Allahabad High Court
Rudra Pratap Singh vs State Of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Home Lko. … on 21 May, 2026
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH
Neutral Citation No. - 2026:AHC-LKO:36602
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
LUCKNOW
APPLICATION U/S 482 No. - 6506 of 2023
Rudra Pratap Singh
.....Applicant(s)
Versus
State Of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Home Lko. And Another
.....Opposite Party(s)
Counsel for Applicant(s)
:
Dhruv Mathur, Inam Uddin Ahmed, Shubham Tripathi
Counsel for Opposite Party(s)
:
G.A., Suresh Chandra Shukla
Reserved on: 08.05.2026 (AFR)
Pronounced on: 21.05.2026
Uploaded on: 21.05.2026
HON'BLE BRIJ RAJ SINGH, J.
(I.A. No.6 of 2026-Recall Application) (Krishna Lal Sharma vs. State of U.P. and another)
1. This is an application moved by the applicant-Krishna Lal Sharma for recall of the order dated 19.3.2026 passed by this Court.
2. Learned counsel for the applicant has submitted that the entire proceedings have been quashed by the judgment and order dated 19.3.2026 without hearing the applicant. It has been submitted by learned counsel for the applicant that the said case was listed on 19.03.2026 before this Court in Court No.16 at Serial No.3003, but mobile phone of applicant’s counsel was out of order, therefore, he could not notice the said case and could not appear and the order was passed on 19.3.2026 without hearing him. It has been further submitted that on 19.03.2026 at 12:10 P.M. Mr. Inam Uddin Ahmed, Advocate i.e. counsel for applicant/opposite party no.2 called applicant’s counsel and asked him about case, on which applicant’s counsel told him that he is out of town, therefore, he could not appear in the case. It is further submitted that on the previous date i.e. 12.03.2026 when applicant’s counsel was ready for argument, counsel for opposite party no.2 sought adjournment and same was granted by this Court, which shows the bonafide of applicant’s counsel that he wanted to argue the case.
3. Learned counsel for the applicant further submits that he is pressing the averments made in the counter affidavit and this Court may consider the submissions as made in the counter affidavit and thereafter, by recalling the order dated 19.3.2026, a fresh judgment may be pronounced. It has been further submitted by learned counsel for the applicant that this Court has failed to consider that no offence under Section 138 of N.I. Act is made out against the applicant as the said cheques were forcibly taken for security purpose and not for the repayment of legally enforceable debt as there was no transaction between the applicant and opposite party no.2, which is admitted by Rudra Pratap Singh himself in his statement before the court below in complaint under Section 138 of N.I. Act but the court below overlooked the same and convicted the applicant in totally illegal and arbitrary manner. It has been submitted this Court has failed to consider that both offences are totally different in nature and applications given by applicant in the year 2017, WhatsApp chats, witnesses’ statements are on record which show that opposite party no.2-Rudra Pratap Singh has committed the alleged offence but this Court has conducted a mini trial regarding the genuineness and reliability of evidence which is beyond the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
4. To buttress his argument, learned counsel for the applicant has placed reliance upon the judgment in the cases of Ganesh Patel v. Umakant Rajoria 2022 SCC OnLine SC 2050; Asit Kumar Kar v. State of West Bengal, (2009) 2 SCC 703; Vishnu Agarwal v. State of U.P., (2011) 14 SCC 813; Jaspreet Singh Garewal v. State of U.P., 2019 SCC OnLine All 3579; Vikram Bakshi v. R.P. Khosla, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1783; T.C. Mathai v. District & Sessions Judge, Thiruvananthapuram, (1999) 3 SCC 614; Samantha Christina Delfina Willis v. State of Karnataka, WRIT Petition No.24602 of 2021 (GM-RES), decided on 01.06.2022; Muskan v. Ishaan Khan (Sataniya), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2355; and State of Odisha v. Pratima Mohanty, (2022) 16 SCC 703.
5. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that in the case of Ganesh Patel (supra), the Supreme Court in paragraphs 8 and 9 observed as under:-
?8. This application for recall of the order was maintainable as it was an application seeking a procedural review, and not a substantive review to which Section 362 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, would be attracted.1 On the aspect of the difference between recall and review and when an order of recall can be passed reference can be made to Budhia Swain v. Gopinath Deb.
9. The High Court was therefore right in recalling the order and listing MCRC No. 6576/2017 for hearing and decision on merits.?
6. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that in the case of Asit Kumar Kar (supra), it is provided by the Supreme Court that there is a distinction between a petition under Article 32, a review petition and a recall application. While in a review petition, the Court considers on merits where there is an error apparent on the face of the record, in a recall petition, the Court does not go into the merits but simply recalls an order which was passed without giving an opportunity of hearing to an affected party. The Supreme Court in Paras 6 and 7 of the said case, observed as under:
?6. There is a distinction between a petition under Article 32, a review petition and a recall petition. While in a review petition the Court considers on merits where there is an error apparent on the face of the record, in a recall petition the Court does not go into the merits but simply recalls an order which was passed without giving an opportunity of hearing to an affected party.
7. We are treating this petition under Article 32 as a recall petition because the order passed in the decision in All Bengal Excise Licensees’ Assn. v. Raghabendra Singh [(2007) 11 SCC 374] cancelling certain licences was passed without giving an opportunity of hearing to the persons who had been granted licences. In these circumstances, we recall the directions in para 40 of the aforesaid judgment. However, if anybody has a grievance against the grant of licences or in the policy of the State Government, he will be at liberty to challenge it in appropriate proceedings before the appropriate court. The writ petitions are disposed of with these directions.?
7. The Supreme Court in Para 6 of the judgment in Vishnu Agarwal (supra) observed:
?6. In our opinion, Section 362 cannot be considered in a rigid and overtechnical manner to defeat the ends of justice. As Brahaspati has observed:
?Kevalam shastram ashritya na kartavyo vinirnayah yuktiheeney vichare tu dharmahaani prajayate?
which means:
?The court should not give its decision based only on the letter of the law.
For if the decision is wholly unreasonable, injustice will follow.?
8. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that in the case of Jaspreet Singh Garewal (supra), the opposite party no.2 was not represented by any counsel nor notices were issued to opposite party No.2 before finally deciding the application. The Supreme Court in Para 69 observed as under:
?69. I have perused the judgements relied upon by counsel for parties. It is an undisputed fact that present criminal misc. application was filed on 13.12.2015 in Registry of this Court. The application came up for admission on 15.12.2016 and this Court allowed the application on same day i.e. 15.12.2016. The opposite party No. 2 was not represented by any counsel nor notices were issued to opposite party No. 2 before finally deciding the application. As such, order dated 15.12.2016 is ex-parte against opposite party No. 2. Rule of audi alterem partem requires that opportunity of hearing should be afforded before an order is passed on judicial side. The aforesaid view has also been reiterated by Apex Court in the case of Makkapati Nagaswara Sastri (Supra). The order dated 2.12.2016 impugned in the application was in favour of opposite party No. 2 and therefore, the said order could not have been set aside without hearing opposite party No. 2. Consequently, prayer for recall made by opposite party No. 2 for recall of order dated 15.12.2016 on aforesaid grounds is perfectly just and legal. The Apex Court in case of Vishnu Agarwal (Supra) and judgement of learned Single Judge in Jawahar Lal (Supra) have reiterated that there is difference between recall and review. By seeking recall of order dated 15.12.2016, opposite party No. 2 is not seeking review of order dated 15.12.2016 and therefore bar contained in section 362 Cr.P.C. will not come in way. Consequently, I am of the considered opinion that order dated 15.12.2016, is liable to be recalled at the behest of opposite party No. 2, who admittedly was not afforded any notice or opportunity of hearing before order dated 15.12.2016 was passed.?
9. Learned counsel for the applicant has further relied upon the judgment in Vikram Bakshi (supra), and has submitted that in the said case the Supreme Court has considered that it is inherent or implied in a court to set aside a palpably erroneous order passed under misapprehension by it, however, a substantive review is when error sought to be corrected is one of law and is apparent on the face of record. In Paras 31 to 34, the Supreme Court observed:-
?31. This Court, however, in exceptional cases, has carved out limited scope for exercise of review power by criminal courts. In Grindlays Bank Ltd. (supra), it was observed that review can be distinguished between ?procedural review? and ?substantive review?. A ?procedural review? is inherent or implied in a court to set aside a palpably erroneous order passed under misapprehension by it, however, a ?substantive review? is when error sought to be corrected is one of law and is apparent on the face of the record. It is in the latter sense, this Court, held that no review lies on merits unless specifically provided under a statute.
32. This distinction has been further clarified in Budhia Swain v. Gopinath Deb6, wherein this Court has laid down certain grounds on which a criminal court can review or recall its judgment or order i.e. when the proceedings before it itself suffers from an inherent lack of jurisdiction or, a fraud is played upon court to obtain the order or, a mistake of court causing prejudice to party or the order was in ignorance of non-serving of necessary party or party had died and estate was not represented. It was further clarified that these exceptions were subjected to the limitation that such grounds cannot be raised to recall or review if they were available during the original action and was not availed.
33. In Ganesh Patel (supra) this Court held that application for recall seeking ?procedural review? and not ?substantive review? to which Section 362 of CrPC be attracted is permissible. This Court upheld the order of the High Court wherein it recalled the earlier order passed in the absence of the Respondent and based on false information.
34. A careful consideration of the statutory provisions and the aforesaid decisions of this Court clarify the now-well-settled position of jurisprudence of Section 362 of CrPC which when summarize would be that the criminal courts, as envisaged under the CrPC, are barred from altering or review their own judgments except for the exceptions which are explicitly provided by the statute, namely, correction of a clerical or an arithmetical error that might have been committed or the said power is provided under any other law for the time being in force. As the courts become functus officio the very moment a judgment or an order is signed, the bar of Section 362 CrPC becomes applicable, this, despite the powers provided under Section 482 CrPC which, this veil cannot allow the courts to step beyond or circumvent an explicit bar. It also stands clarified that it is only in situations wherein an application for recall of an order or judgment seeking a ?procedural review? that the bar would not apply and not a substantive review? where the bar as contained in Section ?362 CrPC is attracted. Numerous decisions of this Court have also elaborated that the bar under said provision is to be applied stricto sensu.?
10. Learned counsel for the applicant has submitted that in Muskan (supra), the Supreme Court in Para 22 observed:-
? 22. On the aspect of the powers of the Courts under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C., it is settled that at the stage of quashing, the Court is not required to conduct a mini trial. Thus, the jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. with respect to quashing is somewhat limited as the Court has to only consider whether any sufficient material is available to proceed against the accused or not. If sufficient material is available, the power under Section 482 should not be exercised.?
11. Learned counsel for the applicant has further relied upon the judgment in the case of Pratima Mohanty (supra), and has submitted that in the said case, the Supreme Court has held that at the stage of discharge and/or considering the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. the courts are not required to go into the merits of the allegations. In Para-8.2, it has been held as under:
? 8.2. It is trite that the power of quashing should be exercised sparingly and with circumspection and in rare cases. As per the settled proposition of law while examining an FIR/complaint quashing of which is sought, the court cannot embark upon any enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness of allegations made in the FIR/complaint. Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception rather than any ordinary rule. Normally the criminal proceedings should not be quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482CrPC when after a thorough investigation the charge-sheet has been filed. At the stage of discharge and/or considering the application under Section 482CrPC the courts are not required to go into the merits of the allegations and/or evidence in detail as if conducting the mini-trial. As held by this Court the powers under Section 482CrPC are very wide, but conferment of wide power requires the court to be more cautious. It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the Court.?
12. Learned counsel for the applicant has further relied upon paragraph-17 of the judgment in T.C. Mathai (supra), wherein the Supreme Court observed:-
?17. The aforesaid observations, though stated sixty years ago, would represent the correct legal position even now. Be that as it may, an agent cannot become a ?pleader? for the party in criminal proceedings, unless the party secures permission from the court to appoint him to act in such proceedings. The respondent-couple have not even moved for such a permission and hence no occasion has arisen so far to consider that aspect.?
13. Learned counsel for the applicant has also relied upon paragraph-13 of the judgment in Samantha Christina Delfina Willis (supra), wherein the Court has observed that power of attorney holder of an accused cannot maintain a petition be it under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India read with Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. In Para-13, the Court observed:-
?13. On a coalesce of the judgments so rendered by the Constitutional Courts, what can be unmistakably gathered is that the power of attorney holder of an accused cannot maintain a petition be it under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India read with Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. or Criminal Petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Therefore, I hold that the present petition filed by the power of attorney holder of the accused, without seeking any permission at the hands of this Court, and without even narrating in the petition that he is personally aware of the facts of the case, the writ petition filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India read with Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is per se not maintainable, as the accused cannot be represented by a power of attorney holder and thus, maintain the subject petition.?
14. On the other hand, Sri Dhruv Mathur, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Sri Shubham Tripathi, appearing for opposite party no.2 herein, has submitted that in this case, the applicant herein had appeared through his counsel and counter affidavit dated 11.11.2025 was also filed on his behalf and he was adequately represented before this Court and also participated in the proceedings of 482 Cr.P.C. It has been submitted that the Court has passed the judgment on 19.3.2026 after going through the material available on record and accordingly found that the complaint instituted is the counterblast to the case instituted by the applicant under Section 138 of N.I. Act against opposite party no.2 and the case was decided on 19.3.2026 in revised call, but learned counsel for the applicant (opposite party no.2 in the application) was not present. It has been submitted by Sri Mathur that a bare perusal of the recall application dated 13.4.2026 would show that by means of the same, learned counsel for the applicant is trying to bring in certain new facts pertaining to the present case and as such, is trying to seek a substantive recall/review of the judgment and order dated 19.3.2026, and in view of Section 362 Cr.P.C., the Court cannot alter or review the judgment after signing it. He has relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the cases of State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Man Singh (2019) 10 SCC 161 and Vikram Bakshi and others vs. R.P. Khosla and another, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1783. He has further submitted that when a procedural review of a judgment or final order is sought, the bar provided under Section 362 Cr.P.C. would not apply, whereas in the present case, the applicant is trying to seek a substantive review of the judgment and order dated 19.3.2026. He further submits that the Supreme Court has carved out an exception that where a judgment or final order is passed without serving all necessary parties or the order lacks inherent jurisdiction, the same can be recalled, but in the present case, no such contingency is visible.
15. I have heard Sri Suresh Chandra Shukla, learned counsel for the applicant, Sri Dhruv Mathur, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Sri Shubham Tripathi, learned counsel for opposite party no.2, Sri Rao Narendra Singh, learned AGA-I for the State, and perused the record.
16. There is substantive provision in Cr.P.C. under Section 362, which prohibits that no Court can alter or review its judgment after signing the same, except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error. Section 362 of Cr.P.C. reads as under:
?362. Court not to alter judgment.- Save as otherwise provided by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, no Court, when it has signed its judgment or final order disposing of a case, shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error.?
17. In the case of Man Singh (supra), it has been held by the Supreme Court that after disposing of a case on merits, the Court becomes functus officio and Section 362 Cr.P.C. expressly bars review and specifically provides that no court after it has signed its judgment shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error. It further observed that recall of judgment would amount to alteration or review of judgment which is not permissible under Section 362 Cr.P.C. The Supreme Court in Paras 7 and 8 observed as under:
?7. It is well settled law that the High Court has no jurisdiction to review its order either under Section 362 or under Section 482 . The inherent power under Section 482 CrPC cannot be used by the High Court to reopen or alter an order disposing of a petition decided on merits. After disposing of a case on merits, the Court becomes functus officio and Section 362 CrPC expressly bars review and specifically provides that no court after it has signed its judgment shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error . Recall of judgment would amount to alteration or review of judgment which is not permissible under Section 362 CrPC. It cannot be validated by the High Court invoking its inherent powers.
8. We have, therefore, no doubt in our mind that the High Court had no power to entertain the petition under Section 482 CrPC and alter the sentence imposed by it. We may also add that the manner in which the probation has been granted is not at all legal. The trial court had given reasons for not giving benefit of probation. When the High Court was deciding the revision petition against the order of conviction, it could have, after calling for a report of the Probation Officer in terms of Section 4 of the Act, granted probation. Even in such a case it had to give reasons why it disagreed with the trial court and the first appellate court on the issue of sentence. The High Court, in fact, reduced the sentence to the period already undergone meaning thereby that the conviction was upheld and sentence was imposed. After sentence had been imposed and served and fine paid, there was no question of granting probation.”
18. The issue of recall has been considered by the Supreme Court in its latest judgment of Vikram Bakshi (supra). In the said case, the Supreme Court has held that a ?procedural review? is inherent or implied in a court to set aside a palpably erroneous order passed under misapprehension by it, however, a ?substantive review? is when error sought to be corrected is one of law and is apparent on the face of the record. When there is an apparent error on the face of record, review can lie and if the proceedings suffer from inherent lack of jurisdiction or fraud, then the recall or review can be entertained. In Paras 31, 32, 33, 34 and 34A, the Supreme Court observed:
?31. This Court, however, in exceptional cases, has carved out limited scope for exercise of review power by criminal courts. In Grindlays Bank Ltd. (supra), it was observed that review can be distinguished between ?procedural review? and ?substantive review?. A ?procedural review? is inherent or implied in a court to set aside a palpably erroneous order passed under misapprehension by it, however, a ?substantive review? is when error sought to be corrected is one of law and is apparent on the face of the record. It is in the latter sense, this Court, held that no review lies on merits unless specifically provided under a statute.
32. This distinction has been further clarified in Budhia Swain v. Gopinath Deb6, wherein this Court has laid down certain grounds on which a criminal court can review or recall its judgment or order i.e. when the proceedings before it itself suffers from an inherent lack of jurisdiction or, a fraud is played upon court to obtain the order or, a mistake of court causing prejudice to party or the order was in ignorance of non-serving of necessary party or party had died and estate was not represented. It was further clarified that these exceptions were subjected to the limitation that such grounds cannot be raised to recall or review if they were available during the original action and was not availed.
33. In Ganesh Patel (supra) this Court held that application for recall seeking ?procedural review? and not ?substantive review? to which Section 362 of CrPC be attracted is permissible. This Court upheld the order of the High Court wherein it recalled the earlier order passed in the absence of the Respondent and based on false information.
34. A careful consideration of the statutory provisions and the aforesaid decisions of this Court clarify the now-well-settled position of jurisprudence of Section 362 of CrPC which when summarize would be that the criminal courts, as envisaged under the CrPC, are barred from altering or review their own judgments except for the exceptions which are explicitly provided by the statute, namely, correction of a clerical or an arithmetical error that might have been committed or the said power is provided under any other law for the time being in force. As the courts become functus officio the very moment a judgment or an order is signed, the bar of Section 362 CrPC becomes applicable, this, despite the powers provided under Section 482 CrPC which, this veil cannot allow the courts to step beyond or circumvent an explicit bar. It also stands clarified that it is only in situations wherein an application for recall of an order or judgment seeking a ?procedural review? that the bar would not apply and not a substantive review? where the bar as contained in Section ?362 CrPC is attracted. Numerous decisions of this Court have also elaborated that the bar under said provision is to be applied stricto sensu.
34A. Having said that, the following exceptional circumstances may be identified, wherein a criminal court is empowered to alter or review its own judgment or a final order under Section 362 CrPC:
a. Such power is expressly conferred upon court by CrPC or any other law for the time being in force or;
b. The court passing such a judgment or order lacked inherent jurisdiction to do so or;
c. A fraud or collusion is being played on court to obtain such judgment or order or;
d. A mistake on the part of court caused prejudice to a party or;
e. Fact relating to non-serving of necessary party or death leading to estate being non-represented, not brought to notice of court while passing such judgment or order.
It needs to be reiterated that all these exceptions are only exercisable for seeking a recall or review of an order or judgment, if a ground that is raised was not available or existent at the time of original proceedings before the Court. Mere fact that the said ground, although available, was not raised or pressed during the concerned proceedings, does not provide for an exemption to the parties to assert it as a ground. Moreover, the said power cannot be invoked as a means to circumvent the finality of the judicial process or mistakes and/or errors in the decision which are attributable to a conscious omission by the parties.
19. This Court, dealing with the similar issue, in the case of Javed Ahmad @ Javed and others vs. State of U.P. and another: 2025:AHC-LKO:25257, in Paras 16, 18 and 20 observed as under:
“16. In the case of Smt. Sooraj Devi vs. Pyare Lal and another, (1981) 1 SCC 500, the Hon’ble Apex Court took note of the expression “clerical or arithmetical error” indicated under Section 362 Cr.P.C. and in regard to the same observed as under:-
“A clerical or arithmetical error is an error occasioned by an accidental slip or omission of the court. It represents that which the court never intended to say. It is an error apparent on the face of the record and does not depend for its discovery on argument or disputation. An arithmetical error is a mistake of calculation, and a clerical error is a mistake in writing or typing. Master Construction Co. (P) Ltd. v. State of Orissa [AIR 1966 SC 1047 : (1966) 3 SCR 99 : (1966) 17 STC 360].”
…….
18. In the case of State of Punjab vs. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar (2011) 14 SCC 770, Hon’ble Apex Supreme Court observed and held that :-
“III. BAR TO REVIEW/ALTER- JUDGMENT
44. There is no power of review with the Criminal Court after judgment has been rendered. The High Court can alter or review its judgment before it is signed. When an order is passed, it cannot be reviewed. Section 362 Cr.P.C. is based on an acknowledged principle of law that once a matter is finally disposed of by a Court, the said Court in the absence of a specific statutory provision becomes functus officio and is disentitled to entertain a fresh prayer for any relief unless the former order of final disposal is set aside by a Court of competent jurisdiction in a manner prescribed by law. The Court becomes functus officio the moment the order for disposing of a case is signed. Such an order cannot be altered except to the extent of correcting a clerical or arithmetical error. There is also no provision for modification of the judgment. (See: Hari Singh Mann v. Harbhajan Singh Bajwa & Ors., AIR 2001 SC 43; and Chhanni v. State of U.P., AIR 2006 SC 3051).
45. Moreover, the prohibition contained in Section 362 Cr.P.C. is absolute; after the judgment is signed, even the High Court in exercise of its inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has no authority or jurisdiction to alter/review the same. (See: Moti Lal v. State of M.P., (2012) 11 SCC 427: AIR 1994 SC 1544; Hari Singh Mann (2001) 1 SCC 169: 2001 SCC (Cri) 113; and State of Kerala v. M.M. Manikantan Nair, (2001) 4 SCC 752 : AIR 2001 SC 2145).
46. If a judgment has been pronounced without jurisdiction or in violation of principles of natural justice or where the order has been pronounced without giving an opportunity of being heard to a party affected by it or where an order was obtained by abuse of the process of court which would really amount to its being without jurisdiction, inherent powers can be exercised to recall such order for the reason that in such an eventuality the order becomes a nullity and the provisions of Section 362 Cr.P.C. would not operate. In such eventuality, the judgment is manifestly contrary to the audi alteram partem rule of natural justice. The power of recall is different from the power of altering/reviewing the judgment. However, the party seeking recall/alteration has to establish that it was not at fault. (Vide: Chitawan & Ors. v. Mahboob Ilahi, 1970 Crl.L.J. 378 (All); Deepak Thanwardas Balwani v. State of Maharashtra & Anr., 1985 Crl.L.J. 23 (Bom); Habu v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1987 Raj. 83 (F.B.); Swarth Mahto & Anr. v. Dharmdeo Narain Singh, AIR 1972 SC 1300; Makkapati Nagaswara Sastri v. S.S. Satyanarayan, AIR 1981 SC 1156; Asit Kumar Kar v. State of West Bengal & Ors., (2009) 2 SCC 703; and Vishnu Agarwal v. State of U.P. & Anr., AIR 2011 SC 1232).
47. This Court by virtue of Article 137 of the Constitution has been invested with an express power to review any judgment in Criminal Law and while no such power has been conferred on the High Court, inherent power of the court cannot be exercised for doing that which is specifically prohibited by the Code itself. (Vide: State Represented by D.S.P., S.B.C.I.D., Chennai v. K.V. Rajendran & Ors., AIR 2009 SC 46).
48. In Smt. Sooraj Devi v. Pyare Lal & Anr., AIR 1981 SC 736, this Court held that the prohibition in Section 362 Cr.P.C. against the Court altering or reviewing its judgment, is subject to what is “otherwise provided by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force”. Those words, however, refer to those provisions only where the Court has been expressly authorised by the Code or other law to alter or review its judgment. The inherent power of the Court is not contemplated by the saving provision contained in Section 362 Cr.P.C. and, therefore, the attempt to invoke that power can be of no avail.
49. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that the criminal justice delivery system does not clothe the court to add or delete any words, except to correct the clerical or arithmetical error as specifically been provided under the statute itself after pronouncement of the judgment as the Judge becomes functus officio. Any mistake or glaring omission is left to be corrected only by the appropriate forum in accordance with law.”
……..
20. In the case of Mukesh Updhyay vs. State of U.P. and another, 2019:AHC:42284, this Court at Allahabad observed as under :-
“This issue has been dealt by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the following judgments :-
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Soorja Devi vs. Pyare Lal and Another reported at (1981) 1 SCC 500 has held in paras No.4, 5, 6 and 7 that :-
“4. The sole question before us is whether the High Court was right in refusing to entertain Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 5127 of 1978 on the ground that it had no power to review its order dated Ist September, 1970. Section 362 of the Code of Criminal Procedure declares :- “Save as otherwise provided by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, no Court, when it has signed its judgment or final order disposing of a case, shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error”. It is apparent that what the appellant seeks by the application is not the correction of a clerical or arithmetical error. What she desires is a declaration that the High Court order dated September 1, 1970 does not affect her rights in the house property and that the direction to restore possession to Pyare Lal is confined to that portion only of the house property respecting which the offence of trespass was committed so that she is not evicted from the portion in her possession. The appellant, in fact, asks for an adjudication that the right to possession alleged by her remains unaffected by the order dated September 1, 1970. Pyare Lal disputes that the order is not binding on her and that she is entitled to the right in the property claimed by her. Having considered the matter, we are not satisfied that the controversy can be brought within the description “clerical or arithmetical error”. A clerical or arithmetical error is an error occasioned by an accidental slip or omission of the court. It represents that which the court never intended to say. It is an error apparent on the face of the record and does not depend for its discovery on argument or disputation. An arithmetical error is a mistake of calculation, and a clerical error is a mistake in writing or typing. Master Construction Co. (P) Ltd. v. State of Orissa.
5. The appellant points out that he invoked the inherent power of the High Court saved by Section 482 of the Code and that notwithstanding the prohibition imposed by Section 362 the High Court had power to grant relief. Now it is well settled that the inherent power of the court cannot be exercised for doing that which is specifically prohibited by the Code. Sankatha Singh v. State of U.P3. It is true that the prohibition in Section 362 against the Court altering or reviewing its judgment is subject to what is “otherwise provided by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force”. Those words, however, refer to those provisions only where the Court has been expressly authorised by the Code or other law to alter or review its judgment. The inherent power of the Court is not contemplated by the saving provision contained in Section 362 and, therefore, the attempt to invoke that power can be of no avail.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Narayan Prasad vs. State of Bihar reported at 2017 SCC Online SC 1738 has held that :-
6. In order to decide the controversy at hand, it would be useful to reproduce Sections 362 and 482 of The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [hereinafter ‘CrPC‘ for brevity]
362. Court not to alter judgment.- Save as otherwise provided by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, no Court, when it has signed its judgment or final order disposing of a case, shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error.
482. Saving of inherent powers of High Court.-Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.
7. Plan reading of these Sections indicate that the prohibition under the Section 362 of Cr.P.C. is absolute; after the judgment is signed even the High Court in exercise of its inherent power under Section 482 of CrPC has no authority or jurisdiction to alter/review the same. The inherent power under Section 482 of CrPC was purported to avoid the abuse of the process of the Court and to secure ends of justice. Such power cannot be exercised to do something which is expressly barred under the Code.
8. If any consideration of the facts by way of review is not permissible under the Code and is expressly barred, it is not for the Court to exercise its inherent power to reconsider the matter.”
Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in a judgment dated 30.5.2016 passed in Criminal Misc. Recall Application No.126367 of 2016 in Application u/s 482 No.5938 of 2016 has held that :-
“Full Bench of five Judges in Mahesh Vs. State, 1971 ALJ page 668 held, “the legal position can be summarized by laying down that the High Court is not possessed of general power to review, revise or reconsider the judgment or order duly pronounced in criminal appeal or a criminal revision, though the judgment or order can be so reviewed, revised or reconsidered in exceptional circumstances in exercise of the inherent power under Section 561-A (presently section 482), Cr.P.C, provided that the inherent power is so exercised for one of the three purposes detailed therein”.
There is no power of review with the criminal court after the judgment has been rendered. The High Court can alter or review its judgment before it is signed. When an order is passed, it cannot be reviewed. Section 362 Cr.P.C is based on an acknowledged principle of law that once a matter is finally disposed of by a court, the said court in the absence of a specific statutory provision becomes functus officio and is dis-entitled to entertain a fresh prayer for any relief unless the former order of final disposal is set aside by a court of competent jurisdiction in a manner prescribed by law. The court becomes functus officio the moment the order for disposing of a case is signed. Such an order cannot be altered except to the extent of correcting a clerical or arithmetical error. There is also no provision for modification of the judgment. ( Vide Hari singh Mann Vs. Harbhajan Singh Bajwa, 2001 (1) SCC 169).
Moreover the prohibition contained in Section 362 Cr.P.C is absolute; after the judgement is signed, even the High Court in exercise of its inherent power under Section 482 CrP.C has no authority or jurisdiction to alter/review the same (vide Moti Lal Vs. State of M.P. (2012) 11 SCC 427).
If a judgement has been pronounced without jurisdiction or in violation of principle of natural justice or where the order has been pronounced without giving an opportunity of being heard to a party affected by it or where an order was obtained by abuse of the process of court which would really amount to its being without jurisdiction, inherent powers can be exercised to recall such order for the reason that in such an eventuality the order becomes a nullity and the provisions of Section 362 Cr.P.C would not operate. In such an eventuality, the judgment is manifestly contrary to the audi alteram partem rule of natural justice. The power of recall is different from the power of altering/reviewing the judgment. However, the party seeking recall/alteration has to establish that it was not at fault.( vide Chitawan Vs. Mahboob Ilahi, 1970 Cri. LJ 378( All), Asit Kumar Kar Vs. State of West Bengal (2009) 2 SCC 703)”.
In view of the abovementioned judgments, the review petition is expressly barred under Section 362 Cr.P.C and applicant has not able to point out that impugned judgment was passed contrary to the rule of natural justice or passed without jurisdiction, therefore, even under power of 482 Cr.P.C., this review application cannot be entertained. Thus, the present review application is rejected being not maintainable.”
20. It is also to be mentioned here that there is no allegation that any order has been obtained by playing any fraud or misrepresentation. The merit has been discussed and thereafter the detailed judgment has been passed by considering the entire evidences produced by the parties. It is also not the case that the applicant was not served notice and his counter affidavit has been filed. It is also not the case of the applicant that this Court lacks inherent jurisdiction while passing the final order. After discussing the aforesaid judgments of the Supreme Court as well as of this Court and perusing the record, it is observed that this Court has passed the order after considering the evidences available on record and in view of Section 362 Cr.P.C., final order cannot be recalled.
21. This Court, therefore, cannot review or alter the judgment once the same has been pronounced and signed. There is also no correction of a clerical or an arithmetical error in the case, rather the applicant wants that the judgment should be recalled and the matter should be re-heard, which is impermissible in view of various judgments, as cited above.
22. In view of above, the recall application is devoid of merit. It is accordingly rejected.
(Brij Raj Singh,J.)
May 21, 2026
Sachin
