Chattisgarh High Court
Ramesh Kumar Jain vs Ashish on 15 May, 2026
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Digitally signed by
NAFR
INDRAJEET
INDRAJEET
SAHU
SAHU
Date: 2026.05.20
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
11:59:44 +0530
WP227 No. 971 of 2025
1 - Ramesh Kumar Jain S/o Late Shri Hira Lal Jain Aged About 58 Years R/o
Navkar Parisar, Near Pulgaon Naka, Durg, Tehsil And District - Durg
Chhattisgarh
... Petitioner(s)
versus
1 - Ashish S/o Mohan Lal Sharma Aged About 40 Years R/o Gaya Nagar,
Near Rajput Kirana Stores, Durg, Tehsil And District - Durg Chhattisgarh
2 - Abhishekh S/o Mohan Lal Sharma Aged About 35 Years (Died And
Deleted)
3 - Savitri D/o Mohan Lal Sharma Aged About 55 Years R/o Gaya Nagar,
Near Rajput Kirana Stores, Durg, Tehsil And District - Durg Chhattisgarh
4 - Karuna D/o Mohan Lal Sharma Aged About 43 Years R/o Gaya Nagar,
Near Rajput Kirana Stores, Durg, Tehsil And District - Durg Chhattisgarh
5 - Smt. Geeta Bai W/o Mohan Lal Sharma Aged About 75 Years (Died But
Not Deleted)
6 - Bholanath S/o Loknath Sharma Aged About 55 Years R/o Brahman Para,
Durg, Tehsil And District - Durg Chhattisgarh
7 - Champa Bai W/o Ramsnehi Sharma Aged About 60 Years (Died, But Not
Deleted)
8 - Kashinath S/o Loknath Sharma Aged About 51 Years R/o Brahman Para,
Durg, Tehsil And District - Durg Chhattisgarh
9 - Vardhaman Builders And Developers Station Road, Durg Through Partner
- Uttam Chand, S/o Khem Chand Khurana, Aged About 45 Years, R/o Navkar
Cut Piece Farishta Complex, Station Road, Durg, Tehsil And District - Durg
Chhattisgarh
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10 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Collector, Durg, Tehsil And District - Durg
Chhattisgarh.
... Respondent(s)
(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)
For Petitioner : Shri Manoj Paranjpe, Sr. Advocate, Shri
B.L. Parakh and Shri Adityadhar Diwan,
Advocates.
For Respondents No.1 : Shri TK Jha and Shri Parth Kumar Jha,
3,4,6 & 8 Advocates.
For State : Shri Vikhyat Arora, Panel Lawyer.
Hon'ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J
Order reserved on 27.04.2026
Order delivered on 15.05.2026
1. The present writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India
has been filed by the petitioner against the impugned order dated
18.08.2025 passed by 6th District Judge, Durg, in Civil Suit
No.A/19/2014 whereby the applications filed by the petitioner/plaintiff
under Order 6 Rule 17 of CPC and Order 1 Rule 10 CPC have been
dismissed.
2. Brief facts of the case are that, the petitioner is plaintiff before the trial
court. He is prosecuting a civil suit before the trial court for specific
performance of the contract and permanent injunction against the
defendants with the pleading that he entered into an agreement to
purchase the suit land bearing Khasra No.293/1 and 346/1 total area
0.316 Hect. for total consideration of Rs.29,00,000/-and Khasra No.264
area 0.146 Hect. for total consideration of Rs.45,00,000/- and entered
into an agreement on 05.12.2013. The said suit lands are situated at
village Kasaridih, PH No.18/25, Tehsil and District Durg. Out of the land
under agreement, the sale deed was executed on 24.01.2014 with
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respect to the land of Khasra No.293/1 and 346/1 total area 0.316
Hect. after payment of its sale consideration of Rs.29,00,000/- and the
agreement dated 05.12.2013 was partly performed. The plaintiff made
repeated request to defendants for registration of sale deed with
respect to Khasra No.264 area 0.146 Hect. and on the assurance
given by the defendants, he got the sale deed drafted and relevant
documents were prepared for execution of the sale deed with respect
to land Khasra No.264 Area 0.146 Hect. and remain present in the
office of Registrar having remaining sale consideration on 01.02.2014.
The defendant No.6 & 8 came there at Registrar Office and asked to
complete the formalities of the registration of the sale deed and on their
assurance the plaintiff has completed all the formalities and get the
sale deed prepared, but the defendants have not turned up for
registration of the deed and on 01.02.2014 the sale deed for remaining
land could not be executed. From 02.02.2014 up to 05.02.2014 the
plaintiff was out of station due to his business work and when he
returned back, he served a legal notice to defendants through his
counsel. A general notice was also published in daily news paper on
11.02.2014. Thereafter, the defendants replied the notice served by the
plaintiff and denied sale agreement executed by them, however,
registration of sale deed of other land in favour of plaintiff in part
performance of the contract was admitted by them. In the reply of
notice, the defendants have disclosed that they have already executed
the sale deed of the subject land in favour of defendant No.9 Uttam
Chand Surana on 03.02.2014, therefore, the plaintiff has filed the civil
suit with the pleading that he being the first person who entered into an
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agreement with the plaintiff, the defendants are bound to execute the
sale deed in his favour. The defendants have not denied the execution
of agreement in favour of plaintiff and admitted the part performance
also and on the assurance of defendants he got the draft sale deed
prepared, but defendants have executed the sale deed in favour of
Uttam Chand Surana instead of executing the same in favour of
plaintiff. The plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the
contract but the defendants avoided the performance of contract of
their part. The plaintiff is having sufficient sale consideration in his bank
account and therefore a decree for specific performance of the contract
may be passed in his favour.
3. The defendants No.1 to 8 filed their written statement jointly and
denied plaint averment. Though they admit execution of sale deed in
favour of plaintiff with respect to land Khasra No.293/1 and 346/1 total
area 0.316 Hect.,but denied execution of agreement with respect to
land Khasra No.264 area 0.146 Hect. for total sale consideration of
Rs.45,00,000/-. Though they have admitted execution and registration
of sale deed, however denied receiving sale consideration of Rs.
29,00,000/- and delivery of possession to the plaintiff. They pleaded
that Rs.5,00,000/- out of total 29,00,000/- is still outstanding. The part
performance of the contract itself reflects that plaintiff was not ready
and willing to perform his part of contract and since Rs.5,00,000/- is
outstanding, the defendants have not executed the sale deed in his
favour for remaining land. They further plead that on 05.12.2013, an
advance amount of Rs.5,00,000/- was paid by the plaintiff and
Rs.19,00,000/- was paid on 24.01.2014. Thus, an amount of
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Rs.5,00,000/-is still outstanding. They also denied that they were ready
to execute the sale deed on 01.02.2014 with respect to remaining land
and on their assurance the plaintiff got prepared the draft sale deed
and waited along with sale consideration of Rs.45,00,000/- at the office
of Registrar. Since they have not assured the plaintiff for execution of
sale deed on 01.02.2014, there is no question of preparation of any
draft sale deed by the plaintiff. There was no conversation between
them for execution and registration of sale deed on 01.02.2014. They
have also pleaded that the legal notice was duly replied by the
defendants and denied the existence of agreement in favour of the
plaintiff. They would also summit that they have executed the sale
deed in favour of Uttam Chand Surana on 03.02.2014 with respect to
suit land Khasra No.264 Area 0.146 Hect. They also denied that
plaintiff is having any right to get the sale deed executed in his favour
on the ground that he is the person who entered into agreement prior
to defendant No.9 Uttam Chand Surana. The plaintiff was never ready
and willing to perform his part of contract and therefore his suit is liable
to be dismissed.
4. The defendant No.9 also filed his written statement separately and
pleaded that he purchased the suit land Khasra No.264 Area 0.146
Hect. from defendants No.1 to 8 through registered sale deed dated
03.02.2014 after payment of its entire sale consideration and obtained
possession of the purchased land. Since he was the bonafide
purchaser and unaware about the agreement between plaintiff and
defendants, his sale deed cannot be questioned which has been
executed and registered in accordance with law.
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5. After recording evidence and hearing the parties, the trial court
dismissed the suit of plaintiff vide its judgment and decree dated
09.08.2019. The said judgment and decree was challenged by the
plaintiff by filing First Appeal No.89 of 2020 before this court. The
Division Bench of this court vide its judgment and decree dated
22.04.2025 allowed the appeal filed by the plaintiff, set aside the
impugned judgment and decree passed by the trial court, and the
matter was remitted back to the trial court with liberty to the parties to
amend their respective pleadings and directed the trial court to frame
specific issue on readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff to
perform his part of the contract and also allowed the parties to lead
evidence on the issue.
6. After remand of the matter to the trial court vide its judgment and
decree dated 22.04.2025, the plaintiff filed an application under Order 6
Rule 17 CPC ON 14.07.2025 and proposed the amendment to be
incorporated in the plaint as paras 17C,17D,17E,20B,23(8) and 23(9).
7. The defendants filed their reply to the application and denied the
proposed amendment. He also filed another application under Order 1
Rule 10 CPC read with Order 22 Rule 10 CPC for impleading the
persons who purchased the part of the suit property from the defendant
No.9. The said application was also replied by the defendants and
denied that the proposed defendants are neither necessary nor proper
party in the suit for specific performed of the contract.
8. After hearing the parties, the trial court dismissed the application filed
on 14.07.2025 by the petitioner/plaintiff under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC
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and Order 1 Rule 10 CPC read with Order 22 Rule 10 CPC, which is
under challenge in the present writ petition.
9. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that Division Bench of
this Court while hearing the First Appeal filed by the plaintiff considers
necessity to amend the pleading and therefore while remanding the
matter liberty was given to the parties to amend their respective
pleadings and thereafter the plaintiff filed the application for
amendment on 14.07.2025. Thus, the proposed amendment in the
plaint are within the scope of liberty granted to the plaintiff and the
issue involved in the present suit does not change the very nature of
suit or inconsistent with the pleading of the plaint. The proposed
amendments are with respect to alienation of the suit property to
various persons who purchased the same from defendant No.9 which
subsequently came into knowledge of the plaintiff. The proposed
amendment was with respect to declaration of their sale deed as null
and void as they purchased the suit property during pendency of suit
and also with respect to claiming of vacant possession from them. All
the subject transactions with respect to persons who purchased the
suit property are during pendency of the suit. He would also submit that
in absence of proper pleading, the plaintiff would be in difficulty even if
he leads evidence to that effect and therefore the proposed
amendment may be allowed. The application filed by the plaintiff under
Order 1 Rule 10 CPC read with Order 22 Rule 10 CPC should also be
allowed by the trial court for the reason that during pendency of the suit
they have purchased the suit property knowingly that suit property is
under litigation and plaintiff is claiming specific performance of the
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contract with respect to suit property in his favour. The proposed
defendants in whose favour the suit property is alienated, are the
necessary part to the suit to defend their case and to avoid any further
litigation. Therefore, dismissal of the application under Order 1 Rule 10
CPC read with Order 22 Rule 10 CPC is also erroneous on the facts
and circumstances of the case. In support of his submissions, he would
rely upon judgment of Supreme Court in case of Dinesh Goyal @
Pappu Vs. Suman Agarwal (Bindal) & Others, 2024 SCC Online SC
2615 and B. Vijaya Bharathi Vs. P. Savitri and Others, 2017(III) MP
Weekly Note-52.
10. Learned counsel for the respondents opposes the submissions made
by the counsel for the petitioner and have submitted that in the First
Appeal No.89 of 2020 liberty to amend the pleadings was given to the
parties only with respect to readiness and willingness to perform the
respective part of the contract by the parties, however, the petitioner
tried to bring new facts by way of proposed amendment. By the
proposed amendment, the nature of suit would entirely change which is
not permissible that too when limited liberty was given by the higher
court. He would also submit that present is a suit for specific
performance of the contract, but the petitioner wants to incorporate the
claim of declaration of the sale deed in favour of the proposed
defendants as null and void which completely change the nature of suit
and would reopen the entire case as the proposed defendants may
also have to be noticed. The appellate court remanded the matter back
only with respect to readiness and willingness to perform the contract.
Therefore, the proposed amendment is not in accordance with the
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pleadings of the parties and cannot be permitted to be incorporated.
The subsequent purchaser of the property are not necessary party to
the suit as they are bound by the principle of lis pendense if ultimately
the suit is decided in favour of plaintiff. Though, they may be proper
party, but not the necessary party. Therefore, the rejection of
applications filed by the petitioner under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC and
Order 1 Rule 10 CPC read with Order 22 Rule 10 CPC by the trial
court is justified and the writ petition is liable to be dismissed.
11. I have heard the counsel for the parties and perused the material
annexed with the writ petition.
12. The present is a suit for specific performance of the contract filed by
the petitioner/plaintiff. The suit was filed on 03.03.2014 for specific
performance of the contract with respect to suit property Khasra
No.264 area 0.146 Hect. situated at village Kasaridih, Tehsil and
District Durg. The suit of the plaintiff was dismissed by the trial court
vide judgment and decree dated 09.08.2019 which was challenged by
him in First Appeal No.89 of 2020 and the same was allowed vide
judgment and decree dated 22.04.2025 and the matter was remitted
back with the following liberty:
“18.In view of the aforesaid discussion and in the light of guidelines of
Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of Kamal Kumar Vs. Premlata Joshi
& Ors, reported in (2019) 3 SCC 704, the impugned judgment and
decree dated 09.08.2019 are set aside. The matter is remitted back to
the trial Court concerned to decide and dispose of the suit in
accordance with law on merits after framing a specific issue on the
readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff to perform his part
of contract and allowing the parties to lead evidence on this issue.
Needless to mention that the parties may amend their pleadings, if
they so desire.”
13. When the Division Bench of this court granted a limited liberty to
decide the suit in accordance with law on merits after framing specific
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issue on the readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff to
perform his part of the contract and allowed the parties to lead
evidence, liberty with respect to amendment of their pleading should
also be confined to that extent. From perusal of application filed by the
petitioner under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC, it transpires that he wants to
amend his pleadings in the plaint by adding paragraph 17C,17D and
17E. In paragraph 17C he sought amendment with respect to the fact
that the suit was earlier decided on 09.08.2019 and the defendant No.9
despite having knowledge of pendency of suit, obtained the
development permission of residential colony over subject land on
16.01.2015 and obtained work completion certificate on 03.11.2021. He
also wanted to insert the pleading that the permission letter has not
been filed by the plaintiff in the suit which contains the condition that in
case of any dispute between the parties, the said permission itself
would deem to be automatically revoked and after work completion
certificate the defendant No.9 started alienating the part of the suit
property to various persons. The proposed amendment sought in
paragraph 17C of the plaint does not change the very nature of the suit
nor prejudice any right of the parties. It appears that plaintiff wants to
bring the subsequent events on the plaint by way of proposed
amendment in paragraph 17C of the plaint.
With respect to proposed amendment in paragraph 17D & 17E is
concerned, it transpires that it is with respect to subsequent purchaser
of the suit property that their sale deeds be declared as null and void
and it is not binding upon the plaintiff. The said proposed amendment
would amount to change the nature of suit from a suit for specific
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performance of the contract to a suit for declaration of sale deeds
executed in favour of proposed defendants and also for vacant
possession of the suit property in favour of plaintiff. The proposed
amendment in plaint paragraph 17D & 17E is out of the purview of the
liberty granted by the Division Bench of this court in First Appeal No.89
of 2020 as it does not come under the definition of readiness and
willingness for which liberty was granted by the Division Bench of this
court.
Further, the proposed amendment in paragraph 20B, 23(8) and
23(9) are also with respect to subsequent alienation in favour of the
proposed defendants and valuation of the suit with respect to challenge
of the sale deeds of the proposed defendants, which also cannot be
permitted in view of liberty granted to the parties in FA No.89 of 2020. It
further transpires that the plaintiff earlier filed an application under
Order 6 Rule 17 CPC on 17.06.2025 with respect to proposed
amendment for vacant possession of the suit property after
demolishing its construction raised by the defendant No.9 and the
defendant No.9 does not acquire any right or title over the suit property
as the alienation made in his favour was during the existence of an
agreement in favour of plaintiff and he had first right to purchase the
property and therefore the sale deed executed in favour of defendant
No.9 be declared as null and void and not binding upon the plaintiff.
However, the said application filed by the petitioner on 17.06.2025 was
partly allowed on 13.08.2025 and only the amendment sought by the
plaintiff in paragraphs 15A,16A as proposed in the application dated
17.06.2025 was allowed to be incorporated in the plaint and proposed
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amendment in paragraph 17A, 17B and 20A has been rejected. The
present application for proposed amendment in the plaint in paragraph
17D and 17E as also in 20B, 23(8) and 23(9) are having the same
effect which has been rejected by the trial court vide order dated
13.08.2025. Therefore, once the proposed amendment has been
rejected by the trial court, the same cannot be permitted in subsequent
application filed by the plaintiff. However, the plaintiff can be permitted
only to the extent of proposed amendment in paragraph 17C made in
his application dated 14.07.2025.
14. So far as the application under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC with respect to
impleadment of subsequent purchaser of the suit property is
concerned, though the plaintiff is claiming that they have purchased the
suit property from the defendant No.9 during pendency of suit/appeal,
however, in view of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882,
they may be proper party, but not necessary party to be impleaded in
the suit. The plaintiff is also claiming relief of declaration of their sale
deed as null and void and for vacant possession of the suit property.
The suit is contested by defendant No.9 who is the purchaser of suit
property from its owner i.e. defendant No.1 to 8 and seller of the suit
property to the proposed defendants. The defendant No.9 is contesting
the suit and protested their interest.
15. In case of M/s JN Real Estate Vs. Shailendra Pradhan & Other,
Civil Appeal Nos.5405-5406 of 2025, the Hon’ble Supreme Court
dealing with the issue of impleadment of party in a suit for specific
performance of the contract considered the proper party and necessary
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party to be incorporated. In paragraphs 25, 27 and 29 it was observed
as under:
“25. In Kasturi (supra), the respondent nos. 1 and 4 to 11 respectively
therein, based their claim to be added as party defendants on an
independent title and possession of the contracted property. In such a
backdrop, while rejecting the applications for impleadment, this Court
had expounded the scope of Order I Rule 10(2) CPC and laid down
certain tests for determining whether a person is a ‘necessary party’ for
the purpose of impleadment in a suit for specific performance as
follows:
(i) First, that a bare reading of Order I Rule 10(2) clearly indicates
that the necessary parties in a suit for a or an contract for sale
specific performance of agreement to sell, are the parties to the
contract or, if they are dead, their legal representatives, as also
persons who had purchased the contracted property from the
vendor. A subsequent purchaser would be a necessary party
since his rights would be affected irrespective of whether he had
purchased the contracted property, with or without notice of the
contract. However, it was clarified that a person whose claim is
adverse to the claim of a vendor, is not a ‘necessary party’.
Therefore, two tests were laid down by this Court, which must be
satisfied for determining the question as to who is a necessary
party (1) there must be a right to some relief against such party in
respect of the controversies involved in the proceedings; (2) no
effective decree can be passed in the absence of such party. The
relevant observations read as under:
“7. In our view, a bare reading of this provision, namely, second
part of Order 1 Rule 10 sub-rule (2) CPC would clearly show that
the necessary parties in suit for specific performance of a
contract for sale are the parties to the contract or if they are
dead, their legal representatives as also a person who had
purchased the contracted property from the vendor. In equity as
well as in law, the contract constitutes rights and also regulates
the liabilities of the parties. A purchaser is a necessary party as
he would be affected if he had purchased with or without notice
of the contract, but a person who claims adversely to the claim of
a vendor is, however, not a necessary party. From the above, it is
now clear that two tests are to be satisfied for determining the
question who is a necessary party. Tests are (1) there must be a
right to some relief against such party in respect of the
controversies involved in the proceedings; (2) no effective decree
can be passed in the absence of such party.”
(Emphasis supplied)
ii) Secondly, as regards the meaning of “proper party”, it was
observed that in case of a suit for specific performance, the
guiding principle for deciding who is a proper party is that the
presence of such a party is necessary to adjudicate the
controversies involved in the suit for specific performance of the
agreement to sell. Such a question has to be decided while
keeping in mind the scope of the suit for specific performance. If
the addition of that party enlarges the scope of such suit so as to
convert it into a suit for title, then the presence of such a party
cannot be said to be necessary for the effective adjudication of
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the controversies involved in the suit. The relevant observations
read as under:
“11. As noted hereinearlier, required be to satisfied to two
tests are the determine question who is a necessary party,
let us now consider who is a proper party in a suit for
specific performance of a contract for sale. For deciding the
question who is a proper party in a suit for specific
performance the guiding principle is that the presence of
such a party is the necessary to adjudicate controversies
involved in the suit for specific performance of the contract
for sale. Thus, the question is to be decided keeping in mind
the scope of the suit. The question that is to be decided in a
suit for specific performance of the contract for sale is to the
enforceability of the contract entered into between the
parties to the contract. If the person seeking addition is
added in such a suit, the scope of the suit for specific
performance would be enlarged and it would be practically
converted into a suit for title. Therefore, for effective
adjudication of the controversies involved in the suit,
presence of such parties cannot be said to be necessary at
all. Lord Chancellor Cottenham in Tasker v. Small [(1834)
40 ER 848 3 My & Cr 63] made the following observations:
(ER pp. 850-51)
‘It is not disputed that, generally, to a bill for a specific
performance of a contract of sale, the parties to the contract
only are the proper parties; and, when the ground of the
jurisdiction of Courts of Equity in suits of that kind is
considered it could not properly be otherwise. The Court
assumes jurisdiction in such cases, because a court of law,
giving damages onty for the non-performance of the
contract, in many cases does not afford an adequate
remedy. But, in equity, as well as at law, the contract
constitutes the right, and regulates the liabilities of the
parties; and the object of both proceedings is to place the
party complaining as nearly as possible in the same
situation as the defendant had agreed that he should be
placed in. It is obvious that persons, strangers to the
contract, and, therefore, neither entitled to the right, nor
subject to the liabilities which arise out of it, are as much
strangers to a proceeding to enforce the execution of it as
they are to a proceeding to recover damages for the breach
of it.’
13. From the aforesaid discussion, it is pellucid that necessary
parties are those persons in whose absence no decree can be
passed by the court or that there must be a right to some relief
against some party in respect of the controversy involved in the
proceedings and proper parties are those whose presence before
the court would be necessary in order to enable the court
effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the
questions involved in the suit although no relief in the suit was
claimed against such person.”
15. In the case of Vijay Saran Sinha [(1996) 10 SCC 53] taken the
same view which is being this judgment as discussed above. This
Court in that decision clearly held that to decide the right, title and
interest in the suit property of the stranger to the contract is beyond
the scope of the suit for specific performance of the contract and
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the same cannot be turned into a regular title suit. Therefore, in our
view, a third party or a stranger to the contract cannot be added so
as to convert a suit of one character into a suit of different
character. […]”
iii) Thirdly, an intervenor seeking to be impleaded must be directly and
legally interested in the answers to the controversies involved in the
suit for specific performance of the agreement to sell. It was held that a
person is considered to be legally interested in the answers to the
controversy, only if he can satisfy the court that it may lead to a result
that would legally affect him. The relevant observations read as under:
XXX
“17. […] Apart from that, the intervener must be directly and legally
interested in the answers to the controversies involved in the suit
for specific performance of the contract for sale. In Amon v.
Raphael Tuck and Sons Ltd. [(1956) 1 All ER 273 (1956) 1 QB
357: (1956) 2 WLR 3721 it has been held that a person is legally
interested in the answers to the controversies only if he can satisfy
the court that it may lead to a result that will affect him legally.”
(Emphasis supplied)
27. While distinguishing Kasturi (supra), it was held in Sumtibai (supra)
that if a third party can show a fair semblance of title or interest, he can
file an application for impleadment in the suit for specific performance.
The relevant observations read thus:
13. As held in Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. N.R. Vairamani
[(2004) 8 SCC 579: AIR 2004 SC 4778] a decision cannot be
relied on without disclosing the factual situation. In the same
judgment this Court also observed (SCC pp. 584-85, paras 9-12)
‘9. Courts should not place reliance on decisions without
discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact
situation of the decision on which reliance is placed.
Observations of courts are neither to be read as Euclid’s
theorems nor as provisions of a statute and that too taken
out of their context. These observations must be read in the
context in which they appear to have been stated.
Judgments of courts are not to be construed as interpret
words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become
necessary for judges to embark into lengthy discussions but
the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges
interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They
interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be
interpreted as statutes. In London Graving Dock Co. Ltd. v.
Horton [1951 AC 737 (HL)) (AC at p. 761) Lord MacDermott
observed (All ER p. 14 C-D)
14. In view of the aforesaid decisions we are of the opinion that
Kasturi case (2005) 6 SCC 733] is clearly distinguishable. In our
opinion it cannot be laid down as an absolute proposition that
whenever a suit for specific performance is filed by A against B, a
third party C can never be impleaded in that suit. In our opinion, if
C can show a fair semblance of title or interest he can certainly
file an application for impleadment, To take a contrary view would
lead to multiplicity of proceedings because then C will have to
wait until a decree is passed against B, and then file a suit for
cancellation of the decree on the ground that A had no title in the
property in dispute. Clearly, such a view cannot be
countenanced.”
(Emphasis supplied)
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29. It was observed that the court may exercise discretion in
impleading a person who is a ‘proper party’ upon an application by a
non-party to the suit for specific performance. If the court is of the
view that the impleadment of such a proper party will alter the nature
of the suit or introduce a new cause of action, it may either refuse to
implead such person or order för his impleadment on certain
conditions. However, even otherwise, the court would not be
precluded from impleading a ‘proper party’ unconditionally in its
discretion. The relevant observations rendered in Mumbai
International Airport (supra) read thus:
“24.4 If an application is made by a plaintiff for impleading
someone as a proper party, subject to limitation, bona fides, etc.,
the court will normally implead him, if he is found to be a proper
party. On the other hand, if a non-party makes an application
seeking impleadment as a proper party and the court finds him to
be a proper party, the court may direct his addition as a
defendant; but if the court finds that his addition will alter the
nature of the suit or introduce a new cause of action, it may
dismiss the application even if he is found to be a proper party, if it
does not want to widen the scope of the specific performance
suit; or the court may direct such applicant to be impleaded as a
proper party, either unconditionally or subject to terms. For
example, if D claiming to be a co-owner of a suit property, enters
into an agreement for sale of his share in favour of P representing
that he is the co-owner with half-share, and P files suit for specific
performance of the said agreement of sale in respect of the
undivided half-share, the court may permit the other co-owner
who contends that D has only one-fourth share, to be impleaded
as an additional defendant as a proper party, and may examine
the issue whether the plaintiff is entitled to specific performance of
the agreement in respect of half a share or only one-fourth share;
alternatively the court may refuse to implead the other co-owner
and leave open the question in regard to the extent of share of
the defendant vendor to be decided in an independent proceeding
by the other co-owner, the plaintiff; alternatively the court may
implead him but subject to the term that the dispute, if any,
between the impleaded co-owner and the original defendant in
regard to the extent of the share will not be the subject-matter a
or of the suit for specific performance, and that it will decide in the
suit only the issues relating to specific performance, that is,
whether the defendant executed the agreement/contract and
whether such contract should be specifically enforced.
25. In other words, the court has the discretion to either to allow
or reject an application of a person claiming to be a proper party,
depending upon the facts and circumstances and no person has
a right to insist that he should be impleaded as a party, merely
because he is a proper party.”
(Emphasis supplied)”
16. As has been observed earlier that the proposed amendment in the
plaint would change the very nature of the suit and would reopen the
entire case with respect to proposed defendants and also that the
defendant No.9 is contesting the suit and status of the proposed
17defendants being stepping into the shoes of defendant No.9 who is
already contesting the suit, it cannot be said that without impleading
the proposed defendants the suit cannot be effectively adjudicated, and
therefore, the rejection of application under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC by
the trial court does not suffer from any perversity or illegality.
17. Accordingly, the writ petition filed by the petitioner is partly allowed to
the extent that the proposed amendment with respect to incorporation
of paragraph 17C in the plaint, as has been proposed in the application
dated 14.07.2025, is allowed. The application with respect to remaining
proposed amendment is rejected. Further, the rejection of application
filed by the petitioner under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC also stands affirmed.
18. The writ petition is partly allowed. Parties to bear their own costs.
Sd/-
(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal)
Judge
inder
