVEEN
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4. It is the case of the petitioners that further delays necessitated
the execution of a Second Supplementary Agreement dated
04.04.2012, whereby the repayment deadline was extended to
30.09.2012 and the amount payable was revised to ₹10,72,52,745/-.
A copy of the Second Supplementary Agreement dated 04.04.2012 is
extracted hereunder:
Signature Not Verified
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Signing Date:10.07.2026
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5. The petitioners further state that, owing to continued delays,
the parties entered into a Third Supplementary Agreement dated
09.08.2012, whereby the repayment deadline was further extended to
28.02.2013 and the amount payable was revised to ₹11,10,60,350/-.
According to the petitioners, petitioner no. 2, as a signatory of M/s
Shree Naurang Godavari Entertainment Limited, had issued 08 post-
dated cheques as security. It is their case that the release of the Film
was a pre-condition for payment of any amount by M/s Shree
Naurang Godavari Entertainment Limited to the complainant
company and, therefore, any legal liability in respect of the said
amount could have arisen only after the release of the Film and not
prior thereto.
6. It is also the case of the petitioners that the aforesaid security
cheques were to be returned by the complainant company to M/s
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Signing Date:10.07.2026
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Shree Naurang Godavari Entertainment Limited upon payment being
made and were never intended to be presented or encashed. The
petitioners further state that 07 out of the 08 cheques issued pursuant
to the Third Supplementary Agreement are the cheques in question
and form the subject matter of the present complaints under Section
138 of the NI Act. A copy of the Third and final Supplementary
Agreement dated 09.08.2012 executed between the parties is
extracted hereunder:
Signature Not Verified
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Digitally Signed
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Signing Date:10.07.2026
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Signature Not Verified
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B. Civil & Criminal Proceedings Instituted by the
Complainant
7. The petitioners further allege that the Film was ready for
release by September/October, 2012 and that its music album had
already been launched in Mumbai, with the release of the Film
scheduled for 12.10.2012. According to the petitioners, instead of
assisting M/s Shree Naurang Godavari Entertainment Limited in
ensuring the successful release and promotion of the Film so that it
could generate revenue, the complainant company, even before the
due date for repayment, i.e. 28.02.2013, instituted a civil suit, being
CS(OS) No. 3037/2012, before this Court. The suit was initially filed
as a suit for injunction and was subsequently amended into a suit for
recovery of the amount claimed under the Third SupplementarySignature Not Verified
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Agreement, which, according to the petitioners, was in breach of the
terms of the said agreement dated 09.08.2012. The petitioners further
state that, on 03.10.2012, learned counsel appearing for the
complainant company had submitted before this Court in the
aforesaid suit that the plaintiff would amend the plaint to seek
recovery of the amount alleged to be due from the present petitioners
and would deposit the requisite court fee within two working days.
At that stage, the Film was scheduled to be released on 12.10.2012.
Based on the aforesaid submissions, this Court directed the present
petitioners, who were defendants in the said suit, not to create any
third-party interest in the negative prints of the Film. They were also
restrained from assigning the music, audio and video rights,
including CD/DVD/Internet rights, satellite rights, channel rights and
export/international rights, to any person without prior permission of
the Court until further orders. The order dated 03.10.2012 passed by
this Court in the aforesaid suit is extracted hereunder:
―The learned counsel for the plaintiff states that the plaintiff would
amend the plaint so as to claim recovery of the amount which it
claims to be due to it from the defendants and would pay the
requisite court fee to the same within two working days. The case of
the plaintiff is that under the Agreement between the parties, the
defendants had agreed to secure the money paid to them by the
plaintiff by creating a lien on the negative of the film ‗Ata Pata
Laapata’ and they had also agreed to assign the music audio and
video rights, CD/DVI/Internet rights, satellite rights, channel rights,
export/international rights to the plaintiff as a security for repayment
of the loan taken from it. The learned counsel appearing for the
plaintiff further states that the movie is scheduled to be released on
12th October, 2012.
Be issued summons in the suit and notice of the application to the
defendants for 11th October, 2012.
In the meantime, the defendants shall not create any third party
interest in the negative prints of the film ‗Ata Pata Laapata’ and shallSignature Not Verified
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By:ZEENAT PRAVEEN
Signing Date:10.07.2026
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not assign music audio and video rights, CD/DVI/Internet rights,
satellite rights, channel rights, export/international rights to anyone
without prior permission of the Court, till further orders. This order
will operate from the time it is served upon defendants along with
suit summons and notice of the application. The plaintiff is directed
to take dasti process and get the defendants served at its own
responsibility within one week. The Registry is directed to give dasti
process to the plaintiffs within two working days.
The plaintiff is directed to comply with provisions of Order 39 Rule
3 of CPC within 24 hours. Dasti…‖
8. It is the case of the petitioners that, in the meantime, during the
pendency of the aforesaid suit before this Court, the complainant
company, in January-February, 2013, presented all the security
cheques for encashment without informing the petitioners and
without obtaining leave of this Court. Thereafter, seven separate
complaints under Section 138 of the NI Act came to be filed by the
complainant company against M/s Shree Naurang Godavari
Entertainment Limited and the present petitioners before the learned
Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate (East), Karkardooma
Courts, Delhi [hereafter ‗Trial Court’]
9. In the said complaints, it was alleged that, in April, 2010,
petitioner no. 1 had approached the complainant seeking financial
assistance for the completion of the Film ‗Ata Pata Lapata’ and, at
his request, the complainant had agreed to provide such assistance. It
was further alleged that, after obtaining a loan of ₹5 crores for
completion of the Film, petitioner nos. 1 and 2, in their individual
capacities, along with M/s Shree Naurang Godavari Entertainment
Limited, had stood as guarantors. According to the complainant,
under the terms of the agreement, M/s Shree Naurang GodavariSignature Not Verified
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Entertainment Limited and the petitioners had undertaken to pay,
without demur and on demand, a sum of ₹8 crores, comprising ₹5
crores towards the principal amount and ₹3 crores towards the agreed
return. The complainant further alleged that, in consideration thereof,
M/s Shree Naurang Godavari Entertainment Limited and petitioner
nos. 1 and 2, as guarantors, had also executed a promissory note and
had issued post-dated cheques towards repayment of the loan
amount. It was also pleaded that, since M/s Shree Naurang Godavari
Entertainment Limited was unable to adhere to its financial
commitments regarding repayment, the loan was rescheduled on
three occasions by way of separate agreements dated 21.09.2011,
04.04.2012 and 09.08.2012. According to the complainant, under the
last agreement dated 09.08.2012, the petitioners and M/s Shree
Naurang Godavari Entertainment Limited had agreed to pay a total
sum of ₹11,10,60,350/-, inclusive of the principal amount and the
interest accrued thereon. It was alleged that all the earlier post-dated
cheques were returned and that petitioner no. 2, in her capacity as
Director of M/s Shree Naurang Godavari Entertainment Limited, had
issued eight fresh cheques aggregating to ₹11,10,60,350/- in favour
of the complainant. Out of these, one cheque was for an amount of
₹60,60,350/-, whereas the remaining seven cheques, each for an
amount of ₹1.05 crores, form the subject matter of the present seven
complaints. The complainant further alleged that, owing to disputes
between the parties concerning the audio and music rights of the
Film, it had approached the High Court of Delhi seeking a stay on the
release of the Film. However, upon an undertaking that cheques toSignature Not Verified
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the extent of ₹7 crores would be honoured, the release of the Film
was permitted. It was further averred that all the seven cheques in
question were subsequently dishonoured with the remarks ‗Funds
Insufficient’, whereafter separate legal notices were issued in respect
of each dishonoured cheque. According to the complainant, despite
service of the said legal notices, the petitioners failed to make
payment of the cheque amounts.
10. The complainant had also placed before the learned Trial
Court, in a tabular form, the particulars of the cheques and the legal
notices issued in respect thereof, which read as under:
11. On 21.04.2013, a Consent Agreement came to be executed
between the complainant and M/s Shree Naurang Godavari
Entertainment Ltd., whereby the parties arrived at a full and final
settlement of their disputes. Under the said settlement, M/s Shree
Naurang Godavari Entertainment Ltd. and M/s Naurang Godavari
Pvt. Ltd. agreed to jointly and severally pay a total amount of ₹10.40
crores to the complainant, M/s Murli Projects Pvt. Ltd. It wasSignature Not Verified
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Digitally Signed
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recorded that a sum of ₹40 lakhs had already been paid through
RTGS and the balance amount of ₹10 crores was to be paid in
instalments, namely, ₹5 crores on or before 31.07.2013, ₹3 crores on
or before 31.12.2013, ₹1 crore on or before 30.06.2014 and the
remaining ₹1 crore on or before 30.09.2014. For securing and
effectuating the aforesaid settlement, M/s Shree Naurang Godavari
Entertainment Ltd. issued four post-dated cheques, namely, cheque
no. 013076 dated 31.07.2013 for ₹5 crores, cheque no. 013077 dated
31.12.2013 for ₹3 crores, cheque no. 013078 dated 30.06.2014 for ₹1
crore and cheque no. 013079 dated 30.09.2014 for ₹1 crore, all
drawn on Axis Bank Ltd., Malad (East), Mumbai. The Consent
Agreement dated 21.04.2013 is extracted hereunder:
―THE PARTIES HERETO ARE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:
1. Whereas this Hon’ble Court had passed the interim orders dated
11.10.2012 and 1.11.2012 in the present suit.
2. Whereas the contemnor i.e. M/s. Shree Naurang Godavari
Entertainment Ltd., Shri Rajpal Navrang Yadav, Mrs. Radha Rajapal
Yadav, and Shree Naurang Godavari Edutainment Pvt. Ltd. had not
complied with the undertakings provided to this Hon’ble Court.
3. Whereas the parties have post committing the contempt of this
Hon’ble Court’s orders, have mutually negotiated a full and final
settlement in the following manner.
a. The contemnor Shree Naurang Godavari Entertainment Ltd.,
Shri Rajpal Navrang Yadav, Mrs. Radha Rajapal Yadav, and
Shree Naurang Godavari Edutainment Pvt. Ltd. (defendants
in the Suit) do hereby solemnly undertake before this
Hon’ble Court that they shall jointly or severally pay a total
sum of Rs.10.40 crores (Rupees ten crores forty lacs) to
Murli Projects Pvt. Ltd. of which Rs.40 lacs (Rupees forty
lacs) has already been paid through RTGS. The balance sum
of Rs.10 crores (Rupees ten crores) shall be paid in the
following manner:
i. Rs.5 crores (Rupees five crores) shall be paid by the
Contemnors jointly or severally to Murli Projects Pvt.
Ltd. on or before 31.7.2013.
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ii. Rs.3 crores (Rupees three crores) shall be paid by
Contemnors jointly or severally to Murli Projects Pvt.
Ltd. on or before 31.12.2013.
iii. Rs.1 crore (Rupees one crore) shall be paid by the
Contemnors jointly or severally to Murli Projects Pvt.
Ltd. on or before 30.6.2014.
iv. Rs.1 crore (Rupees one crore) shall be paid by the
Contemnors jointly or severally to Murli Projects Pvt.
Ltd. on or before 30.9.2014.
b. In order to secure Murli Projects Pvt. Ltd., the contemnors
have in advance provided 4 (four) post dated cheques in the
following manner issued by M/s. Shree Naurang Godavari
Entertainment Ltd., details of the cheque are as follows:
i. Cheque No. 013076 dated 31.7.2013 for Rs.5 crores
drawn on Axis Bank Ltd. Malad (E), Mumbai.
ii. Cheque No. 013077 dated 31.12.2013 for Rs.3 crores
drawn on Axis Bank Ltd. Malad (E), Mumbai.
iii. Cheque No. 013078 dated 30.6.2014 for Rs.1 crore
drawn on Axis Bank Ltd. Malad (E), Mumbai.
iv. Cheque No. 013079 dated 30.9.2014 for Rs.1 crore
drawn on Axis Bank Ltd. Malad (E), Mumbai.
4. The Contemnors do hereby solemnly undertake that they shall
endeavour to pay the above amounts on or before the above cut off
date, failing which Murli Projects Pvt. Ltd. shall be at liberty to
encash the above 4(four) post dated cheques on the respective dates
which the Contemnors undertake before this Hon’ble Court that the
same shall be honoured on presentation.
5. On payment of the above amounts, the present suit shall stand
withdrawn by Murli Projects Pvt. Ltd. and interim order passed by
this Hon’ble Court on 11.10.2012 and 1.11.2012 shall stand vacated.
6. Murli Projects Pvt. Ltd. has instituted 8 (Eight) complaints under
Section 138 N.I. Act against the above contemnors before Addl.
Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Karkardooma in respect of Cheque
Nos. 021677, 021678, 021679, 021680, 021681, 021682, 021683
and 021684 issued by the said contemnors. The Ld. Court has issued
summons in the said 138 N.I. Cases. However, in view of the above
settlement, till 31.7.2013, Murli Projects Pvt. Ltd. shall ensure that
no coercive steps are taken in respect of their 138 N.I.A cases. In
case the cheque issued for the payment of Rs.5 crores (Rupees five
crores) is encashed or payment is made otherwise of Rs.5 crores
(Rupees five crores) prior to 31.7.2013 then Murli Projects Pvt. Ltd.
shall not take any coercive steps in respect of these cheques till
31.12.2013 and similarly steps will be taken in this regard in respect
of the subsequent two cheques dated 30.6.2014 and 30.9.2014. In
case any of the 4 payments are not made, then Murli Projects Pvt.
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Digitally Signed
By:ZEENAT PRAVEEN
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Ltd. shall be at liberty to proceed with the said criminal case against
the Contemnors and others in accordance with law. In case the
payment of Rs.10 crores is received in total as per the above
schedule ending on 30.9.2014 then Murli Projects Pvt. Ltd. shall
withdraw the above criminal cases instituted against the contemnors.
7. In case any of the payments as per the above schedule is not
received by Murli Projects Pvt. Ltd. it shall be deemed that the
contemnors are in contempt of the orders passed by this Hon’ble
Court on 11.10.2012 and 1.11.2012 and also the contempt
proceeding filed by the Murli Projects Pvt. Ltd. on 18.3.2013 which
shall stand revived to their original status and the original amounts as
per the original agreement with supplementary agreements shall
stand revived against the contemnors.
8. The contemnors are endeavoring to come up with a fresh
cinematograph film or a remake film or refurbish film or re-edited
film out of the earlier film called “Ata Pata Laapata”. The
contemnors shall be free to negotiate with third parties in respect of
this newly developed film provided, the payment of Rs.5 crores is
made to Murli Projects Pvt. Ltd. on or before 31.7.2013. In case the
said payment is received by Murli Projects Pvt. Ltd., then Murli
Projects Pvt. Ltd. shall have no right, interest and cause of action in
respect of the said film “Ata Pata Laapata” or its regenerated version
in any form.
9. The Contemnors in order to secure the above payments to Murli
Projects Pvt. Ltd. has already issued the post dated cheques as
mentioned hereinabove, however in order to further satisfy Murli
Projects Pvt. Ltd., the above contemnors are issuing undertakings to
this Hon’ble Court in the manner already done before. Copies of the
undertakings are enclosed herewith.
10. In case there are any amount deposited with this Hon’ble Court
as per the interim orders dated 11.10.2012 and 1.11.2012 or any
amounts are deposited in future, the same shall stand released to the
contemnor on or after the first payment of Rs.5 crores (Rupees five
crores) to Murli Projects Pvt. Ltd. as per:‖
12. Subsequent to the execution of the aforesaid settlement
agreement, the petitioners preferred FAO (OS) No. 267/2013 before
the Division Bench of this Court, assailing the order dated
13.05.2013 passed in IA No. 5427/2013 in CS (OS) No. 3037/2012.
By order dated 06.08.2013, the Division Bench disposed of the said
appeal while taking on record and validating the Consent Agreement
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dated 21.04.2013. The rights of the parties, particularly the right of
the complainant to seek appropriate remedies in the event of breach
of the settlement terms, were expressly reserved.
13. It is, therefore, the case of the petitioners that once the Consent
Agreement dated 21.04.2013 had been executed and subsequently
recognised by the Division Bench of this Court vide order dated
06.08.2013, with liberty reserved to seek remedies in case of its
breach, the cause of action arising from the alleged dishonour of the
cheques issued under the Third Supplementary Agreement dated
09.08.2012 ceased to survive and stood substituted by a fresh cause
of action flowing from the Consent Agreement itself. The petitioners
have drawn the attention of this Court to the order dated 06.08.2013,
which is reproduced hereunder:
―Learned counsel for the parties submit that inter se disputes were
settled in terms of settlement dated 21.4.2013 which was recorded in
the order of the Court dated 24.5.2013. It is submitted that the
appellant was to pay a sum of Rs. 5,00,00,000/- in compliance by
31.7.2013. The appellant did not do so; the parties have since agreed
to extend the time and agreed to modify the term with regard to the
first payment which was to be made on 31.7.2013 i.e. the terms of
clause 3(a)(i). It is submitted that the said amount of Rs.
5,00,00,000/- is sought to be paid to the respondents through three
cheques i.e. cheque bearing No. 013113 dated 05.9.2013 amounting
to Rs. 2,00,00,000/-, cheque bearing No. 013114 dated 25.9.2013
amounting to Rs. 3,00,00,000/- and cheque bearing No. 013115
dated 25.9.2013 amounting to Rs. 20,00,000/-. It is agreed by the
parties that the rest of the terms shall bind them especially the
petitioner. The undertaking of Mr. Rajpal Navrang Yadav and Ms.
Radha Rajpal Yadav, both dated 21.4.2013 are on the record which
shall be treated as undertaking given to the Court; to the extent that
they would make payment of a sum of Rs. 5,00,00,000/- and to the
extent the terms shall stand modified.
It is further agreed by counsel for the parties that upon receipt of the
entire amount agreed in terms of the settlement, all disputes should
be deemed settled and that the present appeal can be disposed off.
Counsel for the respondent further states that in the event of default
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by the appellant, it would be open to the respondent to seek
enforcement of the undertaking given to this Court on 21.4.2013
(these are found at page nos. 508 to 511 of the paperbook). In the
eventuality of non-compliance of terms of settlement, the respondent
can seek enforcement and execution of the undertaking in
accordance with law.
The appeal is disposed off accordingly. The rights of the parties
especially of the respondents to seek remedial action for breach of
the settlement terms, is expressly reserved.‖
14. The petitioners further state that, vide order dated 27.01.2016
passed in CS (OS) No. 3037/2012, this Court passed a consent decree
for recovery of money in favour of the complainant and against the
petitioners in terms of the Consent Agreement dated 21.04.2013. It is
pointed out that paragraph 5 of the said order specifically records that
the original agreement and the supplementary agreements referred to
in paragraph 7 of the Consent Agreement dated 21.04.2013 would
not revive and that the complainant would stand satisfied upon
receiving the amounts stipulated in the said Consent Agreement.
According to the petitioners, once the Consent Agreement dated
21.04.2013 had been entered into and subsequently culminated in a
consent decree, the complaints arising out of the dishonour of the
earlier cheques ought to have been withdrawn or dismissed, it being
their case that the earlier cause of action no longer survived in law.
The learned counsel for the petitioners has also drawn the attention of
this Court to the consolidated consent decree dated 27.01.2016
passed in CS (OS) No. 3037/2012, which reads as under:
―1. Originally the subject suit was a suit seeking injunctions by
claiming rights of the plaintiff in the movie ―Ata Pata Laapata‖.
2. Lot of water has flown under the bridge thereafter and effectively
today the suit stands decreed but not for injunctions but for recoverySignature Not Verified
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of moneys as stated in the settlement terms dated 21.04.2013 entered
into by the parties and signed by them.
3. As per the consent terms/Agreement dated 21.04.2013, a Division
Bench of this Court has passed Orders on 24.05.2013 and 06.08.2013
in FAO(OS) No.267/2013 and which in the opinion of this Court
effectively disposes of the suit by compromise by passing a money
decree.
These Orders dated 24.05.2013 and 06.08.2013 in FAO(OS)
No.267/2013 read as under:
* * *
4. The consent terms as found in the consent terms/Agreement dated
21.04.2013 are as under:
* * *
5. There would be some ambiguity on account of the language
contained in paragraph 7 of the consent terms/Agreement dated
21.04.2013, but the counsel for the plaintiff concedes that the
original agreement and the supplementary agreement as mentioned
in para 7 of the consent terms/Agreement dated 21.04.2013, do not
revive, and the plaintiff will be satisfied on receiving the amounts as
stated in the consent terms/Agreement dated 21.04.2013.
6. Accordingly, a consent decree of money is passed in favour of the
plaintiff and against the defendants as per the terms recorded in the
consent terms/Agreement dated 21.04.2013 and the decree will be
drawn up in terms of the consent terms/Agreement dated 21.04.2013
as reproduced above on the plaintiff making payments of deficient
court fee as stated below.
7. It is however clarified that merely because a money decree is
passed in favour of the plaintiff, as per the consent terms/Agreement
dated 21.04.2013, that will not mean that the plaintiff is not entitled
to continue to pursue remedies that the plaintiff has on account of the
violation by the defendant nos. 2 & 3 of undertakings which are
given to this Court or the orders/directions which have been issued
by the Court but not complied by the defendant no.2.
8. It is further made clear that so far as seeking recovery of amounts
as per the money decree is concerned, the same will only take place
in the execution proceedings seeking execution of the money decree
which is passed today as per the consent terms/Agreement dated
21.04.2013.
9. It is also recorded that this Court is not expressing any opinion,
one way or the other, with respect to the actions which the plaintiff
seeks against the defendant nos. 2 & 3 inasmuch as, an appeal being
Cont. App. (C) No.11/2013 is pending before a Division Bench of
this Court against the Order of a learned Single Judge of this Court
dated 03.12.2013 sentencing the defendant no. 2 to the imprisonment
of 10 days. Issues with respect to finality of the Order dated
03.12.2013 in respect of imprisonment will be in terms of the final
order or interim order which will be passed by Division Bench inSignature Not Verified
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Cont. App. (C) No.11/2013.
10. It is also made clear that attachment of the properties of the
defendants in terms of the orders of this Court, will enure for the
benefit of the plaintiff in the execution proceedings in view of Order
XXXVIII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil procedure, 1908 (CPC).
Issues with respect to recovery of the amounts in favour of the
plaintiff and against the defendants as per the consent
terms/Agreement dated 21.04.2013 will be a subject matter of
execution proceedings of execution of the money decree passed
today.
11. Plaintiff will make up the deficiency with respect to the court fee
on account of the money decree having been passed today in favour
of the plaintiff and against the defendants for a sum of Rs.10.40
crores, and only on payment of the necessary court fee by the
plaintiff, the money decree will be one which will be capable of
being executed for the amounts payable under the money decree.
12. Since the attachment orders are continuing and there is a money
decree in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants, and of
which today an amount of approximately Rs.8.5 crores is said to be
due to the plaintiff, no orders can be passed today for the release of
the passport of defendant no. 2 and such an application can always
be filed in the execution petition which the plaintiff proposes to file
for the execution of the money decree with respect to the balance
amount of Rs.8.5 crores or such application can be filed after
disposal of the Cont. App. (C) No.11/2013.
13. Suit is accordingly decreed and disposed of, subject, however, to
the aforesaid terms and observations.
I.A. No.21054/2012 (u/O 39 R 2A CPC by the plaintiff) & Crl. MA.
No.3403/2014 (u/s 340 Cr.PC by the plaintiff)
List on 10th May, 2016.‖
15. Thereafter, on 06.05.2016, the complainant instituted
Execution Petition No. 69/2016 before this Court seeking execution
of the consent decree dated 27.01.2016 and recovery of the amounts
payable under the full and final settlement arrived at between the
parties. According to the petitioners, even after initiating execution
proceedings on the basis of the Consent Agreement and the consent
decree, the complainant did not withdraw the seven complaints under
Section 138 of the NI Act. The learned counsel for the petitioners has
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drawn the attention of this Court to the order dated 06.05.2016
passed in Execution Petition No. 69/2016, which reads as under:
―3. In view of the order dated 27.1.2016 passed in CS(OS)
No.3037/2012, it is observed that all orders of attachment passed in
CS(OS) No.3037/2012 with respect to the bank accounts of the
judgment debtors, the same will enure and continue to operate so far
as the present execution proceedings are concerned. It is clarified
that bank accounts of which reference is made in the present order as
also in the attachment orders in CS(OS) No.3037/2012, will be those
bank accounts mentioned in para 13 of the affidavit dated 12.1.2014
of the judgment debtor no.2 filed in CS(OS) No.3037/2012.
4. Notice be issued to the judgment debtors, on filing of process fee,
both in the ordinary method as well as by registered post AD,
returnable on 22nd August, 2016.‖
16. The learned counsel for the petitioners submits that, during the
trial of the seven complaint cases, the complainant had examined two
witnesses, namely, CW-1 Rajiv Sharma and CW-2 Madho Gopal
Aggarwal, both of whom were duly cross-examined by the
petitioners. It is stated that the complainant had exhibited eight
documents, marked as Ex. CW-1/1 to Ex. CW-1/8. The learned
counsel contends that both the complainant’s witnesses had concealed
the factum of the Consent Agreement dated 21.04.2013 entered into
between the parties and had not disclosed the same in their
examination-in-chief. In this regard, the learned counsel has drawn
the attention of this Court to the testimonies of CW-1 and CW-2
recorded before the learned Trial Court. It is further submitted that
petitioner no. 1, Rajpal Naurang Yadav, entered the witness box as
DW-1 and his statement was recorded on 21.04.2017 in defence
evidence. The learned counsel has also referred to the testimony of
the said witnesses.
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17. It is further stated that, vide judgments dated 13.04.2018, the
learned Trial Court convicted the petitioners in all the seven
complaint cases under Section 138 of the NI Act. Thereafter, by
orders on sentence dated 23.04.2018, petitioner no. 1, Rajpal
Naurang Yadav, was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a
period of six months and to pay a fine of ₹1.60 crores in each
complaint case, and in default of payment of fine, to further undergo
simple imprisonment for a period of six months. Out of the fine
amount of ₹1.60 crores, a sum of ₹1,59,50,000/- was directed to be
paid to the complainant and the remaining sum of ₹50,000/- was
directed to be paid to the State in each complaint case. By the same
orders on sentence dated 23.04.2018, petitioner no. 2, Radha Rajpal
Yadav, was directed to pay a fine of ₹10 lakhs to the complainant in
each complaint case and, in default of payment thereof, to undergo
simple imprisonment for a period of three months.
18. The petitioners further state that, in the meantime, in Execution
Petition No. 69/2016 and E.A. No. 360/2018, titled Murli Projects
Private Ltd. v. Shree Naurang Godavari Entertainment Ltd. & Ors.,
the complainant sought execution of the consolidated consent decree
dated 27.01.2016. Vide order dated 30.11.2018, this Court directed
the detention of petitioner no. 2 in civil prison for a period of three
months. The order dated 30.11.2018 passed in Execution Petition No.
69/2016 is extracted hereunder:
―1. The counsel for the judgment-debtors states that Mr. Anant
Dattaram Lad whose Aadhaar Card is handed over in the Court and
photocopy of which is kept on record and original returned is the
owner of certain immovable property and is willing to sell the sameSignature Not Verified
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for satisfying the judgment-debt of the judgment-debtors. A
photocopy of the title documents of the property of Mr. Anant
Dattaram Lad is handed over in the Court and is taken on record and
a copy has been given to the counsel for the decree-holder.
2. The counsel for the judgment-debtors states that the decree-
holder may verify whether the decree-holder is interested in taking
the said property in satisfaction / part satisfaction of the debt.
3. The judgment-debtor no.2 present in Court also undertakes to
this Court that he will within one month of today either satisfy the
entire judgment-debt or pay the first instalment of Rs.2 crores in
terms of order dated 21st August, 2018 with interest as may be
directed by the Court and if does not comply with this undertaking
can be sent to prison.
4. The counsel for the decree-holder states that the judgment-
debtors have dodged the decree already for a very long time and the
decree be executed by imprisonment of the judgment-debtor no.2.
5. I am satisfied from the past conduct of the judgment-debtors that
the judgment-debtors, inspite of being in a position to pay the
decretal amount, are managing their affairs so as to avoid execution
of the decree. The judgment-debtor no.2 is found to have acted in
number of films and the explanation each time is, either of the
monies therefor having been received earlier or the judgment-debtor
no.2 performing without consideration.
6. The decree is ordered to be executed by detention of the
judgment debtor no.2 Rajpal Navrang Yadav in civil prison for a
period of three months. The judgment-debtor no.2 is ordered to be
taken into custody forthwith, to be detained in civil prison.
7. The Court Master to call for the marshal and handover the
judgment debtor no.2 to the marshal for compliance of the order
along with a copy of this order.
8. Since the decree-holder has not suggested any other mode of
execution, the execution is closed with the aforesaid.
Dasti under signature of Court Master.‖
19. Being aggrieved by the judgments of conviction and the orders
on sentence passed by the learned Trial Court, the petitioners
preferred seven criminal appeals, being Criminal Appeal Nos.
53/2018, 55/2018, 56/2018, 57/2018, 58/2018, 59/2018 and 60/2018,
before the learned Sessions Court. The complainant, on the other
hand, preferred seven criminal revision petitions, being Criminal
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Revision Nos. 124/2018, 125/2018, 126/2018, 127/2018, 128/2018,
129/2018 and 130/2018, assailing the order on sentence dated
23.04.2018.
20. The learned Special Judge, PC Act, East District,
Karkardooma Courts, Delhi [hereafter ‗Sessions Court’], vide the
impugned common judgment dated 21.01.2019, upheld the
judgments of conviction dated 13.04.2018, while observing as under:
―APPRECIATION OF EVIDENCE AND ARGUMENTS AS
WELL AS FINDINGS :-
7. As per undisputed facts of the case, initially an agreement was
executed between complainant and convicts on 30.05.2010 in respect
of repayment of a loan extended by complainant in the sum of Rs.5
crores to the convicts. Six post dated cheques were issued by
convicts for total sum of Rs.8 crores towards repayment of aforesaid
loan along with interest. However, that promise could not be honored
by the convicts. Thereafter, another supplementary agreement was
executed between both the parties on 21.09.2011, referring to failure
of convicts to make payment of Rs.8 crores as per previous
agreement on the respective due dates. As per this supplementary
agreement, complainant had agreed to receive amount of Rs.8 crores
along with interest of Rs.1,38,06,332/- and thus, once again six post
dated cheques were issued by convicts in favour of complainant for
total sum of Rs.9,38,06,332/-. The last cheque was payable on
31.12.2011, however, once again convicts failed to make such
payment. Therefore, another supplementary agreement was executed
on 04.04.2012, under which fresh amount was fixed to be paid by
convicts to complainant after addition of interest, for total sum of
Rs.10,72,52,745/- and this time convicts issued 11 post dated
cheques for aforesaid sum. The last cheque was payable on
30.09.2012. Once again, convicts failed to make payment of
aforesaid amount and finally another agreement dated 09.08.2012
was executed between the parties vide which convicts undertook to
pay total sum of Rs.11,10,60,350/- to the complainant towards
clearing outstanding debts with interest. This amount was settled
after adjustment of Rs.40 lacs paid by convicts to the complainant
and after addition of interest for delayed period. Once again, convicts
issued eight post dated cheques for total sum of Rs.11,10,60,350/-,
the last cheque being payable on 28.02.2013. All these cheques were
issued towards clearing the outstanding debt. However, on
presentation of seven out of eight cheques given in pursuance to
aforesaid agreement, same were dishonoured on the grounds ofSignature Not Verified
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insufficient funds, which resulted into seven complaint cases in
question being filed by the complainant. At the same time,
complainant company also took civil remedy and a civil suit
no.3037/2012 came into existence before High Court of Delhi for
recovery of amount against the same liability. Before High Court of
Delhi, once again parties settled their dispute on 21.04.2013, on the
basis of which a consent decree was passed by Delhi High Court in
aforesaid civil suit. This settlement had taken place basically in a
contempt proceeding, because of failure of convict no.2 to comply
with the undertakings given before Delhi High Court to make certain
payments.
8. In the present case, argument was raised before trial court as well
as before this court that with execution of agreement dated
21.04.2013 before High Court of Delhi, the agreement dated
09.08.2013 became null and void. Therefore, cheques in question
also became redundant and without any liability. Argument was also
advanced that since new cheques were given out of consent
agreement before Delhi High Court, therefore, cheques in question
could not be payable anymore. In the impugned judgments, ld.
ACMM (East) has dealt with this argument and negated this
argument.
9. It is borne out from clause 6 of the consent agreement dated
21.04.2013 itself, that it was agreed between the parties before Delhi
High Court that in case payments undertaken in that agreement were
not made, then complainant shall be at liberty to proceed with the
criminal cases herein. As per that agreement, these cases were to be
withdrawn by the complainant only on complete payment of Rs.10.4
crores, as agreed before Delhi High Court in aforesaid agreement.
Therefore, I do find that such argument of convicts is fallacious and
without any merit. For same reasons, it cannot be said that trial court
did not have jurisdiction to try the criminal complaints in hand, after
consent decree being passed by High Court of Delhi. For the purpose
of complaints in hand, the liability qua cheques in question should
have been there on the date of presentation of the cheques and for the
purpose of filing of complaints, the requirement was that despite
lapse of 15 days from the date of service of demand notice, such
payments were not made.
10. Another argument/ground was raised on behalf of convicts that
the amount given by complainant was in the form of investment,
rather than loan and hence, it was subject to profit/loss earned out of
movie produced by convicts. Ld. ACMM (East) dealt with this
argument also and rejected the same. To appreciate this argument, it
is appropriate to refer to clause 4 of first agreement executed
between the parties on 30.05.2010. This clause mentioned that the
complainant was to extend inter corporate loan in the sum of Rs.5
crores to the convicts for the purpose of using the same in producing
and releasing of a film ‘Ata Pata Laapata’. Clause 6 of this agreement
mentioned that convicts herein would refund the entire principle
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amount of Rs.5 crores lent by complainant on or before 31.03.2011.
Clause 7 of that agreement further mentioned about liability of
convicts herein to pay a sum of Rs.2.5 crores towards interest, cost
etc. on the aforesaid loan and Rs.50 lac towards management cost of
arranging the funds etc. Thus, as per clause 8 of that agreement,
convicts herein had to refund Rs.8 crores to the complainant. Such
specific terms of aforesaid agreement could not be substituted with
oral assertion of the convicts. Furthermore, the subsequent
agreements executed between the parties, were entered into by
convicts herein with promise to return certain sum of money
including interest on account of delay in payment. Convicts also
went on to issue post dated cheques every time during execution of
every agreement. Had it been actually the intention of the parties that
complainant was investing Rs.5 crores in the production of aforesaid
movie, then there could not have been any occasion for the convicts
to promise to return a particular sum of money and to issue post
dated cheques. In case of investment, if return for the complainant
was to be dependent upon profit/loss earned by aforesaid movie, then
there could not have been any occasion to quantify the money to be
returned to the complainant, at the time of receiving such amount of
Rs.5 crores itself. Therefore, I do not find any merit in this argument
as well.
11. Another argument/ground was raised on behalf of convicts that
the complainant company had no license to advance finance and trial
court failed to acknowledge the infirmities appearing in the balance
sheet of the complainant company. In my opinion, these arguments
cannot be entertained at all, because after having received loan from
complainant company against interest, convicts are stopped from
challenging the competence of complainant company to extend such
loan. Convicts cannot usurp the loan amount on the basis of
aforesaid grounds at all. Hence, this argument has to be rejected.
12. Convicts have also raised another argument/ground that
transaction between the parties was illegal and against the provisions
of Usurious Loan Act, because convicts were not liable to pay
interest at the rate of 30%. It has to be appreciated that such terms of
interest rate were consciously agreed upon by the convicts, while
taking amount of Rs.5 crores from the complainant.Convicts time
and again kept buying time to repay the amount, but they failed and
every time they kept promising to return the amount with interest at
such rate. Section 3 of the Usurious Loan Act, 1918, talks about a
civil suit and provides that the court may reopen the transaction and
declare the interest to be excessive. Therefore, such plea was to be
taken by convicts in civil suit, which was pending before High Court
of Delhi. If such declaration would have been passed by the civil
court under that Act, there could have been a reason to entertain this
plea in the present criminal proceeding. In absence of any such
declaration of Civil court, such plea cannot be entertained herein.
13. Convicts have also referred about injunction being taken by
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complainant from High Court of Delhi and about fate of the movie
on the box office. However, these grounds/arguments are
insignificant in view of the agreed findings given that convicts were
under debt to repay loan with interest to the complainant. Therefore,
these factors do not have any bearing on the decision of these cases.
14. Convicts have also raised grounds that before presenting the
cheques leading to criminal complaints in hand, complainant should
have taken permission either from High Court of Delhi or from the
convicts. However, once again I find such arguments to be merit less
for simple reason that no law provides that to present cheque against
liability or to institute a criminal complaint under Section 138 NI
Act, the complainant has to take permission from the civil court or
from the proposed accused persons. The only requirement to present
the cheques was that the liability qua those cheques was subsisting.
There was no change in that liability on account of proceedings
being pending before High Court of Delhi.
15. In the additional grounds filed on the record, convicts further
took plea that CW1/Sh. Rajiv Sharam was not a competent witness
to depose on behalf of complainant company, because the resolution
Ex.CW1/2 was executed on 28.01.2013, when there was no cause of
action to file the complaints in hand. However, once again, I find
that this argument is not impressive for the reasons that the
resolution dated 28.01.2013 passed by Board of Directors of
complainant, authorized Mr. Rajiv Sharma to sign and file affidavit
as well as any pleading for filing criminal or civil cases on behalf of
complainant company and to appear on behalf of complainant
company as Attorney. He was also empowered to appear as witness
on behalf of complainant company. It was not necessary that after
accrual of cause of action to file criminal complaints herein, a fresh
board resolution was required to be passed. Moreover, CW1 was
expected to depose as per his personal knowledge and information or
on the basis of record of the company. Therefore, to become a
witness, in my opinion there is no requirement to be authorized by
concerned company. Such requirement is only for the purpose of
filing a complaint on behalf of a juristic person. Such requirement
was duly satisfied in the cases in hand and hence, there is no merit in
this argument.
16. Ld. counsel for convicts also referred to a judgment cited as
Venkatesh Dutt v. M/s. M.S. Shoes East Limited, 2004 II AD
(Delhi), to submit that after fresh cheques given out of consent
agreement dated 21.04.2013, the criminal complaints instituted on
the basis of previous cheque, could not be continued and were liable
to be dismissed. It is worth to mention here that in the aforesaid case,
Delhi High Court observed that :-
―by no stretch of imagination complaints under Section 138 NI Act
relating to several cheques given by a party to the complainant on
account of the agreement between the parties towards liability againstSignature Not Verified
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initial cheque leading to the filing of original complaint can be allowed
to go simultaneously…………..Once the parties enter into an agreement
during the pendency of such complaint or proceedings and complainant
accepts the cheques given by the accused in lieu of the subject matter
of original complaint, every cheque gives rise to a fresh cause of action
if it, on presentation is dishonoured as in that case original complaint
becomes extinct. Aggrieved person has a right to file as many
complaints as many cheques were given to him. As every cheque under
the Act provides an independent and fresh cause of action to the
aggrieved person. Even otherwise, it is difficult to accept that two
parallel proceedings, one emanating from the original cheque and
others emanating from the terms of the agreement between the parties,
can be allowed to run simultaneously. If the earlier complaint is also
allowed to continue along with the subsequent complaints, then the
very purpose of agreement between the parties and issuance of fresh
cheques become meaningless as fresh cheques issued by a party are
towards the original liability that gave rise to the initial complaint filed
under Section 138 NI Act.‖
17. The aforesaid observations would make it clear that such
observations were made in case of two parallel proceedings going on
for offence under Section 138 NI Act, out of one liability. Had it
been a case herein that complainant would have also instituted fresh
complaint on the basis of dishonor of cheques handed over on
execution of consent agreement dated 21.04.2013, there would have
been a ground to say that complainant was prosecuting convicts in
two parallel proceedings simultaneously in respect of same liability.
However, it is not the case herein. Complainant did not institute
fresh complaint on the basis of cheques received on execution of
consent agreement dated 21.04.2013, therefore, this argument is also
not acceptable.
18. Another argument had been raised on behalf of convicts that trial
court while imposing sentence of fine on convict no.3, mentioned
about adjustment of amount paid in terms of consent decree, being
adjusted towards the fine, from the date of order. It was argued that
such adjustment should be of the amount paid during pendency of
the complaint, before any court of law and not from the date of order
of sentence. Reliance was placed upon case law titled as D.
Purushotama Reddy & Anr. v. K.Sateesh, 2008 (4) RCR
(Criminal). In the aforesaid case, Supreme Court was dealing with a
question that whether any suit for recovery of money on a cheque
issued by the defendant, but dishonored, the amount received by the
plaintiff and creditor in a criminal proceeding should be adjusted?
This question would show that the Supreme Court was dealing about
adjustment of any amount paid during criminal proceeding, while
preparing a decree in civil proceeding and in that background
Supreme Court observed that the court should take into consideration
the amount of compensation deposited in criminal case and should
draw up a fresh decree after taking into consideration the amounts
deposited. This is not the situation in the present case. No amount
was deposited in the present case as compensation, nor it is a civil
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proceeding to modify the decree accordingly.
19. Section138 NI Act empowers the court to impose fine up to
double of the cheque amount. While deciding any such amount of
fine, the court also take scare of time spent in the trial as well as
other factors. I find that ld. ACMM had imposed fine of Rs.1.6
crores in each case against cheque amount of Rs.1.5 crores, against
convict no.2 and Rs.10 lac in each case against convict no.3. During
arguments both parties were asked to furnish details of payments
made to complainant in respect of liability in question. It is admitted
situation that since 30.04.2012 till 19.06.2018 a total sum of
Rs.19140350/-was paid to complainant on behalf of convicts. Ld.
ACMM in the orders on sentence observed that ―further payment
made by the convict starting from this date before the hon’ble High
Court towards the consent decree shall be adjusted towards the fine
which this court has awarded today.‖ As per this order, amount of
Rs.14640350/- would not be adjusted towards the fine, though so
much of amount has been paid to the complainant. This is not the
meager amount to be ignored, while imposing fine and giving
direction for payment of compensation to the complainant. One
cannot loose sight of the fact that complainant did avail civil remedy
before High Court of Delhi for recovery of amount against same
liability. Complainant had the opportunity to seek all kind of
compensation in the civil proceedings, but complainant limited his
demand to Rs.10.4 crores in the consent agreement. These factors do
have bearing over sentence being passed in proceedings under
Section 138 NIAct.Therefore, I find that the approach adopted by ld.
ACMM was incomplete, to take into account the payments already
made to complainant regarding same liability. However, I shall give
my final conclusion regarding sentence, after dealing with rival
contentions made in criminal revisions.
20. The last ground/argument raised on behalf of convicts was that
trial court could not award default sentence for none payment of fine.
Ld. counsel referred to case law cited as Ahammed Kutty v.
Abdullakoya, 2008 (4) RCR Criminal 763 SC. In this case,
Supreme Court held that while exercising jurisdiction under Section
357(3) Cr.P.C, no direction can be issued for any default to pay the
amount of compensation, that the accused shall suffer simple
imprisonment. On the other hand, ld. counsel for the complainant
referred to latest judgment from Supreme Court cited as Kumaran
v. State of Kerala, 2017 (2) LRC 513 (SC), wherein Supreme Court
while referring to Section 431 and Section 421 Cr.P.C in-conjunction
with Section 64 and Section 70 IPC, held that sentence of
imprisonment for non payment of fine must also be included as
applying directly to compensation under Section 357(3) Cr.P.C as
well. Supreme Court also took note of judgment based in R.Mohan
v. A.K. Vijaya Kumar, (2012) 8 SCC 721, wherein Supreme Court
dealing with a case for offence under Section 138 NI Act itself, held
that ―ifSection421ofthecourtputs compensation ordered to be paid by
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the court on a par with fine so far as mode of recovery is concerned,
then there is no reason why the court cannot impose a sentence in
default of payment of compensation as it can be done in case of
default in payment of fine under Section 64 IPC.‖ In view of such
categorical law explained by Supreme Court in aforesaid two cases,
it cannot be held that a default sentence of imprisonment could not
be awarded by trial court, for non payment of fine including portion
of compensation.
21. It is further more relevant to mention herein that fine imposed in
the cases in hand cannot be termed as order being passed under
Section 357(3) Cr.P.C. Section 357(3) Cr.P.C is applicable to those
cases, wherein court imposes a sentence of which fine does not form
a part and the court orders the accused to pay compensation amount
to sufferer/victim. On the other hand, Section 357(1) Cr.P.C refers to
a situation where court imposes a sentence of fine or a sentence of
which fine forms a part, wherein the court may pass order to apply
some part of that fine in the payment to any person as compensation.
Thus,thesituationhereinreferstoSection357(1)Cr.P.C, rather than
under Section 357(3) Cr.P.C, because the trial court had imposed a
fine upon convict no.2as well as convict no.3 and had directed a part
of fine imposed upon convict no. 2 to be paid to complainant as
compensation.
22. In view of my foregoing discussions, findings and observations, I
do not find any merit in the criminal appeals preferred by the
convicts against impugned judgments of conviction. However, a
decision has to be taken in respect of orders on sentence, which shall
be taken at the end of this judgment, after dealing with plea raised in
criminal revisions.
GROUNDS TAKEN IN SEVEN CRIMINAL REVISION
PETITIONS :-
23. Being aggrieved of the impugned orders on sentence dated
23.04.2018 in aforesaid seven complaint cases, Sh. Sompal Ruhil
being Authorized Representative of complainant company i.e. M/s.
Murli Projects Pvt. Ltd., has preferred seven criminal revision
petitions mainly on the following relevant grounds :-
● That impugned orders on sentence dated 23.04.2018 passed by
trial court is unjust, unfair, unreasonable and against the facts
and law.
● That sentence awarded to convicts is neither adequate nor in
consonance with the sprite of the provisions of Section 138 of
NI Act.
● That trial court erred by awarding lighter punishment/sentence
to convicts, who deserved to be awarded maximum punishment/
sentence as provided under Section 138 of NI Act.
● That trial court erred in not awarding any sentence of
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had signed the cheques in the capacity of managing director of
convict company.
● That trial court did not mention any reason to show leniency in
favour of convict no.2 by imposing insignificant sentence.
● That trial court did not disclose any reason to show leniency in
favour of convict no.3, by imposing insignificant sentence by
way of fine only.
● That trial court failed to consider that object behind introduction
of Chapter XVII in the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881, by
virtue of banking, public financial institutions and Negotiable
Instruments law (Amendment) Act 1988, was with a view to
encourage the culture of use of cheques and enhancing the
credibility of the negotiable instruments.
● That trial court failed to pass a sentence to give proper effect to
the object of legislation, which says that no drawer of cheque
could be allowed to take dishonor of the cheque issued by him
lightly.
● That sentence awarded to convicts could be termed to be a flea
bite sentence as convict no.3 was let off with a meager sentence
of fine only.
● That trial court committed an illegality, while awarding no
sentence of imprisonment to convict no.3 on the ground that she
was only a signatory, who signed the cheques on the asking of
convict no.2 and she is a woman. Gender of accused cannot
earn her any immunity from imposing substantive sentence.
Convict no.3 had signed four agreements of loan dated
30.05.2010, 21.09.2011, 04.04.2012 and 09.08.2012 with
complainant company and played active role in the commission
of offence.
● That convict no.3 is the signatory of cheques and incharge of
the affairs of business of convict no. 1 company with convict
no. 2.Therefore, she is liable to be punished with the sentence
of imprisonment.
● That trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by passing the order
that payment made by convicts from the date of sentence i.e.
23.04.2018, towards the consent decree, should be adjusted
towards the fine awarded to him, as both are separate
proceedings and complainant company is entitled to avail
criminal as well as civil remedies.
APPRECIATION OF ARGUMENTS:-
24. Ld. counsel for petitioner/complainant company argued that trial
court did not pass order of sufficient sentence against the convicts
and was too lenient for them. He further submitted that the sentence
awarded to convict no.2 was too short, though keeping in view the
conduct of convicts maximum sentence should have been passed and
even amount of compensation should have been double of the
cheques amount. He further submitted that trial court was too lenient
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for convict no.3, being guided by her gender, though this factor was
not relevant to award sentence of imprisonment against convict no.3.
Ld. counsel referred to State of Himachal Pradesh v. Nirmala
Devi, (2017) 7SCC262, to support his argument that gender of the
convict no.3 could not be treated as an mitigating factor. He further
referred to case laws cited as Suganthi Suresh Kumar v.
Jagdeeshan,2002 (1) JCC 315 and L.N. Chaturvedi v. State &
Ors., CRL. Rev.P.No.515/11 & Crl.M.A.No.2905/11, decided by
High Court of Delhi on 11.04.2012, to submit that since convicts
did not pay the cheque amount, therefore, severe punishment should
have been awarded against convicts.
25. Per contra, ld. counsel for convicts challenged the maintainability
of revision petitions itself, submitting that there is no provision to
entitle the complainant to file revision petition against order on
sentence. He further referred to judgment passed by High Court
Delhi in the case of Bhajanpura Credit Society Ltd. v. Sushil
Kumar, CRL.A.972/2012, decided by High Court of Delhi on
03.09.2014,to submit that complainant in a case under Section 138
NIAct is not even recognized as victim and hence, even Section 372
Cr.P.C cannot come to his aid. Ld. counsel further submitted that
Section 377Cr.P.C empowers the State Government to prefer appeal
against sentence and therefore, only State could have challenged the
impugned orders of sentence under Section 377 Cr.P.C.
26. The aforesaid argument of convicts was countered by ld. counsel
for petitioner/complainant with support of judgment passed by
Karnataka High Court in the case of Nagraj v. Gowramma, IV
(2004) BC 44 and on the support of judgment passed by Madras
High Court in the case of J.S. Agencies & Ors. v. M/s. Namakkal
South India Transports, 1999 (1) Crimes 70, submitting that
revision petitions were entertained in these cases against order of
sentence.
27. I shall first of all deal with the legal issue of maintainability of
the revision petitions. From the arguments made on behalf of
convicts and on the basis of judgment passed by High Court of Delhi
in the case of Bhajanpura Credit Society Ltd. (supra), it is very
much clear that complainant could not have resorted to Section 372
Cr.P.C against orders on sentence, because Delhi High Court in
aforesaid case has held that complainant in cases under Section 138
NI Act is not a victim as referred in Section 372 Cr.P.C.
28. Section 377 Cr.P.C is also not available to a complainant in order
to appeal against sentence, as this provision is applicable for State. It
is well apparent that Section 377 Cr.P.C could be invoked by the
State only where State would have been a prosecuting agency.
Though, Section 377 Cr.P.C. does not refer to nature of cases in
which such appeal against sentence could be filed, however, in cases
under Section 138 NIAct State is not the prosecuting agency and
State has nothing to do with such cases. In that situation, State is not
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expected to be aggrieved of order on sentence.
29. On the other hand, Section 397 Cr.P.C provides that High Court
or Sessions Judge may examine record of any proceeding before
inferior criminal court to satisfy itself or himself as to correctness,
legality and propriety of any finding, sentence or order etc. Thus, this
provision specifically refers to sentence passed by an inferior
criminal court, which can be looked into by a Sessions Judge under
Section 397 Cr.P.C. In the back drop of such statutory provision, the
observations made by Karnataka High Court in the case of Nagraj
(supra) so as to validate a revision petition being filed before a
Sessions Judge for inadequacy of sentence, assume importance.
Similar was the finding given by Madras High Court in the case
ofJ.S. Agencies (supra). Therefore, I find that all the revision
petitions are well maintainable against impugned orders on sentence,
on the grounds of inadequate sentence.
30. Now, I shall deal with the merit of contentions raised by
complainant against sentence. The judgment passed by Supreme
Court in the case of Nirmala Devi (supra), was pressed into to plead
equality among convicts and to seek sentence of imprisonment
against convict no.3, who is wife of convict no.2. Ld. ACMM (East)
while passing orders on sentence, observed that convict no.3 was
only a signatory to cheques being wife of convict no.2 and she
signed those cheques on asking of convict no.2. She was a woman
and keeping in view her medical condition, no sentence of
imprisonment was awarded against her.
31. The observations passed by Supreme Court in the case of
Nirmala Devi (supra) were made, while dealing with a case of
offence under Section 307/328/392 read with Section 34 IPC. The
nature of those offences were apparently very serious. As far as
Section 138 NI Act is concerned, Supreme Court in the case of
Meter and Instruments Private Limited v. Kanchan Mehta, 2017
SCC OnLine SC 1197, observed that ―the object of the provision
being primarily compensatory, punitive element being mainly with
the object of enforcing the compensatory element, compounding at
the initial stage has to be encouraged.‖ In the same case, Supreme
Court went on to observe that offence under Section 138 of theAct is
primarily a civil wrong. Thus, observations made by Supreme Court
in case of Nirmala Devi (supra) cannot be applicable to the present
cases, keeping in view the vast difference in the nature of offences in
that case and in the present cases.
32. In the case of Praban Kumar Mitra v. State of West Bengal,
AIR 1959 SC 144, a constitution bench of Supreme Court observed
that ―In our opinion, in the absence of statutory provisions, in terms
applying to an application in revision, as there are those in Section
431 in respect of criminal appeals, the High Court has the power to
pass such orders as to it may seem fit and proper, in exercise of its
revisional jurisdiction vested in it by Section 439 of the Code.
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Indeed, it is a discretionary power which has to be exercised in aid of
justice. Whether or not the High Court will exercise its revisional
jurisdiction in a given case, must depend upon the facts and
circumstances of that case. The revisional powers of the High Court
vested in it by Section 439 of the Code, read with Section 435, do
not create any right in the litigant, but only conserve the power of the
High Court to see that justice is done in accordance with the
recognized rules of criminal jurisprudence, and that subordinate
Criminal Courts do not exceed their jurisdiction, or abuse their
powers vested in them by the Code.‖
33. In Rajaram Vs. State, 1983 CrLJ612 (MP),it was held that
“Order of lower court ought not be lightly set aside unless it has
entailed mis carriage of justice or where two views are possible
merely because the revising court takes the other view.‖
34. In the present case, ld. ACMM was well aware of civil remedy
availed by the complainant. The consent decree passed by High
Court of Delhi was also well within knowledge of ld. ACMM. It is
worth to mention here that before High Court of Delhi even
complainant had agreed to receive a total sum of Rs.10.4 lac only,
though he had the option to demand more amount on the grounds of
due compensation. In view of these circumstances, the amount of
fine imposed by ld. ACMM cannot be said to be inadequate fine.
Rather, while dealing with criminal appeal of the convicts, I have
already referred to this aspect to point out the compensation awarded
to the complainant. It cannot be said that compensation awarded to
the complainant is in sufficient, especially when complainant himself
did not seek more compensation in the civil proceeding, which was
more appropriate proceeding to seek such compensation. In fact, ld.
ACMM should have taken note of all the payments made to
complainant towards same liability, while imposing fine and giving
direction for compensation to the complainant.
35. The sentence of imprisonment awarded to conviction is not to be
enhanced merely to satisfy the sense of vengeance of the
complainant. Ld. ACMM has not only passed sentence of
imprisonment against convict no.2, but has also passed default
sentence against convict no.2 as well as convict no.3 for non
payment of fine. The convict no.3 was mother of a child during trial
of the case and was pregnant. During pendency of the appeals before
this court, she gave birth to another child. Therefore, omission of ld.
ACMM to pass any sentence of imprisonment against her, is found
to be in consonance with humane touch to the sentencing. Section
138 of the Act provides for punishment of imprisonment, or fine or
both. Meaning thereby, ld. ACMM had the option to pass sentence of
fine only against convict no.3 and thus, there is no legal infirmity in
such order.
36. In my opinion under revisional jurisdiction this court is not
supposed to substitute its own view, without there being any
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manifest error in the discretion exercised by ld. ACMM, with the
view formed by ld. ACMM. Therefore, the demand of complainant
to enhance the sentence is rejected.
37. However, there is one aspect attached to orders on sentence,
which were not raised by ld. counsel for complainant. Ld. ACMM
though convicted convict no.1 company as well, but no sentence was
passed qua this company. Once, a person (natural or juristic) is
convicted for an offence, the court has to pass some sentence qua
that person. The impugned orders on sentence are totally silent in
respect of any sentence qua convict no.1 company. It appears that ld.
ACMM as well as ld. counsel for complainant overlooked this
aspect. Under revisional jurisdiction, it is duty of this court to point
out legal infirmity so that same may be rectified. Therefore, I do find
that impugned orders on sentence are liable to be set aside for
aforesaid reasons.
38. In view of my foregoing discussions, findings and observations
given in criminal appeals preferred by all the convicts, impugned
judgments dated 13.04.2018 in all seven complaints are upheld.
However, orders on sentence dated 23.04.2018 in all seven
complaints are hereby set aside and matter is remanded back to the
trial court to pass fresh order on sentence in each case, keeping in
view the observations made herein above.
39. To be specific, the trial court shall pass order on sentence qua
convict no.1 company as well. The trial court shall also take into
account the payments made to complainant regarding same liability
till date, while imposing fine against the convicts. Since, this court
has rejected the prayer of complainant for enhancement of
punishment of convicts no.2 and 3, therefore, trial court shall ensure
that sentence against them is passed without any enhancement.
40. Accordingly, all seven criminal appeals as well as all seven
criminal revisions are partially allowed in respect of impugned
orders on sentence. Both parties shall appear before trial court on
31.01.2019 at 02:00 PM. Since convict no.2 is reported to be in civil
prison, trial court shall seek his production accordingly.‖
21. However, at the same time, the learned Sessions Court was
pleased to set aside the orders on sentence dated 23.04.2018 and
remand the matter to the learned Trial Court for reconsideration of
the question of sentence with the following directions:
―i. Not to enhance the period of sentence and the fine.
ii. To award or pass an order for imposing sentence upon Accused
No.1 the company.
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iii. The payments made to the complainant regarding the same
liability till date to be taken into account, while imposing fine against
the Petitioners.‖
22. Pursuant thereto, the matter was reheard by the learned Trial
Court, which passed a fresh order on sentence dated 22.05.2019. By
the said order, accused no. 1 company was admonished in all the
complaint cases, noticing that adequate compensation had already
been awarded to the complainant and that the company had been
struck off from the register maintained by the Registrar of
Companies. The learned Trial Court also reduced the sentence
awarded to petitioner no. 1, Rajpal Naurang Yadav, and sentenced
him in each case to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of
three months and to pay a fine of ₹1.35 crores and, in default of
payment of fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for a further period
of six months. It was further directed that the sentences in all the
seven cases would run concurrently. Insofar as petitioner no. 2,
Radha Rajpal Yadav, is concerned, the learned Trial Court
maintained the earlier order on sentence and directed her to pay a fine
of ₹10 lakhs to the complainant in each complaint case and, in
default of payment thereof, to undergo simple imprisonment for a
period of three months. The sentences in all the seven cases were also
directed to run concurrently.
23. Being dissatisfied with the fresh order on sentence dated
22.05.2019, both sides once again approached the learned Sessions
Court. The petitioners/accused preferred seven criminal revision
petitions, i.e. Cr. Rev Nos. 138/2019, 139/2019, 140/2019, 141/2019,
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142/2019, 143/2019 and 144/2019, challenging the sentence awarded
to them, while the complainant also instituted a separate set of seven
criminal revision petitions, i.e. Crl. Rev No.180/2019, 181/2019,
182/2019, 183/2019, 184/2019, 185/2019, 186/2019, seeking
enhancement of the sentence. Thus, for their respective reasons, both
parties were aggrieved by the order on sentence dated 22.05.2019.
24. In the meantime, on 09.02.2022, the petitioners had instituted
W.P. (CRL) No. 360/2022 before this Court, inter alia, seeking the
following reliefs:
―a. Issue a Writ of mandamus or like nature by directing the Ld.
A.S.J., Kakardooma Court to send the entire record of the Criminal
Revision Petitions Nos. 138- 144/2009 filed by petitioners as well as
Criminal Revision Petitions No. 180- 57 CRL.M.C.-4870-2024
186/20 19 filed by the Decree Holder/ Respondent No.2 and after
examining the record set aside the same as a person cannot be
sentenced twice for the same offence otherwise it would be violation
of Fundamental Rights against Double Jeopardy of Article 20 (2) of
the Constitution of India and declare the order of Learned M.M.
dated 22.05.2019 and order of Learned A.S.J. dated 21.01.2019 as
bad in Law being Violative of fundamental rights.
b. Pass any such further orders to do complete justice as this Hon’ble
Court may deem fit.‖
25. Vide order dated 16.02.2022, this Court permitted the
petitioners to withdraw the said writ petition with liberty to raise all
their contentions before the learned Trial Court, including the
contention that imposition of fine or payment under the proceedings
under the NI Act would result in double jeopardy, inasmuch as the
decree had already been executed. The relevant portion of the order
dated 16.02.2022 reads as under:
―2. After some arguments, learned counsel for the petitioner seeks
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his contentions before the Trial Court including the contention that
imposing a fine/non-payment of the amount in the proceedings under
the Negotiable Instruments Act would result in double jeopardy for
the petitioner inasmuch as the decree has already been executed.
3. Liberty, as prayed for, is granted.
4. Be it noted that this Court has not made any observations on the
merits of the case. The Trial Court is requested to consider the
arguments/contentions of the petitioner on its own merits before
finally adjudicating the matter.
5. With these observations, the petition is disposed of as withdrawn
along with the pending application(s), if any.‖
26. Thereafter, vide common judgment dated 29.05.2024, the
learned Sessions Court partially allowed the seven revision petitions
preferred by the petitioners as well as the seven revision petitions
preferred by the complainant and modified the order on sentence
dated 22.05.2019 passed by the learned Trial Court. The modified
sentence awarded to the petitioners reads as under:
―i. Petitioner No.1- Rajpal Naurang Yadav sentenced to simple
imprisonment for a period of 3 months in each case and to pay a fine
of 1.35 Crore in each case and in default of payment of fine to suffer
simple imprisonment for a further period of six months. (sentences in
all seven cases shall run concurrently). Out of the fine of Rs. 1.35
Crores in each complaint case, a sum of Rs. 1,34,75,000/- shall be
paid to the complainant and Rs. 25,000/- shall be paid to the State.
ii. Petitioner No. 2 – Ms. Radha Rajpal Yadav is sentenced to pay a
fine of Rs. 7,65,665/- to the complainant in each case and in default
of payment of fine to suffer simple imprisonment for a period of
three months. The amount of fine of Rs. 7,65,665/- in each case shall
be paid to the complainant. (sentences in all seven cases shall run
concurrently). 59 CRL.M.C.-4870-2024
iii. Accused No.1 therein – Company Shree Naurang Godavari
Entertainment Pvt ltd. is not operational and has already been struck
off from ROC. Adequate compensation had already been awarded to
the complainant to be paid by Petitioner No. 2 and Petitioner No.3,
therefore, Accused No. 1 company is admonished in all the cases.‖
27. By a separate order of the same date, i.e. 29.05.2024, the
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learned Sessions Court directed petitioner no. 1 to surrender before
the learned Trial Court within thirty days. Petitioner nos. 1 and 2
were also granted one month’s time to deposit the fine amount. The
said period expired on 28.06.2024. The operative portion of the order
dated 29.05.2024 are extracted hereunder:
―Vide separate common judgments announced in the open Court
today in fourteen revision petition, all fourteen criminal revisions are
partially allowed and sentences have been altered against the
convicts in CC Nos.823/13 (New No. 53711/16), 825/13 (New
No.53694/16), 831/13 (New No.53822/16), 832/13 (New No.53827),
02/13 (New No.48785/16), 824/13 (New No.53693/16) & 03/2013
(New No.50553/16).
Convict no.2 Rajpal Navrang Yadav has been sentenced to simple
imprisonment for a period of 3 months in each case and to pay a fine
of 1.35 Crore in each case and in default of payment of fine to suffer
simple imprisonment for a further period of six months in each case.
(sentences in all seven cases shall run concurrently). Out of the fine
of Rs. 1.35 Crores in each complaint case, a sum of Rs. 1,34,75,000/-
shall be paid to the complainant and Rs. 25,000/- shall be paid to the
State.
Convict no. 3 Ms. Radha Rajpal Yadav has been sentenced to pay
fine of Rs. 7,65,665/- to the complainant in each case and in default
of payment of fine to suffer simple imprisonment for a period of
three months in each case. The amount of fine of Rs. 7,65,665/- in
each case shall be paid to the complainant.
Convict no. 1 Company Shree Navrang Godawari Entertainment Pvt
ltd. is not operational and has already been struck off from ROC.
Adequate compensation had already been awarded to the
complainant to be paid by convict no.2 and convict no.3, therefore
convict no.1 company is admonished in all the cases.
A request has been made on behalf of convicts for suspension of
sentence for a period of 30 days to enable them to avail their
remedies against the judgment. Request is vehemently opposed by
the Ld. Counsel for complainant stating that Section 389 Cr.P.C. is
not applicable at the appellate stage.
Convicts no. 2 and 3 are based in Mumbai and are appearing through
VC. Convict no. 2 shall surrender before the Ld. Trial Court within
30 days from today. Convicts no. 2 and 3 are granted one month time
to pay the fine amount. TCRs be sent back along with common
judgment to the trial court forthwith. File be consigned to record
room, as per rules. Copy of this order be given dasti.
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C. The Present Proceedings
28. The petitioners have preferred the seven captioned revision
petitions before this Court, i.e. CRL.REV.P. Nos. 797/24, 798/24,
799/24, 800/24, 801/24, 802/24 and 803/24, challenging the
judgment dated 21.01.2019 of the learned Sessions Court, affirming
the judgment of conviction dated 13.04.2018 passed by the learned
Trial Court.
29. The petitioners have also preferred the fourteen captioned
petitions under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., assailing the judgment
dated 29.05.2024 passed by the learned Sessions Court, with respect
to the order on sentence.
SUBMISSIONS BEFORE THE COURT
A. On Behalf of the Petitioners/Convicts
30. On the point of delay in filing the seven revision petition i.e.
CRL.REV.P. Nos. 797/24, 798/24, 799/24, 800/24, 801/24, 802/24
and 803/24, challenging the judgment dated 21.01.2019 of the
learned Sessions Court, affirming the judgment of conviction dated
13.04.2018 passed by the learned Trial Court, the learned counsel for
the petitioners submits that the delay is neither deliberate nor
intentional, but is attributable to incorrect legal advice tendered by
the erstwhile counsel representing the petitioners.
31. It is contended that, although the prescribed period of
limitation for filing the present revision petitions had expired on
21.04.2019, the learned Trial Court had, in the meantime, reheard the
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matter on the aspect of sentence pursuant to the judgment dated
21.01.2019 (remanding the matter to Trial Court on aspect of
sentencing) and had passed a fresh order on sentence on 22.05.2019.
According to the petitioners, they were advised by their then counsel
that the challenge to the fresh order on sentence before the learned
Sessions Court would also encompass a challenge to the findings of
conviction and that the entire matter, including the legality of the
conviction, would be examined in those proceedings. Acting upon
such legal advice, the petitioners bona fide preferred the said revision
petitions and diligently pursued the remedy available to them before
the learned Sessions Court. It is further submitted that the petitioners
realised the error only upon the pronouncement of the common
judgment dated 29.05.2024, wherein the learned Sessions Court
specifically observed that it could not examine the correctness or
legality of the earlier judgment dated 21.01.2019 insofar as the same
had upheld the conviction of the petitioners. According to the learned
counsel, it was only then that the petitioners became aware that the
judgment dated 21.01.2019 affirming their conviction was required to
be independently assailed before this Court.
32. The learned counsel submits that, having lost confidence in
their earlier counsel, the petitioners thereafter sought fresh legal
advice, whereupon they were advised that separate revision petitions
against the judgment dated 21.01.2019 were required to be filed. It is
further submitted that the petitioners thereafter took immediate steps
to obtain the relevant records and certified copies of the proceedings,
including the records of the criminal appeals, criminal revisions and
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complaint cases, which consumed considerable time. Thereafter, the
present petitions were prepared and filed without any avoidable
delay.
33. It is, therefore, argued that the petitioners had bona fide
pursued a remedy before a forum which ultimately lacked
jurisdiction to examine the issue of conviction and that the entire
period spent in prosecuting the said proceedings deserves to be
excluded. The learned counsel accordingly submits that the
petitioners are entitled to the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation
Act, read with Section 5 thereof, and that the delay in filing the
present revision petitions merits condonation in the interest of justice.
34. On merits, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners
argues that the complaints filed under Section 138 of the NI Act
ceased to be maintainable once a fresh set of cheques was issued
pursuant to the Consent Agreement dated 21.04.2013. In this regard,
reliance is placed upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Gimpex (P) Ltd. v. Manoj Goel: (2022) 11 SCC 705. It is submitted
that the said decision lays down that a subsequent settlement
agreement subsumes the original complaint arising out of the
dishonour of the earlier cheques and, therefore, the proceedings
initiated on the basis of the original cheques can no longer be
maintained. According to the learned counsel, once such a settlement
is arrived at, a fresh cause of action arises only upon the dishonour of
the cheques issued pursuant to the settlement and the complainant
cannot simultaneously pursue proceedings based on both sets of
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cheques.
35. It is argued that the seven complaints in the present case arose
from the dishonour of cheques issued pursuant to the agreements
dated 30.05.2010, 21.09.2011, 04.04.2012 and 09.08.2012. However,
thereafter, the parties entered into the Consent Agreement dated
21.04.2013, whereby the complainant, M/s Murli Projects Pvt. Ltd.,
and M/s Shree Naurang Godavari Entertainment Ltd., along with
petitioner nos. 1 and 2 and M/s Shree Naurang Godavari
Edutainment Pvt. Ltd., arrived at a full and final settlement. Under
the said agreement, the petitioners agreed to jointly and severally pay
a sum of ₹10.40 crores to the complainant, of which ₹40 lakhs had
already been paid through RTGS and the balance amount of ₹10
crores was to be paid in installments. For securing the said
settlement, four post-dated cheques aggregating to ₹10 crores were
issued in favour of the complainant.
36. The learned counsel further submits that this Court, vide order
dated 27.01.2016 passed in CS (OS) No. 3037/2012, passed a consent
decree in terms of the Consent Agreement dated 21.04.2013.
Particular emphasis is placed on the observations contained in the
said order that the original agreement and the supplementary
agreements would not revive and that the complainant would stand
satisfied upon receiving the amounts stipulated in the Consent
Agreement. It is, therefore, argued that the original cause of action
stood extinguished and was substituted by a fresh cause of action
arising out of the Consent Agreement.
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37. It is further argued that it is an admitted position that the
Consent Agreement dated 21.04.2013 was executed and that four
post-dated cheques were issued pursuant thereto. In such
circumstances, the principle laid down in Gimpex (P) Ltd. (supra)
squarely applies and the original complaints could not have been
continued. According to the learned counsel, in the event of breach of
the Consent Agreement, the remedy available to the complainant was
either to institute fresh complaints on the basis of the dishonour of
the cheques issued under the settlement or to pursue appropriate civil
remedies for its breach. Reliance is also placed upon the decision of
this Court in Vinod Bansal v Intec Capital Ltd: 2024 SCC OnLine
Del 3245, where, while applying the dictum of the Supreme Court in
Gimpex (P) Ltd. (supra), it was held that a subsequent settlement
agreement subsumes the complaint based on the earlier dishonoured
cheques and that a fresh cause of action arises only upon the
dishonour of the cheques issued under the settlement. Reliance is
further placed upon the decision in K Jeganathan v P. Sampath:
2024 SCC OnLine Del 4003, where the original complaint under
Section 138 of the NI Act was quashed after issuance of a fresh set of
cheques pursuant to a settlement agreement.
38. The learned counsel further submits that both the learned Trial
Court and the learned Sessions Court erred in rejecting the
petitioners’ contention that, upon execution of the Consent
Agreement dated 21.04.2013, the Third Supplementary Agreement
dated 09.08.2012 ceased to have any effect and the cheques in
question no longer represented an enforceable liability. It is argued
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that the learned Sessions Court also erred in its interpretation of
Clause 6 of the Consent Agreement. It is also contended that
paragraph 7 of the order dated 27.01.2016 passed by this Court in CS
(OS) No. 3037/2012 merely preserves the remedies available to the
complainant in respect of violation of undertakings given to this
Court or non-compliance with its orders and directions, including
proceedings for contempt, and does not preserve the right to continue
with the original complaints under Section 138 of the NI Act. In this
regard, reliance is placed upon paragraph 5 of the said order, wherein
this Court specifically recorded the statement of learned counsel for
the complainant that the original agreement and the supplementary
agreements would not revive and that the complainant would be
satisfied upon receiving the amounts stipulated in the Consent
Agreement dated 21.04.2013.
39. It is further argued that the complainant cannot be permitted to
derive monetary benefits simultaneously through both civil and
criminal proceedings arising from the same cause of action. Having
obtained a consent decree on the basis of the settlement agreement,
without having to prove its claim in the civil suit, the complainant
cannot, according to the petitioners, continue to prosecute the
original complaints arising out of the Third Supplementary
Agreement dated 09.08.2012. It is submitted that permitting recovery
under both proceedings would be inherently unjust and would
amount to an abuse of the process of law.
40. It is, therefore, prayed that the judgments of conviction dated
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13.04.2018, as affirmed by the impugned judgment dated 21.01.2019,
be set aside.
41. On the aspect of sentence, the learned counsel for the
petitioners argues that by virtue of the consent decree dated
27.01.2016, the complainant had already secured a decree for ₹10.40
crores, which represented the full and final settlement between the
parties. It is submitted that, thereafter, vide the impugned order dated
29.05.2024, petitioner no. 1 has been directed to pay a fine of ₹1.35
crores in each of the seven complaint cases, aggregating to
₹9,45,00,000/-, out of which a sum of ₹9,43,25,000/- is payable to
the complainant. It is further submitted that petitioner no. 2, Radha
Rajpal Yadav, has been directed to pay a fine of ₹7,65,665/- in each
of the seven cases, aggregating to ₹53,59,655/-. According to the
learned counsel, the total compensation awarded through the criminal
proceedings thus comes to ₹9,96,84,655/-. It is argued that this
overlapping of the decreed amount and the compensation awarded by
way of fine is inherently unjust and amounts to an abuse of the
process of law.
42. It is further argued that the learned Sessions Court failed to
consider that, on an alleged loan of ₹5 crores, the complainant now
stands to recover an amount close to ₹20 crores by combining the
amounts recoverable under the consent decree and the compensation
arising out of the fines imposed in the criminal proceedings. This
effectively results in a return of nearly 300% on the initial amount of
₹5 crores, which is wholly disproportionate, unjust and impermissible
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in law. It is submitted that, while determining the quantum of fine
under the NI Act, the learned Sessions Court ought to have taken into
account the amount already decreed in the civil proceedings. It is also
argued that the learned Sessions Court ought to have directed that
any amount deposited by the petitioners in future be adjusted towards
the fine and compensation awarded in the criminal proceedings and,
correspondingly, be set off against the amount recoverable under the
consent decree.
43. The learned counsel further submits that petitioner no. 1 has
already undergone three months’ imprisonment in civil prison in
execution proceedings arising out of the same transaction and
concerning the same liability. It is argued that the learned Sessions
Court failed to appreciate that the said imprisonment was directly
connected with the same transaction and cause of action which forms
the basis of the present criminal proceedings. Therefore, petitioner
no. 1 ought not to be subjected to another sentence of imprisonment
arising out of the same transaction.
44. Without prejudice to the aforesaid submissions, it is stated that
even if this Court were to uphold the conviction, no sentence of
imprisonment ought to be awarded to petitioner no. 1 in the facts and
circumstances of the case. In the alternative, it is prayed that
petitioner no. 1 be extended the benefit of Sections 3 or 4 of the
Probation of Offenders Act, 1958.
45. On these grounds, it is prayed that the impugned judgment
dated 29.05.2024, sentencing the petitioners in the present cases, be
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also set aside.
B. On Behalf of the Complainant/Respondent No. 1
46. On the point of delay, the learned counsel appearing for
respondent no. 1/complainant opposes the applications for
condonation of delay and submits that the present revision petitions
are hopelessly barred by limitation, there being a delay of about 1894
days in challenging the judgment dated 21.01.2019. It is contended
that no sufficient cause has been shown for condonation of such an
inordinate delay.
47. It is argued that the petitioners cannot attribute the delay solely
to incorrect legal advice. It is stated that the petitioners were
represented by different counsels at various stages and they had
actively pursued the proceedings over several years. Therefore, it
cannot be said that they were misled by a single counsel or remained
unaware of the appropriate remedy. The learned counsel further
submits that the petitioners had preferred criminal revision petitions
before the learned Sessions Court in July, 2019 and had also
instituted W.P. (CRL.) No. 360/2022 before this Court, specifically
assailing the order dated 21.01.2019. This clearly demonstrates that
the petitioners were fully aware of the impugned judgment and its
consequences. Despite this, they failed to challenge the judgment of
conviction before this Court within the prescribed period of
limitation. It is, therefore, contended that the petitioners have been
grossly negligent and are not entitled to the benefit of Sections 5 or
14 of the Limitation Act. The present revision petitions, being grossly
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delayed, are liable to be dismissed at the threshold on the ground of
limitation alone.
48. On the maintainability of the petitions under Section 482 of the
Cr.P.C., the learned counsel appearing for respondent no. 1 submits
that the present petitions are not maintainable in view of the bar
contained in Section 397(3) of Cr.P.C. It is argued that the petitions
under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. are, in substance, nothing but second
revision petitions disguised as petitions invoking the inherent
jurisdiction of this Court. According to the learned counsel, the
inherent powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. cannot be exercised to
circumvent the statutory bar on a second revision or to nullify the
sentence imposed after the conviction has attained finality. It is
further argued that the petitioners are, in effect, seeking to be
absolved of the consequences of their conviction under Section 138
of the NI Act, even though they do not dispute the conviction itself. It
is stated that the challenge in these petitions under Section 482 of
Cr.P.C. is essentially confined to the sentence awarded to the
petitioners, since their conviction had attained finality upon dismissal
of their appeals by the learned Sessions Court on 21.01.2019 and no
challenge thereto was made within the prescribed period. It is also
submitted that the petitioners had expressly accepted their conviction
in the revision petitions filed before the learned Sessions Court.
49. On merits, the learned counsel for respondent no. 1 opposes
the prayer for setting aside the judgments passed by the learned
Courts below. It is submitted that the petitioners have repeatedly
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failed to honour the undertakings given by them to this Court as well
as the various agreements and settlements voluntarily entered into by
them over the years. It is pointed out that this Court had also passed a
consent decree for ₹10.40 crores on 27.01.2016, but petitioner no. 1
failed to abide by the undertakings and commitments made
thereunder and was consequently directed to undergo detention in
civil prison for a period of three months in Execution Petition No.
69/2016. It is further submitted that for more than a decade, the
petitioners have consistently expressed their inability to discharge the
amounts due to respondent no. 1.
50. The learned counsel has also drawn the attention of this Court
to the order dated 26.09.2024 passed in the present proceedings,
wherein this Court had observed as under:
―8. Although, this Court on a careful reading of the impugned
common judgment, finds no grounds to interfere on the merits of this
petition, however, considering the plea advanced by the learned
Senior Counsel for the petitioners, and for the fact that the petitioners
are not hardened criminals, the sentence awarded by the impugned
common judgment/order dated 29.05.2024 is hereby suspended till
the next date of hearing, subject to the petitioners submitting
personal bond in the sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- with one surety in the like
amount, subject to the satisfaction of the learned MM/duty
MM.Further, subject to the petitioners adopting sincere and genuine
measures to explore the possibility of reaching an amicable
settlement with respondent No. 1…‖
51. It is further submitted that the petitioners had also preferred
twenty-one Special Leave Petitions before the Hon’ble Supreme
Court challenging the order dated 28.06.2024 passed by this Court in
all the fourteen criminal miscellaneous petitions and seven criminal
revision petitions. However, the Hon’ble Supreme Court declined to
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interfere with the matter on merits. The relevant observations of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court read as under:
―2. After hearing learned counsel for the petitioners, we are not
inclined to entertain the present special leave petitions. However, it
is suffice to observe that the mediator while mediating the issues
shall not be influenced by the observations made in paragraph 8 of
the order impugned.
3. Accordingly, the Special Leave Petitions are dismissed‖
52. The learned counsel further submits that the petitioners
thereafter filed an application seeking modification of the order dated
25.04.2025 before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, being Diary No.
10044/2026, which also came to be dismissed. It is stated that
repeated challenges mounted by the petitioners at different stages
have been unsuccessful and the present petitions deserve to be
dismissed.
53. The learned counsel for respondent no. 1 further argues that
the contention of the petitioners that the criminal complaints arising
out of the dishonour of the cheques issued pursuant to the Third
Supplementary Agreement dated 09.08.2012 could not have been
continued after the execution of the Consent Terms dated 21.04.2013
and the passing of the consent decree dated 27.01.2016, is wholly
misconceived. It is submitted that the Consent Terms did not
supersede or extinguish the Third Supplementary Agreement and
were merely supplemental in nature. It is further argued that the
complaint cases arising out of the dishonour of the cheques issued
under the Third Supplementary Agreement were never stayed and the
only protection granted to the petitioners was that no coercive steps
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would be taken against them. The learned counsel has also drawn the
attention of this Court to Clause 6 of the Consent Terms, which
specifically provided that the seven complaint cases would be
withdrawn only upon receipt of the entire payment of ₹10 crores.
Since admittedly the petitioners failed to pay the said amount, there
was never any occasion for withdrawal of the complaints. The
learned counsel further submits that the four cheques issued under the
Consent Terms were merely intended to secure the promises made by
the petitioners under the settlement and were not meant to substitute
the earlier cheques or extinguish the existing complaints.
54. It is also argued that the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Gimpex (P) Ltd. (supra) is inapplicable to the facts of the
present case. It is contended that no fresh prosecution under Section
138 of the NI Act was initiated on the basis of the cheques issued
pursuant to the Consent Terms and, therefore, the apprehension of
two parallel prosecutions, which weighed with the Supreme Court in
Gimpex (P) Ltd. (supra), does not arise in the present case. The
learned counsel further distinguishes the said decision on the ground
that, in that case, the terms of compromise expressly contemplated
that a fresh complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act would lie in
the event of dishonour of the settlement cheques. It is also submitted
that paragraph 41 of the said decision itself clarifies that complaints
based on the original cheques need not necessarily be quashed in
every case where a compromise has been entered into between the
parties. As regards the reliance placed by the petitioners on the
decision of this Court in Vinod Bansal (supra), the learned counsel
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submits that the said decision is itself under challenge before the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in SLP (Crl.) No. 10980/2024.
55. It is further argued that the Consent Terms expressly envisaged
continuation of the original complaints in the event of default.
According to the respondent no. 1, Clause 6 specifically permitted
respondent no. 1 to proceed with the existing complaint cases if the
petitioners failed to adhere to the settlement terms. Thus, respondent
no. 1 could not have instituted fresh prosecutions on the basis of the
four cheques issued under the Consent Terms since the agreement
itself contemplated continuation of the earlier complaints. The
learned counsel also submits that the petitioners are misreading
paragraph 5 of the consent decree dated 27.01.2016. According to
him, the said paragraph was incorporated only to clarify the position
in the event the petitioners paid the entire sum of ₹10 crores under
the settlement. It is argued that only in such eventuality would the
original agreements and supplementary agreements not survive. The
eventuality of non-payment was specifically dealt with in Clause 6,
which reserved the right of respondent no. 1 to continue with the
criminal complaints. It is also pointed out that this very issue has
been considered by both the learned Trial Court and the learned
Sessions Court and concurrent findings have been returned against
the petitioners.
56. As regards the plea of double jeopardy, the learned counsel
submits that the argument of the petitioners that the decree stood
executed by virtue of the order dated 30.11.2018 and that they are,
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therefore, entitled to be discharged from the present proceedings, is
wholly misconceived. It is argued that the order dated 30.11.2018
merely directed detention in civil prison and cannot be construed to
mean that the decree stood fully satisfied or executed. The learned
counsel further submits that the said argument is contrary to Section
58(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, which specifically provides
that a judgment-debtor shall not be discharged from his debt merely
because he has been detained in civil prison. It is also argued that the
contention that petitioner no. 1 should be absolved of criminal
liability under Section 138 of the NI Act because of the period spent
in civil prison is equally misconceived. It is stated that petitioner no.
1 has not undergone any sentence pursuant to his conviction under
the NI Act. The period of three months spent in civil prison was
solely on account of non-payment of the decretal amount and cannot
be equated with the sentence awarded in the criminal proceedings.
57. It is, therefore, submitted that there is no ground to interfere
with the order on sentence, as modified by the learned Sessions Court
vide judgment dated 29.05.2024, and that all the present petitions
deserve to be dismissed.
ANALYSIS & FINDINGS
58. Before adverting to the rival contentions and the issues arising
for consideration, it would be apposite to briefly recapitulate the
nature of the proceedings giving rise to the present batch of petitions.
59. The genesis of the present litigation lies in seven complaint
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cases instituted by respondent no. 1 in the year 2013 under Section
138 of the NI Act. The said complaints culminated in a common
judgment dated 13.04.2018 passed by the learned Trial Court
whereby the petitioners were convicted, followed by separate orders
on sentence dated 23.04.2018.
60. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioners preferred seven criminal
appeals before the learned Sessions Court challenging both the
judgments of conviction as well as the orders on sentence.
Simultaneously, respondent no. 1 also preferred seven criminal
revision petitions assailing the adequacy of the sentence awarded by
the learned Trial Court.
61. The aforesaid seven criminal appeals and seven criminal
revision petitions were decided by the learned Sessions Court vide
common judgment dated 21.01.2019. While the judgments of
conviction dated 13.04.2018 were affirmed, the orders on sentence
dated 23.04.2018 were set aside and the matter was remanded to the
learned Trial Court for passing fresh orders on sentence.
62. Pursuant to the remand, the learned Trial Court passed fresh
orders on sentence on 22.05.2019. Once again, both sides approached
the learned Sessions Court. The petitioners preferred seven criminal
revision petitions challenging the sentence awarded to them, while
respondent no. 1 also filed seven criminal revision petitions seeking
enhancement thereof. These fourteen revision petitions came to be
decided by the learned Sessions Court vide common judgment dated
29.05.2024.
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63. Thus, the present batch of petitions before this Court arises
from two distinct judgments passed by the learned Sessions Court.
The seven criminal revision petitions filed by the petitioners before
this Court challenge the judgment dated 21.01.2019 insofar as it
affirms the conviction of the petitioners, whereas the fourteen
petitions under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. assail the subsequent
judgment dated 29.05.2024 relating to the fresh orders on sentence
passed by the learned Trial Court pursuant to the remand. It is in this
backdrop that the issues arising in the present proceedings are
required to be examined.
A. Criminal Revision Petitions challenging the Judgment of
Conviction dated 13.04.2018 and 21.01.2019
64. The particulars of the seven criminal revision petitions, along
with the corresponding applications seeking condonation of delay,
are tabulated below:
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65. At the outset, it is necessary for the Court to first adjudicate the
applications seeking condonation of delay in filing the present
revision petitions, since the question of limitation goes to the very
maintainability of the revision petitions
66. The delay in filing the present revision petitions is of 1894
days, i.e. more than five years. The petitioners, therefore, carry a
significant burden of establishing ‗sufficient cause’ which prevented
them from approaching this Court within the prescribed period of
limitation.
67. Essentially, the explanation offered by the petitioners is that
though they had challenged the fresh order on sentence dated
22.05.2019, passed by learned Trial Court, before the learned
Sessions Court by way of revision petitions in the year 2019 itself,
they were under a bona fide impression that they had also challenged
the findings of conviction recorded against them. According to them,
it was only upon the pronouncement of the judgment dated
29.05.2024 in those revision petitions that they realised that their
conviction had not been assailed in those revision petitions.
(i) Revision Petitions filed before Sessions Court
68. To appreciate the contentions raised on behalf of the
petitioners and the respondent no. 1, this Court has examined the case
records. A perusal of the revision petitions preferred by the
petitioners in the year 2019 before the Sessions Court (i.e., Crl. Rev.
Nos. 138/2019, 139/2019, 140/2019, 141/2019, 142/2019, 143/2019
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and 144/2019) leaves little room for doubt regarding the nature and
scope of those proceedings. In this regard, the following aspects are
noteworthy:
(i) The very title of each of these revision petitions
described them as a ‗Criminal Revision under Section 397
Cr.P.C. against the Impugned Order on Sentence dated
22.05.2019′. The challenge, therefore, was expressly confined
to the order on sentence and not to the initial judgment of
conviction dated 13.04.2018 or the appellate judgment dated
21.01.2019. This evident from the following:
(ii) The grounds raised in those revision petitions were also
entirely directed against the sentence awarded to the petitioners
herein. The petitioners had questioned, inter alia, the
enhancement of the default sentence from three months to six
months, the failure of the learned Trial Court to take into
account the period spent by petitioner no. 1 herein in civil
prison in the execution proceedings, and the failure to adjust
certain amounts allegedly paid by the petitioners. Significantly,
no ground whatsoever was raised challenging the findings of
guilt recorded by the learned Trial Court or affirmed by the
learned Sessions Court.
(iii) Most importantly, the prayer clauses of those revision
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petitions themselves belie the explanation now sought to be
advanced before this Court. The petitioners had specifically
prayed that the impugned order dated 22.05.2019 be set aside
‗to the effect of awarding sentence’ and that petitioner no. 1
herein be treated as a „convict‟ who had already undergone the
requisite sentence. The relevant portion of the petition reads as
under:
69. The use of the expression ‗be treated as a convict’ in the prayer
clause is relevant, as the prayer proceeds on the premise that the
petitioner is not challenging his conviction, but only the quantum of
sentence requires reconsideration, and he prays that while
maintaining his conviction, he be sentenced to the period already
undergone by him in the execution proceedings in the civil suit which
was filed before this Court. The language used in the prayer clause of
the aforesaid petitions is, therefore, completely contrary to the plea
that the petitioners were under an impression that their conviction
also stood challenged.
70. This Court also cannot ignore that the aforesaid revision
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petitions filed in the year 2019 were duly signed and verified by the
petitioners themselves. The accompanying affidavits which are
required to be filed alongwith any petition also contain specific
averments that the contents of the petitions had been read and
understood by the petitioners and that the petitions had been drafted
under their instructions. Thus, in this Court’s opinion, the petitioners
herein cannot simply contend that they were entirely unaware of the
nature of the proceedings instituted by them or of the ground and
prayer mentioned in those petitions.
71. Prima facie, the material available on record indicates that the
petitioners had consciously chosen to challenge only the order on
sentence and not the judgment affirming their conviction.
72. Pertinently, the conduct of the petitioners – subsequent to the
year 2019 – also does not support their plea that they remained under
a bona fide misconception regarding the challenge to their
conviction.
(ii) Writ Petition No. 360/2022 filed before this Court
73. It is material to note that in the year 2022, the petitioners had
instituted a writ petition, i.e. W.P.(CRL.) 360/2022 before this Court,
titled Mr. Rajpal Navrang Yadav & Anr. v. State of NCT of Delhi &
Anr.. A perusal of the prayer clause in the said petition reveals that
the grievance of the petitioners was confined to the issue of sentence
awarded to them and the plea of double jeopardy. The petitioners had
specifically pleaded that they could not have been sentenced twice
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for the same offence and had sought to challenge the fresh order on
sentence dated 22.05.2019 and the judgment of Sessions Court dated
21.01.2019 only on the ground that the sentence awarded to them,
despite the execution proceedings taken place before the High Court,
amounted to double jeopardy. The prayer clause of the said writ
petition is set out below:
―a. Issue a Writ of mandamus or like nature by directing the
Ld. A.S.J., Kakardooma Court to send the entire record of the
Criminal Revision Petitions Nos. 138- 144/2009 filed by
petitioners as well as Criminal Revision Petitions No. 180-
186/20 19 filed by the Decree Holder/ Respondent No.2 and
after examining the record set aside the same as a person
cannot be sentenced twice for the same offence otherwise it
would be violation of Fundamental Rights against Double
Jeopardy of Article 20 (2) of the Constitution of India and
declare the order of Learned M.M. dated 22.05.2019 and order
of Learned A.S.J. dated 21.01.2019 as bad in Law being
Violative of fundamental rights.
b. Pass any such further orders to do complete justice as this
Hon’ble Court may deem fit.‖
74. The aforesaid writ petition, vide order dated 16.02.2022, was
permitted to be withdrawn, with liberty to raise all contentions before
the learned Trial Court, including the contention that imposition of
fine or non-payment of the amount under the proceedings under the
NI Act would result in double jeopardy. The observations made by
this Court, by way of following order, also demonstrate that the
controversy raised before it pertained only to the issue of sentence
and the consequences flowing therefrom, and not to the correctness
of the conviction itself:
―2. After some arguments, learned counsel for the petitioner
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seeks permission to withdraw the instant petition with liberty
to raise all his contentions before the Trial Court including the
contention that imposing a fine/non-payment of the amount in
the proceedings under the Negotiable Instruments Act would
result in double jeopardy for the petitioner inasmuch as the
decree has already been executed.‖
75. It is also material to note that the above writ petition was filed
in the year 2022, by which time, more than three years had elapsed
from the date of the impugned judgment dated 21.01.2019. Yet, the
petitioners still did not institute any revision petitions before this
Court challenging the judgment affirming their conviction, though
they were actively litigating and pursuing remedies arising out of the
same set of proceedings.
76. It is also noteworthy that the petitioners have, over the years,
engaged multiple counsels in these proceedings. The record, in fact,
also reveals that the learned counsels who had appeared on behalf of
the petitioners in W.P. (CRL.) 360/2022 (noted above) and the
learned counsels who appeared in the present petitions before this
Court on the last few dates of hearing are the same. However,
initially before this Court, several other learned counsels and senior
counsels had appeared on behalf of petitioners. Therefore, this is not
a case where the petitioners herein remained represented by a single
counsel throughout these years, who kept on misguiding the
petitioners.
77. In fact, the petitioners were actively pursuing their cases
before different courts, engaging different counsel from time to time,
and were fully aware of the pendency and status of their cases.
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Despite this, for more than five years, they never chose to assail the
judgment dated 21.01.2019 insofar as it affirmed their conviction for
offence under Section 138 of the NI Act.
78. In these circumstances, the explanation now offered – that the
petitioners were under a misconception that the judgment of
conviction had already been challenged and that they were misled by
their earlier counsel who had filed the revision petitions in the year
2019 – does not inspire the confidence of this Court.
(iii) Whether ‘sufficient cause’ has been demonstrated by the
petitioner?
79. While observing so, this Court is conscious of the settled
principle of law, that the expression ‗sufficient cause’ under Section
5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, should receive a liberal and justice-
oriented interpretation by a court of law, and that a litigant should not
ordinarily be non-suited on technical grounds alone. However, the
law is equally well-settled that mere filing of an application for
condonation of delay does not entitle a party to such relief as a matter
of course. The explanation offered must be bona fide, reasonable and
should satisfactorily explain the entire period of delay in filing a
petition. A mere excuse cannot be elevated to the status of a
sufficient cause.
80. Also, this Court cannot lose sight of the fact that the petitioners
seek to attribute the entire delay to incorrect legal advice tendered by
their earlier counsel. In this regard, this Court is constrained to note
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that petitioner no. 1 herein is an accomplished actor, who is
possessed of sufficient means and resources, and has throughout been
represented by experienced and eminent members of the Bar. This is
not a case of an uninformed or otherwise disadvantaged litigant who
would be unable to understand the nature of the proceedings being
pursued on his behalf. In such circumstances, the plea that the
petitioners remained under a misconception for more than five years,
and believed that they had challenged their conviction as well,
despite them actively pursuing legal proceedings before different
courts and engaging several counsels during this period, cannot be
accepted, and a litigant cannot, after remaining silent for years, be
permitted to simply shift the entire blame on his counsel and seek
condonation of an inordinate delay in availing a legal remedy.
81. In this regard, this Court takes note of the decision of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing
Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy: (2013) 12 SCC 649,
wherein the Court laid down the broad principles governing
condonation of delay and emphasised, inter alia, that lack of bona
fides, gross negligence and fanciful explanations are relevant
considerations while deciding such applications. The relevant
observations read as under:
―21. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can
broadly be culled out are:
21.1. (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented,
non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for
condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to
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in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being
had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are
to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-
situation.
21.3. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the
technical considerations should not be given undue and
uncalled for emphasis.
21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate
causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the
counsel or litigant is to be taken note of.
21.5. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking
condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.
21.6. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof
should not affect public justice and cause public mischief
because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the
ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice.
21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate
the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a
totally unfettered free play.
21.8. (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and
a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine
of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be
attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach
whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation.
21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party
relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to
be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental
principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale
of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said
principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of
liberal approach.
21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the
grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts
should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily
to face such a litigation.
21.11. (xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away
with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking
recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation.
21.12. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully
scrutinised and the approach should be based on the paradigm
of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning
and not on individual perception.
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21.13. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity
representing a collective cause should be given some
acceptable latitude.
22. To the aforesaid principles we may add some more
guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. They are:
22.1. (a) An application for condonation of delay should be
drafted with careful concern and not in a haphazard manner
harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone
delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis
on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system.
22.2. (b) An application for condonation of delay should not be
dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual
philosophy which is basically subjective.
22.3. (c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard
being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious
effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the
adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate
institutional motto.
22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a
non-serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can
be exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be curbed,
of course, within legal parameters.‖
(emphasis added)
82. Similarly, in Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy
(D) Through His LRs.: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 489, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court reiterated that the length of the delay is itself a
relevant factor and that where a party has lost its right by reason of its
own inaction for a long period of time, the delay cannot ordinarily be
presumed to be non-deliberate. The Supreme Court further held that
before considering the merits of the main matter, the Court must first
examine the bona fides of the explanation offered for the delay. The
relevant observations are extracted below:
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the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the
approach of the appellants, it appears that they want to fix their
own period of limitation for instituting the proceedings for
which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held
that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on
merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be
presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances
of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial
justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical
considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of
delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main
matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides
of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It
is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the
opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court
may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of
condoning the delay.‖
83. Likewise, in State of Odisha v. Managing Committee of
Namatara Girls High School: 2026 SCC OnLine SC 191, while
refusing to condone delay of 123 days in filing the Special Leave
Petition and a further delay of 96 days in re-filing the same, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated that condonation of delay is not a
matter of right and it rests entirely within the discretion of the Court.
The Supreme Court also drew a distinction between a genuine
explanation and a mere excuse put forward to justify the delay.
84. This Court also takes note of the observations of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Salil Dutta v. T.M. and M.C. Private Ltd.: (1993)
2 SCC 185, wherein it was held that a litigant cannot completely
absolve itself of responsibility and attribute the entire blame to its
advocate while claiming to be unaware of the nature and significance
of the proceedings. The relevant observations read as under:
―8. The advocate is the agent of the party. His acts and
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statements, made within the limits of authority given to
him, are the acts and statements of the principal i.e. the
party who engaged him. It is true that in certain situations, the
court may, in the interest of justice, set aside a dismissal
order or an ex parte decree notwithstanding the negligence
and/or misdemeanour of the advocate where it finds that
the client was an innocent litigant but there is no such
absolute rule that a party can disown its advocate at any
time and seek relief. No such absolute immunity can be
recognised. Such an absolute rule would make the working
of the system extremely difficult. The observations made in
Rafiq [(1981) 2 SCC 788 : AIR 1981 SC 1400] must be
understood in the facts and circumstances of that case and
cannot be understood as an absolute proposition. As we have
mentioned hereinabove, this was an on-going suit posted for
final hearing after a lapse of seven years of its institution. It
was not a second appeal filed by a villager residing away
from the city, where the court is located. The defendant is
also not a rustic ignorant villager but a private limited
company with its head-office at Calcutta itself and
managed by educated businessmen who know where their
interest lies. It is evident that when their applications were not
disposed of before taking up the suit for final hearing they felt
piqued and refused to appear before the court. Maybe, it was
part of their delaying tactics as alleged by the plaintiff. Maybe
not. But one thing is clear — they chose to non-cooperate with
the court. Having adopted such a stand towards the court, the
defendant has no right to ask its indulgence. Putting the entire
blame upon the advocate and trying to make it out as if they
were totally unaware of the nature or significance of the
proceedings is a theory which cannot be accepted and ought
not to have been accepted…‖
(emphasis added)
85. In Rajneesh Kumar v. Ved Prakash: 2024 SCC OnLine SC
3380, the Hon’ble Supreme Court cautioned against the increasing
tendency of litigants to attribute the entire blame to their advocates
and held that even if an advocate has been negligent, such negligence
by itself cannot furnish a ground to condone a long and inordinate
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proceedings initiated at his own instance. The relevant observations
are as follows:
―10. It appears that the entire blame has been thrown on the
head of the advocate who was appearing for the petitioners in
the trial court. We have noticed over a period of time a
tendency on the part of the litigants to blame their lawyers
of negligence and carelessness in attending the proceedings
before the court. Even if we assume for a moment that the
concerned lawyer was careless or negligent, this, by itself,
cannot be a ground to condone long and inordinate delay as
the litigant owes a duty to be vigilant of his own rights and
is expected to be equally vigilant about the judicial
proceedings pending in the court initiated at his instance.
The litigant, therefore, should not be permitted to throw the
entire blame on the head of the advocate and thereby disown
him at any time and seek relief…‖
(emphasis added)
86. The principles flowing from these judicial precedents make it
abundantly clear that while courts should adopt a justice-oriented
approach, the concepts of liberal interpretation and substantial justice
cannot be stretched to condone every inordinate delay on the basis of
explanations that are devoid of bona fides or are contrary to the
record or a in the nature of mere excuses.
(iv) The Conduct of Petitioner no. 1 before this Court
87. This Court also cannot overlook the manner in which the
present proceedings have progressed before it.
88. The delay in filing the revision petitions was never condoned
by the Predecessor Benches of this Court. In fact, on the very first
date of hearing, the Predecessor Bench was not even inclined to
entertain these petitions on merits, as clearly noted in the order dated
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28.06.2024. It was only on the statement made by the learned Senior
Counsel appearing for the petitioners, that the petitioners were
willing to explore the possibility of an amicable settlement with the
complainant, that indulgence was shown and the parties were referred
to mediation. This is evident from the following paragraphs of order
dated 28.06.2024:
―8. Although, this Court on a careful reading of the impugned
common judgment, finds no grounds to interfere on the merits
of this petition, however, considering the plea advanced by the
learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners, and for the fact that
the petitioners are not hardened criminals, the sentence
awarded by the impugned common judgment/order dated
29.05.2024 is hereby suspended till the next date of hearing,
subject to the petitioners submitting personal bond in the sum
of Rs. 1,00,000/- with one surety in the like amount, subject to
the satisfaction of the learned MM/duty MM.Further, subject to
the petitioners adopting sincere and genuine measures to
explore the possibility of reaching an amicable settlement with
respondent No. 1.
xxx
10. In the interregnum, the matter be listed before the Judge
InCharge of Delhi High Court Mediation Centre (DHM&CC),
for exploring the possibility of an amicable settlement between
the parties on 08.07.2024 at 02:30 PM after issuing notice to
respondent No.l and his counsel. Steps shall be taken to serve
notice upon respondent No. 1 for the said date before the
DHM&CC at the cost and expense of the petitioners.‖
89. In the meantime, the petitioners herein had also challenged the
order dated 28.06.2024 before the Hon’ble Supreme Court by way of
Special Leave Petitions, which were dismissed vide order dated
25.04.2025. However, it was clarified that the mediator concerned
would remain uninfluenced by the observations made in paragraph 8
of order dated 28.06.2024. The order of the Supreme Court is
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extracted hereunder:
―2. After hearing learned counsel for the petitioners, we are not
inclined to entertain the present special leave petitions.
However, it is suffice to observe that the mediator while
mediating the issues shall not be influenced by the
observations made in paragraph 8 of the order impugned.
3. Accordingly, the Special Leave Petitions are dismissed.‖
90. Furthermore, a perusal of the orders passed by this Court, in
the present batch of petitions, would reveal that these cases were kept
pending, only to afford the petitioners an opportunity to settle the
dispute with the complainant. On the first date of hearing itself, i.e.
28.06.2024, the matter was referred to the Delhi High Court
Mediation and Conciliation Centre. A year later, this Court vide order
dated 31.07.2025, had observed that sentence awarded to the
petitioner no. 1 was suspended by the Court only on his undertaking
that he would settle the matter, yet no payment had been made.
91. On 22.08.2025, this Court was informed by the learned senior
counsel for the petitioners that two Demand Drafts of ₹50 lakhs and
₹25 lakhs respectively would be deposited with the Registrar General
of this Court, and that an amount of ₹9 crores still remained payable
to the respondents. However, the said DDs were deposited only
pursuant to the order dated 17.10.2025.
92. On 17.10.2025, the petitioners had assured this Court that they
would make a payment of ₹2.5 crores to the respondent no. 1 in
about one month. However, this undertaking was never complied
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and eventually, since no such payment was made, this Court, vide
order dated 02.02.2026, was constrained to recall the order
suspending the sentence and direct the petitioner no. 1 to surrender
before the jail authorities.
93. Thereafter, the family members of petitioner no. 1, on his
instructions, had paid an amount of ₹1.5 crores to the
complainant/respondent no. 1, pursuant to which, his sentence was
again suspended by this Court vide order dated 16.02.2026.
94. However, after already having made a payment of about ₹2.25
crores towards settlement to the complainant/respondent no. 1, the
petitioner no. 1, changed his counsels, and appeared before this Court
and refused to make any further payments.
95. The course adopted by the petitioner in the present proceedings
indicates that, despite the extraordinary delay of more than five years
in filing these revision petitions, he was granted repeated indulgence
by this Court and afforded every opportunity to resolve the dispute.
However, in the end, the petitioner did not stand by the undertakings
given by him and on his behalf through several learned Senior
Counsels appearing before this Court, and instead took the stand that
his previous counsels had not properly guided him in the proceedings
before this Court. In the considered view of this Court, this
explanation of being misguided by a counsel cannot be repeatedly
invoked every time a litigant wishes to resile from an earlier stand or
avoid the consequences of his own conduct.
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(v) Conclusion
96. Be that as it may, having considered the entire factual matrix,
the explanation furnished by the petitioners, the material on record,
the conduct of petitioner no. 1 throughout the proceedings, and the
settled principles governing condonation of delay, this Court is of the
considered opinion that the petitioners have failed to make out any
sufficient cause for condoning the extraordinary delay of 1,894 days
in filing the present revision petitions, challenging the judgment of
conviction dated 21.01.2019. The explanation that they remained
under a misconception for more than five years that their conviction
had already been challenged is neither borne out from the record nor
inspires confidence of this Court, and equally unpersuasive is the
attempt to attribute the entire delay to the alleged incorrect legal
advice of their previous counsel.
97. In the facts of the present case, this Court finds that the
explanation offered is devoid of bona fides and falls short of the
standard required for condoning such an inordinate delay. This Court,
therefore, finds no ground to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction in
favour of the petitioners.
98. For the reasons recorded hereinabove, the applications seeking
condonation of delay, i.e. CRL.M.A. Nos. 18596/24, 18628/24,
18635/24, 18639/24, 18643/24, 18647/24 and 18651/24, are
dismissed.
99. As a sequitur thereto, the revision petitions, i.e. CRL.REV.P.
Nos. 797/2024, 798/2024, 799/2024, 800/2024, 801/2024, 802/2024
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and 803/2024 are also dismissed.
100. Consequently, the impugned judgment dated 21.01.2019 is
upheld.
B. Criminal Miscellaneous Petitions challenging the Judgment
dated 29.05.2024 and for Quashing of Complaint Cases
101. The particulars of the fourteen criminal miscellaneous petitions
under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., challenging the common judgment
dated 29.05.2024 passed by the learned Sessions Court in the
fourteen revision petitions arising out of the order on sentence dated
22.05.2019, are tabulated below. It is to be noted that seven of these
petitions also seek quashing of the complaint cases under Section 138
of NI Act.
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102. The petitioners, by way of the present petitions under Section
482 of the Cr.P.C., have essentially laid a two-fold challenge. First,
they assail the very maintainability of the complaints instituted by
respondent no. 1 under Section 138 of the NI Act and seek their
quashing by invoking the inherent jurisdiction of this Court,
contending that permitting the complaints to continue amounts to an
abuse of the process of law. Second, they challenge the common
judgment dated 29.05.2024 passed by the learned Sessions Court
insofar as it relates to the sentence awarded to the petitioners in the
said complaint cases.
(i) Whether the Complaint Cases under Section 138 of NI Act
deserve to be quashed?
103. At the outset, it is noted that these petitions under Section 482
of Cr.P.C. came to be filed only in the year 2024, seeking quashing
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of complaint cases which were instituted as far back as in the year
2013. By the time these petitions were instituted, the complaints had
already culminated in judgments of conviction dated 13.04.2018
passed by the learned Trial Court, which had further been affirmed
by the learned Sessions Court vide judgment dated 21.01.2019. Thus,
what is sought to be quashed at this stage by the petitioners are
complaint cases in which the trial has concluded long ago and the
petitioners already stand convicted.
104. As held in the preceding part of this judgment, the criminal
revision petitions challenging the judgment dated 21.01.2019
affirming the conviction were themselves filed after an extraordinary
delay of more than five years. This Court has found no sufficient
cause to condone the said delay and, accordingly, the revision
petitions have been dismissed as barred by limitation. The findings of
conviction recorded by the learned Trial Court vide judgment dated
13.04.2018 and affirmed by the learned Sessions Court vide
judgment dated 21.01.2019, therefore, remain undisturbed.
105. In these circumstances, the present petitions under Section 482
of Cr.P.C., insofar as they seek quashing of the complaint cases
themselves, clearly appear to be yet another attempt of the petitioners
to assail their conviction, indirectly, by invoking the inherent
jurisdiction of this Court. This Court was, therefore, not inclined to
entertain these petitions also, considering the delay and laches on the
part of the petitioners in seeking quashing of complaint cases after
more than eleven years of their institution and after the entire trial
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had concluded in conviction.
106. However, since petitioner no. 1, both in person and through his
learned counsel, repeatedly urged before this Court that the
petitioners are, in fact, the real victims in the present case and that
they have been wrongly convicted in these cases which, according to
them, had ceased to be maintainable in law, this Court considers it
appropriate to examine the principal grounds urged in support of the
present petitions and adjudicate the same on merits.
107. To reiterate, essentially, the main argument of the learned
counsel for the petitioners seeking quashing of the complaint cases is
that these complaints under Section 138 of NI Act had ceased to be
maintainable. It was argued that these seven complaints arose out of
the dishonour of cheques issued pursuant to the original agreement
and the three supplementary agreements, the last being dated
09.08.2012. But thereafter, the parties had entered into a Consent
Agreement dated 21.04.2013, and arrived at a full and final
settlement. Under this settlement, the liability was restructured; four
fresh post-dated cheques aggregating to ₹10 crores were issued; and
the settlement ultimately culminated in the consent decree dated
27.01.2016. According to the petitioners, once the complainant
accepted the fresh settlement and the fresh cheques, the earlier cause
of action stood extinguished and merged into the new settlement.
Therefore, the original complaints under Section 138 of NI Act could
no longer survive. If the settlement failed, the complainant’s
remedies were: to prosecute the dishonour of the four fresh
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settlement cheques, or pursue civil remedies for breach of settlement,
but not to continue the original complaints. Heavy reliance was
placed on the decision in Gimpex (P) Ltd. (supra) to argue that a
subsequent settlement ‗subsumes’ the earlier complaint. They also
relied upon paragraph 5 of the consent decree dated 27.01.2016,
where it was recorded that the original agreement and supplementary
agreements would not revive.
108. The learned counsel for the respondent no. 1/complainant
disputed the above interpretation and contended that the Consent
Agreement dated 21.04.2013 did not supersede or novate the Third
Supplementary Agreement, as they were only supplemental in nature.
Most importantly, Clause 6 of the Consent Terms expressly governed
the fate of the pending criminal complaints, by providing that the
seven complaint cases would be withdrawn only upon receipt of the
entire ₹10 crores under the settlement; and since admittedly, the
petitioners never paid the settlement amount, the contingency for
withdrawal never arose. Therefore, respondent no. 1 was
contractually entitled to continue prosecuting the original complaints.
It was also argued that the four settlement cheques were issued
merely as security for performance of the settlement, and not as
substitutes for the earlier dishonoured cheques. Consequently,
respondent no. 1 rightly did not institute fresh Section 138
complaints on the settlement cheques, because the Consent Terms
themselves contemplated continuation of the pending complaints
upon default. It was contended that decision in Gimpex (P) Ltd.
(supra) is clearly distinguishable on facts.
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109. Insofar as the aforesaid contention of the petitioners is
concerned, this Court notes that there is no dispute regarding the
broad sequence of events between the parties. The record reveals that
the parties had initially entered into the agreement dated 30.05.2010,
which was thereafter followed by three Supplementary Agreements
dated 21.09.2011, 04.04.2012 and 09.08.2012. Pursuant to the Third
and last Supplementary Agreement dated 09.08.2012, eight post-
dated cheques were issued, out of which seven cheques are the
subject matter of the present complaint cases. Upon dishonour of the
said seven cheques and completion of the statutory requirements
under Section 138 of the NI Act, respondent no. 1 had instituted the
seven complaint cases in the year 2013.
110. It is also a matter of record that, during the pendency of the
said complaint cases, the parties entered into a Consent Agreement
dated 21.04.2013 with a view to amicably resolve their disputes.
Under the said agreement, the petitioners agreed to pay a total sum of
₹10.40 crores to respondent no. 1, out of which ₹40 lakhs had already
been paid through RTGS and the balance amount of ₹10 crores was
agreed to be paid in four instalments, i.e., ₹5 crores on or before
31.07.2013, ₹3 crores on or before 31.12.2013, ₹1 crore on or before
30.06.2014 and the remaining ₹1 crore on or before 30.09.2014. To
secure this amount, four post-dated cheques corresponding to the
aforesaid instalments were also issued by the petitioners in favour of
respondent no. 1. Thus, the settlement contemplated not only the
restructuring of the payment schedule but also the issuance of fresh
cheques as security for payment of the agreed settlement amount.
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111. However, it is an admitted position that the petitioners herein
failed to adhere to the terms and conditions of the Consent
Agreement. The agreed installments were not paid in accordance
with the settlement and the obligations undertaken by the petitioners
remained unfulfilled. In the meantime, the civil suit instituted by
respondent no. 1, being CS (OS) No. 3037/2012, also came to be
decreed by this Court vide judgment and decree dated 27.01.2016 in
terms of the Consent Agreement dated 21.04.2013. Even thereafter,
since the decretal amount remained unpaid, respondent no. 1 was
constrained to initiate execution proceedings for enforcement of the
said money decree.
112. In this background, it becomes material to examine Clause 6 of
the Consent Agreement dated 21.04.2013, which specifically governs
the effect of the settlement on the pending complaint cases under
Section 138 of the NI Act. The same reads as under:
―6. Murli Projects Pvt. Ltd. has instituted 8 (Eight) complaints under
Section 138 N.I. Act against the above contemnors before Addl.
Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Karkardooma in respect of Cheque
Nos. 021677, 021678, 021679, 021680, 021681, 021682, 021683
and 021684 issued by the said contemnors. The Ld. Court has issued
summons in the said 138 N.I. Cases. However, in view of the above
settlement, till 31.7.2013, Murli Projects Pvt. Ltd. shall ensure that
no coercive steps are taken in respect of their 138 N.I.A cases. In
case the cheque issued for the payment of Rs.5 crores (Rupees five
crores) is encashed or payment is made otherwise of Rs.5 crores
(Rupees five crores) prior to 31.7.2013 then Murli Projects Pvt. Ltd.
shall not take any coercive steps in respect of these cheques till
31.12.2013 and similarly steps will be taken in this regard in respect
of the subsequent two cheques dated 30.6.2014 and 30.9.2014. In
case any of the 4 payments are not made, then Murli Projects Pvt.
Ltd. shall be at liberty to proceed with the said criminal case against
the Contemnors and others in accordance with law. In case the
payment of Rs.10 crores is received in total as per the above
schedule ending on 30.9.2014 then Murli Projects Pvt. Ltd. shall
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withdraw the above criminal cases instituted against the
contemnors.‖
113. A plain reading of the aforesaid clause leaves no room for
ambiguity, inasmuch as the parties had consciously agreed that the
pending complaint cases would not be withdrawn merely because a
settlement had been arrived at or because fresh cheques had been
issued pursuant thereto. On the contrary, the agreement clearly
stipulated that respondent no. 1 would only defer taking coercive
steps in the pending complaint cases, subject to the petitioners
honouring the payment schedule agreed upon under the Consent
Agreement. The clause further specifically provided that, in the event
any of the four agreed payments was not made, respondent no. 1
would be at liberty to proceed with the pending criminal cases in
accordance with law. It was only upon receipt of the entire settlement
amount of ₹10 crores in accordance with the agreed schedule that
respondent no. 1 had undertaken to withdraw the pending complaint
cases.
114. Admittedly, the petitioners failed to comply with the payment
schedule under the Consent Agreement. The contingency upon which
withdrawal of the complaint cases depended, therefore, never arose.
Consequently, respondent no. 1 became entitled, in terms of Clause 6
itself, to continue prosecuting the pending complaint cases. In view
of this specific stipulation in the Agreement, the argument advanced
on behalf of the petitioners that respondent no. 1 was obliged to
withdraw the complaint cases or that the complaints had
automatically ceased to be maintainable upon execution of the
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Consent Agreement is wholly misconceived and without merit.
115. The petitioners have also sought to rely upon paragraph 5 of
the order dated 27.01.2016 passed by this Court while decreeing CS
(OS) No. 3037/2012. The said paragraph reads as under:
5. There would be some ambiguity on account of the language
contained in paragraph 7 of the consent terms/Agreement dated
21.04.2013, but the counsel for the plaintiff concedes that the
original agreement and the supplementary agreement as mentioned
in para 7 of the consent terms/Agreement dated 21.04.2013, do not
revive, and the plaintiff will be satisfied on receiving the amounts as
stated in the consent terms/Agreement dated 21.04.2013.
116. This Court is unable to accept the interpretation sought to be
placed upon the aforesaid paragraph by the petitioners. The
observations contained in paragraph 5 only clarifies that, upon
respondent no. 1 receiving the entire settlement amount in terms of
the Consent Agreement, the earlier agreements and supplementary
agreements would not revive and the complainant would stand
satisfied with the settlement amount. However, the present case does
not fall within that eventuality, since the petitioners had failed to
honour the settlement and had not paid the agreed amount in terms of
the Consent Agreement. The situation arising from such default was
specifically contemplated and governed by Clause 6 of the Consent
Agreement itself, which expressly preserved the right of respondent
no. 1 to continue with the pending complaint cases in the event of
non-payment. Therefore, paragraph 5 of the order dated 27.01.2016,
which clarified Clause 7 of the Agreement, cannot be read so as to
nullify or override the express stipulation contained in Clause 6 of
the Agreement.
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117. In this background, this Court is of the considered opinion that
the reliance placed by the petitioners on the decision of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Gimpex (P) Ltd. (supra) is also misplaced. In the
said case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court was dealing with a case where
a complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act had initially been filed
on account of the dishonour of a set of cheques. During the pendency
of the said complaint, the parties had entered into a settlement
pursuant to which fresh cheques were issued by the accused towards
compliance with the settlement. Those settlement cheques were also
dishonoured, leading to the institution of a second complaint under
Section 138 of the NI Act. Consequently, there existed two sets of
complaint cases arising out of the same underlying transaction – one
based on the dishonour of the original cheques and the other based on
the dishonour of the settlement cheques. In those facts, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court held that permitting both prosecutions to continue
would be contrary to the object of the NI Act. It was observed that
once the parties had entered into a settlement and the complainant
had chosen to prosecute the dishonour of the settlement cheques, the
earlier complaint could not be continued, as a complainant cannot
pursue two parallel prosecutions in respect of the same underlying
transaction.
118. The facts of the present case, however, stand on an entirely
different footing. Though the petitioners had issued four post-dated
cheques pursuant to the Consent Agreement dated 21.04.2013, the
said cheques were never presented for encashment by respondent no.
1 and, consequently, no fresh complaints under Section 138 of the NI
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Act were ever instituted on that ground. Thus, the situation of two
parallel prosecutions, which weighed with the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Gimpex (P) Ltd. (supra), simply does not arise in the
present case. More importantly, the petitioners and the respondent no.
1 herein themselves had consciously agreed, as per Clause 6 of the
Consent Agreement, that in the event of default in making any of the
agreed payments, respondent no. 1 would be at liberty to proceed
with the pending complaint cases. Thus, unlike Gimpex (P) Ltd.
(supra), where the complainant had chosen to prosecute the
dishonour of the subsequent cheques, respondent no. 1, in the present
case, has acted strictly in accordance with the terms of the settlement
itself by continuing the complaint cases already pending against the
petitioners. The continuation of those complaints was, therefore, not
only permissible in law but was also in consonance with the express
agreement entered into between the parties. Therefore, this Court is
of the considered opinion that the reliance placed by the petitioners
on Gimpex (P) Ltd. (supra) is misconceived and does not advance
their case in any manner whatsoever.
119. Consequently, this Court finds the principal ground, on which
quashing of the complaint cases has been sought, to be devoid of
merit.
120. Accordingly, the prayer seeking quashing of the complaint
cases is rejected.
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(ii) Whether there is any infirmity in the impugned judgment dated
29.05.2024?
121. The petitioners have also challenged, on several grounds, the
impugned judgment dated 29.05.2024, which relates to the order on
sentence. The principal contention is that petitioner no. 1 cannot be
subjected to imprisonment in the present complaint cases since he
had already undergone detention in civil prison for a period of three
months in the execution proceedings arising out of the money decree
passed by this Court. It is thus argued that any further sentence of
imprisonment would amount to double jeopardy. The petitioners
have also contended that the Courts below have failed to
appropriately adjust the amounts already paid by them to the
complainant while determining the quantum of fine and
compensation.
122. Insofar as the plea of double jeopardy is concerned, the
learned Sessions Court has examined the issue in considerable detail
in the impugned judgment dated 29.05.2024 and has dealt with the
same by making the following observations:
―14. The second limb of argument that the order dated 22.05.2019
amounts to double jeopardy as the Revisionist No.2 has already
undergone civil imprisonment for a period of three months in the
Execution No. 69/2016 is also devoid of merit. The concept of
double jeopardy is enshrined in Article 20(2) of the constitution of
India and section 300 Cr.P.C. Article 20(2) prohibits a person from
being prosecuted and punished for the same offense more than once.
This principle of double jeopardy prevents individuals from being
subjected to multiple trials or punishments for the same offense.
Section 300 Cr.PC also envisages the concept of double jeopardy.
The section reads as under:
xxx
15. Article 20(2) and section 300 Cr.PC protects individuals from
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being subjected to multiple trials or punishments for the same
offense and does not bar simultaneous institution of proceedings
under civil and criminal law. Civil imprisonment in execution of a
decree cannot be equated to punishment for an offence and therefore
the principle of double jeopardy has no applicability in the present
case. In complaint under section 138 Negotiable Instrument Act,
dishonour of a cheque is a cognizable offence subject to fulfilment of
condition precedent as laid down in the proviso appended thereto.
The cause of action for institution of the civil suit is grant of loan
whereas that of the criminal case was return of a cheque inter alia on
the premise that the account of the accused was insufficient to
honour it or that it exceeded the amount arranged to be paid from
that account by an agreement with the Bank. Both the proceedings
may be instituted simultaneously. Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Vishnu Dutt Sharma v. Daya Sapra, (2009) 13 SCC 729 held as
under:
8. There cannot be any doubt or dispute that a creditor
can maintain a civil and criminal proceeding at the same
time. Both the proceedings, thus, can run parallel. The fact
required to be proved for obtaining a decree in the civil
suit and a judgment of conviction in the criminal
proceedings may be overlapping but the standard of proof
in a criminal case vis-à-vis a civil suit, indisputably is
different. Whereas in a criminal case the prosecution is
bound to prove the commission of the offence on the part
of the accused beyond any reasonable doubt, in a civil suit
“preponderance of probability” would serve the purpose
for obtaining a decree.
9. Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act provides
that dishonour of a cheque subject to fulfilment of
condition precedent as laid down in the proviso appended
thereto is a cognizable offence.
10. The cause of action for institution of the civil suit was
grant of loan whereas that of the criminal case was return
of a cheque inter alia on the premise that the account of
the accused was insufficient to honour it or that it
exceeded the amount arranged to be paid from that
account by an agreement with the Bank.
11. Section 138 of the Act contains a non obstante clause.
In terms of Section 139 of the Act, a presumption in
favour of the holder of the cheque may be raised that he
had received the cheque of the nature referred to in
Section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any
debt or other liability.
xxx xxx xxx
28. If judgment of a civil court is not binding on a criminal
court, it is incomprehensible that a judgment of a criminal
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court will be binding on a civil court. We have noticed
hereinbefore that Section 43 of the Evidence Act
categorically states that judgments, orders or decrees,
other than those mentioned in Sections 40, 41 and 42 are
irrelevant, unless the existence of such judgment, order or
decree, is a fact in issue, or is relevant in some other
provisions of the Act, no other provisions of the Evidence
Act or for that matter any other statute had been brought
to our notice.”
16. The recovery initiated on the basis of a debt and a criminal
proceeding initiated under section 138 Negotiable Instrument Act on
dishonour of cheque and non-payment of cheque amount may be
instituted simultaneously and decision in one is not binding on other.
Furthermore even a person can be tried for two distinct offences
arising out of same cause of action. In R.P. Mathur Prop. Radhika
Leather Fashions v. S.R.P. Industries Ltd., 2009 SCC OnLine Del
259, Hon’ble High Court held as under:
13. Thus, in the facts of this case two sets of offence have
been disclosed categorically and clearly, that is offence of
cheating in relation to the complaint subject matter of the
CBI investigation and commission of offence under Section
138 of N.I. Act on account of non-payment of the cheque
amount within the time prescribed for which the notice
was issued to the petitioner by the complainant in
accordance with the scheme of the provisions under
Section 138 of the N.I. Act. It is not a case of double
jeopardy inasmuch as separate punishments are provided
for the two set of offences, that is for dishonouring of the
cheque under Section 138 of the N.I. Act which cannot
exonerate the petitioner for having committed other
offences under Section 420/477A/120B IPC to have
cheated the complainant on the basis of false assurance
given by him supported by the bankers etc.
17. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sangeetaben Mahendrabhai
Patel v. State of Gujarat, (2012) 7 SCC 621 held that to attract the
principle of Double Jeopardy enshrined under Article 20(2) of the
constitution of India and section 300 Cr.PC., the ingredients of the
offences in the earlier case as well as in the latter case must be the
same and not different and observed as under:
24. In view of the above, the law is well settled that in
order to attract the provisions of Article 20(2) of the
Constitution i.e. doctrine of autrefois acquit or Section 300
Cr.P.C. or Section 71 IPC or Section 26 of General
Clauses Act, ingredients of the offences in the earlier case
as well as in the latter case must be the same and not
different. The test to ascertain whether the two offences
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identity of the ingredients of the offence. Motive for
committing offence cannot be termed as ingredients of
offences to determine the issue. The plea of autrefois
acquit is not proved unless it is shown that the judgment of
acquittal in the previous charge necessarily involves an
acquittal of the latter charge.
In the present case, order dated 27.01.2016 passed in CS(OS)
3037/2012 by the Hon’ble High Court, whereby the suit was
disposed off and decreed in favour of the plaintiff (complainant) and
against the defendants (Revisionists) as per the terms recorded in the
consent terms/Agreement dated 21.04.2013 cannot be deemed to be
trial for an offence and order passed in execution cannot be deemed
to be conviction of the Revisionists for an offence so as to attract the
principle of double jeopardy. The contention that since the
Revisionist No.1 has been sent to civil prison for three months by the
Hon’ble High Court vide order dated 30.11.2018, nothing remains
for Ld. MM or this court to proceed further against the petitioner is
without merit as the principle of double jeopardy is not attracted in
the facts and circumstances of the case.
18. It is pertinent to observe that though principle of double jeopardy
is not applicable to the facts of present case, however the Ld. MM
has taken into account three months civil imprisonment of
Revisionist No.2 in terms of order dated 30.11.2018 passed by the
Hon’ble High Court in Execution petition No. 69/2016 and vide
order on sentence dated 22.05.2019 reduced the sentence of
Revisionist no.2 from 6 months (as per earlier order on sentence all
dated 23.04.2018) to 3 months…‖
123. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, this Court
finds no reason to take a view different from that adopted by the
learned Sessions Court.
124. The law on the issue is fairly well-settled. Proceedings for
recovery of money through a civil suit and criminal proceedings
under Section 138 of the NI Act operate in distinct fields and are
founded on different causes of action. Only because both proceedings
arise out of the same commercial transaction does not render either of
them impermissible. The object, nature and consequences of the two
proceedings are entirely different. While a civil proceeding is
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intended to secure recovery of the amount due, prosecution under
Section 138 of the NI Act is for commission of a statutory offence
arising from the dishonour of a cheque and the failure to make
payment despite receipt of the statutory notice.
125. In D. Purushotama Reddy v. K. Sateesh: (2008) 8 SCC 505,
the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that – it is beyond any doubt that, in
respect of the same transaction, both a civil suit for recovery and
criminal proceedings under Section 138 of the NI Act are
maintainable and may continue simultaneously.
126. Similarly, in Vishnu Dutt Sharma v. Daya Sapra: (2009) 13
SCC 729, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the pendency or
adjudication of a civil proceeding does not bar prosecution under
Section 138 of the NI Act. The Supreme Court also observed that
although the factual foundation of the two proceedings may overlap,
the causes of action, the nature of the proceedings and the standard of
proof applicable in civil and criminal jurisdictions are fundamentally
different. It was further held that a judgment in a civil proceeding is
not binding upon a criminal court and vice versa.
127. In the opinion of this Court, the aforesaid principles furnish a
complete answer to the contention raised by the petitioners herein.
The detention of petitioner no. 1 in civil prison was not on account of
conviction for any criminal offence, but rather, it was a consequence
of the execution proceedings initiated for enforcement of the money
decree passed by this Court. Such detention cannot be equated with
punishment awarded upon being convicted for an offence under
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Section 138 of the NI Act. There have not been two prosecutions for
the same offence.
128. Moreover, in this execution proceedings, the petitioner no. 1
was ordered to be detained in civil prison for a period of three
months in execution of the money decree. The order dated
30.11.2018 records as under:
―5. I am satisfied from the past conduct of the judgment-debtors that
the judgment-debtors, inspite of being in a position to pay the
decretal amount, are managing their affairs so as to avoid execution
of the decree. The judgment-debtor no.2 is found to have acted in
number of films and the explanation each time is, either of the
monies therefor having been received earlier or the judgment-debtor
no.2 performing without consideration.
6. The decree is ordered to be executed by detention of the judgment
debtor no.2 Rajpal Navrang Yadav in civil prison for a period of
three months. The judgment-debtor no.2 is ordered to be taken into
custody forthwith, to be detained in civil prison.
7. The Court Master to call for the marshal and handover the
judgment debtor no.2 to the marshal for compliance of the order
along with a copy of this order.
8. Since the decree-holder has not suggested any other mode of
execution, the execution is closed with the aforesaid…‖
129. A plain reading of the aforesaid order shows that the decree
was sought to be executed only by resorting to one of the permissible
modes available under law, i.e., the detention of the judgment-debtor
in civil prison. The execution proceedings were thereafter closed only
because the decree-holder had not sought any other mode of
execution. The order does not record that the decretal amount had
been recovered or that the decree stood satisfied.
130. In this regard, the learned counsel appearing for respondent no.
1 also rightly drew the attention of this Court to Section 58(2) of theSignature Not Verified
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Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which expressly provides that a
judgment-debtor shall not be discharged from his debt merely by
reason of his detention in civil prison. Thus, detention in civil prison
is only one of the modes of execution of a decree and does not result
in satisfaction or discharge of the decretal liability.
131. However, the proceedings under Section 138 of the NI Act
stand on an entirely different footing. Section 138 creates a statutory
offence, and upon conviction, the Court is empowered to award the
punishment prescribed therein, which may include imprisonment as
well as fine. The detention of a judgment-debtor in civil prison in
execution of a money decree can, therefore, by no stretch of
imagination, be equated with a sentence awarded after conviction for
a criminal offence.
132. It is also pertinent to note that despite the inapplicability of the
principle of double jeopardy, the learned Courts below have taken
into consideration the fact that petitioner no. 1 had remained in civil
prison for a period of three months. It is for this reason that, the
sentence of simple imprisonment originally awarded to petitioner no.
1, was reduced from six months to three months vide the impugned
judgment. Thus, the period of detention undergone by the petitioner
was not ignored while determining the appropriate sentence.
133. Therefore, for the reasons recorded hereinabove, this Court is
of the opinion that the principle of double jeopardy embodied in
Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India and Section 300 of the
Cr.P.C. has no application to the facts of the present case. The
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argument of the petitioners that no further sentence of imprisonment
could have been imposed merely because petitioner no. 1 had
undergone detention in civil prison is, therefore, devoid of merit.
134. Insofar as the quantum of fine is concerned, this Court is of
the considered opinion that the learned Sessions Court has duly taken
into consideration the amounts already paid by the petitioners to the
complainant pursuant to the settlement between the parties. The
impugned judgment itself reflects that appropriate adjustment has
been granted while determining the quantum of fine. The fine
imposed upon petitioner no. 1 was reduced from ₹1.60 crores to
₹1.35 crores in each of the seven complaint cases. Likewise, the fine
imposed upon petitioner no. 2 was reduced from ₹10 lakhs to
₹7,65,665/- in each case. This was on account of petitioners having
already paid a sum of about ₹1.91 crores to the complainant/
respondent no. 1 in the past.
135. This Court, therefore, finds no infirmity in the exercise
undertaken by the learned Sessions Court in determining the quantum
of fine, and no further interference is called for on this ground.
136. However, it is also a matter of record that during the pendency
of the present proceedings before this Court, petitioner no. 1 has
deposited a total sum of ₹2.25 crores, which has already been
released in favour of respondent no. 1. Since the said payment has
been received by the complainant towards the liability arising out of
the present proceedings, the said amount shall be given due
adjustment while computing the balance amount of
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fine/compensation payable by the petitioners, to the respondent no. 1,
pursuant to the impugned judgment.
137. Insofar as the prayer of the petitioners seeking the benefit
of the Probation of Offenders Act is concerned, this Court, after
giving its thoughtful consideration to the facts and circumstances of
the case, is not inclined to extend such benefit.
138. While considering whether an accused is entitled to be released
on probation, the Court is required to examine not only his
antecedents and how he conducts himself in the society, but also his
conduct before the Court of law and the manner in which he has
conducted himself throughout the judicial proceedings.
139. In the present case, the conduct of petitioner no. 1 has assumed
relevance since the record reveals that on multiple occasions,
undertakings were furnished before the Court, but the same were not
honoured. During the civil proceedings as well as the execution
proceedings before the Coordinate Benches of this Court,
undertakings were given regarding payment of the amounts due
towards the complainant. Those undertakings, however, remained
unfulfilled, ultimately resulting in petitioner no. 1 being detained in
civil prison for a period of three months in execution of the money
decree. Thereafter, in the criminal proceedings under Section 138 of
NI Act, despite the judgment of conviction having been affirmed by
the learned Sessions Court in the year 2019, the petitioner did not
challenge the same for more than five years and, when confronted
with the delay, he sought to explain it by attributing the entire lapse
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to the alleged incorrect advice of his previous counsel – an
explanation which this Court has already found to be devoid of merit
in the preceding discussion.
140. Even before this Court, on the very first date of hearing, the
Predecessor Bench had expressed its disinclination to interfere with
these matters on merit. However, upon a statement made on behalf of
the petitioner that he was willing to amicably resolve the dispute,
indulgence was shown and the parties were afforded an opportunity
to settle the matter. It was on this consideration that the sentence
awarded to the petitioner was suspended. Thereafter, over a
considerable period, repeated opportunities were granted to the
petitioner to honour the settlement. The petitioner, both personally
and through learned Senior Counsel appearing on his behalf, made
statements before this Court acknowledging that he was bound to
return the money to the complainant for which he sought repeated
adjournments to arrange the necessary funds. On several occasions,
assurances and undertakings were given that payment would be made
within the time sought from the Court. Despite these repeated
opportunities and assurances, the petitioner no. 1 failed to honour the
undertakings furnished before this Court, due to which, this Court
was constrained to direct the petitioner no. 1 to surrender before the
jail authority to serve his sentence. Though certain payments were
subsequently made and, on that basis, further indulgence was shown
by this Court by again suspending the sentence, no final settlement
could be arrived at. This Court also made earnest efforts to facilitate
an amicable resolution between the parties. However, at the end of
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the proceedings, petitioner no. 1 categorically refused to make any
further payment to the complainant.
141. What is even more significant is that, on the date when the
hearing in the present petitions concluded, petitioner no. 1 stated
before this Court that ‗he was not willing to pay any amount to the
complainant and would rather go to jail five times than returning the
money.’
142. Needless to state that in case a litigant wishes to choose path
of imprisonment rather than abiding by multiple undertakings
given by him in the Court, it is entirely his choice. Law is not a
script that can be rewritten at the will of an actor, nor can legal
positions be altered with every change of strategy whosoever the
litigant may be. Courts adjudicate on the basis of settled legal
principles and the record before them, and apply law equally to all,
and expect from every litigant fairness and respect for the judicial
process, the present litigant cannot be an exception to this rule.
143. In the above-mentioned circumstances, this Court is of the
considered opinion that petitioner no. 1 does not deserve the
discretionary benefit of release on probation under the Probation of
Offenders Act. The prayer is, accordingly, rejected.
(iii) Conclusion
144. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds no
infirmity in the common judgment dated 29.05.2024 passed by the
learned Sessions Court insofar as it upholds the sentence awarded to
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the petitioners in the present complaint cases.
145. However, as already noted above, during the pendency of the
present petitions before this Court, the petitioners have deposited a
further sum of ₹2.25 crores, which has already been released in
favour of respondent no. 1/complainant. Since the said amount has
been received by the complainant towards the liability arising out of
the present proceedings, the petitioners are entitled to due adjustment
thereof while computing the amount of fine payable by them.
Accordingly, to the limited extent of adjusting the aforesaid
payments made to the complainant, the sentence awarded to the
petitioners deserves to be modified.
146. The sentence awarded to the petitioners shall, therefore, stand
modified in the following terms:
(i) Petitioner no. 1 (Convict No. 2), Rajpal Naurang
Yadav, is sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for
a period of three months in each of the seven complaint
cases and to pay a fine of ₹1.05 crores in each case. In
default of payment of fine, he shall undergo simple
imprisonment for a further period of six months. All the
substantive sentences shall run concurrently. Out of the
fine of ₹1.05 crores in each complaint case, a sum of
₹1,04,75,000/- shall be paid to the complainant and
₹25,000/- shall be credited to the State.
(ii) Petitioner no. 2 (Convict No. 3), Radha Rajpal
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Yadav, is sentenced to pay a fine of ₹5,51,380/- to the
complainant in each complaint case. In default of
payment of fine, she shall undergo simple imprisonment
for a period of three months. The sentences in all the
seven complaint cases shall run concurrently.
(iii) Convict No. 1, M/s Shree Navrang Godawari
Entertainment Pvt. Ltd., having already been struck off
from the register of the Registrar of Companies and
adequate compensation having been directed to be paid
by Convict Nos. 2 and 3, stands admonished in all the
seven complaint cases, as directed by the learned
Sessions Court.
147. Except to the limited modification in the quantum of fine as
aforesaid, the impugned judgment dated 29.05.2024 is affirmed.
148. Consequently, CRL.M.C. Nos. 4870/2024, 4871/2024,
4872/2024, 4873/2024, 4876/2024, 4878/2024, 4879/2024,
4880/2024, 4881/2024, 4882/2024, 4883/2024, 4884/2024,
4885/2024 and 4886/2024 stand disposed of in the above terms.
C. Final Order
149. In view of the foregoing discussion and the conclusions
recorded hereinabove, the following directions are passed:
(i) CRL.REV.P. Nos. 797/2024, 798/2024, 799/2024, 800/2024,
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applications, are dismissed as being barred by limitation.
Consequently, the judgments dated 13.04.2018 passed by the learned
Trial Court and 21.01.2019 passed by the learned Sessions Court,
whereby the petitioners were convicted for the offence punishable
under Section 138 of the NI Act, are affirmed.
(ii) CRL.M.C. Nos. 4870/2024, 4871/2024, 4872/2024,
4873/2024, 4876/2024, 4878/2024, 4879/2024, 4880/2024,
4881/2024, 4882/2024, 4883/2024, 4884/2024, 4885/2024 and
4886/2024, alongwith all pending applications, are disposed of in the
above terms. The prayer seeking quashing of the complaint cases is
rejected. The common judgment dated 29.05.2024 passed by the
learned Sessions Court is upheld, subject only to the modification in
the quantum of fine as directed in the preceding paragraphs, on
account of the further amount of ₹2.25 crores deposited by the
petitioners before this Court and released in favour of respondent no.
1.
150. However, the order on sentence, as modified hereinabove,
shall remain suspended for a period of two months from date, to
enable the petitioners to avail of such remedies as may be available to
them in law, upon expiry of which period, the petitioners shall
undergo the sentence in accordance with law.
151. The judgment be uploaded on the website forthwith.
DR. SWARANA KANTA SHARMA, J
JULY 10, 2026/A/vc/zp
T.D./T.S.
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