Sagar Ambaram Fultaria Thro. Ambaram … vs State Of Gujarat on 21 May, 2026

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    Gujarat High Court

    Sagar Ambaram Fultaria Thro. Ambaram … vs State Of Gujarat on 21 May, 2026

    Author: Sangeeta K. Vishen

    Bench: Sangeeta K. Vishen

                                                                                                              NEUTRAL CITATION
    
    
    
    
                                R/SCR.A/3662/2026                            JUDGMENT DATED: 21/05/2026
    
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                                         IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
    
                              R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION (HABEAS CORPUS) NO.3662 of
                                                        2026
    
                           FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
    
    
                           HONOURABLE MS. JUSTICE SANGEETA K. VISHEN
    
                           and
    
                           HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE D. M. VYAS
    
                           ==========================================================
                                        Approved for Reporting              Yes           No
    
                           ==========================================================
                                  SAGAR AMBARAM FULTARIA THRO. AMBARAM THOBHANBHAI
                                                      FULTARIA
                                                        Versus
                                              STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS.
                           ==========================================================
                           Appearance:
                           MR GHANSHYAM UPADHYAY FOR MR DENISH V MAVADHIYA(9207) for
                           the Applicant(s) No. 1
                           MR UTKARSH SARMA, APP for the Respondent(s) No. 1
                           ==========================================================
    
                              CORAM:HONOURABLE MS. JUSTICE SANGEETA K. VISHEN
                                    and
                                    HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE D. M. VYAS
    
                                                   Date : 21/05/2026
                                                     JUDGMENT
    

    (PER : HONOURABLE MS. JUSTICE SANGEETA K. VISHEN)

    1. In the captioned writ petition, the petitioner has
    sought for direction to the respondents to release the
    petitioner who has been arrested in connection with the FIR
    No. 11189003250401/2025 lodged with Morbi City, A Division
    Police Station, Morbi for the offences punishable under

    SPONSORED

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    sections 336(2), 336(3), 338, 340(2), 349, 3(5), 61, 229(1), 235
    and 236 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (hereinafter
    referred to as “the BNS”). For ease of reference, the prayers
    prayed for by the petitioner are reproduced hereinbelow:

    “a) that this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to issue a writ of
    Habeas Corpus and/or any other appropriate writ, order
    and/or direction in the nature of Habeas Corpus thereby
    directing the Respondents to release the Petitioner
    forthwith from illegal arrest and detention in connection
    with the FIR No. 11189003250401/2025 of Morbi City A
    Division Police Station, Morbi, State of Gujarat (Charge
    Sheet No. 528/2025 pending on the file of Ld. CJM, Morbi,
    State of Gujarat), in exercise of the extra-ordinary powers
    vested with this Hon’ble Court under Article 226 of the
    Constitution of India;

    b) that pending hearing and final disposal of the present
    petition, this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to direct
    release of the Petitioner on bail forthwith in connection
    with the FIR No. 11189003250401/2025 of Morbi City A
    Division Police Station, Morbi, State of Gujarat (Charge
    Sheet No. 528/2025 pending on the file of Ld. CJM, Morbi,
    State of Gujarat) on such terms and conditions, as this
    Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper, in exercise of the
    extra-ordinary powers vested with this Hon’ble Court
    under Article 226 of the Constitution of India;

    c) that interim and ad-interim relief in terms of prayer clause

    (a) and (b) above be granted;

    d) that cost of the petition be provided for;

    e) that any such other and further reliefs, as the nature and
    circumstances of the case may require, be granted.”

    2. With the consent of the learned Advocates
    appearing for the respective parties, the writ petition was
    taken up for final hearing. Issue Rule returnable forthwith.
    Mr.Utkarsh Sharma, learned Additional Public Prosecutor
    waives service of notice of Rule on behalf of the respondents.
    The hearing of the matter was concluded on 08.05.2026 and
    was kept today for orders/pronouncement.

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    3. Mr Ghanshyam Upadhyay, learned advocate
    appearing with Mr Denish Mavadhiya, learned advocate for
    the petitioner submitted that it is not disputed rather
    admitted by the investigating officer that the petitioner was
    apprehended on 25.07.2025 from Gurugram, Haryana but was
    not produced before the nearest learned Magistrate within 24
    hours, let alone seeking transit remand. It is also not in
    dispute that the petitioner was brought by road via Delhi to
    Gandhinagar CID crime and was thereafter taken to Morbi.
    Before reaching Gandhinagar, the petitioner was made to stay
    at the hotel at Ahmedabad. It is submitted that the petitioner
    was arrested on 25.07.2025 but on paper was shown arrested
    on 27.07.2025 at 16:00 hours and the petitioner was produced
    before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Morbi on
    28.07.2025 at 3:30 p.m. Furthermore, it is admitted that the
    “grounds of arrest” were not communicated to the petitioner,
    either orally or in writing. Therefore, the arrest of the
    petitioner is against the constitutional mandate and illegal
    since inception.

    3.1 It is next submitted that the stand taken by the
    respondents, they having visited Gurugram, Haryana for
    preliminary inquiry and the petitioner having willingly joined
    the officers and that it was only after completing the formal
    inquiry that the arrest was made and hence it cannot be said
    that the petitioner was arrested on 25.07.2025, is incorrect. It
    is further submitted that in the case on hand, a senior
    investigating officer in the press-conference has made it clear
    about the arrest of the petitioner from Gurugram, and

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    therefore, it would be incorrect on the part of the prosecution
    to say that the petitioner has voluntarily accompanied the
    officers. The anticipatory bail application filed by the
    petitioner, before the learned Sessions Court, Morbi and
    subsequently before this Hon’ble Court, was vehemently
    contested by the respondents by filing affidavits. Neither the
    contention that the Investigating Authority had gone to
    Gurugram for conducting the preliminary inquiry, nor that
    the petitioner was not arrested and had come on his own, can
    be accepted.

    3.2 Reliance is placed on the judgment in the case of Priya
    Indoria vs. State of Karnataka & Ors.
    reported in 2023 SCC
    OnLine SC 1484 for the proposition that the police is
    obligated to secure the transit remand for taking the arrestee
    from one place to another in their own custody, for the
    purpose of producing him before the concerned Magistrate
    who has the jurisdiction to try/commit the case. The idea
    behind such remand is to enable the police to shift the person
    in custody from the place of arrest to the place where the
    matter can be investigated and tried.
    Further reliance is
    placed on the judgment in the case of Pankaj Bansal vs.
    Union of India & Ors.
    reported in (2024) 7 SCC 576 for the
    proposition that mere passing of an order of remand would
    not be sufficient in itself to validate the arrest if the arrest is
    not in conformity with the requirement of law. Specific
    reliance is placed on paragraphs 11, 14 to 17, 19 to 23. It is
    therefore submitted that if the arrest is itself illegal, the order
    of remand passed by the concerned Judicial Magistrate would

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    not validate the arrest. Reliance is placed on the said
    judgment
    also for the proposition that clause (1) Article 22 of
    the Constitution of India provides, inter alia, that no person
    who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being
    informed of the grounds for such arrest and that it being a
    fundamental right, the mode of conveying information of the
    grounds of arrest must be meaningful so as to serve the
    intended purpose. It is submitted that the Apex Court has laid
    down the proposition that how and when the grounds of arrest
    are to be served upon the arrestee. Reference is made of
    paragraphs 34,35,38,42,43 and 45.

    3.3 Reliance is placed on the judgment in the case of Vishal
    Manohar Mandrekar vs. State of Telangana & Anr.
    reported in
    2024 SCC OnLine TS 69. The issue was regarding non-
    production of the accused before the learned Chief Judicial
    Magistrate within 24 hours. Ancillary contention raised was
    exclusion of time taken for journey from the place of arrest till
    the production before the Magistrate. It is held and observed
    that personal liberty is one of the cherished objects of the
    Indian Constitution and deprivation of the same can only be in
    accordance with law and in conformity with the provisions of
    Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The Court, observed
    that the petitioner therein was not produced before the
    Magistrate within 24 hours without obtaining any transit
    warrant and the arrest was held to be in violation of Article 22
    of the Constitution of India.

    3.4 Reliance is also placed on the judgment in the case of
    Vihaan Kumar vs. State of Haryana & Anr. reported in (2025)

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    5 SCC 799. It is held and observed that the grounds of arrest
    to the person arrested should be effectively and fully
    communicated to the arrestee in the manner in which he will
    fully understand the same. In other words, the grounds of
    arrest must be informed in a language which the arrestee
    understands. Besides, the idea behind informing the grounds
    of arrest, is to give an opportunity to the arrestee to consult
    an advocate of his choice and the right to be defended. If the
    grounds of the arrest are not communicated to the arrestee,
    as soon as may be, he may not be able to effectively exercise
    the right to consult an advocate. The Apex Court has also
    stated that rejection of bail application and filing of charge-
    sheet is immaterial in matters of illegal arrest. For similar
    proposition, reliance is placed on paragraph 17 of the
    judgment in the case of D. K. Basu vs. State of West Bengal
    reported in (1997) 1 SCC 416.
    Attention is also invited to the
    judgment in the case of Gautam Navlakha vs. National
    Investigation Agency
    reported in (2022) 13 SCC 542 and by
    placing specific reliance on paragraphs 73 onwards, it is
    submitted that challenge to the order of remand would have
    invited the risk of non-maintainability of the writ of Habeas
    Corpus, considering the fact in paragraph 80 of the judgment
    the Apex Court has carved out the situations where the
    Habeas Corpus petition would be maintainable.
    Reliance is
    placed on the judgment in the case Dr. Rajinder Rajan v.
    Union of India & Anr.
    of the Apex Court rendered in Criminal
    Appeal No. 001700 of 2026 and Anr.

    3.5 It is submitted that so far as arrest is concerned, it is

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    well settled that the moment an individual’s movement is
    restricted and is completely in the charge of Investigating
    Authority, then the arrest is complete at that very moment
    and not when on paper the formal arrest is shown. The
    Investigating Authority is duty bound to produce the arrestee
    before the nearest learned Magistrate and has to seek transit
    remand, and in the absence thereof, the arrest would be
    illegal. Therefore, the contention of the respondents that the
    petitioner was not arrested is fallacious.

    3.6 By inviting the attention of this Court to the application
    of the respondents dated 28.07.2025 (Annexure C), it is
    submitted that in the first place it was not supplied to the
    petitioner. Besides, the said application, by no stretch of
    imagination, can be construed to be providing the grounds of
    arrest, asmuch as, it only makes a reference of reasons for
    arrest and not the grounds. The grounds of arrest has to be by
    way of an independent document and cannot be inferred from
    any other document. It is submitted that the law requires that
    the arrestee should be informed immediately of the grounds of
    arrest and it is only in exceptional cases and, in any case,
    before two hours of the accused being produced before the
    Court and in the language known to the accused. Reliance is
    placed on the judgment in the case of Prabir Purkayastha vs.
    State (NCT of Delhi
    ) reported in (2024) 8 SCC 254 to contend
    that there is a significant difference in the phrase “reasons for
    arrest” and “grounds of arrest”. It has been held and observed
    that the “reasons for arrest” as indicated in the arrest memo
    are purely formal parameters preventing the accused person

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    from committing any further offence etc. whereas the
    “grounds of arrest” would be required to contain all details in
    hand of the investigating officer, necessitating the arrest of
    the accused. The Apex Court has pointed out that the grounds
    of arrest informed in writing must convey to accused all basic
    facts on which he is being arrested so as to provide him an
    opportunity of defending himself against custodial remand
    and to seek bail. The Apex Court has further held that the
    grounds of arrest are not only to be informed to the arrestee
    but also to his relative or friend. Reliance is placed on the
    judgment in the case of Ashrafbhai Ibrahimbhai Kalavdiya vs.
    Union of India & Anr. reported in 2025 SCC Online Bom 2972
    for similar proposition.

    3.7 It is submitted that in a writ petition seeking Habeas
    Corpus, only one line is to be averred by the petitioner that
    the grounds of arrest have not been supplied. The burden
    then, is on the investigating officer to substantiate that the
    constitutional and statutory mandate has been complied with.
    It is further submitted that in the captioned petition composite
    prayer has been made of release of the petitioner from illegal
    arrest and detention and hence, it is incorrect to suggest on
    the part of the respondents that the petitioner has not
    challenged the order of remand. It is next submitted that the
    case of the respondents is that even if initial detention is
    illegal; what is to be seen is the position prevailing during the
    hearing of the petition and if the arrest by that time has
    become legal, by virtue of an order of remand, then in that
    case, writ petition seeking Habeas Corpus is not maintainable;

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    such contention is misplaced inasmuch as, the law has
    traveled far beyond. In recent judgment of the Hon’ble
    Supreme Court in the case of Mihir R. Shah vs. State of
    Maharashtra & Anr.
    reported in (2025) SCC OnLine SC 2356,
    it is held that non-compliance would result in breach of the
    constitutional and statutory safeguards as provided under
    Article 22 of the Constitution of India, rendering the arrest
    and remand illegal and person will be entitled to be set free.
    Therefore, when initial arrest is itself illegal and in violation of
    Article 22 of the Constitution of India, then subsequent order
    of remand would not validate the initial illegality. It is next
    submitted that despite passing of the remand order or the
    orders refusing the bail by the courts or the charge-sheet
    being filed and Magistrate taking cognizance, the writ petition
    under Habeas Corpus is maintainable.

    3.8 It is further submitted that the stand taken of no
    necessity to take the transit remand and as per the provision
    of section 58 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023
    (hereinafter referred to as “BNSS”), the travel time has to be
    excluded from the 24 hour period stipulated therein, is also an
    incorrect stand. It is further submitted that so far as the
    exclusion of time of 24 hours is concerned, it is held by the
    Apex Court and the various High Courts, that when the
    offender is arrested from another State from the State where
    the FIR is registered; in that case transit remand is must. It is
    submitted that when the petitioner was apprehended from
    Gurugram the option available to the Investigating Officer was
    to have produced him before the nearest learned Magistrate

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    and prayed for a transit remand; however, in the case on
    hand, firstly, there was no transit remand taken and secondly,
    the petitioner, was not produced before the learned Chief
    Judicial Magistrate within 24 hours of his arrest. Reliance is
    placed on the judgment in the case of Manoj vs. State of M.P.
    reported in (1999) 3 SCC 715. It is submitted that the court
    was dealing with the case in connection with section 15 of the
    Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. That
    the petitioner therein was arrested and not produced before
    the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate within 24 hours and
    hence, the writ petition seeking Habeas Corpus, was allowed.
    The Apex Court noted that it is a constitutional mandate that
    no person shall be deprived of his liberty except in accordance
    with the procedure established by law. It has been further
    held and observed that the person arrested and detained in
    custody shall be produced before the nearest Magistrate
    within 24 hours of such arrest.
    In continuation and in support
    of such submission further reliance is placed on the
    judgments in the cases of (i) Directorate of Enforcement vs.
    Subhash Sharma
    reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 240; and

    (ii) Hemang Jadavji Shah vs. State of Maharashtra reported in
    2025 SCC OnLine Bom 2145 (paragraphs 3,4(d),(f), (g), 6,7,11
    to 16,18,21,22,23,26,27 and 30).

    3.9 It is submitted that even while entertaining the writ
    petition seeking Habeas Corpus this Court is empowered to
    grant bail and in support of such submission reliance is placed
    on the judgment in the case of State of Bihar vs. Rambalak
    Singh & Ors
    reported in 1966 SCC OnLine SC 94; AIR 1966

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    SC 1441. It is submitted that the issue before the Apex Court
    was “whether while entertaining a Habeas Corpus petition
    under Article 226 of the Constitution filed on behalf of a
    detenue who has been detained under Rule 30 of the Defence
    of India Rules, the High Court has jurisdiction to release the
    detenue on bail pending the final disposal of the Habeas
    Corpus petition.” The issue, was answered in affirmative by
    observing that in dealing with Habeas Corpus petition under
    Article 226 of the Constitution of India, where the orders of
    detention passed under Rule 30, the High Court has
    jurisdiction to grant bail. It is next submitted that the grounds
    of arrest, has to be separately provided and it would not be
    sufficient even if it is mentioned in the arrest memo or in the
    application seeking remand. It is next submitted that criminal
    antecedents would be relevant while considering the bail
    application but not in the writ petition seeking Habeas
    Corpus.

    4. On the other hand, Mr Utkarsh Sharma, learned
    Additional Public Prosecutor submitted that there is no
    illegality committed on the part of the Investigating Authority
    and the arrest is in accordance with law. The captioned writ
    petition seeking writ of Habeas Corpus is not maintainable
    rather may not be entertained inasmuch as, on 28.07.2025,
    order has been passed granting remand. Moreover, the
    application seeking anticipatory bail has been rejected by the
    Sessions Court, Morbi vide passing a detailed order dated
    03.04.2025 so also by this Court vide order dated 01.07.2025;
    followed by filing of the charge-sheet on 25.09.2025. It is next

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    submitted that the petitioner subsequent thereto has filed an
    application seeking regular bail which also came to be
    rejected by the Sessions Court, Morbi on 18.10.2025. The said
    order is accepted and the petitioner has not approached the
    higher forum and instead has filed the captioned writ petition
    seeking writ of Habeas Corpus, which remedy in view of the
    above development is not available.

    4.1 It is further submitted that a bare perusal of the
    averments made in the remand application, would suggest
    that it complies with the requirements under Article 22 of the
    Constitution of India read with section 47 of the BNSS. It is
    submitted that the first paragraph discloses the offence
    followed by mentioning of the grounds and that is how, the
    submissions were made and recorded of the learned Advocate
    appearing for the petitioner. It is submitted that learned
    advocate for the petitioner was supplied with the remand
    application otherwise he would not have made submissions
    dealing with the merits and the grounds of the arrest. The
    submissions of the learned Advocate for the petitioner in
    vernacular is recorded taking note of the reasons contained in
    the remand application. Therefore, the petitioner as well as
    the learned Advocate had complete knowledge as to why the
    petitioner was arrested.

    4.2 It is further submitted that one of the aspects
    enumerated in Article 22 of the Constitution of India is that
    the arrestee should be aware of as to why he is arrested.
    Simply put, the whole purpose and object of providing
    grounds of arrest is that the arrestee should know for what

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    reasons and in what context, arrest is being made so that the
    arrestee can contest his arrest at the stage of remand/ bail, or
    in a writ of Habeas Corpus. It is submitted that there is
    sufficient compliance of the constitutional mandate inasmuch
    as, what has been provided to the petitioner are the grounds
    of arrest, incorporating sufficient details, over and above the
    material already furnished. Therefore, the case on hand is not
    one of those cases where the accused or his advocate were
    unaware of the reasons. The compliance of the constitutional
    mandate is clear considering the fact that the arrestee had
    sufficient opportunity to oppose his remand application on
    merits. The contention of the petitioner that the grounds of
    arrest are not furnished is far from truth and does not deserve
    to be accepted.

    4.3 It is next submitted that the learned Advocate appearing
    for the petitioner has put his signature in the remand order
    dated 28.07.2025 passed by the learned Chief Judicial
    Magistrate which suggests that why the petitioner has been
    arrested. Essentially it is to be established before Court of law
    that there is sufficient compliance and not technically
    identified compliance. It is submitted that this Hon’ble Court
    can very well examine the aspect and determine whether the
    compliance is in its true spirit or not. It is submitted that
    section 47 of the BNSS requires that the person arrested to be
    informed about full particulars of the offence for which he is
    arrested or other grounds for such arrest. It is submitted that
    for the offences punishable under PML Act, Customs Act, GST
    Act; no such window is open and it strictly requires providing

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    grounds of arrest. The idea behind is to see that the arrestee
    is not kept in dark or is completely unaware about the
    offences alleged to have been committed. In the instant case,
    the remand application and the remand order clearly
    establishes that the petitioner and the learned advocate for
    the petitioner had sufficient knowledge about the grounds of
    arrest.

    4.4 Reliance is placed on the judgment in the case of
    Kasireddy Upender Reddy vs. State of Andhra Pradesh
    reported in 2025 (0) AIJEL-SC 75398. While referring to the
    provision of clause (1) of Article 22 of the Constitution of India
    it has been held and observed that requirement of informing a
    person arrested of grounds of arrest is mandatory. It has been
    further observed that information of the grounds of arrest
    must be provided to the arrested persons in such a manner
    that sufficient knowledge of the basic facts constituting the
    grounds is imparted and communicated to the arrested person
    effectively in the language which he understands. The mode
    and method of communication must be such that the object of
    the constitutional safeguards is achieved.

    4.5 It is submitted that the provision of clause (1) of Article
    22
    is in two parts; first, that no person who is arrested shall
    be detained in custody without being informed of the grounds
    of such arrest, as soon as may be, and second, he shall not be
    denied the right to consult and to be defended by a legal
    practitioner of his choice. It is submitted that the remand
    application was provided and the arrestee was represented by
    the Advocate and had opposed the remand application which

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    suggests that the arrestee and the advocate were aware about
    the grounds of arrest. Had there been any grievance on the
    part of the arrestee of having not received the grounds of
    arrest, objection ought to have been raised about the
    insufficiency or non-furnishing of the grounds of arrest, but
    has not been raised.

    4.6 While referring to the proforma of warrant (form 3) as
    provided under section 72 of BNSS, it is submitted that the
    details as stipulated in a warrant if are furnished by
    Investigating Authority with grounds or in any form, then the
    grounds of arrest can be said to have been communicated. It
    is submitted that in the case of Kasireddy Upender Reddy vs.
    State of Andhra Pradesh
    (supra) it has been held as to in case
    of warrant, why the grounds of arrest are not required to be
    supplied. It is submitted that if from the record it is
    established that the accused was aware of the grounds of
    arrest then, there is sufficient compliance. In the proceedings
    under the PML Act or GST Act, there is no FIR registered and
    hence, the arrestee would not be aware of the ground unlike
    the case on hand inasmuch as, there is an FIR registered
    against the arrestee and the arrestee was very well aware
    about the grounds and everything was within his knowledge.
    There is nothing of which the petitioner was not aware.
    Knowledge was very much there and hence, the requisite
    conditions stand satisfied and the arrest cannot be said to be
    in breach or violation of the constitutional mandate.

    4.7 While adverting to the issue as to whether the petitioner
    was arrested in Gurugram or not, it is submitted that the

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    petitioner and his friend had voluntarily agreed to cooperate
    with the proceedings and that is how both traveled together
    from Gurugram to Gandhingar via Delhi only for the purpose
    of preliminary inquiry. It is submitted that after completing
    the preliminary inquiry, since nothing was found against the
    friend, he was allowed to go; however, the Investigating
    Authority after conducting preliminary inquiry found the
    involvement of the petitioner and hence, thought it fit to
    arrest him. Therefore, during the course of the preliminary
    inquiry, no steps were taken and only upon conclusion when
    there was incriminating material found, the officers arrested
    the petitioner. It is submitted that it is not in dispute that
    travel time from Gurugram to Gandhinagar is more than 24
    hours and the petitioner was arrested on 27.07.2025 at 16:00
    hrs. It is submitted that time necessary for the journey from
    the place of arrest to the learned Magistrate’s court, is to be
    excluded for computing the 24 hours permitted to the police
    to keep an accused in their custody prior to the learned
    Magistrate’s authorization. Reliance is placed on the
    judgment in the case of Enforcement Directorate vs. Kapil
    Wadhwan & Anr
    reported in (2024) 7 SCC 147. Reliance is
    also placed on the judgment in the case of D. K. Basu vs. State
    of West Bengal
    (supra) to content that clause (2) of Article 22
    directs that the person arrested and detained in custody shall
    be produced before the nearest Magistrate within a period of
    24 hours of such arrest, excluding the time necessary for the
    journey from the place of arrest to the court of learned
    Magistrate.

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    4.8 While concluding it is submitted that clause (1) of Article
    22
    , requires compliance, by communicating sufficient
    knowledge of the basic facts, constituting the grounds of
    arrest to the person arrested. In the case on hand, the
    respondents have been able to satisfy that the grounds of
    arrest were very much within the knowledge of the arrestee
    and hence, the objection raised is hyper-technical. Moreover,
    the order of remand speaks for itself, as the learned Advocate
    has raised all the available contentions opposing the
    application which would prove that the arrestee had sufficient
    knowledge of the grounds of arrest and the opportunity was
    availed of by him and his lawyer.

    5. Mr Ghanshyam Upadhyay, learned Advocate for
    the petitioner in rejoinder drew the attention of this Court to
    page 22 of the petition. It is contended that there lies a fallacy
    in the argument that the grounds were supplied inasmuch as,
    the application was not given to the arrestee but the same, is
    addressed to the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate. Two
    applications were filed; one for taking the petitioner into
    judicial custody and another the remand application. The two
    documents, do not remotely suggest that the petitioner was
    furnished the grounds of arrest. Bare perusal of the
    averments would suggest and cannot be construed to be
    grounds of arrest and were neither given to the arrestee or
    his family members or relative. It is submitted that in the
    remand application, there is no endorsement of the arrestee
    or his lawyer of its receipt. In the absence of any endorsement
    or document produced by the respondents suggesting that it

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    has been served upon the petitioner; no inference can be
    drawn from the language of the remand order. Rather the law
    is settled that in any case the grounds of arrest has to be
    supplied in writing in the language known to the arrestee,
    atleast two hours before producing the arrestee before the
    learned Magistrate.

    5.1 It is next submitted that the affidavit-in-reply also does
    not clearly state as to when and how the copy of the remand
    application was served upon the arrestee. As is discernible
    from the record, the arrestee had applied for the certified
    copy of the remand application only in the month of
    December, 2025. Therefore, the contention that the learned
    Advocate for the petitioner had made submission and he had
    knowledge, is misplaced. It is submitted that the moment a
    grievance is raised that the grounds of arrest are not
    supplied, the onus shifts on the investigating agency to satisfy
    that there is sufficient compliance with the requirements of
    the constitutional mandate. Besides, registration of the FIR by
    itself, is not a sufficient compliance and it has to be proved
    that the grounds were furnished. Reference of PML Act, GST
    Act and absence of filing of FIR is also misplaced considering
    the fact that in the case of Mihir Shah vs. State of Maharashta
    (supra), the Apex Court has clearly held that constitutional
    obligation under Article 22 is not statute-specific and it is
    grounded in fundamental right of life and personal liberty
    under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, therefore making
    it applicable to all offences including those under the Indian
    Penal Code
    (now BNS, 2023).

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    5.2 It is submitted that the contention that the petitioner
    and one Nitesh Maheshbhai Goswami were brought for the
    purposes of preliminary inquiry and after recording
    statement, the petitioner was arrested and the other person
    was allowed to go back, is also not correct. It is not the case
    of the respondents that the petitioner was not taken into
    custody at 10:00 p.m. on 25.07.2025 from Gurugram,
    Haryana. The custody from 10:00 p.m. on 25.07.2025 till
    16:00 hrs on 27.07.2025 is stated as not an arrest; however, it
    is the specific case of the petitioner that his movement was
    restricted by the Investigating Authority and right from that
    moment, arrest is said to be made. Formal arrest as
    mentioned in the paper work is immaterial. It is submitted
    that Nitesh Maheshbhai Goswami, the friend of the petitioner
    had accompanied as there was a fear that the petitioner would
    be subjected to torture. Further in case of arrest of a person
    from a State where the offence is not registered, the
    Investigating Authority is required to seek transit remand of
    the arrestee as per the judgment in the Priya Indoria vs. State
    of Karnataka
    (supra). It is urged that as the arrest is illegal
    since inception on both the grounds, the petition deserves to
    be allowed and petitioner may be directed to be released
    forthwith.

    6. Heard the learned advocates appearing for the
    respective parties. Perused and considered the documents on
    record, including the compilations, three in number
    containing numerous judgments cited and made available on
    the record.

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    7. Tersely stated are the facts:

    8. The captioned petition seeking writ of Habeas
    Corpus is filed by the petitioner praying for direction to the
    respondents to release the petitioner in connection with the
    FIR No. 11189003250401/2025 dated 15.03.2025 lodged with
    ‘A’ Division Morbi City Police Station, for the offences
    punishable under sections 336(2), 336(3), 338, 340(2), 349,
    3(5), 61, 229(1), 235 and 236 of the BNS. As per the FIR, the
    petitioner is alleged to have hatched the conspiracy in
    connivance with another accused named in the FIR so as to
    grab the valuable land bearing survey no. 602 admeasuring
    15783 sq. mtrs. situated at village Vajepur, by creating forged
    documents namely affidavits, heirship, death-certificates etc.
    The petitioner apprehending his arrest had preferred
    anticipatory bail applications before the Court of Sessions
    Judge, Morbi as well as before this Court by preferring
    Criminal Miscellaneous Application (for Anticipatory Bail)
    no.8148 of 2025, and both the applications were rejected vide
    detailed order dated 03.04.2025 and vide CAV judgment dated
    01.07.2025, respectively.

    9. Discernibly, the petitioner was apprehended on
    25.07.2025 at about 10 p.m. by the CID Crime, Gandhinagar
    from Gurugram, Haryana and was brought along with his
    friend Niteshbhai Maheshbhai Goswami to Ahmedabad where
    the petitioner and the police officers stayed at the hotel and
    was thereafter taken to Gandhinagar, CID Crime. The
    petitioner was shown to be arrested on 27.07.2025 at 16:00
    hours and thereafter, was produced before the learned Chief

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    Judicial Magistrate, Morbi on 28.07.2025 at 3:30 p.m.
    Applications, both dated 28.07.2025, were filed by the Deputy
    Superintendent of Police before the Additional Chief Judicial
    Magistrate, praying for taking the petitioner in Court’s
    custody and remand of the petitioner respectively. As per the
    endorsement on the application dated 28.07.2025, the learned
    Chief Judicial Magistrate has recorded that the petitioner was
    produced at 3:30 p.m. and upon being asked the petitioner
    has stated that he has no complaint against the police officers.
    The petitioner was taken in judicial custody by passing an
    order dated 28.07.2025. By order of the even date, the
    learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Morbi ordered police
    custody remand of the petitioner till 01.08.2025 upto 11:00
    a.m. Endorsement has been put by the petitioner as well as by
    the learned Advocate representing the petitioner about the
    contents of the order having been explained to them. It is
    clear from the record that the said orders have been accepted
    by the petitioner and not challenged before any higher forum.
    After the investigation, charge-sheet came to be filed on
    25.09.2025. The petitioner, had preferred an application
    seeking regular bail, which came to be rejected vide order
    date 18.10.2025. It may be noted that on 16.12.2025,
    application was preferred by and on behalf of the petitioner
    seeking certified/ simple copy of the remand application;
    production papers, etc.

    10. Perceptibly, the petitioner almost after a period of
    nine months has approached this Court seeking writ of
    Habeas Corpus seeking release as according to the petitioner,

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    his arrest is illegal. Genesis of such prayers is the grounds,
    inter alia, non-production of the petitioner before the nearest
    learned Judicial Magistrate within 24 hours; absence of transit
    remand and non-supply of grounds of arrest. When the issue
    concerns the personal liberty of a person, the delay, is to be
    considered keeping in mind the principle laid down by the
    Apex Court in the case of Vihaan Kumar vs. State of Haryana
    (supra). Contention was raised by the respondent therein that
    the appellant being remanded to custody, the custody is
    pursuant to the order taking cognizance of the charge-sheet.
    The Apex Court, noted that accepting such contention would
    amount to completely nullifying Articles 21 and clause (1) of
    Article 22 of the Constitution and further observed that once
    it is held that arrest is unconstitutional, due to violation of
    clause (1) of Article 22 the arrest itself is vitiated. Relevant
    paragraph 21 reads thus:

    “21. An attempt was made by learned senior counsel appearing
    for 1st respondent to argue that after his arrest, the appellant was
    repeatedly remanded to custody, and now a chargesheet has
    been filed. His submission is that now, the custody of the
    appellant is pursuant to the order taking cognizance passed on
    the charge sheet. Accepting such arguments, with great respect
    to the learned senior counsel, will amount to completely
    nullifying Articles 21 and 22(1) of the Constitution. Once it is held
    that arrest is unconstitutional due to violation of Article 22(1),
    the arrest itself is vitiated. Therefore, continued custody of such a
    person based on orders of remand is also vitiated. Filing a charge
    sheet and order of cognizance will not validate an arrest which is
    per se unconstitutional, being violative of Articles 21 and 22(1) of
    the Constitution of India. We cannot tinker with the most
    important safeguards provided under Article 22.

    Therefore, filing of a charge-sheet and passing of order of
    cognizance would not validate an arrest which, is per se
    unconstitutional being violative of Articles 21 and clause (1) of

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    Article 22 of the Constitution of India.

    11. In the case on hand, remand order was passed in
    the month of July, 2025 followed by filing of the charge-sheet
    on 25.09.2025 before the trial Court; further followed by
    rejection of the regular bail application by the court
    concerned vide order dated 18.10.2025. The above
    observations made by the Apex Court would directly apply to
    the facts of the case inasmuch as, if this Court were to accept
    the contentions raised by the petitioner that the arrest is not
    as per the procedure established by law, then taking place of
    subsequent events or passing of the orders would not validate
    the arrest which is illegal or unconstitutional. Therefore, the
    issues that arise for determination of this Court are; (i)
    whether the petitioner’s arrest was in accordance with the
    procedure established by law and in the terms of the
    safeguards provided to a person of his personal liberty; and

    (ii) whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, can it
    be said that the “grounds of arrest” either orally or in writing
    were provided to the petitioner or his friend or family in the
    known language.

    12. Contention is raised by the State that the
    judgments relied upon by the petitioner may not be applicable
    to the facts of the case for, the judgments were dealing with
    different statutes. Therefore, it would be necessary, at the
    outset, to refer to the observations made by the Apex Court in
    the case of Mihir Rajesh Shah vs. State of Maharashtra
    (supra) in paragraph 39:

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    “39. A plain reading of Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India
    shows that the intent of the constitution makers while
    incorporating the provisions was not to create any exceptional
    circumstances, instead it reads as “No person who is arrested
    shall be detained in custody without being informed, as soon as
    may be, of the grounds for such arrest….”, it casts a mandatory
    unexceptional duty on the State to provide the arrested person
    with the grounds of such arrest with the objective to enable
    that person to be able to defend himself by consulting a legal
    practitioner of his choice. This mandate of Article 22 (1) is
    notwithstanding any exception. This Court has made it explicit
    that the constitutional obligation under Article 22 is not
    statute-specific and it is grounded in fundamental right of life
    and personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of
    India, therefore making it applicable to all offences including
    those under the IPC 1860 (now BNS 2023).”

    13. The Apex Court has made it explicitly clear that the
    constitutional obligation under Article 22 is not statute-
    specific and it is grounded in fundamental right of life and
    personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India,
    and would apply to all the offences including those under the
    Penal Code, 1860 (now BNS, 2023). Having said so, for
    deciding the above referred issues, and before adverting to
    the judgments and the celebrated principles laid down by the
    Apex Court, it would be apt to refer to the provisions of
    Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India, and the same
    are set out hereinbelow for ready reference:

    21. Protection of life and personal liberty

    No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty
    except according to procedure established by law.

    22. Protection against arrest and detention in certain
    cases

    (1) No person who is arrested shall be detained in custody
    without being informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds for

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    such arrest nor shall he be denied the right to consult, and to
    be defended by, a legal practitioner of his choice.

    (2)Every person who is arrested and detained in custody shall
    be produced before the nearest magistrate within a period of
    twenty-four hours of such arrest excluding the time necessary
    for the journey from the place of arrest to the court of the
    magistrate and no such person shall be detained in custody
    beyond the said period without the authority of a magistrate.

    (3)Nothing in clauses (1) and (2) shall apply–

    (a)to any person who for the time being is an enemy alien; or

    (b)to any person who is arrested or detained under any law
    providing for preventive detention.

    (4)No law providing for preventive detention shall authorise the
    detention of a person for a longer period than three months
    unless–(a)an Advisory Board consisting of persons who are, or
    have been, or are qualified to be appointed as, Judges of a High
    Court has reported before the expiration of the said period of
    three months that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for
    such detention:

    Provided that nothing in this sub-clause shall authorise the
    detention of any person beyond the maximum period
    prescribed by any law made by Parliament under sub-clause (b)
    of clause (7); or

    (b)such person is detained in accordance with the provisions of
    any law made by Parliament under sub-clauses (a) and (b) of
    clause (7).

    (5)When any person is detained in pursuance of an order made
    under any law providing for preventive detention, the authority
    making the order shall, as soon as may be, communicate to
    such person the grounds on which the order has been made
    and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a
    representation against the order.

    (6)Nothing in clause (5) shall require the authority making any
    such order as is referred to in that clause to disclose facts
    which such authority considers to be against the public interest
    to disclose.

    (7)Parliament may by law prescribe–(a)the circumstances
    under which, and the class or classes of cases in which, a
    person may be detained for a period longer than three months
    under any law providing for preventive detention without
    obtaining the opinion of an Advisory Board in accordance with
    the provisions of sub-clause (a) of clause (4);

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    (b)the maximum period for which any person may in any class
    or classes of cases be detained under any law providing for
    preventive detention; and

    (c)the procedure to be followed by an Advisory Board in an
    inquiry under sub-clause (a) of clause (4).”

    Article 21 of the Constitution of India, the cherished
    fundamental right provides protection of life and personal
    liberty of a person. It states that no person shall be deprived
    of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure
    established by law. Furthermore, clause (1) of Article 22, is in
    two parts enumerating two requirements namely that the
    arrested person, at the earliest, be provided with the grounds
    of arrest coupled with a further opportunity of consulting a
    legal practitioner of his choice and to be defended by him. The
    underlying purpose is to provide an opportunity to the
    arrestee, to make him understand the alleged accusation
    against him and also further opportunity to him to defend or
    challenge the same on the permissible grounds through a
    legal practitioner. Clause (2) of Article 22 provides that the
    person arrested and detained in custody shall be produced
    before the nearest learned Magistrate within a period of 24
    hours after excluding the time necessary for the journey from
    the place of arrest to the court of learned Magistrate.

    14. For the sake of completeness and in continuation of
    the above referred provisions, the relevant provisions of the
    BNSS, are also worth referring to.

    “47. Person arrested to be informed of grounds of arrest
    and of right to bail.

    (1)Every police officer or other person arresting any person
    without warrant shall forthwith communicate to him full

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    particulars of the offence for which he is arrested or other
    grounds for such arrest

    (2)Where a police officer arrests without warrant any person
    other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence, he shall
    inform the person arrested that he is entitled to be released on
    bail and that he may arrange for sureties on his behalf.

    58. Person arrested not to be detained more than twenty-
    four hours.

    No police officer shall detain in custody a person arrested
    without warrant for a longer period than under all the
    circumstances of the case is reasonable, and such period shall
    not, in the absence of a special order of a Magistrate under
    section 187, exceed twenty-four hours exclusive of the time
    necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the
    Magistrate’s Court, whether having jurisdiction or not.

    187. Procedure when investigation cannot be completed
    in twenty-four hours.

    (1)Whenever any person is arrested and detained in custody,
    and it appears that the investigation cannot be completed
    within the period of twenty-four hours fixed by section 58, and
    there are grounds for believing that the accusation or
    information is well-founded, the officer in charge of the police
    station or the police officer making the investigation, if he is
    not below the rank of sub-inspector, shall forthwith transmit to
    the nearest Magistrate a copy of the entries in the diary
    hereinafter specified relating to the case, and shall at the same
    time forward the accused to such Magistrate.

    (2)The Magistrate to whom an accused person is forwarded
    under this section may, irrespective of whether he has or has
    no jurisdiction to try the case, after taking into consideration
    whether such person has not been released on bail or his bail
    has been cancelled, authorise, from time to time, the detention
    of the accused in such custody as such Magistrate thinks fit, for
    a term not exceeding fifteen days in the whole, or in parts, at
    any time during the initial forty days or sixty days out of
    detention period of sixty days or ninety days, as the case may
    be, as provided in sub-section (3), and if he has no jurisdiction
    to try the case or commit it for trial, and considers further
    detention unnecessary, he may order the accused to be
    forwarded to a Magistrate having such jurisdiction.

    (3)The Magistrate may authorise the detention of the accused
    person, beyond the period of fifteen days, if he is satisfied that
    adequate grounds exist for doing so, but no Magistrate shall
    authorise the detention of the accused person in custody under
    this sub-section for a total period exceeding-(i) ninety days,

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    where the investigation relates to an offence punishable with
    death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of ten
    years or more;(ii) sixty days, where the investigation relates to
    any other offence, and, on the expiry of the said period of
    ninety days, or sixty days, as the case may be, the accused
    person shall be released on bail if he is prepared to and does
    furnish bail, and every person released on bail under this sub-
    section shall be deemed to be so released under the provisions
    of Chapter XXXV for the purposes of that Chapter.

    (4)No Magistrate shall authorise detention of the accused in
    custody of the police under this section unless the accused is
    produced before him in person for the first time and
    subsequently every time till the accused remains in the custody
    of the police, but the Magistrate may extend further detention
    in judicial custody on production of the accused either in
    person or through the audio-video electronic means.

    (5)No Magistrate of the second class, not specially empowered
    in this behalf by the High Court, shall authorise detention in
    the custody of the police.Explanation I.-For the avoidance of
    doubts, it is hereby declared that, notwithstanding the expiry of
    the period specified in sub-section (3), the accused shall be
    detained in custody so long as he does not furnish bail.

    Explanation II.-If any question arises whether an accused
    person was produced before the Magistrate as required under
    sub-section (4), the production of the accused person may be
    proved by his signature on the order authorising detention or
    by the order certified by the Magistrate as to production of the
    accused person through the audio-video electronic means, as
    the case may be:Provided that in case of a woman under
    eighteen years of age, the detention shall be authorised to be in
    the custody of a remand home or recognised social institution:

    Provided further that no person shall be detained otherwise
    than in police station under police custody or in prison under
    judicial custody or a place declared as prison by the Central
    Government or the State Government.

    (6)Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) to
    sub-section (5), the officer in charge of the police station or the
    police officer making the investigation, if he is not below the
    rank of a sub-inspector, may, where a Magistrate is not
    available, transmit to the nearest Executive Magistrate, on
    whom the powers of a Magistrate have been conferred, a copy
    of the entry in the diary hereinafter specified relating to the
    case, and shall, at the same time, forward the accused to such
    Executive Magistrate, and thereupon such Executive
    Magistrate, may, for reasons to be recorded in writing,
    authorise the detention of the accused person in such custody
    as he may think fit for a term not exceeding seven days in the

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    aggregate; and, on the expiry of the period of detention so
    authorised, the accused person shall be released on bail except
    where an order for further detention of the accused person has
    been made by a Magistrate competent to make such order;

    and, where an order for such further detention is made, the
    period during which the accused person was detained in
    custody under the orders made by an Executive Magistrate
    under this sub-section, shall be taken into account in
    computing the period specified in sub-section (3):

    Provided that before the expiry of the period aforesaid, the
    Executive Magistrate shall transmit to the nearest Judicial
    Magistrate the records of the case together with a copy of the
    entries in the diary relating to the case which was transmitted
    to him by the officer in charge of the police station or the police
    officer making the investigation, as the case may be.

    (7)A Magistrate authorising under this section detention in the
    custody of the police shall record his reasons for so doing.

    (8)Any Magistrate other than the Chief Judicial Magistrate
    making such order shall forward a copy of his order, with his
    reasons for making it, to the Chief Judicial Magistrate.

    (9)If in any case triable by a Magistrate as a summons-case, the
    investigation is not concluded within a period of six months
    from the date on which the accused was arrested, the
    Magistrate shall make an order stopping further investigation
    into the offence unless the officer making the investigation
    satisfies the Magistrate that for special reasons and in the
    interests of justice the continuation of the investigation beyond
    the period of six months is necessary.

    (10)Where any order stopping further investigation into an
    offence has been made under sub-section (9), the Sessions
    Judge may, if he is satisfied, on an application made to him or
    otherwise, that further investigation into the offence ought to
    be made, vacate the order made under sub-section (9) and
    direct further investigation to be made into the offence subject
    to such directions with regard to bail and other matters as he
    may specify.”

    15. In connection with the above cherished
    fundamental rights, and the relevant applicable provisions,
    the petitioner has raised the contention that although on
    paper the arrest is shown on 27.07.2025 at 4:00 p.m., the
    movement of the petitioner was restricted since 25.07.2025 at

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    10:00 p.m. It is also argued that as the movement of the
    petitioner was restricted since 25.07.2025, the investigating
    officer ought to have prayed for transit remand and having
    failed to do so and non-production of the petitioner before the
    learned Chief Judicial Magistrate within 24 hours, has
    rendered the arrest of the petitioner illegal and the petitioner
    deserves to be set free. Besides, the petitioner has challenged
    his arrest on the premise that the “grounds of arrest” were
    neither provided to the petitioner nor to his family members
    or friends, either orally or in writing and in the language
    known to them. Hence, the arrest of the petitioner is against
    the established procedure of law and in violation of the
    fundamental rights as enshrined under Article 21 read with
    clauses (1) and (2) of Article 22 of the Constitution of India as
    well as sections 50, 57 and 167 of the Code of Criminal
    Procedure (corresponding sections 47, 58 and 187 of the
    BNSS).

    16. Adverting to the issue that the petitioner was
    arrested on 25.07.2025 and only with a view to curing the
    illegality the custody from 25.07.2025 to 27.07.2025 is
    termed as a voluntary accompaniment for preliminary inquiry,
    notably FIR was registered on 15.03.2025 for the offences
    punishable under sections 3(5), 336(2) and (3), 338, 339,
    340(2) of the BNS with the ‘A’ Division Morbi City Police
    Station and the petitioner is arraigned as an accused no. 2.
    The application seeking anticipatory bail was preferred by the
    petitioner which was opposed by the State alleging that the
    applicant is an accused and in connivance with others, has

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    hatched a conspiracy and committed a serious offence; clearly
    claiming that for the purpose of interrogation, custody of the
    petitioner is necessary. Similarly, anticipatory bail application
    filed before this Court was opposed alleging that
    investigation is in the process and custodial interrogation of
    the applicant is necessitated. The stand taken by the learned
    Additional Public Prosecutor before this Court opposing the
    anticipatory bail of the applicant and recorded in paragraph
    10 of the CAV Judgment dated 01.07.2025 is set out
    hereinbelow for ready reference:

    “10. Learned APP Mr. Sharma further submits that in fact
    co-accused Shantaben is 70 years illiterate lady and could
    not be able to authorise the document by signing it. He
    further submits that bank account of the said co-accused has
    been opened and operated by the present applicant and said
    fact is also verified from the statement of the Bank Manager.
    He further submits that the co-accused did not receive a
    single penny from the said transaction and said fact is also
    found out from certain transactions took place in the account
    of the applicant and the co-accused. He has produced a chart
    and submitted that the entire money had been routed
    through different accounts. He further submits that total
    amount of Rs.94,50,000/- had come in to the account of the
    present applicant by rotating it through the accounts of A. J.
    Enterprise, R. C. Enterprise and West Cost Enterprise.
    Thereafter, an amount of Rs.83,70,000/- had been
    transferred in the account of the co-accused by the present
    applicant and on the strength of the said entries made in the
    bank statement, applicant has executed registered sale deed
    in his favour. Those entries are mentioned in the sale deed.
    He further submits that thereafter from the account of the
    co-accused, the said amount had firstly gone into the account
    of Meet Enterprise of the ownership of Mr. Jagir Kiritkumar
    Khant and from there the amount had gone into the account
    of Mr. Harshad Bhalodiya and Yash Vaghariya and those
    persons have paid the said amount in cash to the applicant.
    Learned APP Mr. Sharma submits that the aforesaid
    evidence/material clearly goes on to show how the money
    has been routed through various accounts and once again
    returned to the applicant. He further submits that the
    investigating officer has also recorded the statements of all
    those persons (various accountant holders) and they have
    very categorically stated that at the instance of the present

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    applicant they had acted in a particular manner and for the
    purpose of acting in such a manner and doing that work,
    they obtained certain amount as a commission from the
    applicant. The aforesaid documents and materials available
    on record crystallized the case of the prosecution that a well
    designed plan has been organized by the present applicant
    with a sole intent to usurp valuable property of the gullible
    persons. He further submits that the Bank Account of the co-
    accused was also opened and operated by the applicant and
    the said fact is also found out from the statement of the Bank
    Officer. He further submits that the investigation is still
    going on and with a view to get details of the involvement of
    other accused persons in the commission of crime, custodial
    interrogation of the applicant is badly needed. He submits
    that thus considering the aforesaid overall facts of the
    present case, this is a fit case wherein the Court may not
    have to exercise discretionary powers by enlarging the
    applicant on anticipatory bail. ”

    As can be seen, it was argued by the learned Additional Public
    Prosecutor before this court that as per the statements
    recorded by the investigating officers of all the persons
    concerned, they have categorically stated that at the instance
    of the applicant i.e. the petitioner herein, they had acted in a
    particular manner and for which, they have received certain
    amount as a commission. The learned Additional Public
    Prosecutor has also further argued that the evidence and/or
    material clearly goes to show how the money has been routed
    through various accounts and that the documents and
    materials available on record supports the case of the
    investigating officers that a well designed plan has been
    structured by the applicant with a sole intent to usurp
    valuable property of the gullible person. Having taken the
    aforesaid stand, it is difficult to fathom the nature of the
    subsequent preliminary inquiry to be carried out by the
    investigating officers inasmuch as, the evidence, the material
    was available and on the top of it the petitioner was arraigned

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    as an accused in the FIR lodged in the month of March, 2025.
    Therefore, the stand taken by the respondents in the affidavit
    that the preliminary inquiry was yet to be conducted and only
    upon getting some clue that the petitioner could have been
    arrested but was not arrested on 25.07.2025, cannot be
    accepted. Pertinently, the investigating officers visited
    Gurugram, and took the control of the petitioner and brought
    him to Ahmedabad via Delhi and thereafter to Gandhinagar.
    Though it is claimed that it was only for the limited purpose of
    preliminary inquiry, had it been a part of the preliminary
    inquiry, there ought to have been a semblance of inquiry;
    however, there is none except, recording of the statement of
    the Niteshbhai Maheshbhai Goswami on 25.07.2025 but, not
    of the petitioner. The petitioner has clearly taken a stand that
    the petitioner was taken into custody and was in complete
    control of the investigating officer resulting into restricting
    the movement of the petitioner. The said contention, has
    been dealt with by the respondents by simply stating in
    paragraph 5 of the reply that:

    “5. In response to the primary contention raised in the
    petition as mentioned hereinabove, it is submitted that the
    petitioner was not arrested on 25.07.2025, from Gurugram
    Haryana, in fact, the petitioner and his friend Nitesh
    Maheshbhai had voluntarily agreed to cooperate with the
    proceedings and therefore, they were brought from Gurugram
    Haryana to Gandhinagar, Gujarat via Delhi only for the purpose
    of preliminary inquiry. In fact to dislodge the contention raised
    by the petitioner that he 46 was arrested on 25.07.2025, it is
    submitted before the Hon’ble Court the said contention stands
    nullified by the fact that Nitesh Maheshbhai who had
    accompanied the present petitioner was also brought, however,
    after preliminary inquiry he was permitted to go therefore,
    when preliminary inquiry is being carried out and the officer
    does not come to a conclusion of arrest therefore, there was no
    reason at the relevant point of time on 25.07.2025, to arrest the
    petitioner. It is further submitted that even otherwise, from

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    Gurugram Haryana to Gandhinagar the total duration of
    traveling is more than 24 Hours therefore, most of the time was
    consumed in travelling. It is submitted that the arrest memo
    annexed to the petition (at Annexure-D Page 28) clearly reflects
    that he has been arrested on 27.07.2025 at 16:00 Hours by the
    CID Crime Gandhinagar. In fact, even the remand application
    dated 28.07.2025 (at Annexure-C Page 22), clearly reflects that
    preliminary inquiry was made thereafter, medical and other
    examinations were carried out and only thereafter, on
    27.07.2025, at 16:00 Hours he was arrested. At this juncture it
    is worth placing before the Hon’ble Court that even if very
    strict presumption of 24 Hours is to be drawn then also if the
    time consumed travelling from Gurugram Haryana to
    Gandhinagar, Gujarat via Delhi and carrying out medical and
    other formality is considered, the arrest on 27.07.2025 at 16:00
    Hours cannot be said to be bad. In fact, when the present
    petitioner was produced before the Ld. Court concerned, on
    28.07.2025, neither any grievance was raised nor a whisper
    with regards to the any of the averments made in this petition
    in context of Section 57 and 167 of the Code of Criminal
    Procedure now Section 58 and 187 of the BNSS Act 2023 or
    Section 50 of the Code of Criminal now Section 47 of the BNSS
    Act 2023 either by the petitioner or by his representing
    counsel. In fact, even at the time of remand application 47
    dated 28.07.2025 and thereafter, the present petitioner was
    represented by his counsel before the Ld. Trial Court and
    arguments were made. The petitioner was made aware about
    all the details and grounds of arrest orally and his counsel had
    perused all the papers and thereafter, had argued the case
    before the ld.Court. ”

    The fact remains that the petitioner was not free to move
    around on his own volition and was all throughout in the
    custody of the investigating officers. Nothing is placed on
    record by the respondent to substantiate that from 25.07.2025
    to 27.07.2025, the petitioner was not taken into custody. In
    this behalf, it is interesting to note the averments made in the
    application dated 28.07.2025, for handing over the custody of
    the petitioner, wherein in the second paragraph, terming the
    petitioner as accused it is stated that the accused is detained
    from Signature Global Golf Greece Residency, Section 79,
    Gurugaon, Haryana and was brought by road to Gandhinagar.

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    Although it is sought to be argued by the respondent-State
    that the petitioner was arrested only on 27.07.2025, such
    stand is not in sync with their own understanding as reflected
    in the application dated 28.07.2025 while handing over the
    custody. Therefore, it is clear that since 25.07.2025, the
    petitioner was deprived of his personal liberty to move around
    and was not at liberty to go wherever he wished to. Clearly,
    the petitioner, was prevented from moving as per his freewill
    and was under strict supervision and complete control of the
    investigating officers inasmuch as, the petitioner was brought
    from Gurugram to Ahmedabad and was taken to Gandhinagar.
    Therefore, the contention of the investigating officer that
    when the preliminary inquiry was being carried out and in the
    absence of any conclusion of arrest there was no reason at the
    relevant point of time i.e. on 25.07.2025 to arrest the
    petitioner, is misplaced. Moreover, in the FIR the petitioner is
    arraigned as an accused and the anticipatory bail applications
    filed by the petitioner before the trial court and this Court,
    were opposed tooth and nail, raising the ground that the
    custody of the petitioner is very much necessary. Therefore,
    this Court is of the considered opinion that the petitioner was
    apprehended rather arrested on 25.07.2025 at 10:00 p.m. and
    the respondents having failed to produce him before the
    nearest learned Judicial Magistrate First Class within 24
    hours of the arrest, the arrest of the petitioner stands vitiated
    for non-compliance of the statutory as well as constitutional
    mandate.

    17. In continuation, further contention is raised by the

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    petitioner that the respondents ought to have prayed for
    transit remand from the nearest learned Magistrate and
    having failed to do so, the arrest is illegal. Pertinently, the
    respondents since inception, have portrayed that the arrest
    was made only on 27.07.2025 and the petitioner was
    produced before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate on
    28.07.2025 at 3:30 p.m. i.e. within 24 hours and hence, there
    was no need of applying for the transit remand as the
    provision permits exclusion of the time necessary for the
    journey. In the case on hand, either of the parties have not
    placed on record the details regarding the travel time.
    Assuming without concluding that for covering the distance
    from Gurugram to Ahmedabad, approximate time consumed
    would be around 15 hours and if one adds 15 hours to the 24
    hours period from 25.07.2025 10:00 p.m., it would be coming
    to an end on 27.07.2025 at around 1:00 p.m. In any event the
    petitioner ought to have been produced before the learned
    Chief Judicial Magistrate latest by 6:00 p.m. on 27.07.2025
    (i.e. 15 hours + 24 hours + 5 hours(buffer period)); however,
    the petitioner was produced only on 28.07.2025 at 3:30 p.m.
    Even after excluding the travel time, the petitioner cannot be
    said to have been produced within 24 hours. In such an
    eventuality, it was expected of the respondents to have opted
    for transit remand; however, no such transit remand is prayed
    for despite the admitted position as is evident from the record
    that the petitioner was detained on 25.07.2025 at 10:00 p.m.
    On reading Section 58 in juxtaposition with sub-section (1) of
    section 187, it is clear that a person arrested shall not be
    detained for more than 24 hours, (excluding the time

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    necessary for the journey) and shall be produced before the
    nearest learned Magistrate, whether having jurisdiction or
    not. Considering the settled principle of law as enunciated by
    the Apex Court, in the case of Priya Indoria vs. State of
    Karnataka
    (supra) and specially, paragraphs 87 to 89, the
    investigating agencies were obligated to secure the transit
    remand. The same are reproduced hereinbelow for ready
    reference:

    “87. Considering that the nature of criminal law regime in In-
    dia, entwined with State amendments, the exercise of the juris-
    diction for grant of extra-territorial anticipatory bail must be
    cognizant of the possibility of forum shopping. We also deem it
    necessary to take note of the evolution of the law on inter-state
    arrests, as this lies at the heart of ‘apprehension of arrest,’ for
    which the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court and
    Court of Session are attracted in case the accused resides in or
    is located in a territorial jurisdiction different from the jurisdic-
    tion in which cognizance of crime is taken by the Court of com-
    petent jurisdiction.

    88. Section 48 of CrPC permits the police to pursue an accused
    in other jurisdictions. A police officer, for the purpose of arrest-
    ing without a warrant, one whom he is allowed to arrest, may
    pursue an individual anywhere in India. Prior to effecting the
    arrest outside a particular jurisdiction, the police is obligated to
    secure the transit remand i.e. the remand of the accused, for
    taking him from one place to another in their own custody, usu-
    ally for the purpose of producing him before the concerned
    magistrate who has jurisdiction to try/commit the case. The pri-
    mary purpose of such a remand is to enable the police to shift
    the person in custody from the place of arrest to the place
    where the matter can be investigated and tried. However in
    various cases, the police and investigating agencies have failed
    to exercise necessary restraint while functioning within their
    legal remit. It is for the aforesaid reason that an accused appre-
    hending arrest seeks pre-arrest bail. The Courts in India have
    to be vigilant about such applications being filed particularly
    when a person alleged to have committed an offence can be
    proceeded with by setting the criminal law in motion in a place
    other than the place where the offence has actually occurred.
    In such circumstances the Courts must balance the interest of
    the accused in the context of the salutary principle of access to
    justice which is a facet of Article 21 of the Constitution as well
    as a Directive Principle of State Policy, especially Article

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    39(A). More importantly, it is a facet of Article 14 of the Consti-
    tution which guarantees to every person in the country, equal-
    ity before the law and equal protection of the law.

    89. In this case, we are concerned with what is loosely
    termed as ‘transit anticipatory bail’. As we have seen, the ex-
    pression ‘anticipatory bail’ is not defined in the CrPC though it
    is traceable to Section 438 of CrPC This Court in Balchand Jain
    had defined anticipatory bail to mean bail in anticipation of ar-
    rest. The Constitution Bench in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia has held
    that filing of FIR is not a condition precedent for exercising
    power under Section 438 of CrPC What is required for invoca-
    tion of power under Section 438 is that the person seeking an-
    ticipatory bail should show reasonable belief of imminent ar-
    rest. If the expression ‘anticipatory bail’ is not a defined expres-
    sion, then it is quite but natural that the larger expression
    ‘transit anticipatory bail’ would not find any exposition in
    the CrPC. Perhaps the need and necessity for transit anticipa-
    tory bail has occasioned because the police has been conferred
    power under the CrPC to pursue an accused in other jurisdic-
    tions. Immediately upon affecting the arrest of a person outside
    the jurisdiction where the offence is registered, the police is ob-
    ligated to secure a transit remand. The arrested person has to
    be produced before the nearest magistrate. If such a magis-
    trate finds that he has no jurisdiction to try the case in which
    the accused has been arrested, he may order the accused to be
    forwarded to a magistrate having the jurisdiction to try the
    case or to commit it for trial. Thus, the police is obligated to se-
    cure a transit remand of the accused for taking him from the
    place where he is arrested to the place where the crime is reg-
    istered, for production before the competent magistrate in
    terms of the requirement of Article 22. As we have already
    noted, the primary purpose of such a transit remand is to en-
    able the police to shift the person in custody from the place of
    arrest to the place where the matter can be investigated. It ap-
    pears that from the aforesaid requirement of transit remand,
    has arisen the necessity of ‘transit anticipatory bail’ for, an af-
    fected person cannot be without a remedy.”

    Therefore, on both the counts, this Court is of the opinion that
    the arrest of the petitioner on 25.07.2025 is against the
    provisions of law and stands vitiated.

    18. Although, the above referred ground, is sufficient
    to allow the writ petition; for the sake of completeness this
    Court, shall deal with second contention regarding non-supply
    of grounds of arrest to the petitioner. Before dealing with the

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    said contention, at this stage, it may be noted that heavy
    reliance is placed by the petitioner on the judgment in the
    case of Mihir R. Shah vs. State of Maharashtra (supra) and
    especially paragraph 56, which reads thus:

    “56. In conclusion, it is held that

    i) The constitutional mandate of informing the arrestee the
    grounds of arrest is mandatory in all offences under all statutes
    including offences under IPC 1860 (now BNS 2023);

    ii) The grounds of arrest must be communicated in writing to
    the arrestee in the language he/she understands;

    iii) In case(s) where, the arresting officer/person is unable to
    communicate the grounds of arrest in writing on or soon after
    arrest, it be so done orally.

    The said grounds be communicated in writing within a
    reasonable time and in any case at least two hours prior to
    production of the arrestee for remand proceedings before the
    magistrate.

    iv) In case of non-compliance of the above, the arrest and
    subsequent remand would be rendered illegal and the person
    will be at liberty to be set free.”

    It is argued that the Apex Court, has held and observed that
    where the arresting officer is unable to communicate the
    grounds of arrest in writing on or soon after arrest, it be so
    done orally. It has been further argued that the grounds be
    communicated in writing within a reasonable time and in any
    case atleast two hours prior to production of the arrestee for
    remand proceedings before the Magistrate. The requirement
    of communicating the grounds of arrest in writing atleast two
    hours prior to the production of the arrestee, in terms of the
    observations made in paragraph 58 of the judgment, would
    not apply to the facts of the case inasmuch as, the petitioner is
    arrested on 25.07.2025 whereas, in the judgment of the Apex

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    Court, it is clarified that the procedure as affirmed shall
    govern the arrests henceforth i.e. the arrests made on and
    after 06.11.2025. Paragraph 58 reads thus:

    “58. We are cognizant that there existed no consistent or
    binding requirement mandating written communication of the
    grounds of arrest for all the offences. Holding as above, in our
    view, would ensure implementation of the constitutional rights
    provided to an arrestee as engrafted under Article 22 of the
    Constitution of India in an effective manner. Such clarity on
    obligation would avoid uncertainty in the administration of
    criminal justice. The ends of fairness and legal discipline
    therefore demand that this procedure as affirmed above shall
    govern arrests henceforth.”

    19. Another issue raised is regarding non-supply of the
    grounds of arrest either orally or in writing to the petitioner
    and in the opinion of this Court, the said contention deserves
    to be answered in favour of the petitioner and against the
    respondent for the reasons discussed hereinafter.

    20. Discernibly, the petitioner, was produced before
    the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate on 28.07.2025 (page 22
    of the compilation) incorporating the reasons for arrest.
    Accepting the said application, the learned Chief Judicial
    Magistrate has recorded to the effect that the arrestee is
    produced at 3:30 p.m. and upon being asked, he has no
    complaint against the police officer. The endorsement further
    suggests that the arrestee is taken in judicial custody.
    Besides, application seeking remand of even date was filed;
    however, there is nothing on record to suggest that the said
    application was served upon the petitioner except arguing
    that from the order dated 28.07.2025 passed by the learned
    Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, it is clear that the

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    learned Advocate was aware about the grounds of arrest and
    accordingly had made the submissions. The said stand is
    stated to be rejected inasmuch as, the requirement of the law
    is that the accused/arrestee and/or family or relative should
    be served with the grounds of arrest either orally or in writing
    and in the language known to him in a meaningful manner.
    Besides, the arrest memo which is placed on record (Annexure
    D) does not specify the grounds of arrest except mentioning
    the provisions of the BNS, the name and address of the
    petitioner, the place of the arrest and in whose presence the
    arrest was made and the telephone numbers.

    21. At the cost of repetition, it may be noted that by
    now it is well settled that the constitutional obligation under
    Article 22 is not a statute-specific and it is grounded in
    fundamental right of life and personal liberty under Article 21
    of the Constitution of India, therefore, making it applicable to
    all offences including those under the Indian Penal Code,
    1860. Keeping this in mind, for the issue of providing the
    grounds of arrest, apt would be the judgment of the Apex
    Court in the case of Prabir Purkayastha vs. State (supra).
    Relevant paragraphs 27 to 30 read thus:-

    “27. Thus, there is no hesitation in the mind of this Court that
    the submission of learned ASG that in a case of preventive
    detention, the grounds of detention need not be provided to a
    detenue in writing is ex facie untenable in eyes of law.

    28. The language used in Article 22(1) and Article 22(5) of the
    Constitution of India regarding the communication of the grounds
    is exactly the identical. Neither of the constitutional provisions
    require that the ‘grounds’ of “arrest” or “detention”, as the case
    may be, must be communicated in writing. Thus, interpretation to
    this important facet of the fundamental right as made by the
    Constitution Bench while examining the scope of Article 22(5) of

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    the Constitution of India would ipso facto apply to Article 22(1) of
    the Constitution of India insofar the requirement to communicate
    the grounds of arrest is concerned.

    29. Hence, we have no hesitation in reiterating that the
    requirement to communicate the grounds of arrest or the grounds
    of detention in writing to a person arrested in connection with an
    offence or a person placed under preventive detention as provided
    under Articles 22(1) and 22(5) of the Constitution of India is
    sacrosanct and cannot be breached under any situation. Non-
    compliance of this constitutional requirement and statutory
    mandate would lead to the custody or the detention being
    rendered illegal, as the case may be.

    30. Furthermore, the provisions of Article 22(1) have already
    been interpreted by this Court in Pankaj Bansal(supra) laying
    down beyond the pale of doubt that the grounds of arrest must be
    communicated in writing to the person arrested of an offence at
    the earliest. Hence, the fervent plea of learned ASG that there
    was no requirement under law to communicate the grounds of
    arrest in writing to the accused appellant is noted to be rejected.”

    22. Relevant would also be the recent judgment of the
    Apex Court in the case of Kasireddy Upender Reddy vs. State
    of Andhra Pradesh
    (supra) Paragraphs 16 to 36 are
    reproduced hereinbelow for ready reference :-

    “16. In Vihaan Kumar (supra), this Court eruditely speaking
    through Justice Abhay S. Oka made some very important
    observations which we must reproduce as under:

    “Therefore, as far as Article 22(1) is concerned,
    compliance can be made by communicating sufficient
    knowledge of the basic facts constituting the grounds
    of farrest to the person arrested. The grounds should
    be effectively and fully communicated to the arrestee
    in the manner in which he will fully understand the
    same. Therefore, it follows that the grounds of arrest
    must be informed in a language which the arrestee
    understands. That is how, in the case of Pankaj Bansal
    v. Union of India
    reported in (2024) 7 SCC 576, this
    Court held that the mode of conveying the grounds of
    arrest must necessarily be meaningful so as to serve
    the intended purpose. However, under Article 22(1),
    there is no requirement of communicating the grounds
    of arrest in writing. Article 22(1) also incorporates the
    right of every person arrested to consult an advocate
    of his choice and the right to be defended by an
    advocate. If the grounds of arrest are not

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    communicated to the arrestee, as soon as may be, he
    will not be able to effectively exercise the right to
    consult an advocate. This requirement incorporated in
    Article 22(1) also ensures that the grounds for
    arresting the person without a warrant exist. Once a
    person is arrested, his right to liberty under Article 21
    is curtailed. When such an important fundamental
    right is curtailed, it is necessary that the person
    concerned must understand on what grounds he has
    been arrested. That is why the mode of conveying
    information of the grounds must be meaningful so as
    to serve the objects stated above.

    14.Thus, the requirement of informing the person
    arrested of the grounds of arrest is not a formality but
    a mandatory constitutional requirement. Article 22 is
    included in Part III of the Constitution under the
    heading of Fundamental Rights. Thus, it is the
    fundamental right of every person arrested and
    detained in custody to be informed of the grounds of
    arrest as soon as possible. If the grounds of arrest are
    not informed as soon as may be after the arrest, it
    would amount to a violation of the fundamental right of
    the arrestee guaranteed under Article 22(1). It will
    also amount to depriving the arrestee of his liberty.
    The reason is that, as provided in Article 21, no person
    can be deprived of his liberty except in accordance
    with the procedure established by law. The procedure
    established by law also includes what is provided in
    Article 22(1). Therefore, when a person is arrested
    without a warrant, and the grounds of arrest are not
    informed to him, as soon as may be, after the arrest, it
    will amount to a violation of his fundamental right
    guaranteed under Article 21 as well. In a given case, if
    the mandate of Article 22 is not followed while
    arresting a person or after arresting a person, it will
    also violate fundamental right to liberty guaranteed
    under Article 21, and the arrest will be rendered
    illegal. On the failure to comply with the requirement
    of informing grounds of arrest as soon as may be after
    the arrest, the arrest is vitiated. Once the arrest is held
    to be vitiated, the person arrested cannot remain in
    custody even for a second.

    15.We have already referred to what is held in
    paragraphs 42 and 43 of the decision in the case of
    Pankaj Bansal (supra). This Court has suggested that
    the proper and ideal course of communicating the
    grounds of arrest is to provide grounds of arrest in
    writing. Obviously, before a police officer
    communicates the grounds of arrest, the grounds of

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    arrest have to be formulated. Therefore, there is no
    harm if the grounds of arrest are communicated in
    writing. Although there is no requirement to
    communicate the grounds of arrest in writing, what is
    stated in paragraphs 42 and 43 of the decision in the
    case of Pankaj Bansal1 are suggestions that merit
    consideration. We are aware that in every case, it may
    not be practicable to implement what is suggested. If
    the course, as suggested, is followed, the controversy
    about the non- compliance will not arise at all. The
    police have to balance the rights of a person arrested
    with the interests of the society. Therefore, the police
    should always scrupulously comply with the
    requirements of Article 22.

    16.An attempt was made by learned Senior counsel
    appearing for 1st respondent to argue that after his
    arrest, the appellant was repeatedly remanded to
    custody, and now a chargesheet has been filed. His
    submission is that now, the custody of the appellant is
    pursuant to the order taking cognizance passed on the
    charge sheet. Accepting such arguments, with great
    respect to the learned senior counsel, will amount to
    completely nullifying Articles 21 and 22(1) of the
    Constitution. Once it is held that arrest is
    unconstitutional due to violation of Article 22(1), the
    arrest itself is vitiated. Therefore, continued custody of
    such a person based on orders of remand is also
    vitiated. Filing a charge sheet and order of cognizance
    will not validate an arrest which is per se
    unconstitutional, being violative of Articles 21 and
    22(1) of the Constitution of India. We cannot tinker
    with the most important safeguards provided under
    Article 22.

    17.Another argument canvassed on behalf of the
    respondents is that even if the appellant is released on
    the grounds of violating Article 22, the first respondent
    can arrest him again. At this stage, it is not necessary
    to decide the issue.

    18. In the present case, 1st respondent relied upon an
    entry in the case diary allegedly made at 6.10 p.m. on
    10th June 2024, which records that the appellant was
    arrested after informing him of the grounds of arrest.
    For the reasons which will follow hereafter, we are
    rejecting the argument made by the 1st respondent. If
    the police want to prove communication of the grounds
    of arrest only based on a diary entry, it is necessary to
    incorporate those grounds of arrest in the diary entry
    or any other document. The grounds of arrest must
    exist before the same are informed. Therefore, in a

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    given case, even assuming that the case of the police
    regarding requirements of Article 22(1) of the
    Constitution is to be accepted based on an entry in the
    case diary, there must be a contemporaneous record,
    which records what the grounds of arrest were. When
    an arrestee pleads before a Court that grounds of
    arrest were not communicated, the burden to prove
    the compliance of Article 22(1) is on the police.

    19. An argument was sought to be canvassed that in
    view of sub- Section (1) of Section 50 of CrPC, there is
    an option to communicate to the person arrested full
    particulars of the offence for which he is arrested or
    the other grounds for the arrest. Section 50 cannot
    have the effect of diluting the requirement of Article
    22(1).
    If held so, Section 50 will attract the vice of
    unconstitutionality. Section 50 lays down the
    requirement of communicating the full particulars of
    the offence for which a person is arrested to him. The
    ‘other grounds for such arrest’ referred to in Section
    50(1)
    have nothing to do with the grounds of arrest
    referred to in Article 22(1). The requirement of Section
    50
    is in addition to what is provided in Article 22(1).
    Section 47 of the BNSS is the corresponding provision.
    Therefore, what we have held about Section 50 will
    apply to Section 47 of the BNSS.

    20. When an arrested person is produced before a
    Judicial Magistrate for remand, it is the duty of the
    Magistrate to ascertain whether compliance with
    Article 22(1) has been made. The reason is that due to
    non-compliance, the arrest is rendered illegal;
    therefore, the arrestee cannot be remanded after the
    arrest is rendered illegal. It is the obligation of all the
    Courts to uphold the fundamental rights.

    CONCLUSIONS

    21. Therefore, we conclude:

    a) The requirement of informing a person arrested of
    grounds of arrest is a mandatory requirement of Article
    22(1);

    b) The information of the grounds of arrest must be
    provided to the arrested person in such a manner that
    sufficient knowledge of the basic facts constituting the
    grounds is imparted and communicated to the arrested
    person effectively in the language which he

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    understands. The mode and method of communication
    must be such that the object of the constitutional
    safeguard is achieved;

    c) When arrested accused alleges non-compliance with
    the requirements of Article 22(1), the burden will
    always be on the Investigating Officer/Agency to prove
    compliance with the requirements of Article 22(1);

    d) Non-compliance with Article 22(1) will be a violation
    of the fundamental rights of the accused guaranteed by
    the said Article. Moreover, it will amount to a violation
    of the right to personal liberty guaranteed by Article 21
    of the Constitution. Therefore, non-compliance with the
    requirements of Article 22(1) vitiates the arrest of the
    accused. Hence, further orders passed by a criminal
    court of remand are also vitiated. Needless to add that
    it will not vitiate the investigation, charge sheet and
    trial. But, at the same time, filing of chargesheet will
    not validate a breach of constitutional mandate under
    Article 22(1);

    e) When an arrested person is produced before a
    Judicial Magistrate for remand, it is the duty of the
    Magistrate to ascertain whether compliance with
    Article 22(1) and other mandatory safeguards has been
    made; and

    f) When a violation of Article 22(1) is established, it is
    the duty of the court to forthwith order the release of
    the accused. That will be a ground to grant bail even if
    statutory restrictions on the grant of bail exist. The
    statutory restrictions do not affect the power of the
    court to grant bail when the violation of Articles 21 and
    22 of the Constitution is established.” (Emphasis
    supplied)

    17. Justice N. Kotiswar Singh while fully concurring with the
    views expressed by Justice Abhay S. Oka added a few lines of his
    own as under:

    2. The issue on the requirement of communication of
    grounds of arrest to the person arrested, as mandated
    under Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India, which
    has also been incorporated in the Prevention of Money
    Laundering Act, 2002
    under Section 19 thereof has
    been succinctly reiterated in this judgment. The
    constitutional mandate of informing the grounds of
    arrest to the person arrested in writing has been
    explained in the case of Pankaj Bansal (supra) so as to

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    be meaningful to serve the intended purpose which
    has been reiterated in Prabir Purkayastha (supra). The
    said constitutional mandate has been incorporated in
    the statute under Section 50 of the CrPC (Section 47 of
    BNSS). It may also be noted that the aforesaid
    provision of requirement for communicating the
    grounds of arrest, to be purposeful, is also required to
    be communicated to the friends, relatives or such
    other persons of the accused as may be disclosed or
    nominated by the arrested person for the purpose of
    giving such information as provided under Section 50A
    of the CrPC. As may be noted, this is in the addition of
    the requirement as provided under Section 50(1) of the
    CrPC.

    3. The purpose of inserting Section 50A of the CrPC,
    making it obligatory on the person making arrest to
    inform about the arrest to the friends, relatives or
    persons nominated by the arrested person, is to ensure
    that they would able to take immediate and prompt
    actions to secure the release of the arrested person as
    permissible under the law. The arrested person,
    because of his detention, may not have immediate and
    easy access to the legal process for securing his
    release, which would otherwise be available to the
    friends, relatives and such nominated persons by way
    of engaging lawyers, briefing them to secure release of
    the detained person on bail at the earliest. Therefore,
    the purpose of communicating the grounds of arrest to
    the detenue, and in addition to his relatives as
    mentioned above is not merely a formality but to
    enable the detained person to know the reasons for his
    arrest but also to provide the necessary opportunity to
    him through his relatives, friends or nominated
    persons to secure his release at the earliest possible
    opportunity for actualising the fundamental right to
    liberty and life as guaranteed under Article 21 of the
    Constitution. Hence, the requirement of
    communicating the grounds of arrest in writing is not
    only to the arrested person, but also to the friends,
    relatives or such other person as may be disclosed or
    nominated by the arrested person, so as to make the
    mandate of Article 22(1) of the Constitution
    meaningful and effective failing which, such arrest
    may be rendered illegal.” (Emphasis supplied)

    18. Thus, the following principles of law could be said to have
    been laid down, rather very well explained, in Vihaan Kumar
    (supra):

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    a) The requirement of informing the person arrested of the
    grounds of arrest is not a formality but a mandatory
    constitutional condition.

    b) Once a person is arrested, his right to liberty under Article 21
    is curtailed. When such an important fundamental right is
    curtailed, it is necessary that the person concerned must
    understand on what grounds he has been arrested.

    c) The mode of conveying the information of the grounds of arrest
    must be meaningful so as to serve the true object underlying
    Article 22(1).

    d) If the grounds of arrest are not informed as soon as may be
    after the arrest, it would amount to a violation of the fundamental
    right of the arrestee guaranteed under Article 22(1).

    e) On the failure to comply with the requirement of informing the
    grounds of arrest as soon as may be after the arrest, the arrest
    would stand vitiated. Once the arrest is held to be vitiated, the
    person arrested cannot remain in custody even for a second.

    f) If the police want to prove communication of the grounds of
    arrest only based on a diary entry, it is necessary to incorporate
    those grounds of arrest in the diary entry or any other document.

    The grounds of arrest must exist before the same are informed.

    g) When an arrestee pleads before a court that the grounds of
    arrest were not communicated, the burden to prove the
    compliance of Article 22(1) is on the police authorities.

    h) The grounds of arrest should not only be provided to the
    arrestee but also to his family members and relatives so that
    necessary arrangements are made to secure the release of the
    person arrested at the earliest possible opportunity so as to make
    the mandate of Article 22(1) meaningful and effective, failing
    which, such arrest may be rendered illegal.

    19. We must clarify one important aspect of Vihaan Kumar
    (supra). In Vihaan Kumar (supra) the case was that there was an
    absolute failure on the part of the police to provide the grounds
    of arrest. In Vihaan Kumar (supra) reliance was placed upon the
    entry in the case diary which recorded that the appellant therein
    was arrested after informing him of the grounds of arrest. In the
    case at hand, it is not in dispute that the grounds of arrest were
    supplied to the arrestee, however, the case put up is that those
    grounds are not meaningful and are bereft of necessary essential
    information.

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    20. In this appeal our endeavor would be to consider whether the
    grounds of arrest supplied to the appellant’s son at the time of
    his arrest could be said to be meaningful and sufficient enough to
    give a broad idea to the person arrested of the accusations
    levelled and as to why he was being taken into custody.

    21. Having looked into the grounds of arrest which were supplied
    to the son of the appellant at the time of his arrest, it is difficult
    for us to take the view that the grounds do not make any sense or
    are not meaningful or are just an eyewash.

    22. In the case of State of Bombay v. Atma Ram reported in 1951
    SCC 43 : AIR 1951 SC 157 (C), it was held by this Court that, the
    test is whether the communication of the grounds of arrest is
    sufficient to enable the detained person to make a representation
    at the earliest opportunity.

    23. Similarly in the case of Magan Lal Jivabhai, in re, AIR 1951
    Bom 33(D), it was held that, the only possible and reasonable
    construction that can be put upon the language of Article 22(6) is
    that the detaining authority, while furnishing grounds of
    detention, is required to state the facts on account of which he is
    satisfied that the detention is necessary in the interest of the
    security of the State, maintenance, of public order, etc.

    24. The only privilege a detaining authority can claim against the
    disclosure of facts is on the grounds of public interest. If no facts
    at all leading to the detention of a detenu are to be mentioned in
    the grounds which are to be furnished to him, then obviously the
    intention underlying the enactment of Article 22(6) would be
    frustrated.

    25. In both the cases referred to above, the persons had been
    detained under the provisions of Preventive Detention Act. The
    information to be supplied to such a person is governed by Clause
    (5) of Article 22. In the present case, the son of the appellant has
    been arrested for specific offences as mentioned in the grounds
    of arrest. His case is governed by Clause (1) and not by Clause
    (5) of Article 22. However, under both the clauses, certain
    information has to be supplied to the person arrested and
    detained.

    26. Under Clause (1), the ground for arrest has to be
    communicated to the person arrested. Under Clause (5) the

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    grounds on which the order of detention has been made has to be
    communicated to the person detained.

    27. The object underlying the provision that the grounds of arrest
    should be communicated to the person arrested has been very
    succinctly explained in Vihaan Kumar (supra). On learning about
    the grounds for arrest, the person concerned will be in a position
    to make an application before the appropriate Court for bail, or
    move the High Court for a writ of habeas corpus. Further, the
    information will enable the arrested person to prepare his
    defence in time for the purposes of his trial. For these reasons, it
    has been provided by the Constitution that, the ground for the
    arrest must be communicated to the person arrested as soon as
    possible.

    28. For the purposes of Clause (1) of Article 22, it is not
    necessary for the authorities to furnish full details of the offence.
    However, the information should be sufficient to enable the
    arrested person to understand why he has been arrested. The
    grounds to be communicated to the arrested person should be
    somewhat similar to the charge framed by the Court for the trial
    of a case.

    29. The rule in Article 22(1) that a person upon being arrested
    must be informed of the grounds of arrest is similar to, though
    not exactly identical with, the rules prevailing in England and in
    United States of America. The rule prevailing in England is that

    “in normal circumstances an arrest without warrant
    either by a policeman or by a private person can be
    justified only if it is an arrest on a charge made known
    to the person arrested”; (per Viscount Simon L.C. in —
    ‘Christie v. Leachinsky (1947 AC 573 at p. 586(F).”

    30. It is a rule of common law and is described in different
    languages by different authorities, but the meaning is the same;
    the arrested person must be told for what he is arrested or be
    informed of the cause of his arrest. In the United States the
    accused has the constitutional right “to be informed of the nature
    and cause of the accusation”; see 6th Amendment to the American
    Constitution. In Hooper v. Lane, (1857) 6 HLC 443 : 10 ER 1368
    (G), one of the reasons for the rule was said to be that the person
    arrested should know whether he is or is not bound to submit to
    the arrest. In Christie v.Leachinsky reported in (1947) AC 573
    Lord Simonds observed at page 591 as thus:

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    “Putting first things first, I would say that it is the right
    of every citizen to be free from arrest unless there is in
    some other citizen, whether a constable or not, the
    right to arrest him. And I would say next that it is the
    corollary of the right of every citizen to be thus free
    from arrest that he should be entitled to resist arrest
    unless that arrest is lawful. How can these rights be
    reconciled with the proposition that he may be arrested
    without knowing why he is arrested? ……. Blind,
    unquestioning obedience is the law of tyrants and of
    slaves: it does not yet flourish on English soil”.

    31. Professor Glanvile L. Williams in his article “Requisites of a
    Valid Arrest” in (1954) Criminal Law Review, at page 16,
    criticised the reason given by Lord Simonds as “somewhat
    legalistic” because very few people know the law of arrest in
    such a way that they can decide on the spot whether the arrest
    to which they are being subjected to is legal. In his opinion, the
    true reason is a different one, e.g., the reason given by Viscount
    11th Simon L.C. in the same case at page 588 in the following
    words:

    “If the charge on suspicion of which the man if arrested
    is then and there made known to him, he has the
    opportunity of giving an explanation of any
    misunderstanding or of calling attention to other
    persons for whom he may have been mistaken with the
    result that further inquiries may save him from the
    consequences of false accusation.”

    32. Another reason given by Lord Simonds at page 592 is that
    the arrested person may without a moment’s delay take such
    steps as will enable him to regain freedom. One more reason is
    that it acts as a safeguard against despotism and over-zeal. As
    remarked by Professor Glanville L. Williams (supra), at page 17:

    “the rule has the effect of preventing the police from
    arresting on vague general suspicion, not knowing the
    precise crime suspected but hoping to obtain evidence
    of the commission of some crime for which they have
    power to arrest”.

    33. In McNabb v. United States of America reported in (1943)
    318 US 332 (H), Frankfurter, J. observed at page 343:

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    “Experience has therefore counselled that safeguards
    must be provided against the dangers of the
    overzealous as well as the despotic …………….
    Legislation such as this, requiring that the police must
    with reasonable promptness show legal cause for
    detaining arrested persons, constitutes an important
    safeguard”.

    34. In United States v. Cruikshank reported in (1876) 92 US 542,
    it was observed by Waite C.J. that the accused is given the right
    to have a specification of the charge against him in order that he
    may decide whether he should present his defence by motion to
    quash, demurrer or plea.

    35. The debates of the Constituent Assembly which framed the
    Constitution are relevant for the purpose of ascertaining the
    reason behind the insertion of a certain Article in the
    Constitution. In the Draft of the Constitution, the Article
    corresponding to the Article under consideration was Article
    15A. The reason given for the inclusion of the said Article was
    that it contained safeguards against illegal or arbitrary arrests (9
    Constituent Assembly Debates, p. 1497).(See: Vimal Kishore
    Mehrotra v. State of Uttar Pradesh
    , AIR 1956 All 56)

    36. If a person is arrested on a warrant, the grounds for reasons
    for the arrest is the warrant itself; if the warrant is read over to
    him, that is sufficient compliance with the requirement that he
    should be informed of the grounds for his arrest. If he is arrested
    without a warrant, he must be told why he has been arrested. If
    he is arrested for committing an offence, he must be told that he
    has committed a certain offence for which he would be placed on
    trial. In order to inform him that he has committed a certain
    offence, he must be told of the acts done by him which amounts
    to the offence. He must be informed of the precise acts done by
    him for which he would be tried; informing him merely of the law
    applicable to such acts would not be enough. (See: Vimal Kishore
    Mehrotra
    (supra)”

    23. Heavy reliance is placed by the learned Additional
    Public Prosecutor on the said judgment to contend that if the
    grounds of arrest are within the knowledge of the person
    arrested, or he is told why he has been arrested or about the
    commission of certain offence for which he would be put to
    trial, then the condition stands satisfied. In the case on hand,

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    there is not a whisper or semblance of any material produced
    through which it can be said that the petitioner was informed
    orally much less in writing about the grounds of his arrest.
    Thus, in the absence of compliance of the said requirement
    merely on the basis that the learned Advocate while opposing
    the application of remand has argued the matter, would not
    be sufficient. Therefore, on this count as well, the arrest of the
    petitioner stands vitiated and the petitioner deserves to be set
    free.

    24. Accordingly, the petitioner is directed to be
    released forthwith and set at liberty. Pertinently, the FIR is
    lodged and in furtherance thereof, upon completion of the
    investigation, charge-sheet is already filed and the matter is
    pending before the court concerned; however, we clarify that
    the findings recorded hereinabove that the arrest of the
    petitioner is illegal, shall not affect the merits of the charge-
    sheet and the case pending before the court concerned.
    Needless to further clarify that the trial court shall be at
    liberty to impose conditions to its satisfaction (including
    requiring personal bond and surety of the petitioner) and
    other such conditions as it may deem fit. Moreover, the
    petitioner shall make himself available as and when required
    and cooperate with the proceedings before the trial court.

    25. Before parting, we would like to express our
    displeasure for what happened before this Court during the
    course of the hearing. The learned advocate appearing for the
    petitioner requested this Court that he is desirous of filing the
    written submissions to which, it was conveyed that the Court

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    has recorded the submissions and written submissions are not
    required. Despite which, there was insistence shown by the
    learned advocate for the petitioner stating that by no means
    this Court can refuse to accept the written submissions.
    Requiring the written submissions would be the discretion of
    the Court and not the discretion or insistence on the part of
    the learned Advocate. As the request of the learned Advocate
    was refused by this Court, it was expected of the learned
    Advocate to have acceded to the refusal and have not filed the
    written submissions; however, exhibiting adamant attitude the
    learned Advocate chose to file it with the Registry through e-
    mail mode which was operating during the Covid time. Such
    attempt, on the part of the learned Advocate is deprecated.
    Even in the past, this Court on 05.05.2026, had to pass the
    following order:

    “1. Yesterday Mr. Ghanshyam Upadhyay, learned advocate
    appearing with Mr. Dennis Mavadhiya, learned advocate for the
    petitioner had made submissions at length in the post lunch
    session on the facts and has placed on record the compilation of
    judgments. Compilations-1 and 2 contain as many as twenty
    judgments and compilation-3 contains fifteen judgments. In all,
    the compilations contains thirty-five judgments. As post lunch
    session Mr. Upadhyay could not finish his submissions; this Court
    yesterday inquired from him and it was informed that he would
    be taking another half an hour and the matter was kept today.
    Today, Mr. Ghanshyam Upadhyay, learned advocate orally
    submitted that he is desirous of placing some more judgments,
    maybe four or five in number.

    2. In the pre-lunch session, this Court was engaged in taking up
    the Habeas Corpus matters wherein the corpora were present
    and hence, in those matters, the proceedings were conducted in
    chamber.

    3. Today after lunch, Mr. Ghanshyam Upadhyay, learned
    Advocate had commenced his submissions around 02:45 p.m.,
    referring to the three compilations. Judgments were cited from

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    the compilations up to item no.11. During the course of the
    arguments, this Court tried to find out the merits of the matter
    and requested the learned Additional Public Prosecutor to assist.
    Mr. Utkarsh Sharma learned Additional Public Prosecutor, has
    briefly addressed the Court to which Mr. Ghanshyam Upadhyay,
    learned Advocate, insisted that in view of the brief address by the
    learned Additional Public Prosecutor, he would like to read the
    judgments of the Apex Court in further detail by referring the
    facts of each of the case. Mr. Ghanshyam Upadhyay, learned
    Advocate, then started reading the facts of the judgment at item
    no.11 when yet another twenty-five judgments were to be cited.
    Although assured for half an hour, the matter had continued from
    02:45 p.m until 5:00 p.m. When this Court requested Mr.
    Upadhyay, learned Advocate that in view of the paucity of time, it
    would not be possible for the Court to look into facts of
    judgments in detail to which, Mr. Upadhyay, learned Advocate
    insisted reading of the judgments including the facts. The
    judgment already read at item no.11. When was asked to give
    brief reference, the learned Advocate had not only closed the file
    expressing frustration but, he slammed it and left it for the Court
    to pass appropriate orders as he is desirous of challenging the
    order before the Apex Court.

    4. Mr Ghanshyam Upadhyay, learned Advocate was heard
    uniterrupted post-lunch since 2:45 p.m. However, only in the
    judgment which is cited at item no.11, the Court tried to inquire
    that how that judgment would be relevant, Mr. Upadhyay,
    learned advocate had expressed his unwarranted displeasure
    which this Court does not approve.

    5. Moreover, this Court had heard other matters in the pre-lunch
    session. Not that the Court is averse to consider the judgments
    but the insistence of the learned counsel was for keeping aside all
    other matters and the captioned matter should be and ought to
    be heard giving priority, it being a matter of illegal detention
    according to him. No doubt, liberty of a person is of paramount
    importance and this Court, is hearing it. The other matters were
    corpora were made available were also equally important to be
    heard. Owing to the paucity of time, this request was made to the
    learned counsel appearing for the petitioner. Also, the learned
    Additional Public Prosecutor was yet to make his submissions.

    6. Offering one more opportunity, we are keeping the matter
    tomorrow i.e. on 06.05.2026. If Mr. Ghanshyam Upadhyay,
    learned Advocate wishes to make further submissions, he may do
    so, or else the Court will hear the learned Additional Public
    Prosecutor and pass appropriate order as desired by the learned
    Advocate for the petitioner.”

    26. Such demeanor exhibited by the learned Advocate

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    during the course of the hearing is not in a right earnest and
    is deprecated.

    27. In view of the above discussion, the petition stands
    allowed. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent. No
    order as to costs.

    (SANGEETA K. VISHEN,J)

    (D. M. VYAS, J)
    SINDHU NAIR

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