Delhi High Court
Sauraj Singh vs M/S Indian Airlines Ltd And Anr on 8 May, 2026
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* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Reserved on: 09.02.2026
Date of decision: 08.05.2026
Uploaded on: 08.05.2026
+ W.P.(C) 377/2013
SAURAJ SINGH .....Petitioner
Through: Ms. Aayushi Jain, Adv.
versus
M/S INDIAN AIRLINES LTD AND ANR .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Sanjoy Ghose, Mr. Rohan
Mandal, Ms. Deeksha Arora, Mr.
Rajesh Ranjan, Mr. A.S. Rastogi and
Mr. Shiv Kant Arora, Advs.
+ W.P.(C) 748/2013
WORKMEN REPRESENTED BY DELHI OFFICES AND
ESTABLISHMENT EMPLOYEES UNION .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Anuj Aggarwal, Ms. Divya
Aggarwal, Ms. Bhumika Kundra, Mr.
Shubham Bahl, Mr. Nikhil Pawar,
Ms. Tanya Rose, Ms. Kritika Matta,
Mr. Lovekesh Chauhan, Ms. Anjali
Bansal, Ms. Shreya Gupta and Mr.
Pradeep Kumar, Advs.
Versus
MANAGEMENT OF AIR INDIA .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Sanjoy Ghose, Mr. Rohan
Mandal, Ms. Deeksha Arora, Mr.
Rajesh Ranjan, Mr. A.S. Rastogi and
Mr. Shiv Kant Arora, Advs.
W.P.(C) 377/2013 and conn. matters Page 1 of 41
+ W.P.(C) 877/2013
WORKMEN REPRESENTED BY DELHI OFFICES AND
ESTABLISHMENT EMPLOYEES UNION THROUGH ITS
PRESIDENT .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Anuj Aggarwal, Ms. Divya
Aggarwal, Ms. Bhumika Kundra, Mr.
Shubham Bahl, Mr. Nikhil Pawar,
Ms. Tanya Rose, Ms. Kritika Matta,
Mr. Lovekesh Chauhan, Ms. Anjali
Bansal, Ms. Shreya Gupta and Mr.
Pradeep Kumar, Advs.
versus
MANAGEMENT OF AIR INDIA (FORMERLY KNOWN AS
INDIAN AIRLINES LIMITED) .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Sanjoy Ghose, Mr. Rohan
Mandal, Ms. Deeksha Arora, Mr.
Rajesh Ranjan, Mr. A.S. Rastogi and
Mr. Shiv Kant Arora, Advs.
+ W.P.(C) 879/2013
WORKMEN REPRESENTED BY DELHI OFFICES AND
ESTABLISHMENT EMPLOYEES UNION .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Anuj Aggarwal, Ms. Divya
Aggarwal, Ms. Bhumika Kundra, Mr.
Shubham Bahl, Mr. Nikhil Pawar,
Ms. Tanya Rose, Ms. Kritika Matta,
Mr. Lovekesh Chauhan, Ms. Anjali
Bansal, Ms. Shreya Gupta and Mr.
Pradeep Kumar, Advs.
versus
MANAGEMENT OF AIR INDIA (FORMERLY KNOWN AS
INDIAN AIRLINES LTD.) .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Sanjoy Ghose, Mr. Rohan
Mandal, Ms. Deeksha Arora, Mr.
W.P.(C) 377/2013 and conn. matters Page 2 of 41
Rajesh Ranjan, Mr. A.S. Rastogi and
Mr. Shiv Kant Arora, Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE SHAIL JAIN
JUDGMENT
SHAIL JAIN, J.
“The power of High Court under Article 226 of Constitution
of India is not confined to the prerogative writs issued by the
English Courts, rather it is modelled on the said writs mainly
to enable the High Courts to keep the subordinate tribunals
within bounds”
– State of Uttar Pradesh and others v. Dr. Vijay Anand
Maharaj
1. The present writ petitions have been preferred by the Petitioner/Union
under Articles 226 & 227 of Constitution of India inter alia challenging the
Awards passed by the Presiding Officer, Central Government Industrial
Tribunal (hereinafter ‘CGIT’) in different industrial disputes, whereby the
CGIT directed the Management to pay compensation varying from Rs.
25,000 to Rs. 55,000 in lieu of reinstatement to the workmen.
2. W.P. (C.) No. 377/2013, titled “Sauraj Singh v. M/s Indian Airlines
Ltd. & Anr.”, has been filed by the Petitioner-workman assailing the Award
dated 27.02.2012 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Central
Government Industrial Tribunal No. 1, Delhi in I.D. No. 189/2011. By the
said Award, the learned CGIT held the termination of the Petitioner-
Workman, Mr. Sauraj Singh, to be illegal and directed compensation of Rs.
40,000/- in lieu of reinstatement.
3. In the same batch, W.P. (C.) No. 877/2013, titled “Workmen
represented by Delhi Offices & Establishment Employees Union Through
W.P.(C) 377/2013 and conn. matters Page 3 of 41
its President vs. Management of Air India (Formally known as Indian
Airlines Ltd.)’ has also been preferred by the Petitioner-Employee Union
challenging the Award dated 09.07.2012 passed by the learned Presiding
Officer, Central Government Industrial Tribunal No. 1, Delhi in I.D. No.
27/2005. By the impugned Award therein, the termination of the Workmen,
was held to be illegal, and compensation varying from Rs. 25,000 to Rs.
55,000 in lieu of reinstatement was awarded.
4. Likewise, W.P. (C.) No. 879/2013, titled “Workmen represented by
Delhi Offices & Establishment Employees Union Through its President vs.
Management of Air India (Formally known as Indian Airlines Ltd.)’ has
also been preferred by the Petitioner-Employee Union challenging the
Award dated 09.07.2012 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Central
Government Industrial Tribunal No. 1, Delhi in I.D. No. 26/2005. By the
impugned Award therein, the termination of the Workmen, was held to be
illegal, and compensation varying from Rs. 25,000 to Rs. 55,000 in lieu of
reinstatement was awarded.
5. Similarly, W.P. (C.) No. 748/2013, titled “Workmen represented by
Delhi Offices & Establishment Employees Union Through its President vs.
Management of Air India (Formally known as Indian Airlines Ltd.)” has
been preferred by the Petitioner-Employee Union challenging the Award
dated 09.07.2012 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Central
Government Industrial Tribunal No. 1, Delhi in I.D. No. 01/2006. By the
impugned Award therein, the termination of the Workmen, was held to be
illegal, and compensation varying from Rs. 25,000 to Rs. 55,000 in lieu of
reinstatement was awarded.
W.P.(C) 377/2013 and conn. matters Page 4 of 41
6. All the aforesaid writ petitions arise from a similar factual matrix,
involve identical questions of law and assail substantially similar findings
returned by the learned CGIT. Since detailed arguments were addressed in
Sauraj Singh, so for the sake of convenience, W.P. (C.) No. 377/2013, titled
“Sauraj Singh vs. Management of Air India (Formally known as Indian
Airlines Ltd.)” has been treated as the lead matter in the present batch, and
the decision rendered therein shall govern the remaining connected petitions
as well.
7. The dispute which has led to filing of these Petitions arises out of the
termination of services of the concerned Petitioners/workmen by the
Respondent/management where the workmen had rendered services to the
Airlines between the years 1993 to 1998. The matter was referred for
adjudication before the learned CGIT, where the legality and justification of
the termination of services of the workmen were examined. Upon
consideration of the material placed on record, the CGIT recorded a finding
that the termination of the services of the workmen was in violation of
Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter ‘the Act’).
After holding the termination to be in contravention of the statutory
provisions, the CGIT, in lieu of granting reinstatement with continuity of
service and back wages, awarded monetary compensation to the workmen.
The compensation awarded by the CGIT was quantified at Rs. 25,000/-, Rs.
40,000/-, and Rs. 55,000/- to the workmen corresponding to their respective
lengths of service. Aggrieved by the nature of relief granted, the Petitioners
have preferred the present Writ Petitions.
W.P.(C) 377/2013 and conn. matters Page 5 of 41
FACTUAL MATRIX :
8. The brief background of facts in W.P. (C.) No. 377/2013, as well as
in the connected writ petitions, is as follows:
9. The present matters pertain to the year 1990, when the Respondent
herein issued Notifications in the years 1988-89 inviting applications for
filling up certain vacancies in the category of Commercial, Commercial
Security, Engineering, Canteen, Vigilance, Personnel, Catering and Store for
the posts of helper, peon, sweeper, typist, driver etc. for various periods. In
pursuance thereof, one panel was prepared in the same year in accordance
with the Recruitment and Promotion Rules of Indian Airlines Ltd., whereby
the validity of the said panel was fixed for a period of two years. Thereafter,
workmen were appointed on the basis of vacancies available at the relevant
time.
10. A Panel of over 200 workmen was approved by the Competent
Authority on 20.11.1990. Thereafter, the Petitioner(s) were engaged in
various capacities as casual labour by the Respondent/Management in 1989,
as per the Panel list which was prepared for the purpose of considering them
for appointment against regular vacancies. The said list came to be referred
to as the “1990 Select List.” Out of the aforesaid 200 casual workers
included in the 1990 Select List, 88 workers in order of merit were
subsequently regularized by the Respondent/Management against regular
vacancies.
11. The said Select List was initially stated to be valid for a period of two
years, and its validity was extended from time to time, remaining in
operation till 15 July 1994. The Respondent/Management, however,
W.P.(C) 377/2013 and conn. matters Page 6 of 41
continued to engage additional casual labourers periodically, including at
regular intervals, resulting in rotation of casual labourers. The present
Petitioner/workman was among those so engaged, having worked with the
Respondent/Management as a Driver on daily wages during the years 1993-
94-95.
12. A group of casual workers, who were empanelled in the 1990 Select
List, thereafter filed W.P.(C) No. 4113/1994 and other connected petitions
including W.P.(C) No. 2155/1995 titled J.D. Biswas v. Indian Airlines &
Ors. before this Court seeking, inter alia, regularization of their services and
interim relief against restriction of employment to 89 days.
13. During the pendency of the said petition, an interim order dated
07.12.1995 was passed by this Court directing the Respondent/Management
to prepare a panel of casual workers on a daily-rated basis in different
categories from amongst the casuals who had worked with it on a daily-rated
basis, in accordance with the guidelines laid down by Hon’ble the Supreme
Court in State of Haryana v. Piara Singh, (1992) 4 SCC 118.
14. In pursuance thereof, a panel was prepared in 1995, hereinafter
referred to as the “1995 Panel”, and the Respondent/Management
commenced engaging workers therefrom. The name of the present
Petitioner/workman was included in the said panel in the category of Driver
(Casual), as communicated to him vide letter dated 05.07.1996. After due
verification of his documents and fulfillment of the requisite formalities,
including medical fitness and other prescribed tests, the Petitioner/workman
was formally engaged as a Driver on casual basis with effect from
20.07.1996 at a salary of Rs. 3,300/- per month.
W.P.(C) 377/2013 and conn. matters Page 7 of 41
15. The aforesaid W.P.(C) No. 4113/1994 was finally decided along with
other connected petitions vide judgment dated 09.05.1997, directing the
Respondent/Management to engage casual workers on a daily-rated basis as
per its requirements, firstly from the panel prepared and approved on
20.11.1990. By the said order, it was further observed and clarified that
casual workers engaged by public undertakings may be continued in
engagement till regular posts are filled in accordance with the applicable
recruitment rules.
16. In the case of the present Petitioner/workman specifically, his services
were terminated on 09.10.1998 without issuance of any show-cause notice,
without payment of wages in lieu of notice, and without payment of
retrenchment compensation, notwithstanding that he had rendered
continuous service for more than 240 days in a calendar year as
contemplated under Section 25-B of the Act. It is further the case of the
Petitioner that at the time of his removal, Drivers junior to him, who were
equally selected from the 1995 Panel, continued to remain in employment.
17. The Petitioner/workmen sent a notice of demand to the
Respondent/Airlines on 20.10.1998, which received no reply. He thereafter
raised an industrial dispute before the Conciliation Officer on 14.01.1999,
demanding reinstatement with continuity and full back wages. The
Respondent/Airlines, in its reply before the Conciliation Officer, contended
that the Petitioner had been engaged as a casual worker on a daily basis for
only 95 days in the year 1993-94, that his empanelment in the 1995 Panel
was pursuant to the interim order dated 07.12.1995, and that since the said
interim order had been superseded by the final judgment dated 09.05.1997,
W.P.(C) 377/2013 and conn. matters Page 8 of 41
the disengagement of the Petitioner entailed no violation of any statutory
provision.
18. The workmen, through the Petitioner Union, also submitted a
representation before the Assistant Labour Commissioner seeking
reinstatement and regularization with consequential benefits. The
Respondent/Management additionally took the stand that the issues raised
had already been adjudicated before this Court and before the Hon’ble
Supreme Court, and therefore no fresh industrial dispute could be raised in
that regard. The conciliation proceedings did not culminate in a settlement
and were reported as having failed, pursuant to which a Reference dated
22.11.2000 came to be made by the appropriate Government.
19. The said Reference was challenged by the Respondent/Management
by filing W.P.(C) No. 2019/2001 before this Court. During the pendency of
the said petition, it was submitted on behalf of the Central Government that
the Reference had not been properly worded, and in view of that statement,
the writ petition was disposed of vide order dated 20.09.2004.
20. Two more such references were made in a similar manner and were
also quashed in two other writ petitions vide orders dated 01.05.2005.
Thereafter, the Appropriate Government, vide order dated 03.10.2005,
referred the present dispute for adjudication with the following terms of
reference:
“Whether the termination of services of Shri Ravinder
Chandra and 42 others (list enclosed) by the management of
Indian Airlines is legal and justified? If not, to what relief are
they entitled?”
W.P.(C) 377/2013 and conn. matters Page 9 of 41
21. The said Reference again came to be challenged by the
Respondent/Management by filing W.P.(C) No. 9204/2006 before this
Court, which was dismissed by a learned Single Judge vide order dated
03.06.2011, holding that the contentions raised could be urged before the
Industrial Tribunal. Two other references made on identical terms were
similarly upheld. Aggrieved thereby, the Respondent/Management preferred
Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 734/2011, 740/2011 and 742/2011, all of which
were dismissed together by a Division Bench of this Court vide judgment
dated 18.05.2012.
22. In the interregnum, on the basis of the Statement of Claim filed by the
Petitioner and the Written Statement filed by the Respondent, coupled with
the examination of witnesses supported by their respective affidavits, the
learned CGIT passed the Award dated 27.07.2012.
23. The CGIT returned a categorical finding that the termination of the
Petitioner/workman was not effected in pursuance of the judgment dated
09.05.1997 as alleged by the Respondent/Airlines, and that there was a clear
violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. However, the
Tribunal declined to grant reinstatement on the ground that the engagement
of the Petitioner was de hors the Rules and that the claimant had no right of
continuance in his casual employment, having been engaged pursuant to the
interim order dated 07.12.1995. Further, in lieu of reinstatement,
compensation was awarded on the basis that claimants who had worked for
240 days or more in one calendar year were awarded Rs.25,000/- each, those
who had rendered service for more than 240 days in two consecutive
calendar years or part thereof exceeding six months were awarded
W.P.(C) 377/2013 and conn. matters Page 10 of 41
Rs.40,000/- each and those who had rendered more than 240 days of
continuous service in three consecutive calendar years or part thereof
exceeding six months were awarded Rs.55,000/- each. The present
Petitioner/workman, having rendered continuous service from 20.07.1996 to
09.10.1998, was awarded compensation of Rs.40,000/-.
24. Aggrieved thereby, the Respondent/Management challenged the
Impugned Award before this Court by way of writ petition being W.P.(C)
No. 1196/2013 titled Air India v. Sauraj Singh. The learned Single Judge
while recording that the Respondent/Management had not disputed before
the CGIT that the workman had worked from 20.07.1996 to 10.10.1998, nor
had it specifically denied completion of 240 days of service held that the
CGIT had rightly found continuous service under Section 25-B of the Act
and that non-compliance with Section 25-F vitiated the retrenchment. The
petition was accordingly dismissed on 25.02.2013.
25. Similarly, other Writ Petitions being W.P.(C) Nos. 317-19/2013 titled
Air India v. Workmen represented by Delhi Offices and Establishment
Employees Union, through its President, was preferred before this Court,
assailing the Award of the CGIT in on identical grounds. This Court
meanwhile deciding the very Writ(s) found that the workmen had accrued
statutory protection under Section 25-F of the Act by virtue of having
rendered more than 240 days of continuous service, and that the judgment
dated 09.05.1997 merely accorded priority to candidates on the 1990 Select
Panel and did not mandate the exclusion of others. The termination was
accordingly held to be arbitrary and in violation of statutory provisions, and
W.P.(C) 377/2013 and conn. matters Page 11 of 41
the Award granting compensation was upheld vide order dated 21.01.2013
with costs of Rs.10,000/- each.
26. The Respondent/Management, aggrieved by the said orders, preferred
Letters Patent Appeals being LPA Nos. 381/2013, 385/2013, 386/2013 and
389/2013, contending that while it would comply with the Award, the
direction contained in paragraph 37 thereof was beyond the terms of
reference and liable to be set aside.
27. The Petitioners herein raised no objection, while reserving their right
to pursue independent remedies regarding reinstatement in pending writ
petitions, including the one with which this Court is presently seized. In
view of the consensus between the parties, the Division Bench disposed of
the appeals, leaving the question of law open, and set aside the directions
contained in paragraph 37 of the Award. The operative portion of the said
order reads as under:
“1. The challenge in all the aforesaid appeals is to the order
passed by the learned Single Judge of this court dated
21.01.2013 by which the Award passed by the learned
Industrial Tribunal has been upheld.
2. Mr. Lalit Bhasin, learned counsel for the appellants
submits that in case the question of law is kept open, the order
passed by the learned Single Judge and the Award would be
complied with except the direction contained in para 37 of the
Award, which is beyond the terms of reference.
3. Mr. Ashok Aggarwal, learned counsel for the respondent
submits that he would have no objection except that he has
invoked an independent remedy with respect to reinstatement
and other relief which are a subject matter of writ petitions
pending before a learned Single Judge of this Court.
W.P.(C) 377/2013 and conn. matters Page 12 of 41
4. Having regard to the stand taken by the parties, all the
appeals are disposed of while leaving the question of law,
raised in these appeals, open.
5. As agreed, the directions contained in para 37 pertaining to
employees, who have not preferred the settlement of claims,
are set aside.
6. All the appeals are disposed of.”
28. For the sake of convenience, Para 37 (mentioned above) has been
extracted as under:
“In view of the facts that the claimants have worked with the
Airlines continuously for a period of more than 240 days in a
calendar year preceding the date of their disengagement, the
period for which they have worked and legal impediment
before the Airlines to continue with their engagement as well
as their young age, I am of the view that the claimants who
had worked for 240 days or more in one calendar year shall
get an amount of Rs.25000/- each, the claimants who had
rendered more than 240 days service in each consecutive two
calendar years or any part thereof in excess of six months will
get an amount of Rs.40,000/- each and the claimants who had
rendered more than 240 days continuous service in each
consecutive three years or any part thereof in excess of six
months will get an amount of Rs.55000/- each as
compensation. The amount of compensation shall be reckoned
in accordance with the period of continuous service of twelve,
twenty four or thirty six months preceding the dates of their
termination, ns mentioned In para twenty eight supra, The
amount of compensation shall be paid, within thirty days of the
date, when the award becomes enforceable. An award is,
accordingly, passed. It be sent to the appropriate Government
for publication.”
29. Hence, the present writ petitions.
W.P.(C) 377/2013 and conn. matters Page 13 of 41
GROUNDS OF WRITS:
30. Present Writs have been preferred by the Petitioners primarily on the
following grounds in respect to the reliefs claimed by them:
A. Learned CGIT erred in holding the engagement to be de hors
the Rules, when the Petitioner was engaged only after due
verification of documents, completion of prescribed tests, and
formal issuance of an appointment letter attributes wholly
inconsistent with and contradictory to such a finding.
B. Learned CGIT erred in relying suo motu on the priority of the
1990 Select Panel as a ground for denying reinstatement, when no
such contention was ever raised or argued by the
Respondent/Management in relation to the present Petitioner,
thereby violating the principles of natural justice.
C. Learned CGIT fundamentally erred in applying the legal
framework of regularization to a case of illegal retrenchment, the
two being entirely distinct in law, and in importing considerations
wholly irrelevant to the dispute actually before it.
D. Learned CGIT, having returned a categorical finding of illegal
termination in contravention of Section 25-F of the Act, erred in
substituting the primary remedy of reinstatement with a mere
compensation of Rs.40,000/-, without any compelling justification
warranting such departure from the settled legal position.
W.P.(C) 377/2013 and conn. matters Page 14 of 41
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER(s):
31. It is contended on behalf of the Petitioner that the issue regarding
engagement of the workmen stood crystallized in terms of the judgment
passed by this Court in W.P. (C) No. 4113 of 1994. By the said judgment,
this Court had categorically directed the Respondent/Management to engage
workers on a casual or ad hoc basis strictly in accordance with the merit
position in the select panel prepared and approved on 20.11.1990. It was
further directed by this Court that only in the event that such empanelled
persons, upon due intimation, declined to accept such engagement, could the
Respondent/Management resort to engaging persons from outside the panel.
32. It is further contended by learned counsel for the Petitioner that this
Court had directed that, so long as the persons whose names appeared in the
select panel were willing to work on a casual or ad hoc basis, they were not
to be discontinued until regular appointments were made. Learned counsel
further submits that it was specifically directed that such empanelled
persons, if engaged, could only be replaced by regularly appointed
employees and not by any other casual or ad hoc workers. It is also
contended that the Respondent/Management was obligated to treat the select
panel as the basis for offering employment and to engage the empanelled
workmen in accordance with their merit position therein. It is further
submitted that this Court had directed that all such empanelled persons
willing to work were to report within a stipulated period of fifteen days and,
upon doing so, were entitled to continued engagement until regular posts
were duly filled.
W.P.(C) 377/2013 and conn. matters Page 15 of 41
33. It is also contended that subsequent to the judgment dated 09.05.1997
passed by this court, the Respondent/Management, under the guise of
implementing the said judgment, proceeded to terminate the services of the
workmen forming part of the present claim. It is submitted that in place of
such workmen, the Respondent/Management engaged fresh persons who
were not even included in the 1990 Select Panel, in clear deviation from the
directions of this court. The process of discontinuation of the services of the
claimant workmen, who were also included in the 1995 Panel, commenced
in or around August 1997 and continued till 07.10.1998, during which
period approximately 250 casual workers were removed from employment.
Thus, it is submitted by the Petitioner that such termination of services is
illegal, unjustified, and contrary to law. It is specifically contended that none
of the judgments passed by this court had directed or contemplated
termination of the services of the claimant workmen, and therefore, the
action of the Respondent/Management is in violation of the directions laid
down by this court.
34. Furthermore, Ld. counsel placed reliance on the judgment of Hon’ble
the Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Piara Singh, (1992) 4 SCC 118
contending that the action of the Respondent/Management in replacing the
claimant workmen with fresh hands is in clear violation of the law laid down
by Supreme court, wherein it has been held that a casual employee cannot be
replaced by another casual employee, and that such workers ought to be
continued till regular appointments are made in accordance with the
prescribed recruitment rules. It is submitted that the claimant workmen had
each completed more than 240 days of continuous service in the year
W.P.(C) 377/2013 and conn. matters Page 16 of 41
preceding the termination of their services. Despite the same, the
Respondent/Management terminated their services without issuing any
notice or pay in lieu thereof, and without payment of retrenchment
compensation attracting Section 25-F of the Act.
35. It is contended that the Respondent/Management has, on several
occasions, sought to justify the termination of the claimant/workmen on the
ground that such action was necessitated to accommodate workers from the
1990 Select List in casual engagements pending their regularization. The
Petitioner submits that the said stand is factually incorrect and has been
taken only to justify arbitrary and selective engagement of casual workers.
36. Additionally, Ld. counsel for the petitioner submitted that as per the
affidavit of the General Manager (Personnel) filed before this High Court,
there existed approximately 300 casual vacancies per day in the
establishment of the Respondent/Management. Out of the 200 workers
included in the 1990 Select List, 88 had already been regularized, leaving
112 workers for casual engagement. It is contended that after the judgment
dated 09.05.1997, only 37 of these 112 workers reported for and undertook
casual engagement, while the remaining workers did not avail such
opportunity. Consequently, according to the Petitioner, only a limited
number of posts were filled from the 1990 Select List, leaving a substantial
number of vacancies unfilled therefore, such remaining vacancies ought to
have been filled from amongst the workmen included in the 1995 Panel,
instead of engaging fresh persons not forming part of either panel. It is
further contended that even assuming, without admitting, that all persons
W.P.(C) 377/2013 and conn. matters Page 17 of 41
from the 1990 Select List were accommodated, sufficient vacancies would
still have remained available for the claimant workmen.
37. It is also alleged that subsequent to the disengagement of the claimant
workmen, the Respondent/Management resumed the practice of engaging
fresh casual workers for limited durations, including engagements not
exceeding 89 days in a calendar year, thereby preventing accrual of statutory
benefits.
38. It is also submitted that some of the casual workers who were listed in
‘1995 List’ preferred a civil writ petition being W.P. (C) No. 2623 of 1997
before this court seeking directions for regularisation of their services, which
was disposed off by holding that adherence to the order dated 09.05.1997
preserving seniority and preventing replacement of existing casual workers
by fresh casuals does not confer any right to regularisation. However, the
court further directed that such continuously engaged casual workers be
given an opportunity to compete for regular posts when vacancies arise,
along with age relaxation in terms of Khagesh Kumar v. Inspector General
of Registration and Inspector General of Registration, U.P. v. Avdesh
Kumar.
39. It is further contended that despite the clear directions issued by this
court in its judgment dated 09.05.1997 in W.P.(C)No. 4113/1994, mandating
engagement of casual workers from the approved panels in order of merit,
the Respondent/Management failed to adhere to the same. It is submitted
that after engaging certain workmen from the 1990 Select List, the
Respondent/Management completely disregarded the 1995 Panel and
proceeded to engage fresh casual workers who were not part of either panel.
W.P.(C) 377/2013 and conn. matters Page 18 of 41
40. Counsel for the Petitioners concluded their arguments by contending
that despite the existence of the 1995 Panel of casual workmen, the
Respondent/Management issued an employment notification dated
12.11.2002 to the Employment Exchange seeking names of candidates for
preparation of a fresh panel for casual engagement therefore, in the presence
of an existing and operative panel of 1995, the Respondent/Management
could not have initiated the process of preparing a fresh panel without first
exhausting the said panel. Such action, according to the Petitioner, is in
direct contravention of the directions issued by the High Court in its
judgment dated 09.05.1997 in W.P.(C) No. 4113/1994. The Petitioner also
relies upon a communication dated 08.08.2002 issued by the Engineering
Department of the Respondent/Management, whereby it was intimated to
the Personnel Department that 55 Engineering Helpers had been promoted
and, consequently, casual labour was required to fill the resultant vacancies.
41. Lastly, Ld. Counsel for Petitioner presses that
Respondent/Management has failed to furnish clear and categorical
disclosures on material aspects, including the number of workmen from the
1990 Select List who were regularized, engaged as casual workers, or
declined engagement pursuant to the directions of this court, and has also
not placed the complete 1990 Select List on record. Moreover, it has not
clarified how many workmen from the 1995 Panel have been engaged, nor
disclosed the identity and panel status, including seniority, of those engaged
in place of the claimant workmen. While asserting a daily requirement of
approximately 300 casual workers on account of absenteeism and temporary
or seasonal work, the Respondent/Management has not produced any
W.P.(C) 377/2013 and conn. matters Page 19 of 41
supporting material, such as details of absenteeism or the nature of such
work, and the Petitioner contends that the requirement is, in fact, of a regular
and continuous nature. It is also contended that although the
Respondent/Management claims to have a policy governing engagement of
casual workers, no such policy has been produced before any authority, and
the absence of a transparent and codified framework has resulted in arbitrary
practices, including replacement of one set of casual workers with another,
contrary to settled legal principles.
SUBMISISONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT:
42. In contradistinction, the counsel for the respondent raised the
preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of petition itself on the
ground that AIR India being a private entity is not amenable to writ
jurisdiction of this court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
43. At the outset, it is submitted on behalf of the
Respondent/Management that the workmen involved in the present dispute
were engaged de hors the applicable rules and regulations, purely to meet
exigencies of work such as sporadic requirements, absenteeism of regular
employees, and unforeseen temporary workload. It is contended that the said
workmen were borne on a panel constituted pursuant to the interim order
dated 07.12.1995 passed by the High Court and were subsequently
discontinued in terms of the final judgment dated 09.05.1997 passed by the
High Court of Delhi. It is further submitted that the engagement and
disengagement of the claimant workmen were in accordance with the
directions issued by this court in W.P.(C) No. 4113 of 1994, and therefore,
W.P.(C) 377/2013 and conn. matters Page 20 of 41
the workmen have no enforceable right to seek reinstatement or continuation
of their services, rendering the present claim untenable. It is also submitted
that although a notification dated 12.11.2002 was issued inviting
applications for preparation of a panel for casual engagement, no
recruitment process was initiated, no panel was finalized, and no
engagements were made pursuant thereto.
44. It is further submitted on behalf of the Respondent/Management that
the present writ petition is liable to be dismissed as the workmen of the
Petitioner Association were engaged only for brief periods on a purely
casual and daily-rated basis, which does not confer any vested or
enforceable right to seek reinstatement, continuity of service, or back wages.
It is contended that such casual engagements were availed strictly as and
when required, and therefore, the workmen cannot claim any right of lien or
continuity in service. The Respondent submits that the number of days
allegedly worked by the workmen is of no relevance, particularly in the
absence of cogent evidence on record substantiating the same. It is further
contended that even assuming that the workmen had completed 240 days of
service, such completion would not entitle them to reinstatement,
regularization, or continuity of service, given their status as casual workers,
and therefore, they are not entitled even to compensation, much less
reinstatement with back wages.
45. Furthermore, it is contended on behalf of the
Respondent/Management that the engagement and disengagement of the
workmen of the Petitioner Association were carried out strictly in terms of
the directions issued by the High Court in W.P.(C) No. 4113 of 1994. It is
W.P.(C) 377/2013 and conn. matters Page 21 of 41
submitted that the learned Labour Court, vide order dated 31.05.2012, closed
the evidence of the parties on the ground that the dispute could be
adjudicated on the basis of the said judgment. The Respondent further
contends that the workmen are not entitled to reinstatement, as granting such
relief would perpetuate the very situation which the Division Bench of this
Court, in LPA No. 734/2011 decided on 18.05.2012, sought to address while
laying down directions regarding the engagement of casual labours.
46. It is further contended on behalf of the Respondent/Management that
even assuming, without admitting, that there was non-compliance with
Section 25-F of the Act the same would not automatically entitle the
workmen of the Petitioner Association to reinstatement. It is submitted that a
catena of judicial pronouncements have held that the appropriate relief in
cases of breach of Section 25-F is compensation rather than reinstatement.
47. The Respondent further contends that the workmen, being casual
employees, cannot claim any right to permanency, and even in the event of
reinstatement, such reinstatement would merely restore them to their
original status as casual workers, without conferring any right to regular
employment or continuity of work. It is also submitted that the present writ
petition is liable to be dismissed in view of the judgment of this Court in
W.P. (C) No. 4799 of 1997 titled J.D. Biswas v. Indian Airlines Ltd.
48. It was further submitted on behalf of the Respondent that the
Petitioner(s) had worked only for a maximum period of two years in total,
that too as casual workers, and therefore, the relief of reinstatement cannot
be granted after a lapse of approximately 30 years, particularly when such
W.P.(C) 377/2013 and conn. matters Page 22 of 41
claim is based on a brief engagement of merely two years in a casual and
contractual capacity
49. In support of his contentions reliance has been placed on various
judgments including BSNL V Bhurumal (2014) 7 SCC 177, Ranbir Singh
V. Executive Engineer PWD (2021) 14 SCC 815, Deepali Gundu Surwase
V. Krantl Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D. Ed) and ors. (2013)10
SCC 324 and Jasmer Singh V. State Of Haryana (2015) 4 SCC 458.
50. At last, ld. Counsel further contended that the learned CGIT observed
that the engagement and disengagement of the workmen were in pursuance
of the orders passed by this Court, and consequently, the said workmen do
not have a claim for continuance in service with the Respondent Airline. It is
further contended that in such circumstances, reinstatement was not
warranted, and that no compensation ought to have been granted in view of
the finding that the workmen had no right to continue in service.
ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION:
51. The issue involved in these writs are primarily twofold:
A. Whether the Respondent i.e. AIR INDIA after having
been taken over by a private corporate entity could be
subjected to Writ jurisdiction of this court? If so,
B. whether the award passed by Learned CGIT directing
monetary compensation in lieu of reinstatement warrants
interference of this court?
DISCUSSION:
52. Having considered the rival submissions, it is evident that the
controversy lies in a narrow compass. The Petitioner’s principal grievance is
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not the non-consideration of its claim or the denial of relief per se, but the
grant of mere monetary compensation in lieu of reinstatement.
53. The dispute in the present writ petitions is nearly three decades old, if
not older. The consistent stand of the Respondent, both before the learned
CGIT and this Court, has been that the workmen were engaged merely as
casual and contractual employees. It is further contended that such
engagement was made pursuant to directions issued by the High Court from
time to time, and therefore did not confer any right upon the Petitioners to
claim permanent employment.
54. On the other hand, the case of the Petitioners is that they were, in
substance, employees of Air India, and that the Respondent, with the intent
of accommodating preferred individuals, repeatedly terminated their
services arbitrarily, illegally, and without any justifiable cause.
55. In order to deal with such contentions firstly this court has to deal and
decide the question of maintainability of these writs against AIR INDIA
which learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent raised as the
preliminary objection to the maintainability of the present Writ .
A. MAINTAINABILITY OF WRIT
56. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent raised a
preliminary objection to the maintainability of the present writ petition,
contending that the Respondent, i.e., Air India, having been privatized in the
year 2022, is no longer amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
W.P.(C) 377/2013 and conn. matters Page 24 of 41
57. In support of the said contention, he places reliance upon the
judgment of a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in R.S. Madireddy
and Another v. Union of India and Others, 2022 SCC OnLine Bom 2657,
wherein it was held that, post-privatization, Air India does not qualify as
“State” within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, and
consequently, a writ petition under Article 226 would not be maintainable
against it.
58. The aforesaid decision was carried in challenge before the Hon’ble
Supreme Court of India in Mr. R.S. Madireddy & Anr. v. Union of India &
Ors., 2024 INSC 425. The Hon’ble Supreme Court dismissed the Special
Leave Petition, thereby affirming the view taken by the Bombay High Court
and holding the same to be the correct law. The relevant extract reads as
under:
“33. Once the respondent No.3(AIL) ceased to be covered
by the definition of State within the meaning of Article 12 of
the Constitution of India, it could not have been subjected to
writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India.
xxxxxx
37. The respondent No.3(AIL), the erstwhile Government
run airline having been taken over by the private company
Talace India Pvt. Ltd., unquestionably, is not performing
any public duty inasmuch as it has taken over the
Government company Air India Limited for the purpose of
commercial operations, plain and simple, and thus no writ
petition is maintainable against respondent No.3(AIL). The
question No. 1 is decided in the above manner.
xxxxxxx
40. Resultantly, the view taken by the Division Bench of the
Bombay High Court in denying equitable relief to the
appellants herein and relegating them to approach theW.P.(C) 377/2013 and conn. matters Page 25 of 41
appropriate forum for ventilating their grievances is the
only just and permissible view.”
59. The Supreme Court, in the said judgment, observed that upon
disinvestment, Air India ceased to be a “State” within the meaning of Article
12 of the Constitution of India and assumed the character of a private
company not discharging any public functions. Consequently, it was
observed that the High Court was correct in not exercising its extraordinary
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to issue writs
against such a private entity in matters not involving any public duty.
60. The reasoning of the Supreme Court proceeds on the footing that Air
India, post-disinvestment, operates purely as a commercial enterprise and is
not engaged in the performance of any public function or statutory duty so
as to attract writ jurisdiction.
61. However, in the considered view of this Court, the aforesaid
reasoning is not applicable to the facts of the present case. In the case before
the Bombay High Court, the employees, aggrieved by their termination, had
directly invoked writ jurisdiction without first availing or exhausting the
efficacious alternative remedy available under the labour law framework,
such as approaching the appropriate Government for reference or seeking
adjudication before the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal. It is in this context
that both the High Court and the Supreme Court held that such a writ
petition was not maintainable against a private entity like Air India.
62. What was thus disapproved was not the exercise of jurisdiction under
Article 226 per se, but the direct invocation of such jurisdiction against a
W.P.(C) 377/2013 and conn. matters Page 26 of 41
private entity in a service dispute, particularly when statutory remedies
under labour laws had not been exhausted.
63. The present case stands on a materially different footing. Here, the
Petitioners have not promptly approached this Court under Article 226 in the
first instance. Rather, they have already availed the statutory mechanism
under labour laws, and the present writ petition has been preferred in the
nature of supervisory jurisdiction of this Court over the adjudicatory process
and award. Therefore, the bar or limitation highlighted in the aforesaid
judgment does not apply to the facts of the present case.
64. Moreover, Section 17(2) of the Act stipulates that “subject to the
provisions of Section 17-A, the award published under sub-section (1) shall
be final and shall not be called in question by any court in any manner
whatsoever.” This provision, firstly, seeks to exclude the jurisdiction of civil
courts in respect of awards passed by adjudicatory authorities under the Act.
Secondly, it indicates the absence of any statutory appeal or revision against
such awards.
65. In this backdrop, even if it is assumed that this Court may not exercise
jurisdiction under Article 226 in relation to industrial disputes involving
private entities, a pertinent question arises ‘whether the awards of the
Tribunal are altogether immune from challenge before any judicial
forum?’
66. Such an interpretation could not have been the intention of the
legislature. The very object behind constituting Labour Courts and Industrial
Tribunals is to ensure expeditious adjudication and effective redressal of
industrial disputes. Any construction that renders their awards completely
W.P.(C) 377/2013 and conn. matters Page 27 of 41
immune from judicial scrutiny would defeat this purpose. It is well settled
that where an award suffers from patent illegality, perversity, or
jurisdictional error, it remains amenable to judicial review under Articles
226 and 227 of the Constitution of India.
67. The High Court exercises the power of writ jurisdiction under Article
226 and power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Indian
Constitution. The High Court exercises the power of writ jurisdiction and
supervision over all the Lower Courts and Tribunals within its jurisdiction.
68. Reliance in this regard can also be placed on the Full Bench of
Hon’ble the Supreme Court in Hindustan Lever Lid v. B.N. Dongre, AIR
1995 SC 817, wherein it was held as follows:
“Since against the decision of the Industrial Tribunal no
remedy was available under the provisions of The Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 the aggrieved party could only invoke
the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226/227 of
the Indian Constitution.”
69. The Court held that where both the employer and the Unions
representing the workers were aggrieved by the award, to the extent it went
against them, they can prefer writ petition against award of the Industrial
Tribunal to the High Court under Article 226 of the Indian Constitution.
70. Similarly, in Engineering Mazdoor Sabha v. Hind Cycles, AIR 1963
SC 874 Hon’ble the Supreme Court held that the award of the Industrial
Tribunal and voluntary arbitrator is subject to writ of certiorari issued by the
Court. The writ of certiorari is issued when the Lower Court or Tribunal acts
illegally or in excess of its jurisdiction. The Supreme Court also held that
though an arbitrator is not a tribunal under Article 136 of the Constitution, in
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a proper case, a writ may lie against the award under Article 226 of the
Constitution.
71. In view of the above discussion, it is established that even though a
private entity like Air India may not ordinarily be amenable to writ
jurisdiction under Article 226, the position differs where the dispute arises
from an adjudication under labour laws. Once a Labour Court or Industrial
Tribunal renders an award, such award is subject to judicial review by the
High Court under Articles 226/227. In such cases, the writ is directed
against the adjudicatory process and the award itself, not merely the private
entity. Therefore, the High Court can entertain a writ petition even where the
underlying dispute involves a private employer, provided it emanates from a
tribunal’s award. Hence, Issue No. 1 is accordingly answered.
B. IMPUGNED AWARD PASSED BY LD. CGIT
72. Now, coming to Issue No. 2 regarding the correctness and legality of
the award passed by the learned CGIT, this Court proceeds to examine
whether the findings returned therein suffer from any patent illegality,
perversity, or jurisdictional error warranting interference in exercise of its
powers under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India.
73. This Court has given its thoughtful consideration to the rival
submissions advanced on behalf of the parties and has perused the material
placed on record, including the impugned award of the learned CGIT.
74. At the outset, it is necessary to delineate the scope of interference
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in matters arising out of
industrial adjudication. It is a settled principle that this Court does not sit in
W.P.(C) 377/2013 and conn. matters Page 29 of 41
appeal over the findings of fact recorded by the Tribunal. Interference is
warranted only where the findings are perverse, based on no evidence, or
suffer from a manifest error apparent on the face of the record. The writ
court is not expected to re-appreciate evidence or substitute its own view
merely because another view is possible.
75. In the present case, the learned Tribunal has, upon appreciation of the
material on record, returned a categorical finding that the workmen were
engaged only as casual, daily-rated workers and that such engagement was
neither regular nor permanent in nature. The Tribunal has also taken into
account the specific stand of the respondent-management that such
engagements were availed strictly on a need basis and were not against any
sanctioned posts.
76. The respondent-management, in its submissions before this Court, has
reiterated that the petitioners were engaged for short and intermittent
periods, and at best for a cumulative duration of about two years. This
assertion has not been effectively rebutted by the petitioners through cogent
documentary evidence. Rather, the petitioners have primarily relied upon
general averments regarding alleged completion of 240 days of service.
77. However, before proceeding to the question of relief, this Court must
first address the two preliminary contentions that go to the root of the matter
78. First, whether the termination was lawfully effected in pursuance of
the High Court’s order dated 09.05.1997, and second, whether Section 25-F
of the Act is attracted in the facts of the present case.
79. Coming on the First Question, whether termination was in pursuance
of the Court’s Order. The respondent-management has sought to justify the
W.P.(C) 377/2013 and conn. matters Page 30 of 41
termination of the Petitioner/workman on the ground that it was necessitated
by and effected in compliance with the judgment dated 09.05.1997 passed
by this Court in W.P.(C) No. 4113/1994. This Court is unable to accept this
contention.
80. The judgment dated 09.05.1997 was pronounced in May 1997. The
services of the Petitioner/workman were, however, not terminated until
09.10.1998, a gap of well over one year. If the termination were truly a
direct and immediate consequence of the Court’s directions, there is no
plausible explanation for why the management waited for more than a year
to act upon those directions in the case of this particular workman. An act
done in compliance with a court order would ordinarily be expected to
follow that order with reasonable promptness. The inordinate delay of over
twelve months between the judgment and the termination belies the
management’s case that the two were causally connected.
81. This inference is further fortified by the manner in which the
terminations were carried out across the board. It is borne out from the
record that the other workmen similarly situated were not terminated on a
single day by a common order. Rather, their services were discontinued at
different times and intervals, spread over a period stretching from August
1997 to October 1998, evidently as per the convenience of the management.
Had the terminations truly been in strict compliance with this Court’s order,
the management would have been expected to terminate all the concerned
workmen simultaneously, on a single date, by a common order, stating the
reason for termination as being the directions of this Court. The staggered
and selective manner of termination, spread across many months, is wholly
W.P.(C) 377/2013 and conn. matters Page 31 of 41
inconsistent with the conduct one would expect of an employer acting in
faithful and prompt compliance with a judicial direction.
82. It must be observed that an employer cannot be, and ought not to be,
permitted the liberty of implementing orders of this Court in any manner and
at any leisure it chooses. The orders of this Court are not a reservoir of
convenient justification to be drawn upon selectively and intermittently as
the management sees fit. Assuming, even at its highest, that the
management’s intent was bona fide and that it genuinely believed it was
acting in pursuance of the judgment dated 09.05.1997, that belief cannot
retrospectively clothe with legality a course of action that was carried out in
a piecemeal, unhurried, and selective fashion over the better part of eighteen
months. A plea of compliance with a court order must be supported not
merely by assertion but by conduct consistent with such compliance and the
conduct of the management in the present case falls far short of that
standard.
83. In the absence of any satisfactory explanation for the delay and the
staggered manner of termination, the defence that the termination was in
pursuance of the Court’s order cannot be sustained.
84. Now coming On the Second Question regarding applicability of
Section 25-F. It is not in dispute that the Petitioner/workman was engaged
after due verification of his documents, fulfillment of requisite formalities,
and successful completion of prescribed tests, and thereafter worked
continuously from 20.07.1996 until his termination on 09.10.1998. It is
equally not disputed that he rendered service for more than 240 days in a
W.P.(C) 377/2013 and conn. matters Page 32 of 41
calendar year, thereby satisfying the threshold of continuous service under
Section 25-B of the Act.
85. Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as it stands, reads
as follows:
“25F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.-
“No workman employed in any industry who has been in
continuous service for not less than one year under an
employer shall be retrenched by that employer until —
(a) the workman has been given one month’s notice in
writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the
period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid
in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice;
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment,
compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days’
average pay for every completed year of continuous service
or any part thereof in excess of six months; and
(c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the
appropriate Government or such authority as may be
specified by the appropriate Government by notification in
the Official Gazette.”
86. A bare reading of the provision makes the legislative intent
abundantly clear. The section is absolute and unqualified in its operation. It
applies to every workman who has been in continuous service for not less
than one year, without exception and without caveat. The legislature, in its
wisdom, has consciously enumerated only three conditions precedent to a
valid retrenchment notice, compensation, and intimation to the appropriate
Government. It has not carved out any exception, whether on the ground of
the nature of employment, the basis of engagement, or the source of the
W.P.(C) 377/2013 and conn. matters Page 33 of 41
employer’s obligation to engage. Significantly, it may be noted that the only
proviso that ever existed in Section 25-F of the Act was expressly omitted
by Parliament by Act 49 of 1984, a legislative act that further reinforces the
intent that the provision must operate without qualification or escape route.
87. The respondent-management has sought to resist the applicability of
Section 25-F of the Act by placing reliance on the judgment in J.D. Biswas
v. Indian Airlines Ltd., contending that since the engagement of the
workman was pursuant to an interim order of the Court and the termination
was consequent upon the final disposal of those proceedings, the provisions
of Sections 2(oo), 25-F and 25-G of the Act would not be attracted. This
Court finds that the said contention does not stand on good footing, for the
following reasons.
88. First, and most fundamentally, the plain text of Section 25-F of the
Act does not admit of any such exception. The statute does not say nor has
the legislature ever said that its mandate shall not apply where the workman
was employed in compliance with a court order. If the legislature had
intended to create such an exception, it would have said so expressly. Courts
cannot read into a statute an exception that the legislature has chosen not to
provide. The management’s contention, if accepted, would amount to
grafting a judicial exception onto a statutory provision that is deliberately
worded in absolute terms an exercise that is impermissible in law. The
intent of the legislature is more than clear: any workman who has served
continuously for 240 days or more deserves, as a matter of right, the full
protection that Section 25-F of the Act mandates, regardless of the
circumstances or source of his engagement.
W.P.(C) 377/2013 and conn. matters Page 34 of 41
89. Furthermore, the factual matrix of J.D. Biswas(supra) is materially
distinguishable from the present case. In J.D. Biswas (supa), the termination
was a direct, immediate, and unbroken consequence of the disposal of the
very writ petition pursuant to whose interim order the workman had been
engaged the causal nexus between the court’s direction and the termination
was complete and uninterrupted. In the present case, as established above,
there is a gap of more than a year between the judgment dated 09.05.1997
and the termination on 09.10.1998. The ratio of J.D. Biswas(supra)
therefore cannot be transplanted onto facts where the essential feature that
animated it an immediate and direct compliance with the court’s direction is
conspicuously absent.
90. Additionally, the workman in the present case was not engaged by the
bare force of a court order alone. He was engaged after due verification of
documents, successful completion of medical fitness and other prescribed
tests, and formal issuance of an appointment letter attributes far more
consistent with a voluntary act of engagement on the part of the employer
than with a purely court-directed absorption. This further distinguishes the
present case from the ratio of J.D. Biswas, which was premised on the
employer having been left with no volition whatsoever in the matter of
engagement.
91. Lastly, and in any event, even if the management’s contention were
accepted at its highest that the engagement was wholly pursuant to the
court’s direction it would not follow that the workman is thereby stripped of
the statutory protection he has independently earned through his own labour
and continuous service. The right under Section 25-F of the Act is not
W.P.(C) 377/2013 and conn. matters Page 35 of 41
derived from the nature or source of the engagement; it is earned through the
act of service itself. Once a workman has rendered continuous service of one
year and completed 240 days in a calendar year, the statutory right
crystallises and cannot be extinguished by reference to the circumstances
that preceded the engagement.
92. In the present case, none of the three conditions mandated by Section
25-F of the Act were complied with. The workman was terminated without
any notice, without wages in lieu thereof, and without retrenchment
compensation. The retrenchment is therefore ex facie illegal, and the Ld.
CGIT’s finding to that effect is unassailable.
93. Now coming to the question of relief, even assuming, for the sake of
argument, that some of the workmen had completed 240 days of service in a
given year, the same would not, in the peculiar facts of the present case, ipso
facto entitle them to reinstatement. The law in this regard is no longer res
integra. Completion of 240 days may attract the provisions of Section 25-F
of the Act, but the consequence of its breach is not automatic reinstatement
in every case.
94. The respondent has specifically contended that even in cases where
Section 25-F of the Act is violated, the appropriate relief, particularly in
respect of casual or daily-rated workers, is monetary compensation rather
than reinstatement. Reliance has been placed on a catena of judgments,
including BSNL v. Bhurumal, Ranbir Singh v. Executive Engineer, PWD,
Deepali Gundu Surwase v. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya, and
Jasmer Singh v. State of Haryana. The principle emerging from these
decisions is that reinstatement is not to be granted as a matter of course,
W.P.(C) 377/2013 and conn. matters Page 36 of 41
especially where the employment was not regular, or where long years have
elapsed since disengagement.
95. This Court finds merit in the aforesaid submission. In the present
case, several distinguishing features exist which weigh heavily against the
grant of reinstatement, particularly: nature of employment, duration of
engagement, delay and laches/long pendency, and engagement pursuant to
judicial orders.
96. The petitioners were admittedly engaged as casual and daily-rated
workers. Their engagement was not preceded by any regular recruitment
process. No letters of appointment indicating permanency or continuity have
been placed on record. The respondent has also clarified that no panel was
ever finalized pursuant to the notification dated 12.11.2002, and no
appointments were made there under. Thus, no right could have accrued to
the petitioners on the basis of a mere notification inviting applications.
97. The respondent has consistently maintained that the petitioners
worked for a limited period of approximately two years in total. This aspect
is significant as the Courts have repeatedly held that where the period of
engagement itself is short, reinstatement after a long lapse of time would be
wholly disproportionate.
98. One such instance is Jagbir Singh v. Haryana State Agriculture
Marketing Board, (2009) 15 SCC 327, wherein the Supreme Court held that
reinstatement with full back wages should not follow as an automatic
consequence of every illegal termination, particularly in the case of daily
wagers or temporary employees. Instead, the relief must be determined on a
contextual evaluation of relevant factors such as the nature of employment,
W.P.(C) 377/2013 and conn. matters Page 37 of 41
the duration of service, and the surrounding circumstances. The Hon’ble
Supreme Court, while acknowledging the illegality of termination, adopted a
pragmatic approach by substituting the relief of reinstatement with a lump
sum compensation of Rs.50,000/-, reflecting the principle that in cases
involving short-term or casual employment, the ends of justice are often
better served by awarding monetary compensation rather than directing
reinstatement.
99. It is an admitted position that the present dispute has been lingering
for nearly three decades. Multiple writ petitions have been filed seeking
similar reliefs. In such a scenario, directing reinstatement at this stage would
not only be impractical but would also disturb the settled position that has
existed for decades. The passage of time is a crucial factor in moulding
relief.
100. Applying the aforesaid principle to the question of relief, it is evident
that the petitioners cannot claim a vested right to reinstatement merely
because they were engaged during the pendency of earlier proceedings or in
compliance with judicial directions. Such engagement cannot be equated
with a regular or voluntary appointment made by the employer in the
ordinary course.
101. Another important aspect which cannot be lost sight of is that even in
the eventuality of reinstatement, the petitioners would revert only to their
original status as casual workers. Such reinstatement would not confer upon
them any right to regularization or continuity of service. In effect, the relief
sought would be largely illusory, particularly in view of the long lapse of
W.P.(C) 377/2013 and conn. matters Page 38 of 41
time and the absence of any subsisting requirement demonstrated by the
respondent.
102. The learned CGIT, while adjudicating the dispute, has taken a
balanced view. It has neither accepted the claim of the petitioners in toto nor
rejected it outright. Instead, it has moulded the relief by granting
compensation, thereby recognizing that the petitioners had worked for some
period, while simultaneously acknowledging that they were not entitled to
reinstatement.
103. This Court finds that such an approach is consistent with the evolving
jurisprudence in labour law, wherein the emphasis has shifted from
automatic reinstatement to a more nuanced consideration of the facts and
equities of each case. Particularly in cases involving casual or daily-rated
workers, compensation has increasingly been regarded as an appropriate and
equitable relief.
104. The contention of the respondent that no compensation ought to have
been granted, in view of the finding that the workmen had no right to
continue in service, does not merit acceptance. Even where reinstatement is
declined, the grant of compensation is often justified to mitigate hardship
and to balance equities. The Tribunal, being the final fact-finding authority,
is vested with the discretion to mould relief in such a manner.
105. In the considered opinion of this Court, while the retrenchment of the
Petitioner(s) was illegal, reinstatement at this stage would not be an
appropriate or workable remedy. The ends of justice would be met by
substituting the relief of reinstatement with monetary compensation,
W.P.(C) 377/2013 and conn. matters Page 39 of 41
commensurate with the length of service rendered by the Respondents and
the attendant circumstances.
106. At this stage, it is apposite to refer to the decision of the Supreme
Court in Amit Kumar Dubey v. M.P.P.K.V.V. Co. Ltd. &Anr. (Civil Appeal
arising out of SLP (C) No. 20902/2024 and connected matters, decided on
29 January 2025), which lays down clear guidelines for determination of the
quantum of compensation in cases where reinstatement is substituted with
monetary relief. Herein, the Apex Court has categorically held that
compensation cannot be nominal, uniform, or arbitrary, and must bear a
direct nexus with the length of service rendered by the workman. It was
emphasized that a blanket award of compensation, without regard to the
duration of employment, would violate the principle of proportionality. The
relevant part of the judgment is extracted here under-
“9. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the matters,
we deem it fit to enhance the compensation granted to the
appellants by the High Court. We hold that the appellants
would be entitled to enhanced compensation at the rate of Rs.
1.5 lakhs per year for the period they have worked and in case,
they have worked for a part of the year, then the amount of
compensation is to be calculated at the same rate to be applied
on a pro-rata basis.[…]”
107. In light of the above principles, as enunciated by the Supreme Court
in Amit Kumar Dubey (supra), this Court deems it fit and appropriate that
the compensation in the present case be awarded in accordance with the
aforesaid parameters, having due regard to the duration of service rendered
by the Petitioners and the attendant facts and circumstances.
W.P.(C) 377/2013 and conn. matters Page 40 of 41
108. In view of the same, the award rendered by the ld. CGIT is partly
modified to the extent that:
A. Workmen who have worked for one year or more shall be
entitled to a lump sum compensation of Rs. 1,25,000/- each ;
B. Workmen who have worked for two years or more shall be
entitled to a lump sum compensation of Rs. 2,50,000/- each and;
C. Workmen who have worked for three years or more shall
be entitled to a lump sum compensation of Rs. 3,75,000/- each.
CONCLUSION:
109. Having regard to the legal position crystallised by the precedents
discussed and the findings recorded herein, this Court is of the view that the
Petitioners have made out a fit case for interference. Accordingly, the
present Petitions are allowed to the effect that the finding of the Tribunal
that the retrenchment violated Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947, is upheld and the compensation is modified.
110. Disposed of. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of. No
orders as to cost.
SHAIL JAIN
JUDGE
MAY 8, 2026/HP
W.P.(C) 377/2013 and conn. matters Page 41 of 41
