Chattisgarh High Court
Royal Traders vs Union Of India on 6 July, 2026
1
CGHC010041342026 2026:CGHC:27607
AFR
Digitally
signed by
YOGESH
YOGESH TIWARI
TIWARI Date:
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
2026.07.06
17:57:48
+0530
Order Reserved on : 06.05.2026
Order Delivered on : 06.07.2026
WPC No. 466 of 2026
1 - Royal Traders, Through Its Proprietor Mohan Patel S/o Kanjee Bhai
Patel, Aged About 54 Years, R/o Village Khuteri- Somni, District -
Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh.
2 - Agrawal Saw Mill, Through Its Proprietor Pramod Kumar Agrwal, S/o
Mohan Lal Agrawal, Aged About 55 Years, R/o Village Asra, Tehsil
Dongargaon, District - Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh.
3 - Khetani Boards, Through Hari Bhai Patel, S/o Jetha Bhai Patel,
Aged About 64 Years, R/o Shankara, Post- Somni , District -
Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh.
4 - Patel Saw Mill, Proprietor Govind Bhai Patel (Dead) Through Legal
Kamlesh Patel, S/o Late Govind Bhai Patel, Aged About 39 Years, R/o
Village Somni , District - Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh.
5 - Subhashchand Jain Saw Mill, Through Its Proprietor Subhashchand
Jain, S/o Khemraj Jain, Aged About 75 Years, R/o Village Arjuni, Tahsil
Dongargaon, District - Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh.
6 - Abdul Khalique Saw Mill, Through Its Proprietor Mohd. Farooqe S/o
2
Abdul Khalique, Aged About 54 Years, R/o Village Gopalpur, Post
Ghumka, District - Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh.
7 - Ramdev Saw Mill, Through Its Proprietor Sahilesh Kumar Jain, S/o
Sari Fatte Lal Jain, Aged About 54 Years, R/o Village Tumdibod, Tehsil
Dongargaon, District - Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh.
8 - Ashok Saw Mill, Through Its Proprietor Ashok Verma, S/o Diwdayal
Verma, Aged About 55 Years, R/o Village Ghumka, District -
Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh.
9 - Radheshyam Saw Mill, Through Its Proprietor Radheshyam, S/o
Late Hari Das, Aged About 51 Years, R/o Village Telai, Post Padumtala,
District - Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh.
10 - Kaushila Bai And Shankar Lal Saw Mill, Through Proprietor
Shankar Lal, S/o Ghurwara, Aged About 42 Years, R/o Village
Tumdibod, Tehsil- Dongargaon, District - Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh.
11 - Someshwar Kumar Verma, S/o Heeraram Verma Aged About 58
Years R/o Village Ramatola Tehsil Dongargarh, District Rajnandgaon
Chhattisgarh.
12 - S.S.D. Saw Mill, Through Its Proprietor Hundraj Mankani S/o Sajan
Das Mankani, Aged About 55 Years, R/o Village Tilai, District
Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh.
13 - Rajaram Saw Mill, Through Its Proprietor Radhelal (D) Through Its
Lrs. Gomati Bai W/o Radhelal Age About 62 Years, R/o Village
Rupakathi, Khursipar Tehsil Dongargaon, District- Rajnandgaon,
Chhattisgarh.
14 - Dubey Saw Mill, Through Its Proprietor Mithilesh S/o Radhe Lal
3
Dubey, Aged About 66 Years, R/o Gendatola, District- Rajnandgaon,
Chhattisgarh.
15 - Kaikeyi Bai Saw Mill, Through Its Proprietor Kaikeyi Bai, W/o
Dindayal Verma, Aged About 66 Years, R/o Village Ghumka, District-
Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh.
16 - Ismile Saw Mill, Through Its Proprietor Mohd. Ismile S/o Suleman
Bhai, Aged About 74 Years, R/o Village Gendatola, District-
Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh.
17 - Govind Saw Mill, Through Its Proprietor Kali Bai Sahu, W/o Late
Govind Lal Sahu, Aged About 65 Years, R/o Village Arjuni, District-
Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh.
18 - Kanwar Saw Mill, Through Its Proprietor Banware Ram, S/o
Ramdayal Kanwar Aged About 75 Years, R/o Village Deokatta, Tehsil
Dongargarh, District- Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh.
--- Petitioners
Versus
1 - Union Of India Ministry of Environment Forest and Climate Change
Through Its Secretary, New Delhi.
2 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Its Secretary, Department Of Forest
And Climate Change, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Nawa Raipur,
Atal Nagar, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh.
3 - Principal Chief Conservator Of Forest Chhattisgarh Aranya Bhawan
Sector-19, North Block, Nawa Raipur, Atal Nagar, District Raipur,
Chhattisgarh.
4
4 - State Level Committee Chhattisgarh Under Wood Based Industries
Guidelines Through Its Member Sector-19, North Block, Nawa Raipur,
Atal Nagar, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh.
5 - Divisional Forest Officer-Cum-Licensing Authority District
Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh.
--- Respondents
WPC No. 2047 of 2026
Chandrakar Saw Mill Through Its Proprietor – Levendra Kumar
Chandrakar S/o Late Onkar Prasad Chandrakar Aged About 59 Years
R/o Village- Sankara Bangla, Post- Karhibadar, Tehsil And District-
Balod, (C.G.)
—Petitioner
Versus
1 – Union Of India Ministry Of Environment Forest And Climate Change
Through Its Secretary, New Delhi
2 – State Of Chhattisgarh Through Its Secretary, Department Of Forest
And Climate Change, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Nawa Raipur,
Atal Nagar, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh
3 – Principal Chief Conservator Of Forest Chhattisgarh Aranya Bhawan
Sector 19, North Block, Nawa Raipur, Atal Nagar, District Raipur,
Chhattisgarh
4 – State Level Committee Chhattisgarh Under Wood Based Industries
Guidelines Through Its Member Sector- 19, North Block, Nawa Raipur,
Atal Nagar, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh
5
5 – Divisional Forest Officer-Cum Licensing Authority District Balod,
Chhattisgarh
— Respondents
WPC No. 745 of 2026
Shailesh Kumar Agrawal S/o Late Ashok Kumar Agrawal Aged About
38 Years Address Village Kuthraud, Post – Hirmi, District Balodabazar-
Bhathapara, Chhattisgarh
—Petitioner
Versus
1 – Union Of India Ministry Of Environment Forest And Climate Change
Through Its Secretary, New Delhi
2 – State Of Chhattisgarh Through Its Secretary, Department Of Forest
And Climate Change, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Nawa Raipur,
Atal Nagar, District Raipur Chhattisgarh
3 – Principal Chief Conservator Of Forest Chhattisgarh, Aranya Bhawan
Sector-19, North Block, Nawa Raipur, Atal Nagar, District Raipur,
Chhattisgarh
4 – State Level Committee Chhattisgarh Under Wood Based Industries
Guidelines Through Its Member Sector-19, North Block, Nawa Raipur,
Atal Nagar, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh
5 – Divisional Forest Officer-Cum-Licensing Authority District Baloda
Bazar-Bhatapara Chhattisgarh
— Respondents
6
WPC No. 984 of 2026
Radheyshyam Sahu S/o Shri Punarad Ram Sahu Aged About 72 Years
Properitor Of Radheyshyam Saw Mill, R/o Village Chord Karsil, Tehsil-
Magarlod And Distt.- Dhamtari (C.G.)
—Petitioner
Versus
1 – Union Of India Ministry of Environment Forest and Climate Change
Through Its Secretary, New Delhi.
2 – State Of Chhattisgarh Through Its Secretary, Department Of Forest
And Climate Change, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Nawa Raipur,
Atal Nagar, Distt.- Raipur (C.G.)
3 – Principal Chief Conservator Of Forest Chhattisgarh, Aranya Bhawn
Sector-19, North Block, Nawa Raipur, Atal Nagar, Distt.- Raipur (C.G.)
4 – State Level Committee Chhattisgarh Under Wood Based Industries
Guidelines Through Its Member Secretary, Aranya Bhawan Sector-19,
North Block, Nawa Raipur, Atal Nagar, Distt.- Raipur (C.G.)
5 – Divisional Forest Officer-Cum-Licencing Authority Dhamtari, Distt.-
Dhamtari (C.G.)
— Respondents
WPC No. 496 of 2026
Bhupendra Agrawal S/o Bhagwan Agrawal Aged About 53 Years
Proprietor Agrawal Saw Mill, Address- Village Lahaud, Tehsil And Dist. –
Baloda Bazar-Bhatapara, Chhattisgarh
—Petitioner
Versus
7
1 – Union Of India Ministry Of Environment Forest And Climate Change
Through Its Secretary, New Delhi
2 – State Of Chhattisgarh Through Its Secretary, Department Of Forest
And Climate Change, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Nawa Raipur,
Atal Nagar, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh
3 – Principal Chief Conservator Of Forest Aranya Bhawan Sector-19,
North Block, Nawa Raipur, Atal Nagar, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh
4 – State Level Committee Chhattisgarh Under Wood Based Industries
Guidelines Through Its Member Secretary, Aranya Bhawan Sector-19,
North Block, Nawa Raipur, Atal Nagar, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh
5 – Divisional Forest Officer-Cum-Licencing Authority Baloda Bazar,
District : Balodabazar-Bhathapara, Chhattisgarh
— Respondents
WPC No. 497 of 2026
Guljari Lal Sahu S/o Late Dashrath Lal Sahu Aged About 57 Years,
Proprietor Agrawal Saw Mill, Address- Village Lahoud, Tehsil And Dist.-
Baloda Bazar-Bhatapara, Chhattisgarh
—Petitioner
Versus
1 – Union Of India Aranya Bhawan Sector-19, North Block, Nawa
Raipur, Atal Nagar
2 – State Of Chhattisgarh Through Its Secretary, Department Of Forest
And Climate Change, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Nawa Raipur,
Atal Nagar, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh
8
3 – Principal Chief Conservator Of Forest, Chhattisgarh, Aranya
Bhawan Sector-19, North Block, Nawa Raipur, Atal Nagar, District :
Raipur, Chhattisgarh
4 – State Level Committee Chhattisgarh Under Wood Based Industries
Guidelines Through Its Member Secretary, Aranya Bhawan Sector-19,
North Block, Nawa Raipur, Atal Nagar, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh
5 – Divisional Forest Officer-Cum-Licencing Authority Baloda Bazar,
District : Balodabazar-Bhathapara, Chhattisgarh
— Respondents
WPC No. 519 of 2026
Sandeep Saw Mill, Through Its Proprietor Krishnanand, S/o Bhola
Prasad Agarwal, Aged About 50 Years, Address- Village Bharsoli, The
Baloda Bazar, Distt Baloda Bazaar Chhattisgarh.
—Petitioner
Versus
1 – Union Of India Ministry Of Environment Forest And Climage Change
Through Its Secretary, New Delhi
2 – State Of Chhattisgarh Through Its Secretary, Department Of Forest
And Climate Change, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Nawa Raipur,
Atal Nagar, Distt. Raipur Chhattisgarh
3 – Principal Chief Conservator Of Forest Chhattisgarh, Aranya Bhawan
Sector-19, North Block, Nawa Raipur, Atal Nagar, Distt. Raipur
Chhattisgarh
4 – State Level Committee Chhattisgarh Under Wood Based Industries
Guidelines Through Its Member Secretary, Aranya Bhawan Sector-19,
North Block, Nawa Raipur, Atal Nagar, Distt. Raipur Chhattisgarh
9
5 – Divisional Forest Officer-Cum-Licencing Authority Baloda Bazar,
Distt. Baloda Bazar-Bhatapara Chhattisgarh
— Respondents
WPC No. 556 of 2026
Chaitram Dewangan, S/o Shri Ganu Lal Dewangan Aged About 45
Years Address- Village Tulsi Post- Damakheda District- Balodabazar
Bhatapara Chhattisgarh District- Balodabazar-Bhathapara,
Chhattisgarh.
—Petitioner
Versus
1 – Union Of India Ministry Of Environment Forest And Climate Change
Through Its Secretary New Delhi,
2 – State Of Chhattisgarh Through Its Secretary Department Of Forest
And Climate Change Mantralaya Mahanadi Bhawan Nawa Raipur, Atal
Nagar District- Raipur Chhattisgarh
3 – Principal Chief Conservator Of Forest Chhattisgarh Aranya Bhawan
Sector 19, North Block- Nawa Raipur Atal Nagar District- Raipur
Chhattisgarh,
4 – State Level Committee Chhattisgarh Under Wood Based Industries
Guidelines Through Its Member Sector -19 North Block- Nawa Raipur
Atal Nagar District- Raipur Chhattisgarh
5 – Divisional Forest Officer Cum Licensing Authority District- Baloda
Bazar-Bhatapara Chhattisgarh
— Respondents
WPC No. 574 of 2026
10
Praveen Patel S/o Ramnik Patel Aged About 38 Years Proprietor
Narayan Saw Mill, Address- Village- Pendri, Tehsil- Bhatapara, District-
Baloda Bazar Bhataparaa Bazar-Bhatapara Chhattisgarh.
—Petitioner
Versus
1 – Union Of India Ministry Of Environment Forest And Climate Change
Through Its Secretary New Delhi.
2 – State Of Chhattisgarh Through Its Secretary Department Of Forest
And Climate Change Mantralaya Mahanadi Bhawan Nawa Raipur Atal
Nagar, District- Raipur Chhattisgarh.
3 – Principal Chief Conservator Of Forest Chhattisgarh Aranya Bhawan
Sector- 19, North Block- Nawa Raipur Atal Nagar, District- Raipur
Chhattisgarh,
4 – State Level Committee Chhattisgarh Under Wood Based Industries
Guidelines Through Its Member Sector -19, North Block- Nawa Raipur,
Atal Nagar District- Raipur Chhattisgarh,
5 – Divisional Forest Officer Cum Licensing Authority District- Baloda
Bazar-Bhatapara Chhattisgarh,
— Respondents
WPC No. 629 of 2026
Mohammad Aabid Gandhi S/o Md. Yakub Gandhi Aged About 40 Years
Address- Village Pondi, Tehsil Kawardha, District Kabirdham,
Chhattisgarh
—Petitioner
Versus
11
1 – Union Of India Ministry Of Environment Forest And Climate Change
Through Its Secretary, New Delhi.
2 – State Of Chhattisgarh Through Its Secretary, Department Of Forest
And Climate Change, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Nawa Raipur,
Atal Nagar, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh
3 – Principal Chief Conservator Of Forest Chhattisgarh Aranya Bhawan
Sector- 19, North Block, Nawa Raipur, Atal Nagar, District : Raipur,
Chhattisgarh
4 – State Level Committee Chhattisgarh Under Wood Based Industries
Guidelines Through Its Member Sector- 19, North Block, Nawa Raipur,
Atal Nagar, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh
5 – Divisional Forest Officer-Cum-Licensing Authority District
Kabirdham, Chhattisgarh
— Respondents
WPC No. 633 of 2026
Smt. Bina Ratre, W/o Ograsen Ratre, Aged About 43 Years Proprietor
Ratre Saw Mill, Address- Village Balsi, Tehsil Saripali, District
Mahasamund (C.G.)
—Petitioner
Versus
1 – Union Of India Ministry Of Environment Forest And Climate Change
Through Its Secretary, New Delhi.
2 – State Of Chhattisgarh Through Its Secretary, Department Of Forest
And Climate Change, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Nawa Raipur,
Atal Nagar, District Raipur C.G.
12
3 – Principal Chief Conservator Of Forest Chhattisgarh, Aranya Bhawan
Sector-19, North Block, Nawa Raipur, Atal Nagar, District Raipur C.G.
4 – State Level Committee Chhattisgarh Under Wood Based Industries
Guidelines Through Its Member Sector-19, North Block, Nawa Raipur,
Atal Nagar, District Raipur C.G.
5 – Divisional Forest Officer-Cum-Licensing Authority District
Mahasamund C.G.
— Respondents
WPC No. 634 of 2026
Om Saw Mill, Through Its Proprietor Om Nath Sahu, S/o Late Govind
Ram Sahu, Aged About 49 Years, Address- Village Amera, Tehsil
Baloda Bazaar, District Balodabazar-Bhathapara, Chhattisgarh
—Petitioner
Versus
1 – Union Of India Ministry Of Environment Forest And Climate Change
Through Its Secretary, New Delhi
2 – State Of Chhattisgarh Through Its Secretary, Department Of Forest
And Climate Change, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Nawa Raipur,
Atal Nagar, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh
3 – Principal Chief Conservator Of Forest Chhattisgarh Aranya Bhawan
Sector- 19, North Block, Nawa Raipur, Atal Nagar, District Raipur,
Chhattisgarh
4 – State Level Committee Chhattisgarh Under Wood Based Industries
Guidelines Through Its Member Sector-19, North Block, Nawa Raipur,
Atal Nagar, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh
13
5 – Divisional Forest Officer-Cum-Licensing Authority District Baloda
Bazar-Bhatapara, Chhattisgarh
— Respondents
WPC No. 432 of 2026
1 – Gurunanak Saw Mill, Through Its Proprietor Ramesh Chandra
Mishra S/o Mahadev Prasad Mishra, Aged About 83 Years, R/o
Bihreekalaa, Ambagarh Chowki, District Ambagarh Chowki
Chhattisgarh
2 – Vyas Narayan Saw Mill, Through Its Proprietor Vyas Narayan S/o
Late Pardeshi, Aged About 51 Years, R/o Village Chilhati, Ambagarh
Chowki, District Ambagarh Chowki Chhattisgarh
3 – Rajendra Kumar Mishra Saw Mill Village Kotra Through Its
Proprietor Rajendra Kumar Mishra (D) Through Its Lrs:-
3(a) – Nitesh Kumar Mishra S/o Naresh Kumar Mishra Aged About 31
Years Caste Brahman, R/o Village Dhadutola, Bandha Bazar, Tehsil
Chowki, District Ambagarh Chowki Chhattisgarh3(b) – Jai Mishra S/o Mukesh Mishra Aged About 19 Years R/o Village
Dhadutola, Bandha Bazar, Tehsil Chowki, District Ambagarh Chowki
Chhattisgarh3(c) – Anurag Mishra S/o Mukesh Mishra Aged About 15 Years Through
Guardian Mukesh Mishra S/o Rajendra Mishra Aged About 47 Years,
R/o Village Dhadutola, Bandha Bazar, Tehsil Chowki, District
Rajnandgaon Chhattisgarh
14
4 – Sahu Saw Mill, Through Its Proprietor Dinesh Kumar Sahu S/o Sant
Kumar Sahu, Aged About 49 Years, R/o Village Gunderdehi, Post
Bandha Bazaar, Tehsil Ambagarh Chowki, District Ambagarh Chowki
Chhattisgarh.
—Petitioners
Versus
1 – Union Of India Ministry Of Environment Forest And Climate Change
Through Its Secretary, New Delhi
2 – State Of Chhattisgarh Through Its Secretary, Department Of Forest
And Climate Change, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Nawa Raipur,
Atal Nagar, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh
3 – Principal Chief Conservator Of Forest Chhattisgarh, Aranya Bhawan
Sector-19, North Block, Nawa Raipur, Atal Nagar, District Raipur,
Chhattisgarh
4 – State Level Committee Chhattisgarh Under Wood Based Industries
Guidelines Through Its Member Sector-19, North Block, Nawa Raipur,
Atal Nagar, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh
5 – Divisional Forest Officer-Cum-Licensing Authority District Mohala-
Manpur-Ambagarh Chowki, Chhattisgarh
— Respondents
WPC No. 775 of 2026
Krishi And Saw Mill Through Proprietor Shri Ashok Kumar S/o
Gaurishankar Jaiswal, Aged About 67 Years, Address- Village Silheti,
Tehsil S. Lohara, District Kabirdham C.G.
—Petitioner
Versus
15
1 – Union Of India Ministry Of Environment Forest And Climate Change
Through Its Secretary, New Delhi.
2 – State Of Chhattisgarh Through Its Secretary, Department Of Forest
And Climate Change, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Nawa Raipur,
Atal Nagar, District Raipur C.G.
3 – Principal Chief Conservator Of Forest, Chhattisgarh, Aranya
Bhawan Sector-19, North Block, Nawa Raipur, Atal Nagar, District
Raipur C.G.
4 – State Level Committee Chhattisgarh Under Wood Based Industries
Guidelines Through Its Member Sector-19, North Block, Nawa Raipur,
Atal Nagar, District Raipur C.G.
5 – Divisional Forest Officer-Cum-Licensing Authority District Kabirdham
C.G.
— Respondents
WPC No. 768 of 2026
Agrawal Saw Mill, Through Its Proprietor Anil Kumar Agrawal, S/o Shri
Ram Gopal Agrawal, Aged About 53 Years, Address- Village Khokhli,
Tehsil Bhatapara, District Baloda Bazar Bhatapara C.G.
—Petitioner
Versus
1 – Union Of India Ministry Of Environment Forest And Climate Change
Through Its Secretary, New Delhi.
2 – State Of Chhattisgarh Through Its Secretary, Department Of Forest
And Climate Change, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Nawa Raipur,
Atal Nagar, District Raipur Chhattisgarh
16
3 – Principal Chief Conservator Of Forest Chhattisgarh, Aranya Bhawan
Sector-19, North Block, Nawa Raipur, Atal Nagar, District Raipur,
Chhattisgarh
4 – State Level Committee Chhattisgarh Under Wood Based Industries
Guidelines Through Its Member Sector-19, North Block, Nawa Raipur,
Atal Nagar, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh
5 – Divisional Forest Officer-Cum-Licensing Authority District Baloda
Bazar-Bhatapara Chhattisgarh
— Respondents
WPC No. 764 of 2026
Mahidhar Tamboli S/o Munnalal Tamboli Aged About 66 Years
Proprietor Maa Sharda Saw Mill, Address – Village Katgi, Tehsil Kasdol,
District Baloda Bazar Bhatapara Chhattisgarh
—Petitioner
Versus
1 – Union Of India Ministry Of Environment Forest And Climate Change
Through Its Secretary, New Delhi
2 – State Of Chhattisgarh Through Its Secretary, Department Of Forest
And Climate Change, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Nawa Raipur,
Atal Nagar, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh
3 – Principal Chief Conservator Of Forest Chhattisgarh Aranya Bhawan,
Sector – 19, North Block, Nawa Raipur, Atal Nagar, District Raipur,
Chhattisgarh
17
4 – State Level Committee Chhattisgarh Under Wood Based Industries
Guidelines Through Its Member Sector-19, North Block, Nawa Raipur,
Atal Nagar, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh
5 – Divisional Forest Officer-Cum-Licensing Authority District Baloda
Bazar – Bhatapara, Chhattisgarh
— Respondents
WPC No. 755 of 2026
Khemraj Patel S/o Laxmiprasad Patel Aged About 65 Years Address
Village Patasendri, Tehsil Saraipali, District Mahasamund Chhattisgarh
—Petitioner
Versus
1 – Union Of India Ministry Of Environment Forest And Climate Change
Through Its Secretary, New Delhi
2 – State Of Chhattisgarh Through Its Secretary, Department Of Forest
And Climate Change, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Nawa Raipur,
Atal Nagar, District Raipur Chhattisgarh
3 – Principal Chief Conservator Of Forest Chhattisgarh Aranya Bhawan
Sector-19, North Block, Nawa Raipur, Atal Nagar, District Raipur,
Chhattisgarh
4 – State Level Committee Chhattisgarh Under Wood Based Industries
Guidelines Through Its Member Sector-19, North Block, Nawa Raipur,
Atal Nagar, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh
5 – Divisional Forest Officer-Cum-Licensing Authority District
Mahasamund Chhattisgarh
— Respondents
18
WPC No. 758 of 2026
Gokul Prashad Rana S/o Vishe Sinhhash Aged About 67 Years
Address- Village Bhanwarpur, Tehsil Saripali, District Mahasamund
Chhattisgarh
—Petitioner
Versus
1 – Union Of India Ministry Of Environment Forest And Climate Change
Through Its Secretary, New Delhi
2 – State Of Chhattisgarh Through Its Secretary, Department Of Forest
And Climate Change, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Nawa Raipur,
Atal Nagar, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh
3 – Principal Chief Conservator Of Forest Chhattisgarh, Aranya Bhawan
Sector- 19, North Block, Nawa Raipur, Atal Nagar, District Raipur,
Chhattisgarh
4 – State Level Committee Chhattisgarh Under Wood Based Industries
Guidelines Through Its Member Sector- 19, North Block, Nawa Raipur,
Atal Nagar, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh
5 – Divisional Forest Officer-Cum-Licensing Authority District
Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh
— Respondents
WPC No. 424 of 2026
1 – Shri Anil Kumar Sharma S/o Sita Ram Sharma Aged About 57 Years
R/o Village Ijhalma Tehsil And District Balod, Chhattisgarh
19
2 – Hanuman Saw Mill Through Its Proprietor Triveni Bai Bairagi W/o
Late Shri Hanumandas Bairagi, Age About 65 Years R/o Village
Salhemanaki Tehsil Lohara District Balod Chhattisgarh
3 – Satish Saw Mill Through Its Proprietor Satish Kumar Jain S/o Late
Shri Fattelal Jain, Aged About 56 Years R/o Village Salhemanaki Tehsil
Lohara District Balod Chhattisgarh
4 – Durga Saw Mill Through Its Proprietor Laxminarayan Verma S/o
Late Shri Omprakash Verma, Aged About 30 Years, R/o Village Deori
Bangala Tehsil Lohara, District Balod Chhattisgarh
5 – Jai Ambey Saw Mill Through Its Proprietor Bhuwanlal Sahu S/o Late
Shri Mansaram Sahu Age About 52 Years R/o Village Parsuli, Tehsil
Lohara, District Balod Chhattisgarh
6 – Dewangan Saw Mill Through Its Proprietor Narayan Dewangan S/o
Shri Virendra Dewangan, Age About 56 Years, R/o Village Gidhwa,
Tehsil Lohara District Balod Chhattisgarh
7 – Sahu Saw Mill Through Its Proprietor Ramadhar Sahu S/o Shri
Thukaluram Sahu Age About 78 Years R/o Village Chihatikala Tehsil
Lohara District Balod Chhattisgarh
8 – Tigala Saw Mill Through Its Proprietor Mohd. Jabbar Tigala, S/o
Noor Mohmmad Tigala, Aged About 67 Years, R/o Village Mlighori
Tehsil Lohara District Balod Chhattisgarh
—Petitioners
Versus
1 – Union Of India Ministry of Environment Forest and Climate Change
Through Its Secretary, New Delhi.
20
2 – State Of Chhattisgarh Through Its Secretary, Department Of Forest
And Climate Change, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Nawa Raipur,
Atal Nagar, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh
3 – Principal Chief Conservator Of Forest Chhattisgarh, Aranya Bhawan
Sector-19, North Block, Nawa Raipur, Atal Nagar, District Raipur
Chhattisgarh
4 – State Level Committee Chhattisgarh Under Wood Based Industries
Guidelines Through Its Member Sector-19, North Block, Nawa Raipur,
Atal Nagar, District Raipur Chhattisgarh
5 – Divisional Forest Officer-Cum-Licensing Authority District Balod,
Chhattisgarh
— Respondents
(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)
For Respective : Mr. Chandresh Shrivastava, Mr. Vaibhav
Petitioners Shukla, Mr. Aditya Bhardwaj and Mr. Avinash
Chand Sahu, Advocates
For Union of India : Mr. Manoj Kumar Mishra, Senior Panel
Counsel and Mr. Niraj Baghel, Advocate on
behalf of Mr. Ramakant Mishra, Deputy
Solicitor General
For State : Mr. Anand Dadariya, Deputy Advocate
General
Hon’ble Shri Amitendra Kishore Prasad, Judge
CAV Order
1. Heard Mr. Chandresh Shrivastava, Mr. Vaibhav Shukla, Mr. Aditya
Bhardwaj and Mr. Avinash Chand Sahu, learned counsel
appearing for the respective petitioners as well as Mr. Manoj
Kumar Mishra, Senior Panel Counsel and Mr. Niraj Baghel,
21
Advocate on behalf of Mr. Ramakant Mishra, Deputy Solicitor
General, appearing for the Union of India and Mr. Anand
Dadariya, learned Deputy Advocate General, appearing for the
State.
2. Since common questions of law and fact arise for consideration in
this batch of nineteen writ petitions, all the matters were heard
analogously and are being decided by this common order.
3. Though the petitioners are different and the consequential closure
orders impugned in the respective petitions have been issued by
different authorities and, in some cases, on different dates, the
principal challenge in all the petitions is directed against the
Notification dated 25.09.2025, published in the Chhattisgarh State
Gazette (Extraordinary) on 03.10.2025, issued by the State
Government under Section 5(1) of the Chhattisgarh Kashtha
Chiran (Viniyaman) Adhiniyam, 1984 (for short, ‘Adhiniyam of
1984’), whereby all areas falling within an aerial distance of 10
kilometres from the nearest notified forest/protected area have
been declared as “Prohibited Area” for a period of three years.
4. The consequential closure orders passed pursuant thereto have
also been called in question. As the issues involved in all the
petitions emanate from the same notification and raise
substantially identical questions relating to the scope of Section
5(1) of the Adhiniyam of 1984, the effect of the directions issued
by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in T.N. Godavarman
22
Thirumulpad v. Union of India and others, (1997) 2 SCC 267,
the role and recommendations of the State Level Committee, and
the legality of the resultant closure of saw mills situated within the
notified area, all the petitions were clubbed together for analogous
hearing.
5. For the sake of convenience and to avoid repetition of facts,
pleadings and submissions, W.P.(C) No. 466 of 2026 has been
treated as the lead case. The factual matrix of the said petition
broadly represents the nature of controversy involved in the
connected matters and the questions arising therein substantially
overlap with those involved in the remaining writ petitions.
6. Accordingly, the facts are being referred to from W.P.(C) No. 466
of 2026 and, unless the context otherwise requires, references to
the pleadings, documents and grounds shall be understood as
references to the lead case. It is, however, made clear that the
adjudication rendered herein shall govern all the connected writ
petitions, subject to any individual factual distinctions, if relevant.
7. Since the reliefs claimed in the connected petitions are
substantially similar and arise out of a common cause founded
upon the validity of the aforesaid notification and the
consequential closure orders, for the purpose of brevity and
convenience, the prayer clause reproduced in this judgment is
extracted from W.P.(C) No. 466 of 2026, the lead case. The
relief(s) sought for in W.P.(C) No. 466 of 2026 are as under :-
23
“I. That, the Hon’ble Court may issue
appropriate writ quashing Notification dated
25.09.2025 issued by Respondent No.2 under
Section 5(1) of the Chhattisgarh Kashtha
Chiran (Viniyaman) Adhiniyam, 1984, whereby
areas within 10 kilometers aerial distance from
the nearest notified/protected forest have been
declared as “Prohibited Area”, being arbitrary,
illegal, without jurisdiction and in violation of
binding directions of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court. (Annexure P/1).
II. Quash the impugned Closure Order /Show
Cause Notice dated 07.11.2025 bearing No.
संरक्षण/आ.म./2025/583 issued by the Divisional
Forest Officer & Licensing Authority,
Rajnandgaon, directing closure of the
petitioner’s saw mill from 03.10.2025 to
02.10.2028, as being mechanical, non-
speaking, violative of principles of natural
justice and dehors the provisions of the 1984
Adhiniyam (Annexure P/2).
III. Pass any other order(s) as this Hon’ble
Court may deem fit and proper in the interest of
justice.”
8. The challenge in the present batch of writ petitions is directed
against the legality, validity and constitutional propriety of the
Notification dated 25.09.2025 (Annexure P/1), issued by the
Forest and Climate Change Department, Government of
Chhattisgarh in exercise of powers under Section 5(1) of the
Chhattisgarh Kashtha Chiran (Viniyaman) Adhiniyam, 1984,
24
whereby all areas falling within an aerial distance of ten kilometres
from the boundary of the nearest notified forest or protected area,
excluding specified exempted categories, have been declared as
prohibited areas for a period of three years. The petitioners have
also assailed the consequential orders passed by the respective
Licensing Authorities, including the order dated 07.11.2025
(Annexure P/2) issued by the Licensing Officer-cum-Divisional
Forest Officer, Rajnandgaon Forest Division, and similar orders
passed in connected matters, whereby the saw mills of the
petitioners have been directed to cease operations and renewal of
their licences has been withheld on the ground that the units are
situated within the prohibited area declared under Annexure P/1.
9. The petitioners contend that their saw mills were lawfully
established and have been operating under valid licences much
prior to 12.12.1996 and, therefore, the impugned actions are
unsustainable in law. According to the petitioners, while issuing
the Notification dated 25.09.2025 (Annexure P/1), the State
Government has mechanically adopted a uniform 10-kilometre
aerial-distance criterion in disregard of the recommendations
made by the State Level Committee and without undertaking any
fresh scientific or expert assessment relatable to local conditions
prevailing in the State. It is further contended that the
consequential closure orders, including Annexure P/2 dated
07.11.2025, have been passed without affording any opportunity
of hearing to the affected saw mill operators and without
25
considering their individual cases, thereby violating the principles
of natural justice. On the aforesaid grounds, it is urged that
Annexure P/1 and the consequential orders issued pursuant
thereto are arbitrary, unreasonable, contrary to the directions
issued by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and liable to be quashed in
exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India.
10. Brief facts of all the writ petitions, shorn of unnecessary details,
are that the petitioners are owners/proprietors of saw mills
established and operating within the State of Chhattisgarh under
valid licences granted under the provisions of the Chhattisgarh
Kashtha Chiran (Viniyaman) Adhiniyam, 1984. The licences
granted in favour of the petitioners have been renewed from time
to time and the establishments have been carrying on their
business activities lawfully for several decades. A substantial
number of the petitioners’ saw mills were established prior to
12.12.1996, i.e., prior to the order passed by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad (supra) and
were included in the list of existing saw mills submitted before the
Hon’ble Supreme Court pursuant to the directions issued therein.
11. The record would reveal that by order dated 12.12.1996, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court, while dealing with matters relating to
wood-based industries, directed each State Government to
constitute an Expert Committee to assess, inter alia, the
26
sustainable capacity of forests, the number of saw mills that could
safely be sustained and, most importantly, the optimum distance
from forests at which saw mills should be located. Subsequently,
by order dated 05.10.2015, the Hon’ble Supreme Court
authorized the State Level Committees (SLCs), subject to
compliance with prescribed guidelines and procedure, to take
decisions relating to grant of licences and regulation of wood-
based industries. The petitioners contend that the determination
of the optimum distance of saw mills from forest areas was thus
entrusted to the Expert Committee/State Level Committee and no
uniform distance was ever prescribed by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court for all States.
12. Pursuant to the aforesaid directions, the State Level Committee
for the State of Chhattisgarh examined the issue and in its
meeting dated 22.04.2019, after considering relevant factors such
as local geography, topography, forest density, population
requirements and availability of timber resources, recommended
that areas falling within 4 kilometres from notified/protected
forests be treated as prohibited areas for establishment and
operation of saw mills. The petitioners contend that the said
determination represented the expert opinion of the competent
body constituted in terms of the directions of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court and continued to hold the field.
13. It appears that notwithstanding the aforesaid recommendation, the
27
State Government issued a notification dated 13.08.2021
declaring areas within 10 kilometres aerial distance from forests
as prohibited areas. The said notification gave rise to the first
round of litigation before this Court. During the pendency of the
said proceedings, this Court, by order dated 06.10.2021, directed
the authorities to consider the objections of the affected saw mill
owners and restrained coercive action till final decision.
Thereafter, the controversy again reached this Court and by order
dated 25.09.2024, while disposing of the connected matters, this
Court noticed the recommendation made by the State Level
Committee and recorded the statement of the State that it would
abide by the recommendation of the SLC. This Court also
observed that it was expected that the State would adhere to the
recommendation made by the SLC and left it open to the
petitioners to challenge any adverse order that may subsequently
be passed.
14. During the interregnum, the State Level Committee, in its 25th
meeting held on 22.06.2022, took note of the fact that nearly 190
saw mills situated within the 10-kilometre zone had been
adversely affected and that a large number of such units were
established long before 12.12.1996 and had been operating
lawfully for decades. The SLC further noticed that several of such
units had been included in the list submitted before the Hon’ble
Supreme Court pursuant to T.N. Godavarman proceedings.
Having regard to these circumstances, the SLC recommended
28
that saw mills established prior to 12.12.1996 and included in the
list submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court be permitted to
continue at their existing locations, while any new or relocated
saw mill should comply with the distance restrictions prescribed
by the regulatory framework.
15. The recommendation of the SLC was thereafter supported by the
Principal Chief Conservator of Forests, Chhattisgarh through
communication dated 13.09.2022 addressed to the Ministry of
Environment, Forest and Climate Change. According to the
petitioners, notwithstanding the existence of the aforesaid
recommendations and despite the expectation expressed by this
Court that the State would adhere to the same, no final decision
was taken upon the recommendations and the matter remained
pending at different administrative levels.
16. While matters stood thus, the State Government issued the
impugned Notification dated 25.09.2025 under Section 5(1) of the
Adhiniyam of 1984 declaring all areas falling within 10 kilometres
aerial distance from the nearest notified forest or protected area
as “Prohibited Area” for a period of three years. The petitioners
contend that the notification neither discloses any fresh scientific
study, expert assessment, field survey or recommendation of the
State Level Committee forming the basis for fixation of the 10-
kilometre aerial distance nor records any reason for disregarding
the earlier determination made by the SLC fixing 4 kilometres as
29
the prohibited distance and the subsequent recommendation
permitting continuation of pre-12.12.1996 saw mills.
17. Consequent upon issuance of the aforesaid notification, the
respective Divisional Forest Officers/Licensing Authorities issued
closure orders and show cause notices directing the petitioners to
discontinue operation of their saw mills till the currency of the
notification. According to the petitioners, the said orders were
issued in a mechanical manner solely on the basis of the
impugned notification without undertaking any independent
examination of the individual cases. It is further alleged that no
effective opportunity of hearing was granted, no measurement
reports, maps, geo-spatial studies or technical data were supplied
to establish that the respective units actually fall within the
prescribed 10-kilometre aerial distance and no reasons were
assigned as to how the distance was determined.
18. The petitioners further contend that the State Government, while
issuing the impugned notification, acted contrary to the scheme
evolved under the directions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and
ignored the binding recommendations of the State Level
Committee, which alone was competent to determine the optimum
distance of saw mills from forest areas. According to the
petitioners, the State Government has mechanically adopted a
uniform distance criterion by relying upon superseded guidelines
and without obtaining any fresh recommendation from the SLC or
30
conducting any independent expert assessment. The petitioners
assert that the impugned action has resulted in closure of long-
standing lawful businesses, causing grave financial prejudice and
affecting the livelihood of numerous persons dependent upon
such establishments.
19. It is in the aforesaid backdrop, and being aggrieved by the
Notification dated 25.09.2025 and the consequential closure
orders passed pursuant thereto, that the petitioners have
approached this Court invoking its writ jurisdiction under Article
226 of the Constitution of India.
20. Mr. Chandresh Shrivastava, Mr. Vaibhav Shukla, Mr. Aditya
Bhardwaj and Mr. Avinash Chand Sahu, learned counsel
appearing for the respective petitioners, jointly submit that the
impugned Notification dated 25.09.2025 and the consequential
closure orders passed by the concerned Divisional Forest
Officers/Licensing Authorities are wholly without jurisdiction,
arbitrary, unconstitutional and contrary to the statutory scheme
governing establishment and regulation of saw mills in the State
of Chhattisgarh. It is contended that the petitioners are not
unauthorized operators but are holders of valid licences granted
under the provisions of the Chhattisgarh Kashtha Chiran
(Viniyaman) Adhiniyam, 1984 and many of the petitioners have
been carrying on their business activities for several decades,
including from a period prior to 12.12.1996. According to learned
31
counsel, despite the petitioners having acquired vested rights
under valid licences and despite their units having been
continuously renewed and recognized by the competent
authorities, the State Government has mechanically directed
closure of their establishments solely on the basis of a uniform 10-
kilometre aerial-distance criterion, without undertaking any fresh
scientific assessment, expert evaluation or statutory exercise as
contemplated under law.
21. Learned counsel would submit that the entire foundation of the
impugned notification is contrary to the directions issued by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad
(supra). Inviting attention to the orders dated 12.12.1996 and
05.10.2015 and 11.09.2017, it is argued that the Hon’ble Supreme
Court consciously entrusted the task of determining the optimum
distance of wood-based industries from forest areas to Expert
Committees/State Level Committees constituted for each State,
having regard to local conditions, forest density, ecological
requirements, population needs, topography and other relevant
factors. It is submitted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court never
prescribed any uniform minimum distance applicable throughout
the country and, on the contrary, recognized that such
determination must necessarily be State-specific and based upon
expert evaluation. According to learned counsel, the impugned
notification proceeds on an assumption that a uniform aerial
distance of 10 kilometres can be imposed throughout the State
32
irrespective of local conditions, which is directly inconsistent with
the scheme evolved by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
22. Learned counsel further submit that the State Government has
completely ignored the recommendations and decisions of the
State Level Committee, which is the expert body recognized
under the orders of the Hon’ble Supreme Court as well as the
Wood Based Industries Guidelines. Particular emphasis has been
laid on the decision of the State Level Committee dated
22.04.2019 whereby, after detailed consideration of ecological
and local factors, the prohibited distance was determined as 4
kilometres from notified and protected forests. It is argued that
once the competent expert body had already undertaken the
exercise and arrived at a considered decision, the State
Government could not have unilaterally substituted the same by
prescribing a distance of 10 kilometres without any fresh
recommendation, fresh expert study or reconsideration by the
State Level Committee. Learned counsel submit that the
impugned notification does not disclose any material whatsoever
indicating why the earlier expert determination was discarded,
thereby rendering the decision-making process arbitrary, irrational
and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
23. It is further contended that the petitioners belong to a distinct class
of saw mill owners whose establishments were admittedly set up
prior to 12.12.1996 and whose names formed part of the list
33
submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the Godavarman
proceedings. Learned counsel submit that the State Level
Committee, in its 25th meeting held on 22.06.2022, specifically
took note of the hardship faced by such pre-existing units and
recommended that saw mills established prior to 12.12.1996
should be permitted to continue at their existing locations while
applying the distance restrictions only to new or relocated units. It
is submitted that the said recommendation was further endorsed
by the Principal Chief Conservator of Forests and communicated
to the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change.
However, while issuing the impugned notification and
consequential closure orders, neither the State Government nor
the Licensing Authorities considered the aforesaid
recommendation, resulting in closure of long-standing lawful units
contrary to the opinion of the expert body itself.
24. Learned counsel also assail the impugned action on the ground of
violation of principles of natural justice. It is submitted that the
closure orders have been issued mechanically and in a routine
manner without affording any meaningful opportunity of hearing to
the petitioners. According to learned counsel, no individual
determination has been made regarding the location of the
respective saw mills, no measurement reports, maps, satellite
imagery, survey records or technical data have been supplied to
demonstrate that the petitioners’ establishments actually fall within
the alleged 10-kilometre aerial distance, nor have the authorities
34
disclosed the identity of the nearest notified forest or protected
area from which such distance has been measured. It is argued
that the impugned orders are non-speaking and bereft of reasons
and have been passed solely as a consequence of the
notification, thereby constituting a clear violation of the principles
of audi alteram partem and fair administrative action.
25. Learned counsel further contend that the State has acted in
complete disregard of the earlier orders passed by this Court in
the previous rounds of litigation. Reference has been made to the
orders dated 06.10.2021 and 25.09.2024, wherein this Court had
observed that the matter required consideration in light of the
recommendations of the State Level Committee and had recorded
the expectation that the State would adhere to the
recommendations made by the expert body. It is argued that
despite the aforesaid observations and despite the issue
remaining under consideration before the competent authorities,
the State Government has once again issued a fresh notification
substantially reiterating the earlier position without addressing the
concerns noticed by this Court. According to learned counsel,
such conduct amounts to complete non-application of mind and is
contrary to the spirit of the earlier orders passed by this Court.
26. Learned counsel also submit that the impugned action imposes an
unreasonable and disproportionate restriction upon the
petitioners’ fundamental right to carry on trade and business
35
guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. It is
argued that the closure of long-standing industrial units affects not
only the petitioners but also numerous employees, labourers and
families dependent upon such establishments for their livelihood.
According to learned counsel, even assuming environmental
concerns existed, the State was required to adopt a balanced
approach by considering regulatory measures, monitoring
mechanisms and expert recommendations rather than imposing a
blanket prohibition resulting in complete cessation of lawful
business activity. It is submitted that the impugned notification and
closure orders are manifestly arbitrary, discriminatory,
disproportionate and unsupported by any scientific or legal basis
and, therefore, deserve to be quashed by this Court.
27. Learned counsel for the petitioners have placed heavy reliance
upon the orders passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in T.N.
Godavarman Thirumulpad (supra), particularly the orders dated
12.12.1996 and 05.10.2015, as also the recent judgment
rendered in T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India &
Others, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3778. It is submitted that the
entire regulatory framework governing establishment and
operation of wood-based industries in the country traces its origin
to the aforesaid proceedings and, therefore, any action taken by
the State Government in relation to saw mills must necessarily
conform to the principles and directions laid down therein.
Learned counsel would contend that the impugned notification
36
and the consequential closure orders have been issued in
complete disregard of the binding directions issued by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court and are, therefore, liable to be set aside on this
ground alone.
28. Learned counsel submit that by order dated 12.12.1996 passed in
T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme
Court specifically directed every State Government to constitute
an Expert Committee for assessing the sustainable capacity of
forests, the number of saw mills that could safely be sustained
within the State and, most importantly, the optimum distance from
forests at which saw mills should be located. It is argued that the
aforesaid direction clearly demonstrates that the determination of
the appropriate distance between a saw mill and a forest area
was intended to be an exercise undertaken by a State-specific
expert body after considering local ecological, geographical and
socio-economic conditions. According to learned counsel, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court consciously refrained from prescribing
any uniform minimum distance applicable throughout the country
and instead entrusted such determination to expert committees
constituted at the State level.
29. Placing further reliance on the order dated 05.10.2015 passed in
Category-I matters relating to Wood Based Industries arising out
of T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad (supra), learned counsel
submit that the Hon’ble Supreme Court expressly authorized the
37
State Level Committees (SLCs), subject to compliance with the
prescribed guidelines and procedure, to take decisions
concerning wood-based industries. It is contended that the said
order reaffirmed the central role of the State Level Committee as
the expert decision-making body in matters concerning
establishment, regulation and licensing of wood-based industries.
According to learned counsel, once the Hon’ble Supreme Court
had vested such authority in the SLC, the State Government
could not have independently and unilaterally fixed a distance of
10 kilometres without obtaining any recommendation from the
SLC or conducting a fresh expert assessment through the
mechanism recognized by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
30. Learned counsel further submit that the State Level Committee,
Chhattisgarh, in compliance with the directions issued by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court, had already undertaken the requisite
exercise and, by its decision dated 22.04.2019, determined 4
kilometres as the prohibited distance from notified and protected
forests after considering relevant factors including topography,
forest cover, population requirements and local conditions. It is
argued that the impugned notification dated 25.09.2025
completely ignores the said expert determination and substitutes it
with a uniform 10-kilometre aerial-distance restriction without
disclosing any fresh scientific study, ecological assessment,
technical report or recommendation of the State Level Committee.
According to learned counsel, such an exercise is directly contrary
38
to the regulatory framework evolved by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in the T.N. Godavarman’s proceedings and constitutes an
impermissible assumption of powers reserved for expert bodies.
31. Reliance has also been placed upon the judgment of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Jawahar Lal Sharma and another v.
Divisional Forest Officer, U.P. and another, AIR 2002 SC 769
and The State of Uttar Pradesh v. Uday Education and
Welfare Trust in Civil Appeal Nos.2407-2412 of 2021 vide
judgment dated 21.10.2022 as well as the judgment rendered by
the Hon’ble Karnataka High Court in K.R. Vijayan v. State of
Karnataka and others, AIR OnLine 2024 KAR 2353 to buttress
their submissions.
32. On the strength of the aforesaid authorities, learned counsel
submit that the determination of the optimum distance of saw mills
from forest areas is not a matter of executive discretion but a
specialized function entrusted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court to
expert bodies constituted for that purpose. Therefore, the State
Government could not have substituted its own opinion for that of
the State Level Committee nor could it have imposed a uniform
10-kilometre aerial-distance restriction in the absence of any
recommendation by the competent expert body. It is, thus,
contended that the impugned notification dated 25.09.2025 and
the consequential closure orders are in direct conflict with the law
declared by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the T.N. Godavarman
39
(supra) series of cases and are liable to be quashed as being
arbitrary, without jurisdiction and contrary to binding judicial
directions.
33. On the other hand, Mr. Anand Dadariya, learned Deputy Advocate
General appearing on behalf of the State, vehemently opposes
the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the respective
petitioners and submits that the entire challenge raised in the
present batch of writ petitions is misconceived, devoid of any legal
foundation and liable to be rejected. At the outset, it is contended
that the impugned Notification dated 25.09.2025 has been issued
by the State Government in exercise of powers expressly
conferred under Section 5(1) of the Adhiniyam of 1984 and,
therefore, enjoys a presumption of legality and constitutionality.
According to him, the notification constitutes a policy and
regulatory measure intended to achieve the larger objective of
conservation and protection of forests, preservation of ecological
balance and regulation of wood-based industries in accordance
with the environmental obligations imposed upon the State under
Articles 48A and 51A(g) of the Constitution of India. It is submitted
that the determination of distance norms from forest boundaries is
essentially a matter involving environmental policy, ecological
considerations and technical expertise and, therefore, the scope
of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution is extremely
limited. Unless the petitioners are able to establish patent lack of
jurisdiction, manifest arbitrariness or violation of any statutory
40
provision, this Court ought not to interfere with a policy decision
taken by the State in public interest.
34. Learned Deputy Advocate General further submits that the
controversy sought to be raised in the present proceedings is not
a new one and, in fact, represents the third round of litigation
concerning the same subject matter. It is argued that the earlier
notifications, distance norms and consequential regulatory actions
had already been subjected to judicial scrutiny before this Court.
In the first round of litigation, challenge was laid to Clause 7(ii) of
the Wood Based Industries (Establishment and Regulation)
Guidelines, 2016, as amended in 2017, as well as to the
notification dated 13.08.2021 and the show-cause notices issued
pursuant thereto. The said batch of petitions came to be disposed
of by this Court on 06.10.2021 with liberty to the authorities to
take a final decision after considering the replies submitted by the
affected parties. Thereafter, in the second round of litigation, the
petitioners once again questioned the validity of the distance-
based regulatory regime and the orders directing closure and non-
renewal of licences. The said batch of petitions was disposed of
by this Court on 25.09.2024, noticing that the recommendations of
the State Level Committee were under consideration before the
Government of India. Learned State counsel submits that the
present proceedings are, in substance, an attempt to reopen
issues which already stood considered in the earlier rounds of
litigation and, therefore, deserve to be viewed with
41
circumspection.
35. Elaborating his submissions, learned Deputy Advocate General
contends that the petitioners are proceeding on an erroneous
assumption that the recommendations of the State Level
Committee confer upon them an enforceable legal right to
continue operating their saw mills irrespective of the prevailing
regulatory framework. According to him, the recommendations
made by the State Level Committee in its meetings dated
22.04.2019 and 22.06.2022 were merely recommendatory in
nature and did not attain finality or acquire binding force in law.
The State Government, realizing the concerns expressed by the
saw mill owners, had forwarded the recommendations of the State
Level Committee to the Ministry of Environment, Forest and
Climate Change, Government of India, through communications
including the letter dated 13.09.2022. However, such
recommendations remained subject to examination and approval
by the competent authority at the Central level. It is submitted that
unless and until such recommendations were accepted and
incorporated within the governing regulatory framework, no vested
right could accrue in favour of the petitioners merely on the basis
of a proposal or recommendation made by the State Level
Committee. Therefore, according to the learned State counsel, the
petitioners cannot seek enforcement of recommendations which
never matured into a binding decision.
42
36. Learned Deputy Advocate General further submits that the matter
was thereafter examined by the Ministry of Environment, Forest
and Climate Change, Government of India, which, by
communication dated 16.06.2025, categorically declined to accept
the proposal seeking exemption in favour of saw mills established
prior to 12.12.1996 from the prescribed distance norms. Drawing
attention to the contents of the said communication, it is argued
that the Government of India expressly found that the proposal
forwarded by the State Government was not in conformity with the
Wood Based Industries (Establishment and Regulation)
Guidelines, 2016, as amended in 2017, nor was it supported by
the directions issued by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Learned
counsel submits that once the competent authority at the Central
level had rejected the proposal seeking relaxation, the State
Government was left with no option but to implement the existing
regulatory regime in its true letter and spirit. It is, therefore, argued
that the petitioners cannot derive any benefit from
recommendations which stood effectively disapproved by the
Central Government itself.
37. Learned Deputy Advocate General places considerable reliance
upon the Wood Based Industries (Establishment and Regulation)
Guidelines, 2016, issued by the Ministry of Environment, Forest
and Climate Change in compliance with the orders passed by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad
(supra), and the subsequent amendment dated 11.09.2017.
43
According to him, the entire regulatory framework governing
establishment and operation of wood-based industries across the
country is now regulated by the said guidelines. Referring to the
relevant provisions, learned counsel submits that the State Level
Committee does not possess the exclusive authority claimed by
the petitioners and that its role is confined to functions specifically
enumerated under the guidelines, including assessment of timber
availability, consideration of applications, monitoring and making
recommendations. It is contended that the guidelines themselves
contemplate regulation of wood-based industries with reference to
distance from the nearest notified forest or protected area and
recognize implementation through State-specific regulatory
mechanisms. Therefore, the State Government, while issuing the
impugned notification under Section 5(1) of the Adhiniyam of
1984, has merely implemented the central regulatory framework
and has not acted independently of it.
38. Learned State counsel further submits that the power exercised
under Section 5(1) of the Adhiniyam of 1984 is plenary in nature
and specifically authorizes the State Government to declare any
area as a prohibited area for such period as may be specified.
The impugned notification has been issued after considering the
larger environmental concerns associated with indiscriminate
operation of wood-based industries in close proximity to forest
areas and, therefore, constitutes a valid exercise of statutory
power. It is argued that the fixation of a 10-kilometre aerial
44
distance cannot be said to be arbitrary merely because the
petitioners prefer a different standard. According to learned
counsel, environmental regulation necessarily involves drawing
regulatory lines and adopting uniform standards capable of
effective implementation throughout the State. The decision to
prescribe a 10-kilometre aerial-distance norm is a matter of policy
and technical assessment, and the Court ought not substitute its
own view for that of the executive authorities entrusted with
environmental governance.
39. Learned Deputy Advocate General also disputes the contention of
the petitioners that their pre-1996 status confers any special
protection or immunity from future regulatory measures. It is
argued that operation of a saw mill is not an absolute right but a
licensed and heavily regulated activity. Even assuming that some
of the petitioners had established their units prior to 12.12.1996,
such circumstance does not create a perpetual or indefeasible
right to continue operations irrespective of subsequent
environmental regulations enacted in public interest. According to
learned counsel, environmental law is a dynamic field and
regulatory measures are required to evolve in response to
changing ecological realities. A licence granted several decades
ago cannot prevent the State from imposing more stringent
conditions in the larger interest of environmental protection and
sustainable development. The restrictions imposed by the
impugned notification are, therefore, reasonable restrictions within
45
the meaning of Article 19(6) of the Constitution and cannot be
faulted merely because they adversely affect commercial
interests.
40. Learned State counsel further submits that the challenge founded
upon principles of natural justice is equally unsustainable.
According to him, the closure orders are merely consequential
and flow directly from the statutory notification issued under
Section 5(1) of the Adhiniyam of 1984. Once a particular area
stands notified as a prohibited area, the consequences
contemplated under Section 5(2) automatically follow, including
cessation of operations of saw mills situated within such area. It
is, therefore, contended that the petitioners cannot insist upon a
separate adjudicatory process for implementation of
consequences expressly provided by the statute itself. In any
event, learned counsel submits that the petitioners have
repeatedly participated in earlier proceedings concerning the
same issue and were fully aware of the regulatory regime
governing operation of saw mills within the prescribed distance
from forest areas.
41. Lastly, learned Deputy Advocate General submits that the
impugned notification represents a uniform regulatory measure
applicable throughout the State and has not been targeted
against any individual petitioner. The adoption of aerial distance
as the criterion for measurement is stated to be a rational and
46
scientifically acceptable method, as it provides a uniform buffer
around forest areas and avoids inconsistencies arising from road
alignments, changes in transportation routes or local geographical
variations. It is contended that the petitioners are, in substance,
seeking individual exemptions from a generally applicable
environmental regulation despite the fact that such exemptions
have already been considered and declined by the competent
authorities. According to learned counsel, the impugned
notification, the consequential closure orders and the regulatory
framework governing wood-based industries are fully consistent
with the provisions of the Adhiniyam of 1984, the Wood Based
Industries Guidelines, 2016 as amended in 2017, and the
environmental obligations cast upon the State under the
Constitution. He would, therefore, submit that no case for
interference under Article 226 of the Constitution is made out and
the writ petitions deserve to be dismissed.
42. Mr. Manoj Kumar Mishra, learned Senior Panel Counsel and Mr.
Niraj Baghel, Advocate appearing on behalf of Mr. Ramakant
Mishra, learned Deputy Solicitor General for the Union of India,
adopt the submissions advanced by the learned State counsel
and further submit that the impugned Notification dated
25.09.2025 has been issued in consonance with the regulatory
framework governing wood-based industries and the guidelines
framed by the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate
Change. It is submitted that the recommendations made by the
47
State Level Committee do not possess overriding force so as to
curtail or supersede the statutory powers vested in the State
Government under Section 5 of the Adhiniyam of 1984. They
would further submit that the recommendation forwarded by the
State Level Committee was duly considered by the Ministry of
Environment, Forest and Climate Change, Government of India;
however, the same was not approved by the competent authority.
It is contended that once the recommendation of the State Level
Committee was not accepted by the Ministry, the petitioners
cannot claim any vested or enforceable right on the basis thereof.
It is further submitted that the distance criteria prescribed under
the impugned Notification is in furtherance of the object of forest
conservation, environmental protection and sustainable regulation
of wood-based industries and, therefore, the same cannot be said
to be arbitrary, irrational or contrary to law. Lastly, they would
submit that the challenge raised by the petitioners essentially
seeks judicial review of a policy decision taken in the field of
environmental governance and forest conservation. In the
absence of any demonstrable illegality, arbitrariness, mala fides or
violation of statutory provisions, no interference is called for in
exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India. Accordingly, it is prayed that the writ
petitions, being devoid of merit, deserve to be dismissed.
43. I have heard learned counsel appearing for the respective parties
and perused the pleadings and documents brought on record, the
48
statutory provisions governing the field, the relevant policy
guidelines, the recommendations of the State Level Committee,
the communications exchanged between the State Government
and the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change, as
well as the judgments and orders relied upon by the learned
counsel appearing for the parties.
44. From perusal of Annexure P/1, i.e., Notification dated 25.09.2025
issued by the Forest and Climate Change Department,
Government of Chhattisgarh, it transpires that the said notification
has been issued by the State Government in exercise of powers
conferred under sub-section (1) of Section 5 of the Chhattisgarh
Kashtha Chiran (Viniyaman) Adhiniyam, 1984. The notification
further reveals that the same has been issued in supersession of
the earlier notification dated 23.08.2021 and that the State
Government, upon being satisfied that such action is necessary in
the public interest for protection and conservation of forests and
environment, has declared all areas falling within an aerial
distance of ten kilometres from the boundary of the nearest
notified forest or protected area, excluding roadside, railway-side
and canal-side plantations and except industrial estates or
municipal areas, as “prohibited areas” for the purposes of the
Adhiniyam for a period of three years from the date of publication
of the notification in the Official Gazette.
45. A further reading of the notification makes it evident that the
49
impugned action is not founded upon any individual or localized
consideration concerning a particular saw mill or wood-based
industry, but constitutes a general regulatory measure applicable
uniformly throughout the State. The notification expressly records
that the same has been issued for the protection and conservation
of forests and environment and, therefore, is traceable to the
object sought to be achieved by the Adhiniyam of 1984. It is also
apparent that while prescribing the ten-kilometre aerial-distance
criterion, the State Government has carved out specific
exceptions in respect of industrial estates and municipal areas,
thereby indicating that the notification has been issued after taking
into consideration the broader regulatory framework governing
wood-based industries.
46. Thus, on the face of the record, Annexure P/1 discloses that the
State Government has exercised a statutory power specifically
conferred upon it under Section 5 of the Adhiniyam of 1984 and
has assigned reasons relatable to forest conservation,
environmental protection and public interest for issuance of the
impugned notification. The notification, therefore, cannot be said
to be bereft of statutory authority or devoid of the object sought to
be achieved by the parent enactment.
47. From a bare perusal of Annexure P/2 dated 07.11.2025, it is quite
clear that the said order has been issued by the Licensing Officer-
cum-Divisional Forest Officer, Rajnandgaon Forest Division,
50
Rajnandgaon, in purported implementation of the Notification
dated 25.09.2025 issued by the State Government under Section
5 of the Chhattisgarh Kashtha Chiran (Viniyaman) Adhiniyam,
1984. The order records that pursuant to the declaration of areas
falling within an aerial distance of ten kilometres from the
boundary of the nearest notified forest or protected area as
prohibited areas, a survey and assessment were undertaken and
it was found that the saw mills specified therein were situated
within the prohibited zone and outside the exempted categories
contemplated under the notification.
48. A further reading of Annexure P/2 would reveal that the Licensing
Authority has identified twenty-one saw mills operating within the
territorial jurisdiction of Rajnandgaon Forest Division and has
specifically recorded the aerial distance of each saw mill from the
nearest notified forest area. On the basis of such determination,
the authority has proceeded to hold that the said saw mills fall
within the prohibited area declared under the Notification dated
25.09.2025 and, consequently, in exercise of powers traceable to
Section 5(2)(b) and 5(2)(c) of the Adhiniyam of 1984, has directed
postponement of renewal of their licences and cessation of their
operations for a period co-terminus with the duration of the
notification, i.e., from 03.10.2025 till 02.10.2028.
49. It is also evident from the said order that the action taken by the
Divisional Forest Officer is not founded upon any independent
51
adjudication of rights nor upon any allegation of misconduct or
breach attributable to any particular saw mill owner. Rather, the
order is purely consequential in nature and has been passed to
give effect to the declaration made by the State Government
under the Notification dated 25.09.2025. The foundation of the
impugned order, therefore, is the statutory notification issued
under Section 5 of the Adhiniyam of 1984.
50. Significantly, Annexure P/2 discloses that the Licensing Authority
has not exercised any discretion contrary to or independent of the
State Government’s notification. The order merely implements the
legal consequences flowing from the declaration of the concerned
areas as prohibited areas under Section 5 of the Adhiniyam. Once
an area is declared as a prohibited area, the consequences
contemplated under Section 5(2) of the Adhiniyam automatically
come into operation, including non-renewal of licences and
cessation of saw-mill operations within such area.
51. Thus, from a plain reading of Annexure P/2, this Court finds that
the order dated 07.11.2025 is consequential and incidental to the
Notification dated 25.09.2025 and derives its authority therefrom.
In other words, the validity of the consequential order is
intrinsically dependent upon the validity of the parent notification.
Therefore, once the Notification dated 25.09.2025 is found to be
within the competence of the State Government and legally
sustainable, the consequential order issued by the Divisional
52
Forest Officer implementing the mandate of the said notification
cannot be faulted on any independent ground.
52. Upon hearing the learned counsel for the parties at considerable
length and upon careful examination of the material available on
record, this Court finds that the controversy involved in the
present batch of writ petitions lies in a narrow compass. The
principal question which arises for consideration is whether the
State Government, while exercising powers under Section 5(1) of
the Adhiniyam of 1984, could have unilaterally declared all areas
falling within 10 kilometres aerial distance from the nearest
notified forest or protected area as “Prohibited Area” and
consequently directed closure of the petitioners’ saw mills,
notwithstanding the recommendations made by the State Level
Committee and the regulatory framework evolved pursuant to the
orders passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in T.N.
Godavarman Thirumulpad (supra).
53. The challenge essentially revolves around the interplay between
the statutory powers vested in the State Government under
Section 5 of the Adhiniyam of 1984 and the role assigned to the
State Level Committee under the framework governing Wood
Based Industries pursuant to the directions issued by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court. The ancillary questions which arise for
consideration are whether the recommendations of the State
Level Committee possess any binding or persuasive value;
53
whether fixation of a uniform 10-kilometre aerial distance is
supported by any expert determination; whether the impugned
notification suffers from arbitrariness, non-application of mind or
violation of the principles of natural justice; and whether the
consequential closure orders can be sustained in law.
54. Since all the writ petitions raise substantially identical questions
and the validity of the Notification dated 25.09.2025 constitutes
the foundational issue, this Court proposes to examine the legality
of the said notification in the first instance, as the fate of the
consequential closure orders would necessarily depend upon the
validity of the parent notification itself.
55. Upon hearing the parties and upon careful examination of the
material available on record, this Court finds that the controversy
involved in the present batch of writ petitions principally centres
around the scope of the powers exercisable by the State
Government under Section 5 of the Adhiniyam of 1984, the role
and functions assigned to the State Level Committee under the
regulatory framework governing Wood Based Industries, and the
legality of the impugned Notification dated 25.09.2025 issued
pursuant thereto.
56. Since the challenge raised by the petitioners is founded upon the
interpretation of the provisions of the Adhiniyam of 1984, the
Wood Based Industries (Establishment and Regulation)
Guidelines, 2016, as amended in 2017, and the statutory
54
consequences flowing therefrom, this Court considers it
necessary to first examine the legislative and regulatory
framework governing the field. A proper appreciation of the
relevant statutory provisions is indispensable for determining the
nature and extent of the powers conferred upon the State
Government, the significance of the recommendations made by
the State Level Committee and the validity of the impugned
notification and consequential closure orders.
57. Before proceeding further and adverting to the rival submissions
on merits, it would be apposite to reproduce the relevant
provisions of the Adhiniyam of 1984, the applicable Guidelines
and the relevant Rules having a bearing on the controversy
involved in the present cases.
58. Section 5 of the Chhattisgarh Kashtha Chiran (Viniyaman)
Adhiniyam, 1984, which deals with declaration of prohibited area,
reads as under :-
“5. Declaration of prohibited area.- (1) The
State Government, may, by notification, for
reasons to be specified therein, declare any
area to be a prohibited area for such period not
exceeding three years at a time, as may be
specified therein.
(2) During the period any area is declared to be
a prohibited area under sub-section (1), the
following consequence shall ensue, namely :–
(a) no licence shall be granted for
55establishment of a saw mill [11][x x x] in that
area;
(b) no licence shall be renewed during that
period;
(c) a saw mill [12][x x x] situated in that area
shall cease to operate and keep its sawing
operations closed:
Provided that the licensing authority may permit
sawing of wood in deposit in the saw mill [13][x
x x] subject to such conditions and restrictions
as it may deem fit to impose;
(d) no claim on account of damages because of
closure shall be entertained nor any damages
shall be payable.”
59. A plain and meaningful reading of the aforesaid provision would
reveal that Section 5 confers power upon the State Government
to declare any area as a “prohibited area” by issuance of a
notification. However, the exercise of such power is not unbridled
or unguided. The legislature has consciously employed the
expression “for reasons to be specified therein”, thereby making it
obligatory for the State Government to disclose the reasons which
necessitate declaration of a particular area as a prohibited area.
The requirement of recording reasons is not an empty formality
but constitutes an important safeguard against arbitrary exercise
of statutory power. The existence of reasons and their disclosure
in the notification form the very foundation upon which the validity
of the exercise of power under Section 5(1) rests.
56
60. It is further noticeable that once an area is declared as a
prohibited area under sub-section (1), serious civil and
commercial consequences automatically follow under sub-section
(2). Not only is the grant of a fresh licence prohibited, but renewal
of existing licences is also barred. More significantly, clause (c)
mandates that every saw mill situated within such notified area
shall cease its operations and keep its sawing activities closed
during the currency of the notification. Thus, a notification issued
under Section 5(1) directly affects the rights, business interests
and livelihood of persons operating licensed saw mills within the
notified area.
61. The legislative scheme embodied in Section 5 therefore indicates
that the power to declare a prohibited area is an extraordinary
regulatory power having far-reaching consequences. Such power
cannot be exercised mechanically or on mere ipse dixit of the
executive authority. Since the declaration results in closure of
existing industrial establishments and suspension of lawful
business activities, the decision-making process must necessarily
be founded upon relevant considerations, objective material and a
rational basis having nexus with the purpose sought to be
achieved under the Adhiniyam of 1984.
62. Equally significant is the fact that the statute itself requires the
State Government to specify reasons while issuing the
notification. The legislative insistence on recording reasons
57
demonstrates that the exercise of power under Section 5(1) is
intended to be transparent, informed and capable of judicial
scrutiny. Therefore, while examining the validity of the impugned
Notification dated 25.09.2025, this Court would be required to
ascertain whether the decision to declare all areas falling within
10 kilometres aerial distance from the nearest notified forest or
protected area as a prohibited area is supported by relevant
material, expert assessment and cogent reasons consistent with
the statutory scheme and the regulatory framework governing
wood-based industries.
63. At this stage, it would also be apposite to refer to Clauses 3, 4 and
7 of the Wood Based Industries (Establishment and Regulation)
Guidelines, 2016, which deal with the constitution, powers and
functions of the State Level Committee and the procedure relating
to grant and regulation of licences for wood-based industries.
64. Since considerable emphasis has been laid by the learned
counsel for the petitioners on the role and recommendations of
the State Level Committee, and equally by the learned State
counsel on the scope of its authority under the regulatory
framework, the said provisions assume significance for
adjudication of the controversy involved in the present batch of
writ petitions. Clauses 3, 4 and 5 of the Wood Based Industries
(Establishment and Regulation) Guidelines, 2016, therefore,
extracted below for ready reference:-
58
“Clause 3 – Constitution of the State Level
Committee: (1) Each State shall constitute a
State Level Committee to perform the functions
stipulated in these guidelines.
(i) The State Level Committee shall consist of
the following:
a) Principal Chief Conservator of Forests/Head of Chairperson
Forest Department
b) A representative of the Regional Office of the Member
Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate
Change
c) A representative of the State Forest Department Member
not below the rank of a Conservator of Forests
dealing with preparation of Working Plans/Working
Schemes
d) Director/Additional Director of Department of Member
Industries
e) Representative of the each Autonomous District Member
Council constituted in accordance with the
provisions of the Sixth Schedule to the
Constitution, in case any such Council exists in the
State
f) Representative of the Forest Development Member
Corporation, in case any such Corporation exists
in the State
g) An officer not below the rank of Conservator of Member Secretary
Forests working in the Forest Head quarters
(h) The State Level Committee may nominate
any other officer working in territorial wing of
the Forest Department not below the rank of
CF.
(iii) Such State where the composition of State
Level Committee already constituted is different
from as stipulated in these guideline, shall,
within one year from the date of publication of
these guidelines, re-constitute the State Level
Committee. The reconstitution of the State
Level Committee will be without any prejudice
to the recommendations made or the decisions
taken by the existing State Level Committee till
its re-constitution.
(iv) The State Level Committee shall meet at
59least once in three months.
(v) The quorum of the State Level Committee
meeting shall be at least fifty percent of
permanent members.
(vi) SLC will invite one representative of the
industry nominated by the saw-mill association
as a special invitee to each and every theeting
of the State Level Committee.
4. Powers and functions of the State Level
Committee.
The State Level Committee shall:-
(i) Assess the availability of timber for wood
based industrial units in the State/UT every five
years.
(ii) Assess quantity of different raw material
requirement for wood based industrial units
which may be sustainably harvested from trees
outside forest areas in the State/UT.
(iii) Assess annual requirement of timber and
other forest produce in the domestic markets in
the State.
(iv) Maintain a database of timber and other
raw materials utilized by each wood based
industrial unit permitted to Establish and
operate in the State/UT during each financial
year.
(v) Approve appropriate locations for setting up
of wood based industrial units.
(vi) Approve the name of wood based industrial
60units which may be considered for grant of
fresh license or enhancement of the existing
licensed capacity in case the committee is
satisfied that timber is available legally for the
said new Wood Based Industries (such as
Trees outside forest, Forests etc.).
(vii) The State Level Committee will ensure that
the amount lying with the respective State
Forest Departments (recovered from Wood
Based Industries) will be utilized for the
purpose of afforestation only.
(viii) Examine and make appropriate
recommendations on any other matter referred
by the State Government or the Ministry of
Environment, Forest and Climate Change.
7. Restriction on location of wood based
industries.
(i) In the North Eastern States of Arunachal
Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya,
Mizoram, Nagaland, Tripura and Sikkim the
wood based industries shall be permitted to be
established within the industrial estates.
(ii) In the States other than the afore-mentioned
North Eastern States, wood based industries
shall ordinarily be not Vallowed to be
established within ten kilometers aerial
distance from the boundary of nearest notified
forests and protected areas. The State Level
Committee for the reasons to be recorded in
writing and after obtaining prior approval of the
Central Government in the Ministry of
61
Environment, Forest and Climate Change may
permit to establish/operate a wood based
industry at an aerial distance less than 10
kilometers from the boundary of a notified
forest or a protected area.”
65. A conjoint and harmonious reading of Clauses 3, 4 and 7 of the
Wood Based Industries (Establishment and Regulation)
Guidelines, 2016, leaves little room for doubt that the regulatory
framework governing establishment and operation of wood-based
industries is not intended to be administered solely through
executive discretion. Rather, the Guidelines envisage a structured
and institution-based decision-making process in which the State
Level Committee occupies a central and pivotal role. The
composition of the State Level Committee itself, as prescribed
under Clause 3, demonstrates that it is conceived as a
multidisciplinary expert body comprising senior officers of the
Forest Department, representatives of the Ministry of
Environment, Forest and Climate Change, the Department of
Industries and other stakeholders possessing expertise and
experience in matters concerning forestry, environmental
protection, industrial regulation and sustainable utilization of forest
resources.
66. The significance attached to the State Level Committee becomes
even more apparent from Clause 4 of the Guidelines, which
enumerates its powers and functions. The Committee has been
entrusted with the responsibility of assessing the availability of
62
timber resources, evaluating the sustainable requirement of raw
material for wood-based industries, determining domestic market
requirements, maintaining databases relating to timber utilization
and, most importantly, approving appropriate locations for
establishment of wood-based industrial units. The expression
“approve appropriate locations for setting up of wood based
industrial units” occurring in Clause 4(v) is of considerable
significance and cannot be treated as surplusage. The said
function necessarily requires the Committee to examine
ecological, geographical and environmental considerations and to
determine whether a particular location is suitable for
establishment or operation of a wood-based industry. Thus, the
issue relating to the location of saw mills and other wood-based
industries falls squarely within the domain entrusted to the State
Level Committee under the Guidelines.
67. Equally important is Clause 4(viii), which empowers the State
Level Committee to examine and make recommendations on any
matter referred to it either by the State Government or by the
Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change. The
conferment of such power clearly indicates that the Committee is
intended to function as the principal expert advisory body in
matters relating to regulation of wood-based industries. The
recommendations emanating from such a body may not, in every
case, possess the force of a statutory mandate; nevertheless,
they constitute expert inputs which cannot be ignored or brushed
63
aside without cogent reasons, particularly when the subject matter
involves technical and environmental considerations requiring
specialized knowledge and assessment.
68. A further examination of Clause 7 of the Guidelines reinforces the
aforesaid conclusion. Clause 7(ii) stipulates that, in States other
than the North-Eastern States, wood-based industries shall
ordinarily not be permitted to be established within an aerial
distance of ten kilometres from the boundary of the nearest
notified forest or protected area. However, the provision does not
stop there. Significantly, it carves out an exception by specifically
empowering the State Level Committee, for reasons to be
recorded in writing and upon obtaining prior approval of the
Central Government, to permit establishment or operation of a
wood-based industry at an aerial distance of less than ten
kilometres from the boundary of a notified forest or protected
area.
69. The use of the words “the State Level Committee” in Clause 7(ii)
assumes considerable importance. The provision does not confer
such authority upon the State Government acting independently.
On the contrary, the power to examine cases requiring relaxation
from the general distance norm has been consciously vested in
the State Level Committee, subject to recording of reasons and
obtaining prior approval of the Central Government. The
regulatory scheme, therefore, recognizes the State Level
64
Committee as the competent body to evaluate location-specific
issues and to assess whether operation of a wood-based industry
at a distance less than ten kilometres would be environmentally
sustainable and legally permissible.
70. Viewed thus, the Guidelines unmistakably reveal that questions
relating to location of wood-based industries, assessment of
environmental impact, determination of suitability of sites and
consideration of exceptions to the prescribed distance norms are
matters which fall substantially within the domain of the State
Level Committee. The regulatory framework does not contemplate
exclusion of the Committee from the decision-making process.
Rather, it envisages active participation of the Committee at every
stage where technical, environmental and location-specific
considerations are required to be examined.
71. Therefore, while considering the validity of the impugned
Notification dated 25.09.2025, this Court cannot lose sight of the
statutory and regulatory significance accorded to the State Level
Committee under the Guidelines. The extent to which the
recommendations made by the State Level Committee were
considered, accepted, rejected or ignored, and whether the
impugned notification is supported by any independent expert
assessment consistent with the scheme of the Guidelines, are
questions which assume considerable relevance.
72. Since considerable emphasis has been laid by learned counsel
65
appearing for the petitioners on the powers, functions and
recommendations of the State Level Committee and the effect
thereof on the impugned Notification, and equally by learned
counsel appearing for the respondents on the amendments
brought about by the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate
Change in the regulatory framework governing wood-based
industries, it would be apposite to refer to the relevant
amendments introduced in the Wood Based Industries
(Establishment and Regulation) Guidelines, 2016 by Resolution
dated 11.09.2017 issued by the Ministry of Environment, Forest
and Climate Change, Government of India, in compliance with the
directions issued by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in T.N.
Godavarman Thirumulpad (supra).
73. By the said Resolution dated 11.09.2017, the Central Government
carried out substantial amendments in the Wood Based Industries
(Establishment and Regulation) Guidelines, 2016. In particular,
Clauses 2 and 5 of the amending Resolution assume significance
for adjudication of the controversy involved in the present batch of
writ petitions. Clause 2 amended the composition and functioning
of the State Level Committee, whereas Clause 5 substituted Para
7(ii) of the Guidelines relating to the distance criteria applicable to
wood-based industries from the nearest notified forests or
protected areas. The said provisions are extracted below for
ready reference:-
66
“2. The entries under Para 3(h) of these
Guidelines are substituted with the following:-
The State Level Committee may co-opt an
officer from Territorial Wing of the Forest
Department not below the rank of Conservator
of Forests and officers from the Department of
Agriculture and Department of Revenue of the
concerned State/UT.
9. The entries under Para- 4 of these
guidelines are substituted with the following-
The State Level Committee (SLC) shall: –
i. assess the availability of timber in the state
by way of appropriate study on demand and
supply on demand when it decides. SLC shall
devise suitable mechanism for sustainable use
of timber in a way that does not affect the
forests of the area adversely.
ii. approve the name of wood based industries
which may be considered for grant of fresh
license or enhancement of the existing licensed
capacity in case the SLC is satisfied that timber
is available legally for the said new Wood
Based Industries (such as Trees outside forest,
Forests etc.).
iii. ensure that the amount lying with the
respective State Forest Departments
(recovered from Wood Based Industries) is
utilized for the purpose of afforestation only.
iv. examine and make appropriate
recommendations or any other matter referred
67by the State Government to the Ministry of
Environment, Forest and Climate Change.
5. The entries under Para 7(ii) of these
Guidelines are substituted with the following:-
(a) In the States/UTs (other than North Eastern
States), in respect of distance from the
boundary of nearest notified forests or
protected areas, wood based industries shall
be allowed to operate as per state-specific
order/approval of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court/Hon’ble High Court of the concerned
State/Central Empowered Committee; or
beyond ten kilometers of aerial distance from
the boundary of nearest notified forests or
protected areas, excluding roadside/railway
side/canal side plantations, whichever is less.
(b) A Wood Based Industry can be established
in an Industrial Estate or a Municipal Area,
irrespective of the aerial distance from the
boundary of nearest notified forest or protected
area.”
74. The aforesaid amendments are of considerable significance. A
perusal thereof would reveal that the regulatory framework
governing wood-based industries underwent a material change
with effect from 11.09.2017. More importantly, the amended Para
7(ii) specifically incorporates the criterion of ten kilometres aerial
distance from the boundary of the nearest notified forest or
protected area, subject to any State-specific order or approval of
the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the concerned High Court or the
68
Central Empowered Committee. The amendment, therefore,
manifests the intention of the Central Government to ensure a
uniform regulatory mechanism for protection of forest resources
and ecologically sensitive areas while permitting operation of
wood-based industries in accordance with law.
75. It is also pertinent to note that under the amended scheme, the
role of the State Level Committee stands confined to the functions
specifically entrusted to it under the Guidelines. The Committee
undoubtedly continues to play an important role in matters relating
to assessment of timber availability, grant of approval for fresh
licences and other regulatory functions. However, neither the
amended provisions nor any other clause of the Guidelines can
be construed as conferring upon the State Level Committee any
overriding authority to supersede statutory powers vested in the
State Government under the parent enactment.
76. Thus, the amendments introduced by the Resolution dated
11.09.2017 clearly indicate that the regulatory regime governing
wood-based industries is required to be understood in the
backdrop of environmental protection, forest conservation and the
directions issued by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the continuing
proceedings arising out of T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad
(supra). The said amendments, therefore, assume considerable
relevance while examining the legality and validity of the
impugned Notification dated 25.09.2025.
69
77. Before proceeding to record the final conclusion, it would be
appropriate to remind oneself that the present controversy does
not merely concern the commercial interests of individual saw mill
operators or wood-based industries. The issue involved
transcends private rights and enters the realm of environmental
governance, forest conservation and sustainable management of
natural resources. The Court is therefore required to balance
competing interests while keeping in view the constitutional
mandate contained in Articles 48-A and 51-A(g) of the Constitution
of India, which impose a duty upon the State as well as citizens to
protect and improve the natural environment and safeguard
forests and wildlife.
78. The object underlying the Chhattisgarh Kashtha Chiran
(Viniyaman) Adhiniyam, 1984 is not merely regulatory in nature
but is fundamentally aimed at preventing indiscriminate
exploitation of timber resources and ensuring that industrial
activity dependent upon forest produce is carried on in a manner
consistent with ecological sustainability. The legislative intent is
thus rooted in the larger public interest of preserving forest wealth
for present and future generations.
79. As discussed hereinabove, Section 5 of the Adhiniyam of 1984
confers a specific statutory power upon the State Government to
declare any area as a prohibited area by issuance of a notification
specifying reasons therefor. The source of authority is therefore
70
directly traceable to the parent enactment. Once the legislature
has consciously vested such power in the State Government, the
Court cannot read into the provision limitations which the
legislature itself has not chosen to impose.
80. The principal argument of the petitioners that the
recommendations of the State Level Committee were not
accepted and, therefore, the impugned notification deserves to be
invalidated, cannot be accepted. A careful reading of Clauses 3, 4
and 7 of the Guidelines undoubtedly demonstrates the importance
of the State Level Committee in the regulatory framework.
However, neither the language of the Guidelines nor the scheme
of the Adhiniyam indicates that the recommendations of the
Committee are intended to override or supersede the statutory
powers vested in the State Government.
81. The Guidelines operate in aid of the statute. They supplement the
statutory framework but cannot control, curtail or render otiose a
power expressly conferred by the legislature. Acceptance of the
petitioners’ submission would amount to elevating the
recommendations of an expert body above the mandate of the
statute itself. Such an interpretation would be contrary to settled
principles governing delegated legislation and statutory
interpretation.
82. This Court is further of the opinion that environmental decision-
making occupies a distinct position in public law. Unlike ordinary
71
commercial regulation, environmental governance frequently
requires adoption of precautionary measures even in situations
where scientific certainty may not be absolute. The very purpose
of environmental regulation is to prevent irreversible ecological
damage before it occurs rather than to await its manifestation.
83. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the celebrated forest and
environmental jurisprudence developed in T.N. Godavarman
(supra) line of cases has repeatedly emphasized the need for
institutional mechanisms aimed at effective environmental
governance. In reference to T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad
(supra), the Supreme Court reiterated the concept of
“environmental rule of law” and observed that constitutional courts
are required to ensure that environmental regulatory institutions
function effectively, transparently and in furtherance of
environmental protection. The Court emphasized that
environmental governance must be guided by principles of
accountability, transparency and effective implementation of
environmental laws.
84. The aforesaid decision assumes considerable significance in the
facts of the present case. The impugned notification has been
issued in the field of environmental regulation and forest
conservation. Therefore, while exercising powers of judicial
review, this Court must remain conscious of the limits of judicial
intervention in matters involving environmental policy and
72
regulatory choices made by competent authorities.
85. It is equally well settled that the doctrines of sustainable
development, precautionary principle and inter-generational equity
now form an integral part of Indian environmental jurisprudence.
Sustainable development requires that economic growth and
environmental protection proceed hand in hand. The
precautionary principle mandates preventive action where there
exists a risk of serious environmental harm. The doctrine of inter-
generational equity recognizes that natural resources are held in
trust not merely for the present generation but also for
generations yet to come.
86. Viewed from the aforesaid perspective, the decision of the State
Government to prescribe a uniform aerial-distance criterion of ten
kilometres from the nearest notified forest or protected area
cannot be said to be arbitrary or irrational. The regulatory
framework itself recognizes the significance of such distance
criteria. The State Government has merely adopted a policy
measure intended to achieve greater protection of forest
resources and ecological balance. Merely because the impugned
notification may result in economic hardship or commercial
inconvenience to certain operators cannot furnish a ground for
invalidating the notification. Whenever environmental concerns
and purely commercial interests come into conflict, the Court is
required to strike a balance consistent with constitutional values
73
and the larger public interest. Environmental protection, by its very
nature, often requires restrictions upon commercial activity.
87. This Court also finds no substance in the contention that the
impugned notification suffers from arbitrariness. The petitioners
have not been able to establish mala fides, colourable exercise of
power, non-application of mind, consideration of irrelevant
material or exclusion of relevant considerations. The challenge
essentially invites the Court to substitute its own view for that of
the competent governmental authority. Such substitution is
impermissible within the limited scope of judicial review under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
88. Judicial review is directed against the decision-making process
and not against the merits of the decision itself. So long as the
authority acts within the bounds of its statutory powers, considers
relevant factors and arrives at a conclusion which cannot be
termed perverse or irrational, the Court would not interfere merely
because another view is possible.
89. At this juncture, it would be profitable to notice that the scope of
judicial review in matters involving governmental policy,
environmental regulation and management of natural resources is
no longer res integra. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has
consistently held that while constitutional courts possess the
power of judicial review, they do not sit in appeal over policy
decisions taken by competent authorities and would interfere only
74
when such decisions are shown to be arbitrary, mala fide, violative
of constitutional or statutory provisions or manifestly
unreasonable.
90. The interference of this Court has been sought in exercise of its
extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India against the decision of the State Government declaring,
by Notification dated 25.09.2025 issued under Section 5(1) of the
Chhattisgarh Kashtha Chiran (Viniyaman) Adhiniyam, 1984, all
areas falling within an aerial distance of 10 kilometres from the
boundary of the nearest notified forest or protected area as
prohibited areas for the purposes of regulation of saw mills and
other wood-based industries. The said decision has been taken in
the backdrop of the regulatory framework governing wood-based
industries, the amended Wood Based Industries (Establishment
and Regulation) Guidelines, 2016, and the larger objective of
forest conservation and ecological protection flowing from the
directions issued by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in T.N.
Godavarman Thirumulpad (supra).
91. In the considered opinion of this Court, it would not be appropriate
to exercise writ jurisdiction to interdict such a policy and regulatory
measure, particularly when indiscriminate proliferation of saw mills
and wood-based industries in close proximity to forest areas has
the potential to adversely impact forest resources and ecological
balance. Environmental degradation, depletion of forest cover and
75
the corresponding need to adopt precautionary and protective
measures in larger public interest are matters which fall primarily
within the domain of the competent governmental authorities. No
material has been brought on record by the petitioners to
demonstrate that the impugned decision of the State Government
is vitiated by mala fides, arbitrariness, lack of jurisdiction or
manifest illegality so as to warrant interference in exercise of
powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. Significantly, the
petitioners have also not laid any substantive challenge on the
basis that some other scientifically determined or legally
sustainable distance ought to have been prescribed in place of
the 10-kilometre aerial-distance norm.
92. In case of Sachidanand Pandey v. State of West Bengal,
(1987) 2 SCC 295, the Apex Court, though in a slightly different
context, held as follows:-
“4. ……. Whenever a problem of ecology is
brought before the Court, the Court is bound
to bear in mind Art. 48-A of the Constitution,
Directive Principle which enjoins that “The
State shall endeavour to protect and improve
the environment and to safeguard the forests
and wild life of the country,” and Art. 51A(g)
which proclaims it to be the fundamental duty
of every citizen of India “to protect and
improve the natural environment including
forests, lakes, rivers and wild life, and to have
compassion for living creatures”. When the
76Court is called upon to give effect to the
Directive Principle and the fundamental duty,
the Court is not to shrug its shoulders and say
that priorities are a matter of policy and so it
is a matter for the policy making authority……”
93. The Division Bench considered the provisions of the said Aet
Rules in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in T.N.
Godavarman Thirumulkpad‘s case (supra) and other decisions
and concluded as follows:-
“14. We have carefully considered the
submissions made on behalf of the respective
parties having regard to the directions given
by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the
various provisions of the Bihar Saw Mills
(Regulation) Act, 1990 and the rules framed
thereunder and we are inclined to agree with
Mr. Sahay’s submission that the question as
to whether the saw mill licence of the
petitioner was to be renewed or not, had been
left to the discretion of the Government in
keeping with the directions contained not only
in T.N. Godavarman Thirumulkpad‘s case,
(supra), but also in the case decided by the
Division Bench of the Patna High Court in
Basudeo Yadav, (supra). It is quite clear that
the intention of the Hon’ble Supreme Court
was that wood-based industries were to be
curtailed/minimized in order to protect the
forests and environment and in keeping with
such policy, a direction was given to the
Central Government and State Governments
77to appoint Expert Committees to go into the
matter. Whether the report of one committee
was accepted or not or whether the same
was an order within the meaning of Article
166 of the Constitution or not, is, in our view,
not very material for the purpose of the
present writ application. The Hon’ble
Supreme Court has clearly directed that the
Expert Committee was to submit its report to
the Hon’ble Supreme Court which appears to
have been done. The decision was taken by
the State Government to curtail and phase
out saw-mills and timber-based industries, in
the manner as indicated in the
communication of 28th November, 2000 and
the decision not to renew the petitioner’s
licence appears to have been taken, pursuant
to such a policy.
15. We are not, therefore, inclined to interfere
with the policy decision of the State
Government, which we are convinced is in
keeping with the directions of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court”.
94. Recently, in N.G. Projects Limited v. Vinod Kumar Jain and
others, (2022) 6 SCC 127, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while
reiterating the limited scope of judicial review in matters involving
policy decisions and contractual/tender-related disputes, has
observed as under:
“15. In Uflex Ltd. v. State of T.N., (2022) 1
SCC 165, this Court stated that the enlarged
78role of the Government in economic activity
and its corresponding ability to give economic
“largesse” was the bedrock of creating what is
commonly called the “tender jurisdiction”. The
objective was to have greater transparency
and the consequent right of an aggrieved
party to invoke the jurisdiction of the High
Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India beyond the issue of strict enforcement of
contractual rights under the civil jurisdiction.
However, the ground reality today is that
almost no tender remains unchallenged.
Unsuccessful parties or parties not even
participating in the tender seek to invoke the
jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226
of the Constitution. The Court held as under:
(SCC pp. 173-74 & 189-90, paras 2-3 & 42)
“2. The judicial review of such contractual
matters has its own limitations. It is in this
context of judicial review of administrative
actions that this Court has opined that it is
intended to prevent arbitrariness,
irrationality, unreasonableness, bias and
mala fides. The purpose is to check whether
the choice of decision is made lawfully and
not to check whether the choice of decision
is sound. In evaluating tenders and awarding
contracts, the parties are to be governed by
principles of commercial prudence. To that
extent, principles of equity and natural
justice have to stay at a distance.
3. We cannot lose sight of the fact that a
79tenderer or contractor with a grievance can
always seek damages in a civil court and
thus, ‘attempts by unsuccessful tenderers
with imaginary grievances, wounded pride
and business rivalry, to make mountains out
of molehills of some technical/procedural
violation or some prejudice to self, and
persuade courts to interfere by exercising
power of judicial review, should be resisted.
* * *
42. We must begin by noticing that we are
examining the case, as already stated
above, on the parameters discussed at the
inception. In commercial tender matters
there is obviously an aspect of commercial
competitiveness. For every succeeding party
who gets a tender there may be a couple or
more parties who are not awarded the
tender as there can be only one L-1. The
question is should the judicial process be
resorted to for downplaying the freedom
which a tendering party has, merely because
it is a State or a public authority, making the
said process even more cumbersome. We
have already noted that element of
transparency is always required in such
tenders because of the nature of economic
activity carried on by the State, but the
contours under which they are to be
examined are restricted as set out in Tata
Cellular and other cases. The objective is
not to make the Court an appellate authority
80for scrutinising as to whom the tender should
be awarded. Economics must be permitted
to play its role for which the tendering
authority knows best as to what is suited in
terms of technology and price for them.”
(emphasis supplied)
16. In Galaxy Transport Agencies v. New J.K.
Roadways, (2021) 16 SCC 808, a three-
Judge Bench again reiterated that the
authority that authors the tender document is
the best person to understand and appreciate
its requirements, and thus, its interpretation
should not be second-guessed by a court in
judicial review proceedings. It was observed
as thus: (SCC paras 17-18 & 20)
“17. In accordance with these judgments
and noting that the interpretation of the
tendering authority in this case cannot be
said to be a perverse one, the Division
Bench 18 ought not to have interfered with it
by giving its own interpretation and not
giving proper credence to the word “both”
appearing in Condition No. 31 of the NIT.
For this reason, the Division Bench’s
conclusion that JK Roadways was wrongly
declared to be ineligible, is set aside.
18. Insofar as Condition No. 27 of the NIT
prescribing work experience of at least 5
years of not less than the value of Rs 2
crores is concerned, suffice it to say that the
expert body, being the Tender Opening
81
Committee, consisting of four members,
clearly found that this eligibility condition
had been satisfied by the Appellant before
us. Without therefore going into the
assessment of the documents that have
been supplied to this Court, it is well settled
that unless arbitrariness or mala fide on the
part of the tendering authority is alleged, the
expert evaluation of a particular tender,
particularly when it comes to technical
evaluation, is not to be second-guessed by
a writ court. Thus, in Jagdish Mandal v.
State of Orissa, (2007) 14 SCC 517, this
Court noted: (SCC pp. 531-32, para 22)
22. Judicial review of administrative action is
intended to prevent arbitrariness,
irrationality, unreasonableness, bias and
mala fides. Its purpose is to check whether
choice or decision is made “lawfully” and not
to check whether choice or decision is
“sound”. When the power of judicial review
is invoked in matters relating to tenders or
award of contracts, certain special features
should be borne in mind. A contract is a
commercial transaction. Evaluating tenders
and awarding contracts are essentially
commercial functions. Principles of equity
and natural justice stay at a distance. If the
decision relating to award of contract is
bona fide and is in public interest, courts will
not, in exercise of power of judicial review,
interfere even if a procedural aberration or
error in assessment or prejudice to a
82
tenderer, is made out. The power of judicial
review will not be permitted to be invoked to
protect private interest at the cost of public
interest, or to decide contractual disputes.
The tenderer or contractor with a grievance
can always seek damages in a civil court.
Attempts by unsuccessful tenderers with
imaginary grievances, wounded pride and
business rivalry, to make mountains out of
molchills of some technical/procedural
violation or some prejudice to self, and
persuade courts to interfere by exercising
power of judicial review, should be resisted.
Such interferences, either interim or final,
may hold up public works for years, or delay
relief and succour to thousands and millions
and may increase the project cost manifold.
Therefore, a court before interfering in
tender or contractual matters in exercise of
power of judicial review, should pose to itself
the following questions:
(i) Whether the process adopted or decision
made by the authority is mala fide or
intended to favour someone;
or
Whether the process adopted or decision
made is so arbitrary and irrational that the
court can say: ‘the decision is such that no
responsible authority acting reasonably and
in accordance with relevant law could have
reached’;
83
(ii) Whether public interest is affected.
If the answers are in the negative, there
should be no interference under Article 226.
Cases involving blacklisting or imposition of
penal consequences on a
tenderer/contractor or distribution of State
largesse (allotment of sites/shops, grant of
licences, dealerships and franchises) stand
on a different footing as they may require a
higher degree of fairness in action.’
* * *
20. This being the case, we are unable to
fathom how the Division Bench, on its own
appraisal, arrived at the conclusion that the
Appellant held work experience of only 1
year, substituting the appraisal of the expert
four-member Tender Opening Committee
with its own.”
(emphasis supplied)
17. Therefore, the position of law with
regard to the interpretation of terms of the
contract is that the question as to whether a
term of the contract is essential or not is to
be viewed from the perspective of the
employer and by the employer. Applying the
aforesaid position of law to the present
case, it has been the contention of
Respondent 1 that the format for bank
guarantee was not followed strictly by the
State and that the relaxation given was not
uniform, in that Respondent 1 was singled
84
out. The said contention has found favour
with the courts below.”
95. In Jacob Puliyel v. Union of India and others, (2024) 17 SCC
485, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while dealing with judicial review
of public health policy, has succinctly reiterated the limits of
judicial interference in policy matters in the following terms:
“25. We shall now proceed to analyse the
precedents of this Court on the ambit of
judicial review of public policies relating to
health. It is well-settled that the Courts, in
exercise of their power of judicial review, do
not ordinarily interfere with the policy
decisions of the executive unless the policy
can be faulted on grounds of mala fide,
unreasonableness, arbitrariness or
unfairness, etc. Indeed, arbitrariness,
irrationality, perversity and mala fide will
render the policy unconstitutional. It is neither
within the domain of the courts nor the scope
of judicial review to embark upon an enquiry
as to whether a particular public policy is wise
or whether better public policy can be
evolved. Nor are the courts inclined to strike
down a policy the behest of a petitioner
merely because it has been urged that a
different policy would have been fairer or
wiser or more scientific or more logical20.
Courts do not and cannot act as appellate
authorities examining the correctness,
suitability and appropriateness of a policy, nor
are courts advisors to the executive on
85matters of policy which the executive is
entitled to formulate. The scope of judicial
review when examining a policy of the
Government is to check whether it violates the
fundamental rights of the citizens or is
opposed to the provisions of the Constitution,
or opposed to any statutory provision or
manifestly arbitrary.
26. This Court in a series of decisions has
reiterated that courts should not rush in where
even scientists and medical experts are
careful to tread. The rule of prudence is that
courts will be reluctant to interfere with policy
decisions taken by the Government, in
matters of public health, after collecting and
analysing inputs from surveys and research.
Nor will the courts attempt to substitute their
own views as to what is wise, safe, prudent or
proper, in relation to technical issues relating
to public health in preference to those
formulated by persons said to possess
technical expertise and rich experience.
Where expertise of a complex nature is
expected of the State in framing rules, the
exercise of that power not demonstrated as
arbitrary must be presumed to be valid as a
reasonable restriction on the fundamental
right of the citizen and judicial review must
halt at the frontiers. The Court cannot re-
weigh and substitute its notion of expedient
solution.
27. Within the wide Judge-proof areas of
86policy and judgment open to the Government,
if they make mistakes, correction is not in
court but elsewhere. That is the comity of
constitutional jurisdictions in our
Jurisprudence. We cannot evolve a judicial
policy on medical issues. All judicial thought,
Indian and Anglo-American, on the judicial
review power where rules under challenge
relate to a specialised field and involve
sensitive facets of public welfare, has warned
courts of easy assumption of
unreasonableness of subordinate legislation
on the strength of half-baked studies of
judicial generalists aided by the ad hoc
learning of the counsel. However, the court
certainly is the constitutional invigilator and
must act to defend the citizen in the assertion
of his fundamental rights against executive
tyranny draped in disciplinary power.
28. There is no doubt that this Court has held
in more than one judgment that where the
decision of the authority is in regard to a
policy matter, this Court will not ordinarily
interfere since decisions on policy matters are
taken based on expert knowledge of the
persons concerned and courts are normally
not equipped to question the correctness of a
policy decision. However, this does not mean
that courts have to abdicate their right to
scrutinise whether the policy in question is
formulated keeping in mind all the relevant
facts and the said policy can be held to be
beyond the pale of discrimination or
87unreasonableness, bearing in mind the
material on record. In DDA, this Court held
that an executive order termed as a policy
decision is not beyond the pale of judicial
review. Whereas the superior courts may not
interfere with the nitty-gritty of the policy, or
substitute one by the other but it will not be
correct to contend that the court shall lay its
judicial hands off, when a plea is raised that
the impugned decision is a policy decision.
Interference therewith on the part of the
superior court would not be without
jurisdiction as it is subject to judicial review. It
was further held therein that the policy
decision is subject to judicial review on the
following grounds:
28.1. If it is unconstitutional.
28.2. If it is dehors the provisions of the Act
and the regulations.
28.3. If the delegatee has acted beyond its
power of delegation.
28.4. If the executive policy is contrary to
the statutory or a larger policy.”
96. Very recently, the Hon’ble Odisha High Court in Sanjib Kumar
Mohanty and others v. State of Odisha and others, 2024(I)
ILR-CUT22, has considered the legality of the action of the State
authorities in relation to regulation of saw mills and wood-based
industries in the context of the governing statutory framework, the
environmental concerns underlying such regulation and the effect
88
of the directions issued in the T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad’s
line of cases. While dealing with the said controversy, the Hon’ble
Bench emphasized the primacy of environmental protection and
forest conservation in matters concerning regulation of wood-
based industries and reiterated the limited scope of judicial
interference in policy and regulatory measures adopted in
furtherance of ecological and forest protection, by holding as
under :-
“12. Before parting with the case, this Court
deems it apposite to make a mention that in
the name of rehabilitation of closed saw mills,
the State authorities including the forest
officers, cannot and should not act
detrimental to the interest of the public at
large, which affects the public policy and very
well come in realm of judicial review.
Therefore, the forest department has to
ensure that in the name of rehabilitation of
closed saw mills, the forest resources made
available should not be destroyed. In the
event of any destruction thereof, the
authorities, who are in the helm of affairs,
should be put to task, because the human
habitation are now facing severe crisis for
their survival in a healthy environment, which
should not be jeopardized further in any
manner. In the interest of justice, equity and
fair-play, both the human habitation and the
forest growth simultaneously should have a
healthy atmosphere and environment, as
89because any damage caused to the forest
resources would definitely jeopardize human
habitation.
13. This Court hopes and trusts, the
committee which has been constituted should
take care of the above mentioned aspects,
when we are facing acute pollution of air and
water. The burning example before this Court
is New Delhi, capital of India, suffers from
acute air pollution. Had there been enough
growth of forest, this air pollution could have
been averted. Similarly, the State of Orissa,
mainly its capital, Bhubaneswar is heading
towards similar problem which is faced in
New Delhi, may be within a short span of
time. Therefore, now time has come for all the
stake holders to aet strictly in consonance
with the provisions of law to give better
environment for survival of human habitation,
and that to allow human beings to live with
dignity in consonance with Article 21 of the
Constitution of India. The primary objective is
survival of human habitation, which should
not be lost sight of, while considering the
rehabilitation of the closed saw mills and also
notification issued for consideration of the
State Level Committee for taking decision
regarding grant of license/permission to the
wood based industries subject to compliance
of the prescribed guidelines and procedures
issued by Ministry of Environment, Forest and
Climate Change, Government of India, New
Delhi.”
90
97. Reverting to the facts of the present batch of cases in the light of
the aforesaid judicial pronouncements, this Court finds that the
impugned decision of the State Government culminating in
Notification dated 25.09.2025, whereby all areas falling within an
aerial distance of 10 kilometres from the boundary of the nearest
notified forest or protected area have been declared prohibited
areas for the purposes of regulation of saw mills and wood-based
industries, is essentially a policy determination founded upon
environmental considerations, forest conservation imperatives,
statutory regulation and expert assessment. The impugned
measure is not an isolated executive fiat but a decision taken in a
specialized regulatory field governed by the Adhiniyam of 1984,
the Wood Based Industries (Establishment and Regulation)
Guidelines, 2016 as amended, and the larger framework of
environmental governance shaped by the directions of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad
(supra).
98. The principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in N.G.
Projects Limited (supra), and Jacob Puliyel (supra) leave no
manner of doubt that policy decisions taken by the executive in
matters involving technical expertise, economic or regulatory
evaluation, environmental protection or public welfare are not to
be interfered with merely because another view is possible, or
because such decision may entail adverse civil or commercial
consequences for a section of persons affected thereby. The
91
scope of judicial review in such matters is confined to examining
whether the impugned decision is unconstitutional, contrary to the
statute, vitiated by mala fides, manifest arbitrariness, irrationality,
perversity, procedural impropriety or lack of jurisdiction. A writ
court does not sit in appeal over the wisdom, desirability or
comparative merits of the policy itself.
99. Tested on the anvil of the aforesaid parameters, this Court finds
that the petitioners have failed to demonstrate any constitutional,
statutory or jurisdictional infirmity in the impugned Notification
dated 25.09.2025 or in the consequential order dated 07.11.2025.
No material of any probative worth has been placed on record to
establish that the impugned action is arbitrary, discriminatory,
mala fide or bereft of any rational nexus with the object sought to
be achieved, namely regulation of wood-based industries in the
interest of forest conservation, ecological protection and
sustainable environmental governance. On the contrary, the
object and purpose of the Notification are directly aligned with the
constitutional mandate under Articles 48-A and 51-A(g), the
statutory framework of the Adhiniyam of 1984 and the
environmental principles recognised in Sachidanand Pandey
(supra), T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad (supra) and Jacob
Puliyel (supra). It is equally well settled that a precedent cannot
be read as though it were a statutory text and that every decision
must be understood in the factual context in which it was
rendered.
92
100. The judgments relied upon by the petitioners do not, upon close
scrutiny, lay down any proposition which would render the
impugned Notification ultra vires, unconstitutional or otherwise
unsustainable in law. Those decisions turn on their own facts,
statutory setting or nature of challenge. None of them dilute the
settled principle that where the State, acting within the four
corners of its statutory authority and on the basis of relevant
considerations, formulates a policy in a technical or specialised
field in larger public interest, the Court would be slow to interfere
unless the decision is demonstrably arbitrary, mala fide or
contrary to law. Rather, the line of authority in N.G. Projects
Limited (supra) and Jacob Puliyel (supra) reinforces judicial
restraint in relation to expert-driven and policy-based
determinations.
101. This Court is also unable to overlook that the subject matter of the
present controversy lies at the intersection of environmental
regulation, forest governance and industrial control. In such
matters, the Court is required to remain conscious of the
distinction between judicial review and appellate scrutiny. The
Court is not concerned with whether some other distance norm
may also have been possible, whether a lesser radius could have
been prescribed, or whether the economic impact upon individual
licensees could have been mitigated differently. Those are matters
falling within the province of policy and executive assessment.
What falls for examination in judicial review is only whether the
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policy is lawful, constitutionally permissible, supported by the
statute and informed by relevant considerations.
102. Once it is found that the decision has a rational nexus with the
object sought to be achieved and is not shown to be arbitrary or
mala fide, judicial review must stop at that threshold. In the
present batch of cases, the statutory framework under the
Adhiniyam of 1984 clearly vests the State Government with
authority to regulate saw mills and wood-based industries and to
declare prohibited areas in furtherance of forest conservation and
environmental protection. The Notification dated 25.09.2025 has
been issued in exercise of powers under Section 5(1) of the said
Adhiniyam of 1984 and is therefore directly traceable to the
source of statutory power. The legislative object underlying the
enactment is to regulate wood-based industries in a manner
consistent with preservation of forest resources.
103. Therefore, the exercise of power by the State Government in
issuing the impugned Notification cannot be said to be dehors the
statute, lacking in competence or beyond jurisdiction. The material
placed before this Court further indicates that the impugned policy
is the outcome of a conscious decision-making process
undertaken by the competent authority in the backdrop of the
prevailing regulatory regime governing wood-based industries, the
amended Guidelines of 2016, the concept of prohibited areas and
the need to maintain a safe and uniform distance from notified
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forests and protected areas. The prescription of a uniform aerial-
distance norm appears to have been adopted as a regulatory
standard so as to ensure consistency, certainty and enforceability
in implementation across the State. Merely because such a
standard may incidentally operate harshly against some existing
operators cannot be a ground to invalidate the policy itself, so
long as the standard bears a reasonable nexus with the object of
forest conservation and is not shown to be capricious or irrational.
104. The contention of the petitioners that the impugned Notification
results in grave commercial prejudice, closure of existing units or
denial of renewal of licences also cannot, by itself, furnish a
ground for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is
trite that where competing interests of private commercial
convenience and larger public interest in environmental protection
are involved, the latter must ordinarily prevail, subject of course to
the action being otherwise lawful and intra vires. Economic
hardship, loss of business opportunity or adverse financial
consequences to a class of licensees, however genuine, cannot
eclipse the overriding necessity of forest conservation and
ecological balance, particularly in a sector inherently linked with
extraction and utilization of forest resources. As noticed in T.N.
Godavarman Thirumulpad (supra), the regulatory control of
wood-based industries is integrally connected with the larger
object of arresting depletion of forest cover and preserving
environmental equilibrium.
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105. This Court is also of the considered view that in matters
concerning environmental regulation and forest protection, the
State is not only entitled but constitutionally obliged to adopt
precautionary and preventive measures. The doctrine of
sustainable development, the precautionary principle and the
public trust obligations of the State are no longer alien concepts in
Indian environmental jurisprudence. If the State, acting through its
competent authorities and within the framework of the statute,
adopts a regulatory measure intended to minimize potential
adverse impact upon forests and protected areas, such measure
must receive due deference unless it is shown to be manifestly
arbitrary, wholly unsupported by law or violative of constitutional
guarantees. No such infirmity has been demonstrated in the
present case.
106. Accordingly, this Court finds no merit in the challenge raised to the
Notification dated 25.09.2025 (Annexure P/1) or to the
consequential order dated 07.11.2025 (Annexure P/2). Both the
impugned actions are found to be within the competence of the
State authorities, supported by the statutory provisions of the
Adhiniyam of 1984, and justified by the object sought to be
achieved, namely protection and conservation of forests,
regulation of wood-based industries and maintenance of
ecological balance through a sustainable regulatory regime.
107. For all the reasons recorded hereinabove, this Court holds that
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the petitioners have failed to make out any case warranting
interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India,
particularly in view of the limited scope of judicial review laid down
in N.G. Projects Limited (supra), T.N. Godavarman
Thirumulpad (supra), Jacob Puliyel (supra) and the recent
reiteration of environmental primacy by the Hon’ble Odisha High
Court in Sanjib Kumar Mohanty (supra).
108. Before parting with the matter, this Court also considers it
apposite to notice that a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court, while
dealing with a similar challenge to the very same Notification
dated 25.09.2025 in W.P.(C) No.466 of 2026 and connected
matters, by order dated 05.02.2026, after taking into account the
rival submissions advanced by the parties, the provisions
contained in the Wood Based Industries (Establishment and
Regulation) Guidelines, 2016 as amended in 2017, the
recommendations of the State Level Committee and the stand of
the State Government as well as the Union of India, was not
inclined to grant interim protection in favour of the petitioners
therein. While declining interim relief, the Co-ordinate Bench took
note of the amendment made in Clause 7(ii) of the Guidelines and
also the alteration in the regulatory position concerning the role of
the State Level Committee under the amended framework.
109. It is true that the aforesaid order of the Co-ordinate Bench was
passed at the interlocutory stage and does not finally determine
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the rights of the parties or conclude the issues involved in the
present batch of petitions. Nevertheless, the same constitutes a
relevant circumstance which cannot be completely brushed aside,
particularly when the challenge in both sets of proceedings arises
from the same Notification and is founded on substantially similar
grounds. The fact that even at the interlocutory stage the Co-
ordinate Bench did not find a prima facie case warranting
suspension of the operation of the impugned Notification lends
some support to the conclusion independently reached by this
Court upon a full consideration of the pleadings, statutory
provisions and material brought on record.
110. This Court, however, clarifies that its present conclusions are
founded upon an independent examination of the entire
controversy on merits and not merely upon the earlier
interlocutory order of the Co-ordinate Bench. Upon such
independent scrutiny, this Court finds that the challenge mounted
by the petitioners is essentially directed against the wisdom of the
State policy itself rather than against any demonstrable illegality in
the exercise of power. The petitioners have not been able to show
that the decision-making process was vitiated by non-
consideration of relevant factors, consideration of extraneous
matters, colourable exercise of power, violation of statutory
procedure, hostile discrimination or manifest unreasonableness.
In the absence of such foundational infirmities, the impugned
Notification cannot be interdicted merely because its operation
98
has serious consequences for existing saw mills situated within
the prohibited area.
111. Considering the overall facts and circumstances of the present
batch of writ petitions, the nature of the challenge raised, the
object sought to be achieved by the Chhattisgarh Kashtha Chiran
(Viniyaman) Adhiniyam, 1984, the statutory powers vested in the
State Government under Section 5 thereof, the regulatory
framework governing wood-based industries, the constitutional
obligation of the State to protect forests and ecological resources,
and the principles of sustainable development and environmental
governance recognized by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, this Court
is of the considered opinion that the petitioners have failed to
establish any legal basis for invoking the extraordinary writ
jurisdiction of this Court so as to annul the impugned policy
decision.
112. This Court is further satisfied that the Notification dated
25.09.2025 (Annexure P/1), issued by the Forest and Climate
Change Department, Government of Chhattisgarh in exercise of
powers conferred under Section 5(1) of the Adhiniyam of 1984,
has been promulgated by the competent authority in accordance
with law and for the avowed purpose of protection and
conservation of forests and environment. The said Notification
bears a direct and reasonable nexus with the object sought to be
achieved by the parent enactment, namely regulation of wood-
99
based industries and preservation of forest resources. The
prescription of a 10-kilometre aerial-distance criterion from the
boundary of the nearest notified forest or protected area is clearly
traceable to the regulatory framework governing wood-based
industries and cannot be characterized as arbitrary, irrational,
mala fide, discriminatory or dehors the statutory scheme. Equally,
the consequential order dated 07.11.2025 (Annexure P/2), issued
by the Licensing Officer-cum-Divisional Forest Officer,
Rajnandgaon Forest Division, merely implements and gives effect
to the legal consequences flowing from Annexure P/1. The said
order does not create any independent restriction nor does it
travel beyond the scope of the parent Notification; rather, it
identifies the saw mills falling within the prohibited area and
enforces the statutory consequences contemplated under Section
5(2) of the Adhiniyam of 1984. No material has been brought on
record to establish that either Annexure P/1 or Annexure P/2
suffers from any jurisdictional error, procedural impropriety,
arbitrariness, mala fides or violation of any constitutional or
statutory provision.
113. Consequently, the Notification dated 25.09.2025 (Annexure P/1)
and the consequential order dated 07.11.2025 (Annexure P/2) are
held to be legal, valid, intra vires and fully within the competence
of the authorities concerned. The challenge mounted against both
the aforesaid actions, therefore, fails and is accordingly rejected.
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114. In the result, all the writ petitions, being devoid of merit, deserve to
be and are accordingly dismissed.
115. All pending interlocutory applications also stand disposed of.
116. There shall be no order as to costs.
Sd/-
(Amitendra Kishore Prasad)
Judge
Yogesh
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Head-Note
A policy decision prescribing a distance norm/prohibited area for
saw mills and other wood-based industries, taken in exercise of
statutory power and founded on environmental considerations, expert
inputs and the governing regulatory framework, is not ordinarily
amenable to interference in writ jurisdiction. In the absence of
arbitrariness, mala fides, lack of jurisdiction or violation of any
constitutional or statutory provision, the Court would not interfere
merely because such decision results in adverse commercial
consequences to a section of operators.
