Chattisgarh High Court
Ramphal Paikra vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 3 July, 2026
Author: Ramesh Sinha
Bench: Ramesh Sinha
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CGHC010124902024 2026:CGHC:27341-DB
NAFR
MANPREET
KAUR
Digitally signed
by MANPREET
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
KAUR
Date: 2026.07.07
11:19:27 +0530
CRA No. 749 of 2024
Ramphal Paikra S/o Dandu Paikra Aged About 24 Years R/o Village
Sarnadih P.S. Sankargarh, District Balrampur Ramanujganj
Chhattisgarh.
... Appellant(s)
versus
State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Station House Officer, P.S.
Sankargarh District Balrampur - Ramanujganj Chhattisgarh.
... Respondent(s)
For Appellant(s) : Mr. A.N. Pandey, Advocate
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Priyank Rathi, G.A.
Hon'ble Shri Justice Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Hon'ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J.
Judgment on Board
Per Ramesh Sinha, CJ
03.07.2026
1. In compliance with the order of this Court dated 18.06.2026, a
report has been submitted by the learned Principal District and
Sessions Judge, Balrampur-Ramanujganj (C.G.). As per the
report dated 24.06.2026, the co-accused, namely, Budhram
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Pankra, was convicted under Section 363 read with Section 34 of
the IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a
period of three years along with a fine of Rs.500/- by judgment
dated 06.03.2024 passed in Special Sessions Case No. 26/2022.
It has further been reported that on the very same day, i.e.,
06.03.2024, the said co-accused preferred an application under
Section 389(3) of the Cr.P.C. seeking suspension of sentence,
which was allowed, and he was released on bail. However,
thereafter, he neither appeared before the concerned Court nor
preferred any appeal against the judgment of conviction. The
present appellant, on the other hand, stands convicted for the
offence punishable under Section 376 of the IPC and has been
sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for twenty years
under the provisions of the POCSO Act. In view of the aforesaid
facts, we proceed to hear and decide the present appeal on
merits on behalf of the present appellant.
2. This appeal arises out of the judgment of conviction and order of
sentence dated 06.03.2024 passed by the Additional Sessions
Judge, First (F.T.S.C.), Special Judge (POCSO Act),
Ramanujganj, District- Balrampur-Ramanujganj in Special
Sessions Case No. 129/2019, whereby the appellant has been
convicted for the offences as under:-
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Conviction Sentence Fine Additional
under Section Imprisonment in
default of
payment of fine
Section 363/34 R.I. for 5 years Rs. 500/- 01 month R.I.
of the IPC
Section 366 of R.I. for 5 years Rs. 500/- 01 month R.I.
the IPC
Section 6 of the R.I. for 20 years Rs.25,000/- 2 months R.I.
POCSO Act
All sentences have been directed to run concurrently.
3. The prosecution case, in brief, is that on 14.03.2022, a written
report (Ex. P-3) was lodged by the father of the victim (PW-2) at
Police Station Shankargarh alleging that his minor daughter, aged
about 13 years, had gone to attend the weekly market at
Shankargarh but did not return home. It was further alleged that
the appellant had taken her away without the consent of her lawful
guardian. On the basis of the said report, FIR (Ex.P-4) was
registered for the offence punishable under Section 363 of the
IPC and investigation was taken up.
4. During investigation, the victim was traced and recovered on the
very same day from Village Rakiya. Her statement was recorded,
wherein she levelled allegations against the appellant regarding
the commission of offences during the period she remained in his
company. The victim was thereafter medically examined and the
medical report was obtained as part of the investigation.
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5. The Investigating Officer also collected the school records of the
victim for determination of her age, seized the articles relevant to
the investigation, recorded the memorandum statement of the
appellant, pursuant to which certain belongings of the victim were
recovered, and caused the appellant to undergo medical
examination. The seized articles were forwarded to the Forensic
Science Laboratory for scientific examination. During
investigation, the statements of the witnesses under Section 161
of the Cr.P.C. and the statement of the victim under Section 164 of
the Cr.P.C. were also recorded.
6. Upon completion of investigation, the police filed the charge-sheet
against the appellant and the co-accused for offences punishable
under Sections 363, 366, 392, 376(2)(d) read with Section 34 of
the IPC and Sections 4 and 6 of the POCSO Act.
7. The learned Special Court framed charges against the appellant
under Sections 363/34, 366/34 and 376(3) of the IPC and Section
6 of the POCSO Act, and against the co-accused under Section
363 read with Section 34 of the IPC and Section 17 of the
POCSO Act. The accused denied the charges and claimed trial.
8. In support of its case, the prosecution examined ten witnesses
and exhibited the relevant documentary evidence. After
completion of the prosecution evidence, the statements of the
accused were recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., wherein
they denied the incriminating circumstances appearing against
5
them, pleaded false implication and did not adduce any evidence
in defence.
9. The defence contended that the prosecution had failed to
establish the age of the victim beyond reasonable doubt, that the
evidence suffered from material contradictions and omissions,
and that the allegations had not been proved beyond reasonable
doubt. The prosecution, on the other hand, submitted that the oral
and documentary evidence sufficiently established the guilt of the
accused and prayed for their conviction.
10. After appreciation of evidence available on record, the learned
trial Court has convicted the accused/appellant and sentenced
him as mentioned in para 1 of the judgment. Hence, this appeal.
11. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the impugned
judgment of conviction and order of sentence is illegal, perverse
and contrary to the evidence available on record. It is contended
that the prosecution has failed to establish beyond reasonable
doubt that the victim was a minor on the date of the alleged
incident, as PW-4, the Headmaster, admitted that no documentary
proof of her date of birth had been furnished at the time of her
admission, while PW-2, the father of the victim, stated that the
date of birth entered in the school records was based merely on
his estimation and not on any authentic document. It is further
argued that the testimonies of the victim (PW-1) and her father
(PW-2) suffer from material omissions and contradictions vis-Ã -vis
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their previous statements, thereby rendering their evidence
unreliable. Learned counsel also points out that the independent
seizure witness, PW-3 Pradeep Kumar, did not support the
prosecution case and was declared hostile. It is further submitted
that although the father of the victim alleged that he had received
a phone call informing him that the victim had been taken away,
the prosecution neither established the ownership of the mobile
number nor connected it with the appellant. Referring to the
evidence of PW-5, Dr. Shashikala Toppo, it is contended that the
medical evidence does not conclusively support the prosecution
case, as the doctor was unable to give any definite opinion
regarding recent sexual intercourse. It is also urged that no test
identification parade was conducted, the prosecution has failed to
adduce any cogent or independent evidence connecting the
appellant with the alleged offences, and the trial Court failed to
appreciate these material infirmities in their proper perspective. It
is, therefore, submitted that the prosecution has failed to prove its
case beyond reasonable doubt and that the appellant is entitled to
acquittal by setting aside the impugned judgment of conviction
and sentence.
12. Learned State counsel, supporting the impugned judgment,
submits that the prosecution has succeeded in establishing the
guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt through cogent
and reliable oral as well as documentary evidence. It is contended
that the testimony of the victim is natural, consistent and inspires
7
confidence, and is duly corroborated by her statement recorded
under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C., the medical evidence and the
surrounding circumstances. It is further submitted that the age of
the victim has been duly established from the school records
collected during the investigation, and the trial Court has rightly
held her to be a minor on the date of the incident. Learned State
counsel argues that the minor discrepancies and omissions
pointed out by the defence are inconsequential and do not affect
the core of the prosecution case. It is further submitted that the
evidence on record clearly establishes that the appellant had
taken the victim away from the lawful guardianship of her parents
and thereafter committed the offence alleged against him. The
findings recorded by the learned Special Court are based on
proper appreciation of the evidence and settled principles of law,
warranting no interference by this Court in the present appeal.
Accordingly, it is prayed that the appeal, being devoid of merit,
deserves to be dismissed.
13. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused
the record with utmost circumspection.
14. The issue that arises for consideration in the present appeal is
whether the testimony of the victim deserves acceptance and
whether the prosecution has established the case of the appellant
beyond reasonable doubt.
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15. It is pertinent to observe that the question whether conviction of
the accused can be based on the sole testimony of the victim in
cases of sexual assault/rape is no longer res integra. The Hon’ble
Supreme Court has dealt with the issue in a catena of judgments
and has held that the sole testimony of the victim if found reliable
can be the sole ground for convicting the accused and that the
creditworthy testimony of the victim in cases of such nature
deserves acceptance.
16. The next issue that arises for consideration in the present appeal
is whether the age of the victim on the date of commission of the
offence concerned, was below 18 years of age.
17. Regarding the age of the victim, the first contention advanced on
behalf of the appellant is that the prosecution has failed to
establish that the child victim was below eighteen years of age on
the date of the incident. Learned counsel has submitted that the
school record cannot be safely relied upon as PW-4, the
Headmaster, admitted that no document relating to the date of
birth had been produced at the time of admission and PW-2, the
father of the victim, also stated that the date of birth was entered
in the school records on the basis of his estimation.
18. We have carefully considered the aforesaid submission and
perused the evidence available on record. PW-1, the child victim,
has stated that her date of birth is 04.07.2009. Significantly, this
part of her testimony remained unshaken during cross-
9
examination. PW-2, the father of the child victim, has also
deposed that at the time of the incident, his daughter was about
14 years of age. Although, during cross-examination, he stated
that he was not aware of the exact date of birth and that no birth
certificate had been furnished at the time of admission in the
school, such admission, by itself, is not sufficient to discard the
documentary evidence otherwise brought on record.
19. PW-4 Dashrath Ram, the Headmaster of the concerned school,
proved the admission register and the certified extract thereof (Ex.
P-10C). He categorically deposed that the child victim was
admitted to Class-I on 02.07.2014 and that her date of birth was
recorded in the admission register as 04.07.2009. Though he
admitted that he had not himself made the relevant entry and that
the register does not disclose the document on the basis of which
the date of birth was recorded, nothing substantial could be
elicited in his cross-examination to doubt the authenticity of the
school records maintained in the ordinary course of official
business.
20. Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of
Children) Act, 2015 prescribes the manner in which the age of a
child is to be determined. The provision accords primacy to the
matriculation or equivalent certificate and, in its absence, to the
birth certificate issued by the school first attended. It is only in the
absence of such documentary evidence that recourse can be
10
taken to medical opinion. The principles governing determination
of age under the aforesaid provision have been recognized by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jarnail Singh v. State of Haryana,
reported in 2013 (7) SCC 263 wherein it has been held that the
documents enumerated under the statutory scheme constitute the
primary evidence for determination of age.
21. It is equally well settled that entries made in public or official
records maintained in the discharge of official duties are relevant
under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. In Ravinder
Singh Gorkhi v. State of U.P., reported in (2006) 5 SCC 584 the
Hon’ble Supreme Court held that entries in official registers
maintained in the ordinary course of business constitute relevant
evidence unless their authenticity is successfully impeached.
22. Tested on the aforesaid principles, we find no reason to discard
the school records relied upon by the prosecution. The admission
register pertains to the first school attended by the child victim and
has been duly proved through the Headmaster. Merely because
the document on the basis of which the date of birth was initially
entered was not available, the evidentiary value of the school
record does not stand effaced, particularly when there is no
material to suggest that the entry was manipulated or fabricated.
The oral testimony of PW-1 and PW-2 substantially corroborates
the documentary evidence.
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23. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are satisfied that the
prosecution has successfully established that the date of birth of
the child victim is 04.07.2009. Consequently, on the date of the
incident, i.e., 14.03.2022, she was about 12 years and 8 months
of age and, therefore, was a “child” within the meaning of Section
2(1)(d) of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act,
2012. The finding recorded by the learned Special Court on this
aspect is based on proper appreciation of the evidence and does
not warrant interference
24. The next crucial aspect for consideration is the testimony of the
child victim (PW-1).
25. The prosecution has primarily relied upon the testimony of the
child victim (PW-1). In her examination-in-chief recorded on
12.07.2022, she deposed that since the year 2019, while she was
attending school, the appellant had been repeatedly approaching
her, stopping her on the way and asking for her mobile phone
number. She further stated that on the date of the incident, she
was travelling from Manoharpur to Shankargarh by an auto-
rickshaw for the purpose of getting her Aadhaar Card corrected.
According to her, when the auto-rickshaw reached near Khairadih
forest, the appellant contacted her on her mobile phone,
threatened her with a knife and directed her to get down from the
vehicle. Owing to the threat extended by the appellant, she
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alighted from the auto-rickshaw near Khairadih forest and started
walking back towards her village.
26. PW-1 further deposed that shortly thereafter, the appellant and co-
accused Budhram arrived on a motorcycle from the direction of
Shankargarh. According to her, they covered her mouth, forcibly
made her sit on the motorcycle and took her to Pendardih forest.
She stated that co-accused Budhram was driving the motorcycle,
she was seated in the middle and the appellant sat behind her
while restraining her. She further deposed that after taking her to
the forest area, the appellant subjected her to penetrative sexual
assault. PW-1 further deposed that after the occurrence, she was
assaulted and her hands were tied behind her back with her
dupatta. She stated that when the appellant moved away for a
short while, she managed to escape from the place of occurrence,
ran for about two kilometres and reached the house of a Pahadi
Korwa family. From the mobile phone of the lady residing therein,
she contacted her father and informed him about her
whereabouts. She further stated that the police thereafter reached
the said place and recovered her. This part of her testimony is
corroborated by the recovery memo (Ex.P-1) as well as by the
testimony of Laxmania (PW-8), in whose house the victim had
taken shelter.
27. PW-2, the father of the victim, deposed that after receiving
information from the appellant over the telephone that the victim
13
had been taken away, he searched for his daughter and
subsequently received a telephone call from the victim informing
him about her location. Thereafter, he lodged the written
complaint (Ex.P-3) at Police Station Shankargarh, on the basis of
which the First Information Report (Ex.P-4) was registered. He
further proved that the Investigating Officer prepared the spot map
(Ex.P-5) in his presence and also stated that he had given his
consent for the medical examination of the victim.
28. Laxmania (PW-8), an independent witness, supported the
prosecution case by deposing that the victim had reached her
house after escaping from the place of occurrence and that the
police subsequently recovered the victim from her house under
the recovery memo (Ex.P-1).
29. The prosecution has further examined Pradeep Kumar (PW-3),
who is a witness to the memorandum and seizure proceedings.
He supported the prosecution case regarding the memorandum
statement of the appellant (Ex.P-7) recorded by the Investigating
Officer and the consequent seizure of the victim’s Aadhaar Card,
bank passbook, mobile phone and cash amounting to Rs.680/-
from the possession of the appellant under seizure memo (Ex.P-
8). Although PW-3 stated during cross-examination that the
contents of the memorandum and seizure memo were not read
over to him, he categorically denied the suggestion that no
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memorandum proceedings had taken place in his presence or
that no recovery had been effected from the appellant.
30. Amit Gupta (PW-7), the Investigating Officer, deposed that during
investigation he recorded the memorandum statement of the
appellant (Ex.P-7) in accordance with law, pursuant to which the
articles belonging to the victim were recovered and seized under
seizure memo (Ex.P-8). He further proved the seizure of the
school admission register under seizure memo (Ex.P-9), the
recovery of the victim under recovery memo (Ex.P-1), the
registration of the First Information Report (Ex.P-4), preparation of
the spot map (Ex.P-5), and the other investigative steps
undertaken during the course of investigation. He further stated
that, on the basis of the disclosure made by the appellant, the
involvement of co-accused Budhram came to light. Although no
Test Identification Parade was conducted, the victim (PW-1),
during her deposition before the trial Court, identified co-accused
Budhram in Court as the person who had accompanied the
appellant on the date of the incident.
31. The medical evidence has been adduced through Dr. Shashikala
Toppo (PW-5), who examined the victim on 15.03.2022 at the
Community Health Centre, Shankargarh. She deposed that, upon
clinical examination, she noticed abrasions measuring
approximately 0.5 cm × 0.5 cm on both lower limbs of the victim,
which, in her opinion, could have been caused by a hard and
15
blunt object within about twenty-four hours prior to the
examination. She further found that the hymen was old torn.
During the examination, vaginal smear slides and pubic hair
samples were collected and sealed for forensic examination. The
medical examination report has been proved as Ex.P-11.
32. PW-5 further deposed that, on the basis of the clinical
examination alone, she was not in a position to express any
definite opinion regarding recent sexual intercourse and,
therefore, advised that the samples collected during examination
be forwarded for forensic analysis. She also examined the
undergarment of the victim, on which a whitish stain was noticed,
and recommended its forensic examination. The said report has
been proved as Ex.P-12. Nothing material has been elicited
during her cross-examination so as to discredit either the medical
examination conducted by her or the findings recorded in the
medical reports.
33. The prosecution further examined Dr. Anil Singh (PW-10), who
medically examined the appellant on 15.03.2022. He deposed
that, upon examination, the appellant was found physically
capable of performing sexual intercourse. The medical
examination report has been proved as Ex.P-15. PW-10 further
deposed that he examined the undergarment of the appellant and,
although no visible stain was noticed thereon, the same was
sealed and forwarded for forensic examination. The relevant
16
report has been proved as Ex.P-16. His testimony has also
remained substantially unchallenged during cross-examination.
34. The prosecution has also relied upon the report of the Forensic
Science Laboratory (Ex.P-17). The said report indicates the
presence of human spermatozoa on the vaginal smear slides
collected during the medical examination of the victim. The
scientific evidence, therefore, lends assurance to the prosecution
version and corroborates the testimony of the child victim
regarding the commission of penetrative sexual assault.
35. Though PW-5 did not express any conclusive opinion regarding
recent sexual intercourse solely on the basis of clinical
examination, such circumstance, by itself, does not weaken the
prosecution case. Medical evidence is essentially corroborative in
nature and cannot override otherwise cogent and reliable ocular
testimony. In the present case, the medical evidence, when read
conjointly with the forensic report (Ex.P-17) and the consistent
testimony of the child victim (PW-1), provides substantial
corroboration to the prosecution case.
36. The Supreme Court in the matter of Rai Sandeep @ Deenu v.
State of NCT of Delhi, 2012 (8) SCC 21 held as under:-
“22. In our considered opinion, the ‘sterling witness’
should be of a very high quality and caliber whose
version should, therefore, be unassailable. The Court
considering the version of such witness should be in a
position to accept it for its face value without any
17hesitation. To test the quality of such a witness, the
status of the witness would be immaterial and what
would be relevant is the truthfulness of the statement
made by such a witness. What would be more relevant
would be the consistency of the statement right from
the starting point till the end, namely, at the time when
the witness makes the initial statement and ultimately
before the Court. It should be natural and consistent
with the case of the prosecution qua the accused.
There should not be any prevarication in the version of
such a witness. The witness should be in a position to
withstand the cross-examination of any length and
howsoever strenuous it may be and under no
circumstance should give room for any doubt as to the
factum of the occurrence, the persons involved, as
well as, the sequence of it. Such a version should
have co-relation with each and everyone of other
supporting material such as the recoveries made, the
weapons used, the manner of offence committed, the
scientific evidence and the expert opinion. The said
version should consistently match with the version of
every other witness. It can even be stated that it
should be akin to the test applied in the case of
circumstantial evidence where there should not be any
missing link in the chain of circumstances to hold the
accused guilty of the offence alleged against him. Only
if the version of such a witness qualifies the above test
as well as all other similar such tests to be applied, it
can be held that such a witness can be called as a
‘sterling witness’ whose version can be accepted by
the Court without any corroboration and based on
which the guilty can be punished. To be more precise,
the version of the said witness on the core spectrum of
18the crime should remain intact while all other attendant
materials, namely, oral, documentary and material
objects should match the said version in material
particulars in order to enable the Court trying the
offence to rely on the core version to sieve the other
supporting materials for holding the offender guilty of
the charge alleged.”
37. In the matter of Alakh Alok Srivastava v. Union of India & Ors.,
(2018) 17 SCC 291, in paras 14 and 20, it is observed as under:
“14. At the very outset, it has to be stated with authority
that the Pocso Act is a gender legislation. This Act has
been divided into various chapters and parts therein.
Chapter II of the Act titled “Sexual Offences Against
Children” is segregated into five parts. Part A of the
said Chapter contains two sections, namely, Section 3
and Section 4. Section 3 defines the offence of
“Penetrative Sexual Assault” whereas Section 4 lays
down the punishment for the said offence. Likewise,
Part B of the said Chapter titled “Aggravated
Penetrative Sexual Assault and Punishment therefor”
contains two sections, namely, Section 5 and Section
6. The various subsections of Section 5 copiously deal
with various situations, circumstances and categories
of persons where the offence of penetrative sexual
assault would take the character of the offence of
aggravated penetrative sexual assault. Section 5(k), in
particular, while laying emphasis on the mental stability
of a child stipulates that where an offender commits
penetrative sexual assault on a child, by taking
advantage of the child’s mental or physical disability, it
shall amount to an offence of aggravated penetrative
sexual assault.”
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“20. Speaking about the child, a three Judge Bench in
M.C. Mehta v. State of T.N. (1996) 6 SCC 756 “1. …
“child is the father of man”. To enable fathering of a
valiant and vibrant man, the child must be groomed
well in the formative years of his life. He must receive
education, acquire knowledge of man and materials
and blossom in such an atmosphere that on reaching
age, he is found to be a man with a mission, a man
who matters so far as the society is concerned.”
38. The Supreme Court in the matter of Nawabuddin v. State
of Uttarakhand (CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.144 OF 2022), decided
on 8.2.2022 has held as under:-
“10. Keeping in mind the aforesaid objects and to
achieve what has been provided under Article 15 and
39 of the Constitution to protect children from the
offences of sexual assault, sexual harassment, the
POCSO Act, 2012 has been enacted. Any act of sexual
assault or sexual harassment to the children should be
viewed very seriously and all such offences of sexual
assault, sexual harassment on the children have to be
dealt with in a stringent manner and no leniency should
be shown to a person who has committed the offence
under the POCSO Act. By awarding a suitable
punishment commensurate with the act of sexual
assault, sexual harassment, a message must be
conveyed to the society at large that, if anybody
commits any offence under the POCSO Act of sexual
assault, sexual harassment or use of children for
pornographic purposes they shall be punished suitably
and no leniency shall be shown to them. Cases of
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sexual assault or sexual harassment on the children
are instances of perverse lust for sex where even
innocent children are not spared in pursuit of such
debased sexual pleasure.
Children are precious human resources of our country;
they are the country’s future. The hope of tomorrow
rests on them. But unfortunately, in our country, a girl
child is in a very vulnerable position. There are
different modes of her exploitation, including sexual
assault and/or sexual abuse. In our view, exploitation
of children in such a manner is a crime against
humanity and the society. Therefore, the children and
more particularly the girl child deserve full protection
and need greater care and protection whether in the
urban or rural areas. As observed and held by this
Court in the case of State of Rajasthan v. Om
Prakash, (2002) 5 SCC 745, children need special
care and protection and, in such cases, responsibility
on the shoulders of the Courts is more onerous so as
to provide proper legal protection to these children. In
the case of Nipun Saxena v. Union of India, (2019) 2
SCC 703, it is observed by this Court that a minor who
is subjected to sexual abuse needs to be protected
even more than a major victim because a major victim
being an adult may still be able to withstand the social
ostracization and mental harassment meted out by
society, but a minor victim will find it difficult to do so.
Most crimes against minor victims are not even
reported as very often, the perpetrator of the crime is a
member of the family of the victim or a close friend.
Therefore, the child needs extra protection. Therefore,
no leniency can be shown to an accused who has
committed the offences under the POCSO Act, 2012
21
and particularly when the same is proved by adequate
evidence before a court of law.”
39. When considering the evidence of a victim subjected to a sexual
offence, the Court does not necessarily demand an almost
accurate account of the incident. Instead, the emphasis is on
allowing the victim to provide her version based on her
recollection of events, to the extent reasonably possible for her to
recollect. If the Court deems such evidence credible and free from
doubt, there is hardly any insistence on corroboration of that
version. In State of H.P. v. Shree Kant Shekar (2004) 8 SCC 153
the Hon‟ble Supreme Court held as follows:”
“21. It is well settled that a prosecutrix complaining of
having been a victim of the offence of rape is not an
accomplice after the crime. There is no rule of law that
her testimony cannot be acted without corroboration in
material particulars. She stands on a higher pedestal
than an injured witness. In the latter case, there is
injury on the physical form, while in the former it is
physical as well as psychological and emotional.
However, if the court on facts finds it difficult to accept
the version of the prosecutrix on its face value, it may
search for evidence, direct or circumstantial, which
would lend assurance to her testimony. Assurance,
short of corroboration, as understood in the context of
an accomplice, would suffice.”
40. On these lines, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shivasharanappa
and Others v. State of Karnataka, (2013) 5 SCC 705 observed
as follows:
22
“17. Thus, it is well settled in law that the court can rely
upon the testimony of a child witness and it can form
the basis of conviction if the same is credible, truthful
and is corroborated by other evidence brought on
record. Needless to say as a rule of prudence, the
court thinks it desirable to see the corroboration from
other reliable evidence placed on record. The
principles that apply for placing reliance on the solitary
statement of the witness, namely, that the statement is
true and correct and is of quality and cannot be
discarded solely on the ground of lack of corroboration,
apply to a child witness who is competent and whose
version is reliable.”
41. The Supreme court in the matter of State of UP v. Sonu
Kushwaha, (2023) 7 SCC 475 has held as under :
“12. The POCSO Act was enacted to provide more
stringent punishments for the offences of child abuse
of various kinds and that is why minimum punishments
have been prescribed in Sections 4, 6, 8 and 10 of the
POCSO Act for various categories of sexual assaults
on children. Hence, Section 6,on its plain language,
leaves no discretion to the Court and there is no option
but to impose the minimum sentence as done by the
Trial Court. When a penal provision uses the
phraseology “shall not be less than….”, the Courts
cannot do offence to the Section and impose a lesser
sentence. The Courts are powerless to do that unless
there is a specific statutory provision enabling the
Court to impose a lesser sentence. However, we find
no such provision in the POCSO Act. Therefore,
notwithstanding the fact that the respondent may have
moved ahead in life after undergoing the sentence as
23modified by the High Court, there is no question of
showing any leniency to him. Apart from the fact that
the law provides for a minimum sentence, the crime
committed by the respondent is very gruesome which
calls for very stringent punishment. The impact of the
obnoxious act on the mind of the victim/child will be
lifelong. The impact is bound to adversely affect the
healthy growth of the victim. There is no dispute that
the age of the victim was less than twelve years at the
time of the incident. Therefore, we have no option but
to set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court
and restore the judgment of the Trial Court.”
42. Having bestowed our anxious consideration to the entire evidence
available on record, we find that the testimony of the child victim
(PW-1) inspires confidence and is wholly reliable. Her narration of
the occurrence has remained consistent on all material particulars
from the inception of the prosecution case till her deposition
before the trial Court. She has unequivocally stated that the
appellant threatened her, compelled her to alight from the auto-
rickshaw, forcibly took her to the forest area and thereafter
committed penetrative sexual assault upon her. Despite lengthy
cross-examination, nothing substantial could be elicited so as to
impeach her credibility or create any reasonable doubt regarding
the occurrence as narrated by her.
43. We find that the evidence of the child victim receives substantial
corroboration from the testimony of her father (PW-2). PW-2 has
deposed regarding the information received by him over the
24
telephone, the prompt lodging of the written complaint (Ex.P-3),
registration of the First Information Report (Ex.P-4) and the
subsequent recovery of the victim. His testimony also establishes
that immediately upon receiving information from the victim
regarding her whereabouts, he informed the police, which
ultimately led to her recovery. The promptness with which the
criminal law was set into motion excludes any possibility of false
implication after deliberation.
44. The prosecution version also finds independent corroboration
from the testimony of Laxmania (PW-8), who has categorically
deposed that the victim reached her house after escaping from
the place of occurrence and sought shelter there. PW-8 has
further proved that the police recovered the victim from her house
under Recovery Memo (Ex.P-1). The testimony of this witness,
who has no animus against the appellant, lends considerable
assurance to the prosecution case.
45. The memorandum statement of the appellant (Ex.P-7) and the
consequential recovery effected under Seizure Memo (Ex.P-8)
constitute another important incriminating circumstance. Amit
Gupta (PW-7), the Investigating Officer, has proved that pursuant
to the disclosure statement made by the appellant, the victim’s
Aadhaar Card, passbook, mobile phone and cash were recovered
from his possession. Though Pradeep Kumar (PW-03) was
subjected to cross-examination, he has not denied his presence
25
during the memorandum proceedings or the recovery effected
pursuant thereto. Merely because he stated that the contents of
the documents were not read over to him cannot render the
memorandum or the consequential recovery inadmissible or
unreliable.
46. The criticism advanced on behalf of the appellant that PW-3 did
not fully support the prosecution case is also misconceived. It is
well settled that the testimony of a witness is not liable to be
discarded in toto merely because he has not supported every part
of the prosecution version. The Court is entitled to rely upon that
part of the testimony which is otherwise found to be credible and
is corroborated by other evidence available on record. In the
present case, the material portion of the evidence of PW-3
regarding the memorandum proceedings and recovery stands
duly corroborated by the testimony of the Investigating Officer
(PW-7).
47. Equally significant is the medical and scientific evidence brought
on record. Dr. Shashikala Toppo (PW-5), who examined the
victim, noticed abrasions over both lower limbs and proved the
medical examination report (Ex.P-11). Though she did not
express any definite opinion regarding recent sexual intercourse
solely on clinical examination, she collected vaginal smear slides,
pubic hair and other biological samples for forensic examination.
The supplementary medical report (Ex.P-12) further records that a
26
whitish stain was noticed on the undergarment of the victim, which
was preserved and forwarded for forensic analysis.
48. Dr. Anil Singh (PW-10), who medically examined the appellant,
proved the medical examination report (Ex.P-15) and opined that
the appellant was physically capable of performing sexual
intercourse. He also proved the report relating to the articles
collected from the appellant (Ex.P-16). Nothing has been elicited
during his cross-examination so as to cast any doubt upon the
medical examination conducted by him.
49. The Forensic Science Laboratory Report (Ex.P-17) assumes
considerable significance. The report confirms the presence of
human spermatozoa on the vaginal smear slides collected during
the medical examination of the victim. The scientific evidence thus
lends strong corroboration to the ocular testimony of the child
victim and completely rules out the argument that the prosecution
case is unsupported by medical or scientific evidence.
50. Much emphasis was laid by the learned counsel for the appellant
on the submission that PW-5 did not give a conclusive opinion
regarding recent sexual intercourse. In our considered opinion,
the said contention deserves to be rejected. It is a settled principle
of criminal jurisprudence that medical evidence is essentially
corroborative in nature. Where the testimony of the victim is
trustworthy and inspires confidence, absence of a definite medical
opinion or even absence of injuries cannot by itself be a ground to
27
discard the otherwise reliable ocular evidence. In the present
case, the medical evidence, scientific evidence and documentary
evidence, when read conjointly with the testimony of PW-1,
furnish complete assurance to the prosecution case.
51. We also do not find any substance in the submission that the
absence of a Test Identification Parade is fatal to the prosecution.
The victim herself has categorically deposed that she had known
the appellant since the year 2019 as he used to repeatedly
approach and harass her while she was going to school. The
identity of the appellant was, therefore, never in dispute and no
Test Identification Parade was required. So far as the co-accused
Budhram is concerned, the victim identified him before the trial
Court during her deposition. It is well settled that Test
Identification Parade is only an investigative aid and not
substantive evidence.
52. Likewise, the contention regarding non-establishment of the
ownership of the mobile number through which the alleged calls
were made does not persuade us to take a different view. The
prosecution case does not rest upon the call details alone. The
conviction is founded primarily upon the direct evidence of the
child victim, which is duly corroborated by the testimony of PW-2,
PW-7 and PW-8, the prompt FIR, the recoveries effected during
investigation, the medical evidence and the forensic report.
28
53. Therefore, upon a comprehensive re-appreciation of the entire
oral, documentary, medical and scientific evidence available on
record, we are of the considered opinion that the prosecution has
succeeded in proving, beyond reasonable doubt, that the
appellant had kidnapped the child victim from the lawful
guardianship of her father and thereafter committed aggravated
penetrative sexual assault upon her. The testimony of the child
victim (PW-1) is wholly reliable, inspires confidence and stands
duly corroborated by the evidence of PW-2, PW-7 and PW-8, the
prompt lodging of the First Information Report (Ex.P-4), the
recovery proceedings, the medical evidence (Ex.P-11 and Ex.P-
12) and the Forensic Science Laboratory Report (Ex.P-17). The
minor discrepancies and omissions pointed out by the defence
are natural and do not affect the substratum of the prosecution
case. We find that the learned Special Court has appreciated the
evidence in its correct perspective and has recorded the
conviction on the basis of cogent, reliable and legally admissible
evidence. No perversity, illegality or infirmity has been
demonstrated which would warrant interference by this Court in
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
54. In the result, this Court comes to the conclusion that the
prosecution has succeeded in proving its case beyond all
reasonable doubts against the appellant. The conviction and
sentence as awarded by the trial court to the appellant is hereby
29
upheld. The present criminal appeal lacks merit and is accordingly
dismissed.
55. It is stated at the Bar that the appellant is in jail. He shall serve out
the sentence as ordered by the trial Court.
56. Registry is directed to send a copy of this judgment to the
concerned Superintendent of Jail where the Appellant is
undergoing the jail term, to serve the same on the Appellant
informing him that he is at liberty to assail the present judgment
passed by this Court by preferring an appeal before the Hon’ble
Supreme Court with the assistance of High Court Legal Services
Committee or the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha)
Judge Chief Justice
Manpreet
