Himachal Pradesh High Court
Santosh Kumar Chaudhary vs State Of H.P. & Anr on 3 July, 2026
2025:HHC:46560
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. Appeal No. 4161 of 2013
Reserved on: 28.4.2026
.
Date of Decision: 15.6.20261
Santosh Kumar Chaudhary ...Appellant
Versus
State of H.P. & anr. ...Respondents
of
Coram rt
Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?2 Yes.
For the Appellant : M/s B.L. Soni and Nitin Soni,
Advocates.
For Respondent No.1/State : Mr Ajit Sharma, Deputy
Advocate General.
For Respondent No.2. : Proceedings abated vide order
dated 25.8.2025.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The present appeal is directed against the judgment
of conviction dated 15.10.2013 and order of sentence dated
18.10.2013, passed by the learned Special Judge, Una, District
Una, H.P., (learned Trial Court). (Parties shall hereinafter be
referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the
learned Trial Court for convenience.)
1
Correction carried out in compliance to order dated 30.6.2026.
2
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
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2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present
appeal are that the police presented a challan against the accused
before the learned Trial Court for the commission of offences
.
punishable under Sections 409, 420, 467, 468, 471, and 120-B of
the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Section 13(2) of the Prevention
of Corruption Act, 1988 (PC Act). It was asserted that a complaint
of
was received from the Joint Secretary (Revenue), to the
Government of Himachal Pradesh, against Ramesh Kumar
rt
Chaudhary, Naib Tehsildar (Sales) and others, stating that the
land bearing Khasra Nos. 2915, 2946, 2950 and 2951, measuring
1-31-84 hectares, situated in Village Bhanjal, Tehsil Amb,
District Una, H.P., belonging to the custodian department, was
illegally sold by Ramesh Kumar Chaudhary by issuing a bogus
sale certificate. The police registered the FIR (Ex.PW36/A). Rani
Devi, Deputy Superintendent of Police (PW36), obtained the
record, including a letter (Ex.PW1/A) regarding the evacuee
property from Uttam Chand Kanungo (PW1), which was seized
vide memo (Ex.PW1/B). Kirpa Ram (PW2) produced the letters
(Ex.PW2/A and Ex.PW2/B), which were seized vide memo
(Ex.PW2/C). Copies (Ex.PW2/D and Ex.PW2/E) of the Daily Credit
Book were obtained from Naib Tehsildar (Sales), Shimla. Rani
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Devi obtained the admitted handwriting of Ramesh Kumar
(Ex.PW3/A1 to Ex.PW3/A4, and Ex.PW3/B and Ex.PW3/C) from
Jamuna Devi (PW3). She obtained the copies (Ex.PW36/B and
.
Ex.PW36/C). Ram Parkash (PW5) produced a letter (Ex.PW5/A)
which was seized vide memo (Ex.PW5/B). Bhupinder Singh
(PW6) produced the relevant record (Ex.PW6/A to Ex.PW6/F),
of
which was seized vide memo (Ex.PW6/G). Parvesh Kumar (PW8)
produced a letter (Ex.PW8/A) which were seized vide memo
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(Ex.PW8/B). Neena Thakur (PW9) produced the copies of the
receipt register (Ex.PW9/A), which was seized vide memo
(Ex.PW9/B). Deputy Superintendent of Police Rani Devi (PW36)
also obtained a copy of the average sale value (Ex.PW9/B1) and
letter (Ex.PW9/A1), which were seized vide memo (Ex.PW9/C).
Gurbachan Singh, Senior assistant, Tehsil Office, Amb (PW25)
produced the charge assumption report of the accused Santosh
Kumar. Deputy Superintendent of Police, Rani Devi (PW36) also
received the copy of the posting order (Ex.PW36/D) and
notification (Ex.PW36/E). She obtained the specimen signatures
of the accused Santosh Kumar (Ex. S1 to S12) before learned
Judicial Magistrate First Class Mr Aman Sood. She found after the
investigation that Ramesh Kumar Chaudhary had sold evacuee
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property to the co-accused Madan Lal despite the prohibition
and received ₹3,11,000/-. However, he had failed to deposit the
amount of ₹3,11,000/- in the Government Treasury. Accused
.
Santosh Kumar had forwarded the fake sale certificate to the
Patwari, and accused Santosh Kumar sanctioned the mutation
despite a complete ban on the transfer of evacuee property.
of
Madan Lal sold the land to Bimla Devi after two months of the
purchase, and in this manner, he caused loss to the State
Government.
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Parthsarathi Mitra (PW37) accorded the
prosecution sanction against Santosh Kumar (Ex.PW29/A).
Sansar Chand (PW34) partly investigated the matter. He obtained
the admitted handwriting of Santosh Kumar (Ex.PW10/A to
Ex.PW10/D) vide memo (Ex.PW10/E). He also obtained specimen
handwriting of Ramesh Kumar Chaudhary (Ex.S13 to Ex.S30).
The specimen and disputed signatures were sent to RFSL,
Dharamshala. Dr. Meenakshi (PW35) examined the disputed,
admitted and specimen handwriting and issued the report
(Ex.PW34/A) mentioning that specimen signatures and
handwriting of Santosh Kumar (Ex.S1 to Ex.S12), his admitted
handwriting (A1 to A12) and disputed handwriting (Q1 to Q12)
were written by one person. The specimen signatures and
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handwriting of Ramesh Kumar (S13 to S-30), admitted
handwriting (A9 to A15) and questioned handwriting (Q13 to Q21)
were written by one person. Sansar Chand obtained the mutation
.
orders (Ex.PW6/B and Ex.PW6/C). He also obtained the original
sale certificate vide order dated 27.7.2007 (Ex.PW31/A). He
recorded the statements of witnesses as per their version and
of
filed the charge sheet before the Court after the completion of
the investigation.
3.
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Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to
summon the accused. When the accused appeared, they were
charged with the commission of offences punishable under
Sections 420 read with Section 120-B of IPC and accused Santosh
Kumar was charged with the commission of an offence
punishable under Section 13(2) of the PC Act, to which they
pleaded guilty and claimed to be tried.
4. The prosecution examined 37 witnesses to prove its
case. Uttam Chand (PW1), Kirpa Ram (PW2), Jamuna Devi (PW3),
Bhupinder Singh (PW6), Ashok Kumar (PW7) and Neena Thakur
(PW9) produced the record. Pritam Chand Patial (PW4), Ram
Prakash (PW5), Asha Nand Thakur (PW18), and Ramesh Chand
(PW26) witnessed the recoveries. Parveen Kumar (PW8) sent the
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sale letter. Mandeep Kumar (PW10) identified the signatures of
Santosh Kumar and produced the record. Parveen Kumar (PW11)
and Kuldeep Singh (PW20) did not support the prosecution’s
.
case. Charan Pal (PW12) and Ram Nath, Superintendent (PW17),
proved the signatures of the SDM on the letter. Rakesh Kumar
(PW13) had attested the affidavit of Ramesh Kumar. Jagdev Singh
of
(PW14) had entered the mutation at the instance of Santosh
Kumar. Bimla Devi (PW15) had purchased the land from the co-
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accused Madan Lal; however, the mutation was not sanctioned.
Anayat Ali (PW16) had purchased the land from Ramesh Chand.
Chander Bhan (PW19) proved the statement made by Ramesh
Kumar. Sukhdarshan Singh (PW21) forwarded the complaint
received from the Revenue Department. Nek Chand (PW22),
Gurbax Singh (PW23) and Santosh Kumari (PW24) proved that
no auction was conducted before the sale. Gurbachan Singh
(PW25) went to Dharamshala and purchased 08 Marlas of land.
O.P. Kant (PW27) sent a letter in response to the queries raised by
the police. Gopal Chand (PW28) and Ramesh Chand (PW29) had
put up the file pertaining to the evacuee property and obtained
the sanction. Chanchla Devi (PW30) was the Pradhan of the Gram
Panchayat who had passed a resolution against the sale of the
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evacuee property. Rakesh Kumar (PW31) proved the documents
annexed to the civil suit. Inspector Sher Singh (PW32) and Chuni
Lal (PW33) recorded the statements of witnesses as per their
.
version. Dr Meenakshi Mahajan (PW35) examined the
handwriting. Sansar Chand (PW34) and Rani Devi (PW36)
investigated the matter. Parthasarathi Mitra (PW37) granted the
of
prosecution sanction to prosecute the accused Santosh Kumar.
5. The accused, Santosh Kumar, in his statement
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recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
admitted that Ramesh Kumar Chaudhary was promoted and
posted as Section Officer-cum-Naib Tehsildar (Sales) in the
Relief and Rehabilitation Department. He also admitted that
Ramesh Kumar was also looking after the work of Naib Tehsildar
(Sales) in addition to his own duty. He admitted that Ramesh
Kumar Chaudhary had written a letter for the attestation of the
mutation, and he sanctioned the mutation based on the letter. He
admitted that the land was sold to Bimla Devi but claimed that he
was not aware of any ban imposed regarding the transfer of
evacuee property. He did not know the average sale
consideration. He denied the rest of the prosecution’s case. He
claimed that a false case was made against him. He did not
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produce any evidence in defence. Co-accused Ramesh Kumar
Chaudhary died during the proceedings pending before the
learned Trial Court, and co-accused Madan Lal died during the
.
pendency of the proceedings before this Court.
6. Learned Trial Court held that Ramesh Kumar
Chaudhary had issued the sale certificate in favour of Madan Lal
of
for ₹3,11,000/-. No money was deposited in the treasury, and no
sale certificate was found in the record of Naib Tehsildar (Sales).
rt
Therefore, the sale certificate was fake. Accused Santosh Kumar
was aware of the Government orders restricting the attestation
of the mutation of the evacuee property located in Himachal
Pradesh, but he had attested the mutation and registered the sale
deed in favour of Bimla Devi. Gurbachan Singh (PW25) had also
purchased the evacuee property, but his mutation was not
sanctioned. The prosecution proved two sale letters (Ex.PW31/B
and Ex.PW13/C). The accused Naresh Kumar did not verify the
correctness of these documents and proceeded to attest the
mutation and register the sale deed. This showed that he had
entered into a conspiracy with the co-accused. He had misused
his position to benefit the accused Madan Lal. He had registered
the sale deed in favour of Bimla Devi for an amount less than the
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average sale value. The sanction was given after proper
application of mind. Hence, the learned Trial Court convicted and
sentenced the accused as under: –
.
Conviction Sentence
Section 420 of IPC To undergo rigorous
imprisonment for one year, pay a
fine of ₹20,000/- and, in default of
payment of the fine, to undergoof
simple imprisonment for six
months.
Section 120-B of IPC To undergo rigorous
rt imprisonment for three months,
pay a fine of ₹1,000/- and, indefault of payment of the fine, to
undergo simple imprisonment for
fifteen days.
Section 13(2) of the PC Act, 1988 To undergo rigorous
imprisonment for one year, pay a
fine of ₹10,000/- and, in default ofpayment of the fine, to undergo
simple imprisonment for onemonth.
All the sentences were ordered to be run concurrently.
7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by
the learned Trial Court, the accused has filed the present appeal,
asserting that the learned Trial Court failed to properly
appreciate the material on record. The prosecution had failed to
prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The accused Santosh
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Kumar had received the sale certificate during the discharge of
his official duties, and he had attested the mutation in routine
without any suspicion. The Patwari had entered the mutation,
.
and Kanungo had verified it, but they were not prosecuted. The
appellant was discharging the quasi-judicial authority, and he
was entitled to the benefit of Section 3 of the Judges Protection
of
Act. The basic ingredients of the commission of an offence
punishable under Section 420 of the IPC, read with Section 120-B
rt
of the IPC, were not satisfied. No witness had deposed regarding
any meeting of minds beetween the accused persons. Ramesh
Kumar Chaudhary had sworn an affidavit before the Civil Court
that the sale certificate had been issued by him while discharging
his official duties. This certificate was ignored by the learned
Trial Court. The prosecution sanction was not properly accorded.
Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and
the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court be set
aside.
8. I have heard M/s B.L. Soni and Nitin Soni, learned
counsel for the appellant/accused, and Mr Ajit Sharma, learned
Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent/State.
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9. Mr B.L. Soni, learned counsel for the
appellant/accused, submitted that the learned Trial Court erred
in appreciating the material on record. Co-accused Ramesh
.
Kumar Chaudhary had sworn an affidavit that he had issued the
sale certificate in his official capacity. The accused was not
required to verify the correctness of the documents produced
of
before him. All acts were performed in the discharge of the
official duties and valid sanction under Section 197 of the Cr.PC.
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had not been obtained in the present case. Therefore, he prayed
that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment and order
passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.
10. Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for
the respondent No.1/State submitted that Ramesh Kumar
Chaudhary had no jurisdiction to issue the sale certificate. The
Govt had issued instructions not to register the sale deeds
regarding the transfer of evacuee property. These instructions
were in the knowledge of the accused Santosh Kumar, and he had
refused to attest to the mutation of Gurbachan Singh (PW25).
The conspiracy cannot be proved by direct evidence, but the
circumstances surrounding the transactions have to be seen to
infer the conspiracy. All the accused were acting in concert,
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which was sufficient to show that they were acting in pursuance
of the conspiracy. Learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable
view while convicting the accused, and no interference is
.
required with the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court.
Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed.
11. I have a given considerable thought to the
of
submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records
carefully.
12.
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It was not disputed that the sale certificate was issued
by Ramesh Chand. The prosecution relied upon the affidavit
(Ex.PW13/A) executed by Ramesh Kumar, in which he had stated
that the sale certificate dated 20.10.1999 was issued by him in
favour of Madan Lal in the capacity of being a managing
Officer/Naib Tehsildar (Sales). The learned Trial Court proceeded
on the basis that the sale certificate issued by Ramesh Chand was
a fake document because the amount of ₹3,11,000/- was not
deposited in the treasury, and no such sale certificate was found
in the record.
13. The term forgery has been defined in section 463 of
the IPC as under:
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“463. Forgery.–Whoever makes any false documents or
electronic record part of a document or electronic record
with, intent to cause damage or injury], to the public or
any person, or to support any claim or title, or to cause any
person to part with property, or to enter into any express.
or implied contract, or with intent to commit fraud or that
fraud may be committed, commits forgery.”
14. It is apparent from the definition that a person has to
make a false document before he can be said to have committed
forgery. Making a false document is defined in Section 464 of the
of
IPC. It reads as follows:
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464. Making a false document.–A person is said to make
a false document or false electronic record–
First.–Who dishonestly or fraudulently–
(a) makes, signs, seals or executes a document or
part of a document;
(b) makes or transmits any electronic record or
part of any electronic record;
(c) affixes any electronic signature on any
electronic record;
(d) makes any mark denoting the execution of a
document or the authenticity of the electronic
signature,
with the intention of causing it to be believed that such
document or part of a document, electronic record or
electronic signature was made, signed, sealed, executed,
transmitted or affixed by or by the authority of a person by
whom or by whose authority he knows that it was not
made, signed, sealed, executed or affixed; or
Secondly,–Who, without lawful authority, dishonestly or
fraudulently, by cancellation or otherwise, alters a
document or an electronic record in any material part
thereof, after it has been made, executed or affixed with
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electronic signature either by himself or by any other
person, whether such person be living or dead at the time
of such alteration; or
Thirdly.–Who dishonestly or fraudulently causes any
person to sign, seal, execute or alter a document or an
.
electronic record or to affix his electronic signature on any
electronic record knowing that such person by reason of
unsoundness of mind or intoxication cannot, or that by
reason of deception practised upon him, he does not know
the contents of the document or electronic record or the
nature of the alteration.
of
15. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Mohammed Ibrahim versus State of Bihar 2009 (8) SCC 751 that the
rt
prosecution is required to prove that the accused had forged a
document by creating a false document to establish the offence of
forgery. A false document is executed claiming to be executed by
someone else or authorised by someone else, or a document is
tempered or signatures are obtained by practising deception. It
was observed:-
“[10] An analysis of section 464 of the Penal Code shows
that it divides false documents into three categories:
10.1) The first is where a person dishonestly or
fraudulently makes or executes a document with the
intention of causing it to be believed that such a
document was made or executed by some other
person, or by the authority of some other person, by
whom or by whose authority he knows it was not
made or executed.
10.2) The second is where a person dishonestly or
fraudulently, by cancellation or otherwise, alters a
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either himself or any other person.
10.3) The third is where a person dishonestly or
fraudulently causes any person to sign, execute or
alter a document knowing that such person could.
not because of (a) unsoundness of mind; or (b)
intoxication; or (c) deception practised upon him,
know the contents of the document or the nature of
the alteration.
[11] In short, a person is said to have made a ‘false
document’ if (i) he made or executed a document
of
claiming to be someone else or authorised by
someone else; or (ii) he altered or tampered with a
document; or (iii) he obtained a document by
practising deception, or from a person not in control
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of his senses.”
16. In the cited case, the prosecution alleged that the
accused had executed a sale deed regarding the property over
which he had no right. It was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court
that there is a distinction between a document whose contents
are false and a document which is itself false within the
definition of Section 464 of IPC. A document containing a false
averment does not attract the provisions of Criminal Law, and
the accused cannot be held liable for executing the sale deed by
claiming to be the owner when he was not the owner. It was
observed:-
“[12] The sale deeds executed by the first appellant clearly
and obviously do not fall under the second and third
categories of ‘false documents’. It, therefore, remains to
be seen whether the claim of the complainant that the::: Downloaded on – 03/07/2026 20:45:24 :::CIS
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2025:HHC:46560execution of sale deeds by the first accused, who was in no
way connected with the land, amounted to committing
forgery of the documents with the intention of taking
possession of complainant’s land (and that accused 2 to 5
as the purchaser, witness, scribe and stamp vendor.
colluded with first accused in execution and registration of
the said sale deeds) would bring the case under the first
category. There is a fundamental difference between a
person executing a sale deed claiming that the propertyconveyed is his property, and a person executing a sale
deed by impersonating the owner or falsely claiming to be
authorised or empowered by the owner to execute the deedof
on the owner’s behalf. When a person executes a
document conveying a property, describing it as his, there
are two possibilities. The first is that he bona fide believes
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that the property actually belongs to him. The second is
that he may be dishonestly or fraudulently claiming it to
be his, even though he knows that it is not his property.
But to fall under the first category of ‘false documents’, it
is not sufficient that a document has been made or
executed dishonestly or fraudulently. There is a furtherrequirement that it should have been made with the
intention of causing it to be believed that such a document
was made or executed by, or by the authority of a person,by whom or by whose authority he knows that it was not
made or executed. When a document is executed by aperson claiming a property that is not his, he is not
claiming that he is someone else, nor is he claiming that
he is authorised by someone else. Therefore, execution ofsuch a document (purporting to convey some property of
which he is not the owner) is not an execution of a false
document as defined under section 464 of the Code. If
what is executed is not a false document, there is no
forgery. If there is no forgery, then neither section 467 nor
section 471 of the Code is attracted”.
17. In Mir Nagvi Askari Vs CBI 2009 (15) SCC 643, the
accused was charged with making false entries in the record of
the bank. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that
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making wrong entries by itself will not attract criminal liability
unless it is proved that the document was false within the
meaning of Section 464 of IPC. It was observed:-
.
“[229] A person is said to make a false document or record
if he satisfies one of the three conditions as noticed
hereinbefore and provided for under the said section. Thefirst condition being that the document has been falsified
with the intention of causing it to be believed that such a
document has been made by a person, by whom the personof
falsifying the document knows that it was not made.
Clearly, the documents in question in the present case,
even if it be assumed to have been made dishonestly or
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fraudulently, had not been made with the intention of
causing it to be believed that they were made by or under
the authority of someone else.
[230] The second criterion of the section deals with a case
where a person without lawful authority alters a document
after it has been made. There has been no allegation ofalteration of the voucher in question after they have been
made. Therefore, in our opinion, the second criterion of
the said section is also not applicable to the present case.
[231] The third and final condition of Section 464 deals
with a document, signed by a person who, due to hismental capacity, does not know the contents of the
documents which were made, i.e., because of intoxicationor unsoundness of mind, etc. Such is also not the case
before us. Indisputably, therefore, the accused before us
could not have been convicted for the making of a false
document.
[232] The learned Special Judge, therefore, in our opinion,
erred in holding that the accused had prepared a false
document, which clearly, having regard to the provisions
of the law, could not have been done.
[233] Further, the offence of forgery deals with the making
of a false document with the specific intentions
enumerated therein. The said section has been reproduced::: Downloaded on – 03/07/2026 20:45:24 :::CIS
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“463. Forgery.–Whoever makes any false
documents or electronic record part of a document
or electronic record with, intent to cause damage or
injury], to the public or any person, or to support.
any claim or title, or to cause any person to part with
property, or to enter into any express or implied
contract, or with intent to commit fraud or thatfraud may be committed, commits forgery.”
[234] However, since we have already held that the
commission of the said offence has not been convincingly
of
established, the accused could not have been convicted for
the offence of forgery. The definition of “false document”
is a part of the definition of “forgery”. Both must be read
together. [Dr. Vimla v. Delhi Administration, 1963 Supp2 SCR
585].
rt
18. It was further held that in the absence of the
document being forged, a person cannot be convicted of the
commission of an offence punishable under Section 471 of the
IPC. It was observed: –
“[235] Accordingly, the accused could not have been tried
for an offence under Section 467, which deals with forgery
of valuable securities, will, etc. or Section 471, i.e., using as
genuine a forged document or Section 477-A, i.e,falsification of accounts. The conviction of the accused for
the said offences is accordingly set aside”.
19. This question was also considered in Sheila Sebastian
versus R Jawaharaj & Anr ETC. 2018 (7) SCC 581, and it was held
that unless the ingredients of Section 464 of IPC are satisfied, a
person cannot be convicted of the commission of an offence
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punishable under Section 465 of IPC. It was observed: –
“[26] The definition of “false document” is a part of the
definition of “forgery”. Both must be read together.
‘Forgery’ and ‘Fraud’ are essentially matters of evidence.
which could be proved as a fact by direct evidence or by
inferences drawn from proved facts. In the case at hand,
there is no finding recorded by the trial Court that therespondents have made any false document or part of the
document/record to execute the mortgage deed under the
guise of that ‘false document’. Hence, neither respondentof
no.1 nor respondent no.2 can be held as makers of the
forged documents. It is the imposter who can be said to
have made the false document by committing forgery. In
such an event, the trial court, as well as the appellate
rt
court, misguided themselves by convicting the accused.
Therefore, the High Court has rightly acquitted theaccused based on the settled legal position, and we find no
reason to interfere with the same”.
20. In the present case, the prosecution never asserted
that Ramesh Chand had executed a document with the intention
of causing it to be believed that such a document was made or
executed by some other person or by the authority of some other
person, or he had altered the document after it was executed or
had caused anyone to sign, execute or alter such a document.
Therefore, the essential ingredient of the forgery was not
satisfied in the present case.
21. The Government had issued the letters (Ex.PW1/A,
Ex.PW2/A and Ex.PW2/) stating that the evacuee property should
not be sold/transferred without the knowledge of Financial
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Commissioner (Revenue), to the Government of H.P. It was
submitted that the sale made by a Ramesh Kumar Chaudhary was
contrary to the Government instruction and the mutation
.
attested by Santosh, violated these instructions. Even if, it is
accepted that Ramesh Kumar had sold the land despite the
prohibition, such an act would not make the document forged,
of
but would expose him to penalties under the service law.
Therefore, these instructions are not sufficient to make the
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documents forged.
22. It is undisputed that Ramesh Kumar was posted as
Naib Tehsildar (Sales) in the Custodian Department, and he had
the authority to deal with the evacuee property under the
Administration of Evacuee Property Act. Ram Nath,
Superintendent (PW17), proved the distribution of evacuee
property (Ex.PW17/G). Naib Tehsildar (Sales), Shimla, was
competent to sell/manage the evacuee property located at
Shimla, Solan, Kangra, Sirmour, Bilaspur and Una. Reliance was
placed upon the notification (Ex.PW17/H) vide which the power
of Managing Officer (Sales) conferred upon them under Section
20 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation)
Act, 1954, was ordered to be withdrawn. However, the powers
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conferred upon the Administration of Evacuee Property Act,
1950, were not withdrawn, and not much advantage can be
derived from this notification.
.
23. It is undisputed that accused Santosh Kumar was
posted as Naib Tehsildar and he had the jurisdiction to attest the
mutation. Jagdev Singh (PW14) stated that he had received a sale
of
certificate for entering it in the mutation register. He entered the
Mutation No. 381, which was attested by Santosh Kumar,
rt
Tehhsildar. Subsequently, the mutation was cancelled. He
admitted in his cross-examination that sale certificates were
received through the proper channel for entering mutation, and
Nirmal Singh, Kanungo, had compared and checked the
mutation. The mutation was reviewed after following the due
procedure.
24. It was submitted that the Government had issued
instructions to ban the transfer/sale of evacuee property, and it
was impermissible to attest the mutation. This submission will
not help the State. The mutation does not amount to transfer but
is only attested for fiscal purposes for keeping the revenue record
up-to-date and determining the person who is liable to pay land
revenue to the State. Mutation does not confer the title, nor does
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it take away the title. Therefore, the attestation of the mutation
will not fall within the prohibition of the instruction of the
sale/transfer.
.
25. It was held by Allahabad High Court in Phool Chandra
Arya v. State of U.P., 2016 SCC OnLine All 3328 that the attestation
of the mutation in the name of purchasers mentioned in the sale
of
deed does not attract the provisions of Sections 419, 420, 467,
468, 406 of IPC and Section 13(d) of Prevention of Corruption
rt
Act. It was observed:
“32. The prosecution has submitted a charge sheet against
the applicant under sections 419, 420, 467, 468, 471, 406
IPC and 13(1)(d) of the P.C. Act, Police Station George
Town, District Allahabad. A bare perusal of the recordwould disclose that the applicant has not been accused of
making a false document, as defined under section 464
IPC. Making a false document is a condition precedent forthe offence under sections 467, 468 and 471 IPC. There is
no allegation, much less evidence, to show that any falsedocument was prepared by the applicant; therefore, the
offence under sections 467, 468 and 471 IPC is notattracted at all. [Mohammad Ibrahim v. State of Bihar
(2007) 4 SCC 247]
33. Similarly, for attracting ingredients of sections 419 and
420 IPC, inducement to deliver property to any person or
to make an alteration or to destroy the whole or any part
of a valuable security, or anything which is signed or
sealed, and which is capable of being converted into a
valuable security, is essential. The fact of the matter is that
the sale deed was executed and registered in Mumbai
between the vendors and vendees. There is no allegation
that the applicant was present in Mumbai at the relevant::: Downloaded on – 03/07/2026 20:45:24 :::CIS
23
2025:HHC:46560time. The entire evidence discloses no action on the part of
the applicant except conducting mutation proceedings
under the Revenue law, subsequent to the application
made by the purchasers. There is no material involvement
of the applicant in the execution and registration of the.
deed. The ingredients of section 415 IPC are totally absent;
it cannot be said that the offences punishable under
sections 419 and 420 IPC are made out against the
applicant. The role of the applicant has been delineated by
the prosecution itself, and his role is limited to mutation
proceedings only. There is, in fact, no allegation or
whisper that prior to mutation proceedings, the applicant
of
was involved with any party at all.
34. As far as that leaves only of fence under section 13(1)
(d) of P.C. Act a bare perusal of section 13(1)(d) of P.C Act
rt
would reveal that public servant can only be prosecuted
under the aforesaid provision, if he by corrupt or illegal
means, obtains for himself or any other person any
valuable thing or pecuniary advantage, or by abusing his
position as a public servant, obtains for himself or any
other person an) valuable thing or pecuniary advantage or
while holding office as a public servant, obtains for any
person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage without
any public interest.
35. There is absolutely no whisper that the applicant
obtained any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage by
abusing his position as a public servant or by using his
office for the said advantage. Such allegations are virtually
absent; therefore, the applicant cannot be prosecuted
under section 13(1)(d) of the P.C. Act.”
26. In the present case, no witness has stated that the
accused had taken any money for the attestation of the mutation.
The only allegation is that he had attested the mutation contrary
to the instructions issued by the Government, which, as noticed
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above, do not apply to the mutation. Therefore, the offences
punishable under Section 420 and 13(1) are not made out.
27. The ingredients of cheating were explained by the
.
Hon’ble Supreme Court in S.W. Palanitkar v. State of Bihar, (2002)
1 SCC 241 as under:
“10. The ingredients of an offence of cheating are: (i) there
of
should be fraudulent or dishonest inducement of a person
by deceiving him, (ii)(a) the person so deceived should be
induced to deliver any property to any person or to
consent that any person shall retain any property; or (b)
rt
the person so deceived should be intentionally induced to
do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit ifhe were not so deceived; and (iii) in cases covered by (ii)
(b), the act of omission should be one which causes or is
likely to cause damage or harm to the person induced in
body, mind, reputation or property.
11. One of us (D.P. Mohapatra, J.), speaking for the Bench,
in HridayaRanjan Prasad Verma v. State of Bihar [(2000) 4SCC 168: 2000 SCC (Cri) 786] on facts of that case, has
expressed thus: (SCC p. 177, para 15)“15. In determining the question, it has to be kept in
mind that the distinction between mere breach ofcontract and the offence of cheating is a fine one. It
depends upon the intention of the accused at the
time of inducement, which may be judged by his
subsequent conduct, but for this, subsequent
conduct is not the sole test. Mere breach of contract
cannot give rise to criminal prosecution for cheating
unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown
right at the beginning of the transaction, that is, the
time when the offence is said to have been
committed. Therefore, it is the intention which is
the gist of the offence. To hold a person guilty of::: Downloaded on – 03/07/2026 20:45:24 :::CIS
25
2025:HHC:46560cheating, it is necessary to show that he had a
fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making
the promise. From his mere failure to keep up a
promise, subsequently, such a culpable intention right
at the beginning, that is, when he made the promise,.
cannot be presumed.”
(emphasis supplied)
12. Finding that the ingredients of the offence of cheating
and its allied offences had not been made out, this Court
interfered with the order of the High Court and quashed
of
the criminal proceedings.
13. In G.V. Rao v. L.H.V. Prasad [(2000) 3 SCC 693: 2000 SCC
(Cri) 733], this Court in para 7 has stated thus: (SCC pp.
696-97)
rt
“7. As mentioned above, Section 415 has two parts.
While in the first part, the person must ‘dishonestly’
or ‘fraudulently’ induce the complainant to deliver
any property; in the second part, the person should
intentionally induce the complainant to do or omit
to do a thing. That is to say, in the first part,
inducement must be dishonest or fraudulent. In the
second part, the inducement should be intentional.
As observed by this Court in Jaswantrai Manilal
Akhaney v. State of Bombay [AIR 1956 SC 575: 1956 Cri
LJ 1116], a guilty intention is an essential ingredient
of the offence of cheating. In order, therefore, to
secure the conviction of a person for the offence of
cheating, ‘mens rea’ on the part of that person must
be established. It was also observed in Mahadeo
Prasad v. State of W.B. [AIR 1954 SC 724: 1954 Cri LJ
1806] that in order to constitute the offence of cheating,
the intention to deceive should be in existence at the
time when the inducement was offered.”
(emphasis supplied)
14. In Trisuns Chemical Industry v. Rajesh Agarwal [(1999) 8
SCC 686: 2000 SCC (Cri) 47] dealing with the effect of
existence of arbitration clause in the agreement on
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criminal prosecution on the ground that civil proceedings
are also maintainable, this Court has held that quashing of
FIR or a complaint exercising power under Section 482
CrPC should be limited to a very extreme exception;
merely because an act has a civil profile is not enough to
.
stop action on the criminal side. It is further held that a
provision made in the agreement for referring the
disputes to arbitration is not an effective substitute for a
criminal prosecution when the disputed act constitutes a
criminal offence.
28. A similar view was taken in G.V. Rao v. L.H.V. Prasad,
of
(2000) 3 SCC 693, as under:
rt
“4. Cheating” is defined in Section 415 of the Penal Code,
1860, which provides as under:
“415. Cheating.–Whoever, by deceiving any person,
fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so
deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to
consent that any person shall retain any property, orintentionally induces the person so deceived to do or
omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if
he were not so deceived, and which act or omissioncauses or is likely to cause damage or harm to that
person in body, mind, reputation or property, is saidto ‘cheat’.
Explanation.–A dishonest concealment of facts is a
deception within the meaning of this section.”
5. The High Court quashed the proceedings principally on
the ground that Chapter XVII of the Penal Code, 1860,
deals with the offences against properties and, therefore,
Section 415 must also necessarily relate to the property
which, in the instant case, is not involved and,
consequently, the FIR was liable to be quashed. The broad
proposition on which the High Court proceeded is not
correct. While the first part of the definition relates to
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property, the second part does not necessarily relate to
property. The second part is reproduced below:
“415. … intentionally induces the person so deceived
to do or omit to do anything which he would not do.
or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or
omission causes or is likely to cause damage or
harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or
property, is said to ‘cheat’.”
6. This part speaks of intentional deception which must be
intended not only to induce the person deceived to do or
of
omit to do something but also to cause damage or harm to
that person in body, mind, reputation or property. The
intentional deception presupposes the existence of a
dominant motive of the person making the inducement.
rt
Such inducement should have led the person deceived or
induced to do or omit to do anything which he would not
have done or omitted to do if he were not deceived. The
further requirement is that such an act or omission should
have caused damage or harm to body, mind, reputation or
property.
7. As mentioned above, Section 415 has two parts. While in
the first part, the person must “dishonestly” or
“fraudulently” induce the complainant to deliver any
property; in the second part, the person should
intentionally induce the complainant to do or omit to do a
thing. That is to say, in the first part, inducement must be
dishonest or fraudulent. In the second part, the
inducement should be intentional. As observed by this
Court in Jaswantrai Manilal Akhaney v. State of Bombay [AIR
1956 SC 575: 1956 Cri LJ 1116: 1956 SCR 483], a guilty
intention is an essential ingredient of the offence of
cheating. In order, therefore, to secure the conviction of a
person for the offence of cheating, “mens rea” on the part
of that person must be established. It was also observed in
Mahadeo Prasad v. State of W.B. [AIR 1954 SC 724: 1954 Cri LJ
1806] that in order to constitute the offence of cheating,
the intention to deceive should be in existence at the time
when the inducement was offered.
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8. Thus, so far as the second part of Section 415 is
concerned, “property”, at no stage, is involved. Here, it is
the doing of an act or omission to do an act by the
complainant, as a result of intentional inducement by the
accused, which is material. Such inducement should result
.
in the doing of an act or omission to do an act as a result of
which the person concerned should have suffered or was
likely to suffer damage or harm in body, mind, reputation
or property. In an old decision of the Allahabad High Court
in Empress v. Sheoram [(1882) 2 AWN 237], it was held by
Mahmood, J.:
of
“That to palm off a young woman as belonging to a
caste different to the one to which she really
belongs, with the object of obtaining money,
rt
amounts to the offence of cheating by personation
as defined in Section 416 of the Penal Code, 1860,which must be read in the light of the preceding
Section 415.”
29. In the present case, there is nothing on record to
show that any person was induced to deliver any property on
account of the attestation of the mutation. As already stated, the
mutation does not confer any title upon any person and will not
enable any person to purchase or sell the property. The
sale/purchase would be dependent upon the sale certificate
issued by Naib Tehsildar (Sales). Thus, the attestation of the
mutation will not attract the provisions of Section 420 of the IPC.
30. The further case of the prosecution is that Madan Lal
sold the property to Bimla Devi for a consideration of
₹2,00,000/-. The property, which had been purchased by Madan
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29
2025:HHC:46560Lal for ₹3,11,000/-, could not have been sold for ₹2,00,000/-.
The petitioner, being the Sub Registrar, had registered the sale of
such property. In this regard, it is to be noticed that Bimla Devi
.
(PW15) stated that she had purchased Khasra Nos. 2946, 2950
and 2951 for ₹2,00,000/-, whereas the Sale Certificate (Mark-X)
was issued for Khasra Nos. 2915, 2946, 2950 and 2951. Therefore,
of
the whole land was not sold, and a part of the property was sold.
Thus, the sale consideration paid by Madan Lal could not have
rt
been used for determining the market value.
31. Bhupinder Singh (PW6) prepared the statement of
average sale price (Ex.PW6/F). However, he didnot calculate the
average sale price of the land purchased by Bimla Devi, and his
testimony does not show that Madan Lal had mentioned less
than market value in the sale deed. Furthermore, no instructions
have been placed on record that the sale deed could not have
been executed for less than the average sale price. Therefore, his
testimony does not prove that the accused Santosh Kumar, had
forged the registry and the sale deed.
32. Parthsarathi Mitra (PW37) accorded the prosecution
sanction. He stated in his cross-examination that, as per the
normal practice, the office looks into a case file and prepares the
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draft for prosecution sanction. He went through the record sent
by the Vigilance as well as through the draft prepared and
accorded the prosecution sanction after making the required
.
corrections. He stated in his cross-examination that he had read
the entire record, understood and checked the draft, whether it
correctly reflected whatever was mentioned in the record. He
of
admitted that, as per the H.P. Land Record Manual, the Patwari
enters mutation, but he had mentioned in the sanction order that
rt
the Tehsildar had entered the mutation. He admitted that the
Tehsildar was not found to have entered the mutation but
attested the mutation. He was not sure whether the Tehsildar is a
Class-I Officer, and so far as his knowledge goes, only the Chief
Secretary is empowered to grant prosecution sanction in case of a
Class-I Officer.
33. Cross-examination of this witness shows that he had
signed the draft prepared by the office. He claimed that he had
gone through the record, but he was not sure whether Tehsildar
was a Class-I Officer, and he was competent to grant sanction.
Further, he had wrongly recorded that the Tehsildar had entered
the mutation, whereas the mutation was attested by the Patwari.
Hence, the statement of this witness is not sufficient to show
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that he had accorded the sanction after the proper application of
mind. Learned Trial Court erred in holding that the sanction was
properly given by him.
.
34. Therefore, the learned Trial Court erred in convicting
the accused. Hence, the judgment passed by the learned Trial
Court cannot be sustained and is liable to be interfered with.
of
35. In view of the above, the present appeal is allowed and
the judgment of conviction dated 15.10.2013 and order of
rt
sentence dated 18.10.2013, passed by learned Special Judge, Una,
District Una, H.P., are ordered to be set aside. The accused is
acquitted of the charges framed against him. The fine, if
deposited be refunded to the appellant/accused after the expiry
of the period of limitation, in case no appeal is preferred, and in
case of appeal, the same be dealt with as per the orders of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India.
36. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code
of Criminal Procedure [Section 481 of Bharatiya Nagarik
Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS)], the accused is directed to
furnish personal bond in the sum of ₹25,000/- with one surety in
the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Registrar
(Judicial) of this Court/learned Trial Court, within four weeks,
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which shall be effective for six months with stipulation that in
the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this
judgment, or on grant of the leave, the appellant/accused, on
.
receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble
Supreme Court.
37. A copy of this judgment, along with the records of the
of
learned Trial Court, be sent back forthwith. Pending
miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stand(s) disposed of.
rt
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
15th June, 2026
(Chander)
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