Jharkhand High Court
Ravi Tiwary @ Ravi Kumar Tiwary vs The State Of Jharkhand Through Chief … on 10 April, 2026
Author: Sanjay Prasad
Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad, Sanjay Prasad
2026:JHHC:10475-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
W.P.(Cr)(D.B.) No.69 of 2026
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Ravi Tiwary @ Ravi Kumar Tiwary, son of aged about 26 years, son of
Ramakant Tiwari, R/o village Pachpadwa, PO and PS: Garhwa, District-
Garhwa, Jharkhand. ... ...Petitioner
Versus
1.The State of Jharkhand through Chief Secretary, having office at –
Project Building, PO: Dhurwa, PS: Jagarnathpur, District: Ranchi
2. Additional Secretary, Department of Home, Prison and Disaster
Management, Government of Jharkhand, having office at Project
Bhawan, PO: Dhurwa, PS: Jagarnathpur, District Ranchi.
3. The District Magistrate cum Deputy Commissioner, Garhwa, having
office at Garhwa DC Office, Garhwa, PO and PS:Garhwa, District
Garhwa.
4. The Superintendent of Police, having office at Garhwa SP Office,
Garhwa, PO and PS: Garhwa, District Garhwa.
5. The Sub-Divisional Police Officer, Garhwa, having office at Garhwa
SDPO, Garhwa, PO and PS: Garhwa, District Garhwa.
……. Respondents
—–
CORAM:HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY PRASAD
——-
For the Petitioners(s) : Mr. Sheo Kumar Singh, Advocate
For the Respondent(s): Mr. Sachin Kumar, AAG-II
Mr. Srikant Swaroop, AC to AAG-II
——
C.A.V.ON: 19.3.2026 PRONOUNCED ON:10/04/2026
1. The present writ petition has been filed under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India seeking following reliefs:
“a. In the nature of Certiorari for quashing order dated 07.11.2025
in case no. 03/2025 passed by the District Magistrate-cum- Deputy
Commissioner, Garhwa, whereby the petitioner was put under
preventive detention in terms of Section 12(1) and 12(2) of the
Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002.
b. The petitioner has also challenged the memo no.
5/CCA/01/62/2025/460/CCA/Ranchi by order dated 22.12.2025
passed by the Additional Secretary, Department of Home, Prisons
and Disaster Management, Government of Jharkhand, whereby and
whereunder the order of preventive detention passed under section
12 of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002, in order dated1
2026:JHHC:10475-DB07.11.2025 in case no. 03/2025 passed by the District Magistrate-
cum- Deputy Commissioner, Garhwa has been confirmed.
2. During the pendency of the instant writ petition, memo no.
5/CCA/01/62/2025-13/CCA/Ranchi dated 30.01.2026 was passed by
the Additional Secretary, Department of Home, Prisons and Disaster
Management, Government of Jharkhand by which the detention has
been extended from 07.02.2026 to 06.05.2026 which has also been
challenged by filing interlocutory application being I.A. No.2271 of
2026 seeking amendment in the writ petition, in the pleading and
prayer portion thereof.
3. The said interlocutory application was allowed vide order dated
17.02.2026.The amended writ petition has also been filed and kept on
record.The counter affidavit to the amended writ petition has also
been filed.
Factual Matrix:
4. The brief facts of the case as per pleadings made in the present writ
petition are as under:
(i) On 26.09.2025 in-charge, Garhwa Police Station got
information that harden criminal Ravi Tiwari @ Ravi Kumar
Tiwari who is in judicial custody in Mandal Jail, Garhwa, in
connection with Garhwa PS case no. 379/2025 is using his
henchman for threatening in the town that after release from
jail, he will create panic in the town. On this information, a
sanha bearing No.67 of 2025 was registered. Thereafter, other
2
2026:JHHC:10475-DBofficers have also got information about henchmen in town for
threatening that after release from jail he will be spread panic.
(ii) By memo no. 2810 dated 24.10.2025, the Sub-Divisional
Police Officer, Garhwa has recommended for taking action
against the petitioner under Sections 12(1) and 12(2) of the
Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002(hereinafter referred to
Act of 2002) as there is possibility of threatening to the
witnesses of cases against the petitioner.
(iii) By memo no. 1245 dated 25.10.2025 the Superintendent of
Police, Garhwa has recommended for taking action against the
petitioner under Section 12(1) and 12(2) of the Jharkhand
Control of Crimes Act, 2002 as there will be difficulty to
maintain law and order and peace in public if the petitioner is
released from jail.
(iv) On the basis of recommendation of the respondent nos. 4 and
5, the respondent no. 3 has framed charge against the
petitioner in case no. 03/2025, under Section 12(2) of the
Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002, wherein 11 criminal
cases and 6 sanha have been mentioned, which were registered
against the petitioner and there is possibility of violation of
public peace and law and order if the petitioner will be
released from jail.
(v) Thereafter, detention order dated 07.11.2005 in case no.
03/2025, was passed by the respondent no.3 against the
detenu/petitioner under section 12(2) of the Jharkhand Control
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of Crimes Act, 2002, wherein petitioner was ordered to be
detained for three months.
(vi) Then, by memo no. 5/CCA/01/62/2025/460/CCA/Ranchi
dated 22.12.2025 passed by the Additional Secretary,
Department of Home, Prisons and Disaster Management,
Government of Jharkhand, whereby and whereunder the
orderdated 07.11.2025 passed by the District Magistrate-cum-
Deputy Commissioner, Garhwa, under section 12 of the
Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002, has been confirmed
and petitioner was ordered to be detained for three months i.e.
07.11.2025 to 06.02.2026.
(vii)By memo no. 5/CCA/01/62/2025-13/CCA/Ranchi dated
30.01.2026 passed by the Additional Secretary, Department of
Home, Prisons and Disaster Management, Government of
Jharkhand, detention of the petitioner was further extended from
07.02.2026 to 06.05.2026.
Submission on behalf of the writ petitioner:
5. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has taken
the following grounds in assailing the impugned orders:
(i) It has been contended that petitioner has been illegally
detained as no case is made out to detain the petitioner under
the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act. Petitioner is neither a
habitual offender nor an anti-social element as defined under
section 2(d) of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act.
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(ii) It is further contended that there is nothing to suggest that
the petitioner is a threat to the society and is a threat to public
order.
(iii) It is further contended that the officials of the district have
tried to convert law and order problem to that of public order
and are thus unnecessarily harassing the petitioner.
(iv) It has further been contended that out of the 11 criminal
cases mentioned in the impugned detention order,
detenue/petitioner has been acquitted in four cases and has
been enlarged on bail in six cases by the court of law. Hence,
only in i.e. Garhwa PS case no. 416/2025, the petitioner is in
judicial custody.
(v) It has been further submitted that authorities have tried to
convert law and order problem to that of public order and
hence, unnecessarily harassing the petitioner.
(vi) The learned counsel for the petitioner has further
submitted that there is difference between public order and law
and order. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of
AmeenaBegum vs. State of Telangana and Others reported in
(2023)9 SCC 587, while referring to various earlier judgments
has distinguished between law and order and public order.
(vii) The learned counsel has further relied on the judgment of
Hon’ble Apex Court delivered in case of Shaik Nazneen
versus State of Telangana and Others reported in (2023)9
SCC 633, and submitted that in the present case state may seek
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cancelation of bail instead of passing detention order against
the petitioner under the preventive detention law.
(viii) The learned counsel for the petitioner has further
submitted that so far as the Station Diary Entries (Sanhas) are
concerned, it is an admitted case that those have not been
culminated in any criminal case. Merely entry in the Station
Diary and alleging some acts, cannot be the ground to detain a
person.
(ix) The learned counsel has further submitted that if the acts
mentioned in the Station Diary Entries are criminal acts and
are cognizable in nature, then why the State has not filed any
FIR. Law provides that if cognizable offence is committed and
is brought to the knowledge of an authority, FIR should be
lodged.
6. The learned counsel, based upon the aforesaid grounds, has submitted
that the impugned orders therefore, need interference by this Court
and be quashed.
Submission on behalf of the Respondent-State:
7. Per contra, Mr. Sachin Kumar, the learned AAG-II appearing for the
respondent-State to defend the impugned orders has raised the
following grounds:
(i) It has been contended that the impugned detention order is
issued under the provision of section 12(2) of Jharkhand
Control of Crimes Act, 2002, as the petitioner is involved in
eleven criminal cases as well as six sanhas were registered
against him in police stations of Garhwa District specially for
6
2026:JHHC:10475-DBcreating threat by his henchmen among witnesses and public at
large and also to disturb the public order when he will be
releasedfrom jail and, as such, the present writ petition is not
maintainable in the law as well as on facts.
(ii) It is further contended that police records refer to 11 criminal
cases against the petitioner and acquittal in four cases do not
absolve the petitioner of his pattern of criminal conduct. The
sevenpending cases against the petitioner are as under:
i. Garhwa P.S. Case No. 253 of 2022, bail granted on
20.03.2023.
ii. Garhwa P.S. Case No. 293 of 2023, bail granted on
13.10.2025.
iii. Garhwa P.S. Case No. 368 of 2025, bail granted on
09.10.2025
iv. Garhwa P.S. Case No. 391 of 2025, bail granted on
02.12.2025
v. Garhwa P.S. Case No. 403 of 2025, bail granted on
04.12.2025
vi. Garhwa P.S. Case No. 405 of 2025, bail granted on
28.11.2025
vii. Garhwa P.S. Case No. 416 of 2025, petitioner is in
custody.
(iii) it is further submitted that initial detention of the petitioner was
from 07.11.2025 to 06.02.2026. The police reported that petitioner
and his henchman still extended threat to disturb the public order
when he will be released and for this Sanha No. 60/2026, dated
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10.01.2020 and Sanha No. 54/2026, dated 11.01.2026 was
registered requesting Respondent No. 3 to extend the period of
detention, accordingly, respondent No. 3 being satisfied with the
report and materials, recommended extension vide
05/CCA/01/62/2025-13/CCA/Ranchi dated 30.01.2026 from
07.02.2026 to 06.05.2026 under Sections 21(1) and 22 of the Act
of 2002, after review.Hence,The extension is lawful and necessary
to avert imminent public disorder.
(iv) It is stated and submitted that petitioner’s extensive criminal
record, including multiple violent offences and use of henchmen
for threats, clearly establishes him as a societal threat, warranting
preventive detention to safeguard public tranquility.
(v) It is submitted that final reports in some cases, or acquittals
granted, do not negate the pattern of the criminal activity of the
petitioner. The criminal antecedents and collected intelligence
regarding threat to disturb public order demonstrates recidivism,
justifying detention.
(vi) The petitioner qualifies as a “habitual offender” and “anti-social
element under Section 2(d) of the Act due to repeated charges
under Chapters XVI/XVII IPC (now BNS equivalents) and Arms
Act and organized intimidation. His activities habitually threaten
public order beyond individual cases.
8. The learned State counsel, based upon the aforesaid grounds, has
submitted that the impugned orders, thus, need no interference and
the present writ petition is fit to be dismissed.
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Analysis:
9. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and gone
through the pleadings made in the writ petition along with the
relevant documents annexed therewith.
10.In the backdrop of the aforesaid factual aspect the following issues
require consideration herein:
i. Whether the criminal activities of petitioner come under the purview
of definition of ”Anti-social Elements” as defined under section
2(d) of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002?
ii. Whether acquittal and grant of bail to thedetenue/petitioner in some
cases is ground for his release from the prevention detention passed
under 12(2) of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002?
iii. Whether the petitioner’s criminal history and alleged activities
threatened “public order” as stipulated in Act 2002 or simply
affected “law and order.”
Re: Issue No. (i)
11.But, before considering the first issues, the statutory provisions as
contained under the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act,2002 needs to
be referred herein.
12.The relevant provisions which require consideration herein are
Section 2(d)and Section 12 of Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act,2002.
13.”Anti-social Element” has been defined in section 2(d) of the Act of
2002, which reads hereunder as: –
” 2(d) Anti-social element” means a person who-
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(i) either by himself or as a member of or leader of a gang habitually
commits or attempts to commit or abets the commission of offences
punishable under Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of the Indian
Penal Code;or
(ii) habitually commits or abets the commission of offences under the
Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956; or
(iii) who by words or otherwise promotes or attempts to promote, on
grounds of religion, race, language, caste or community or any other
grounds whatsoever, feelings of enmity or hatred between different
religions, racial or language groups or castes or communities; or
(iv) has been found habitually passing indecent remarks to, or teasing
women or girls; or
(v)who has been convicted of an offence under sections 25,26, 27, 28 or
29 of the Arms Act of 1959.”
14.From perusal of Section 2(d) of the Jharkhand Crime Control Act of
2002, it is evident that “anti-social element” as a person who
habitually commits or abets offenses listed in Chapters XVI or XVII
of the Indian Penal Code, or certain other specific crimes. It needs to
refer herein that this definition requires a pattern of behaviour, not
isolated incidents, and aims to identify individuals whose acts cause
alarm or terror among the public, warranting preventive detention to
maintain public order.
15.It requires to refer herein that the Act of 2002 was meant to make
special provisions for the control and suppression of anti-social
elements with a view to maintenance of public order. It also needs to
refer herein that the “Law and order” problems typically affect only
individuals or small groups, whereas “public order” disruptions affect
the community’s normal functioning on a broader scale often
generating fear or anxiety among the general public.
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16.It is pertinent to mention herein that the primary element with respect
to Section 2(d)(i) seems to be the word “habitual”. It would thus mean
that a person who is frequently engaged in committing or attempting
or abating commission of an offence in terms of Chapter XVI or
Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code would be an anti-social
element. In this context, we may refer to the case of Vijay Narayan
Singh Vs. State of Bihar reported in (1984) 3 SCC 14 wherein the
word “habitually” has been sought to be enumerated in the following
manner:
“31. It is seen from Section 12 of the Act that it makes provision for the
detention of an anti-social element. If a person is not an antisocial
element, he cannot be detained under the Act. The detaining authority
should, therefore, be satisfied that the person against whom an order is
made under Section 12 of the Act is an anti-social element as defined
in Section 2(d) of the Act. Sub-clauses (ii), (iii) and (v) of Section 2(d) of
the Act which are not quite relevant for the purposes of this case may be
omitted from consideration for the present. The two other sub-clauses
which need to be examined closely are sub clauses (i) and (iv) of Section
2(d). Under sub-clause (i) of Section 2(d) of the Act, a person who either
by himself or as a member of or leader of a gang habitually commits or
attempts to commit or abets the commission of offences punishable under
Chapter XVI dealing with offences affecting the human body or Chapter
XVII dealing with offences against property, of the Penal Code, 1860 is
considered to be an anti-social element. Under subclause (iv) of Section
2(d) of the Act, a person who has been habitually passing indecent
remarks to, or teasing women or girls, is an anti-social element. In both
these sub clauses, the word “habitually” is used. The expression
“habitually” means “repeatedly” or “persistently”. It implies a thread of
continuity stringing together similar repetitive acts. Repeated, persistent
and similar, but not isolated, individual and dissimilar acts are necessary
to justify an inference of habit. It connotes frequent commission of acts or
omissions of the same kind referred to in each of the said sub clauses or
an aggregate of similar acts or omissions. This appears to be clear from
the use of the word “habitually” separately in subclause (i), sub-clause
(ii) and sub- clause (iv) of Section 2(d) and not in sub clauses (iii) and (v)
of Section 2(d). If the State Legislature had intended that a commission of
two or more acts or omissions referred to in any of the sub- clauses (i) to11
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(v) of Section 2(d) was sufficient to make a person an “anti-social
element”, the definition would have run as “Anti-social element” means
“a person who habitually is. ..”. As Section 2(d) of the Act now stands,
whereas under sub-clause (iii) or sub-clause (v) of Section 2(d) a single
act or omission referred to in them may be enough to treat the person
concerned as an ‘antisocial element’, in the case of sub-clause (i), sub-
clause (ii) or sub-clause (iv), there should be a repetition of acts or
omissions of the same kind referred to in sub-clause (i), subclause (ii) or
in sub-clause (iv) by the person concerned to treat him as an “anti-social
element”. Commission of an act or omission referred to in one of the sub-
clauses (i), (ii) and (iv) and of another act or omission referred to in any
other of the said sub-clauses would not be sufficient to treat a person as
an “anti-social element”. A single act or omission falling under subclause
(i) and a single act or omission falling under sub-clause (iv) of Section
2(d) cannot, therefore, be characterized as a habitual act or omission
referred to in either of them. Because the idea of “habit” involves an
element of persistence and a tendency to repeat the acts or omissions of
the same class or kind, if the acts or omissions in question are not of the
same kind or even if they are of the same kind when they are committed
with a long interval of time between them they cannot be treated as
habitual ones.”
17.Thus, from the aforesaid it is evident that if a person is not an
antisocial element, he cannot be detained under the Act. The
detaining authority should, therefore, be satisfied that the person
against whom an order is made under Section 12 of the Act is an anti-
social element as defined in Section 2(d) of the Act. Under sub-clause
(i) of Section 2(d) of the Act, a person who either by himself or as a
member of or leader of a gang habitually commits or attempts to
commit or abets the commission of offences punishable under
Chapter XVI dealing with offences affecting the human body or
Chapter XVII dealing with offences against property, of the Penal
Code, 1860 is considered to be an anti-social element. Further the
expression “habitually” means “repeatedly” or “persistently”. It
implies a thread of continuity stringing together similar repetitive
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acts. Repeated, persistent and similar, but not isolated, individual and
dissimilar acts are necessary to justify an inference of habit.
18.It requires to refer herein that Section 12 of the Act of 2002 contains
the word “anti-social” which qualifies the section 12 of Act of 2002
for passing the order of detention of any individual or others. Section
12 of the Act is the initiation of the process of detaining a person
under the Act, for ready reference the same is being quoted herein,
which reads as under-
“12. Power to make order detaining certain persons. – The State
Government may- (1) if satisfied with respect to any person that
with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner
prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and there is reason
to fear that the activities of anti-social elements cannot be
prevented otherwise than by the immediate arrest of such person,
make an order directing that such anti-social element be detained.
(2) If, having regard to the circumstances prevailing or likely to
prevail in any area within the local limits of the jurisdiction of a
District Magistrate, the State Government is satisfied that it is
necessary so to do, it may by an order in writing direct, that during
such period as may be specified in the order, such District
Magistrate may also, if satisfied as provided in sub-section (1)
exercise the powers conferred upon by the said sub-section:
Provided that the period specified in an order made by the State
Government under this sub-section shall not, in the first instance
exceed three months, but the State Government may, if satisfied as
aforesaid that it is necessary so to do, amend such order to extend
such period from time to time by any period not exceeding three
months at any one time.
(3) When any order is made by District Magistrate, he shall
forthwith report, the fact to the State Government together with the
grounds on which the order has been made and such other
particulars as, in his opinion, have a bearing on the matter, and no
such order shall remain in force for more than 12 days after the13
2026:JHHC:10475-DBmaking thereof unless, in the meantime, it has been approved by
the State Government:
Provided that where under Section 17 the grounds of detention are
communicated by the officer making the order after five days but
not later than ten days from the date of detention, this sub-section
shall apply subject to the modification that, for the words “twelve
days”, the words “fifteen days” shall be substituted.”
19.Thus, from the perusal of Section 12 of the Act of 2002, it is evident
that power to make orders detaining certain persons are provided
in section 12 of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002. Section
12(1) provides that if State Government is satisfied with respect to
any person that with a view to preventing him from acting in any
manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and there is
reason to fear that the activities of anti-social elements cannot be
prevented otherwise than by the immediate arrest of such person,
make an order directing that such anti-social element be detained.
20.Hence, section 12(1) empowers the State Government to detain anti-
social element if there is reason to fear that the activities of anti-social
elements cannot be prevented otherwise than by the immediate arrest
of such person. The anti-social element has been defined in Section
2(d) of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002 and section
2(d)(i) of the Act provides that “Anti-social Element” means a person
who either by himself or as a member of or leader of gang habitually
commits, or attempts to commit or abets the commission of offences
punishable under Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal
Code.
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21.In the backdrop of the aforesaid settled position of law this Court is
now, reverting to the first issue whether the criminal activities of
petitioner come under the purview of definition of “Anti-social
Elements” as defined under section 2(d) of the Jharkhand Control of
Crimes Act, 2002.
22.On going through the impugned detention order dated 07.11.2025
(Annexure-5), this court finds that detention order is passed by the
respondent no.3 District Magistrate-cum- Deputy Commissioner,
Garhwa, wherein involvement of the petitioner in 11 criminal cases
are mentioned out of which petitioner has been acquitted in four cases
i.e. Garhwa P.S. Case No. 665 of 2020 dated 30.09.2020,under
section 307 IPC and 27 Arms Act; Garhwa P.S. Case No. 675 of 2020
dated 01.10.2020,under section 307/34 IPC and 27 Arms Act;Garhwa
P.S. Case No. 292 of 2023 dated 28.06.2023,under section 394 IPC
and Garhwa P.S. Case No. 342 of 2024 dated 25.06.2024,under
section 302/34 IPC and 27 Arms Act.
23.Further, from the impugned detention order dated 07.11.2025
(Annexure-5), this court finds that following 7 FIRs have been
registered against the petitioner in Garhwa police station:
i. Garhwa P.S. Case No. 253 of 2022, dated 20.05.2022,
under section 379 IPCii. Garhwa P.S. Case No. 293 of 2023, dated28.06.2023,
under section 25(1-B)/26/27/35 Arms Actiii. Garhwa P.S. Case No. 368 of 2025, dated 20.08.2025
under section 308(4)/3(5) of BNS15
2026:JHHC:10475-DBiv. Garhwa P.S. Case No. 379 of 2025, dated 27.08.2025
under section 308(4)/351(2)/352/3(5) BNSv. Garhwa P.S. Case No. 403 of 2025, dated 06.09.2025
under section 109(1)/308(4)/351(2)/352/3(5) BNS and
27 Arms Actvi. Garhwa P.S. Case No. 405 of 2025, dated 08.09.2025
under section 25(1-B)a/26/27/35 Arms Actvii.Garhwa P.S. Case No. 416 of 2025, dated
13.09.2025under section 25(1-B) a/26/27/35 Arms Act
24.From record it appears that petitioner has been granted bail in Garhwa
P.S. Case No. 253 of 2022 on 20.03.2023; in Garhwa P.S. Case No.
293 of 2023 on 13.10.2025; in Garhwa P.S. Case No. 368 of 2025 on
09.10.2025; in Garhwa P.S. Case No. 379 of 2025 on 02.12.2025; in
Garhwa P.S. Case No. 403 of 2025 on 04.12.2025 and inGarhwa P.S.
Case No. 405 of 2025 on 28.11.2025. The writ petitioner is in custody
in connection with Garhwa P.S. Case No. 416 of 2025.
25.Hence, from the 7 FIRs mentioned in the impugned detention order
dated 07.11.2025 (Annexure-5), this court finds that crime committed
by the petitioner ranges from attempt to murder, criminal
intimidation, extortion etc. and the several cases under Arms Act has
also been registered against the petitioner. Hence, this court is of view
that the petitioner is habitual offender.
26.Thus, petitioner habitually commits offences punishable under
section Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code(now
BNS equivalents) as defined in section 2(d)(i) of the Act of 2002.
27.Further, the detaining authority respondent no.3 while passing the
impugned detention order dated 07.11.2025 (Annexure-5), under
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section 12(2) of the Act was satisfied that the dentition
of the petitioner was necessary as continuous criminal activities of the
petitioner was causing threat to maintenance of public order.
28.This Court, on consideration of the aforesaid factual aspect, is of the
view that the authority concerned has rightly considered that the act
of the petitioner comes under the purview of the ”Anti-social
Elements” as stipulated under Section 2(d) of the Jharkhand Control
of Crimes Act, 2002.This Court, therefore, is of the view that the
orders of detention dated 07.11.2025 (Annexure-5), on this score
needs no interference.
29.Accordingly issue no. (i) is hereby answered.
Re: Issue No. (ii)
30.Regarding this issue i.e. whether acquittal and grant of bail to the
detenue/petitioner in some cases is ground for his release from the
prevention detention passed under 12(2) of the Jharkhand Control of
Crimes Act, 2002?
31.In this regard learned counsel for the detenue/petitioner has
contended the said cases were relied by the detaining authority while
passing the impugned order of detention dated 07.11.2025
(Annexure-5) and hence, detention order cannot be sustained.
32.This court finds that in the impugned detention order dated
07.11.2025 (Annexure-5), there is reference of 11 criminal cases
against the detenue/petitioner out of which detenue/petitioner has
been acquitted in four cases Garhwa P.S. Case No. 665 of 2020 dated
30.09.2020, Garhwa P.S. Case No. 675 of 2020 dated
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01.10.2020,Garhwa P.S. Case No. 292 of 2023 dated 28.06.2023 and
Garhwa P.S. Case No. 342 of 2024 dated 25.06.2024.
33.Further, in 7 FIRs mentioned in the impugned detention
order,detenue/petitioner has been enlarged on bail in six cases –
GarhwaP.S. Case No. 253 of 2022 dated 20.05.2022, Garhwa P.S.
Case No. 293 of 2023, dated 28.06.2023, Garhwa P.S. Case No. 368
of 2025 dated 20.08.2025, Garhwa P.S. Case No. 379 of 2025 dated
27.08.2025, Garhwa P.S. Case No. 403 of 2025 dated 06.09.2025,
Garhwa P.S. Case No. 405 of 2025 dated 08.09.2025. In connection
with Garhwa P.S. Case No. 416 of 2025, dated 13.09.2025,
detenue/petitioner is in judicial custody.
34.Hence, so far as acquittal of the detenue/petitioner in some of the
cases and his release on bail,in aforesaid pending cases is
concerned, this Court finds that it is the subjective satisfaction of
the Detaining Authority that in spite of his continuous activities
causing threat to maintenance of public order and in such
circumstances, based on the relevant materials and satisfying itself,
that it would not be possible to control his habituality in continuing
the criminal activities by resorting the normal procedures, the
Detaining Authority had passed an order detaining him under the
Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002.
35.Further, acquittal and enlargement on bail, of the
detenue/petitioner, in some of the cases cannot be said to affect the
decision taken by the competent authority of detention, rather the
accusation so made in the First Information Report is to be seen for
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the purpose to have the subjective satisfaction of the nature of
accusation made in the said FIR. Since the detention order is to be
passed by the competent authority anticipating the criminality of
the concerned and it would be evident from the accusation made in
the impugned detention order dated 07.11.2025 (Annexure-
5),passed by the District Magistrate, wherein seven pending
criminal cases registered against the detenue is mentioned.
36.The consideration of coming from judicial custody by virtue of order
passed by the court to release on bail has been taken into
consideration by the Hon’ble Apex Court in D.M Nagaraja Versus
Government of Karnataka and others reported in (2011) 10 SCC
215 wherein detenue had challenged his detention order. The Hon’ble
Apex Court in this case had noted in paragraph-17 that the even after
release on bail detenue again started indulging in the same type of
offences, particularly, threatening the public life, damaging public
property, etc. and hence, detenue appeal was dismissed. Further in
paragraph-20 of the aforesaid judgment the Hon’ble Apex Court had
noted the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority in passing
the detention order against the detenue, for the ready reference
Paragraph-17 and 20 of D.M. Nagaraja(supra) case is quoted herein
below –
“17. All the abovementioned details which have been correctly stated
in the detention order clearly show that the appellant is not
amenable to ordinary course of law. It also shows that even after his
release on bail from the prison on various occasions, he again
started indulging in the same type of offences, particularly,
threatening the public life, damaging public property, etc. All these
aspects have been meticulously considered by the detaining authority19
2026:JHHC:10475-DBand after finding that in order to maintain public order, since his
activities are prejudicial to the public, causing harm and danger, the
detaining authority detained him as “goonda” under Karnataka
Act 12 of 1985 for a period of 12 months and the same was rightly
approved by the Advisory Board and the State Government.
Inasmuch as the detaining authority has taken note of all the relevant
materials and strictly followed all the safeguards as provided in the
Act ensuring the liberty of the detenue, we are in entire agreement
with the decision of the detaining authority as well as the impugned
order of the High Court affirming the same.”
Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
20. In the case on hand, we have already extracted criminality,
criminal activities starting from the age of 30 and details relating to
eleven cases mentioned in the grounds of detention. It is not in
dispute that in one case he has been convicted and sentenced to
undergo rigorous imprisonment for a term of nine years. He had
been acquitted in two cases and four cases are pending against him
wherein he was granted bail by the courts. It is the subjective
satisfaction of the detaining authority that in spite of his continuous
activities causing threat to maintenance of public order, he was
getting bail one after another and indulging in the same activities. In
such circumstances, based on the relevant materials and satisfying
itself, namely, that it would not be possible to control his habituality
in continuing the criminal activities by resorting to normal
procedure, the detaining authority passed an order detaining him
under Act 12 of 1985.”
37.In the present case, from the impugned detention order dated
07.11.2025 (Annexure-5), it is apparent thatin seven pending cases
registered against the detenue ranges from attempt to murder,
criminal intimidation, extortion etc. and the several cases under Arms
Act has also been registered against the petitioner.
38.From, the impugned detention order dated 07.11.2025, it also appears
that out of the pending cases against the detenue/petitioner, the oldest
FIR is of the year 2022 and thereafter, petitioner did not repent and
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again in years 2024 and 2025, six more FIRs had been registered
against the detenue/petitioner.
39.The authority concerned while passing the impugned detention order
which was passed on 07.11.2025 has taken into consideration the
entire history of accusation against the petitioner and only thereafter
has passed the order of detention. Hence, satisfaction has been arrived
by the detaining authority bearing in mind existence of live and
proximate link between the past conduct of the petitioner and material
which is not stale.
40.Thus, from the impugned detention order dated 07.11.2025, it is
evident that the detenue/petitioner is habitually involved in offences
which ranges from attempt to murder, involvement in organized
crime, extortion etc. and the several cases under Arms Act and further
on the basis of subjective satisfaction the detaining authority has
arrived to conclusion that the well-organized manner in which such
pre-judicial activities have been carried on and nexus between dates
of incidents and passing of the detention order and the said
observation is according to the ratio led down by the Hon’ble Apex
Court in the case of D.M Nagaraja Versus Government of
Karnataka and others(supra) therefore, the said observation of the
detaining authority cannot be said to be suffer from an error.
41.Accordingly,Issue No.(ii) is hereby answered
Re: Issue No. (iii)
42.Regarding this issue i.e.whether the petitioner’s criminal history and
alleged activities threatened “public order” as stipulated in Act 2002
or simply affected “law and order.”
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43.The petitioner has challenged the detention order by also taking the
ground that his alleged activities did not rise to the level of “public
order” disturbance and that no strong factual foundation existed to
justify his continued detention.
44.With regard to the aforesaid contention of the learned Counsel, it
would be instructive to refer to the relevant case law on the
distinction between “law and order” and “public order” which has
been enunciated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in catena of Judgments.
45.In the case of Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia v. State Bihar1965 SCC
OnLine SC 9 a Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court,
explained the difference between maintenance of law and order and
maintenance of public order and its disturbance. The Court has
further explained the whole concept of public order and law and
order, by observing that one has to imagine three concentric circles,
that law and order represents the largest circle, within which is the
next circle representing public order and the smallest circle represents
security of State. For ready reference the relevant paragraphs of the
aforesaid judgment are being quoted as under:
“54. … Does the expression “public order” take in every kind of
disorder or only some of them? The answer to this serves to
distinguish “public order” from “law and order” because the
latter undoubtedly takes in all of them. Public order if disturbed,
must lead to public disorder. Every breach of the peace does not
lead to public disorder. When two drunkards quarrel and fight
there is disorder but not public disorder. They can be dealt with
under the powers to maintain law and order but cannot be detained
on the ground that they were disturbing public order. Suppose that
the two fighters were of rival communities and one of them tried to
raise communal passions. The problem is still one of law and order
but it raises the apprehension of public disorder. Other examples22
2026:JHHC:10475-DBcan be imagined. The contravention of law always affects order but
before it can be said to affect public order, it must affect the
community or the public at large. A mere disturbance of law and
order leading to disorder is thus not necessarily sufficient for
action under the Defence of India Act but disturbances which
subvert the public order are. A District Magistrate is entitled to
take action under Rule 30(1)(b) to prevent subversion of public
order but not in aid of maintenance of law and order under
ordinary circumstances.
55. It will thus appear that just as “public order” in the rulings of
this Court (earlier cited) was said to comprehend disorders of less
gravity than those affecting “security of State”, “law and order”
also comprehends disorders of less gravity than those affecting
“public order”. One has to imagine three concentric circles. Law
and order represents the largest circle within which is the next
circle representing public order and the smallest circle represents
security of State. It is then easy to see that an act may affect law
and order but not public order just as an act may affect public
order but not security of the State.”
46.In the case Arun Ghosh v. State of W.B., (1970) 1 SCC 98the
Hon’ble Apex Court has deal with the question of “public order” and
“law and order” by citing the various illustration, the relevant
portionof the aforesaid judgment reads as under:
“3. … Public order was said to embrace more of the
community than law and order. Public order is the even
tempo of the life of the community taking the country as a
whole or even a specified locality. Disturbance of public
order is to be distinguished from acts directed against
individuals which do not disturb the society to the extent
of causing a general disturbance of public tranquillity. It
is the degree of disturbance and its effect upon the life of
the community in a locality which determines whether the
disturbance amounts only to a breach of law and order.
Take for instance, a man stabs another. People may be
shocked and even disturbed, but the life of the community
keeps moving at an even tempo, however much one may
dislike the act. Take another case of a town where there is23
2026:JHHC:10475-DBcommunal tension. A man stabs a member of the other
community. This is an act of a very different sort. Its
implications are deeper and it affects the even tempo of
life and public order is jeopardised because the
repercussions of the act embrace large sections of the
community and incite them to make further breaches of
the law and order and to subvert the public order. An act
by itself is not determinant of its own gravity. In its
quality it may not differ from another but in its
potentiality it may be very different. Take the case of
assault on girls. A guest at a hotel may kiss or make
advances to half a dozen chamber maids. He may annoy
them and also the management but he does not cause
disturbance of public order. He may even have a fracas
with the friends of one of the girls but even then it would
be a case of breach of law and order only. Take another
case of a man who molests women in lonely places. As a
result of his activities girls going to colleges and schools
are in constant danger and fear. Women going for their
ordinary business are afraid of being waylaid and
assaulted. The activity of this man in its essential quality
is not different from the act of the other man but in its
potentiality and in its effect upon the public tranquillity
there is a vast difference. The act of the man who molests
the girls in lonely places causes a disturbance in the even
tempo of living which is the first requirement of public
order. He disturbs the society and the community. His act
makes all the women apprehensive of their honour and he
can be said to be causing disturbance of public order and
not merely committing individual actions which may be
taken note of by the criminal prosecution agencies. It
means therefore that the question whether a man has only
committed a breach of law and order or has acted in a
manner likely to cause a disturbance of the public order is
a question of degree and the extent of the reach of the act
upon the society.”
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47.In Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia‘s case examples were given by the
Hon’ble Apex Court by observing that like acts in different contexts
affect differently law and order on the one hand and public order on
the other. It is always a question of degree of the damage and its
affect upon the community. The question to ask is : Does it lead to
trouble of the current of life of the community so as to amount a
disturbance of the public order or does it affect merely an individual
leaving the tranquility of the society undisturbed? This question has
to be faced in every case on facts. There is no formula by which one
case can be distinguished from another.
48.The Hon’ble Apex Court in the in the case of Babul Mitra v. State
of W.B. (1973) 1 SCC 393 had deal with the question of “public
order” and “law and order”. The Hon’ble Apex Court observed that
the true distinction between the areas of “law and order” and “public
order” is one of degree and extent of the reach of the act in question
upon society. The Court pointed out that the act by itself is not
determinant of its own gravity. In its quality it may not differ but in
its potentiality, it may be very different.
49.In Haradhan Saha v. The State of West Bengal (1975) 3 SCC 198
the Hon’ble Supreme Court has prescribed tests to determine whether
the alleged acts affect ‘law and order’ or ‘public order’. The Hon’ble
Court held that it is the potentiality of the act to disturb the even
tempo of life which makes it prejudicial to the maintenance of public
order and that it is the degree and extent of the each of the
objectionable activity on the society which is vital for consideration.
Considering the question whether a person has committed only
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breach of law and order or has acted in any manner likely to cause
disturbance to public order, it was held that an order of detention
under the Act would be valid if the activities of the detenu affect
public order, but could not be so where the same affects only the
maintenance of law and order and that the facts of each case have
therefore to be carefully scrutinized to test the validity of the
detention.
50.The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Pesala Nookaraju v. State of
A.P., (2023) 14 SCC 641 has categorically observed that there is a
very thin line between the question of law-and-order situation and a
public order situation, and some times, the acts of a person relating to
law-and-order situation can turn into a question of public order
situation. What is decisive for determining the connection of ground
of detention with the maintenance of public order, the object of
detention, is not an intrinsic quality of the act but rather its latent
potentiality. Therefore, for determining whether the ground of
detention is relevant for the purposes of public order or not, merely an
objective test based on the intrinsic quality of an act would not be a
safe guide. The potentiality of the act has to be examined in the light
of the surrounding circumstances, posterior and anterior for the
offences under the Prohibition Act.
51.This Court is conscious with the fact that Preventive detention of a
person is an extreme measure resorted to by the State when ordinary
criminal law is found not adequate to control his activities which
cause disturbance to public order. The preventive detention laws have
been conceived in order to control the activities of a person which
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tend to disturb public order as opposed to law and order and the
procedural safeguards prescribed by the ordinary criminal laws are
not available to the detenu under preventive detention laws.
52.The order of preventive detention and the decision must depend on
the facts of the particular case; preventive detention being necessary
to prevent the detenue from acting in any manner prejudicial to the
security of the State or to the maintenance of public order etc. but the
detaining authority must show its awareness to the fact of subsisting
custody of the detenu and take that factor into account while making
the order; but, even so, if the detaining authority is reasonably
satisfied on cogent material that there is likelihood of his release and
in view of his antecedent activities which are proximate in point of
time he must be detained in order to prevent him from indulging in
such prejudicial activities, the detention order can be validly made
even in anticipation to operate on his release.
53.Keeping in view the legal position discussed above, we need to
consider the allegations against the detenue/writ petitioner.
54.It has come on record that the petitioner is involved in various
criminal cases as well as six sanhas were also registered against
him in police stations of Garhwa District specially for creating
threat by his henchmen among witnesses and public at large and
also to disturb the public order. Further the authority concerned
based upon its subjective satisfaction has noted that when
petitioner will be released from jail, he will create panic in the
town.
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55.It has further come on record that initial detention of the petitioner
was from 07.11.2025 to 06.02.2026. The police reported that
petitioner and his henchman still extended threat to disturb the
public order and for this Sanha No. 60/2026, dated 10.01.2020 and
Sanha No. 54/2026, dated 11.01.2026 was registered requesting
Respondent No. 3 to extend the period of detention, accordingly,
respondent No. 3 being satisfied with the report and materials,
recommended extension of detention from 07.02.2026 to
06.05.2026 under Sections 21(1) and 22 of the Act of 2002.
56.In the present case, the detaining authority has arrived at a subjective
satisfaction that the activities of the detenu-appellant are detrimental
to the maintenance of public order. The authority has further
concluded that it is necessary to prevent the detenu from engaging in
such activities in the future. This satisfaction is based on credible
material available on record, therefore, the contention of the writ
petitioner that his alleged activities did not rise to the level of “public
order” disturbance and that no strong factual foundation existed to
justify his continued detention, is not fit to be accepted.
57. Accordingly, issue no.(iii) answered herein.
58. On the basis of the discussion made hereinabove this Court is of the
considered view that the orders of detention need no interference.
59.Accordingly, the detention order dated 07.11.2025, (Annexure-
5)passed by the Respondent No.3and order dated
22.12.2025(Annexure-6) passed by the Respondent No.2, confirming
the detention order dated 07.11.2025and subsequent extension order
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dated 30.01.2026(Annexure-8),extending the period of preventive
detention are sustained and upheld.
60.Consequent thereto, the instant writ petition stands dismissed.
61.Pending I.As, if any, stands disposed of.
I Agree (Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)
(Sanjay Prasad, J.)
(Sanjay Prasad, J.)
Jharkhand High Court
Dated:10.04.2026
KNR/AFR
Uploaded on: 13.04.2026
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