Bombay High Court
Ravinderpal Singh Jaspal Singh vs State Of Maharashtra Thr Spo., … on 27 April, 2026
2026:BHC-NAG:6634
1 66 aba28.26.odt
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR.
CRIMINAL APPLICATION (ABA) NO. 28 OF 2026
Dr. Ravinderpal Singh Jaspal Singh
Vs.
State of Maharashtra, through Police Station Officer, Brahmapuri Police
Station, Tq. Brambapuri, District Chandrapur
__________________________________________________________________
Office Notes, Office Memoranda of Coram,
appearances, Court's orders of directions Court's or Judge's orders.
and Registrar's Orders.
Mr. S.V. Sirpurkar, Advocate for applicant.
Mr. D.V. Chauhan, Senior Advocate and Government Pleader assisted
by Mr. U.R. Phasate, A.P.P. for non-applicant/State.
CORAM : RAJNISH R. VYAS, J.
DATE : 27.04.2026.
1. This matter was heard at length on 23.04.2026
and was kept on 29.04.2026 at 4.30 pm for the
pronouncement of the order. While perusing the record, the
Court came across documents revealing that the applicant
was arrested for the same crime at in Delhi and produced
before the jurisdictional magistrate. Thus, to make the
counsels aware of the aforesaid aspect and grant them a
hearing to decide the question of maintainability of the
anticipatory bail application, matter was fixed on
27.04.2026 at 02.30 pm. Since I have heard Mr S. V.
Shirpurkar, the learned counsel for the applicant, and Mr
D.V. Chauhan, the learned Senior Counsel and Public
Prosecutor for the State, I think that the issue can be decided
today only. Therefore, though the matter was already fixed
for the pronouncement of the order on 29.04.2026,
2 66 aba28.26.odt
considering the issue involved, the order can be passed
today.
2. Heard respective counsels.
QUESTION INVOLVED
The issue involved is whether an accused, who has
been arrested, produced before a Magistrate, and released
on transit bail, can still invoke Section 438 Code of Criminal
Procedure (for short, “Cr.P.C.”) / Section 482 of the
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short
“BNSS”)?
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
3. A First Information Report No.654/2025 was
registered on 16.02.2025 with Police Station, Brahmapuri,
district Chandrapur for a commission of offences punishable
under Sections 387, 342, 294, 506, 120B and 326 of Indian
Penal Code. (I.P.C)., as also Sections 39 and 44 of the
Maharashtra Money-Lending (Regulation) Act, 2014. The
applicant was not named in the First Information Report. A
total of 6 accused were named in the First Information
Report. During the course of investigation, the applicant was
impleaded as an accused and provisions of Section 18 and
19 of the Transplantation of Human Organs and Tissues Act,
1994 and Section 143(1)(a)(f), 143(2), 143(3) of BNS,
3 66 aba28.26.odt
2023 were added. A station diary entry to that effect was
taken on 21.12.2025. The applicant was arrested in Delhi
and produced before the Duty JMFC, North West, Rohini
Court, New Delhi, on 30.12.2025 and this transit demand
was prayed for.
4. On that day, the following order was passed by
the said Court:
“Fresh Vakalatnama filed on behalf of accused. Be taken
on record.
Application perused.
The identity of the concerned arresting officer Assistant
Police Inspector Dipak Kankredwar has been duly verified.
A copy of identity card of the arresting officer has been
taken.
It is submitted by the Assistant Police Inspector that the
present accused has been involved in an illegal Kidney
transplantation syndicate operating at Star Kims Hospital,
Trichy, Tamil Nadu which has been functioning in an
organized manner. It is further submitted that during the
course of investigation, the name of the present accused
has come on record particularly in the disclosure statement
of accused no.7 Ram Krushna. It is therefore requested
that transit remand of the accused for the aforesaid period
be granted for investigation purpose.
Per contra, an application seeking release / transit bail
has been filed on behalf of the accused. It is argued that
the present accused has not been named in the said FIR. It
has further been argued that the accused is a renowned
Doctor and has deep roots in the society. It is further
submitted that the case of the present accused is only with
respect to trafficking of human organs. It is further
submitted that the accused has no intention to run away
from the investigating agency and shall join investigation
4 66 aba28.26.odtas and when asked by the IO. It is further submitted that
the accused is a reputed senior Surgeon related to Liver
transplant and a lot of critical surgeries are to be
conducted / overseen by the present accused. Finally, it is
submitted that the accused has already handed over his
mobile phone to the IO and is ready and willing to further
cooperate in the investigation of the present matter.
Submission heard. Record perused.
In the present matter, it is important to observe that the
accused has been apprehended mainly upon the disclosure
statement of the co-accused Ram Krushna. It has been
submitted by the IO that investigation of the present
matter is at an initial stage and many aspects of the matter
are yet to be investigated. It is further important to observe
that the accused is a reputed Senior Doctor who has been
an even presently associated with a number of Medical
Institutions, having deep roots in society. Granting Transit
Remand/custody of the accused shall not only cause a
deep stigma to the long standing reputation of the accused
but shall also adversely affect the medical condition of the
patients who may have to be attended by the accused,
more so, when further evidence in the matter is yet to
come on record.
Considering the above observations, the standing of the
accused in society and the undertaking expressed by the
accused to join and cooperate in the ongoing investigation,
the present application for Transit Bail upon furnishing
personal bond in the sum of Rs.50,000/- subject to the
condition that the accused shall appear before the
concerned CJM, District Chandrapur, State Maharashtra
on 02.01.2026 at 2 PM sharp.
Further, the accused shall not leave the country or tamper
with any evidence of the case during the aforesaid period.
The present application stands disposed of accordingly.
Copy of this order be given dasti to the IO as well as
advocate as prayed for.”
5 66 aba28.26.odt
5. On perusal of the aforesaid order, it would reveal
that the Duty Magistrate has directed the applicant to join
and cooperate in the ongoing investigation. The order
further reveals that the applicant/accused undertook to join
and cooperate with the ongoing investigation. The
application for transit remand was refused, and the accused
was granted transit bail upon furnishing a personal bond of
₹50,000/- subject to the condition that the accused shall
appear before the concerned CJM, District Chandrapur,
Maharashtra, on 02.01.2026 at 2:00 pm sharp. The order it
self shows that the applicant was “apprehended”.
6. The applicant, instead of appearing before the
Chief Judicial Magistrate, District, Chandrapur, preferred an
application under Section 482 of the Bharatiya Nagarik
Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short, “BNSS”) on 01.01.2026
and prayed for his release on anticipatory bail. On
01.01.2026, the learned Additional Sessions Judge,
Chandrapur, granted the applicant interim bail and, vide
order dated 07.01.2026, finally rejected the anticipatory bail
application. The applicant/accused then approached this
Court. The predecessor of this Court, vide its order dated
12.02.2026, granted ad interim anticipatory bail to the
applicant with a direction to attend the police station.
7. It is further necessary to mention here that the
transit remand report was submitted by Assistant Police
Inspector, Local Crime Branch, Chandrapur, to the
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Magistrate Court at Rohini, Delhi, in which it was stated that
the investigating agency had arrested the wanted accused
person, Dr Ravindrapal Singh, resident of Kohat, New Delhi,
in the Subhash Place Police Station jurisdiction on
30.12.2025. A request was made to grant transit remand
from 30.12.2025 to 01.01.2026. Along with the arrest
memo, the reasons and grounds of arrest were also
prepared, and the documents produced for perusal of the
court shows that the same was supplied to the applicant on
30.12.2025, and his acknowledgement was also taken.
Information regarding the arrest was given to the applicant’s
wife (Pages 720 to 727 of File No. 2 of the charge-sheet).
8. A document issued by Bhagwan Mahavir Hospital,
Pitampura, Delhi (page 729), shows that a medical-legal
report was also prepared showing medical examination of
the applicant on 30.12.2025.
ARGUMENTS BY THE ACCUSED
9. In this background, the learned counsel for the
applicant has submitted that, as the transit remand
application was rejected and he was directed to appear
before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, his arrest was only a
“paper arrest”. He submitted that it cannot be said that he
was arrested in accordance with the provisions of BNSS. He
further relied upon Section 35 (e) of BNSS and has
contended that the power of a police officer under Section
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35 (1) (e) of the BNSS to re-arrest the applicant will revive
from 02.01.2026 if he fails to appear before the
jurisdictional magistrate on 02.01.2026. According to the
learned counsel for the applicant, despite being initially
arrested and subsequently released on transit bail, “reason to
believe that he may be arrested” persisted. He then relied
upon the short note given, giving the factual position and a
few judgments delivered by the Hon’ble Apex Court. The
said judgments are reproduced as under:
(1) Dhanraj Asawani VS. Amarjeetsingh reported in (2023)
20 SCC 136, contending that mere formal arrest would not
extinguish the right of the accused to apply for anticipatory
bail.
(2) Siddharam Satilinappa Mhetre Vs. State of Maharashtra
reported in (2011) 1 SCC 694, Gurbaksh Singh Sibba Vs.
State of Punjab reported in (1980) 2 SCC 565 and Sushila
Aggrawal Vs State (NCT of Delhi) reported (2020) 5 SCC 1,
arguing that the purpose behind incorporating the provision
of anticipatory bail was to recognise the importance of
personal liberty in a free and democratic country.
(3) Commissioner of Income Tax, Bangalore Vs. JH Gotla,
Yadagiri reported in (1985) 4 SCC 343, to make a point that
when the plain literal interpretation of a statutory provision
produces a manifestly unjust result which the Legislature
could never have intended, the Court might modify the
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language used by the Legislature to achieve the intention of
the Legislature and produce a rational construction.
(4) Judgment in the case of Gautam Navalakha Vs. The
National Investigation Agency reported in (2022) 13 SCC
542 was also relied upon to claim that even an arrested
accused can prefer an application for anticipatory bail.
With utmost fairness, both the counsels also brought to
my notice judgment passed by the High Court of Kerala at
Ernakulam in Bail Application No.13662 of 2025 dated
11.02.2026, by which it was held that an application for pre-
arrest bail is not maintainable if the transit bail after arrest is
granted.
10. The gist of the learned counsel’s argument for the
applicant is that it cannot be said that the applicant was
arrested at any point in time at Delhi.
ARGUMENTS BY THE STATE
11. Per contra, Mr Chauhan, the learned Senior
Counsel and Public Prosecutor, has invited my attention to
the judgment in the case of Directorate of Enforcement Vs.
Deepak Mahajan and another reported in [(1994) 3 SCC
440], more particularly paras 48 and 49, and contended that
in every arrest there is custody, but not vice versa, and that
both words ‘custody’ and ‘arrest’ are not synonyms. Though
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custody may amount to arrest in certain circumstances, it
does not under all circumstances. He then submitted that, at
the time the applicant was apprehended in Delhi and
produced before the duty magistrate, the benefits of Section
482 of the BNSS cannot be extended to the applicant. He
further submitted that even the grounds of arrest in writing
were supplied to the applicant, and an arrest memo was
prepared, which was also signed by the applicant. He further
submitted that the conduct of the applicant in not
approaching the Magistrate’s Court at Chandrapur, though
undertaken before the Duty Magistrate at Delhi, is
blameworthy. He submitted that no further arguments
would be necessary, as once a person is arrested, he cannot
file an anticipatory bail application.
12. Mr Chauhan, learned Senior Counsel and Public
Prosecutor, has also brought to my attention the bail bond
executed by the applicant before the Magistrate’s Court at
Delhi, and contended that the applicant had surrendered to
the Court’s custody. According to him,it can now be said that
the applicant is under ‘constructive custody’. He has also
relied upon Gautam Navlakha Vs. National Investigation
Agency [2022] 13 SCC 542], Directorate of Enforcement Vs.
Deepak Mahajan and another [(1994) 3 SCC 440], Sundeep
Kumar Bafna Vs. State of Maharashtra [(2014) 16 SCC 623],
Manish Jain Vs. Haryana State of Pollution Control Board
[Special Leave to Appeal No.5385/2020], H.M. Prakash @
Dali Vs. State of Karnataka [ILR 2004 KAR 2637], Kamal
10 66 aba28.26.odt
Sabharwal Vs. State of Assam [2023 SCC Online Gau 4108],
Pankaj Kumar Vs. State of Kerala [Petition for Special Leave
to Appeal (Crl.) No.6314/2026], Pankaj Kumar and others
Vs. The Station House Officer, Cyber Crime Police Station,
Triunanantahpuram and others [Bail Application
No.13662/2025], Kukesh Kishanpuria Vs. State of Bengal
[(2010) 15 SCC 154] and Sukhawant Singh and others Vs.
State of Punjab [(2009) 7 SCC 559] and, in short, has
contended that the anticipatory bail application is not at all
maintainable once the applicant is arrested and produced
before the Magistrate.
ANALYSIS AND REASONING
13. The principal contention of the learned counsel
for the applicant is the applicability of Section 35 (1)(e)
BNSS. In this regard, it is necessary to mention that, if
Section 35 of BNSS is perused, it reveals that it concerns the
power of the police to arrest without a warrant. Clause (e)
of sub-section (1) speaks about “unless such person is
arrested, his presence in the court whenever required cannot
be ensured”. According to him, the act of the police officers
in arresting the applicant in Delhi and production before the
Magistrate’s court would only be a “paper arrest”. At this
juncture, it is necessary to consider the provision regarding
arrest. Section 46 of Cr.P.C. deals with the procedure of
arrest and the duties of the arresting officer. Section 46
reads as follows:
11 66 aba28.26.odt
“46. Arrest how made.–(1) In making an arrest the
police officer or other person making the same shall
actually touch or confine the body of the person to be
arrested, unless there be a submission to the custody by
word or action:
Provided that where a woman is to be arrested, unless the
circumstances indicate to the contrary, her submission to
custody on an oral intimation of arrest shall be presumed
and, unless the circumstances otherwise require or unless
the police officer is a female, the police officer shall not
touch the person of the woman for making her arrest.
(2) If such person forcibly resists the endeavour to arrest
him, or attempts to evade the arrest, such police officer or
other person may use all means necessary to effect the
arrest.
(3) Nothing in this section gives a right to cause the death
of a person who is not accused of an offence punishable
with death or with imprisonment for life.
(4) Save in exceptional circumstances, no woman shall be
arrested after sunset and before sunrise, and where such
exceptional circumstances exist, the woman police officer
shall, by making a written report, obtain the prior
permission of the Judicial Magistrate of the first class
within whose local jurisdiction the offence is committed
or the arrest is to be made.”
14. On perusal of Section 46, it would be revealed
that, while making an arrest, the police officer or other
person making the arrest shall actually touch or confine the
body of the person to be arrested, unless there is a
submission to custody by word or action. If, in the light of
the aforesaid section, the order passed by the magistrate, the
grounds of arrest supplied to the applicant, the arrest form
12 66 aba28.26.odt
which is prepared by the police, and the fact that the
applicant had submitted to the jurisdiction of the court at
Delhi, would reveal that the applicant was in fact arrested in
the crime. Further, it cannot be ignored that the applicant
himself had, before the magistrate at Delhi, undertaken to
appear before the magistrate at Chandrapur. The
investigating agency has followed entire procedure while
arresting the accused, including the conduct of a medical
examination, and thus Sections 50, 50A, 51 and 54 of the
Cr.P.C. were duly complied with.
15. As the applicant was required to be taken in the
State of Maharashtra, recourse was also had to Section 167
of the Cr.P.C. The order passed by the Magistrate at Delhi is
crystal clear and needs no clarification. The accused, by way
of said order, was directed to appear before the Magistrate’s
Court at Chandrapur, but he has not done so. Thus, it is
clear that the applicant was arrested for the offence. Once
arrest is effected, the remedy shifts from Section 438 to
regular bail under Sections 437/439 of code of criminal
procedure. The remedy of pre-arrest thus was not at all
available to the applicant.
16. So far as contention for the learned counsel for
the applicant that his arrest is only a ‘paper arrest’, it needs
to be mentioned here that the same contention is without
any substance as the due procedure prescribed under the
Cr.P.C., as stated supra, is already followed. The applicant
was not a free man when he was produced before the
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magistrate Court at Delhi as he was arrested by the police
and moment he was produce before the court, was under the
command of the court. It is crucial to highlight that it was
not the transit anticipatory bail which was prayed for, which
even otherwise could have been granted by the Sessions
Court only. What was sought before the magistrate by the
investigating agency was the transit remand and what was
prayed by the applicant was the transit bail and am not an
anticipatory bail.
17. As regards the judgments relied upon by the
counsel for the applicant in the case of Dhanraj Asawani
(supra), the principal question in the aforesaid case was
whether the anticipatory bail application under Section 438
of Cr.P.C. was maintainable at the instance of the accused
while he was already in judicial custody with his
involvement in a different case. In the present case, only one
crime is involved, in which the applicant was already
arrested; therefore, it cannot be said that the applicant was
in judicial custody in connection with his involvement in
other cases.
18. The law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court and
relied upon by the counsel for the applicant in cases of
Siddharam Mhetre, Gurbaksh Singh Sibba, and Sushila
Aggarwal deals with the anticipatory bail. Though these
judgements speak about protection of liberty against arrest,
but presupposes absence of arrest.
14 66 aba28.26.odt
19. No doubt, the provision for the grant of
anticipatory bail was incorporated with a view to
recognising the importance of public liberty. Still, at the
same time, it cannot be ignored that a person can be
deprived of his personal liberty by the due process
established by law. The arrest of an accused in a cognisable
offence at the instance of the police would not permit him to
take assistance of Section 438 of Cr.P.C. The transit bail will
not undo the arrest made by the police.
20. The plain literal interpretation of Section 438 of
the Cr.P.C. and Section 482 of the BNSS of not applying
these provisions to the arrested accused cannot be said to
produce a manifestly unjust result. Thus, even the judgment
cited by learned counsel for the applicant in the case of
Commissioner of Income Tax, Bangalore, vs. JH Gotla,
Yadagiri (supra) would be of little assistance.
21. Coming to the case of Gautam Navlakha (supra),
suffice it to say that said judgment also does not deal with
the maintainability of anticipatory bail.
22. Regarding the judgments cited by learned Senior
Counsel and the Public Prosecutor, it can be said that in the
case of the Directorate of Enforcement Vs. Deepak Mahajan
(supra) Hon’ble Apex Court has observed as under “
“49. While interpreting the expression ‘in custody’ within
the meaning of Section 439 CrPC, Krishna Iyer, J. speaking
for the Bench in Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram
Kharote18 observed that: (SCC p. 563, para 9)
15 66 aba28.26.odt“He can be in custody not merely when the police arrests
him, produces him before a Magistrate and gets a remand
to judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in
judicial custody when he surrenders before the court and
submits to its directions.”
23. In the case of Sundeep Kumar Bafna (supra) also
the Hon’ble Apex Court has clarified the meaning of
‘custody’.
24. Thus, by relying upon the aforesaid judgment, the
learned Public Prosecutor has contended that the applicant
is in the ‘constructive custody’ and has already submitted to
the jurisdiction of the magistrate’s court and had given an
undertaking that he would appear before the jurisdictional
court at Chandrapur, which fact disentitles the applicant
from claiming the anticipatory bail.
25. The observations made in the case of Gautam
Navlakhani (supra) are apt for answering the issue raised
and the same is reproduced as under:
“173. On the other hand, Article 21 of the Constitution
of India, provides that no person shall be deprived of
his life or personal liberty except in accordance with
the procedure prescribed by law. This Article, creates a
fundamental right, which cannot be waived.
Moreover, unlike the persons, who apparently
underwent house arrest on the basis of the offer made
on their behalf, in the case of the appellant, even prior
to the order dated 29.8.2018, the High Court had
ordered house arrest, which constituted house arrest.
The appellant was an accused in an FIR invoking
cognizable offences. He stood arrested by a police
officer. He was produced before a Magistrate. A transit
16 66 aba28.26.odtremand, which was a remand under Section 167, was
passed. Police custody followed. The High Court
ordered that the appellant be kept in house arrest. The
setting aside of the order of transit remand will not
wipe out the police custody or the house arrest. We
agree that illegality in order of the CMM, Saket, will
not erase the deprivation of liberty. But other aspects
already discussed militate against the order being
treated as passed purportedly under Section 167.
There can be no quarrel with the proposition that a
court cannot remand a person unless the court is
authorised to do so by law. However, we are in this
case not sitting appeal over the legality of the house
arrest. But we are here to find whether the house
arrest fell under Section 167. We are of the view, that
in the facts of this case, the house arrest was not
ordered purporting to be under Section 167. It cannot
be treated as having being passed under Section 167.
174. There is one aspect which stands out. Custody
under Section 167 has been understood hitherto as
police custody and judicial custody, with judicial
custody being conflated to jail custody ordinarily.
175. The concept of house arrest as part of custody
under Section 167 has not engaged the courts
including this Court. However, when the issue has
come into focus, and noticing its ingredients we have
formed the view that it involves custody which falls
under Section 167.
176. We observe that under Section 167 in
appropriate cases it will be open to courts to order
house arrest. As to its employment, without being
exhaustive, we may indicate criteria like age, health
condition and the antecedents of the accused, the
nature of the crime, the need for other forms of
custody and the ability to enforce the terms of the
house arrest. We would also indicate under Section
309 also that judicial custody being custody ordered,
17 66 aba28.26.odtsubject to following the criteria, the courts will be free
to employ it in deserving and suitable cases.”
26. In that view of the matter, since the applicant was
already arrested and was produced before the Magistrate,
the present application would not be maintainable.
27. Therefore, the question is answered as “An
application for anticipatory bail is not maintainable once an
arrest is effected, irrespective of the grant of transit bail.”
28. Hence, the application is rejected, as not
maintainable.
(Rajnish R. Vyas, J.)
Wagh