Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)
Ravi Shankar Mani Tripathi & Ors vs State Of West Bengal & Anr on 5 May, 2026
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CRIMINAL REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
APPELLATE SIDE
PRESENT:
THE HON'BLE JUSTICE UDAY KUMAR
CRR 3836 OF 2022
WITH
CRAN 1 OF 2024
CRAN 2 OF 2024
CRAN 3 OF 2025
RAVI SHANKAR MANI TRIPATHI & ORS.
-VS-
STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ANR.
For the Petitioners : Mr. Monish Sen, Ld. Adv.
Ms. Oisani Mukherjee, Ld. Adv.
For the Opposite
Party No. 2 : Mr. Jayanta Narayan Chatterjee, Ld. Sr. Adv.
Mr. Apalak Basu, Ld. Adv.
Mr. Nazir Ahmed, Ld. Adv.
Mr. Nazir Ahmed, Ld. Adv.
Mr. Yavik Singhal, Ld. Adv.
Hearing concluded on : 30.03.2026
Judgment on : 05.05.2026
UDAY KUMAR, J.: -
THE INTRODUCTION
1.
The present revisional application, preferred under Section 482 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, seeks the quashing of
proceedings in Sessions Case No. 179 of 2020, currently pending
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before the Learned Additional Sessions Judge, 1st Court,
Durgapur, Paschim Bardhaman. The litigation originates from
Durgapur (Women) P.S. Case No. 24 of 2018, a case replete with
grave accusations under Sections 498A, 324, 313, 307, 506, 34,
and 109 of the Indian Penal Code, read with Sections 3 and 4 of
the Dowry Prohibition Act.
2. The Petitioners, being the matrimonial relatives of the Opposite
Party No. 2, move this Court for the summary termination of the
proceedings. It is their primary grievance that the prosecution is
not an exercise in seeking justice, but rather a “potently crafted
instrument of vendetta,” designed to implicate the entire extended
family in the fallout of a failed marriage.
THE FACTUAL MATRIX
3. The matrimonial bond between the de-facto complainant and the
principal accused was solemnized on December 2, 2015, an
alliance ostensibly built on traditional foundations but destined
for a swift transition into discord. Despite the substantial
endowment of twenty bhories of gold and sixteen lakhs in cash, a
testament to the paternal house’s commitment, the sanctity of the
union was soon eclipsed by a persistent and insatiable
dissatisfaction. This discontent manifested initially through a
systematic campaign of verbal abuse and mental coercion,
orchestrated to erode the complainant’s psychological equilibrium
and the dignity of her natal family.
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4. The narrative of cruelty assumed a visceral dimension when the
complainant joined her husband at his official quarters in
Durgapur. The allegations suggest that on July 4, 2016, the
hopeful prospect of her pregnancy became a catalyst for brutality
rather than joy. It is recorded that upon this disclosure, the
husband, acting in concert with Petitioner No. 2 and Petitioner
No. 5, allegedly subjected the complainant to a vicious physical
assault. The specific overt act, comprising repeated kicks to the
victim’s abdomen, allegedly resulted in a forced miscarriage. This
incident is further contextualized by the admitted physical
presence of Petitioner No. 5 in Durgapur, where he was pursuing
his studies at the material time.
5. The birth of a daughter on June 7, 2017, failed to bridge the
widening chasm between the parties. Instead, it inaugurated a
period of exile, punctuated by a desperate attempt at
reconciliation in September 2017, facilitated by a further payment
of one lakh rupees. However, this reprieve was fleeting. The
escalation of violence reached a harrowing peak on June 4, 2018,
when the husband allegedly attempted to slit the complainant’s
throat with a blade, an act purportedly directed through the
telephonic instructions of the petitioners residing in Bihar.
6. The physical aftermath of this encounter was documented at the
Durgapur Mission Hospital, where clinical findings revealed
“defensive wounds” on the complainant’s hands and forehead,
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that serve as a contemporaneous record of a desperate struggle
for survival.
7. Parallel to these criminal events, a decree of divorce was passed
by a Family Court in Bihar in 2023, a judgment that currently
remains under challenge before the Hon’ble High Court at Patna.
It is within this factual landscape, marked by documented
medical trauma, the loss of a foetus or attempting murder, the
interplay of local and distant participation, and common intention
that this Court must now determine whether the prosecution can
be throttled at the threshold.
POINTS FOR DETERMINATION
8. In the light of the factual landscape delineated hereinabove and
to test the sustainability of the criminal proceedings against the
rigorous touchstone of judicial precedent, the following points are
formulated for determination:
i. Whether the allegations against the matrimonial relatives
transcend the category of “vague and omnibus” recitals to
disclose specific overt acts of criminality?
ii. Whether the attribution of a physical assault leading to
miscarriage against Petitioner Nos. 2 and 5 constitutes a
triable issue of fact?
iii. Whether the petitioners residing in Bihar can be held
prima facie liable for acts in Durgapur on the strength of
“telephonic instigation” and shared common intention?
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iv. Whether the clinical findings of “defensive wounds” in the
medical report provide sufficient independent
corroboration to sustain the charge under Section 307 of
the IPC?
v. Whether a contested decree of divorce, granted during the
pendency of criminal proceedings, operates as a legal bar
to a trial for heinous offences committed during the
subsistence of the marriage?
vi. Whether the continuation of the proceedings against the
petitioners constitutes an abuse of the process of law
warranting the exercise of inherent powers under Section
482 of the Cr.P.C.?
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS
9. Mr. Monish Sen, the learned counsel appearing for the
petitioners, has opened his address by imploring this Court to
exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure to prevent what he characterizes as a
manifest abuse of the judicial process. He contended that the
current prosecution is a quintessential illustration of
“matrimonial over-reach,” where the embers of a failed marriage
are being fanned by the de-facto complainant to engulf the
husband’s entire family in a conflagration of criminal litigation.
The primary thrust of his submission was that the allegations,
while grave in their nomenclature, are “vague, omnibus, and
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inherently improbable,” designed not to seek justice but to extract
a “pound of flesh” from the matrimonial relatives.
10. It was the primary submission of the Petitioners that the present
FIR is a retaliatory strike, conceived in the wake of an
irretrievable marital breakdown. Mr. Sen argued that Petitioner
Nos. 1, 3, and 4 are permanent residents of Motihari, Bihar, and
have never shared a common household with the complainant in
Durgapur. He contended that the allegations concerning the
grave incidents of 2016 and 2018 are factually detached from
these petitioners, as the theory of “telephonic instigation” is a
mere legal artifice designed to extend the reach of the prosecution
to distant relatives who lacked any functional or territorial nexus
to the alleged sites of violence.
11. To fortify the challenge against “vague and omnibus” accusations,
the learned counsel placed heavy reliance on the seminal
principles articulated in Geeta Mehrotra v. State of U.P. [(2012) 10
SCC 741] and Preeti Gupta v. State of Jharkhand [(2010) 7 SCC
667]. He submitted that there is a burgeoning and regrettable
tendency to convert domestic discords into criminal enterprises
by naming every relative of the husband, regardless of their
proximity or participation. This proposition was further supported
by citing (2010) 1 Cal. L.R. (Cal) 200 and (2019) 1 C CR LR (CAL)
453, asserting that roping in an entire extended family, including
a nephew (Petitioner No. 5) and brothers-in-law, without distinct
roles, constitutes a gross abuse of the criminal machinery.
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12. In light of evolving matrimonial jurisprudence, the Petitioners
cited a triad of recent decisions, Vasant v. State of Karnataka
[2025 SCC 221], Renuka v. State of Karnataka [2025 SCC Online
SC 970], and Sanjay D. Jain v. State of Maharashtra [2025 SCC
Online 2000], to highlight the judicial caution required against the
“growing tendency to implicate all family members” to settle
matrimonial scores.
13. Mr. Sen argued that the invocation of vicarious culpability under
Section 34 IPC was done in a vacuum, as the prosecution failed
to satisfy the “prior meeting of minds” test. Relying on the ratio in
Ramaswami Ayyangar and Others v. State of Tamil Nadu (1976) 3
SCC 779, he emphasized that where allegations are so inherently
improbable that no prudent person could reach a conclusion of
sufficient grounds for proceeding, the High Court must intervene.
14. Directing the Court’s attention to the specific charge under
Section 313 of the IPC, the learned counsel dismissed it as a
“belated and strategic concoction.” He pointed out the anomalous
timeline where an incident of 2016 was brought to the fore only in
2018, long after the birth of a healthy child in June 2017.
Referring to Bhaskar Lal Sharma v. Monica [(2014) 3 SCC 383] and
Kaptan Singh v. State of U.P. [(2021) 9 SCC 35], he argued that
while the court usually refrains from weighing evidence, it must
not remain a silent spectator when the “factual matrix” itself is
inherently improbable. He submitted that the delay in alleging the
miscarriage, coupled with the residency of the petitioners in
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Bihar, makes the continuation of the trial a “perpetuation of
injustice.”
15. Finally, the petitioners leaned heavily upon the Decree of Divorce
granted on May 11, 2023, by the Family Court, Motihari. Mr. Sen
contended that this decree serves as a testament to the finality of
the matrimonial breakdown and exposes the complainant’s
grievances as a post-facto reaction to the judicial dissolution of
the marital tie. He concluded by stating that since no prima facie
case is made out under the strict standards of Sections 498A,
307, or 313 IPC, the proceedings ought to be quashed to preserve
the dignity of the legal process and prevent further judicial
harassment.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE STATE AND OPPOSITE PARTY
NO. 2
16. Mr. Jayanta Narayan Chatterjee, the learned senior counsel
representing the de-facto complainant (Opposite Party No. 2),
supported by the learned counsel for the State, had mounted a
vigorous resistance against the prayer for quashing. He had
opened his address by characterizing the matter not as a common
matrimonial discord, but as a case involving “heinous and overt
criminal acts” that demanded the full rigors of a trial. He had
contended that the FIR was far from being a collection of generic
grievances; rather, it served as a repository of date-specific and
visceral accounts of physical brutality. Specifically, he had
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pointed to the allegations of July 4, 2016, where Petitioner No. 2
and Petitioner No. 5 were alleged to have acted in concert with the
husband to subject the pregnant complainant to a horrific
assault, leading to a forced miscarriage. He had argued that such
distinct and specific roles constituted a triable issue of fact under
Section 313 of the IPC that could not be brushed aside as
perfunctory or omnibus in nature.
17. In developing this argument, the learned counsel had strategically
distinguished the legal propositions relied upon by the
petitioners. He had argued that the protective umbrella of Geeta
Mehrotra v. State of U.P. and Preeti Gupta v. State of Jharkhand is
exclusively reserved for cases involving “generic and omnibus”
allegations of dowry harassment, where relatives are roped in
solely to exert matrimonial pressure. He had contended that
those ratios become inapplicable the moment a case moves into
the territory of substantive, independent crimes such as
attempted murder and forced miscarriage.
18. He had pointed out that while the petitioners sought to
characterize the matter as a “refined matrimonial dispute,” the
presence of specific overt acts and medical trauma, including the
documented attempt to slit the complainant’s throat, removed it
from the ambit of the “judicial caution” normally exercised in
Section 498A cases.
19. To ground these factual assertions in objective evidence, the
learned counsel had placed heavy reliance on the Injury Report
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(MR No. 364110) from Durgapur Mission Hospital. He had argued
that the clinical findings of lacerations and “defensive wounds”
etched upon the complainant’s person provided a
“contemporaneous and clinching corroboration” of the attempt on
her life. Relying on the ratio in Bhaskar Lal Sharma v. Monica
[(2014) 3 SCC 383], he had submitted that at this threshold stage,
the Court must not assume the role of a trial judge to weigh the
relative merits of the evidence but must only ascertain the
existence of a prima facie case, which he contended was
abundantly clear from the medical trail.
20. To reinforce this distinction, he had relied upon the principles in
Veena Mittal v. State of Uttar Pradesh [Criminal Appeal No. 122 of
2022], noting that the Apex Court itself has clarified that where
the FIR contains specific allegations of physical violence, the High
Court should refrain from using its inherent powers to stifle the
prosecution.
21. Addressing the petitioners’ plea of territorial detachment, Mr.
Chatterjee had pointed out that Petitioner No. 5 (Sankalp) was
admittedly a student in Durgapur during the relevant period,
thereby placing him within the immediate jurisdiction where the
offences occurred. He had argued that this physical proximity
destroyed any plea of total detachment for the local petitioners.
Furthermore, invoking the principles in Taramani Parakh v. State
of M.P. [(2015) 11 SCC 260], he had contended that the shield of
“distance” cannot be invoked to quash proceedings when the
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allegations reflect specific cruelty and active participation in a
shared criminal design. Regarding the relatives in Bihar, he had
proposed a theory of “intellectual participation,” where the
attempt to slit the complainant’s throat was allegedly executed
under direct telephonic command, thereby binding all petitioners
under the singular thread of Section 34 and Section 109 of the
IPC.
22. The learned counsel had further argued that the Decree of
Divorce, currently under challenge before the Hon’ble High Court
at Patna, could not operate as a retrospective amnesty for
criminal acts. He had contended that a civil dissolution of
marriage does not act as a quietus to a prosecution for grave
offences. Relying on Renuka v. State of Karnataka [(2025) 3 SCC
735], he had emphasized that the “ends of justice” demanded a
full-fledged trial to unearth the truth. He had carefully
distinguished the authorities cited by the petitioners, particularly
Geeta Mehrotra, by arguing that the ratio therein applies to “pure”
matrimonial disharmony under Section 498A, whereas the
present case involves independent, heinous crimes that stand on
a different footing.
23. In the concluding limb of his submissions, Mr. Chatterjee had
referred to Veena Mittal v. State of Uttar Pradesh [Criminal Appeal
No. 122 of 2022] and Kaptan Singh v. State of U.P. [(2021) 9 SCC
35], reiterating the settled position that the High Court cannot
appreciate evidence or evaluate the merits of a case in a summary
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proceeding under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. He had submitted
that the investigation had already culminated in a charge-sheet,
signifying that the investigating agency found sufficient material
to warrant a trial. He had warned that any premature
interference by this Court would result in a “miscarriage of
justice” and would effectively “throttle” a legitimate prosecution
for offences that had caused irreparable physical and
reproductive trauma to the victim.
DISCUSSIONS AND FINDINGS
Point (i): Specificity of Accusation and the Prima Facie Threshold
24. To adjudicate upon the first point for determination, this Court
must evaluate whether the allegations etched in the FIR and the
supplementary materials collected during the investigation
possess the requisite “factual density” to compel the petitioners to
stand trial. It is a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence, as
underscored in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1992 Supp (1) SCC
335], that while the High Court should not embark upon an
inquiry into the reliability of evidence at this stage, it is
nonetheless duty-bound to ensure that the uncontroverted
allegations, taken at their face value, actually disclose the
essential ingredients of the offences charged. In matrimonial
disputes, this scrutiny becomes particularly exacting to prevent
the “criminalization of marital friction.”
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25. Upon a dispassionate reading of the Case Diary and the
statement of the de-facto complainant, it appears that the
allegations against the matrimonial relatives transcend the
category of “vague and omnibus” recitals. While the Petitioners
have relied heavily on the ratio of Geeta Mehrotra, asserting that
they have been roped in purely by virtue of their status, the
record suggests otherwise. Unlike cases where general allegations
of “torture” or “demand for dowry” are made against the entire
family in a single breath, the present narrative provides a date-
specific and act-specific account of brutality. The allegation of
July 4, 2016, does not target the family as a collective monolith
but specifically attributes a visceral physical assault to Petitioner
No. 2 and Petitioner No. 5, detailing repeated kicks to the
abdomen of a pregnant woman. Such specificity lifts the case out
of the “omnibus” category and establishes a prima facie nexus
between the accused and the alleged offence under Section 313 of
the Indian Penal Code.
26. Furthermore, the analysis of Section 498A and Section 307 of the
IPC in the context of these facts reveals that the prosecution is
not merely chasing shadows. The presence of the “defensive
wounds” documented in the medical report serves as a
contemporaneous physical anchor to the complainant’s story. The
law does not require that a “mini-trial” be conducted under the
umbrella of Section 482; rather, it requires the Court to see if a
“triable issue” exists. The defensive nature of the injuries,
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typically sustained while shielding one’s vital organs from an
assailant, provides a formidable prima facie basis to suggest that
the violence was not a mere “domestic bickering” but a life-
threatening encounter. The principles of law governing quashing
mandate that where the allegations are specific and supported by
a trail of medical evidence, the “ends of justice” are met by a trial,
not by a summary dismissal.
27. Consequently, this Court finds that the allegations are neither
“patently absurd” nor “inherently improbable” so as to warrant a
judicial “throttling” of the case at the threshold. The specificity of
the overt acts, the documented trauma, and the chronological
narrative of the events establish a clear prima facie case. The
contention that the petitioners have been maliciously roped in is
a defence that must be tested in the crucible of cross-
examination, as the current materials disclose a sufficient legal
basis for the trial to proceed.
28. The allegations against the petitioners are sufficiently specific and
supported by investigative materials to disclose a prima facie
case, thereby precluding the summary quashing of the
proceedings on the ground of being vague or omnibus.
Point (ii): Factual Density of Section 313 IPC and the Specificity
of Overt Acts
29. The second point for determination invites a closer scrutiny of the
charge under Section 313 of the Indian Penal Code, which
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pertains to the causing of a miscarriage without the woman’s
consent, a felony of significant statutory weight. The petitioners
have forcefully argued that this accusation is an “afterthought,”
strategically inserted to escalate a matrimonial dispute into a
sessions-triable offense. However, in the exercise of our
jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., this Court must
refrain from a premature assessment of the “truth” of the
allegation, focusing instead on whether the claim possesses
sufficient “factual density” to survive a motion for quashing.
30. A perusal of the record reveals that the complainant has not
merely labelled a broad grievance of ill-treatment; she has
identified a specific temporal window, July 4, 2016 and specific
perpetrators Petitioner Nos. 2 and 5, attributing to them a
targeted physical assault upon her pregnant abdomen. The law is
well-settled that when a specific overt act is attributed to a
particular accused, resulting in a distinct criminal consequence,
the matter enters the realm of a “triable issue of fact.” Such an
allegation, by its very nature, cannot be resolved by a High Court
on the basis of affidavits or competing narratives. Whether the
assault occurred as described, and whether it was the proximate
cause of the loss of the foetus, are matters that must be tested
through the crucible of medical evidence and the cross-
examination of the victim.
31. The learned counsel for the petitioners has attempted to cast
doubt on this narrative by highlighting the admitted fact that
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Petitioner No. 5 was a student at the material time. Far from
acting as a shield, this circumstance of territorial proximity, his
presence in Durgapur where the alleged assault took place,
strengthens the prosecution’s case for a trial. Unlike the other
relatives residing in Bihar, Petitioner No. 5 had the physical
opportunity to participate in the events described. This
“geographical nexus,” combined with the specific description of
the assault, creates a formidable prima facie case that transcends
the threshold of a “vague or improbable” implication.
32. Furthermore, the principles governing the quashing of
proceedings for an offense under Section 313 IPC dictate that the
Court must look for a linkage between the act and the outcome.
At this preliminary stage, the complainant’s statement,
corroborated by her narrative of the subsequent termination of
pregnancy, provides that linkage. The argument that the delay in
filing the FIR (lodged in 2018 for a 2016 incident) should be fatal
to the prosecution is a matter of “appreciation of evidence.” It is a
settled position of law that “delay in lodging an FIR is not a
ground for quashing” if the allegations otherwise disclose the
commission of a cognizable offense. The explanation for such
delay, often rooted in the victim’s hope for marital reconciliation,
is a factual defence that must be evaluated by the Trial Court.
33. Consequently, this Court is of the opinion that the attribution of
a physical assault leading to miscarriage against Petitioner Nos. 2
and 5 is neither superficial nor stray. It is an allegation of a grave
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and visceral nature, supported by a specific date, a defined role,
and a measurable medical consequence. To quash the
proceedings at this stage would be to deny the victim the
opportunity to prove a serious crime and would amount to a “pre-
trial acquittal,” which is impermissible in the exercise of our
inherent powers.
34. The allegations under Section 313 IPC against Petitioner Nos. 2
and 5 involve specific overt acts and a documented medical
consequence, constituting a substantial triable issue of fact that
cannot be adjudicated or extinguished in a quashing petition.
Point (iii): Territorial Distance, Telephonic Instigation, and the
Reach of Common Intention
35. The third point for determination requires this Court to navigate
the complex intersection of physical absence and criminal
culpability. The petitioners residing in Bihar (Petitioner Nos. 1, 3,
and 4) contend that their geographical remoteness from the scene
of the alleged crime in Durgapur serves as an absolute alibi,
rendering their implication in the charges of attempted murder
and matrimonial cruelty legally fragile. They argue that the theory
of “telephonic instigation” is a desperate attempt to bridge the
miles with a tenuous legal thread. However, the law of “common
intention” under Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and
“abetment” under Section 109 does not always demand a physical
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presence at the locus delicti; it demands a meeting of minds and a
shared criminal objective.
36. In the context of matrimonial offenses, the “four walls” of the
matrimonial home often extend, psychologically and
communicatively, to the homes of the extended family. The
complainant’s narrative specifically alleges that the husband’s
attempt to slit her throat with a blade on June 4, 2018, was not a
spontaneous outburst but an act executed upon the telephonic
directions of the relatives in Bihar. While the learned counsel for
the petitioners has dismissed this as a “literary flourish,” this
Court must acknowledge that in the modern era of instant
communication, “instigation” is no longer confined by borders. If
a person, through a telephonic command, provides the
psychological impetus or the direct instruction for a crime to be
committed by another, they cannot claim immunity simply
because they were not holding the weapon.
37. However, the threshold for holding absentee relatives liable is
significantly higher than that for those present on the spot. To
sustain a charge against the Bihar-based petitioners, the
materials in the Case Diary must reflect more than a mere
“omnipresent influence”; they must indicate a prima facie link
between the telephonic communication and the specific overt act.
In the present case, the complainant alleges a recurring pattern
where the husband acted as the “physical arm” of the family’s
“intellectual will.” When such an allegation is coupled with a
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grave charge under Section 307 of the IPC, and further bolstered
by the documented “defensive wounds” on the victim, the
question of whether the Bihar relatives actually “instigated” the
act becomes a triable issue of fact. It is a matter for the Trial
Court to determine, through the analysis of call records and oral
testimony, whether the common intention was truly shared
across state lines.
38. The principles governing Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. caution
against the quashing of proceedings where the allegations suggest
a conspiracy or abetment, even if some accused are at a distance.
The “telephonic instigation” described by the complainant
provides the necessary legal bridge to bring the Bihar relatives
within the ambit of the prosecution at this stage. To extinguish
their liability now would be to prematurely sever the chain of
“common intention” before the evidence can be fully unravelled.
This Court finds that the allegations of remote instigation, linked
to a specific and violent overt act in Durgapur, provide a
sufficient prima facie basis to compel the Bihar-based petitioners
to stand trial alongside the principal accused.
39. Physical absence from the place of occurrence does not inherently
negate criminal liability when the allegations involve specific
telephonic instigation leading to a life-threatening assault. The
shared common intention between the local and absentee
petitioners constitutes a triable issue, precluding the summary
discharge of the relatives residing in Bihar.
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Point (iv): The Evidentiary Weight of Clinical Findings and the
“Defensive Wound” Doctrine
40. The fourth point for determination brings us to the pivotal
intersection of medical jurisprudence and the penal provisions of
Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code. The petitioners have
consistently characterized the allegations of an attempt to murder
as a “hyperbolic escalation” of a domestic dispute. However, this
Court’s scrutiny is anchored not merely in the words of the
complainant, but in the objective reality of the clinical findings
recorded at the Durgapur Mission Hospital. The focal point of this
judicial audit is whether the presence of “defensive wounds” on
the complainant’s person provides the necessary independent
corroboration to sustain a charge as grave as an attempt to
murder.
41. In the lexicon of forensic medicine, a “defensive wound” is not a
mere accidental injury; it is a tell-tale signature of a victim’s
instinctive struggle to parry a lethal blow or to seize a weapon
aimed at vital organs. When the medical report documents such
injuries on the hands and forehead, regions typically raised in a
reflex action to shield the throat or face, it provides a silent,
contemporaneous testimony that corroborates the complainant’s
narrative of a life-threatening assault. Under Section 307 IPC, the
prosecution is not required to prove that a near-fatal injury was
actually caused; it is sufficient to prove that an act was
committed with the intent or knowledge that it could cause death.
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The discovery of defensive wounds serves as a potent indicator of
such intent, suggesting a level of violence that transcends
ordinary physical hurt and enters the realm of homicidal attempt.
42. The learned counsel for the petitioners has urged this Court to
view these injuries in isolation, suggesting they may be self-
inflicted or the result of a minor scuffle. However, such an
exercise in “evidence-weighing” is strictly prohibited within the
narrow confines of Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. It is a settled legal
proposition that if the medical evidence prima facie aligns with
the ocular version provided in the FIR, the High Court must defer
to the Trial Court for a final determination. The clinical trial in
this case, marked by the specific nature and location of the
wounds, acts as an independent anchor that prevents the
prosecution from being dismissed as a mere “oral concoction.” It
transforms the allegation from a subjective claim into an
objectively triable issue.
43. Furthermore, the presence of these injuries, documented shortly
after the alleged occurrence on June 4, 2018, provides a
chronological continuity that is difficult to ignore. The law
regarding the quashing of a charge under Section 307 IPC is
clear: where the weapon used (a blade), the site targeted (the
throat), and the resulting injuries (defensive marks) collectively
point toward a murderous intent, the proceedings cannot be
stifled at the threshold. This Court finds that the medical report
from Durgapur Mission Hospital constitutes significant
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independent corroboration, creating a formidable prima facie
basis for the charge to be tested through a full-fledged trial.
44. The clinical documentation of “defensive wounds” provides crucial
independent corroboration of a life-threatening struggle, thereby
validating the sustainability of the charge under Section 307 IPC
for the purposes of trial. These findings constitute objective
evidence that precludes the summary quashing of the
proceedings.
Point (v): The Interplay Between Civil Dissolution and Criminal
Accountability
45. The fifth point for determination addresses a pivotal legal
question: whether a decree of divorce, granted by a civil court of
competent jurisdiction, serves as a retrospective “judicial
immunity” against criminal prosecution for acts committed
during the subsistence of the marriage. The petitioners have
argued with considerable conviction that the decree of divorce
passed in 2023 marks the finality of the matrimonial dispute, and
that the continuation of criminal proceedings thereafter is a
redundant exercise in judicial bitterness. However, this Court
must clarify the fundamental distinction between the civil status
of a relationship and the criminal liability arising from conduct
within that relationship.
46. It is a settled principle of law that the “civil death” of a marriage
through a decree of divorce does not extinguish the criminal
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accountability of the parties for offences such as matrimonial
cruelty, forced miscarriage, or attempted murder. Criminal law is
concerned with the protection of the public at large and the
punishment of offenders, whereas matrimonial law focuses on the
status and obligations of the individuals involved. The offences
alleged in the present case, specifically under Sections 307 and
313 of the IPC, are heinous in nature and are categorized as
“crimes against society.” The mere fact that the parties are no
longer husband and wife in the eyes of the civil law does not, and
cannot, wash away the “blood of the crime” or the trauma
allegedly inflicted while the bond existed.
47. Furthermore, the petitioners’ reliance on the divorce decree is
further weakened by the fact that the said decree is currently
under challenge before the Hon’ble High Court at Patna. Even if
the decree were final, the ratio of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
cases such as State of Rajasthan v. Sambhu Ram [(2013) 11 SCC
12] makes it abundantly clear that in cases involving non-
compoundable and serious offences, a subsequent settlement or a
change in marital status is not a valid ground for quashing. To
allow a divorce decree to act as a bar to a criminal trial would be
to provide a “perverse incentive” for perpetrators to seek a swift
civil exit to escape the consequences of their criminal actions.
48. The jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is meant to
prevent the abuse of the process of law, not to bypass the
substantive provisions of the Penal Code. In the present factual
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matrix, where the complainant has documented medical injuries
and specific allegations of forced miscarriage, the civil dissolution
of the marriage is a “parallel development” that does not intersect
with the state’s duty to prosecute grave violence. This Court finds
that the criminal liabilities of the petitioners are independent of
their matrimonial status and must be adjudicated on their own
merits in the trial court.
49. A decree of divorce, whether contested or final, does not operate
as a legal bar to the prosecution for offences committed during
the subsistence of the marriage. The civil dissolution of a union
does not offer a retrospective shield against criminal
accountability for acts of cruelty or violence.
Point (vi): The Exercise of Inherent Powers and the Threshold of
“Abuse of Process”
50. The final point for determination brings us to the ultimate
question of whether the continuation of these criminal
proceedings constitutes an abuse of the process of law. The
inherent power of the High Court under Section 482 of the
Cr.P.C. is a “safety valve” designed to be used sparingly, yet
decisively, to prevent the machinery of justice from being
converted into an engine of oppression. The petitioners have
urged this Court to view the entire prosecution as a retaliatory
narrative born out of a failed marriage, while the State and the
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de-facto complainant have presented it as a necessary quest for
accountability against visceral violence.
51. To determine if an “abuse of process” exists, this Court must look
beyond the labels of the offences and examine the “foundational
integrity” of the allegations. As established in the preceding points
of discussion, the case at hand is not built upon mere verbal
skirmishes or generic claims of “unhappiness.” Instead, it is
anchored in specific, date-related overt acts, corroborated by
contemporaneous clinical findings of “defensive wounds” and a
medical history of terminated pregnancy. Under the standards set
by State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335],
quashing is permissible only when the allegations, even if taken
as true, do not disclose an offence. Here, the allegations not only
disclose offences but provide a granular detail that mandates a
factual inquiry.
52. The learned counsel for the petitioners has heavily relied on the
argument that “matrimonial relatives” are being unjustly dragged
into a civil dispute. However, the ratio in Taramani Parakh v.
State of M.P. and Veena Mittal v. State of Uttar Pradesh makes it
clear that the status of being a relative does not grant a “blanket
immunity” when specific acts of cruelty and physical assault are
attributed to them. In the present case, the roles of Petitioner
Nos. 2 and 5 in the abdominal assault and the role of the Bihar-
based relatives in the alleged instigation of a life-threatening
attack are triable issues. For this Court to quash the proceedings
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at this stage would be to usurp the function of the Trial Court
and to pre-judge the veracity of a victim who carries physical
scars as evidence of her ordeal.
53. Furthermore, the argument regarding the Decree of Divorce does
not tilt the scale in favor of quashing. A civil dissolution of
marriage cannot act as a “judicial amnesty” for criminal acts of
the nature alleged here, specifically forced miscarriage and
attempted murder. The “ends of justice” would be better served by
allowing the prosecution to reach its natural conclusion in the
crucible of a trial. To “throttle” the case now would be to deny the
victim her day in court and would set a dangerous precedent that
grave violence within a marriage can be neutralized by a
subsequent civil decree.
54. Consequently, this Court finds that the prosecution is not
“manifestly attended with mala fides,” nor is it “patently absurd.”
There exists a prima facie case with sufficient factual density and
medical corroboration to warrant a full-fledged trial. The inherent
powers under Section 482 are meant to protect the innocent from
harassment, but they cannot be used to shield the accused from
a legitimate trial for heinous offences. The continuation of the
proceedings against the petitioners does not, therefore, constitute
an abuse of the process of law.
55. The existence of a prima facie case, supported by specific overt
acts and independent medical corroboration, necessitates a trial.
The continuation of the proceedings does not amount to an abuse
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of the judicial process, and the invocation of inherent powers to
quash the same is not warranted in the present facts and
circumstances.
CONCISE FINDINGS ON THE POINTS OF LAW
56. Having meticulously evaluated the competing submissions and
the investigative record, this Court arrives at the following
distilled legal findings:
57. The judicial protection afforded to matrimonial relatives against
“vague and omnibus” allegations, as established in Geeta
Mehrotra, is not an absolute immunity. Where an FIR provides
date-specific, site-specific, and role-specific accounts of physical
violence (such as the abdominal assault of July 4, 2016), the
allegations transcend the threshold of “perfunctory recitals” and
constitute a prima facie triable case.
58. In matters involving the loss of a foetus due to physical trauma,
the “proximate overt act” (e.g., kicks to the abdomen) attributed to
specific accused creates a substantial triable issue. A temporal
delay in reporting or the subsequent birth of another child does
not, at the threshold stage, extinguish the gravity of the initial
offence, which must be tested through medical evidence and
cross-examination.
59. Physical presence at the locus delicti is not a prerequisite for
criminal liability in the age of modern communication. Allegations
of “telephonic instigation” and shared common intention, when
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linked to a specific heinous act (such as an attempt to slit the
throat), provide a sufficient legal bridge to compel absentee
relatives to stand trial. The shield of “territorial distance,” as
discussed in Taramani Parakh, cannot be used to quash
proceedings when the “intellectual will” of the remote accused is
prima facie linked to the crime.
60. Clinical findings of “defensive wounds” in a medical report act as
independent, objective anchors for a charge under Section 307
IPC. Such injuries signify a life-threatening struggle and parrying
of lethal force, providing the requisite prima facie intent or
knowledge required to sustain a prosecution for attempted
murder at the quashing stage.
61. A decree of divorce serves only to alter the civil status of the
parties; it does not grant retrospective amnesty for criminal
conduct committed during the subsistence of the marriage.
Criminal accountability for heinous offences (Sections 307, 313
IPC) remains independent of the marital bond and cannot be
extinguished by the dissolution of the union.
62. The inherent power to quash is reserved for cases of “patent
absurdity” or “manifest bad faith.” Where the “factual matrix”
contains granular accusations supported by medical
documentation, the High Court must refrain from conducting a
“mini-trial” or evaluating the reliability of evidence, as the ends of
justice are best served by a full factual determination in the Trial
Court.
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RATIO DECIDENDI AND CONCLUSION
63. The quintessence of the legal reasoning, the ratio decidendi,
underpinning this judgment is predicated upon the following
three-fold logic:
(i) the inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is not
an instrument for a “pre-trial acquittal.” Where the
allegations, taken at their face value, disclose the
essential ingredients of grave offences like Section 307
and 313 of the IPC, and are supported by an
independent medical trail of “defensive wounds,” the
High Court cannot usurp the role of the Trial Court to
weigh the probabilities of the case.
(ii) the “vague and omnibus” rule is a shield against
frivolous matrimonial bickering, not a sanctuary for
those accused of specific overt acts of visceral
brutality. The existence of a date-specific narrative
and clinical documentation transforms a matrimonial
dispute into a case of substantive criminality.
(iii) territorial distance is no bar to criminal culpability
under the principles of Common Intention (Section 34
IPC) and Abetment (Section 109 IPC). Telephonic
instigation, if proven, constitutes sufficient intellectual
participation to warrant a trial, and a civil decree of
divorce cannot act as a retrospective amnesty for such
criminal acts.
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64. In the light of the discussions held hereinabove, I am of the firm
view that the materials on record disclose a formidable prima
facie case against all the petitioners. The questions of alibi, the
reliability of the medical history, and the extent of participation
are disputed questions of fact which must be tested in the
crucible of a trial.
CONCLUSION
65. The cumulative audit of the factual matrix and the settled legal
position leads this Court to the inescapable conclusion that the
present petition does not meet the stringent criteria for quashing
under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. While this Court is cognizant of
the judicial alarm raised in Geeta Mehrotra and Preeti Gupta
regarding the over-implication of matrimonial relatives, those
safeguards cannot be stretched to provide a sanctuary where the
allegations are specific, visceral, and corroborated by clinical
documentation.
66. The existence of “defensive wounds” and the specific attribution of
an abdominal assault resulting in miscarriage lift this case out of
the realm of “domestic bickering” and place it firmly within the
category of substantive criminality. To stifle the prosecution at
this juncture would be to deny the de-facto complainant the
opportunity to seek justice for alleged acts that have caused
profound physical and reproductive trauma. The truth of these
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competing narratives must be distilled in the crucible of a trial,
not in a summary proceeding before this Court.
CONSEQUENTIAL ORDERS AND DIRECTIONS
67. In light of the findings recorded above, this court is disposing this
revision by passing the following orders and directions:
(i) The criminal revision application filed by the petitioners
under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. for quashing of the
proceedings in Sessions Case No. 179 of 2020 [arising out
of Durgapur (Women) P.S. Case No. 24 of 2018], is hereby
dismissed.
(ii) CRAN 1 of 2024, CRAN 2 of 2024 and CRAN 3 of 2025 are
also disposed of accordingly.
(iii)All interim orders previously granted by this Court,
including any stay on the proceedings in the Court below,
stand vacated with immediate effect.
(iv) The learned Additional Sessions Judge, 1st Court,
Durgapur, Paschim Bardhaman is directed to proceed with
the trial with utmost expedition. Considering that the FIR
dates back to 2018 and the incident involves a grave charge
under Section 313 IPC, the Trial Court shall endeavour to
conclude the recording of evidence and deliver the final
judgment as early as possible.
(v) The petitioners are directed to appear before the Trial Court
on the next date fixed for hearing and shall strictly comply
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to cancel the bail of any petitioner who seeks to protract
the proceedings by seeking unnecessary adjournments.
(vi) It is further clarified that the observations made by this
Court in this judgment are limited to the determination of
the prima facie case for the purpose of Section 482 Cr.P.C.
(vii) The learned Trial Court shall proceed with the trial strictly
on the basis of the evidence adduced before it, without
being influenced by any observations made herein
regarding the merits of the case.
(viii) The Registry is directed to communicate a copy of this
judgment / order to the learned Court below forthwith and
ensure the transmission of the Trial Court Records, if any,
within one week.
68. The Trial Court Record (TCR), if any, shall be sent down to the
Trial Court, at once.
69. Case diary, if any, be returned forthwith.
70. There shall be no order as to costs.
71. Urgent photostat certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be
supplied to the parties upon compliance with all requisite
formalities.
(Uday Kumar, J.)
