Jammu & Kashmir High Court
Reserved On: – 12.03.2026 vs State Of J&K on 1 April, 2026
2026:JKLHC-JMU:873
Sr. No. 02
HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
AT JAMMU
Case No.: CRMC No. 67/2013
c/w
CRMC No. 15/2013
Reserved on: - 12.03.2026
Pronounced on:- 01.04.2026
Uploaded on:- 01.04.2026
Whether the operative part
or full judgment is pronounced Full
Kali Dass and Anr. .... Petitioner(s)
Through: - Mr. O P Thakur, Sr. Advocate with
Mr. R K S Thakur, Advocate.
Ms. Anandita Thakur, Advocate
(in CRMC No. 67/2013).
Mr. Aseem Kumar Sawhney, Sr.
Adv. (Th. Virtual Mode).
Ms. Tehseena Bukhari, Advocate.
Mr. Sarfaraz Ahmed, Advocate.
Mr. Piyush Behal, Advocate.
Mr. Dheeraj Singh, Advocate.
Mr. Harsh Singh, Advocate in
(CRMC No. 15/2013)
V/s
State of J&K. .... Respondent(s)
Through: - Mr. P D Singh, Dy. AG.
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY PARIHAR, JUDGE
JUDGMENT
1. These two petitions arise out of a common order dated 15.12.2012
passed by Principal Sessions Judge, Jammu, hereinafter referred to
as “the trial Court”, in a case arising out of FIR No. 31/2006
registered at Police Station, Peer Mitha, Jammu, for commission of
offences under Sections 3/7 of the Essential Commodities Act and
Sections 419, 420, 467, 468 and 471 RPC. By virtue of the
impugned order, the petitioners came to be discharged for offences
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under Sections 467 and 471 RPC, but were directed to be charged
for offences under Sections 419, 420, 468, 120-B RPC and Sections
3/7 of the Essential Commodities Act. Aggrieved thereof, the
petitioners have questioned the legality, propriety and correctness
of the order of charge.
2. The principal grounds urged in challenge are that the order
impugned is contrary to facts and law; that the petitioners have
been falsely implicated; that they have been roped in subsequently
only on the basis of statements of co-accused; that there was no
legal material before the trial Court to frame charges against them;
and that the petitioners have been made accused in relation to what
is essentially the same transaction already forming subject matter of
another FIR registered by another police station, which, according
to them, was not legally permissible.
3. The case of the petitioners, in brief, is that the prosecution has
failed to place on record any material to show that allotment order
No. 1384-87/AD/CAPD/J-100-05 dated 16.05.2006 was prepared
by any of them. It is contended that the said allotment order
pertains to FIR No. 91/2006 of Police Station, Satwari, and not to
the present FIR No. 31/2006 of Police Station, Peer Mitha. It is
further submitted that in the list of allotment orders annexed with
the charge-sheet in the present case, the aforesaid allotment order
dated 16.05.2006 is not specifically reflected as the foundational
forged document prepared by the petitioners. According to the
petitioners, the prosecution has failed to identify with certainty the
particular false document attributed to each of them.
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4. It is also contended that petitioner Kali Dass, at the relevant time,
was serving as Senior Assistant in the CAPD Department;
petitioner Swaran Singh was working as Chowkidar; and petitioner
Bal Krishan Sharma was functioning as Assistant Director in the
said Department. According to learned counsel for the petitioners,
mere employment in the CAPD Department cannot be made a basis
for fastening criminal liability, unless there is cogent material
showing participation in preparation, issuance or use of forged
allotment orders. The argument is that no such material has been
collected during investigation.
5. The factual matrix, as emerging from the record, is that Police
Station, Satwari had registered FIR No. 91/2006 under Sections 3/7
of the Essential Commodities Act and Sections 419, 420, 467, 468
and 471 RPC, when it was found that one Gurmeet Singh, licence-
holder of a kerosene oil sale outlet, was indulging in black-
marketing of kerosene oil meant for public distribution. A raid
conducted at his premises resulted in recovery of 600 litres of
kerosene oil in three barrels, which, according to the police, was in
excess of the allotted quota of 300 litres.
6. During investigation of the said case, it surfaced that the kerosene
oil had been decanted at the outlet of the said Gurmeet Singh on
14.06.2006 by Tanker No. JK06G-9394 driven by Kesar Singh. The
tanker belonged to M/S Devi Dass Gopal Krishan Warehouse,
Jammu, a stockist of kerosene oil of Indian Oil Corporation. Upon
arrest of Gurmeet Singh and scrutiny of the record, the police found
that the kerosene oil had allegedly been released vide allotment
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order No. 1384-87/AD/CAPD/J-100-05 dated 16.05.2006, which
came to be suspected as fake.
7. It further appears that the senior police officer supervising the
jurisdiction of Police Station, Satwari informed the Senior
Superintendent of Police, Jammu, that kerosene oil was being sold
in black market by various sale depots in Jammu city on the
strength of fake allotment orders. Consequently, Police Station,
Peer Mitha registered FIR No. 31/2006 for offences under Sections
3/7 of the Essential Commodities Act and Sections 419, 420, 467,
468 and 471 RPC, in relation to the larger racket concerning
preparation and circulation of fake allotment orders.
8. During investigation of FIR No. 31/2006, it was alleged that
employees of M/S Devi Dass Gopal Krishan disclosed that fake
allotment orders had been got prepared with the active connivance
of officials of the CAPD Department. It is also the case of the
prosecution that fake allotment orders were being used by stockists
to obtain release of kerosene oil, which was then sold in black
market, thereby defeating the object of public distribution under the
statutory control regime.
9. The record further reveals that the co-accused Swarn Singh is stated
to have disclosed during investigation that co-accused Rattan Lal
and Keshav Sawhney had faked a large number of allotment orders
with the connivance of the then Assistant Director, namely Bal
Krishan Sharma. Likewise, petitioner Kali Dass is shown to have
stated under Section 161 Cr.P.C. that the co-accused, namely,
Keshav Sawhney and Rattan Lal, who were associated with the
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Kerosene Oil Dealers’ Association, used to produce photocopies of
various orders and that the then Assistant Director had asked him to
sign printed allotment orders, which he signed under directions of
the superior officer. He is also shown to have stated that later he
found that such orders were photocopies, tampered with and
illegally used for fake allotment of kerosene oil.
10. It has also come in the investigation that typing work of such
allotment orders was allegedly being undertaken in the office of
M.K. Enterprises, Chowk Chaubtra, Mubarak Mandi, owned by one
M.K. Koul. Statement of PW-Sanjay Sharma indicates that Keshav
Sawhney and Rattan Lal used to come regularly for typing
allotment orders of kerosene oil for the last several months and he
used to charge Rs.10/- per page, though according to him, he had
no knowledge that the same were forged documents.
11. The prosecution has also relied upon the statement of PW-Omesh
Sharma, an employee of M/S Devi Dass Gopal Krishan, who stated
that allotment order bearing No. 1384-87/AD/CAPD/J-100-05
dated 16.05.2006 had been produced by co-accused Keshav
Sawhney. He further stated that when he and another employee
suspected the genuineness of the order, the photocopy thereof was
shown to Kali Dass and Swaran Singh, employees of the CAPD
Department, who informed them that the order was genuine,
whereafter kerosene oil was issued on that basis.
12. Upon completion of investigation, the petitioners along with other
accused came to be challaned before the Court of Special Railway
Magistrate, Jammu, for commission of offences under Sections 3/7
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of the Essential Commodities Act and Sections 419, 420, 467, 468,
471 and 120-B RPC. The petitioners had remained on bail during
investigation. The learned Magistrate committed the case to the
Court of Sessions, that trial Court, after consideration of the
material on record, discharged the petitioners for offences under
Sections 467 and 471 RPC, but framed charges against them for
offences under Sections 419, 420, 468, 120-B RPC and Sections
3/7 of the Essential Commodities Act. It is this order, which is
under challenge in the present petitions.
13. Learned counsel for the petitioners argued that not an iota of
evidence has been collected during investigation to show that any
forged allotment order was actually prepared by the petitioners. It is
contended that the trial Court failed to notice that the allotment
order dated 16.05.2006 is the subject matter of FIR No. 91/2006 of
Police Station, Satwari, and that the present charge-sheet in FIR
No. 31/2006 does not clearly spell out as to which particular forged
order was authored or fabricated by the petitioners.
14. It is next contended that petitioner Bal Krishan Sharma has been
implicated solely on the basis of statements of co-accused recorded
by the police under Section 161 Cr.P.C., which are neither
substantive evidence nor legally admissible against a co-accused for
the purpose of framing charge. It is urged that statements of co-
accused, unless amounting to legally admissible confessions within
the framework of the Evidence Act, cannot be used to implicate
another accused. It is submitted that the trial Court failed to
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appreciate this settled principle and proceeded on conjectures and
assumptions.
15. Learned counsel further submitted that PW-Omesh Sharma and
Chamail Singh, both employees of the stockist firm, in fact stated
that when the questioned allotment order was brought from the
office of M/S Devi Dass Gopal Krishan, they became suspicious
and approached the CAPD Department for verification, where they
were told by petitioners Kali Dass and Swaran Singh that the order
was genuine. According to the petitioners, even if this statement is
taken at face value, it may at best amount to an act of verification or
misrepresentation, but by no stretch establishes preparation of
forged allotment orders or conspiracy to fabricate them.
16. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent-State
submitted that the trial Court has rightly passed the impugned
order. According to the respondent, the material collected during
investigation discloses a prima facie case showing active
connivance of the petitioners with stockists and dealers in
preparation, verification and use of fake allotment orders. It is
submitted that at the stage of framing of charge, the Court is not
required to meticulously appreciate the evidence as if finally
determining guilt, but only to see whether strong suspicion or grave
suspicion arises from the material collected.
17. It is also submitted by the respondent that the learned trial Court
has already sifted the material and found that there was no
sufficient ground for framing charge under Sections 467 and 471
RPC, which is why the petitioners were discharged for those
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offences. According to the learned State counsel, the impugned
order demonstrates due application of mind, inasmuch as the
learned trial Court separated the offences not made out from those
for which prima facie case did exist.
18. In rebuttal, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the
CAPD Department had, by order dated 04.01.2006, directed all
stockists of kerosene oil not to act upon photocopies of allotment
orders. Therefore, according to the petitioners, even if a forged
photocopy was used in the market, the petitioners cannot be blamed
unless there is direct evidence of their participation in the
fabrication or intentional use thereof.
19. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused the
impugned order, the charge-sheet, the statements collected during
investigation and the material produced on record.
20. The scope of interference by this Court, while exercising revisional
jurisdiction against an order framing charge, is well circumscribed.
It is trite that at the stage of charge, the Court is not required to
meticulously evaluate the evidence as if conducting a full-fledged
trial. The test is whether the material placed on record, if taken at
its face value, discloses the existence of a prima facie case or at
least raises a grave suspicion against the accused. The Court is not
to weigh the sufficiency of evidence for conviction but only to
examine whether there exists a strong suspicion which, if
unrebutted, would warrant the accused being put on trial. This
principle stands authoritatively settled in “State of Bihar v. Ramesh
Singh, AIR (1977) 4 SCC 39″, wherein it was held that even strong
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suspicion founded on material before the Court is sufficient for
framing charge.
21. It is equally settled that while exercising powers of discharge or
framing of charge, the Court must sift the material to the limited
extent necessary to determine whether the allegations are
groundless. Where the material gives rise to grave suspicion, the
Court would be justified in framing the charge; conversely, where
two views are possible and the material gives rise only to mere
suspicion, the accused would be entitled to discharge. However, the
threshold at this stage is intentionally low, so as not to stifle
legitimate prosecution at its inception. The principles governing
this stage have been succinctly laid down in “Union of India
vs. Prafulla Kumar Samal, AIR 1979 SC 366″, wherein the
Supreme Court delineated the contours of judicial scrutiny at the
stage of charge.
22. In the present case, the argument of the petitioners that there is “not
an iota of evidence” against them is, upon a careful scrutiny of the
record, found to be an overstatement. The material collected during
investigation cannot be said to be wholly bereft of incriminating
circumstances. The seizure of as many as twenty-five allotment
orders, coupled with the forensic indication that at least one such
allotment order was fake, prima facie suggests that the case is not
confined to a singular aberration but points towards a systematic
modus operandi involving preparation and use of forged allotment
orders. At this stage, such material is sufficient to raise a
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presumption, within the meaning of law governing framing of
charge.
23. The statement of PW-Omesh Sharma assumes significance at this
stage. According to the prosecution, when suspicion arose
regarding the genuineness of the allotment order dated 16.05.2006,
the same was shown to petitioners Kali Dass and Swaran Singh,
who, being officials of the CAPD Department, represented the
same to be genuine, whereafter kerosene oil was released. If this
material is taken at face value, it prima facie indicates that the said
petitioners were not passive spectators but played a role in
facilitating the use of a forged document. Whether such conduct
ultimately constitutes culpability is a matter for trial; however, at
this stage, the Court cannot undertake a meticulous evaluation of
credibility. As reiterated in “Amit Kapoor Vs. Ramesh Chander,
(2012) 9 SCC 460″, the Court must refrain from examining the
sufficiency or reliability of evidence and should only see whether
the allegations disclose an offence.
24. Further, the statements indicating that forged allotment orders were
being repeatedly typed outside the department by private
individuals, and that such orders were similar in nature and used
over a period of time, lend support to the prosecution version that
the activity was organized and not isolated. The allegation of a
broader conspiracy involving private persons and departmental
officials, therefore, cannot be said to be inherently implausible at
this stage. It is settled that conspiracy is seldom proved by direct
evidence and may be inferred from surrounding circumstances, as
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recognized in “State (NCT of Delhi) Vs. Navjot Sandhu“,
AIR 2005 SC 3820”.
25. The principal thrust of the petitioners’ challenge relates to the
implication of petitioner Bal Krishan Sharma on the basis of
statements recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. It is correct that
such statements are not substantive evidence. A statement made to
a police officer, if in the nature of a confession, is rendered
inadmissible by virtue of Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act,
except to the limited extent permissible in law. The evidentiary
limitations of such statements have been consistently emphasized,
including in “Kashmira Singh vs. State of Madhya Pradesh,
AIR 1952 SC 159″ where it was held that confession of a
co-accused is not substantive evidence and can only lend assurance
to other independent evidence.
26. This Court is in respectful agreement with the proposition that a
co-accused cannot be implicated solely on the basis of a police
statement of another accused, particularly, when such statement is
sought to be treated as substantive evidence. However, the question
that arises is whether, in the present case, the prosecution rests
exclusively on such statements.
27. A careful reading of the charge-sheet reveals that the prosecution
has not rested its case solely on statements under Section 161
Cr.P.C. There exists additional material pointing towards (i)
existence of multiple forged allotment orders, (ii) their circulation
and use, (iii) verification by departmental officials, and (iv)
interaction between private accused and departmental authorities.
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At the stage of charge, such material is sufficient to raise grave
suspicion requiring adjudication at trial. The Supreme Court in
“Sajjan Kumar v. CBI, (2010) 9 SCC 368″, has reiterated that
where the material discloses grave suspicion, the Court should not
discharge the accused merely because the evidence may not
ultimately result in conviction.
28. It must be borne in mind that admissibility and probative value of
evidence are matters for trial. At the stage of framing charge, the
Court cannot exclude material merely because it may ultimately be
found inadmissible, unless such inadmissibility is apparent on the
face of the record. This position has been reaffirmed in “Niranjan
Singh Karam Singh Punjabi vs. Jitendra Bhimraj Bijjaya,
AIR 1990 SC 1962″.
29. The argument that FIR No. 31/2006 is barred as a second FIR in
view of the law laid down in “T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala,
(2001) 6 SCC 181″, does not impress this Court. The prohibition
against multiple FIRs applies only where the subsequent FIR relates
to the same incident or occurrence forming the subject matter of the
earlier FIR. The decisive test is the “test of sameness”.
30. In the case at hand, FIR No. 91/2006 pertains to a specific incident
of black-marketing based on a particular allotment order, whereas
FIR No. 31/2006 pertains to a larger conspiracy involving
preparation and circulation of multiple forged allotment orders. The
two FIRs, though connected, operate in distinct spheres of
criminality. The distinction between “same transaction” and
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“distinct conspiracy” has been clarified by the Supreme Court in
“Babubhai vs. State of Gujarat, 2010 AIR SCW 5126″.
31. Therefore, the second FIR cannot be said to be legally
impermissible. Rather, it falls within the permissible category
where subsequent investigation reveals a wider conspiracy,
justifying independent registration within territorial jurisdiction.
32. The submission of the petitioners regarding the departmental
circular dated 04.01.2006 may be relevant for trial but does not
demolish the prosecution case at the threshold. The defence sought
to be projected cannot be examined in depth at this stage, as held in
“State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi, AIR 2005 SC 359″,
wherein it was held that defence material cannot ordinarily be
considered at the stage of framing charge.
33. The contention that there is no direct evidence of preparation of
forged allotment orders is equally untenable at this stage. Offences
involving conspiracy and cheating are often proved through
circumstantial evidence. Direct evidence is not a sine qua non for
framing charge.
34. The learned trial Court has, in the considered opinion of this Court,
exercised due judicial discretion by discharging the petitioners for
certain offences while proceeding against them for others. This
reflects proper application of mind and does not call for
interference.
35. Viewed thus, this Court is satisfied that the material on record,
taken at its face value, discloses a prima facie case and raises grave
suspicion against the petitioners. The petitioners have failed to
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demonstrate that the allegations are so inherently improbable or
unsupported by material as to justify discharge at this stage.
Petitions are, thus, dismissed. Interim direction, if any, shall stand
vacated enabling the trial court to proceed with the trial in
accordance with law.
(SANJAY PARIHAR)
JUDGE
JAMMU
01.04.2026
Ram Krishan
Whether the order is speaking? Yes
Whether the order is reportable? Yes
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