Himachal Pradesh High Court
Rohit vs State Of Hp on 16 July, 2026
2026:HHC:29075
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MP(M) No. 980 of 2026
Reserved on : 15.07.2026
.
Date of Decision: 16.7.2026.
Rohit ....Petitioner
Versus
State of HP ....Respondent
of
Coram
Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No.
rt
For the Petitioner : Mr Chetan Thakur, Advocate,
vice Mr Arun Sehgal, Advocate.
For the Respondent/State : Mr Lokender Kutlehria,
Additional Advocate General.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioner has filed the present petition seeking
regular bail in F.I.R. No. 47 of 2025, dated 03.05.2025, registered
at Police Station, Jawali, District, Kangra, for the commission of
offences punishable under Section 20 and 29 of the Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (NDPS Act).
2. It has been asserted that, as per the prosecution, the
police were checking the vehicles near Village Gartholi on
1
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
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03.05.202. A vehicle bearing registration No. HP-38J-1001 came
from Jawali. The driver attempted to turn the vehicle after seeing
.
the police. The police stopped the vehicle and enquired about the
names of the occupants. The driver disclosed his name as
Gurpeet. The person sitting beside the driver disclosed his name
as Rohit (the present petitioner). The police searched the vehicle
of
and recovered a polythene packet containing 1.122 kilograms of
charas. The police separated two samples and sealed the bulk
rt
parcel and the samples on the spot. The police apprehended
Gurpreet and Rohit. These allegations are false. The petitioner is
innocent, and he has nothing to do with the commission of the
crime. No recovery was effected from the petitioner’s possession.
The mandatory provisions of search, seizure and investigation
were not complied with. The police have filed the charge sheet
before the Court, and no fruitful purpose would be served by
detaining the petitioner in custody. The petitioner would abide
by the terms and conditions that the Court may impose. Hence, it
was prayed that the petitioner be released on bail.
3. The petition is opposed by filing a status report
asserting that the police had set up a Nakka near Gartholi on
03.05.2025. The police met Gagan Singh and Shubham. A vehicle
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bearing registration No HP-38J-1001 came from Kangra at about
03.40 a.m., the police signalled the driver to stop the vehicle. The
.
driver attempted to turn the vehicle. The police apprehended the
driver and the passenger, who revealed their names as Gurpreet
and Rohit. The police searched the vehicle and recovered 1.122
kilograms of Charas. The police arrested the occupants of the
of
vehicle and seized the Charas. The charas was sent to the SFSL,
and it was confirmed to be an extract of cannabis and a sample of
rt
Charas. Subsequently, Paras and Rajesh Kumar were arrested.
The petitioner would indulge in the commission of a similar
crime and would intimidate the witnesses if released on bail.
Hence, it was prayed that the petition be dismissed.
4. I have heard Mr Chetan Thakur, learned vice counsel
appearing on behalf of the petitioner/accused and Mr Lokender
Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General, for the
respondent/State.
5. Mr Chetan Thakur, learned vice counsel for the
petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was
falsely implicated. There is no material to connect him to the
commission of the crime. The petitioner was arrested on
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03.05.2025. One year has elapsed since the petitioner’s arrest.
The prosecution has failed to complete the evidence, which
.
violates the petitioner’s right to a speedy trial. The police have
filed the charge sheet, and no fruitful purpose would be served by
detaining the petitioner in custody. The petitioner would abide
by the terms and conditions that the Court may impose. Hence, it
of
was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the
petitioner be released on bail. He relied upon the judgment of the
rt
High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Rajbir Singh
alias Mota vs. State of H.P. Cr.MP(M) No. 51018 of 2024, decided on
16.1.2025 and judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rab
Prakash vs. The State of Odisha in Special Leave to Appeal (Crl)
No(s) No. 4169 of 2023, decided on 13.07.2023in support of his
submission.
6. Mr Lokender Kutlehria, Additional Advocate General,
for the respondent State, submitted that the petitioner was found
in possession of a commercial quantity of Charas and the rigours
of Section 37 of the NDPS Act apply to the present case.
The petitioner has failed to satisfy the twin conditions laid down
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under Section 37 of the NDPS Act, and he is not entitled to bail.
Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.
.
7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
8. The parameters for granting bail were considered by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC
of
314: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page 380:
(i) Broad principles for the grant of bail
rt
56. In Gudikantis Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1
SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115, Krishna Iyer, J., while elaboratingon the content of Article 21 of the Constitution of India in the
context of personal liberty of a person under trial, has laid
down the key factors that should be considered while
granting bail, which are extracted as under: (SCC p. 244,paras 7-9)
“7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the
vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is alsopertinent. The punishment to which the party may be
liable, if convicted or a conviction is confirmed, also bearsupon the issue.
8. Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice
would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignantjurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being.
[Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England”
(Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 — Modern
Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.]
9. Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court
considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with
witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the
process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in this
context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who is
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applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record,
particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to
commit serious offences while on bail. In regard to habituals,
it is part of criminological history that a thoughtless bail
.
order has enabled the bailee to exploit the opportunity to
inflict further crimes on the members of society. Bail
discretion, based on evidence about the criminal record of a
defendant, is therefore not an exercise in irrelevance.”
(emphasis supplied)
57. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4 SCC
280: 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted various
of
aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing
with an application seeking bail. The same may be extracted
as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8)
“8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the
rt
basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the
circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner.
While granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind the
nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support
thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will
entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing of the
accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused,
reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused
at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being
tampered with, the larger interests of the public or State and
similar other considerations. It has also to be kept in mind
that for the purposes of granting the bail the legislature has
used the words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of
“the evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant
of bail can only satisfy it (sic itself) as to whether there is a
genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution
will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the
charge.” (emphasis supplied)
58. This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh,
(2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688, speaking through
Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising discretion in
matters of bail has to undertake the same judiciously. In
highlighting that bail should not be granted as a matter of
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course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this Court observed as
follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3)
“3. Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order, but,
however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion in a
.
judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An order for
bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained. Needless
to record, however, that the grant of bail is dependent upon
the contextual facts of the matter being dealt with by the
court and facts do always vary from case to case. While the
placement of the accused in society, though it may be
considered by itself, cannot be a guiding factor in the matter
of
of grant of bail, the same should always be coupled with
other circumstances warranting the grant of bail. The nature
of the offence is one of the basic considerations for the grant
of bail — the more heinous is the crime, the greater is the
chance of rejection of the bail, though, however, dependent
rt
on the factual matrix of the matter.” (emphasis supplied)
59. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC
528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977, this Court held that although it is
established that a court considering a bail application cannot
undertake a detailed examination of evidence and an
elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, yet the court
is required to indicate the prima facie reasons justifying the
grant of bail.
60. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC
496: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765, this Court observed that where a
High Court has granted bail mechanically, the said order
would suffer from the vice of non-application of mind,
rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with regard to
the circumstances under which an order granting bail may be
set aside. In doing so, the factors which ought to have guided
the Court’s decision to grant bail have also been detailed as
under: (SCC p. 499, para 9)
“9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere
with an order passed by the High Court granting or rejecting
bail to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon the
High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously
and strictly in compliance with the basic principles laid down
in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well
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settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to be
borne in mind while considering an application for bail are:
(i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground
to believe that the accused had committed the offence;
.
(ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;
(iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction;
(iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if
released on bail;
(v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of
the accused;
of
(vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated;
(vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being
influenced; and
rt (viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant
of bail.” (emphasis supplied)
xxxxxxx
62. One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of
application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise of
discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the accused
is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2
SCC (Cri) 170, wherein a three-Judge Bench of this Court,
while setting aside an unreasoned and casual order (Pappu
Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2856 and Pappu
Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2857) of the High
Court granting bail to the accused, observed as follows:
(Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2
SCC (Cri) 170]), SCC p. 511, para 35)“35. While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an
individual is an invaluable right, at the same time while
considering an application for bail courts cannot lose sight of
the serious nature of the accusations against an accused and
the facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly, when
the accusations may not be false, frivolous or vexatious in
nature but are supported by adequate material brought on
record to enable a court to arrive at a prima facie conclusion.
While considering an application for the grant of bail, a
prima facie conclusion must be supported by reasons and
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must be arrived at after having regard to the vital facts of the
case brought on record. Due consideration must be given to
facts suggestive of the nature of crime, the criminal
antecedents of the accused, if any, and the nature of
.
punishment that would follow a conviction vis-Ã -vis the
offence(s) alleged against an accused.” (emphasis supplied)
9. The present petition has to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
10. The status report mentions that the petitioner was
of
found in the vehicle from which the police had recovered 1.122
kilograms of Charas. In Madan Lal versus State of H.P. (2003) 7 SCC
rt
465: 2003 SCC (Cri) 1664: 2003 SCC OnLineSC 874, the contraband
was recovered from a vehicle, and it was held that all the
occupants of the vehicle would be in conscious possession of the
contraband. It was observed:
“19. Whether there was conscious possession has to be
determined with reference to the factual backdrop. The
facts which can be culled out from the evidence on recordare that all the accused persons were travelling in a
vehicle, and as noted by the trial court, they were known
to each other, and it has not been explained or shown as tohow they travelled together from the same destination in
a vehicle which was not a public vehicle.
20. Section 20(b) makes possession of contraband articles
an offence. Section 20 appears in Chapter IV of the Act,
which relates to offences for possession of such articles. It
is submitted that to make the possession illicit, there must
be conscious possession.
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21. It is highlighted that unless the possession was coupled
with the requisite mental element, i.e., conscious
possession and not mere custody without awareness of
the nature of such possession, Section 20 is not attracted.
.
22. The expression “possession” is a polymorphous term
that assumes different colours in different contexts. It
may carry different meanings in contextually different
backgrounds. It is impossible, as was observed in theSupdt. & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, W.B. v. Anil Kumar
Bhunja [(1979) 4 SCC 274: 1979 SCC (Cri) 1038: AIR 1980 SC
52] to work out a completely logical and precise definitionof
of “possession” uniformly applicable to all situations in
the context of all statutes.
23. The word “conscious” means awareness of a particular
fact. It is a state of mind which is deliberate or intended.
rt
24. As noted in Gunwantlal v. State of M.P. [(1972) 2 SCC
194: 1972 SCC (Cri) 678: AIR 1972 SC 1756], possession in agiven case need not be physical possession but can be
constructive, having power and control over the article in
the case in question, while the person to whom physical
possession is given holds it subject to that power orcontrol.
25. The word “possession” means the legal right to
possession (see Heath v. Drown [(1972) 2 All ER 561: 1973 AC
498: (1972) 2 WLR 1306 (HL)] ). In an interesting case, itwas observed that where a person keeps his firearm in his
mother’s flat, which is safer than his own home, he must
be considered to be in possession of the same. (SeeSullivan v. Earl of Caithness [(1976) 1 All ER 844: 1976 QB
966: (1976) 2 WLR 361 (QBD)].)
26. Once possession is established, the person who claims
that it was not a conscious possession has to establish it
because how he came to be in possession is within his
special knowledge. Section 35 of the Act gives a statutory
recognition of this position because of the presumption
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2026:HHC:2907554, where a presumption is also available to be drawn
from possession of illicit articles.
27. In the factual scenario of the present case, not only
possession but conscious possession has been established.
.
It has not been shown by the accused-appellants that the
possession was not conscious in the logical background of
Sections 35 and 54 of the Act.”
11. Therefore, prima facie, the petitioner was in
possession of 1.122 kilograms of charas.
of
12. The Central Government has notified 1 kilogram as
the commercial quantity of charas; therefore, the petitioner was,
rt
prima facie, found in possession of a commercial quantity of
charas, and the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act applied to
the present case. Section 37 of the NDPS Act reads as follows:-
“37. Offences to be cognizable and non-bailable. – (1)
Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)–
(a) every offence punishable under this Act shall be
cognizable;
(b) No person accused of an offence punishable for
offences under section 19 or section 24 or section27A, and also for offences involving commercial
quantity, shall be released on bail or on his own
bond unless-
(i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an
opportunity to oppose the application for
such release, and
(ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the
application, the court is satisfied that there
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2026:HHC:29075is not guilty of such an offence and that he is
not likely to commit any offence while on
bail.
(2) The limitations on granting of bail specified in
.
clause (b) of sub-section (1) are in addition to the
limitations under the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 (2 of 1974) or any other law for the time being
in force, on granting of bail.”
13. This section was interpreted by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Union of India Versus Niyazuddin & Another (2018) 13 SCC
of
738, and it was held that in the absence of the satisfaction that the
accused is not guilty of an offence and he is not likely to commit
rt
an offence while on bail, he cannot be released on bail. It was
observed:
“7. Section 37 of the NDPS Act contains special provisions
with regard to the grant of bail in respect of certain
offences enumerated under the said Section. They
are:
(1) In the case of a person accused of an offence
punishable under Section 19,(2) Under Section 24,
(3) Under Section 27A and(4) Of offences involving commercial quantity.
8. The accusation in the present case is with regard to the
fourth factor, namely, commercial quantity. Be that
as it may, once the Public Prosecutor opposes the
application for bail to a person accused of the
enumerated offences under Section 37 of the NDPS
Act, in case the court proposes to grant bail to such a
person, two conditions are to be mandatorily
satisfied in addition to the normal requirements
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under the provisions of the Cr.P.C. or any other
enactment.
(1) The court must be satisfied that there are
reasonable grounds for believing that the
.
person is not guilty of such an offence;
(2) that person is not likely to commit any offence
while on bail.”
14. This position was reiterated in State of Kerala Versus
Rajesh, AIR 2020 SC 721, wherein it was held:
of
“19. This Court has laid down broad parameters to be
followed while considering the application for bail
rtmoved by the accused involved in offences under the
NDPS Act. In Union of India vs. Ram Samujh and Ors.,
(1999) 9 SCC 429, it has been elaborated as under: –
“7. It is to be borne in mind that the aforesaid
legislative mandate is required to be adhered to
and followed. It should be borne in mind that in
a murder case, the accused commits themurder of one or two persons, while those
persons who are dealing in narcotic drugs are
instrumental in causing death or in inflictingdeath-blow to a number of innocent young
victims, who are vulnerable; it causesdeleterious effects and a deadly impact on the
society; they are a hazard to the society; even if
they are released temporarily, in allprobability, they would continue their
nefarious activities of trafficking and/or
dealing in intoxicants clandestinely. The
reason may be the large stake and illegal profit
involved. This Court, dealing with the
contention with regard to punishment under
the NDPS Act, has succinctly observed about
the adverse effect of such activities in Durand::: Downloaded on – 16/07/2026 20:34:09 :::CIS
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2026:HHC:29075Didier vs. Chief Secy. Union Territory of Goa,
(1990) 1 SCC 95) as under:
24. With deep concern, we may point out
that the organised activities of the.
underworld and the clandestine
smuggling of narcotic drugs and
psychotropic substances into this
country and illegal trafficking in such
drugs and substances have led to drug
addiction among a sizeable section of the
public, particularly the adolescents andof
students of both sexes and the menace
has assumed serious and alarming
proportions in recent years. Therefore, in
rt order to effectively control and eradicate
this proliferating and booming
devastating menace, causing deleteriouseffects and a deadly impact on society as
a whole, Parliament, in its wisdom, has
made effective provisions by introducing
Act 81 of 1985 specifying mandatoryminimum imprisonment and fine.
8. To check the menace of dangerous drugs flooding
the market, Parliament has provided that theperson accused of offences under the NDPS Act
should not be released on bail during trialunless the mandatory conditions provided in
Section 37, namely,
(i) there are reasonable grounds for
believing that the accused is not guilty
of such offence; and
(ii) that he is not likely to commit any
offence while on bail are satisfied. The
High Court has not given any justifiable
reason for not abiding by the aforesaid
mandate while ordering the release of
the respondent accused on bail. Instead::: Downloaded on – 16/07/2026 20:34:09 :::CIS
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2026:HHC:29075of attempting to take a holistic view of
the harmful socio-economic
consequences and health hazards which
would accompany trafficking illegally in.
dangerous drugs, the court should
implement the law in the spirit with
which Parliament, after due
deliberation, has amended.”
20. The scheme of Section 37 reveals that the exercise of
power to grant bail is not only subject to the
limitations contained under Section 439 of the CrPC
of
but is also subject to the limitation placed by Section
37, which commences with the non-obstante clause.
The operative part of the said section is in the
rtnegative form prescribing the enlargement of bail to
any person accused of the commission of an offence
under the Act unless twin conditions are satisfied.
The first condition is that the prosecution must be
given an opportunity to oppose the application, and
the second is that the Court must be satisfied that
there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is
not guilty of such an offence. If either of these two
conditions is not satisfied, the ban for granting bail
operates.
21. The expression “reasonable grounds” means
something more than prima facie grounds. It
contemplates substantial probable causes for
believing that the accused is not guilty of the alleged
offence. The reasonable belief contemplated in the
provision requires the existence of such facts and
circumstances as are sufficient in themselves to
justify satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of
the alleged offence. In the case at hand, the High
Court seems to have completely overlooked the
underlying object of Section 37 that, in addition to
the limitations provided under the CrPC, or any other
law for the time being in force, regulating the grant
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of bail, its liberal approach in the matter of bail under
the NDPS Act is indeed uncalled for.”
15. A similar view was taken in Union of India v. Mohd.
.
Nawaz Khan, (2021) 10 SCC 100: (2021) 3 SCC (Cri) 721: 2021 SCC
OnLine SC 1237, wherein it was observed at page 110:
“21. Under Section 37(1)(b)(ii), the limitations on the grant
of bail for offences punishable under Sections 19, 24 or 27-
A and also for offences involving a commercial quantityof
are:
(i) The Prosecutor must be given an
opportunity to oppose the application for bail;
and
rt (ii) There must exist “reasonable grounds to
believe” that: (a) the person is not guilty of
such an offence; and (b) he is not likely to
commit any offence while on bail.
22. The standard prescribed for the grant of bail is
“reasonable ground to believe” that the person is not
guilty of the offence. Interpreting the standard of
“reasonable grounds to believe”, a two-judge Bench
of this Court in Shiv Shanker Kesari [Union of India v.
Shiv Shanker Kesari, (2007) 7 SCC 798: (2007) 3 SCC
(Cri) 505], held that: (SCC pp. 801-02, paras 7-8 &
10-11)
“7. The expression used in Section 37(1)(b)(ii) is
“reasonable grounds”. The expression means
something more than prima facie grounds. It
connotes substantial probable causes for believing
that the accused is not guilty of the offence
charged, and this reasonable belief, contemplated
in turn, points to the existence of such facts and
circumstances as are sufficient in themselves to
justify the recording of satisfaction that the
accused is not guilty of the offence charged.
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8. The word “reasonable” has in law the prima
facie meaning of reasonable in regard to those
circumstances of which the actor, called on to
act reasonably, knows or ought to know. It is
.
difficult to give an exact definition of the word
“reasonable”.
‘7. … Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary, 4th Edn., p.
2258 states that it would be unreasonable to
expect an exact definition of the word
“reasonable”. Reason varies in its conclusions
according to the idiosyncrasy of the individual,
of
and the times and circumstances in which he
thinks. The reasoning which built up the old
scholastic logic sounds now like the jingling of
a child’s toy.’
rt
[See MCD v. Jagan Nath Ashok Kumar [MCD v.
Jagan Nath Ashok Kumar, (1987) 4 SCC 497], SCC
p. 504, para 7 and Gujarat Water Supply &
Sewerage Board v. Unique Erectors (Gujarat) (P)
Ltd. [Gujarat Water Supply & Sewerage Board v.
Unique Erectors (Gujarat) (P) Ltd., (1989) 1 SCC
532]]
***
10. The word “reasonable” signifies “in
accordance with reason”. In the ultimate
analysis, it is a question of fact whether a
particular act is reasonable or not, depends on
the circumstances in a given situation. (See
Municipal Corpn. of Greater Mumbai v. Kamla
Mills Ltd. [Municipal Corpn. of Greater Mumbai
v. Kamla Mills Ltd. (2003) 6 SCC 315]
11. The court, while considering the application
for bail with reference to Section 37 of the Act,
is not called upon to record a finding of not
guilty. It is for the limited purpose, essentially
confined to the question of releasing the
accused on bail, that the court is called upon to
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see if there are reasonable grounds for
believing that the accused is not guilty and
records its satisfaction about the existence of
such grounds. But the court has not to consider
.
the matter as if it is pronouncing a judgment of
acquittal and recording a finding of not
guilty.”
(emphasis supplied)
23. Based on the above precedent, the test which the
High Court and this Court are required to apply while
granting bail is whether there are reasonable
of
grounds to believe that the accused has not
committed an offence and whether he is likely to
commit any offence while on bail. Given the
seriousness of offences punishable under the NDPS
rtAct and in order to curb the menace of drug
trafficking in the country, stringent parameters for
the grant of bail under the NDPS Act have been
prescribed.”
16. This position was reiterated in Narcotics Control
Bureau v. Mohit Aggarwal, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 891, wherein it was
observed:
“11. It is evident from a plain reading of the non-obstante
clause inserted in sub-section (1) and the conditions
imposed in sub-section (2) of Section 37 that there are
certain restrictions placed on the power of the Court whengranting bail to a person accused of having committed an
offence under the NDPS Act. Not only are the limitations
imposed under Section 439 of the Criminal Procedure
Code, 1973, to be kept in mind, but the restrictions placed
under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 37 are also to
be factored in. The conditions imposed in subsection (1) of
Section 37 are that (i) the Public Prosecutor ought to be
given an opportunity to oppose the application moved by
an accused person for release, and (ii) if such an::: Downloaded on – 16/07/2026 20:34:09 :::CIS
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2026:HHC:29075application is opposed, then the Court must be satisfied
that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the
person accused is not guilty of such an offence.
Additionally, the Court must be satisfied that the accused.
person is unlikely to commit any offence while on bail.
12. The expression “reasonable grounds” has come up for
discussion in several rulings of this Court. In “Collector of
Customs, New Delhi v. Ahmadalieva Nodira” (2004) 3 SCC549, a decision rendered by a Three Judges Bench of this
Court, it has been held thus: —
“7. The limitations on granting bail come in only when
of
the question of granting bail arises on merits. Apart
from the grant of opportunity to the Public Prosecutor,
the other twin conditions which have relevance so far
as the present accused-respondent is concerned, are
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the satisfaction of the court that there are reasonable
grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty ofthe alleged offence and that he is not likely to commit
any offence while on bail. The conditions are
cumulative and not alternative. The satisfaction
contemplated regarding the accused being not guiltyhas to be based on reasonable grounds. The expression
“reasonable grounds” means something more than prima
facie grounds. It contemplates substantial probable causesfor believing that the accused is not guilty of the alleged
offence. The reasonable belief contemplated in theprovision requires the existence of such facts and
circumstances as are sufficient in themselves to justify
satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of the allegedoffence.” [emphasis added]
13. The expression “reasonable ground” came up for
discussion in “State of Kerala v. Rajesh” (2020) 12 SCC 122,
and this Court has observed as below:
“20. The expression “reasonable grounds” means
something more than prima facie grounds. It
contemplates substantial probable causes for believing
that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. The::: Downloaded on – 16/07/2026 20:34:09 :::CIS
20
2026:HHC:29075reasonable belief contemplated in the provision requires
the existence of such facts and circumstances as are
sufficient in themselves to justify satisfaction that the
accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. In the case at.
hand, the High Court seems to have completely
overlooked the underlying object of Section 37 that, in
addition to the limitations provided under the CrPC, or
any other law for the time being in force, regulating thegrant of bail, its liberal approach in the matter of bail
under the NDPS Act is indeed uncalled for.” [emphasis
added]of
14. To sum up, the expression “reasonable grounds” used
in clause (b) of Sub-Section (1) of Section 37 would mean
credible, plausible and grounds for the Court to believe
that the accused person is not guilty of the alleged offence.
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For arriving at any such conclusion, such facts and
circumstances must exist in a case that can persuade theCourt to believe that the accused person would not have
committed such an offence. Dovetailed with the aforesaid
satisfaction is an additional consideration that the accused
person is unlikely to commit any offence while on bail.
15. We may clarify that at the stage of examining an
application for bail in the context of Section 37 of the Act, the
Court is not required to record a finding that the accusedperson is not guilty. The Court is also not expected to weigh
the evidence for arriving at a finding as to whether theaccused has committed an offence under the NDPS Act or not.
The entire exercise that the Court is expected to undertake at
this stage is for the limited purpose of releasing him on bail.
Thus, the focus is on the availability of reasonable grounds for
believing that the accused is not guilty of the offences that he
has been charged with and that he is unlikely to commit an
offence under the Act while on bail.
17. In the present case, the petitioner was prima facie found
in possession of a commercial quantity of charas, and there is
nothing to show that he would not indulge in the commission of a
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2026:HHC:29075
similar offence if released on bail; thus, the petitioner has not
satisfied the twin conditions laid down under Section 37 of the NDPS
.
Act, and he cannot be held entitled to bail.
18. It was submitted that the prosecution has failed to
complete the evidence, which violates the petitioner’s right to a
speedy trial, and the petitioner is entitled to bail on this
of
consideration. This submission will not help the petitioner. The
petitioner has not filed the copies of the order sheet to
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demonstrate the delay. The petitioner was prima facie found in
possession of a commercial quantity of Charas, and he is not
entitled to bail without satisfying the twin conditions laid down
under Section 37 of the NDPS Act. It was laid down by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Vijin K. Varghese 2025:
INSC:1316 that bail cannot be granted on the ground of prolonged
incarceration without satisfying the twin conditions laid down
under Section 37 of the NDPS Act. It was observed: –
“17. The High Court then, on the strength of those
premises, recorded a finding that there exist reasonable
grounds to believe that the applicant is not guilty of the
alleged offence, treating prolonged incarceration and
likely delay as the justification for bail. Such a finding is
not a casual observation. It is the statutory threshold
under Section 37(1)(b)(ii), which would disentitle the
discretionary relief and grant of bail must necessarily rest::: Downloaded on – 16/07/2026 20:34:09 :::CIS
22
2026:HHC:29075on careful appraisal of the material available. A conclusion
of this nature, if returned without addressing the
prosecution’s assertions of operative control and
antecedent involvement, risks trenching upon the.
appreciation of evidence which would be in the domain of
the trial court at first instance.
18. This Court ordinarily shows deference to the discretion
exercised by the High Court while considering the grant ofbail. However, offences involving a commercial quantity
of narcotic drugs stand on a distinct statutory footing.
Section 37 enacts a specific embargo on the grant of bailof
and obligates the Court to record satisfaction on the twin
requirements noticed above, in addition to the ordinary
tests under the Code of Criminal Procedure.
19. In the present case, the High Court has not undertaken
rt
the analysis of those twin requirements with reference to
the material placed by the prosecution. The orders dated22.01.2025 and 12.03.2025 do not advert to the allegation
regarding the respondent’s prior involvement in a seizure
of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances only days
prior to the seizure forming the subject matter of thepresent complaint, nor do they engage with the
prosecution’s assertion as to the respondent’s role in
arranging, importing, clearing and supervising theconsignments. The omission to consider these factors
bears directly upon the statutory satisfaction required by
19. A similar view was taken in Union of India v Namdeo
Ashruba Nakade SLP (Crl.) 9792/2025, decided on 07.11.2025,
wherein it was observed:
“11. In the present case, this Court finds that though the
Respondent-accused was in custody for one year, four
months, and charges have not been framed, yet the
allegations are serious inasmuch as not only is the
recovery much in excess of the commercial quantity, but::: Downloaded on – 16/07/2026 20:34:09 :::CIS
23
2026:HHC:29075the Respondent-accused allegedly got the cavities
ingeniously fabricated below the trailer to conceal the
contraband.
12. Prima facie, this Court is of the opinion that the
.
Respondent-accused is involved in drug trafficking in an
organised manner. Consequently, no case for dispensing
with the mandatory requirement of Section 37 of the NDPS
Act is made out in the present matter.”
20. This position was reiterated in State of Punjab v.
Sukhwinder Singh, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 671, wherein it was
of
observed: –
9. It is well-settled that in matters involving recovery of
rt
contraband in commercial quantity, the twin conditions
under Section 37(1)(b)(ii) of the NDPS Act are mandatoryand entail no relaxation merely on the ground that the
accused has undergone prolonged incarceration during
the pendency of trial. The provision casts upon the Court a
duty to record, before enlarging an accused on bail, itssatisfaction on two cumulative conditions, first, that there
exist reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is
not guilty of the offence charged; and second, that he isnot likely to commit any offence while on bail. The
recording of such satisfaction is not a mere formality but amandatory precondition, the non-observance of which
vitiates the grant of bail. This Court, in Kashif (supra), has
held in no uncertain terms that the recording ofsatisfaction on the twin conditions under Section 37 is
mandatory and not merely directory, and that an order
granting bail without such recorded satisfaction stands
vitiated and cannot be sustained. The same view stands
reiterated in Lalrintluanga Sailo (supra).
10. The impugned order, on its own showing, does not
record the satisfaction mandated under Section
37(1)(b)(ii) of the NDPS Act. Far from recording such
satisfaction, the High Court has gone on to observe that::: Downloaded on – 16/07/2026 20:34:09 :::CIS
24
2026:HHC:29075‘the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act can be diluted
bearing in mind the right to a speedy trial.’ Such an
approach is plainly contrary to the settled law laid down
by this Court and deserves to be set aside on this ground.
alone. The right to speedy trial, rooted in Article 21 of the
Constitution, is undoubtedly a precious Constitutional
right. That said, in matters governed by a special
enactment such as the NDPS Act, particularly where the
recovery is of a commercial quantity, the said right under
Article 21 must be exercised within the framework of
Section 37 and cannot be pressed into service solely on the
of
ground of delay to override it. The constitutional right
under Article 21 and the special provision of law under
Section 37, NDPS Act, are to be read harmoniously and not
placed in opposition to each other. The High Court, by
rt
failing to record its satisfaction on the twin conditions
under Section 37, has, in this Court’s view, committed an
error.
****
9. The position of law on the grant of bail in matters
involving the recovery of a commercial quantity of
contraband under the NDPS Act is well settled. Section
37(1)(b)(ii) of the NDPS Act is cast in mandatory terms.
Where the Public Prosecutor opposes the bail application,
the Court can enlarge an accused on bail only upon
recording its satisfaction on two cumulative conditions:
first, that there are reasonable grounds for believing that
the accused is not guilty of the offence; and second, that
the accused is not likely to commit any offence while onbail. The recording of such satisfaction is not a mere
formality but a jurisdictional requirement. This Court in
Kashif (supra) has held, in plain terms, that the non-
recording of the twin satisfaction, being mandatory in
nature, renders an order granting bail unsustainable. A
similar view has been expressed in Lalrintluanga Sailo
(supra) and Ajay Kumar Singh (supra).
10. When the impugned order is tested against that settled
position, it becomes apparent that paragraph 8 of the
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2026:HHC:29075
impugned order, which carries the weight of the
reasoning, does not contain a finding on either of the twin
conditions prescribed by Section 37(1)(b)(ii) of the NDPS
Act. What the High Court has, instead, proceeded on is the
.
proposition that “the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act
can be diluted bearing in mind the right to a speedy trial”.
The right to speedy trial under Article 21 of the
Constitution is undoubtedly a valuable constitutional
guarantee, but in the context of a special statute such as
the NDPS Act dealing with commercial quantity, that right
has to be read alongside, and not in displacement of, the
of
mandate of Section 37. The omission to record the twin
satisfaction prescribed by the statute, it appears, may
have escaped the attention of the High Court.
21.
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Therefore, the petitioner cannot claim bail because of the
violation of his right to a speedy trial.
22. In Rajbir Singh alias Mota (supra), the accused was
lodged in jail for more than two years and in Rabi Prakash (supra),
the accused lodged in jail for more than four years and the Courts
held that the right of the accused to a speedy trial was being
violated. In the present case, the petitioner has remained in
custody for about 1 year, and the cited judgments do not apply to
the present case.
23. No other point was urged.
24. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it
is dismissed.
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2026:HHC:29075
25. The observations made hereinabove are regarding the
disposal of this petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on
.
the merits of the case.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
16th July, 2026
(Ravinder)
of
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