Punjab-Haryana High Court
Sarv Haryana Grameen Bank vs The Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner … on 2 April, 2026
CWP-39044-2025(O&M) -1-
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
113 CWP-39044-2025(O&M)
Date of Decision :02.04.2026
Sarv Haryana Gramin Bank .. Petitioner
Versus
The Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner
(Central) & ors. .. Respondents
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARPREET SINGH BRAR
Present: Mr. Tarun Dhingra, Advocate
for the petitioner.
HARPREET SINGH BRAR, J. (ORAL)
1. The present petition has been filed under Articles 226/227 of
the Constitution of India seeking issuance of a writ in the nature of certiorari
for quashing of the order dated 18.07.2022 (Annexure P-8) passed by the
Controlling Authority-cum-Assistant Labour Commissioner (Central),
Karnal, whereby the application moved by respondent No.3 for payment of
gratuity was allowed, and the order dated 16.12.2024 (Annexure P-10)
passed by the Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner (Central), Chandigarh,
the appellate authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, dismissing
the petitioner’s appeal. A further prayer has been made for directing the
official respondents not to give effect to the said orders and to return the
amount deposited by the petitioner at the time of filing the writ petition
before respondent No.1, along with interest.
CONTENTIONS
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner inter alia contends that
respondent No.3 was appointed in the year 1988. While working as a
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Manager with the petitioner-Bank, he was served with a charge sheet on
30.05.2013 and a supplementary charge sheet on 30.06.2014 under the
major penalty proceedings and Vigilance category, as per the provisions of
the Sarva Haryana Gramin Bank (Officers and Employees) Service
Regulations, 2010, with regard to serious irregularities committed by him.
Regular departmental proceedings were conducted by following the
prescribed procedure. The respondent No.3 was found guilty of unauthorised
and corrupt practices based on proven charges. Learned counsel further
submits that all the charges clearly reflect upon his integrity. The respondent
No.3 indulged in the practice of sanctioning loans under various schemes
without ensuring the availability of security and without complying with
KYC norms, which exposed the petitioner-Bank to financial loss.
Furthermore, the fraud perpetrated on the petitioner-Bank was also reported
to the police authorities. Thereafter, the disciplinary authority, after taking
into consideration the material available on record, ordered the compulsory
retirement of respondent No.3 on 12.03.2018. The respondent No.3 filed a
statutory appeal, which was dismissed on 08.06.2018 (Annexure P-4).
Subsequently, a show cause notice for forfeiture of gratuity was issued on
07.03.2019 (Annexure P-5) due to the loss suffered by the petitioner-Bank.
2.1 Following which the respondent No.3 approached the
Controlling Authority seeking release of gratuity on 17.10.2019. The
Controlling Authority allowed the application on 18.07.2022 vide the
impugned order (Annexure P-8), directing the petitioner to pay an amount of
₹10,89,830/- as gratuity along with simple interest at the rate of 10% per
annum. The petitioner-Bank filed an appeal, but the appellate authority
dismissed the same on 16.12.2024 (Annexure P-10) without proper
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consideration. The petitioner has challenged both orders as being illegal and
contrary to the provisions of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. In support
of his contention, learned counsel for the petitioner relies upon the judgment
of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Western Coal Fields Ltd. vs. Manohar
Govinda Fuzele, 2025 SCC Online SC 345, and submits that for forfeiture
of gratuity, a conviction in a criminal case is not a sine qua non for
constituting an offence involving moral turpitude and that the determination
of moral turpitude lies with the disciplinary/appointing authority.
OBSERVATION & ANALYSIS
3. I have heard counsel for the petitioner and perused the record
with his able assistance.
4. This Court is of the considered view that it is well-settled that
the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India are to be exercised
only where the findings recorded by an authority are arbitrary, suffer from
procedural illegality, or disclose manifest prejudice. This Court cannot re-
appreciate the matter on merits and substitute the conclusion drawn by the
concerned authority with its own. Tritely, a High Court cannot sit in appeal
with respect to the decision arrived. As such, this Court must confine itself
to ensuring that the findings rendered are justified by the material available
on record, that the proceedings were conducted in compliance with the
prescribed procedure as well as the principles of natural justice. A two-
Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in South Indian Bank Ltd. v.
Naveen Mathew Philip, (2023) 17 SCC 311, speaking through Justice M.M.
Sundresh, has observed as follows in this regard:
“13. A writ of certiorari is to be issued over a decision when the
court finds that the process does not conform to the law or statute.
In other words, courts are not expected to substitute themselves with
the decision-making authority while finding fault with the process
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CWP-39044-2025(O&M) -4-along with the reasons assigned. Such a writ is not expected to be
issued to remedy all violations. When a tribunal is constituted, it is
expected to go into the issues of fact and law, including a statutory
violation. A question as to whether such a violation would be over a
mandatory prescription as against a discretionary one is primarily
within the domain of the Tribunal. So also, the issue governing
waiver, acquiescence, and estoppel. We wish to place reliance on the
decision of this Court in Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmad Ishaque
[Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmad Ishaque, (1954) 2 SCC 881 :
(1955) 1 SCR 1104] : (SCC pp. 898-900, paras 24-27):
“24. Then the question is whether there are proper grounds for
the issue of certiorari in the present case. There was
considerable argument before us as to the character and scope
of the writ of certiorari and the conditions under which it could
be issued. The question has been considered by this Court in
Parry & Co. Ltd. v. Commercial Employees’ Assn. [Parry &
Co. Ltd. v. Commercial Employees’ Assn., (1952) 1 SCC 449] ,
G. Veerappa Pillai v. Raman & Raman Ltd. [G. Veerappa
Pillai v. Raman & Raman Ltd., (1952) 1 SCC 334] , Ebrahim
Aboobakar v. Custodian of Evacuee Property [Ebrahim
Aboobakar v. Custodian of Evacuee Property, (1952) 1 SCC
798] and quite recently in T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa [T.C.
Basappa v. T. Nagappa, (1954) 1 SCC 905] . On these
authorities, the following propositions may be taken as
established:
24.1. Certiorari will be issued for correcting errors of
jurisdiction, as when an inferior court or Tribunal acts
without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or fails to exercise it.
24.2. Certiorari will also be issued when the Court or
Tribunal acts illegally in the exercise of its undoubted
jurisdiction, as when it decides without giving an opportunity
to the parties to be heard, or violates the principles of natural
justice.
24.3. The Court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of
a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One consequence
of this is that the Court will not review findings of fact
reached by the inferior court or Tribunal, even if they be
erroneous. This is on the principle that a Court which has
jurisdiction over a subject-matter has jurisdiction to decide
wrong as well as right, and when the legislature does not
choose to confer a right of appeal against that decision, it
would be defeating its purpose and policy, if a superior court
were to rehear the case on the evidence, and substitute its own
findings in certiorari. These propositions are well-settled and
are not in dispute…
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xx xx xx
…The position was thus summed up by Morris, L.J. : (R. case
[R. v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal, ex p
Shaw, (1952) 1 KB 338 (CA)] , KB p. 357)
‘It is plain that certiorari will not issue as the cloak of
an appeal in disguise. It does not lie in order to bring
up an order or decision for rehearing of the issue raised
in the proceedings. It exists to correct error of law
where revealed on the face of an order or decision, or
irregularity, or absence of, or excess of, jurisdiction
where shown.’
27. In G. Veerappa Pillai v. Raman & Raman Ltd. [G.
Veerappa Pillai v. Raman & Raman Ltd., (1952) 1 SCC 334] ,
it was observed by this Court that under Article 226 the writ
should be issued : (SCC p. 341, para 26)
’26. … in grave cases where the subordinate tribunals
or bodies or officers act wholly without jurisdiction, or
in excess of it, or in violation of the principles of
natural justice, or refuse to exercise a jurisdiction
vested in them, or there is an error apparent on the face
of the record….’
In T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa [T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa,
(1954) 1 SCC 905] the law was thus stated : (SCC p. 915, para
11)
’11. … An error in the decision or determination itself
may also be amenable to a writ of “certiorari” but it
must be a manifest error apparent on the face of the
proceedings e.g. when it is based on clear ignorance or
disregard of the provisions of law. In other words, it is a
patent error which can be corrected by “certiorari” but
not a mere wrong decision.'”
(Emphasis supplied)
4.1. Admittedly the Controlling Authority, vide order dated
18.07.2022 (Annexure P-8), allowed the application moved by respondent
No.3 for payment of gratuity. The Appellate Authority, vide order dated
16.12.2024 (Annexure P-10), upheld the said findings of the Controlling
Authority and dismissed the petitioner-Bank’s appeal. Admittedly, the
Appellate Authority recorded that there was no finding as to any loss caused
by respondent No.3 to the petitioner-Bank on account of his misconduct.
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CWP-39044-2025(O&M) -6-While adverting to Section 4(6) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, which
provides that gratuity may be forfeited to the extent of the damage or loss
where an employee’s services are terminated for any wilful omission or
negligence resulting in loss to the employer, it was observed that the burden
squarely lies on the employer to establish such loss. In the present case, the
Appellate Authority found no evidence of any monetary loss attributable to
respondent No.3 arising from his alleged wilful misconduct. The Appellate
Authority, therefore, held that the petitioner-Bank had failed to make out a
case for forfeiture of gratuity under Section 4(6) of the Act of 1972.
4.2. Thus, this Court is of the considered opinion that the
Controlling Authority and the Appellate Authority in the present case have
passed well-reasoned orders and the findings recorded therein are neither
arbitrary nor tainted by any procedural or jurisdictional irregularity, nor do
they disclose any manifest error apparent on the face of the proceedings.
This Court is satisfied that the conclusions reached are duly supported by the
material on record and that the proceedings were conducted in accordance
with the prescribed procedure as well as the principles of natural justice. The
petitioner-Bank has failed to place any material on record to establish that
any quantifiable loss was caused by respondent No.3 so as to attract the
provisions of Section 4(6) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972.
5. It is undisputed that the service of the respondent No.3 was not
terminated rather the respondent No.3 was made to “compulsorily retire”. A
punitive measure such as dismissal of service stands on a different footing
than “compulsory retirement”. A Constitutional Bench of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Shyamlal v. State of Uttar Pradesh 1954 INSC 34, while
speaking through Justice S.R Das observed that,
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CWP-39044-2025(O&M) -7-“18. Finally, rule 49 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and
Appeal) Rules clearly indicates that dismissal or removal is a
punishment. This is imposed on an officer as a penalty. It involves loss
of benefits already earned. The officer dismissed or removed does
not get pension which he has earned. He may be granted a
compassionate allowance by that. Under Article 353 of the Civil
Service Regulations, is always less than the pension, actually earned
and is even less than the pension which he would have got had he
retired on medical certificate. But an officer who is compulsorily
retired does not lose any part of the benefit that he has earned.
On compulsory retirement he will entitled to the pension etc. that he
has actually earned. There is no diminution of the accrued benefit.
It is said that compulsory retirement, like dismissal or removal,
deprives the officer of the chance of serving and getting his pay till
he attains the age of superannuation and thereafter to get an
enhanced pension and that is certainly a punishment. It is true that
in that wide sense the officer may consider himself punished but
there is a clear distinction between the loss of benefit already earned
and the loss of prospect of earning something more.
In the first case it is a present and certain loss and is certainly a
punishment but the loss of future prospect is too uncertain, for the
officer may die or be otherwise incapacitated from serving a day
longer and cannot, therefore, be regarded in the eye of the law as a
punishment. The more important think is to see whether by
compulsory retirement the officer loses the benefit he has earned as
he does by dismissal or removal. The answer is clearly in the
negative. The second element for determining whether alternation of
service amounts to dismissal or removal is, therefore, also absent in
the case of termination of service brought about by compulsory
retirement.” (Emphasis supplied)5.1. Further, a Constitutional Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Moti Ram Deka v. General Manager North East Frontier
Railway 1963 INSC 244, while speaking through Justice P.B.
Gajendragadkar observed that,
“146. In a still more recent case AIR 1960 Supreme Court
1305, it was held by this Court that an order of compulsory
retirement of a public servant for administrative reasons
under Rule 278 of the Patiala State Regulations which
Regulations did not fix the minimum age or length of service
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CWP-39044-2025(O&M) -8-after which an order of compulsory retirement could be
made,was not one of dismissal or removal from service within
the meaning of Article 311(2) of the Constitution, because
retirement under a Service Rule which provided for
compulsory retirement at any age irrespective of the length of
service put in, cannot necessarily be regarded as dismissal or
removal within the meaning of Article 311, and the
observations (hereinbefore quoted) made by Venkatarama
Aiyar, J., in Saubhagchand Doshi’s case 1958 SCR 571 were
for the purposes of deciding that case obiter, and that it was not
a general rule that an order of compulsory retirement not
amounting to dismissal or removal can take place only under a
rule fixing the age of compulsory retirement.”
(Emphasis supplied)
5.2 A conjoint reading of the principles laid down by the
Constitution Benches of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shyam Lal (supra)
and Moti Ram Deka (supra), together with Section 4(6)(b) of the Payment
of Gratuity Act, 1972, clearly delineates the distinction between
“compulsory retirement” and “termination” for the purpose of forfeiture of
gratuity. The Constitution Benches have unequivocally held that dismissal
or removal is a punitive measure, entailing stigma and loss of accrued
benefits, whereas even where compulsory retirement is imposed as a
penalty, it does not entail loss of accrued benefits nor does it carry the same
consequences as dismissal or removal, but merely curtails the future tenure
of service. In contradistinction, Section 4(6)(b) predicates forfeiture of
gratuity exclusively upon “termination” of services on specified grounds
such as riotous or disorderly conduct, acts of violence, or offences involving
moral turpitude, each of which inherently postulates a punitive severance of
service founded on proved misconduct.
5.3 Conclusively a Three Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Union of India v. Shri Dulal Dutt 1993 INSC 47, examined the
order of compulsory retirement of a Controller of Stores in Indian Railway
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and held that an order of compulsory retirement is not an order of
punishment. It is a prerogative of the Government but it should be based on
material and has to be passed on the subjective satisfaction of the
Government and that it is not required to be a speaking order. The Hon’ble
Apex Court while speaking through Justice Yogeshwar Dayal held as
under:
“18. It will be noticed that the Tribunal completely erred in assuming,
in the circumstances of the case, that there ought to have been a
speaking order for compulsory retirement. This Court, has been
repeatedly emphasising right from the case of R.L Butail v. Union of
India, (1970) 2 SCC 876 and Union of India v. J.N. Sinha, (1970) 2
SCC 458 that an order of a compulsory retirement is not an order of
punishment. It is actually a prerogative of the Government but it
should be based on material and has to be passed on the subjective
satisfaction of the Government. Very often, on enquiry by the Court
the Government may disclose the material but it is very much different
from the saying that the order should be a speaking order. No order
of compulsory retirement is required to be a speaking order. From the
very order of the Tribunal it is clear that the Government had, before
it, the report of the Review Committee yet it thought it fit of
compulsory retiring the respondent. The order cannot be called either
mala fide or arbitrary in law.:”
(Emphasis added)
5.3 The consistent use of the expression “terminated” in the
provision, and the absence of any reference to “compulsory retirement”, is
legally significant and cannot be treated as inadvertent. Thus, the statutory
scheme, when read in harmony with the settled constitutional position,
makes it evident that “termination” in this context must be construed as
punitive termination involving stigma and forfeiture of earned benefits, and
not every cessation of service. Consequently, compulsory retirement, even
when imposed as a penalty, does not result in forfeiture of accrued benefits
and preserves accrued rights, operating in a distinct legal field and cannot be
equated with termination for the purposes of forfeiture of gratuity
particularly in the absence of a stigmatic severance of service accompanied
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by statutory grounds for forfeiture. The two concepts are, therefore, not
synonymous but stand on fundamentally different footings; and in the
absence of a punitive termination as contemplated under Section 4(6)(b), the
very foundation for invoking forfeiture of gratuity is lacking.
6. Furthermore the issue regarding withholding gratuity on
account of compulsory retirement has been conclusively dealt with by a Two
Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jyotirmay Ray v. The Field
General Manager, Punjab National Bank 2023 INSC 979, which while
speaking through Justice J.K. Maheshwari observed as under:
“20. The Bank harmonizing the provisions of Regulation 46 of 1979
Regulations and the Gratuity Act issued Circular No. 1563 on
16.01.1997 through its personnel division. Therein harmonizing the
Regulations with the provisions of the Gratuity Act and in clauses 8
and 14 of the Circular, the instances as to when gratuity could be
forfeited, have been specified. Those clauses are relevant and have
been reproduced as under:
“8. FORFEITURE OF GRATUITY UNDER ACT
The gratuity payable under the payment of gratuity act, is liable to full
or partial forfeiture under different circumstances. Section 4(1) of
payment of gratuity act deals to payment of gratuity whereas section
4(6) of the act deals with forfeiture of gratuity. Section 4(1) reads as
under:
Gratuity shall be payable to an employee on the termination of his
employment after he has rendered continuous service for not less than
five Years,
a. On his superannuation, or
b. On his retirement or resignation, or
c. On his death or disablement due to accident or disease.
Provided that the completion of continuous service of five years shall
not be necessary where the termination of the employment of any
employee is due to death or disablement.
Section 4(6) provides as under:
“Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1)
a. The gratuity of an employee, whose services have been
terminated for any act, wilful omission or negligence causing
any damage or loss to, or destruction of, property belonging to
the employee, shall be forfeited to the extent of the damage or
loss so caused:
b. The gratuity payable to an employee may be wholly or
partially forfeited.
I) If the services of such employee have been terminated for his
riotous or disorderly conduct or any other act of violence on
his part, or
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CWP-39044-2025(O&M) -11-II) If the services of such employee have been terminated for
any act which constitutes an offence involving moral turpitude,
provided that such offence is committed by him in the course of
his employment.
14. PAYMENT UNDER OFFICERS SERVICE
REGULATIONS
Rules relating to payment of gratuity of officers staff have been
laid down under Regulation 46 of PNB Officers Service
Regulations, 1979 which is as under:-
(I) Every officer shall be eligible for gratuity on:
(a) Retirement, (b) death (c) disablement rendering him unfit
for further service as certified by a medical officer approved by
the bank, or (d) resignation after completing ten years of
continuous service or termination of service in any other way
except by way of punishment after completion of 10 years of
service.
Explanation: We have to clarify that gratuity may be paid in
case of termination of service, subject to the condition that the
officers has put in at least 10 years of service with the bank and
provided that the termination is not by way of dismissal or
removal from service as punishment.
(II) The amount of gratuity payable to an officer shall be one
month’s pay for every completed year of service, subject to a
maximum of 15 months’ pay.
Provided that where an officer has completed more than 30
years of service, he shall be eligible by way of gratuity for an
additional amount at the rate of one half of month pay for each
completed year of service beyond thirty years.
Pay for the purpose of gratuity in case of officer shall mean
basic pay only. While calculating gratuity, that part of PQA &
FPA drawn by an officer, which rank for superannuation
benefit, shall also be taken into account.
Note: If the fraction of service beyond completed years of
service is six months or more, gratuity will be paid pro-rata for
the period. In this connection, we have to clarify that for the
purpose of calculating gratuity, the number of days, beyond 6
months period is also to be taken into account.”
On a combined reading of the provisions of the Gratuity Act, 1979
Regulations and the circular, it becomes clear that the gratuity shall
become payable to every officer on retirement, death, disablement or
on resignation except in a case of termination of service in any other
way, by way of punishment after completion of 10 years of continuous
service.
XXX
26. The counsel for appellant also relied upon the judgement of B.R.
Sharma (supra), in which the riotous behaviour of the employee was
found proved. However, the said judgment does not apply in the facts
of the present case. Similarly, reliance was also placed on the case of
Canara Bank (supra) wherein as per the Regulations of the Canara
Bank, the withholding of the amount of gratuity to the extent of loss
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caused was permissible. In the facts of the present case and contents
of Regulations and Circular of the Bank, the said judgment being
distinguishable, has no application. The learned Single Judge has
correctly observed that as per the 1977 Regulations, compulsory
retirement; removal from service which shall not be a
disqualification for future employment and dismissal which shall
ordinarily be a disqualification for future employment are distinct
and separate punishments. The act of forfeiture of gratuity is not
envisaged in the present case as the provisions are silent on the
aspect of forfeiture in case of compulsory retirement. As per
Circular No. 1563 dated 16.01.1997 of the Bank, in our view, the
Division Bench erred in reversing the judgment of the learned Single
Judge.”
(emphasis added)
6.1 The ratio that emerges is that even in cases where compulsory
retirement is imposed after disciplinary proceedings, gratuity cannot be
withheld unless the exhaustive conditions stipulated in the Section 4(6) of
the Payment of Gratuity, 1972 are met.
7. Moreover, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Y.K. Singla v. Punjab
National Bank, (2013) 3 SCC 472 has conclusively held that the provisions
of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 shall have a superior status in respect
to any enactment (including any other instrument or contract) inconsistent
therewith, insofar as the entitlement of an employee to gratuity is concerned.
Thereby reinforcing that statutory conditions for forfeiture cannot be diluted
by service regulations or administrative instructions.
8. The reliance placed on Western Coal Fields Ltd. (supra) by the
learned counsel for the petitioner is misconceived, as the said case pertains
to a situation involving termination of service, thereby satisfying the
foundational requirement under Section 4(6). In contrast, the present case
involves compulsory retirement, coupled with absence of any proven or
quantified loss, and thus falls outside the statutory framework for forfeiture.
Thus, the statutory trigger for invoking forfeiture is itself absent in the
present case.
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9. Consequently, this Court is of the considered view that the
Controlling Authority as well as the Appellate Authority have rightly and
judiciously appreciated both the facts and the applicable law, and have
correctly concluded that the case does not fall within the ambit of Section
4(6) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. In the absence of any punitive
termination as contemplated under the said provision, and further in the
absence of any cogent evidence establishing or quantifying loss attributable
to respondent No. 3, the essential statutory preconditions for forfeiture of
gratuity remain unfulfilled. The impugned orders, therefore, do not suffer
from any illegality, perversity, or jurisdictional error warranting interference
in exercise of writ jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of
India.
10. Accordingly, finding no merit in the present petition, the same
stands dismissed.
11. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stand
disposed of.
02.04.2026 (HARPREET SINGH BRAR)
monika JUDGE
Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No
Whether reportable : Yes/No
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