Rajasthan High Court – Jodhpur
Sanyukt Shekhari vs State Of Rajasthan (2026:Rj-Jd:16370) on 7 April, 2026
Author: Anil Kumar Upman
Bench: Anil Kumar Upman
[2026:RJ-JD:16370]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous (Petition) No. 3377/2024
Sanyukt Shekhari S/o Inder Shekhari, Aged About 35 Years,
Resident Of Shekhari House, Batala, Gurdaspur, Punjab.
----Petitioner
Versus
1. State Of Rajasthan, Through Pp
2. Bhagwati Chouhan W/o Dhanraj Chouhan, Aged About 44
Years, R/o Near Adharshila, Jaloriyonka Bas, Jodhpur.
----Respondents
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Shreyash Ramdev, Adv.
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Vikram Singh Rajpurohit, PP
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR UPMAN
Order
REPORTABLE
07/04/2026
1. Instant Criminal Misc. Petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has
been filed by the petitioner with the prayer to quash the entire
criminal proceedings emanating from FIR No.139/2016, registered
at Police Station Nagauri Gate, District Jodhpur (East) for offences
punishable under Sections 420, 406 and 120B of the IPC along
with charge-sheet dated 09.07.2018 and further proceedings
pending before the Court of learned Metropolitan Magistrate
No.10, Jodhpur in Criminal Case No.1417/2018.
2. The brief facts of the case are that a complaint was filed by
the complainant-respondent No.2 under Section 156(3) of the
Cr.P.C. against the petitioner and the co-accused, Sunil Baweja,
pursuant to which FIR No.139/2016 came to be registered at
Police Station Nagauri Gate, District Jodhpur (East). Upon
completion of investigation, the police filed a charge-sheet against
(Uploaded on 17/04/2026 at 09:35:07 AM)
(Downloaded on 24/04/2026 at 10:08:10 PM)
[2026:RJ-JD:16370] (2 of 11) [CRLMP-3377/2024]
the petitioner and the co-accused before the competent Court for
offences punishable under Sections 420, 406 and 120B of IPC.
Since the petitioner did not join the investigation, the charge-
sheet qua him was filed under Section 299 Cr.P.C. After filing of
the charge-sheet, the learned trial Court took cognizance and
framed charges against the co-accused, Sunil Baweja. However,
the proceedings against the present petitioner were kept pending
as he was declared an absconder.
3. Counsel for the petitioner submits that essentially, there is a
civil dispute between the parties arising out of monetary
transactions which has been given a criminal colour. It is
submitted that in the year 2018, the parties had entered into a
compromise, pursuant to which the petitioner as well as the co-
accused, Sunil Baweja, have already paid the entire disputed
amount to the complainant. Counsel submits that while granting
bail to the co-accused, this Court had taken note of the payment
of Rs.50,000/- made to the complainant and had observed that
the balance amount would be paid upon his release. It is
contended that the said amount has since been fully paid and the
compromise stands duly acted upon. In such circumstances, the
continuation of the criminal proceedings in pursuance of the FIR is
fruitless and would be a futile exercise and a waste of precious
judicial time and resources. It is further submitted that even if the
allegations in the FIR are taken at their face value, no criminal
offence is made out against the petitioner or the co-accused. The
dispute emanates from an agreement for local distributorship
executed between the parties on certain terms and conditions. The
(Uploaded on 17/04/2026 at 09:35:07 AM)
(Downloaded on 24/04/2026 at 10:08:10 PM)
[2026:RJ-JD:16370] (3 of 11) [CRLMP-3377/2024]
alleged non-supply of goods, owing to subsequent disputes, at
best gives rise to a civil liability and does not attract criminal
culpability. Counsel thus, prays that the entire criminal
proceedings arising out of the impugned FIR be quashed.
4. Learned State Counsel places on record factual report dated
06.04.2026 received from SHO, Police Station Nagauri Gate,
District Jodhpur (East). According to the factual report, on
10.05.2024, the Investigating Officer visited the residence of the
petitioner, where he met the petitioner’s father, Indra Shekhari.
During the visit, Indra Shekhari produced an affidavit dated
13.07.2018, executed by the husband of the complainant,
acknowledging the receipt of a sum of Rs.2,96,000/- through a
demand draft. The Investigating Officer collected the certified copy
of the affidavit along with a copy of the demand draft, and same
were taken on record. The factual report further indicates that the
petitioner does not have any criminal antecedents.
5. I have considered the contentions and perused the material
available on record.
6. It is a settled proposition of law that a mere breach of
contract, agreement, or promise, by itself, does not give rise to
criminal liability under Sections 420 and 406 of the IPC. In order
to constitute the offences of cheating or criminal breach of trust, it
is imperative to establish the existence of fraudulent or dishonest
intention at the very inception of the transaction. It is well settled
that criminal proceedings cannot be resorted to for the purpose of
resolving civil disputes or for recovery of money. In the absence of
any allegation or material indicating such initial dishonest
(Uploaded on 17/04/2026 at 09:35:07 AM)
(Downloaded on 24/04/2026 at 10:08:10 PM)
[2026:RJ-JD:16370] (4 of 11) [CRLMP-3377/2024]
intention, the continuation of criminal proceedings would amount
to an abuse of the process of law.
7. The distinguishing factor between the offence of cheating
and any other civil dispute lies in the presence or absence of mens
rea at the inception of the transaction. To constitute the offence of
cheating, it must be shown that the accused had a dishonest or
fraudulent intention from the very beginning. A mere failure to
honour a promise or fulfill a contractual obligation, by itself, does
not give rise to a presumption of such dishonest intention. In the
absence of any material to indicate that the intention to deceive
existed at the inception, the dispute remains civil in nature and
does not attract criminal liability.
8. In simple terms, a breach of contract constitutes an
infringement of a private right, which is ordinarily remediable
under civil law, such as by instituting proceedings for recovery of
money. However, for such a dispute to attract criminal liability,
there must be evidence indicating that the accused had no
intention to fulfill the promise from the very inception of the
agreement and, with such dishonest intention, persuaded the
other party to believe the promise.
9. Hence, where the breach is due to mere non-fulfillment of
the contract without any fraud or deceitful intentions during the
initial stages of signing the contract, the dispute remains civil in
nature and does not warrant initiation of criminal proceedings.
10. Hon’ble Supreme Court has consistently held that mere non-
performance of an agreement is not cheating. In the case of
Arshad Neyaz Khan Versus the State of Jharkhand & Anr.,
(Uploaded on 17/04/2026 at 09:35:07 AM)
(Downloaded on 24/04/2026 at 10:08:10 PM)
[2026:RJ-JD:16370] (5 of 11) [CRLMP-3377/2024]
reported in 2025 SCC Online SC 2058, it was held that for
establishing the offence of cheating, the complainant/respondent
No.2 was required to show that the appellant had a fraudulent or
dishonest intention at the time of making a promise or
representation of not fulfilling the agreement for sale of the said
property. Paragraph Nos. 18, 19 and 20 of the aforesaid judgment
are being reproduced for ready reference:-
“18. In light of the facts and circumstances of the
present case, we find that the
complainant/respondent No.2 has failed to make
out a case that satisfies the basic ingredients of the
offence under Section 420 IPC. We fail to
understand as to how the allegations against the
appellant herein could be brought within the scope
and ambit of the aforesaid section. On a bare
perusal of the FIR as well as the complaint, we do
not find that the offence of cheating as defined
under Section 420 IPC is made out and we do not
find that there is any cheating and dishonest
inducement to deliver any property or a valuable
security involved in the instant case.
19. It is settled law that for establishing the offence
of cheating, the complainant/respondent No.2 was
required to show that the appellant had a
fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of
making a promise or representation of not fulfilling
the agreement for sale of the said property. Such a
culpable intention right at the beginning when the
promise was made cannot be presumed but has to
be made out with cogent facts. In the facts of the
present case, there is a clear absence of dishonest
and fraudulent intention on the part of the
appellant during the agreement for sale. We must(Uploaded on 17/04/2026 at 09:35:07 AM)
(Downloaded on 24/04/2026 at 10:08:10 PM)
[2026:RJ-JD:16370] (6 of 11) [CRLMP-3377/2024]hasten to add that there is no allegation in the FIR
or the complaint indicating either expressly or
impliedly any intentional deception or
fraudulent/dishonest intention on the part of the
appellant right from the time of making the
promise or misrepresentation. Nothing has been
said on what the misrepresentations were and how
the appellant intentionally deceived the
complainant/respondent No.2. Mere allegations by
the complainant/respondent No.2 that the
appellant failed to execute the agreement for sale
and failed to refund the money paid by the
complainant/respondent No.2 does not satisfy the
test of dishonest inducement to deliver a property
or part with a valuable security as enshrined under
Section 420 IPC.
20. On perusal of the allegations contained in the
complaint, in light of the ingredients of Section 406
IPC, read in the context of Section 405 IPC, do not
find that any offence of criminal breach of trust has
been made out. It is trite law that every act of
breach of trust may not result in a penal offence
unless there is evidence of a manipulating act of
fraudulent misappropriation of property entrusted
to him. In the case of criminal breach of trust, if a
person comes into possession of the property and
receives it legally, but illegally retains it or converts
it to its own use against the terms of contract, then
the question whether such retention is with
dishonest intention or not and whether such
retention involves criminal breach of trust or only a
civil liability would depend upon the facts and
circumstances of the case. In the present case, the
complainant/respondent No.2 has failed to
establish the ingredients essential to constitute an
offence under Section 406 IPC. The(Uploaded on 17/04/2026 at 09:35:07 AM)
(Downloaded on 24/04/2026 at 10:08:10 PM)
[2026:RJ-JD:16370] (7 of 11) [CRLMP-3377/2024]complainant/respondent No.2 has failed to place
any material on record to show us as to how he
had entrusted property to the appellant.
Furthermore, the complaint also omits to aver as to
how the property, so entrusted to the appellant,
was dishonestly misappropriated or converted for
his own use, thereby committing a breach of trust.”
11. A bare perusal of the FIR as well as factual report does not
disclose any material to indicate that the accused persons had an
intention to deceive the complainant from the very inception, i.e.,
at the time of execution of the agreement for local distributorship
between the parties. Subsequently, some dispute arose between
the parties and therefore, the required goods were not supplied by
the accused persons to the complainant. The complainant has
alleged that the accused persons cheated her and dishonestly
obtained an amount of Rs.2,96,000/- from her. However, the
factual report reveals that on 13.07.2018, the husband of the
complainant executed an affidavit on a stamp paper of Rs.50/-,
declaring that the disputed amount of Rs.2,96,000/- has been
received by way of a demand draft. The material on record does
not prima facie disclose the existence of any fraudulent or
dishonest intention at the inception of the transaction.
12. The aforesaid facts clearly demonstrate that the complainant
had already received the disputed amount of Rs.2,96,000/- way
back in the year 2018. In the event that any grievance still
subsists, it would be open to the complainant to raise a civil
dispute in this regard before the competent forum.
(Uploaded on 17/04/2026 at 09:35:07 AM)
(Downloaded on 24/04/2026 at 10:08:10 PM)
[2026:RJ-JD:16370] (8 of 11) [CRLMP-3377/2024]
13. In the backdrop of the aforesaid discussions and in view of
the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Arshad Neyaz
(Supra), coupled with the fact that the disputed amount of
Rs.2,96,000/- has already been paid by the petitioner as well as
the co-accused, Sunil Baweja to the complainant, this Court is of
the considered view that the criminal proceedings pending before
the learned trial Court against the petitioner, as well as the co-
accused, who is not before this Court but whose case stands on
the same footing as that of the petitioner, deserve to be quashed
as continuation of the criminal proceedings would amount to an
abuse of the process of law.
14. In the instant case, this Court, upon a bare perusal of the
FIR, finds that no offence is made out and the continuation of
further proceedings based on the FIR against the petitioner and/or
the co-accused would undoubtedly amount to an abuse of the
process of law. It is well settled that where the foundational
allegations do not disclose a cognizable offence, permitting
criminal proceedings to continue would defeat the very purpose of
instituting such a case and would result in injustice and
harassment to the accused.
15. Despite the fact that the co-accused, against whom criminal
proceedings are pending, has not separately approached and
sought any relief from this Court, the Court cannot overlook that
the allegations levelled in the FIR are identical against both the
petitioner and the co-accused, and that the facts of the case are
interdependent. Therefore, since no offence is made out even on a
prima facie consideration of the FIR, this Court holds that the co-
(Uploaded on 17/04/2026 at 09:35:07 AM)
(Downloaded on 24/04/2026 at 10:08:10 PM)
[2026:RJ-JD:16370] (9 of 11) [CRLMP-3377/2024]
accused is equally entitled to the relief granted to the petitioner,
notwithstanding the fact that he has not approached this Court.
This proposition is bolstered by the long held legal doctrine
established by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, which recognizes that
a Court has the power, in the interest of justice, to extend the
benefit of its judgment to similarly situated persons, even if they
are not before the Court. It is evident that a failure to grant such
relief would result in a grave anomaly and injustice, particularly
where the very foundation of the proceedings is found to be
untenable.
16. Therefore, for the sake of justice and for avoiding any abuse
of the judicial process, the benefit of this order shall be granted
not only to the petitioner but also to the co-accused who is not
before this Court.
17. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Javed Shaukat Ali
Qureshi vs State of Gujarat, reported in 2023 0 AIR(SC)
4444, while dealing with the identical issue, has observed that -:
“18. Now, we come to the case of accused no.2. By
the order dated 11th May 2018, a special leave
petition filed by accused no.2 was summarily
dismissed without recording any reasons. The law is
well settled. An order refusing special leave to
appeal by a non-speaking order does not attract the
doctrine of merger. At this stage, we may refer to a
three judge Bench decision of this Court in the case
of Harbans Singh v. State of U.P. & Ors., (1982) 2
SCC 101. In paragraph 18, this Court held thus:
“18. To my mind, it will be a sheer travesty of justice
and the course of justice will be perverted, if for the
very same offence, the petitioner has to swing and(Uploaded on 17/04/2026 at 09:35:07 AM)
(Downloaded on 24/04/2026 at 10:08:10 PM)
[2026:RJ-JD:16370] (10 of 11) [CRLMP-3377/2024]pay the extreme penalty of death whereas the death
sentence imposed on his co-accused for the very
same offence is commuted to one of life
imprisonment and the life of the co-accused is
shared (sic-spared). The case of the petitioner
Harbans Singh appears, indeed, to be unfortunate,
as neither in his special leave petition and the
review petition in this Court nor in his mercy petition
to the President of India, this all important and
significant fact that the life sentence imposed on his
co-accused in respect of the very same offence has
been commuted to one of life imprisonment has
been mentioned. Had this fact been brought to the
notice of this Court at the time when the Court dealt
with the special leave petition of the petitioner or
even his review petition, I have no doubt in my
mind that this Court would have commuted his
death sentence to one of life imprisonment. For the
same offence and for the same kind of involvement,
responsibility and complicity, capital punishment on
one and life imprisonment on the other would never
have been just. I also feel that had the petitioner in
his mercy petition to the President of India made
any mention of this fact of commutation of death
sentence to one of life imprisonment on his co-
accused in respect of the very same offence, the
President might have been inclined to take a
different view on his petition.” (emphasis added)
19. We have found that the case of accused no 2
stands on the same footing as accused nos. 1, 5 and
13 acquitted by this Court. The accused no.2 must
get the benefit of parity. The principles laid down in
the case of Harbans Singh will apply. If we fail to
grant relief to accused no 2, the rights guaranteed
to accused no. 2 under Article 21 of the Constitution
of India will be violated. It will amount to doing(Uploaded on 17/04/2026 at 09:35:07 AM)
(Downloaded on 24/04/2026 at 10:08:10 PM)
[2026:RJ-JD:16370] (11 of 11) [CRLMP-3377/2024]manifest injustice. In fact, as a Constitutional Court
entrusted with the duty of upholding fundamental
rights guaranteed under the Constitution, it is our
duty and obligation to extend the same relief to
accused no.2. Therefore, we will have to recall the
order passed in the special leave petition filed by
accused no.2.”
18. Hence, the Criminal Misc. Petition is allowed. The criminal
proceedings pending before learned Metropolitan Magistrate
No.10, Jodhpur in Criminal Case No.1417/2018 arising out of FIR
No.139/2016 registered at Police Station Nagauri Gate, District
Jodhpur (West) for offences under Sections 420, 406 & 120B of
the IPC are hereby quashed against the petitioner and co-accused,
Sunil Baweja.
19. The stay application and pending application(s), if any, also
stand disposed of.
(ANIL KUMAR UPMAN),J
125-Manoj Solanki/-
(Uploaded on 17/04/2026 at 09:35:07 AM)
(Downloaded on 24/04/2026 at 10:08:10 PM)
Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)