Allahabad High Court
Rinku @ Amrish vs State Of U.P. on 22 May, 2026
Author: Rajesh Singh Chauhan
Bench: Rajesh Singh Chauhan
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH
A.F.R.
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
LUCKNOW
CRIMINAL APPEAL No. - 2380 of 2019
..Appellant(s)
Versus
State of U.P. ..Respondents(s)
Counsel for Appellant(s) : Surya Kumar, Harshit Singh, Parmanand Gupta, Rajesh Kumar, Ranjana Srivastava, Sunil Kumar Sinha
Counsel for Respondent(s) : Government Advocate
Reserved on 20.02.2026
Delivered on 22.05.2026
Court No. 9
HON'BLE RAJESH SINGH CHAUHAN, J.
HON’BLE ABDHESH KUMAR CHAUDHARY, J.
(Per: Honble Abdhesh Kumar Chaudhary, J.)
1. The present Criminal Appeal under Section 374 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as Cr.P.C.) has been filed by the appellant-accused- Rinku @ Amrish, against the Judgment and order dated 07.09.2019 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge/ Special Judge, P.C. Act, Lucknow, in Sessions Trial No. 1062 of 2014 (State Vs. Rinku @ Amrish), arising out of Case Crime No. 264 of 2014, Police Station Krishna Nagar, District Lucknow, wherein he has been convicted for the commission of offences under Section 302, 323, 504, 506, 427 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as the I.P.C.) and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life, along with a fine of Rs.1,00,000/-, and, in default, further imprisonment for six months.
CASE OF THE PROSECUTION
2. The prosecution case, as unfolded through the evidences adduced during the Trial, is succinctly narrated as under:
2.1) The complainant/P.W.-1, Smt. Satvindar Kaur, (wife of the deceased, Shri Gurpreet Singh Sethi), was running a boutique under the name and style of Simiran Boutique situated on Natkheda Road, within the jurisdiction of Police Station Krishna Nagar, Lucknow. The appellant-accused, Rinku @ Amrish, was previously employed as a tailor in the said boutique.
2.2) On account of alleged acts of misconduct, including that of theft and other wrongdoing in the said boutique shop, the appellant-accused was dismissed from his employment. Subsequently, the appellant-accused opened a tailoring shop in the same vicinity/complex.
2.3) On the fateful evening of 09.07.2014, at around 9:00 PM, the complainant/P.W.-1 Satvindar Kaur, along with her husband Gurpreet Singh Sethi (deceased), and her mother, Smt. Basant Kaur (P.W.-2), were present inside the boutique. Suddenly, all of them heard the distinct sound of breaking glass from outside. Upon rushing out to ascertain the cause, they found the appellant-accused Rinku @ Amrish, smashing/breaking the windshield/glass of their parked Activa scooter. When these people, in order to stop him, went near the appellant-accused, he started abusing them in filthy language and threatened to kill them. In the course of the alleged ensuing altercation/scuffle, actuated by a pre-existing grudge and with the clear intention to cause death, the appellant-accused picked up a pair of scissors and stabbed the deceased, Gurpreet Singh Sethi, once on the left side of the chest. During the said scuffle, the P.W.-1 and P.W.-2 also sustained injuries while attempting to rescue the deceased and ward off the assault.
The injured Gurpreet Singh Sethi was immediately rushed to Awadh Hospital, Lucknow, where he was declared brought dead. The incident was alleged to have been occurred under sufficient street-light illumination, rendering the identification of the appellant-accused unimpeachable.
2.4) Immediately thereafter, the complainant/P.W.-1, Smt. Satvindar Kaur, lodged a written complaint/Tehrir (Exhibit-Ka-1) at Police Station Krishna Nagar, Lucknow on the basis of which F.I.R. No. 264/2014 (Exhibit-Ka-13) was registered at about 10:00 PM on the same night under Sections 302, 323, 504, 506 and 427 I.P.C. against the appellant-accused. Inquest proceedings were conducted at the hospital (Exhibit-Ka-2), and the dead body was sent for post-mortem examination.
2.5) During investigation, the Investigating Officer/P.W.-4, (Inspector Vikas Kumar Pandey), inspected the scene of occurrence, prepared the Site plan (Exhibit-Ka-6 to Exhibit-Ka-8), collected blood-stained earth/soil from the spot, and recorded statements of witnesses under Section 161 Cr.P.C., and subsequently, arrested the appellant-accused pursuant to his disclosure and pointing out, and, effected recovery of the blood-stained scissors (the alleged weapon used in the offence) and the blood-stained pant worn by the appellant-accused at the time of incident, from a pile of bricks in an open field at Mahuari Bagh. After completing the investigation, the Investigating Officer found sufficient incriminating material against the appellant-accused and, therefore, filed a charge sheet against the appellant-accused.
3. The case, being triable exclusively by the Court of Session, was committed accordingly. Charges were framed on 21.04.2015 under Sections 302, 323, 504, 506, and 427 of the I.P.C. The appellant-accused pleaded not guilty and claimed Trial. Hence, the case was taken up for Trial.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT
4. To bring home the charges, the prosecution examined the following witnesses during the course of Trial against the appellant- accused Rinku @ Amrish:-
1. Smt. Satvindar Kaur P.W.-1 Complainant/ Wife of the Deceased (Eye Witness)
2. Smt. Basant Kaur P.W.-2 Mother of Complainant/ P.W.-1 and mother-in-law of the Deceased (Independent Eye Witness)
3. S.I. Dharamveer Singh P.W.-3 Proved the inquest proceedings/ photo-lash and other Inquest papers.
4. Inspector Vikas Kumar Pandey P.W.-4 Investigating Officer/ proved spot inspection, Site plan(s) and arrest of the accused
5. Manoj Kumar Yadav P.W.-5 Head Moharir/proved registration of F.I.R. and General Diary entry
6. Dr. Alok Sonkar P.W.-6 Emergency Medical Officer/proved the medical examination of injured P.W.-2
7. Dr. Nirupam Awasthi P.W.-7 Conducted the post mortem of the deceased
5. Apart from the aforementioned oral evidence, the prosecution also exhibited and proved the following documentary evidence to support its case, running from Exhibit Ka-1 to Exhibit Ka-17 :-
(i) Written Complaint /Tehrir Exhibit-ka-1
(ii) Panchayatnama/Inquest Report Exhibit-ka-2
(iii) Police Form 13 Exhibit-ka-3
(iv) Photo lash Exhibit-ka-4
(v) Sample Seal Exhibit-ka-5
(vi) Site-plan of the crime spot Exhibit-ka-6
(vii) Site-plan Exhibit-ka-7
(viii) Site-plan Exhibit-ka-8
(ix) Recovery Memo/Fard Exhibit-ka-9
(x) Recovery Memo/Fard Exhibit-ka-10
(xi) Forensic Report Exhibit-ka-11
(xii) Charge-sheet Exhibit-ka-12
(xiii) First Information Report Exhibit-ka-13
(xiv) Police Information Sheet/
General Diary Exhibit-ka-14
(xv) Injury Report of P.W.-2/
Smt. Basant Kaur Exhibit-ka-15
(xvi) Injury Report of P.W.-1/
Smt. Satvindar Kaur Exhibit-ka-16
(xvii) Post Mortem Report Exhibit-ka-17
6. Furthermore, in the present case, the defence also produced the following defence witnesses in support of the appellant-accused Rinku @ Amrish:-
1. Smt. Sushma D.W.-1 Hospital Staff
2. Vishal Sharma D.W.-2 Neighbour
3. Devendra Kumar D.W.-3 fellow tailor/alleging alibi
7. The prosecution, in order to prove its case before the Trial Court, had produced seven witnesses, wherein P.W.-1/ Smt. Satvindar Kaur, who is also the Complainant, an eye-witness, and the wife of the deceased, fully supported the prosecution version during her examination-in-chief. She narrated the entire sequence of events, being the employment and subsequent dismissal of the appellant-accused Rinku @ Amrish, on theft charges, the ensuing grudge, the breaking of scooter glass, abuse/threats, scuffle, the stabbing with scissor on the chest of the deceased- husband causing fatal injury, injuries to herself and her mother (P.W.-2), and the shifting to the hospital and declaration of death.
She proved her written complaint/Tehrir (Exhibit-ka-1), identified the appellant-accused Rinku @ Amrish, in the Court, and asserted presence of sufficient light at the crime scene for clear identification. Additionally, she stated in her examination-in-chief that when all of them came outside after hearing the sound of breaking of glass, it was her deceased husband who initially went to stop the appellant-accused. P.W.-1 deposed that the appellant-accused abused her husband, and also did hatha-pai with her husband, and then only attacked him with the scissors, causing fatal injury.
8. P.W.-2/ Smt. Basant Kaur (Mother-in-law of the deceased), an ocular and injured eye-witness, corroborated the testimonies of P.W.-1 in toto. In her examination-in-chief, P.W.-2 deposed that on 09.07.2014 at around 9:00 PM, she was at the boutique with her daughter and son-in-law (the deceased). Upon hearing the glass breaking, they exited and saw the appellant-accused Rinku @ Amrish, vandalizing the scooter’s windshield. Upon objection, the appellant-accused abused them, threatened death, and, during the scuffle, stabbed the deceased in the chest with scissors. Resultantly, the deceased collapsed; P.W.-2 and P.W.-1 intervened and sustained injuries (lacerations on their hands). They immediately carried the deceased to Awadh Hospital, where he was declared brought dead.
P.W.-2 identified her daughter’s signature on the F.I.R. (Exhibit Ka-1) and her own thumbprint on the Injury Report (Exhibit Ka-15). She confirmed her medical examination on 10.07.2014, revealing two lacerated wounds. P.W.-2 positively identified the appellant-accused Rinku @ Amrish, in the Court as the perpetrator of the fateful incident.
9. P.W.-3/ S.I. Dharamveer Singh, who was posted as Station In-charge, Sarafa Bazar, Krishna Nagar P.S.- Lucknow, deposed that on 09.07.2014, as per the S.O.’s order, he conducted the inquest at Awadh Hospital at 10:10 PM of the deceased’s body, under Case Crime No. 264/2014. The panchayatnama noted the death as homicidal by stabbing. P.W.-3 prepared and signed the panchayatnama (Exhibit Ka-2), Challan-lash (Form 13, Exhibit Ka-3 to Exhibit Ka-5), and forwarded the body for post-mortem. P.W.-3 confirmed readings to the panch witnesses and obtained their signatures. During his cross-examination, P.W.-3 admitted no personal knowledge of the incident but affirmed all procedural compliances.
10. P.W.-4/ Vikas Kumar Pandey, the Investigating Officer, detailed the investigation conducted on 09.07.2014, he took charge, recorded P.W.-1’s statement, inspected the Site, prepared the Site-plan (Exhibit Ka-6 to Exhibit Ka-8), collected blood-soaked soil, and recorded statement of witnesses Govind Ram and Pinku Jaiswal (not examined). P.W.-4 arrested the appellant-accused Rinku @ Amrish, and recorded his disclosure statement admitting the grudge, vandalism, scuffle, and stabbing. On appellant’s pointing out, P.W.-4 recovered the blood-stained scissors and pants from a brick pile in Mahuari Bagh. P.W.-4 proved the Charge-sheet (Exhibit Ka-12) and Material exhibits (Exhibit Ka-1 to Exhibit Ka-4). During Cross-examination, P.W.-4 admitted dictation of some documents to his subordinates but verified the signatures himself and also highlighted the lack of independent recovery witnesses.
11. P.W.-5/ Manoj Kumar Pal, Head Moharir proved the registration of F.I.R. at 22:00 hours on 09.07.2014 (Exhibit Ka-13) and General Diary (Exhibit Ka -14), copying verbatim the written complaint and signing the same.
12. P.W.-6/ Dr. Alok Sonkar, who was posted as an Emergency Doctor at Lokbandhu Hospital, Lucknow, examined the injured P.W.-2/ Smt. Basant Kaur, on 10.07.2014 at 7:45 PM and recorded the following: Injury 1 – 3×1 cm lacerated wound on left palm below thumb with clot; Injury 2 – 3×1 cm lacerated wound on right wrist with redness. Opined simple, by blunt object, – 1 day old; (Exhibit Ka-15). For P.W.-1/ Satvindar Kaur, no external injuries but pain was opined, (Exhibit Ka-16).
13. P.W.-7/ Dr. Nirupam Awasthi, who conducted the post-mortem of the deceased on 10.07.2014 at 05:00 PM found one punctured wound 3×1 cm on left chest (70 cm below left nipple, 18 cm from mid line), penetrating deep into chest cavity, lacerating lung and causing about 1.5 litres haemothorax. Cause of death was haemorhage and shock due to injury to vital organ by sharp weapon (consistent with scissors). Time since death was opined about half a day (Exhibit Ka-17). The said witness also deposed that there were no signs of any scratches or injuries on the rest of the body.
14. After the closure of prosecution evidence, the statement of the appellant-accused Rinku @ Amrish, was recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C., wherein he denied the incident, admitted only his prior employment at the shop of P.W.-1, and pleaded false implication due to business rivalry after he opened his own tailoring shop in the vicinity . He claimed about an unfair investigation in the present case.
15. In order to bolster its case, the defence examined three witnesses to establish alibi, false implication, and procedural lapses. The defence Counsel produced D.W.-1/ Smt. Sushma, hospital staff at Awadh Hospital, Lucknow, who deposed that on the alleged date of the incident in 2014, the deceased was brought in dead at around10:00 PM and not as a patient. D.W.-1 was in the O.P.D., provided a stretcher, but no treatment/inquest occurred there. D.W.-1 refuted having any knowledge about further police proceedings.
16. D.W.-2/ Vishal Sharma, a neighbour of the appellant-accused Rinku @ Amrish, deposed that he knew appellant-accused as a nearby resident of his grandmother’s adjacent house. D.W.-2 denied any knowledge of a criminal history of the appellant-accused Rinku @ Amrish. D.W.-2 also deposed about witnessing arrest of the appellant-accused Rinku @ Amrish from Lalita Prasad’s house at midnight in the year 2014, by police officers. D.W.-2 came to know about the charges from the newspaper on the next day. D.W.-2 deposed that he did not meet the appellant-accused Rinku @ Amrish on the evening of the incident, as he had returned home around 9:00-10:00 PM from his bookstore job.
17. D.W.-3/ Devendra Kumar, a fellow tailor of the appellant-accused Rinku @ Amrish, deposed that on the day of the incident, he was working with the appellant-accused at his shop at Natkheda Road. They closed the shop at about 9:00 PM as usual, and thereafter, the D.W.-3 dropped the appellant-accused at his maternal grandmothers house and returned home. The next morning, he came to know that the appellant-accused had been arrested in the present case. He stated that the appellant-accused Rinku @ Amrish never had any quarrel with customers or anyone and that he was not aware about the incident mentioned in the F.I.R.
18. The learned Trial Court found that P.W.-1 and P.W.-2, being the natural and injured eye-witnesses, their testimonies were reliable as the same were consistent throughout. The learned Trial Court ignored the minor discrepancies, by holding that they do not affect the substratum of the prosecution case. The learned Trial Court found the medical evidence to corroborate the ocular version of a single stab injury on the chest causing death of the deceased due to haemorrhage and shock. The learned Trial Court found that the F.I.R. was also promptly lodged, and any delay stood satisfactorily explained, the motive also stood proved and the recovery of the blood-stained scissors and pants pursuant to disclosure, was admissible and trustworthy. The learned Trial Court returned a finding that the plea of alibi was unsupported and unreliable. Thus, the learned Trail Court on the basis of the documentary and oral evidence, produced by both the parties, after dealing with the points of challenge, appreciation of evidence, and analyzing the core facts, held that the prosecution had proved its case beyond reasonable doubt, and consequently, went on to record a finding of conviction against the appellant-accused and accordingly, sentenced him for maximum punishment of life imprisonment, along with a fine of Rs.1,00,000/-, with a default clause, under Sections 302, 323, 504, 506 and 427of the I.P.C.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THIS COURT
19. It is in this aforesaid background that the appellant-accused Rinku @ Amrish, as being aggrieved, has preferred the present Criminal Appeal under Section 374(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 against the impugned Judgment and order dated 07.09.2019, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge/ Special Judge, P.C. Act, Lucknow, in Sessions Trial No. 1062 of 2014 (State Vs. Rinku @ Amrish), arising out of Case Crime No. 264 of 2014, Police Station Krishna Nagar, Lucknow.
20. The First bail application filed by the appellant-accused Rinku @ Amrish along with the present appeal, was rejected by a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court with a reasoned order dated 17.06.2021, passed in Criminal Miscellaneous Bail Application No. 145579 (B) of 2019. Subsequently, the Second bail application filed by the appellant-accused Rinku @ Amrish was again rejected by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court with a reasoned order dated 07.04.2023, passed in Criminal Miscellaneous Bail Application No. IA/09/2023.
21. Further, during the pendency of the present Criminal Appeal, a Third bail application came to be filed by the appellant-accused Rinku @ Amrish on 14.02.2025, being Criminal Miscellaneous Bail Application No. IA/11/2025; but while arguing the bail application, Shri Harshit Singh, learned Counsel for the appellant-accused Rinku @ Amrish, has also pressed that, since the paper book has been prepared and that the actual period of incarceration of the appellant/accused Rinku @ Amrish, is more than 12 years, as per the Custody Certificate issued by the Jail Authorities, therefore, the appeal may be heard and decided on its merits and prayed that the Third bail application be dismissed as being not pressed. Consequently, the instant bail application is dismissed being not pressed, and the appeal has been heard on its merits.
SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE PARTIES
22. Sri Harshit Singh, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant- accused Rinku @ Amrish, has submitted that the impugned conviction is contrary to the evidence on record and settled principles of criminal law. According to him, even if the prosecution case is accepted at its highest, the attending circumstances unmistakably attract Exception 4 to Section 300 of the I.P.C. and, at best, make out a case under Section 304 of the I.P.C., and not under Section 302 I.P.C.
23. Learned Counsel appearing for the appellant-accused has vehemently submitted that the prosecution story itself discloses that the occurrence arose out of a sudden quarrel relating to an alleged dispute over the smashing of the Activa scooter mirror. There is no allegation of prior enmity, motive, planning, or preparation. He further submits that the alleged weapon i.e. a pair of scissors, is an ordinary article available in shops and workplaces, and there is no evidence that it was carried with a preconceived intention to commit murder.
The learned Counsel has submitted that only a single injury is attributed to the deceased, and there is no allegation of repeated blows, pursuit, cruelty, or undue advantage. Thus, he submits that these circumstances clearly indicate that the act, if any, occurred in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel, without premeditation, and the prosecution has failed to establish the specific intention to cause death or such bodily injury as was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. According to him, at the highest, knowledge may be attributed, but not intention; which is a distinction crucial in determining whether the offence falls under Section 302 I.P.C. or Section 304 I.P.C.
24. Learned Counsel has strenuously submitted that the conviction primarily rests upon the testimony of P.W.-1 and P.W.-2, who are closely related to the deceased. Their evidence suffers from material contradictions. P.W.-1 stated that no employee was present at the shop at the relevant time, whereas P.W.-2 deposed that two employees were present and working. This inconsistency strikes at the root of the prosecution case. If employees were present, their non-examination constitutes a serious lacuna warranting an adverse inference. If they were not present, the case rests solely upon interested witnesses without independent corroboration. Further, despite the admitted fact that other shops were open and public witnesses were present in the market area, no independent witness had been examined.
25. Learned Counsel has also submitted that the defence evidence further creates a reasonable doubt in the impugned conviction of the appellant, as D.W.-3 has deposed that he was working along with the appellant-accused and the shop came to be closed at about 9:00 PM, and that he dropped the appellant-accused at his maternal grandmothers house. Thereafter, D.W.-3 has further deposed that upon inquiry from other shopkeepers, none had witnessed the alleged occurrence. It has been submitted that it is well settled that defence witnesses are entitled to equal treatment and their testimony cannot be discarded merely because they were examined by the defence. Thus, it has been submitted that when read cumulatively with the contradictions in the prosecution case, a clear and reasonable doubt emerges in the present case.
26. Learned Counsel has also vehemently submitted that the very genesis of the prosecution story i.e., the alleged breaking of the scooter mirror, remains unsubstantiated. The broken mirror was neither recovered nor produced before the Trial Court. No photograph of the alleged damage was placed on record. Further, the official record from the Regional Transport Office shows that the vehicle registration number allegedly involved does not stand in the name of the deceased or his family members and pertains to a different vehicle altogether. This material discrepancy renders the alleged motive doubtful and weakens the prosecution case at its foundation.
27. Learned Counsel has lastly submitted that, in view of the cumulative effect of the aforesaid circumstances, absence of premeditation, a single-blow injury, contradictions in material witnesses, non-examination of independent witnesses, doubtful genesis of the occurrence, and plausible defence version; the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The conviction under Section 302 I.P.C. is, therefore, liable to be set aside. Alternatively, even if culpability is assumed, the case would fall within Section 304, Part II of the I.P.C., which prescribes for a maximum punishment of 10 years.
28. Learned Counsel appearing for the appellant-accused has placed reliance upon the following precedents of the Honble Supreme Court in order to buttress his arguments:-
* Ravinder Kumar v. State of Punjab, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 635;
* Arjun v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2017) 3 SCC 247;
* Jagriti Devi v. State of H.P., (2009) 14 SCC 771;
* Jagtar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1983) 2 SCC 342;
* Jagrup Singh v. State of Haryana, (1981) 3 SCC 616;
* Satish Narayan Sawant v. State of Goa, (2009) 17 SCC 724;
* Hem Raj v. State (Delhi Admn.), 1990 Supp SCC 291;
* Gurmail Singh v. State of Punjab, (1982) 3 SCC 185;
* Kulwant Rai v. State of Punjab, (1981) 4 SCC 245;
* Ahmed Shah v. State of Rajasthan, (2015) 3 SCC 93.
29. Per contra, Sri S.P. Singh, learned Additional Government Advocate (A.G.A.) for the State, has vehemently opposed the appeal and supported the judgment of conviction passed by the learned Trial Court. Learned A.G.A. has submitted that the prosecution has successfully established the guilt of the appellant-accused Rinku @ Amrish, beyond reasonable doubt for offences punishable under Sections 302, 323, 504, 506 and 427 of the Indian Penal Code. The impugned judgment is based upon cogent ocular testimony, duly corroborated by medical and documentary evidence, and warrants no interference.
30. Learned A.G.A. has strenuously contended that the occurrence dated 09.07.2014, at about 9:00 PM, stands proved by the consistent testimony of P.W.-1 Satvindar Kaur (wife of the deceased), and P.W.-2 Smt. Basant Kaur (mother-in-law of the deceased), both of whom were natural eye-witnesses present at the place of occurrence. Their presence at the shop is undisputed, and their testimony clearly established that appellant-accused Rinku @ Amrish, nursing a grudge after being removed from employment on allegations of theft, came to the shop, vandalized the vehicle parked outside, and, when objected to, assaulted the deceased with scissors, inflicting a forceful blow on the chest. Their evidence has remained materially intact in cross-examination and inspires confidence.
31. The learned A.G.A. has also submitted that merely because P.W.-1 and P.W.-2 are closely related to the deceased, their testimony cannot be discarded. It is settled law that evidence of a related or interested witness is not to be rejected if it is otherwise credible and trustworthy. In the present case, P.W.-1 herself sustained injuries in the incident, and P.W.-2 was medically examined by P.W.-6/ Dr. Alok Kumar Sonkar, who proved the injury report. The presence of an injured eyewitness lends strong assurance to the prosecution case.
Even the medical evidence fully corroborates the ocular version. P.W.-7/ Dr. Nirupam Awasthi, who conducted the post-mortem, found a penetrating wound on the left side of the chest cavity, resulting in laceration of vital organs and excessive internal bleeding of approximately 1.5 litres. The cause of death was opined to be shock and haemorrhage due to the ante-mortem injury caused by a sharp-edged weapon such as scissors. The injury was sufficient, in the ordinary course of nature, to cause death. The situs of the injury on a vital part of the body and the force applied clearly establish intention to cause death, thereby attracting Section 302 of the I.P.C.
32. The learned A.G.A. has further submitted that the motive stands sufficiently established from the evidence on record. The appellant-accused had been removed from service on suspicion of theft and had developed animosity against the deceased and his family. Even otherwise, where there is clear and reliable direct evidence of eyewitnesses, proof of motive assumes secondary importance. The prosecution has led direct ocular evidence, which stands corroborated by medical findings and recovery. The recovery of the blood-stained scissors and blood-stained jeans/pants at the instance of the accused further strengthens the prosecution case. The Investigating Officer, P.W.-4/ Vikas Kumar Pandey, proved the recovery memos and arrest proceedings. The fact that independent public witnesses were not examined for the recovery is not fatal, particularly when the recovery is duly proved by official witnesses whose testimony has not been shaken in cross-examination.
33. The learned A.G.A. has vehemently submitted that plea of the defence that the appellant-accused Rinku @ Amrish, had gone to his grandmothers house and was not present at the scene, is merely an afterthought and unsupported by reliable evidence. D.W.-3/ Devendra Kumars, testimony is self-serving and does not inspire confidence, particularly in light of the recovery of the weapon at the instance of the accused and the consistent testimony of the eye-witnesses placing him at the scene.
34. The learned A.G.A. has strenuously submitted that the contention of the learned Counsel appearing for the appellant-accused that the present case falls under the Exception 4 to Section 300 I.P.C. is misconceived. The evidence clearly shows that the appellant- accused, after vandalizing the vehicle and engaging in a scuffle, deliberately inflicted a forceful stab injury on the chest of the deceased, a vital part of the body, with a sharp-edged weapon. The nature of the injury, its depth, the damage to internal organs, and the resultant excessive haemorrhage unequivocally demonstrate intention to cause death or, at least to cause such bodily injury as was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The act cannot be characterized as a mere sudden quarrel devoid of intention.
35. The learned A.G.A. has lastly submitted that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt, establishing that the appellant-accused Rinku @ Amrish, has intentionally inflicted a fatal injury upon the deceased and also caused injuries to P.W.-1 and P.W.-2, besides committing acts of abuse, criminal intimidation, and mischief. The findings recorded by the learned Trial Court are based on a proper appreciation of the evidence and do not suffer from perversity or illegality warranting interference in the present criminal appeal. It is, therefore, submitted that the conviction of the appellant-accused Rinku @ Amrish, under Sections 302, 323, 504, 506 and 427 I.P.C. is fully justified both on facts and in law, and the present criminal appeal deserves to be dismissed.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
36. Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties, we have given our thoughtful consideration to the submissions canvassed by the learned Counsels and have also carefully perused the materials placed on record.
37. In the present case, it is apparent from a facial reading of the impugned judgment that the Trial Court has based the conviction of the appellant-accused on the ocular account furnished by the informant and injured Satvinder Kaur (P.W.-1), and injured Smt. Basant Kaur (P.W.-2), and that of recoveries of the weapon of assault, i.e., the scissors, effected from the disclosure statement of the appellant-accused, as well as the medial opinion of the medical Experts.
38. The learned Counsel for the appellant-accused has vehemently argued that the conviction of the appellant-accused is perverse, as it primarily rests on the deposition of P.W.-1 and P.W.-2, who are related to the deceased, being the wife and mother-in-law, respectively. According to the learned Counsel, the credibility and consistency of these witnesses are questionable and doubtful, and, as such the Trial Court could not have based its conviction entirely on their testimony.
First and foremost, apparently it seems that the learned Counsel has missed the event that these two eyewitnesses are also injured witnesses, as has also been deposed by P.W.-6 (Dr. Alok Kumar). The said P.W.-6 has deposed that the P.W.-2 has sustained injury, which was opined to be from a blunt object. Further, the doctor also deposed that P.W.-2 had about 3×1 cm lacerated wound was found on the left palm below the thumb with clot and another lacerated wound of 3×1 cm size was found on right wrist with redness. The said Doctor also opined that P.W.-1 experienced pain, although had no external injuries. This all goes to show that these eye-witnesses were also injured witnesses.
39. As far as the testimony of an Injured witness is concerned, it is settled law that ocular evidence of the victim or the injured is considered the best evidence. Apparently, these kind of witnesses come with a built-in guarantee of their presence at the scene of the crime and are unlikely to spare their actual assailant in order to falsely implicate anyone. Thus, testimony of these kind of witnesses is placed on a higher pedestal than a normal eye-witness, who is not injured. In State of U.P. v. Naresh, reported in (2011) 4 SCC 324; the Honble Supreme Court held as follows:
27. The evidence of an injured witness must be given due weightage being a stamped witness, thus, his presence cannot be doubted. His statement is generally considered to be very reliable and it is unlikely that he has spared the actual assailant in order to falsely implicate someone else. The testimony of an injured witness has its own relevancy and efficacy as he has sustained injuries at the time and place of occurrence and this lends support to his testimony that he was present during the occurrence. Thus, the testimony of an injured witness is accorded a special status in law. The witness would not like or want to let his actual assailant go unpunished merely to implicate a third person falsely for the commission of the offence. Thus, the evidence of the injured witness should be relied upon unless there are grounds for the rejection of his evidence on the basis of major contradictions and discrepancies therein. [Vide: Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab, (2009) 9 SCC 719; Balraje @ Trimbak v. State of Maharashtra, (2010) 6 SCC 673; and Abdul Sayed v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2010) 10 SCC 259.
(Emphasis Supplied)
40. Further, as to how the evidence of an injured ocular witness is to be dealt with, the Honble Supreme Court in Balu Sudam Khalde v. State of Maharashtra, reported in (2023) 13 SCC 365; noted the following legal principles, which must be kept in mind by a Court while appreciating the said testimony. These principles are being enumerated herein below:
26. When the evidence of an injured eyewitness is to be appreciated, the undernoted legal principles enunciated by the courts are required to be kept in mind:
26.1. The presence of an injured eyewitness at the time and place of the occurrence cannot be doubted unless there are material contradictions in his deposition.
26.2. Unless, it is otherwise established by the evidence, it must be believed that an injured witness would not allow the real culprits to escape and falsely implicate the accused.
26.3. The evidence of injured witness has greater evidentiary value and unless compelling reasons exist, their statements are not to be discarded lightly.
26.4. The evidence of injured witness cannot be doubted on account of some embellishment in natural conduct or minor contradictions.
26.5. If there be any exaggeration or immaterial embellishments in the evidence of an injured witness, then such contradiction, exaggeration or embellishment should be discarded from the evidence of injured, but not the whole evidence.
26.6. The broad substratum of the prosecution version must be taken into consideration and discrepancies which normally creep due to loss of memory with passage of time should be discarded.
(Emphasis Supplied)
41. The Honble Supreme Court in the said judgment also went on to observe that, in assessing the value of the evidence of an eye-witness, two principal considerations arise, firstly, as to whether in the circumstances of the case, it is possible to believe their presence at the scene of occurrence or in such a situation as would make it possible for them to witness the facts deposed to by them; and secondly, whether there is anything inherently improbable or unreliable in their evidence.
42. Testing on the anvil of these said two principal considerations, when we look into the oral evidence of the two injured eye-witnesses, namely, Satvinder Kaur and Smt. Basant Kaur (P.W.-1 and PW-2), respectively, it is apparent that Satvinder Kaur (PW-1) has deposed that the place of occurrence of the incident was near her shop, and it has also come in evidence that the appellant-accused had a shop in the same vicinity. Next, the time of incident is about 9 PM, which generally is the closing time of all the shops. It has come in evidence of P.W.-1 that, the incident occurred at 9 PM, when she was about to close her shop. It has also come in evidence of D.W.-1 that, on that particular date of incident, he along with the appellant-accused had closed their shop at 9 PM. Thus, both the place of occurrence and the time of the incident coincide, and it cannot be said that the presence of P.W.-1 at the scene of occurrence was not natural or impossible.
43. However, the learned Counsel for the appellant-accused has submitted that there is a contradiction in the version of the testimony of P.W.-1 and P.W.-2 relating to the number of employees present in the shop at the relevant point of time. According to him, P.W.-1 has stated in her testimony that there were no employees in her shop, whereas, on the contrary, P.W.-2 has deposed that two employees were present in the shop at the time of the incident. When, we examine the testimony of P.W.-1 and P.W.-2, as pointed out by the learned Counsel for the appellant-accused, we find that the said discrepancy in the statement does not have any bearing on the place of occurrence of the incident or the time of incident. On a dispassionate and careful reading of the depositions of both these injured eye-witnesses, we find that, except for minor the inconsistency relating to the presence of any employee in the shop at that particular time, there is no marked disparity in their statements.
Further, we find that the discrepancy pointed out by the learned Counsel for the appellant-accused is not material and does not go to the root of the controversy and could had been engineered due to various reasons of failing human memory and as to how one person has perceived the said fact or understood the question asked during the cross-examination. This Court does not find any good reason to disbelieve the testimony deposed by these injured ocular witnesses or anything inherently improbable or unreliable in their evidence. We do not find any material on records, which could disprove their presence at the time of incident. Further, the learned Trial Court has minutely dealt with the said aspect and recorded its observations, as herein under, in the impugned judgment:
” 34.- अभियुक्त के विद्वान अधिवक्ता द्वारा यह भी तर्क प्रस्तुत किया गया है कि घटना रात नौ बजे के आस-पास होना बताया गया है लेकिन घटना का कोई चक्षुदर्शी साक्षी को परीक्षित नही कराया गया है। जबकि घटनास्थल पर रामवीर, गौरव सिंह, शिवम, गुरूमीत सिंह व राजवीर सिंह को घटनास्थल पर होना बताया गया है। उसके साथ उनकी दुकान भी होना बताया गया है लेकिन किसी भी गवाह को न्यायालय में लाकर घटना के तथ्य, तिथि व समय आदि को साबित नही कराया गया है। घटना की वादिनी मृतक की पत्नी तथा पी०डब्लू०-2 बसंत कौर जो उसकी सास है तथा हितवद्ध साक्षी है। अतः घटना को किसी स्वतंत्र साक्षी द्वारा साबित नहीं कराया गया है इसलिए अभियोजन कथानक संदेह से परे साबित नहीं माना जा सकता है। इस संबंध में अभियोजन द्वारा यह कहा गया है कि विवेचक के द्वारा केस डायरी में बहुत सारे गवाहों के बयान धारा 161 सी०आर०पी०सी० के अंतर्गत अंकित किये गये है लेकिन यह सब लोग अभियुक्त से मिल गये हैं इसलिए इनकी गवाही अभियोजन द्वारा नही करायी गयी है। विधि का यह सुस्थापित सिद्धान्त है कि अभियोजन इस बात के लिए स्वतंत्र है कि वह किस साक्षी को परीक्षित कराये और किसको परीक्षित न कराये। क्योंकि विधि यह भी है कि किसी तथ्य को साबित करने के लिए Quantity की आवश्यकता नहीं है, बल्कि Quality की आवश्यकता है। मा० सर्वोच्च न्यायालय की विधि व्यवस्था ” हुकुम सिंह बनाम स्टेट आफ राजस्थान, 2000 (41) एसीसी 662 (एससी) व ” कृपाल सिंह बनाम स्टेट आफ हरियाणा, 2013- एससीसी (क्रि.) में मा० सर्वोच्च न्यायालय द्वारा अभिमत पारित किया गया है।
35.- घटना को साबित करने के लिए भारतीय साक्ष्य अधिनियम की धारा 134 के अन्तर्गत साक्षियों की संख्या होना आवश्यक नहीं है बल्कि घटना के तथ्य को संदेह से परे साबित होना आवश्यक है। घटनास्थल पर स्वयं वादिनी मुकदमा उपस्थित थी और बीच बचाव में उसे भी चोटें आयी हैं। भले ही वह हितबद्ध साक्षी हो लेकिन वह घटना के तथ्य व समय तथा स्थान को स्वयं अपने आंखों से देखा है और न्यायालय में आकर इस तथ्य को साबित किया है। इसलिए हितबद्ध साक्षी के आधार पर मृतक की पत्नी को उसके बयान अविश्वसनीय
36.- इस संबंध में मेरे द्वारा केस डायरी में अंकित गवाहों के बयान धारा 161 सी०आर०पी०सी० तथा पी०डब्लू०-1 व पी०डब्लू०-2 के बयानों का अवलोकन किया गया जिससे स्पष्ट है कि विवेचक के द्वारा रामवीर, गौरव सिंह, शिवम, गुरुमीत सिंह व राजवीर सिंह का बयान अन्तर्गत धारा 161 सी०आर०पी०सी० दौरान विवेचना अंकित किया गया है लेकिन उनको परीक्षित नहीं कराया गया है क्योंकि उनको अभियुक्त से मिल जाना बताया गया है। लेकिन गवाह सतविन्दर कौर ने घटना को अपनी आंखों से देखा है जो मृतक की पत्नी है और केवल उसी को परीक्षित होने के कारण घटना को असाबित नहीं माना जा सकता है। माननीय उच्च न्यायालय के निर्णय विधि “कैलाश व अन्य बनाम स्टेट ऑफ यू०पी०, 1997 जे०आई०सी० 911 (एस०सी०)” के अवलोकन से स्पष्ट है कि हितबद्ध साक्षी यदि घटना को संदेह से परे साबित किया है तो उसे इस आधार पर अविश्वसनीय नहीं कहा जा सकता है कि मृतक का रिश्तेदार है। अतः मैं अभियुक्त के विद्वान अधिवक्ता के इस तर्क से सहमत नही हूँ कि सतविन्दर कौर उसकी पत्नी होने के कारण सही नहीं माना जा सकता है कि घटना को अन्य तथ्यों से संदेह से परे साबित किया गया हो। चूंकि सतविन्दर कौर स्वयं घटनास्थल पर मौजूद थी और वह चक्षुदर्शी साक्षी है।
37.- अभियुक्त के विद्वान अधिवक्ता द्वारा यह भी तर्क दिया गया है कि डी०डब्लू०-2 बसंत कौर कभी भी दुकान पर नहीं आती थी, लेकिन उस दिन वह दुकान कैसे आ गयी, इसका कोई स्पष्टीकरण नहीं दिया गया है? क्योंकि उन्हें घटनास्थल पर उपस्थित होना बताया गया है और न्यायालय में आकर अपने बयान में घटना के सम्बंध में साक्ष्य दिया है, यह नहीं कहा जा सकता है कि वह घटनास्थल पर उपस्थित नहीं रही। दूसरे की घटना के समय वह मृतक को छुड़ाने गयी थी। स्वयं पी०डब्लू०-2 बसंत कौर को भी उक्त घटना में चोटें आयी हैं और उनका मेडिकल हुआ है जिसे पी०डब्लू०-6 डा० अशोक कुमार सोनकर ने साबित किया है जो पत्रावली पर प्रदर्श क-15 के रूप में दाखिल किया गया है. जिसके अवलोकन से स्पष्ट है कि उनके शरीर पर दो चोटें आयी थी जो किसी हार्ड और ब्लण्ट आब्जेक्ट से आना सम्भव है। यदि वह घटनास्थल पर उपस्थित नही थी तो उन्हें चोटें कैसे आयी थी। इस पर अभियुक्त की ओर से कोई तर्क प्रस्तुत नहीं किया गया है। केवल यह कहना कि कभी भी वह दुकान पर नही आती थी और उसी दिन घटना की तिथि पर दुकान पर कैसे आयी, उनकी उपस्थिति को संदिग्ध होना नही कहा जा सकता और मैं अभियुक्त के विद्वान अधिवक्ता के स्तर सहमत नहीं हूँ। इस संबंध में मा० सर्वोच्च न्यायालय की विधि व्यवस्था” मोतीलाल व अन्य बनाम स्टेट आफ यू०पी०, 2010, क्रि०ला०जर्नल, 1937, पेज 1937″ में मा० न्यायालय द्वारा कहा गया है कि यदि गवाह उक्त घटना में चुटहिल है, तो उसकी अनुपस्थिति पर कोई संदेह नही व्यक्ति किया जा सकता है। पी०डब्लू० 2 बसंत कौर को भी उक्त घटना में बीच बचाव करने में चोटें आयी हैं और उसका चिकित्सीय परीक्षण हुआ है और गवाह डाक्टर पी०डब्लू० 6 ने भी उसकी चोटों को साबित किया है। अतः उपरोक्त पी०डब्लू० 2की घटना पर उपस्थिति में कोई संदेह नही रह जाता है।”
44. As far as the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant-accused is concerned, that no independent witness has been examined, although several people were present at the crime spot. It has to be understood that in case if a witness examined in the Court is otherwise found reliable and trustworthy, the fact sought to be proved by that witness need not be further proved (read doubly proved) through other witnesses, even though there may be other witnesses available who could have been examined but were not examined. The stress is on the quality, and not the quantity, of evidence, as per Section 134 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Any non-examination of a material witness is not a mathematical formula or a consequential effect for discarding the weight of the testimony available on record, however natural, trustworthy, and convincing it may be. It is settled law that the non-examination of independent witnesses cannot be pressed into service like a ritualistic formula for discarding the prosecution case, when the testimony of a witness is found to be trustworthy, reliable, and sterling. The Court can convict an accused on the testimony of a witness even if he is a relative of the deceased. The non-examination of an independent witness would not be fatal to the case of the prosecution.
45. Further, from the aforesaid portion of the judgment of the Trial Court extracted herein above, we also find that as far as the argument of the learned Counsel for the appellant-accused relating to reason for non-examination of independent witnesses, whether shop-keepers or public is concerned, the Trial Court has beautifully dealt with the said argument at paragraph 34 of the impugned judgment. To further add, we find that the law in that regard is also no longer res integra, in as much as, the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Rajesh Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in (2022) 12 SCC 200; has held as follows:
Non-examination of witness
34. A mere non-examination of the witness per se will not vitiate the case of the prosecution. It depends upon the quality and not the quantity of the witnesses and its importance. If the court is satisfied with the explanation given by the prosecution along with the adequacy of the materials sufficient enough to proceed with the trial and convict the accused, there cannot be any prejudice. Similarly, if the court is of the view that the evidence is not screened and could well be produced by the other side in support of its case, no adverse inference can be drawn. Onus is on the part of the party who alleges that a witness has not been produced deliberately to prove it.
46. Further, the non-examination of independent witnesses would not reduce the credibility of the eye-witness account in any manner. Thus, the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant-accused, that P.W.-1 and P.W.-2, being related witnesses, their testimony cannot be taken into account for conviction without any deposition of an independent witness, has to be rejected.
47. As far as the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant-accused that a doubt has been cast on the prosecution narrative as D.W.-3 has deposed that, after closing the shop at 9 PM, the said witness dropped the appellant-accused at his grand-mothers house and, upon inquiry the next morning from other shop-keepers in the complex, he came to learn that none had witnessed the said incident: firstly, this evidence appears to be hearsay for the simple reason that D.W.-3 does not himself say that no such incident had occurred, but relies on the version of other shop-keepers to say that no one has witnessed the said incident. Secondly, he was only a witness of the closing of the shop at 9 PM and to dropping the appellant-accused at his grandmothers place after the said closing of his shop. Neither the grandmother of the appellant-accused has been examined nor any witness, who would say that D.W.-3 actually dropped the appellant-accused at his grandmothers place after 9 PM and he continued to stay at her place until he was arrested by the police has been produced by the dense. In fact, D.W.-3 states in his cross-examination that he is not aware as to what the appellant-accused did after dropping the appellant at his grandmothers place. Thirdly, he admits that he was called as a witness by the father of the appellant-accused and wanted to help him and not that he had come to state the truth of the incident. Thus, apparently D.W.-3 appears to be not trustworthy and most importantly, he does not throw any light on the incident and expresses his inability about the said occurrence. According to this Court, the testimony of D.W.-3 has done more harm than favor to the appellant-accused.
48. The learned Counsel has next argued that the breaking of the Activa scooty mirror, which, according to him, was the foundation of the prosecution case, was not substantiated. According to him, the broken glass was not recovered from the crime spot, nor were any photographs produced of the said incident. It was also argued that even the scooty registration number suggested by the prosecution does not belong to the deceased or his family, and as such, these discrepancies go to the root of the controversy and create a reasonable doubt in the prosecution story. According to this Court, the aforesaid grounds are meaningless, as the defence cannot have a say on what kind of evidence is to be collected or as to what all evidence has to be proved by the investigating agency. The grounds as tried to be substantiated by the learned Counsel for the appellant-accused are, therefore to be rejected, as the prosecution has successfully proved the case beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of the depositions of the injured eye-witnesses, being P.W.-1 and P.W.-2, the testimony of the medical expert, and the recovery of the crime weapon upon the disclosure statement of the appellant-accused.
49. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant-accused has next drawn our attention to the non-applicability of Section 302 I.P.C. and according to him, in the given facts and circumstances, the appellant-accused ought to have been punished under Section 304 part-II and not under Section 302 I.P.C. The learned Counsel vehemently submitted that, as it is a case of a single blow, Section 302 I.P.C. shall not be attracted. It was submitted that even the so called alleged motive for the incident was prior to one and half months of the incident in question, i.e., the time when the appellant was removed from his service, and therefore, the prosecution has failed to establish and prove a motive for the appellant to kill the deceased.
It is, thus, submitted that the occurrence had taken place out of a sudden fight and, therefore, the offence would fall under Exception 4 to Section 300 I.P.C. and accordingly, the appellant has to be convicted for a lesser offence than Section 302 I.P.C. Relying on the various judgments mentioned supra, it has been prayed to convert the conviction from Section 302 I.P.C. to Section 304 Part- II of the I.P.C.
50. As far as the submission on behalf of the appellant-accused, that the prosecution has failed to establish or prove the motive, and/or that the alleged motive of the incident is prior in time to the incident in question, this Court finds that the law in that regard is no longer res integra. In a case where the eye-witnesses are available, the motive becomes insignificant. Admittedly, in the present case, P.W.-1 and P.W.-2 are the eye-witnesses to the incident, and therefore, the proof of motive is insignificant. Further, on the aspect of non-proving of motive is concerned, this Court finds that the Honble Apex Court in Madan v. State of U.P., reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1473; has held that when there is an eye-witness who had seen the commission of murder and their evidence is credible, it is not necessary that the prosecution had to prove the motive behind the offence.
51. Similarly, in Shivaji Genu Mohite v. State of Maharashtra, reported in AIR 1973 SC 55; it was held that it is a well-settled principle in criminal jurisprudence that when ocular testimony inspires the confidence of the Court, the prosecution is not required to establish motive. The mere absence of motive would not impinge upon the testimony of a reliable eye-witness. Motive is an important factor for consideration in a case of circumstantial evidence. But when there is a direct eye witness, motive is not significant. This is what was held by the Honble Supreme Court in the said judgment:
In case the prosecution is not able to discover an impelling motive, that could not reflect upon the credibility of a witness proved to be a reliable eye-witness. Evidence as to motive would, no doubt, go a long way in cases wholly dependent on circumstantial evidence. Such evidence would form one of the links in the chain of circumstantial evidence in such a case. But that would not be so in cases where there are eye-witnesses of credibility, though even in such cases if a motive is properly proved, such proof would strengthen the prosecution case and fortify the court in its ultimate conclusion. But that does not mean that if motive is not established, the evidence of an eye-witness is rendered untrustworthy The principle that the lack or absence of motive is inconsequential when direct evidence establishes the crime has been reiterated by this Court in Bikau Pandey v. State of Bihar, (2003) 12 SCC 616; Rajagopal v. Muthupandi, (2017) 11 SCC 120; Yogesh Singh v. Mahabeer Singh, (2017) 11 SCC 195.
52. As held by this Court in a catena of decisions, motive is not an explicit requirement under the Penal Code, though motive may be helpful in proving the case of the prosecution in a case of circumstantial evidence. As observed herein above, there are two eye-witnesses to the incident, and the prosecution has been successful in proving the case against the appellant-accused by examining those two eye-witnesses and therefore, as rightly observed by the Trial Court, assuming that the alleged motive predates the incident or the prosecution has failed to prove the motive beyond doubt, the same shall not be fatal to the case of prosecution.
As observed and held by the Apex Court in the case of Jafel Biswas v. State of West Bengal reported in (2019) 12 SCC 560; the absence of motive does not disperse a prosecution case if the prosecution succeeds in proving the same. The motive is always in the mind of person authoring the incident. Motive not being apparent or not being proved only requires deeper scrutiny of the evidence by the Courts while coming to a conclusion. When there is definite evidence proving an incident and eyewitness account prove the role of the accused, absence in proving of the motive by prosecution does not affect the prosecution case.
53. Thus, non-proving of motive is not fatal to the prosecution in case of direct witnesses. As such, the only issue which is now required to be considered in the present appeal is whether the appellant-accused has committed an offence punishable under Section 302 of the I.P.C., or any other lesser offence, more particularly Section 304 Part-I or II of the I.P.C.?
54. Before, this Court delves into the said consideration of facts relevant to the aforesaid determination, it would be pertinent to refer to certain guiding principles in the nature of judgment passed by the Honble Apex Court in the said context, which would act as a north star in answering to the aforesaid proposition. The submission of the learned Counsel for the appellant-accused for the applicability of Exception 4 to Section 300 of the I.P.C., so that the appellant-accused can be punished for the lessor punishment under Section 304, Part-II of the I.P.C. in place of Section 302 I.P.C., is threefold viz, (i) death is caused without any premeditation (ii) merely a single blow was inflicted and (iii) the whole incident occurred due to a sudden fight, and the appellant-accused did not take undue advantage or acted in an unusual manner.
55. As far as the single blow theory for applicability of Section 304 I.P.C. or Section 302 I.P.C. is concerned, the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Mahesh Balmiki v. State of M.P., reporetd in (2000) 1 SCC 319; while deciding the question of whether a single blow with a knife to the chest of the deceased would attract Section 302 I.P.C. or not, held thus: (SCC pp. 322-23, para 9)
9. there is no principle that in all cases of a single blow Section 302 IPC is not attracted. A single blow may, in some cases, entail conviction under Section 302 IPC, in some cases under Section 304 IPC and in some other cases under Section 326 IPC. The question with regard to the nature of offence has to be determined on the facts and in the circumstances of each case. The nature of the injury, whether it is on the vital or non- vital part of the body, the weapon used, the circumstances in which the injury is caused and the manner in which the injury is inflicted are all relevant factors which may go to determine the required intention or knowledge of the offender and the offence committed by him. In the instant case, the deceased was disabled from saving himself because he was held by the associates of the appellant who inflicted though a single yet a fatal blow of the description noted above. These facts clearly establish that the appellant had the intention to kill the deceased. In any event, he can safely be attributed the knowledge that the knife blow given by him was so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death.
56. Further, as far as the contention of the learned Counsel that a sudden fight had occurred on the fateful night between the deceased and the appellant-accused, and as such Exception 4 to Section 300 I.P.C. is applicable instead of Section 302 I.P.C. is concerned, the Honble Supreme Court, from time to time has devised certain propositions, which plays a pivotal role in deciding whether the case falls under Section 302 or under Section 304 Part I or 304 Part II I.P.C. Thus, we see that the Apex Court in Dhirajbhai Gorakhbhai Nayak v. State of Gujarat, reported in (2003) 9 SCC 322; while discussing the ingredients of Exception 4 to Section 300 I.P.C. relating to sudden fight, as has been claimed by the appellant-accused in the present case, held as follows: (SCC pp. 327, para 11)
11. The fourth exception of Section 300 IPC covers acts done in a sudden fight. The said Exception deals with a case of prosecution (sic provocation) not covered by the first exception, after which its place would have been more appropriate. The Exception is founded upon the same principle, for in both there is absence of premeditation. But, while in the case of Exception 1 there is total deprivation of self- control, in case of Exception 4, there is only that heat of passion which clouds men’s sober reason and urges them to deeds which they would not otherwise do. There is provocation in Exception 4 as in Exception 1, but the injury done is not the direct consequence of that provocation. In fact, Exception 4 deals with cases in which notwithstanding that a blow may have been struck, or some provocation given in the origin of the dispute or in whatever way the quarrel may have originated, yet the subsequent conduct of both parties puts them in respect of guilt upon an equal footing. A sudden fight implies mutual provocation and blows on each side. The homicide committed is then clearly not traceable to unilateral provocation, nor could in such cases the whole blame be placed on one side. For if it were so, the Exception more appropriately applicable would be Exception 1. There is no previous deliberation or determination to fight. A fight suddenly takes place, for which both parties are more or less to be blamed. It may be that one of them starts it, but if the other had not aggravated it by his own conduct it would not have taken the serious turn it did. There is then mutual provocation and aggravation, and it is difficult to apportion the share of blame which attaches to each fighter. The help of Exception 4 can be invoked if death is caused (a) without premeditation, (b) in a sudden fight, (c) without the offenders having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner, and (d) the fight must have been with the person killed. To bring a case within Exception 4 all the ingredients mentioned in it must be found. It is to be noted that the fight occurring in Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC is not defined in IPC. It takes two to make a fight. Heat of passion requires that there must be no time for the passions to cool down and in this case, the parties had worked themselves into a fury on account of the verbal altercation in the beginning. A fight is a combat between two and more persons whether with or without weapons. It is not possible to enunciate any general rule as to what shall be deemed to be a sudden quarrel. It is a question of fact and whether a quarrel is sudden or not must necessarily depend upon the proved facts of each case. For the application of Exception 4, it is not sufficient to show that there was a sudden quarrel and there was no premeditation. It must further be shown that the offender has not taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. The expression undue advantage as used in the provision means unfair advantage.
(Emphasis Supplied)
57. From the above stated decisions, it emerges that there is no hard and fast rule that in a case of single blow injury Section 302 of the I.P.C. would not be attracted. It depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The fact situation has to be considered in each case, more particularly, the events which precede will also have a bearing on the issue whether the act by which the death was caused was done with an intention of causing death or knowledge that it is likely to cause death. It is the totality of the circumstances which will decide the nature of the offence.
58. Applying the law laid down by the Apex Court in the aforesaid decisions, more particularly the decisions on the single blow injury and the facts on hand, it is required to be considered whether the case would fall under Section 302 I.P.C. or any other lesser offence.
P.W.1 Satvindar Kaur, who is an eyewitness to the incident right from the beginning and also an injured, deposed that the appellant-accused had worked along with her for two years and was removed one and a half months (in cross-examination, she says 3 months) prior to the incident due to allegations of theft and hera-pheri against the appellant-accused. She admits that although a complaint had been lodged for the said theft, however, the same was settled on the ground that the appellant-accused would not repeat such conduct in the future. She also admits that it was her deceased-husband, who had come out first after hearing the noise of the breaking glass of the scooty, and she and her mother (P.W.-2) came out only upon hearing the abusive duel between her husband and the appellant-accused. It has also been admitted by the said eye-witness that dhakka-mukki has occasioned and when the complainant and her mother went to save her husband, the appellant-accused attacked the husband with the scissors.
She also admits that both the appellant-accused and the deceased, while fighting and pushing each other, came from the spot of scooty to the basement where her shop was located, and eventually her husband was attacked in front of Sanjeev Boutique. She admits that she had told the police during investigation that her husband was stabbed at the place of scooty due to her mental disturbance.
Thus, apparently it appears that there had been some quarrel between the deceased and the appellant-accused over the breaking of glass and abuses words, which resulted in dhakka-mukki and eventually leading to stabbing the deceased. Further, this Court finds that both the appellant-accused and the deceased moved from the spot of parking of scooty to the basement for more than two minutes. Thus, keeping in view the cumulative happening of the incident, it can be termed to be a sudden fight.
59. Further, the said eyewitness although has deposed that the appellant had bricks (withy which he was breaking the glass of scooty) in one hand and a pair of scissors in the other, however, when she is further cross-examined, she says that the appellant-accused was beating the deceased with his hands during dhakka-mukki, and the said beating went for about two minutes. She also admits that the appellant-accused attacked the deceased with the scissors suddenly and the first blow was directed towards her mother (P.W.-2) and the second towards her husband. She also admits that there were altogether only two blows with the scissors. Thus, it can be said that upon hearing the breaking of glass of the scooty , the deceased immediately rushed outside and may have challenged the appellant-accused and obviously would have given rise to verbal abuses followed by dhakka-mukki, resulting in a sudden quarrel, due to the existing dispute of the appellant-accused being an ex-employee and now a competitor, as has been brought out from the evidence on record.
60. Further, from an analysis of the aforesaid statement of the eyewitness, it is apparent from the statement, as far as the appellant-accused having the bricks in one hand and scissors in the other cannot be believed for the simple reasons that later during her cross-examination, she admits that prior to the blow with the scissors, Dhakka-mukki i.e., pushing and fisting, had occasioned at the crime-spot and the appellant-accused was seen beating the deceased for two minutes by his hand. If both the hands of the appellant-accused were engaged with bricks and scissors,, as deposed by the eyewitness, how can the appellant-accused beat the deceased with his hands for two minutes. Thus, according to this Court, the appellant-accused was not holding the scissors in his hand when the fight started, and he may only had bricks with which he broke the glass of the scooty.
Further, this Court finds that there is no evidence on record as to whose scissor was used for stabbing the deceased, as to whether the appellant-accused brought along with him or that the scissor was picked from the shop of the deceased or the Sanjeev Boutique, wherein he eventually died with the stabbing of a scissor. Neither of the parties have led any evidence on the said aspect, although a suggestion was put by the appellant-accused to P.W.-1 that the scissor was brought by the deceased himself from his shop, which was denied, but this Court does not find any sterling evidence on the said issue as to who brought the scissor or as to who was the owner of the scissor. Since, there is no evidence, the benefit of the same has to accrue in favour of the appellant-accused and as such, it has to be held that the appellant-accused did not bring along with him the scissor, with which the deceased was attacked. In case, the appellant-accused was carrying the scissors all throughout the happening of the incident, this Court fails to understand as to why he used the bricks to break the glass of scooty or as to why he did indulge in dhakka-mukki or that why the beating of the deceased by the appellant-accused was with hand. These all questions, merely indicate that the scissors were not brought along by the appellant-accused. Thus, it can be said in a way that the attack was not premeditated or preplanned.
61. Next, it has been admitted by the P.W.-1 that there were altogether two blows inflicted with the scissors. . The first being on the mother (P.W.-2) and the second on the deceased. Again, if the first blow was to the mother, it definitely meant that the intention of the appellant-accused was not directed towards the deceased only but was also towards the mother (P.W.-2). However, we see from the evidence which has come on record that the mother (P.W.-2) was not a regular visitor to the shop nor used to sit regularly at the shop. She, as per the evidence on record, came to visit her daughter and the shop, as a matter of chance. Thus, it cannot be said that the appellant-accused would have planned the same fate for the mother as well for the deceased. In any case, no evidence has been brought on record relating to any animosity between the mother (P.W.-2) and the appellant-accused. Thus, it can be stated with some certainty that a fight ensued between the parties due to the breaking of glass of the scooty by the appellant-accused and because of the dhakka-mukki and beating which went for two minutes and the appellant-accused being faced with three persons i.e., the deceased, P.W.-1 and P.W.-2, could have caught hold of a pair of scissors and attacked the persons indiscriminately, who came in front of him. Since there was no premeditation, the mother-in-law of the deceased (P.W.-2) came first and as such was attacked with the scissors prior to the second attack on the deceased.
62. As to the intensity of the blow, the medical evidence shows that the injuries sustained by the mother were simple in nature. The medical report can be seen in that regard, which is being mentioned herein:
* 3×1 cm lacerated wound was found on the left palm below the left hand thumb with clot
* 3×1 cm Lacerated wound over the ulna found on right wrist with redness
The aforesaid injury has been opined to be simple by the Doctor. Apparently, the deceased was the second person to receive the blow with the scissors from the appellant-accused with equal intensity as has been revealed from the postmortem report. The said report says that the deceased sustained the following ante-mortem injury:
A stab wound (punctured wound) size 3 x 1 cm at chest cavity deep on Left side chest, 7.0 cm away from (Lt) Nipple and 18.0 cm away from (Rt) Nipple.
The cause of death is due to shock and haemorrhage as a result of ante-mortem injury.
An analysis of the Medical report as aforesaid shows that although the intensity of the stab inflicted by the appellant-accused to the mother (P.W.-2) and the deceased is almost the same as the wound is of size 3 x 1 cm in both cases, however, there is a huge difference when it comes to the consequence of the said stabbing, as the mother merely sustained simple injury, whereas the deceased sustained a fatal injury. Apparently, the said difference in consequences is due to the place, where the stabbing was inflicted. In the case of deceased, he was stabbed on a vital part. But the question is whether the appellant-accused had the intention or knowledge of the said stabbing on vital part. The answer would be no, for the simple reason that it has come in evidence that there was a fight between the appellant-accused on one side and P.W.-1, P.W.-2 and deceased on the other. Further, it has also come in evidence that there were various neighbouring shop owners who had come to see the fight after verbal abuses between the appellant-accused and the deceased, therefore a commotion like situation was created at the crime-spot, leading to usage of the scissors to attack and get away from the said scene. Thus, we see that the first blow landed on the mother-in-law (P.W.-2) on the wrist/hand, while the second blow unfortunately landed on the chest of the deceased, causing fatal injuries.
63. Further, this Court finds that after the said second blow, there was no further blow to anyone or even to the deceased. There was only a single blow to the deceased. Thus, from the aforesaid narration of facts, it can be safely said that (i) the act was committed without premeditation; (ii) there was a sudden fight; (iii) the act was in a heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel; and (iv) the offender has not taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner.
64. As per Exception 4 to Section 300 of the I.P.C., Culpable Homicide is not Murder if it is committed without premeditation, in a sudden fight, in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel, and without the offender having taken undue advantage and not having acted in a cruel or unusual manner. In the present case, from the analysis of the evidence brought on record, the Culpable Homicide cannot be said to be a murder within the definition of Section 300 I.P.C. and, therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case narrated herein above, and the manner in which the incident started with the breaking of the scooty glass, and followed by verbal abuse and dhakka-mukki, we are of the opinion that Section 302 of the I.P.C. shall not be attracted.
65. Now, the next question which is posed for consideration of this Court is whether the case would fall under Section 304, Part II I.P.C. Considering the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, and more particularly that the appellant-accused inflicted a blow with scissors and he inflicted the injury on the deceased on a vital part of the deceaseds body, it is to be presumed that causing such bodily injury was likely to cause death. Therefore, the case would fall under Section 304, Part I of the I.P.C. and not under Section 304, Part II of the I.P.C.
66. Though, the issue would now be restricted only to the sentence for the offence under Section 304, Part I of the I.P.C., and we have to consider about the appropriate punishment for the appellant-accused in this case, for its aggravating circumstances relating to the crime while mitigating circumstances relating to the criminal. We see from the record that at the time of commission of charged incident, age of appellant-accused was about 35 years. From the facts and circumstances of the case, it is clear that the appellant-accused initially had no intention for murder/homicide or causing any injury. The appellant-accused has no criminal history and is in incarceration for about 12 years. This Court when faced with the hardcore term of determining the quantum of sentence to be awarded to the appellant-accused, is reminded of the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Hazara Singh v. Raj Kumar, reported in (2013) 9 SCC 516. The relevant paragraph is being extracted herein below in verbatim:-
17.We reiterate that in operating the sentencing system, law should adopt the corrective machinery or deterrence based on factual matrix. The facts and given circumstances in each case, the nature of the crime, the manner in which it was planned and committed, the motive for commission of the crime, the conduct of the accused, the nature of weapons used and all other attending circumstances are relevant facts which would enter into the area of consideration. We also reiterate that undue sympathy to impose inadequate sentence would do more harm to the justice system to undermine the public confidence in the efficacy of law. It is the duty of every court to award proper sentence having regard to the nature of the offence and the manner in which it was executed or committed. The court must not only keep in view the rights of the victim of the crime but also the society at large while considering the imposition of appropriate punishment.
67. Therefore, keeping in view the totality of facts and circumstances, and for the reasons stated herein above, the impugned judgment and order passed by the Trial Court convicting the appellant-accused for the offence punishable under Section 302 I.P.C. is hereby modified from that of under Section 302 I.P.C. to Section 304, Part I of the I.P.C. The appellant-accused is held guilty for the offence punishable under Section 304, Part I of the I.P.C. and is accordingly sentenced to undergo 12 years Rigorous Imprisonment with a fine and default clause, as awarded by the Trial Court in Sessions Trial No.1062 of 2015, arising out of Case Crime No. 264 of 2014.
68. In view of the above, the appeal is partly allowed to the aforesaid extent.
69. Let a copy of this judgment, as well as the lower Court record, be sent to the Trial Court for necessary information and ensuring compliance.
70. All pending application(s) shall stand disposed of.
(Abdhesh Kumar Chaudhary, J.) (Rajesh Singh Chauhan, J.)
May 22, 2026
MVS/-
