Delhi District Court
Savita vs Ramesh Chand Dhingra on 20 July, 2026
IN THE COURT OF RENT CONTROL TRIBUNAL
WEST DISTRICT : TIS HAZARI COURTS : DELHI
RCT ARCT No. 09/2026
CNR No. DLWT01-003629-2026
Smt. Savita
W/o. Sh. Suresh Bharti
R/o. B-1697, Gali No. 24
Private Shop No. 3
in Property No. 778/M
Baba Faridpuri, West Patel Nagar
New Delhi - 110008. .... Appellant
versus
Sh. Ramesh Chand Dhingra
S/o. Late Sh Arur Chand
R/o. 778/M, Baba Faridpuri
West Patel Nagar
New Delhi - 110008. .... Respondent
Date of institution : 23.03.2026
Date of reserving judgment : 04.06.2026
Date of pronouncement of
judgment : 20.07.2026
JUDGMENT
1. This is an appeal under Section 38 of the Delhi Rent Control Act,
1958 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the DRC Act‘) filed by the
appellant/tenant aggrieved by the order dated 17.02.2026 passed by the
ld. ACJ/CCJ/ARC (West), THC, Delhi, in RC ARC No. 8/2018 titled as
Ramesh Chand Dhingra v. Savita, whereby ld. ARC dismissed the
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application of the respondent, filed under Section 15 of the DRC Act
for condonation of 7 days delay in depositing the rent for the month of
April, 2023.
2. For the sake of convenience, I would be referring to parties as per
their nomenclature before the ld. trial court. Therefore, the appellant
would be referred to as ‘tenant’ and the respondent would be referred as
‘landlord’.
BRIEF FACTS
3. Briefly stated, the landlord filed a petition under Section 14(1)
(a) of the DRC Act against the tenant praying for passing an eviction
order against the tenant in respect of the shop private No. 3 in the
property bearing No. 778/M, Baba Faridpuri, West Patel Nagar, New
Delhi (hereinafter referred to as ‘tenanted premises’) as shown red in
the site plan let out to the tenant at a monthly rent of Rs. 2000/-
(Rupees two thousand only). However, the tenant did not pay the rent
properly and fell in arrears of rent and accordingly, a legal notice dated
13.10.2017 was served upon the tenant demanding the arrears of rent
w.e.f. 01.10.2014. However, despite due service of the same, the arrears
of rent was never paid or tendered by the tenant.
4. It is further averred that during the pendency of the eviction
proceedings, the ld. trial court vide order dated 16.07.2018 directed the
tenant to deposit the rent at the rate of Rs. 2000/- per month from April,
2017 till that day within 30 days from that day and also directed the
tenant to pay the rent by the 15 th day of each succeeding month. The
tenant in compliance of the order dated 16.07.2018, deposited the
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arrears of rent from April, 2017 to 16.07.2018 and subsequently, paid
the monthly rent till February, 2026 without any default in the bank
account of the landlord. It is further averred that during the course of
arguments on 22.12.2025, the ld. counsel of the landlord pointed out
that in the month of April 2023, the rent for the month of April, 2023
was deposited by the tenant on 21.04.2023 instead of 15.04.2023.
5. It is further averred that due to two death in the family of the
tenant, the entire family of the tenant proceed to their native place
Tamadhaun, Bhikiasain, Almora, Uttarakhand and stayed there for
more than one month for funeral rites and rituals. It is further averred
that the entire period of 90 months from the order dated 16.07.2018, the
tenant continuously deposited the rent prior to 15 th day in every
calender month without any delay and fully complied with the order
dated 16.07.2018 passed by the ld. ARC except the month of April,
2023. It is further averred that because of the unforeseen circumstances,
the tenant could not deposit the rent within the stipulated period and
deposited the rent immediately upon return to Delhi and also moved an
application before the ld. trial court seeking condonation of delay. It is
further averred that the ld. trial court failed to appreciate the case laws
filed by the tenant in support of her application and failed to pass
reasoned order.
6. It is further averred that that the following questions of law arises
in the present appeal which are as under :
i. Whether the ld. trial court failed to exercise judicial discretion in
considering the application for condonation of delay in depositing the
rent?
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ii. Whether a single delay in deposit of rent due to specific
unavoidable circumstances can be treated as second default under the
DRC Act?
iii. Whether the provisions of Section 15 of DRC Act being
procedural and beneficial in nature, should be interpreted liberally?
iv. Whether the ld. trial court adopted an overly technical approach
contrary to the object of rent control legislation?
7. It is stated that an appeal bearing RCT ARCT No. 20/2023 was
preferred by the tenant under Section 38 of the DRC Act against the
judgment dated 27.10.2023 passed in RC ARC No. 08/2018 titled as
Ramesh Chand Dhingra v. Savita challenging the eviction order dated
27.10.2023 passed by ld. trial court. Arguments were heard by the ld.
Predecessor of this court and vide judgment dated 01.10.2024, the
impugned order dated 27.10.2023 was set aside and the matter was
remanded back to the ld. trial court and restored to its original number
and position.
8. The tenant stated that he had duly complied with the order dated
16.07.2018 passed under Section 15(1) of the DRC Act, however, due
to the 7 days delay in deposit of rent for the month of April 2023, an
application seeking condonation of delay was filed by the tenant which
was dismissed vide impugned order dated 17.02.2026.
GROUNDS FOR APPEAL
9. The impugned order has been challenged on the following
grounds namely :-
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i. The ld. trial court has not appreciated that the tenant always deposited
the rent in advance before the due date since the order dated
16.07.2018 till February, 2026 without any default before 15 th day of
each month except six days delay in the month of April, 2023 for
which appellant has shown genuine cause in non depositing the rent for
the month of April, 2023 prior to due date.
ii. The ld. trial court has miserably failed to consider that the bank
statement filed by the landlord clearly shows that the rent for the month
of March, 2023 was already deposited by the tenant on 10.03.2023 and
the ld. trial court, without going through the contents of the application
come to the conclusion that the tenant seeking condonation of delay in
depositing rent for the month of March 2023, despite that the tenant
had already deposited the rent for the month of March, 2023.
iii. The ld. trial court failed to consider that the tenant are totally
dependent and survive for bread and butter from the tenanted premises
and the entire family of the tenant is bound to suffer an irreparable loss
and injury, if the delay in deposit of rent is not condoned.
iv. The impugned order is nullity and has no force in the eyes of law, the
same is totally unlawful, illegal, unjustified and unwarranted and
cannot be enforced against the tenant.
v. The ld. trial court failed to consider that the provisions of Section 15 of
the DRC Act are procedural and beneficial, and are intended to protect
tenants from eviction for minor procedural lapses, the provision must,
therefore, be interpreted in a beneficial and justice oriented manner,
and it is settled law that no straight-jacket formula can be applied in
determining whether delay should be condoned and each case must be
decided on its own facts and circumstances.
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10. Reply has been filed on behalf of the landlord. In reply, the
landlord denied the allegations levelled by the tenant. It is further
stated that the present appeal has been filed against an interlocutory
order and as per Section 38 of the DRC Act, no appeal is maintainable
against an interlocutory order, and in the said order, there is no finding
on any legal point, as such the present appeal requires dismissal under
Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. It is further stated that the husband of the tenant
has deposited all the rent from his account and made various payments
from the period 13.03.2023 to 21.04.2023, but he has not deposited the
rent for the month of April, 2023.
11. It is further stated that the tenant has failed to mention that who
had prevented her from depositing the rent for the month of April, 2023
in the bank account of the landlord. The tenant has not filed any other
document except copy of the death certificate which can prove that the
tenant has stayed in Uttarakhand till 21.04.2023 as claimed by her in
the application under Section 15 of the DRC Act. It is further stated that
the non payment of the rent for the month of April, 2023 is willful,
negligent and deliberate on the part of the tenant as the tenant has made
various transactions during the period mentioned by the tenant in his
application under Section 15 of the DRC Act and the bank statement
filed by the tenant in this regard is self-explanatory and the same may
be looked into in this regard. It is further stated that the tenant failed to
mention any reason as to who had prevented her to deposit the rent for
the said month in the bank account of the landlord through UPI as the
bank statement filed by the tenant clearly show that she has made
various payment through UPI to various persons for the said period. It
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is further stated that the present appeal is only an abuse of process of
law and requires dismissal with heavy cost.
12. Arguments were addressed by Sh. R. M. Tiwari, ld. counsel for
the tenant and Sh. S. K. Chawla, ld. counsel for the landlord.
13. Ld. counsel for the tenant argued that the delays in deposit of rent
were minor, bona fide and occurred due to unavoidable circumstances.
It has been further argued that the tenant has duly complied with the
order under Section 15(1) of the DRC Act and paid the rent well before
the 15th day of each calender month from the date of passing of the
order till March, 2023. It is further argued that the tenant has shown the
sufficient cause regarding the 7 days delay in paying the rent for the
month of April, 2023 and the delay should be condoned. It is further
argued that the tenant is wholly dependent on the tenanted premises for
his bread and butter. It is further argued that the ld. trial court adopted a
strict and hyper-technical approach while passing the impugned order.
Accordingly, the impugned order is liable to be set aside. Reliance has
been placed upon the judgments passed by superior courts in
Shyamcharan Sharma v. Dharamdas, 1980 AIR 587; Ram Murti v.
Bhola Nath & Anr., AIR 1984 SC 1392; Balwanti Devi v. Mahesh
Kumar Chopra, Neutral Citation 2012:DHC:710; Ram Gopal
Mongia v. Capt. Preetinder Singh Thapara & Ors., Neutral Citation
2024:DHC:9390; Ghyanshyam Khohar v. Madan Mohal through his
LRs & Ors., Neutral citation 2025:DHC:11576-DB; Mrs. Santosh
Mehta v. Om Prakash & Ors., AIR 1980 SC 1664; and Smt. Kanta
Devi v. Shri Vasdev, AIR 1995 SC 985, in support of his arguments.
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14. Ld. counsel for the landlord has argued that the tenant has filed
the appeal against an interlocutory order and as per Section 38(1) of the
DRC Act, no appeal is maintainable against an interlocutory order. It is
further argued that Section 38(1) of the DRC Act give a right of appeal
to a party aggrieved by some order which affects right or liability. It is
further argued that in the context of Section 38(1) of the DRC Act, the
word; every order of the controller made under this Act; though very
wide, do not include interlocutory order, which are merely procedural
and do not affect the rights or liabilities of the parties. It is further
argued that the tenant has made a second default in the payment of rent
in the year 2023, but the tenant has not filed any application for
condonation of delay in depositing the rent in the year 2023 but the
tenant has filed the said application at the time of final arguments when
the landlord has pointed out the same before the ld. trial court, so the
mistake on the part of the tenant is not bonafide but the same is
malafide. Reliance has been placed upon Central Bank of India v.
Gokal Chand, 1967 AIR 799.
15. Written submissions have been filed by the parties in which they
have reiterated the submissions made at the time of arguments.
DECISION
16. It would be expedient to set out the relevant provisions of the
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.
Section 14(1) (a) of the Act
14 (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained
in any other law or contract, no order or decree for the
recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any
court or Controller in favour of the landlord against a
tenant:
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Provided that the Controller may, on an application made to
him in the prescribed manner, make an order for the
recovery of possession of the premises on one or more of the
following grounds only, namely:-
(a) that the tenant has neither paid nor tendered the whole
of the arrears of the rent legally recoverable from him
within two months of the date on which a notice of demand
for the arrears of rent has been served of him by the
landlord in the manner provided in section 106 of the
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882);
Section 14 (2) of the Act
14 (2) No order for the recovery of possession of any
premises shall be made on the ground specified in clause (a)
of the proviso to sub-section (1), if the tenant makes
payment or deposit as required by section 15;
Provided that no tenant shall be entitled to the benefit under
this sub-section, if, having obtained such benefit once in
respect of any premises, he again makes a default in the
payment of rent of those premises for three consecutive
months.
Section 15 (1) of the Act
15. When a tenant can get the benefit of protection against
eviction.–(1) In every proceeding of the recovery of
possession of any premises on the ground specified in clause
(a) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 14, the
Controller shall, after giving the parties an opportunity of
being heard, make an order directing the tenant to pay to
the landlord or deposit with the Controller within one month
of the date of the order, an amount calculated at the rate of
rent at which it was last paid for the period for which the
arrears of the rent were legally recoverable from the tenant
including the period subsequent thereto up to the end of the
month previous to that in which payment or deposit is made
and to continue to pay or deposit, month by month, by the
fifteenth of each succeeding month, a sum equivalent to the
rent at that rate.
17. At the very outset, it may be noted that during the course of
arguments, ld. counsel for the landlord by placing reliance on Central
Bank of India (Supra) has raised the contention that the impugned
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order did not effect the rights of the tenant, and such interlocutory order
which are merely procedural are not appealable, this contention appears
to be attractive but the same is fallacious in as much as in Central
Bank of India (Supra), it was observed as under :
“The object of Section 38(1) is to give a right of appeal to a
party aggrieved by some order which affects his right or
liability. In the context of Section 38(1), the words “every
order of the Controller made under this Act”, though very
wide, do not include interlocutory orders, which are merely
procedural and do not affect the rights or liabilities of the
parties. In a pending proceeding, the Controller may pass
many interlocutory orders under Sections 36 and 37, such
as orders regarding the summoning of witnesses, discovery,
production and inspection of documents, issue of a
commission for examination of witnesses, inspection of
premises, fixing a date of hearing and the admissibility of a
document or the relevancy of a question. All these
interlocutory orders are steps taken towards the final
adjudication and for assisting the parties in the prosecution
of their case in the pending proceeding; they regulate the
procedure only and do not affect any right or liability of the
parties. The legislature could not have intended that the
parties would be harassed with endless expenses and delay
by appeals from such procedural orders. It is open to any
party to set forth the error, defect or irregularity, if any, in
such an order as a ground of objection in his appeal from
the final order in the main proceeding. Subject to the
aforesaid limitation, an appeal lies to the Rent Control
Tribunal from every order passed by the Controller under
the Act. Even an interlocutory order passed under Section
37(2) is an order passed under the Act and is subject to
appeal under Section 38(1) provided it affects some right or
liability of any party. Thus, an order of the Rent Controller
refusing to set aside an ex parte order is subject to appeal to
the Rent Control Tribunal.
Similar considerations have induced the courts to give a
limited construction on the apparently wide words of other
statutes conferring rights of appeal. Section 202 of the
Indian Companies Act, 1913 confers a right of appeal “from
any order or decision made or given in the matter of the
winding up of a company by the court”. In Shankarlal
Aggarwal v. Shankarlal Poddar1 this court decided that
these words, though wide, would exclude merely procedural
orders or those which did not affect the rights or liabilitiesRCT No.09/2026 Savita v. Ramesh Chand Dhingra Page No.10/18
of parties.
The order of the Controller dated May 29, 1965 refusing to
issue a commission for inspection and preparation of a plan
of premises No. 17, Alipur Road was a mere procedural
order not affecting any right or liability of the appellant.
The issue of a commission is only a step for assisting the
parties in the prosecution of their case. It is open to the
appellant to canvass the error, defect or irregularity, if any,
in the order in an appeal from the final order passed in the
proceeding for eviction. But no appeal from the order lay to
the Rent Control Tribunal under Section 38(1). The appeal
is dismissed with costs.”
18. In addition to it, it may also be noted that the judgment
Ghanshyam Khohar (Supra) although deals with the powers of the
Hon’ble High Court under Section 10 of the Delhi High Court Act,
1996 and the question involved was as to whether the non appealable
order passed by Hon’ble Single Judge amounts to a judgment and can
be appealed to the Division Bench under Section 10 of the Delhi High
Court Act, 1996 and it was observed as under :
“11. The application was finally decided by the learned
Single Judge, which directly affects the rights of the
Appellant. This Court is of the view that the Order
impugned herein is appealable under Section 10 of the
Delhi High Court Act, 1966. We are also guided by a full
bench Judgement of this Court in Jaswinder Singh v.
Mrigendra Pritam Vikramsingh Steiner [2012 SCC
OnLine Del 5506], wherein, while taking into consideration
the judgement of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Shah
Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben D. Kania [(1981) 4 SCC 8], it
was held that a non-appealable order passed by the learned
Single Judge that amounts to a “judgment” can be
appealed to the Division Bench under Section 10 of the
Delhi High Court Act, 1966. The relevant extract of
Jaswinder Singh (supra) is reproduced herein below for the
sake of brevity:
“28. The question as to the maintainability of appeals from
orders passed by a learned Judge exercising ordinary
original civil jurisdiction which are not appealable under
Order 43 Rule 1 of the said Code has been examined by
the Supreme Court in Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben D.
Kania(1981) 4 SCC 8. An appeal was held to beRCT No.09/2026 Savita v. Ramesh Chand Dhingra Page No.11/18
maintainable if the order was within the meaning of
“Judgment”. If the order purports to decide valuable
rights of parties and what are called the orders of the
moment, an appeal was held to be maintainable if it is not
categorized in the nature of an order which is appealable
under Order 43 Rule 1 of the said Code. The expression
“Judgment” has been held to be capable of taking three
different characters. It may be a final Judgment, it may be
a preliminary judgment or it may be an intermediary or
interlocutory Judgment. The third category are cases
which possess characteristics and trappings of finality and
may have direct and immediate effect rather than an
indirect or remote one. It is against such orders also that
an appeal has been held to be maintainable while
discussing the scope of clause 15 of the Letters Patent of
the Chartered High Courts as the case emanated from the
Bombay High Court. As noticed aforesaid that clause 10 of
the Letters Patent of Lahore as applicable to Delhi is
distinct on view of the absence of any ordinary original
civil jurisdiction in the High Court Judicature at Lahore,
not being a Presidency town.
…………………..
39. We, thus, conclude by laying down the following
principle of law :
In case of an order passed by the learned Single Judge in
exercise of ordinary original civil jurisdiction in case of a
non-appealable order under Section 104 read with Order
43 of the said Code which meets the test of a “Judgment”
that decides matters of moment or affects vital and
valuable rights of parties and which works serious
injustice to the parties concerned as per the parameters
laid down in Shah Babulal Khimji case (supra) by the
Supreme Court, an appeal to the Division Bench would
exclusively lie under Section 10 of the said Act and not
under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent.”
19. So far as the reliance placed upon Shri Ram Gopal Mongia
(supra) by ld. counsel for the appellant is concerned, suffice it to say
that in said judgment Hon’ble High Court of Delhi has relied upon the
case law titled as Central Bank of India Ltd. (supra) and has observed
in para no. 5 and 6 as under :
“5. The Supreme Court in the case of Central Bank of India
Ltd. v. Gokal Chand has held that Section 38 of the DRC Act
gives a right of Appeal to the Rent Control Tribunal against
every order of the Rent Controller made under the DRC Act
in the following terms:
“3. The object of Section 38(1) is to give a right of appeal
to a party aggrieved by some order which affects his right
or liability. In the context of Section 38(1), the wordsRCT No.09/2026 Savita v. Ramesh Chand Dhingra Page No.12/18
“every order of the Controller made under this Act”,
though very wide, do not include interlocutory orders,
which are merely procedural and do not affect the rights
or liabilities of the parties. In a pending proceeding, the
Controller may pass many interlocutory orders under
Sections 36 and 37, such as orders regarding the
summoning of witnesses, discovery, production and
inspection of documents, issue of a commission for
examination of witnesses, inspection of premises, fixing a
date of hearing and the admissibility of a document or the
relevancy of a question. All these interlocutory orders are
steps taken towards the final adjudication and for assisting
the parties in the prosecution of their case in the pending
proceeding; they regulate the procedure only and do not
affect any right or liability of the parties. The legislature
could not have intended that the parties would be
harassed with endless expenses and delay by appeals
from such procedural orders. It is open to any party to set
forth the error, defect or irregularity, if any, in such an
order as a ground of objection in his appeal from the final
order in the main proceeding. Subject to the aforesaid
limitation, an appeal lies to the Rent Control Tribunal
from every order passed by the Controller under the Act.
Even an interlocutory order passed under Section 37(2) is
an order passed under the Act and is subject to appeal
under Section 38(1) provided it affects some right or
liability of any party. Thus, an order of the Rent Controller
refusing to set aside an ex parte order is subject to appeal
to the Rent Control Tribunal.”
6. A Coordinate Bench of this Court in the Inder Mohan
Sachdeva v. Usha International Ltd. while relying on the
Central Bank case has held that an order effecting the rights
and liabilities of the parties is an appealable order under
Section 38(1) of the DRC Act and that since an alternate
remedy is available, the Court would not interfere with the
Impugned Order in its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India. The relevant paragraph is reproduced
below :
“9. Thus, the Supreme Court was of the view that some of
the orders can be agitated while preferring an Appeal
against a final order and if an innocuous order (though
wrong) is passed the legislature did not intend that the
same should become an instrument of harassment or
delay by giving a remedy of Appeal against such an order.
10. In my view, the order declining to set aside the order
dismissing an Eviction Petition in default is very much an
order affecting the rights and liabilities of the parties.
Therefore, Appeal under Section 38(1) of the Act is
maintainable. The alternative remedy being available, this
Court would not interfere with the impugned order in its
jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of
India.”
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20. From a bare perusal of the ratio decidendi laid down by the
superior courts, it can be safely concluded that the impugned order
passed by the ld. ARC, which affects the rights and liabilities of the
tenant, cannot be termed as interlocutory order and the impugned order
cannot be stated that it is falling under the category of interlocutory
order, which are merely procedural and did not affect the rights and
liabilities of the tenant, and, in the judgment Shri Ram Gopal Mongia
(supra), the controversy involved was as to whether the order passed
by the ld. ARC while disposing of the application under Order 6 Rule
17 CPC is an appealable order or revision is maintainable against the
said order before Hon’ble High Court of Delhi and in this context, it
was held that appeal is maintainable under Section 38 of the DRC Act.
From the above discussion, it can be safely concluded that the
impugned order is appealable under Section 9 of the DRC Act.
21. So far as the contention of the ld. counsel for the tenant that the
tenant had been paying the rent in terms of the order dated 16.07.2018
passed by ld. ARC regularly for the last 90 months and there was a
default for payment of rent for the month of April, 2023, which was
supposed to be paid on 15.04.2023, but on account of reason beyond
her control, the tenant has deposited the rent on 21.04.2023 and there
has been only a delay of 7 days which deserves to be condoned is
concerned, the same is not only attractive but having substance under
law in as much as it is mandate of law that when the ld. ARC has the
discretion under Section 15(7) of the DRC Act not to strike out the
defence of the tenant, then the ld. ARC necessarily has the power to
extend the time for payment of future rent under Section 15(1) of the
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DRC Act where the failure of the tenant to make such payment for
deposit was due to circumstances beyond his control. In this regard, the
observation made after taking into consideration the case law Ram
Murti (supra) in Balwanti Devi (supra) are apt and reproduced as
under :
“5. The present petition is a petition under Section 14(1)(a)
of the DRCA. The scheme of the DRCA encompasses that a
ground of eviction is available to a landlord in case the
tenant does not pay the rent which is legally recoverable
from him within the prescribed period; in the absence of a
contract to the contrary this payment has to be made by the
15th day of each succeeding month. It is only in a case of
second default that the petition under Section 14(1)(a) of the
DRCA would be decreed in favour of the landlord; in the
case of first default benefit of Section 14(2) of the DRCA is
granted to the tenant. Section 15(7) of the DRCA vests a
discretion in the Rent Controller to strike out the defence of
the tenant in the event where he does not comply with the
direction passed against him under Section 15(1) of the
DRCA i.e. for payment of arrears of rent within a period of
one month; however, if this defence is not struck out under
Section 15(7) by the Rent Controller the tenant would still
have the other defences available to him under the Act; the
irresistible conclusion being that he would have the right to
claim a protection under Section 14(2) of the DRCA. In this
context the Supreme Court in the judgment reported in AIR
1984 SC 1392; Ram Murti v. Bhola Nath has interalia held
as follows:
“The words “as required” by S. 15(1) in these provisions
must be construed in a reasonable manner. If the Rent
Controller has the discretion under S. 15(7) not to strike out
the defence of the tenant, he necessarily has the power to
extend the time for payment of future rent under S. 15(1)
where the failure of the tenant to make such payment or
deposit was due to circumstances beyond his control. The
previous decision in Hem Cand’s case interpreting S. 15(7)
and S. 14(2) in the context of S. 15(1) of the Delhi Rent
Control Act, 1958, although not expressly overruled, can
not stand with the subsequent decision in Shyamcharan’s
case interpreting the analogous provisions of the Madhya
Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 as it is of a
large Bench.”
22. From the bare perusal of the law laid down by Hon’ble High
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Court of Delhi in the above said judgment, it can be safely concluded
that rent controller has the power to condone the delay on the part of
the tenant in the deposit of the rent; if he is able to show that on
account of circumstances, which were beyond his control, and, which
made it impossible for him to deposit the rent in time; the late payment
should, however, not to be willful and contumacious, if tenant guilty of
willful and deliberate default in payment of future rent, the tenant is not
entitled for this protective umbrella of the DRC Act. In this
background, the order passed by the ld. ARC is to be considered.
Record shows that after the order dated 16.07.2018 passed by ld. Rent
Controller under Section 15(1) of the DRC Act, the deposit of rent has
been made by the tenant; in fact the application filed by the tenant
seeking condonation of delay in depositing the rent has explained the
circumstances due to which the delay has occurred; it is not in dispute
that the tenant had gone to her native village in Uttarakhand on account
of some bereavement in his family, and, on account of such reason, she
could not deposit the rent for the month of April, 2023. It may also be
noted that the ld. ARC has observed that the tenant has not paid the rent
for the month of March, 2023 whereas as per the document on record
including the bank statements filed by the tenant, the tenant had made
the rent for the month of March, 2023 on 10.03.2023. Therefore, there
is a typographical mistake in the impugned order passed by ld. ARC
and the rent for the month of March, 2023 has been paid by tenant on
10.03.2023 as per the bank statement of tenant placed on record and
there is default of 7 days for the month of April, 2023.
23. The contention raised by ld. counsel for the landlord that the
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tenant has made payment through UPI during the period when she
alleged to have been in her native village in Uttarakhand on account of
bereavement in her family appears to be attractive but the same is
fallacious in as much as the tenant had been regular in making payment
of the rent in terms of the order dated 16.07.2018 passed by ld. ARC,
without a single default, and this is the first default for the month of
April, 2023 and, as and when she returned to Delhi, she immediately
paid the rent for the month of April, 2023 on 21.04.2023. The delay
was due to the circumstances beyond the control of the tenant and the
delay is thus held to be bona fide and not intentional.
24. There is no dispute that the ld. ARC has the discretion to condone
the delay; the discretion should have been exercised in a judicious
manner and the delay should have been condoned. This was not the
case where the tenant wilfully, deliberately defaulted in payment of the
rent. Admittedly the payment of rent in terms of the order passed under
Section 15(1) of the DRC Act was being made; the delay in the
aforesaid period was only for the reason explained by the tenant and
such a tenant, in no manner, can be said to be contumacious. It may be
noted that there is no dispute to the provisions that a benefit which is
available to a party under a special legislation, must be given to her
only if she makes a strict compliance of the said legislation. In the
instant case, in view of the abovesaid facts and circumstances it cannot
be stated that the tenant has committed any willful default.
25. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the petition deserves to be
allowed and is hereby allowed. The impugned order dated 17.02.2026
is set aside. The delay of 7 days in depositing the rent for the month of
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April, 2023 is condoned and the application under Section 15 of the
DRC Act dated 19.01.2026 filed by the tenant before the ld. ARC is
allowed and disposed of accordingly. The Trial Court record along with
copy of this order be sent back. The appeal file be consigned to the
Record Room. Digitally signed
by VIJAY
VIJAY KUMAR
Announced in the open Court KUMAR
DAHIYA
Date:
on 20th day of July, 2026 DAHIYA 2026.07.20
17:09:08
+0530
(Dr. Vijay Kumar Dahiya)
Rent Control Tribunal (West)
Tis Hazari Courts: Delhi
RCT No.09/2026 Savita v. Ramesh Chand Dhingra Page No.18/18
