Rajasthan High Court – Jodhpur
Ramesh Kumar vs Bank Of Baroda (2026:Rj-Jd:17541) on 9 April, 2026
Author: Anand Sharma
Bench: Anand Sharma
[2026:RJ-JD:17541]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 4388/2023
PETITIONER:-
Ramesh Kumar S/o Shri Bhadar Ram, Aged 31 years, Resident of
Chak 35-STG, Post Office-Rampura, Tehsil Pilibanga, District Sri
Ganganagar (Raj.).
Versus
RESPONDENTS:
1. Bank of Baroda, through its Executive Director &
Appellate Authority, Bank of Baroda, Board Corporate
Centre, C-26, G-Block, Bandra Kurla Complex, Bandra
(East), Mumbai.
2. The Deputy General Manager & Deputy Zonal Head, Bank
of Baroda, Zonal Office-Jaipur.
For Petitioner : Mr. Ramendra Singh Saluja Advocate
with Mr. Anmol Saluja Advocate.
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANAND SHARMA
Judgment
09/04/2026
1. The present writ petition has been filed under Article
226 of the Constitution of India assailing the order of penalty of
removal from service imposed upon the petitioner vide order
dated 29.09.2020 pursuant to a departmental enquiry. Vide the
said penalty order, it was also directed that the penalty of removal
from service shall not be a disqualification for the petitioner for
future employment and further, the period of suspension of the
petitioner shall be treated as period not spent on duty and he shall
not be eligible for any benefits accrued during the said period, if
any. The petitioner has also assailed order dated 06.05.2021
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passed by the appellate authority whereby appeal filed by the
petitioner against the penalty order has been dismissed. The
petitioner contends that the punishment awarded by the
disciplinary authority is excessive, harsh, and disproportionate to
the alleged misconduct and, therefore, warrants interference by
this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction.
2. The undisputed factual matrix reveals that on account
of certain discrepancies, the petitioner, while working as an Officer
of Bank of Baroda, Pilibanga Branch, was placed under suspension
vide order dated 13.02.2019. Thereafter, the petitioner was
subjected to a regular departmental enquiry on charges of carring
on fraudulent transfers from the account holders of the Bank to
his relatives and with regard to certain transactions, the
customers of the Bank have also submitted complaints. A charge-
sheet under the provisions of the Bank of Baroda Officer
Employees’ (Discipline & Appeal) Regulations, 1976 (hereinafter
referred to as ‘the Regulations of 1976’) was duly served and the
petitioner was afforded full opportunity to participate in the
enquiry proceedings, to cross-examine witnesses and to lead
defence evidence. Upon conclusion of the enquiry, the Enquiry
Officer returned findings holding the charges proved. The
disciplinary authority, served copy of enquiry report along with a
show cause notice to the petitioner. The petitioner submitted his
reply to the show cause notice and thereafter, the disciplinary
authority, after considering the enquiry report, imposed the
impugned penalty. On appeal filed by the petitioner against the
penalty order, the appellate authority thereafter affirmed the said
decision.
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3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the
impugned penalty order is liable to be set aside as it is vitiated by
arbitrariness, non-application of mind, and violation of the
principles of proportionality, inasmuch as the disciplinary authority
has imposed a harsh and excessive punishment of removal from
service, which is wholly disproportionate to the nature and gravity
of the alleged misconduct. It is the contention of learned counsel
for the petitioner that the findings recorded in the enquiry are
perverse and based on selective consideration of evidence, while
material exculpatory evidence and the petitioner’s defence have
been ignored without assigning cogent reasons. The enquiry
proceedings suffer from procedural infirmities, resulting in serious
prejudice to the petitioner and the punishment imposed would
also shock the conscience of this Court. The appellate authority
has mechanically affirmed the penalty without independent
consideration, thereby rendering the decision-making process
flawed and amenable to judicial review under Articles 226 of the
Constitution of India.
4. The core issue that arises for consideration is whether
this Court, in exercise of its limited power of judicial review, can
interfere with the penalty imposed by the disciplinary authority.
5. At the outset, it is necessary to reiterate the settled
position of law that disciplinary proceedings are conducted by the
employer in exercise of its administrative authority to maintain
discipline, integrity, and efficiency in service. The scope of judicial
review under Articles 226 of the Constitution of India is confined
to examining the decision-making process and not the decision
itself. Courts exercising writ jurisdiction do not sit as appellate
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authorities over departmental enquiries and cannot re-appreciate
evidence or substitute their own conclusions for those of the
disciplinary authority.
6. It is significant to note that Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Union of India & Others v. P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC
610, after relying upon its earlier judgments in the cases of B.C.
Chaturvedi v. Union of India & Others, (1995) 6 SCC 749;
Union of India & Another v. G. Ganayutham, (1997) 7 SCC
463, Om Kumar & Others v. Union of India, (2001) 2 SCC
386; Coimbatore District Central Cooperative Bank v.
Coimbatore District Central Cooperative Bank Employees
Assn. & Another, (2007) 4 SCC 669, and Chairman-cum-
Managing Director, Coal India Limited & Another. v. Mukul
Kumar Choudhuri & Others, (2009) 15 SCC 620, has
authoritatively delineated the contours of judicial review in
disciplinary matters. It has been categorically held that High
Courts cannot re-appreciate evidence, cannot interfere with
findings of fact if they are based on some evidence and cannot
interfere with the quantum of punishment unless the same is
shockingly disproportionate or vitiated by perversity, illegality, or
procedural impropriety. The Hon’ble Apex Court emphasised that
adequacy or sufficiency of evidence is beyond the scope of judicial
review. Para 12 and 13 of the above judgment are relevant as
under:
“12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to
note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the
disciplinary proceedings, reappreciating even the evidence before
the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge I was accepted by the
disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central
Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High
Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The(Uploaded on 23/04/2026 at 12:14:42 PM)
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[2026:RJ-JD:17541] (5 of 9) [CW-4388/2023]High Court, in exercise of its powers under Articles 226/227 of the
Constitution of India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the
evidence. The High Court can only see whether:
(a) the enquiry is held by a competent authority;
(b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure
prescribed in that behalf;
(c) there is violation of the principles of natural
justice in conducting the proceedings;
(d) the authorities have disabled themselves from
reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations
extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case;
(e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be
influenced by irrelevant or extraneous
considerations;
(f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so
wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable
person could ever have arrived at such conclusion;
(g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously
failed to admit the admissible and material evidence;
(h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously
admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the
finding;
(i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence.”
13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court
shall not:
(i) reappreciate the evidence;
(ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the
same has been conducted in accordance with law;
(iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;
(iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;
(v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which
findings can be based.
(vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to
be;
(vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks
its conscience.”
7. Similarly, in so many judgments, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court has reiterated that the question of what punishment should
be imposed upon a delinquent employee is primarily within the
domain of the disciplinary authority. Courts must exercise
restraint and refrain from interfering with the quantum of
punishment unless it is grossly disproportionate to the gravity of
the misconduct proved. In Union of India & Others v.
Constable Sunil Kumar (2023) 3 SCC 622, while following the
earlier judgments in the cases of Union of India & Others v. Ex.
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Constable Ram Karan, (2022) 1 SCC 373, Commandant
22nd Battalion, Central Reserve Police Force Srinagar, c/o
56/APO & Others v. Surinder Kumar, (2011) 10 SCC 244
and Union of India & Others v. R.K. Sharma, (2001) 9 SCC
592, the Hon’ble Supreme Court explicitly clarified that
interference with punishment is permissible only when the penalty
is “strikingly disproportionate” to the misconduct. Even in such
cases, the proper course for the Court is to remit the matter to the
disciplinary authority for reconsideration, rather than substituting
its own opinion or imposing a lesser penalty. This principle
preserves the administrative autonomy of the employer in service
matters. Para 11 to 13 of the above judgment have significance
on this point and are being reproduced as under:
“11. Even otherwise, the Division Bench of the High Court
has materially erred in interfering with the order of penalty
of dismissal passed on proved charges and misconduct of
indiscipline and insubordination and giving threats to the
superior of dire consequences on the ground that the same
is disproportionate to the gravity of the wrong. In Surinder
Kumar [CRPF v. Surinder Kumar, (2011) 10 SCC 244 :
(2012) 1 SCC (L&S) 398] while considering the power of
judicial review of the High Court in interfering with the
punishment of dismissal, it is observed and held by this
Court after considering the earlier decision in Union of India
v. R.K. Sharma [Union of India v. R.K. Sharma, (2001) 9
SCC 592 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 767] that in exercise of powers of
judicial review interfering with the punishment of dismissal
on the ground that it was disproportionate, the punishment
should not be merely disproportionate but should be
strikingly disproportionate. As observed and held that only in
an extreme case, where on the face of it there is perversity
or irrationality, there can be judicial review under Articles
226 or 227 or under Article 32 of the Constitution.
12. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid
decision(s) to the facts of the case on hand, it cannot be
said that the punishment of dismissal can be said to be
strikingly disproportionate warranting the interference of the
High Court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India. In the facts and circumstances of the
case and on the charges and misconduct of indiscipline and
insubordination proved, the CRPF being a disciplined force,
the order of penalty of dismissal was justified and it cannot
be said to be disproportionate and/or strikingly
disproportionate to the gravity of the wrong. Under the
circumstances also, the Division Bench of the High Court has
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committed a very serious error in interfering with the order
of penalty of dismissal imposed and ordering reinstatement
of the respondent.
13. At this stage, it is required to be observed that even
while holding that the punishment/penalty of dismissal
disproportionate to the gravity of the wrong, thereafter, no
further punishment/penalty is imposed by the Division
Bench of the High Court except denial of back wages. As per
the settled position of law, even in a case where the
punishment is found to be disproportionate to the
misconduct committed and proved, the matter is to be
remitted to the disciplinary authority for imposing
appropriate punishment/penalty which as such is the
prerogative of the disciplinary authority. On this ground
also, the impugned judgment and order [Sunil Kumar v.
Union of India, 2017 SCC OnLine Raj 3970] passed by the
Division Bench of the High Court is unsustainable.”
8. Similarly, in a recent judgment delivered by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Union of India & Others vs Pranab Kumar
Nath 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2893, it has been observed, as
under:
“8. None of the parties to this lis are alleging that
the enquiry and subsequent proceedings till the
High Court have transgressed the law or its duly
laid down procedure. We need not, therefore,
look into that aspect. The crux of this appeal lies
in appreciating the contours of the power of the
High Court vis-a-vis disciplinary proceedings. It
has long been held that under Article 226
jurisdiction, the court is not akin to an appellate
Court, its powers are limited to the extent of
judicial review. They cannot set aside punishment
or impose a different punishment unless they find
that there is substantial non-compliance of the
rules…..”
9. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the
present case, this Court finds that the departmental enquiry was
conducted in accordance with the prescribed procedure and in
compliance with the principles of natural justice. The petitioner
was afforded adequate opportunity at every stage. The findings
recorded by the enquiry officer are supported by evidence on
record and cannot be characterized as perverse or based on no
evidence. The petitioner’s attempt to invite this Court to reassess
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the evidence or to arrive at a different factual conclusion is wholly
impermissible in writ jurisdiction.
10. As regards the contention that the punishment is
disproportionate, this Court is unable to accept the same. The
nature of the misconduct proved against the petitioner, viewed in
the context of the duties and responsibilities attached to the post
held by the petitioner, cannot be said to be trivial or
inconsequential. The disciplinary authority has exercised its
discretion after due consideration of the gravity of the charges,
the service record of the petitioner, and the impact of the
misconduct on the discipline of the Bank. The penalty imposed
does not shock the conscience of this Court, nor can it be termed
outrageously disproportionate.
11. It is well settled that mere harshness of punishment is
not a ground for judicial interference. Unless the penalty is such
that no reasonable employer would have imposed it in the given
facts, the Court must refrain from substituting its own sense of
proportionality. To do otherwise would amount to converting
judicial review into an appellate exercise, which is expressly
forbidden by law.
12. This Court finds that when enquiry report was served
upon the petitioner, in order to grant him an opportunity to file
representation, instead of filing any representation pointing out
defects or lacuna in the enquiry proceedings, the petitioner simply
submitted a letter, mainly tendering apology for his conduct and
misdeeds. Even in the memo of appeal filed by the petitioner
against penalty order, no ground whatsoever has been raised by
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the petitioner for assailing or pointing out any perversity or
irrationality in the penalty order, nor any defect in the procedure
of the enquiry was pointed out by the petitioner in the memo of
appeal. Under these circumstances, when the petitioner has
utterly failed to point out any material illegality, irregularity or
perversity in the enquiry proceedings, appellate authority has not
committed any illegality in dismissing the appeal filed by the
petitioner. It is well settled that this Court, while sitting in the writ
jurisdiction, can only examine the decision making process and
not the decision itself. The impugned orders, therefore, do not
suffer from any illegality, irrationality, or perversity so as to
warrant interference under Articles 226 of the Constitution.
13. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the
considered opinion that the writ petition is devoid of merit. The
disciplinary authority as also the appellate authority both have
acted within the bounds of their jurisdiction, and the punishment
imposed falls squarely within the permissible range of
administrative discretion.
14. Accordingly, the writ petition is hereby dismissed.
15. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed off.
(ANAND SHARMA),J
MANOJ NARWANI-1
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