Chattisgarh High Court
Deepchand Komre vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 29 April, 2026
Author: Ramesh Sinha
Bench: Ramesh Sinha
1
MANPREET
2026:CGHC:19835-DB
KAUR
Digitally signed
by MANPREET
KAUR
NAFR
Date: 2026.04.29
17:50:36 +0530
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
CRA No. 624 of 2022
1 - Deepchand Komre S/o Ashok Komre Aged About 24 Years R/o
Rewadih, Ward No. 21, Milan Chowk, Police Station Lalbag, District
Rajnandgaon Chhattisgarh
2 - Doman Thakur S/o Nakul Thakur Aged About 23 Years R/o Rewadih,
Ward No. 21, Milan Chowk, Police Station Lalbag, District Rajnandgaon
Chhattisgarh
... Appellant(s)
versus
State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Arakshi Kendra Lalbag, District
Rajnandgaon Chhattisgarh
... Respondent(s)
For Appellant(s) : Mr. S.C. Verma, Sr. Adv along with Mr. M.L.
Sahu and Mr. Naqeeb, Advocates
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Ashish Shukla, Add. A.G.
Hon’ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Hon’ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge
Judgment on Board
Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
29.04.2026
1. The present appeal is listed today for final hearing. Further,
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learned counsel for the appellants submits that though the
appellant is on bail, it is wrongly mentioned in the cause-list that
the appellants are on jail. However, considering the fact that
counsel for the appellants are ready and willing to argue the
matter finally, we proceed to hear the same.
2. The present appeal is filed under Section 374(2) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, ‘Cr.P.C.’) directed against the
impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated
09.02.2022 passed by learned First Additional Additional Sessions
Judge, Rajnandgaon (C.G.) in Sessions Case No.11/2019,
whereby the learned trial Court has convicted the appellants for
the offence punishable under Sections 302/34 of the Indian Penal
Code, 1860 (for short, ‘IPC‘) and sentenced to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for life and fine of Rs.10,000/- each, in default of
payment of fine amount, additional rigorous imprisonment for six
months to each of them.
3. The prosecution case, in brief, is that on 08.11.2018, the
complainant, Lokesh Yadav, lodged a report at Police Station
Lalbag stating that at about 9:00 PM on the said date, he and his
brother, the deceased Domendra Yadav, had taken dinner
together. Thereafter, while the complainant was watching
television, the deceased informed his mother, Surajbai, that he
was going out to consume gutkha and left the house. It is further
alleged that shortly thereafter, one Evan Yadav, a neighbour,
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came to the complainant and informed him that the deceased was
being assaulted. Upon receiving such information, the
complainant rushed towards the place of occurrence. On reaching
there, he allegedly saw his sister Tulsi Yadav attempting to
intervene, while the accused persons, namely Monu Patoti and
Deepchandra, were assaulting the deceased. The complainant
has further stated that when he attempted to intervene, he too
was pushed and knocked down by the accused persons. It is
alleged that by the time he reached near the deceased, the
accused had already inflicted fatal injuries upon him by means of
a stick and a sharp-edged weapon, including a knife, and
thereafter fled from the spot. The deceased was found lying on
the roadside in an injured condition, bleeding profusely, having
sustained injuries behind the left ear, on the waist, and on the
back. With the assistance of a passerby, the injured was taken to
the District Hospital, Rajnandgaon, where he succumbed to his
injuries during treatment.
4. On the basis of the aforesaid information, an inquest proceeding
(Ex.P-13) was initiated. Thereafter, First Information Report (Ex.P-
14) was registered at Police Station Lalbag vide Crime No.
436/2018 for the offence punishable under Section 302/34 of the
Indian Penal Code.
5. The dead body of the deceased was subjected to postmortem
examination and the report thereof (Ex.P-23A) was obtained.
4
During the course of investigation, viscera of the deceased was
seized (Ex.P-31). Certain articles, including plain cloth pieces,
were seized under seizure memo (Ex.P-32). Blood-stained soil
and plain soil were seized from near the place of occurrence at
the instance of the complainant (Ex.P-6). A bamboo stick allegedly
used in the commission of the offence was seized under seizure
memo (Ex.P-8). The accused persons were taken into custody
and their memorandum statements (Ex.P-4 and Ex.P-5) were
recorded. Pursuant thereto, a bamboo stick allegedly bearing
bloodstains was seized at the instance of accused Deepchand
(Ex.P-7). Blood-stained clothes allegedly worn by the accused
persons at the time of the incident were also seized under seizure
memos (Ex.P-8 and Ex.P-9). The seized articles were sent for
chemical examination to the Forensic Science Laboratory, Raipur,
and reports (Ex.P-37 and Ex.P-38) were obtained. Site maps of
the place of occurrence were prepared (Ex.P-15 and Ex.P-23).
Statements of witnesses were recorded under Section 161 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure.
6. Upon completion of investigation, charge-sheet was filed against
the accused persons for the offence punishable under Section
302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code before the
Court of Sessions, Rajnandgaon.
7. The case, upon committal, was tried by the learned Sessions
Court. Charges under Section 302/34 IPC were framed against
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the accused persons. The contents of the charges were read over
and explained to them, to which they pleaded not guilty and
claimed to be tried.
8. During trial, the prosecution examined its witnesses and exhibited
documents in support of its case. The statements of the accused
persons were recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, wherein they denied the incriminating circumstances
appearing against them.
9. The accused persons did not adduce any evidence in their
defence
10. The trial Court after appreciating oral and documentary evidence
available on record, by its judgment dated 09.02.2022, convicted
and sentenced the accused/appellants as mentioned in opening
paragraph of this judgment, against which, the present appeall
has been preferred by the accused/appellants under Section
374(2) of Cr.P.C.
11. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants would submit, in a
comprehensive and forceful manner, that the impugned judgment
of conviction and sentence passed by the learned trial Court is
wholly unsustainable in law as well as on facts, being based on
conjectures, surmises, and an erroneous appreciation of evidence
on record. It is contended that the entire case of the prosecution
rests on circumstantial evidence, yet the essential legal
requirement of establishing a complete and unbroken chain of
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circumstances has not been fulfilled. The so-called “last seen”
evidence, which forms the foundation of the prosecution case, is
inherently weak and unreliable inasmuch as the key witnesses,
namely PW-6 (Tulsi Yadav) and PW-9 (Divya Yadav), have
themselves admitted in their cross-examination that they did not
witness the actual assault and had left the place of occurrence
prior to the alleged infliction of fatal injuries. Their statements, as
reflected in the record, do not establish proximity of time or
continuity of events so as to rule out the possibility of intervention
by a third person. It is further submitted that there exists a clear
and unexplained time gap between the alleged “last seen”
circumstance and the death of the deceased, thereby creating a
serious lacuna in the prosecution story. Learned counsel would
further argue that both these witnesses are closely related to the
deceased and admittedly on inimical terms with the accused, and
in absence of any independent corroboration, their testimonies
ought to have been scrutinized with greater caution, which the
learned trial Court has failed to do. The contradictions and
omissions in their depositions, when juxtaposed with their
previous statements recorded during investigation, materially
affect their credibility and render their evidence unreliable,
incapable of forming the basis of conviction.
12. It is further vehemently contended that the alleged recovery of
incriminating articles, including the weapon of offence and blood-
stained clothes, is highly doubtful and legally untenable, as the
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mandatory requirements under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence
Act have not been complied with. In this regard, learned counsel
would draw specific attention to the memorandum statements
(Ex.P-4 and Ex.P-5) and seizure memos (Ex.P-7, Ex.P-8, and
Ex.P-9), which are sought to be relied upon by the prosecution,
and submit that the same stand seriously impeached by the
testimony of PW-10 (Rupesh Yadav), an independent witness to
these proceedings. The said witness has categorically denied that
any memorandum statement was recorded in his presence or that
any recovery was effected before him, and has further admitted
that his signatures on the said exhibits were obtained at the police
station without explaining the contents thereof. This renders the
alleged discovery and seizure wholly unreliable. It is also pointed
out that the seizure of blood-stained soil vide Ex.P-6 and the
alleged recovery of articles lack proper evidentiary sanctity in
absence of credible independent corroboration. Learned counsel
would further submit that though the prosecution has relied upon
the Forensic Science Laboratory reports (Ex.P-37 and Ex.P-38),
the same do not conclusively connect the appellants with the
crime, as there is no evidence on record establishing the blood
group of the deceased or correlating it with the stains found on the
seized articles. In absence of such serological linkage and in light
of the doubtful recovery, the FSL reports lose their probative
value. It is further contended that the alleged motive of prior
enmity, as sought to be projected by the prosecution, is vague
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and not substantiated by cogent evidence on record, and in any
case, motive alone cannot sustain conviction in absence of
reliable substantive evidence. Therefore, it is submitted that the
prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt,
and the appellants are entitled to be acquitted by extending the
benefit of doubt.
13. Per contra, learned State counsel would support the impugned
judgment and submit that the learned trial Court has rightly
appreciated the oral as well as documentary evidence available
on record in its proper perspective, and no interference is
warranted in appellate jurisdiction. It is contended that the
prosecution has successfully established a complete chain of
circumstances pointing unerringly towards the guilt of the
appellants. The “last seen” circumstance stands proved from the
consistent testimonies of PW-6 (Tulsi Yadav) and PW-9 (Divya
Yadav), who have categorically stated that the deceased was last
seen in the company of the accused persons immediately prior to
the incident. It is further submitted that the medical evidence, as
reflected from the postmortem report (Ex.P-23) and the deposition
of PW-12 (Dr. Nitin Barmate), clearly establishes that the death
was homicidal in nature and the injuries sustained by the
deceased were consistent with the weapons allegedly used in the
commission of the offence. Learned State counsel would further
contend that the memorandum statements of the accused (Ex.P-4
and Ex.P-5) have led to the recovery of incriminating articles,
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including the weapon of offence and blood-stained clothes, as
evidenced by seizure memos (Ex.P-7, Ex.P-8, and Ex.P-9), which
have been duly proved by the investigating officer (PW-16).
Merely because one of the witnesses, namely PW-10 (Rupesh
Yadav), has not fully supported the prosecution case, the entire
recovery cannot be discarded when it stands corroborated by
official witnesses and documentary evidence. It is also submitted
that the FSL reports (Ex.P-37 and Ex.P-38) confirm the presence
of human blood on the seized articles, which lends further
corroboration to the prosecution case. The existence of prior
enmity between the parties has also been established on record,
thereby providing a strong motive for the commission of the
offence. It is thus argued that minor contradictions or
discrepancies in the testimonies of witnesses are natural and do
not go to the root of the matter, and the learned trial Court has
rightly recorded conviction upon proper appreciation of evidence,
which calls for no interference.
14. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties,
considered their rival submissions made hereinabove and also
went through the records with utmost circumspection.
15. The first question for consideration would be, whether death
of deceased was homicidal in nature ?
16. The trial Court after appreciating oral as well as documentary
evidence available on record, particularly, relying upon the
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statement of Dr. Nitin Barmate (PW-12), who conducted
postmortem over the dead body of the deceased and given its
report vide Ex.P/23, has opined that on examination, he has found
following injuries over dead body:-
“A. External Injuries
1. Scratch mark measuring 2 × 0.6 cm on the
right side of the head.
2. Lacerated wound measuring 1.5 × 0.6 cm,
muscle deep, on the right side of the head.
3. Incised wound measuring 2 × 0.5 cm,
muscle deep, over the left eyebrow and left
periorbital region (with stitches).
4. Stitched wound measuring 0.5 cm on the
left side of the head.
5. Incised wound measuring 7 × 0.2 cm,
muscle deep.
6. Lacerated wound measuring 3 × 0.7 cm,
muscle deep, with stitches, on the right
occipital region.
7. Lacerated wound measuring 1 × 3 cm,
muscle deep, on the right occipital region.
8. Lacerated wound measuring 1.5 × 0.6 cm
on the left occipital region.
9. Lacerated wound measuring 7 × 0.4 cm,
deep to flesh.
10. Incised wound measuring 7 × 0.4 cm,
deep to flesh, below the left ear.
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11. Three abrasions measuring:
* 7 × 0.3 cm
* 3 × 0.4 cm
* 3 × 1.5 cm
(all on the left side of the face)
12. Linear abrasion measuring 6 × 0.1 cm on
the right side of the face.
13. Lacerated wound measuring 1 × 0.5 cm,
deep to flesh, on the left maxillary region.
14. Crescent-shaped abrasion measuring 0.7
× 0.1 cm on the right side of the face.
15. Abrasion measuring 7 × 4 cm on the right
side of the neck.
16. Linear abrasion measuring 0.2 cm on the
neck region.
17. Stab wound measuring 3 × 0.6 cm, cavity
deep, on the left side of the abdomen.
18. Stab wound measuring 4 × 0.8 cm, with
stitches, on the left side of the abdomen.
19. Incised wound measuring 1.2 × 0.3 cm,
muscle deep, with stitches, on the right side
of the back.
20. Abrasion measuring 4 × 3 cm on the right
gluteal region.
21. Abrasion measuring 1.6 × 1 cm on the
right elbow.
22. Abrasion measuring 0.5 × 0.3 cm on the
12left side of the abdomen.
B. Internal Injuries
23. Contusion measuring 5 × 4 cm on the
right frontal region of the head (inner scalp).
24. Contusion measuring 7 × 5 cm on the
occipital region of the head (inner scalp).
25. Subarachnoid haemorrhage present in
the brain.
26. Swelling (edema) in brain tissues.
27. Stab injury over abdominal membrane
and peritoneum.
28. Approximately 1.5 litres of blood present
in the abdominal cavity.
29. Stab injuries at two places on intestinal
membrane and small intestine.”
The medical expert has categorically opined that the injuries
sustained by the deceased, particularly the head injuries and
abdominal stab wounds, were sufficient in the ordinary course of
nature to cause death. He further opined that the cause of death
was attributable to the combined effect of head injury and
abdominal stab wounds, and that the same were homicidal in
nature.
17. In view of the consistent, cogent, and reliable medical evidence,
duly corroborated by documentary evidence on record, this Court
finds no infirmity in the finding recorded by the learned trial Court
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that the death of the deceased Domendra Yadav was homicidal in
nature.
18. The next question for consideration is whether the prosecution
has been able to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, that the
accused persons are the authors of the crime and shared
common intention in causing the death of the deceased?
19. Keeping the aforesaid factual matrix in view, this Court considers
it appropriate to examine the present case on the touchstone of
settled principles governing cases based on circumstantial
evidence, namely, whether the chain of circumstances relied upon
by the prosecution is so complete and cogent that it unerringly
points towards the guilt of the accused and rules out every
hypothesis consistent with their innocence.
20. The circumstances relied upon by the prosecution may broadly be
classified as follows:
(i) The deceased was allegedly last seen in the company of
the accused.
(ii) The deceased was thereafter found in an injured condition
and later succumbed to injuries.
(iii) Recovery of weapons and blood-stained articles, allegedly
at the instance of the accused.
(iv) Existence of motive on account of prior enmity.
21. It is, therefore, incumbent upon this Court to examine whether
each of the aforesaid circumstances has been proved beyond
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reasonable doubt and whether they form a complete chain
pointing only towards the guilt of the accused.
22. The prosecution has attempted to establish the “last seen” theory
primarily through the testimonies of PW-6 i.e., Tulsi Yadav and
PW-9 i.e., Divya Yadav, projecting them as eyewitnesses to the
incident.
23. Tulsi Yadav (PW-6), who is the sister of the deceased, in her
examination-in-chief, has stated that on the date of the incident,
she saw the accused persons dragging her brother towards the
roadside and pushing him. She further deposed that when she
attempted to intervene, she was prevented by the accused
persons and sustained an injury.
24. However, when her testimony is subjected to careful scrutiny,
particularly in light of her cross-examination, it becomes evident
that her version does not inspire confidence. She has
categorically admitted that she did not witness the actual assault
upon the deceased. She has further stated that she only saw the
deceased being dragged and thrown to the ground.
25. It is also admitted by this witness that after witnessing the said
act, she immediately left the spot to call her mother and brother,
and when she returned, the accused persons were no longer
present at the place of occurrence. This admission clearly
establishes that she was not present at the time when the fatal
injuries were allegedly inflicted.
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26. More importantly, PW-6 has unequivocally admitted that she did
not see how the deceased sustained injuries, nor did the
deceased disclose to her the identity of the assailants. Such
admissions go to the root of the prosecution case and materially
weaken her credibility as an eyewitness.
27. It is further noteworthy that the place of occurrence was a public
area where, as per her own admission, several persons were
present. However, no independent witness from the locality has
been examined to corroborate her version, which casts an
additional doubt on the prosecution story.
28. Thus, the testimony of PW-6, when read in its entirety, falls short
of establishing the direct involvement of the accused in causing
the fatal injuries to the deceased. At best, her evidence creates a
suspicion, but it is well-settled that suspicion, however strong,
cannot take the place of proof.
29. Divya Yadav (PW-9) has also been projected as an eyewitness by
the prosecution. In her examination-in-chief, she has attempted to
support the prosecution case by stating that the accused persons
dragged the deceased and assaulted him with a knife and stick.
30. However, her testimony suffers from serious infirmities when
tested on the anvil of cross-examination. She has admitted that
when she reached the place of occurrence, the deceased was
already lying in an injured condition and the accused persons
were not present there.
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31. She has further admitted that she did not actually witness the
assault being committed upon the deceased. She has also stated
that she does not know what transpired between the time the
deceased left his house and when he was found injured, thereby
creating a significant gap in the prosecution case.
32. The witness has also admitted that she was informed by the
police regarding the involvement of the accused persons, which
raises a serious doubt as to whether her testimony is based on
her own observation or influenced by external inputs.
33. Additionally, this witness has candidly admitted that her family
does not share cordial relations with the accused persons and
that she desires punishment for them. Such admissions clearly
indicate the possibility of bias and interested testimony, which
requires careful scrutiny and corroboration.
34. There are also material contradictions between her police
statement and her deposition before the Court, particularly with
regard to the place of occurrence and the manner of incident,
which further erodes her credibility.
35. A comparative analysis of the testimonies of PW-6 and PW-9
reveals that both witnesses are inconsistent not only with each
other but also within their own statements on material particulars.
36. While both have attempted to implicate the accused in their
examination-in-chief, their cross-examination clearly establishes
17
that neither of them has witnessed the actual infliction of injuries
upon the deceased.
37. Both witnesses admit that they left the spot and returned later, by
which time the accused persons were no longer present. This
creates a crucial break in the chain of events and renders the
prosecution version incomplete.
38. Furthermore, the existence of prior enmity and strained relations
between the families of the witnesses and the accused introduces
the possibility of false implication, which cannot be ruled out in the
absence of independent corroboration.
39. In a case resting primarily on ocular evidence, such material
inconsistencies and admissions assume great significance and
make it unsafe to rely upon such testimonies for recording a
conviction.
40. Thus, at best, the prosecution has been able to show that the
accused were allegedly seen with the deceased at some point
prior to the incident. However, it is well settled that “last seen”
evidence by itself is a weak piece of evidence, unless the time
gap between the last seen and the death is so small that the
possibility of intervention by a third person is completely ruled out.
41. In the present case, there exists a clear gap in the chain of
events, as neither witness has seen the actual occurrence of
assault, nor has the prosecution been able to establish the exact
18
time when the fatal injuries were inflicted.
42. In absence of a complete and continuous chain, the “last seen”
circumstance cannot be treated as conclusive proof of guilt.
43. The prosecution has further relied upon the recovery of a bamboo
stick and alleged blood-stained clothes of the accused pursuant to
their memorandum statements.
44. Though the investigating officer (PW-16) has supported the
recovery, it is significant to note that the prosecution has
examined Rupesh Yadav (PW-10) as a witness to the
memorandum statements and seizure proceedings, with a view to
lend corroboration to the alleged recovery of incriminating articles
at the instance of the accused persons.
45. In his examination-in-chief, this witness has attempted to support
the prosecution case to a limited extent by stating that certain
seizures, including that of a knife and other articles, took place in
his presence. However, a closer scrutiny of his testimony reveals
that such support is illusory and not substantive in nature.
46. At the outset, it is significant to note that this witness has
categorically stated that he had no direct knowledge of the
incident, and that he had merely “heard” about the alleged murder
of the deceased. Thus, his testimony is not relevant insofar as the
occurrence of the incident is concerned.
47. More importantly, this witness has made material admissions in
19
his cross-examination, which strike at the very root of the
prosecution case relating to recovery and memorandum:
(i) He has unequivocally admitted that no incident took place
in his presence.
(ii) He has further stated that he was called by his father and
thereafter taken by the police, indicating that he was not an
independent witness voluntarily present at the scene.
(iii) He has clearly admitted that he signed all documents at
the instance of the police.
(iv) He has candidly stated that he did not read the
documents and that the police did not explain their contents
to him.
(v) He has admitted that no memorandum statement of the
accused was recorded in his presence.
(vi) He has further admitted that no seizure of clothes of the
accused was effected in his presence.
(vii) He has also stated that the alleged knife was produced
by a juvenile (Oman Padauti) and not by the present accused
persons.
48. These admissions are of crucial importance as they completely
demolish the evidentiary value of the alleged memorandum and
seizure proceedings. The very foundation of recovery under
Section 27 of the Evidence Act requires that the discovery be
20
made pursuant to information given by the accused in the
presence of witnesses. In the present case, PW-10 has
specifically denied the recording of such memorandum in his
presence, thereby rendering the recovery highly doubtful.
49. Furthermore, the witness has admitted that sticks are commonly
available in every household and are lying scattered in the village,
thereby weakening the prosecution’s attempt to link the seized
bamboo stick exclusively with the offence.
50. The conduct of this witness, as reflected from his testimony,
indicates that he was merely a formal witness to documents
prepared by the police, without having any real participation in or
knowledge of the alleged recovery process.
51. In such circumstances, the evidentiary value of seizure memos
(Ex.P-7, Ex.P-8, Ex.P-9) and memorandum statements (Ex.P-4,
Ex.P-5) stands seriously impaired, as one of the key witnesses to
these documents has not supported the prosecution in material
particulars.
52. It is a settled principle of law that when independent witnesses to
recovery turn hostile or fail to support the prosecution, the Court
must exercise greater caution in relying upon such evidence,
especially when the case is otherwise based on circumstantial
evidence.
53. In the present case, the prosecution has failed to provide any
21
satisfactory explanation for such serious contradictions in the
testimony of PW-10, nor has it produced any other reliable
independent evidence to conclusively prove the recovery.
54. In view of the aforesaid analysis, this Court finds that the alleged
recovery of weapons and blood-stained articles at the instance of
the accused persons is not proved in a reliable and convincing
manner.
55. So far as the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) report (Ex.P-37
and Ex.P-38) is concerned, the prosecution has sought to rely
upon the same to establish that human blood was found on the
alleged weapons of offence and on the clothes of the accused
persons.
56. A careful perusal of the FSL report indicates that although human
blood has been detected on certain seized articles, including the
knife, bamboo stick, and clothes allegedly belonging to the
accused, the report does not conclusively establish a direct nexus
between the said blood stains and the deceased.
57. It is significant to note that the prosecution has failed to establish
the blood group of the deceased and to correlate the same with
the blood stains found on the seized articles. In absence of such
serological matching, the presence of human blood, by itself,
cannot be treated as conclusive proof connecting the accused
with the crime.
22
58. Furthermore, the evidentiary value of the FSL report is rendered
doubtful in view of the serious infirmities in the seizure and
recovery process, as discussed hereinabove, particularly in light
of the testimony of PW-10, who has not supported the prosecution
case regarding memorandum and seizure in material particulars.
59. The possibility of tampering, contamination, or improper handling
of samples cannot be ruled out, especially when the prosecution
has failed to establish an unbroken chain of custody from the time
of seizure till examination by the FSL.
60. It is also pertinent to observe that the articles allegedly seized,
such as sticks and clothes, are of a common nature and easily
accessible, and in absence of specific identification marks or
conclusive forensic linkage, the mere presence of blood stains
cannot be attributed exclusively to the offence in question.
61. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has consistently held that FSL
evidence is corroborative in nature and cannot, in isolation, form
the basis of conviction unless it is supported by reliable and
cogent primary evidence.
62. In the present case, where the ocular evidence itself is unreliable
and the recovery evidence is doubtful, the FSL report, lacking
conclusive linkage, cannot cure the inherent defects in the
prosecution case.
63. Thus, this Court is of the considered opinion that the FSL
23
evidence, as placed on record, does not conclusively connect the
accused persons with the commission of the offence, and at best
raises a suspicion, which falls short of the standard of proof
required in criminal law.
64. Accordingly, the circumstance relating to FSL evidence cannot be
said to have been proved beyond reasonable doubt and fails to
complete the chain of circumstances sought to be established by
the prosecution.
65. At this stage, pertinent decision of the Supreme Court on this
point in the matter of Balwan Singh v. State of Chhattisgarh
and another1 may be noticed herein, in which the Supreme Court
has summarized the law on this point after taking into the decision
of the Supreme Court (Constitution Bench) in the matter of
Raghav Prapanna Tripathi v. State of U.P.2. In Raghav
Prapanna Tripathi (supra), the Constitution Bench of the
Supreme Court has held that in case the prosecution needed to
prove that the bloodstains found on the earth or the weapons
were of a human origin and were of the same blood group as that
of the accused.
66. The aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court i.e. Raghav
Prapanna Tripathi (supra) was followed in Balwan Singh (supra)
in which it was observed as under:-
“23. From the aforementioned discussion, we
1 (2019) 7 SCC 781
2 AIR 1963 SC 74
24can summarise that if the recovery of
bloodstained articles is proved beyond
reasonable doubt by the prosecution, and if
the investigation was not found to be tainted,
then it may be sufficient if the prosecution
shows that the blood found on the articles is
of human origin though, even though the
blood group is not proved because of
disintegration of blood. The court will have to
come to the conclusion based on the facts
and circumstances of each case, and there
cannot be any fixed formula that the
prosecution has to prove, or need not prove,
that the blood groups match.”
67. Thereafter, the Supreme Court in Balwan Singh (supra) relying
upon the fact that the prosecution has failed to prove that the
blood was of human origin declined to rely upon the aspect of
recovery of the weapons from the accused therein. It was
observed as under:-
“24. In the instant case, then, we could have
placed some reliance on the recovery, had the
prosecution at least proved that the blood was
of human origin. As observed supra, while
discussing the evidence of PWs 9 and 16, the
prosecution has tried to concoct the case from
stage to stage. Hence, in the absence of
positive material indicating that the stained
blood was of human origin and of the same
blood group as that of the accused, it would
be difficult for the Court to rely upon the
25aspect of recovery of the weapons and tabbal,
and such recovery does not help the case of
the prosecution.”
68. In the present case, the first circumstance sought to be
established by the prosecution is the “last seen” theory. However,
as discussed hereinabove, the testimonies of PW-6 (Tulsi Yadav)
and PW-9 (Divya Yadav), on which this circumstance is founded,
do not inspire confidence. Both the witnesses have categorically
admitted in their cross-examination that they did not witness the
actual assault upon the deceased. Their presence at the scene is
intermittent, and there exists a clear gap between the point when
the deceased was allegedly seen with the accused and the time
when he was found injured. In absence of proximity of time and
continuity of events, the “last seen” theory loses its evidentiary
significance and cannot be treated as a conclusive circumstance.
69. The second circumstance relates to the recovery of alleged
weapons of offence and blood-stained clothes at the instance of
the accused. As already discussed, the prosecution has failed to
prove the memorandum and seizure proceedings in accordance
with law. The independent witness to such recovery, PW-10
(Rupesh Yadav), has not supported the prosecution case and has
made categorical admissions that no memorandum was recorded
in his presence and that he had signed documents at the instance
of the police without knowledge of their contents. Such evidence
renders the recovery doubtful and unsafe to rely upon.
26
70. The third circumstance pertains to the FSL report. Though human
blood has been detected on certain seized articles, the
prosecution has failed to establish the blood group of the
deceased and correlate the same with the stains found on the
alleged articles. In absence of such scientific linkage and in view
of doubtful recovery, the FSL report does not conclusively connect
the accused with the crime.
71. The prosecution has also attempted to establish motive on the
basis of alleged prior enmity. However, the evidence in this regard
is vague, inconsistent, and not of such a nature as to conclusively
establish a strong motive sufficient to drive the accused to commit
the alleged offence. In any case, motive alone, in absence of
reliable substantive evidence, cannot sustain a conviction.
72. It is a settled principle of criminal law that in a case based on
circumstantial evidence, each circumstance must be proved
beyond reasonable doubt, and all such circumstances must form
a chain so complete that it leaves no reasonable ground for a
conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused. If any
link in the chain is found to be missing or doubtful, the benefit
thereof must go to the accused.
70. In the present case, the prosecution has failed to establish:
(i) a reliable “last seen” circumstance,
(ii) a trustworthy recovery of incriminating articles,
(iii) a conclusive forensic link, and
27
(iv) a cogent and compelling motive.
73. Thus, the chain of circumstances is not only incomplete but also
suffers from serious infirmities, contradictions, and gaps.
74. The learned trial Court, while recording conviction, appears to
have proceeded on assumptions and presumptions not supported
by reliable evidence. It has failed to properly appreciate the
material contradictions in the testimonies of key witnesses and
has overlooked the legal requirements governing cases based on
circumstantial evidence. The findings recorded by the trial Court,
therefore, cannot be sustained in the eyes of law.
75. It is trite that suspicion, however grave, cannot take the place of
proof. The prosecution is required to stand on its own legs and
prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The benefit of every
reasonable doubt must necessarily go in favour of the accused.
76. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the considered
opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove the charge under
Section 302/34 IPC against the appellants beyond reasonable
doubt. The appellants are, therefore, entitled to the benefit of
doubt.
77. Consequently, the appeal deserves to be and is hereby allowed.
78. The impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence
dated 09.02.2022 passed by the learned Sessions Court in
Sessions Case No. 11/2019 is hereby set aside.
28
79. The appellants are acquitted of the charges under Section 302/34
of the Indian Penal Code.
80. The appellants are reported to be on bail. They need not
surrender, however, keeping in view of the provisions of Section
437-A CrPC (now Section 481 of BNSS), their bail bonds are not
discharged at this stage and shall remain effective for a period of
six months from today along with an undertaking that in the event
of filing of Special Leave Petition against the instant judgment or
for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellants on receipt of notice
thereof shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
81. The trial Court record alongwith the copy of this judgment be sent
back immediately to the trial Court concerned for compliance and
necessary action.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha)
Judge Chief Justice
Manpreet