Rajasthan High Court – Jaipur
Ram Prakash @ Prakash S/O Gopal B/C … vs State Of Rajasthan Through Pp on 16 April, 2026
[2026:RJ-JP:15879-DB]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
D.B. Criminal Appeal (Db) No. 305/2018
Ram Prakash @ Prakash S/o Gopal, R/o Khairali Police Station
Baran Sadar Distt. Baran Raj. (At Present He Is Confined In
Distt. Jail Baran)
---Accused-Appellant
Versus
State Of Rajasthan Through PP, Raj.
----Respondent
For Appellant(s) : Mr. Girish Khandelwal with
Ms. Swati Sharma and
Mr. Khizer Iqbal Khan
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Rajesh Choudhary, GA-cum-AAG
with
Mr. Aman Agarwal
Mr. Vinod Sharma
Ms. Neha Goyal
Mr. Amit Kumar Punia, PP
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE MAHENDAR KUMAR GOYAL
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE BHUWAN GOYAL
Judgment
16/04/2026
PER HON’BLE MAHENDAR KUMAR GOYAL, J.
Learned Public Prosecutor has submitted the status report
dated 14.04.2026 furnished by SHO, Police Station, Baran Sadar,
District Baran which is taken on record.
This criminal appeal is directed against the judgment dated
04.08.2018 passed by learned Special Judge, SC/ST (Prevention
of Atrocities) Cases, Baran (for short, ‘learned trial Court’) in
Sessions Case No.304/2016 CIS No.293/2016 whereby, the
accused-appellant (for short, ‘appellant’) has been convicted and
sentenced as under:
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[2026:RJ-JP:15879-DB] (2 of 19) [CRLAD-305/2018]Section 302 IPC:- Life imprisonment and
fine of Rs.25,000/-; in default whereof, six months’
additional simple imprisonment.
Section 452 IPC:- Five years’ simple
imprisonment and fine of Rs.5,000/-; in default
whereof, two months’ additional simple
imprisonment.
Both the sentences to run concurrently.
The relevant facts in nutshell are that based on the parcha
bayan of Mukesh Kumar (PW14) made at about 12:30 pm on
03.08.2013 in the emergency ward, Maharao Bhimsingh Hospital,
Kota, an FIR No.217 dated 03.08.2013 came to be registered at
Police Station Baran Sadar, District Baran for the offences under
Sections 452, 308, 323/34 IPC. It was alleged therein that at
about 8:00 pm on 02.08.2013, the appellant came with a sword
and inflicted multiple blows on the person of his brother-Rajendra
including his head. It was averred that upon hearing scuffle,
Rakesh, Banshi Lal and Kanhaiya Lal, armed with lathies and
gandasi- a sharp edged curved instrument, also came and they
also inflicted injuries to Rajendra. It was further alleged that he
was also hit with a lathi by Rakesh. During the course of
investigation, Rajendra expired. After investigation, the appellant,
along with co-accused Kanhaiya Lal and Banshi Lal, was charge-
sheeted under Sections 452, 308, 302 and 323 read with Section
34 IPC whereunder, charges were also framed. After trial, while,
co-accused Kanhaiya Lal and Banshi Lal were acquitted of the
charges framed against them, the appellant has been convicted
and sentenced, as stated hereinabove.
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Assailing the impugned judgement, learned counsel for the
appellant, inviting attention of this Court towards the parcha
bayan (Ex.P4) made by the injured eye witness-Mukesh Kumar,
submitted that though, it contained allegations of infliction of
multiple blows to the deceased by him as also by three other co-
accused person; he, however, in his examination-in-chief as
PW14, changing the story, stated that since he was wrongfully
confined in a room by the accused, he was unaware as to who had
beaten his brother after infliction of 2-3 injuries by the appellant.
But, as per the postmortem report of the body of the deceased
(Ex.P11), only four injuries were found. He contended that as per
the medical opinion, cause of death was head injury but, Smt.
Chhaya (PW3)- an eye witness and wife of the deceased, has
attributed the head injury to the appellant with a sword as also to
Kanhaiya Lal with the gandasi. He submitted that it is established
from the evidence on record that in the scuffle, he has also
received injuries turning out it to be a case of free fight. Learned
counsel canvassed that from the prosecution evidence, it was not
established that he had trespassed in the house of deceased
Rajendra armed with a deadly weapon with an intention to cause
his death; rather, the incident occurred on spur of the moment on
account of falling of a common wall in between the houses of the
parties. In the aforesaid factual backdrop, learned counsel would
contend that the case would not travel beyond the scope of
Section 304 Part-I IPC and therefore, his conviction is liable to be
altered from Section 302 IPC to Section 304 Part-I IPC and since,
he has already served the sentence of more than 15 years
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including remission, the substantive sentence may be reduced to
the period already undergone.
Per contra, learned Public Prosecutor, opposing the
submissions, contended that since, the appellant has come armed
with a sword and inflicted multiple blows on the person of the
deceased, the learned trial Court did not err in recording his
conviction under Section 302 IPC. He, therefore, prayed for
dismissal of the appeal.
Heard. Considered.
As per the postmortem report of the body of the deceased
(ExP11) and the testimony of Dr. Surendra Meena (PW10) who
conducted the autopsy, four external injuries were found on the
body of the deceased; a 3 cm long stitched wound on right
forehead, a 3×2 cm bruise on right side of head, a 2.5 cm stitched
wound on right cheek and a 10 cm long stitched wound below
right ear. On dissection, the scalpel hematoma was found towards
right side of scalp with fracture of right fronto parietal region,
subdural and subarachnoid hematoma on both side of the scalp
with contusion of brain. Cause of death was opined to be coma on
account of the head injury.
In view of the aforesaid, it is found to be an established case
of homicidal death.
Although, in his parcha bayan, Mukesh (PW14)- the injured
eye witness and brother of the deceased, has stated that multiple
blows were inflicted on the person of the deceased by the
appellant with a sword and by the co-accused namely Rakesh,
Banshi Lal and Kanhaiya Lal with lathies and gandasi; but,
improving his statement, in his examination-in-chief, he stated
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that after 2-3 injuries were inflicted by the appellant, he was
wrongfully confined in a room by the accused and he was unaware
who had beaten his brother thereafter. Smt. Chhaya (PW3)- the
eye witness and wife of the deceased, has, in contradiction with
the statement of PW14, stated that on the head of deceased, one
injury with the sword was inflicted by the appellant and another
by the co-accused Kanhaiya Lal with the gandasi. Since, as per
medical opinion, cause of death was found to be the head injury, it
is rendered doubtful as to whose blow was fatal and was, the
cause of the death.
Further, we find from the material available on record that in
the scuffle, the appellant has also received injuries. In his arrest
memo (Ex.P17), it is mentioned that there was swelling below his
both eyes with white bandage on his head. It also shows that he
was medically examined on 03.08.2013; however, no such medical
report is part of the record. Although, Mukesh (PW14) denied the
suggestion that he, along with his brother, has beaten the
appellant but, in the same breath, admitted that he was facing a
criminal case of physical altercation. The eye witness-Chhaya
(PW3) has also admitted during her cross-examination that in the
scuffle, the accused party also received injuries and his brother-in-
law (Mukesh) was facing a criminal case on that count. In these
circumstances, we are not convinced that the prosecution has
come with clean hands with regard to true genesis of the case and
it appears to be a case of free fight on account of a dispute
between the parties due to falling of the common wall in between
their houses as not denied by Mukesh (PW14) during his cross-
examination.
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It may also be worthy to note here that the prosecution has
not projected any enmity between the parties. Although, Mukesh
(PW14) has stated that after intoxication, the accused party had
outraged the modesty of his sister-in-law (Chhaya) which led to
scuffle but, his version was not corroborated by Chhaya herself as
PW3. In these circumstances, a possibility cannot be denied that
the incident occurred on spur of the moment without any
premeditation in which both the parties received injuries.
The Hon’ble Apex Court has, in the case Nandkumar @
Nandu Manilal Mudaliar Vs. State of Gujarat IN Criminal
Appeal No. 1266 of 2014, held as under:
5.6 In Kesar Singh & Anr. v. State of Haryana, this Court
observed thus,
“The distinguishing feature is the mens rea.
What is prerequisite in terms of clause (2) of
Section 300 is the knowledge possessed by the
offender in regard to the particular victim being
in such a peculiar condition or state of health
that the intentional harm caused to him is likely
to be fatal. Intention to cause death is not an
essential ingredient of clause (2). When there
is an intention of causing a bodily injury
coupled with knowledge of the offender as
regards likelihood of such injury being sufficient
to cause the death of a particular victim would
be sufficient to bring the offence within the
ambit of this clause.” (Para 10)
5.6.1 For the above purpose, the exceptions contained
in Section 300, IPC are taken into consideration. In the
same judgment, the Court further explained the
distinction between ‘culpable homicide amounting to
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murder’ and ‘not amounting to murder’, stating,
“Culpable homicide is genus, murder is its
specie. The culpable homicide, excluding the
special characteristics of murder, would amount
to culpable homicide not amounting to murder.
The Code recognises three degrees of culpable
homicide. When a culpable homicide is of the
first degree, it comes within the purview of the
definition of Section 300 and it will amount to
murder. The second degree which becomes
punishable in the first part of Section 304 is
culpable homicide of the second degree. Then
there is culpable homicide of third degree
which is the least side of culpable homicide and
the punishment provided for is also the lowest
among the punishments for the three grades. It
is punishable under the second part of Section
304.” (Para 11)
5.7 In other words, where the two ingredients namely
that the infliction of bodily injury on deceased was
caused intentionally and secondly that it was sufficient
to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, are
satisfied, the offence would amount to murder. There
may be circumstances which may emerge from the
facts and evidence of a given case that the offence
becomes ‘culpable homicide not amounting to murder’.
5.8 In Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab and further
in Shankar Narayan Bhadolkar v. State of
Maharashtra , this Court stated that divided into two
Parts, Section 304, IPC deals with the situations where
‘culpable homicide’ would not be a murder. The
conceptualisation of the ‘culpable homicide not
amounting to murder’ were explained in the following
way, as quoted in para 4 of the Kesar Singh ,
“If an injury is inflicted with the knowledge and
intention that it is likely to cause death, but
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with no intention to cause death the offence
would fall within the definition of Section 304
Part I, however, if there is no intention to
cause such an injury, but there is knowledge
that such an injury can cause death, the
offence would fall within the definition of
Section 304 Part II. Thus, is intention. If
intention to cause such an injury as is likely to
cause death, is established, the offence would
fall under Part I but where no such intention is
established and only knowledge that the injury
is likely to cause death, it would fall under Part
II.”
A co-ordinate Bench of this Court has, in the case of Ajay
Ghos Vs State of Rajasthan in D.B. Criminal Appeal No.
731/2017, held as under:
10. Distinction between whether an offence is culpable
homicide amounting to murder or culpable homicide
not amounting to murder has been dealt by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Mohd. Rafiq v.
State of Madhya Pradesh: (2021) 10 SCC 706 after
taking into consideration earlier judgments on the
point. The Court held that even though it is difficult to
distinguish whether the punishment for offence would
fall Under Section 302 or Section 304 of Indian Penal
Code, there is a subtle distinction of degree of intention
and knowledge involved in both the crimes. Relevant
paragraphs of the judgment are reproduced below:
“Para 11 – The question of whether in a given
case, a homicide is murder, punishable Under
Section 302 Indian Penal Code, or culpable
homicide, of either description, punishable(Uploaded on 23/04/2026 at 12:28:39 PM)
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[2026:RJ-JP:15879-DB] (9 of 19) [CRLAD-305/2018]under Section 304 Indian Penal Code has
engaged the attention of courts in this country
for over one and a half century, since the
enactment of the Indian Penal Code; a welter
of case law, on this aspect exists, including
perhaps several hundred rulings by this Court.
The use of the term “likely” in several places
in respect of culpable homicide, highlights the
element of uncertainty that the act of the
Accused may or may not have killed the
person. Section 300 Indian Penal Code which
defines murder, however refrains from the use
of the term likely, which reveals absence of
ambiguity left on behalf of the accused. The
Accused is for sure that his act will definitely
cause death. It is often difficult to distinguish
between culpable homicide and murder as
both, involve death. Yet, there is a subtle
distinction of intention and knowledge involved
in both the crimes. This difference lies in the
degree of the act. There is a very wide
variance of degree of intention and knowledge
among both the crimes.
Para 12 – The decision in State of Andhra Pradesh v.
Rayavarapu Punnayya and Anr. notes the important
distinction between the two provisions, and their
differing, but subtle distinction. The court pertinently
pointed out that:
12. In the scheme of the Penal Code, “culpable
homicide”is genus and murder its specie. All
murder is “culpable homicide” but not vice-
versa. Speaking generally,”culpable homicide”
sans “special characteristics of murder”, is
“culpable homicide not amounting to
murder”.For the purpose of fixing punishment,
proportionate to the gravity of this generic(Uploaded on 23/04/2026 at 12:28:39 PM)
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[2026:RJ-JP:15879-DB] (10 of 19) [CRLAD-305/2018]offence, the Code practically recognizes three
degrees of culpable homicide. The first is,what
may be called, “culpable homicide of the first
degree”. This is the greatest form of culpable
homicide,which is defined in Section 300 as
“murder”. The second may be termed as
“culpable homicide of the second degree”. This
is punishable under the first part of
Section304. Then, there is “culpable homicide
of the third degree”. This is the lowest type of
culpable homicide and the punishment
provided for it is, also, the lowest among the
punishments provided for the three grades.
Culpable homicide of this degree is punishable
under the second part of Section 304.
13. The academic distinction between
“murder” and”culpable homicide not
amounting to murder” has vexed the courts
for more than a century. The confusion is
caused, if courts losing sight of the true scope
and meaning of the terms used by the
legislature in these sections, allow themselves
to be drawn into minute abstractions. The
safest way of approach to the interpretation
and application of these provisions seems to
be to keep in focus the keywords used in the
various clauses of Sections 299 and 300;
Para 13 – The considerations that should weigh with
courts, in discerning whether an act is punishable as
murder, or culpable homicide, not amounting to
murder, were outlined in Pulicherla Nagaraju @
Nagaraja Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh. This Court
observed that:
29. Therefore, the Court should proceed to
decide the pivotal question of intention, with
care and caution, as that will decide whether(Uploaded on 23/04/2026 at 12:28:39 PM)
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[2026:RJ-JP:15879-DB] (11 of 19) [CRLAD-305/2018]the case falls Under Section 302 or 304Part I
or 304 Part II. Many petty or insignificant
matters-plucking of a fruit, straying of cattle,
quarrel of children, utterance of a rude word
or even an objectionable glance, may lead to
altercations and group clashes culminating in
deaths. Usual motives like revenge, greed,
jealousy or suspicion may be totally absent in
such cases. There may be no intention. There
may be no premeditation. In fact, there may
not even be criminality. At the other end of the
spectrum, there may be cases of murder
where the Accused attempts to avoid the
penalty for murder by attempting to put forth
a case that there was no intention to cause
death. It is for the courts to ensure that the
cases of murder punishable Under Section
302, are not converted into offences
punishable Under Section 304 Part I/II, or
cases of culpable homicide not amounting to
murder are treated as murder punishable
Under Section 302. The intention to cause
death can be gathered generally from a
combination of a few or several of the
following, among other, circumstances; (i)
nature of the weapon used; (ii) whether the
weapon was carried by the Accused or was
picked up from the spot; (iii) whether the blow
is aimed at a vital part of the body; (iv) the
amount of force employed in causing injury;
(v) whether the act was in the course of
sudden quarrel or sudden fight or free for all
fight; (vi) whether the incident occurs by
chance or whether there was any
premeditation; (vii) whether there was any
prior enmity or whether the deceased was a
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stranger; (viii) whether there was any grave
and sudden provocation, and if so, the cause
for such provocation; (ix) whether it was in
the heat of passion; (x) whether the person
inflicting the injury has taken undue
advantage or has acted in a cruel and unusual
manner; (xi) whether the Accused dealt a
single blow or several blows. The above list of
circumstances is, of course, not exhaustive
and there may be several other special
circumstances with reference to individual
cases which may throw light on the question
of intention.”
Another co-ordinate Bench of this Court has, in the case of
Hari Ram & Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan IN D.B.
Criminal Appeal No. 341/2007, held as under:
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Dayanand Vs.
State of Haryana reported in 2008 Cri.L.J. 2975
considering the identical issue that in absence of motiveor intention and upon the fact that there was no repeated
blow upon the vital part of the body, made following
adjudication which reads as under:-
“10. The crucial question is as to which was
the appropriate provision to be applied. In the
scheme of the IPC culpable homicide is genus
and ‘murder’ its specie. All ‘murder’ is
‘culpable homicide’ but not vice-versa.
Speaking generally, ‘culpable homicide’ sans
‘special characteristics of murder is culpable
homicide not amounting to murder’. For the
purpose of fixing punishment, proportionate to
the gravity of the generic offence, the IPC
practically recognizes three degrees of(Uploaded on 23/04/2026 at 12:28:39 PM)
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[2026:RJ-JP:15879-DB] (13 of 19) [CRLAD-305/2018]culpable homicide. The first is, what may be
called, ‘culpable homicide of the first degree’.
This is the gravest form of culpable homicide,
which is defined in Section 300 as ‘murder’.
The second may be termed as ‘culpable
homicide of the second degree’. This is
punishable under the first part of Section 304.
Then, there is ‘culpable homicide of the third
degree’. This is the lowest type of culpable
homicide and the punishment provided for it is
also the lowest among the punishments
provided for the three grades. Culpable
homicide of this degree is punishable under
the second part of Section 304.
11. The academic distinction between ‘murder’
and ‘culpable homicide not amounting to
murder’ has always vexed the Courts. The
confusion is caused, if Courts losing sight of
the true scope and meaning of the terms used
by the legislature in these sections, allow
themselves to be drawn into minute
abstractions. The safest way of approach to
the interpretation and application of these
provisions seems to be to keep in focus the
keywords used in the various clauses of
Sections 299 and 300. The following
comparative table will be helpful in
appreciating the points of distinction between
the two offences.
Section 299 Section 300
A person commits Subject to certain exceptions
culpable homicide if culpable homicide is murder if
the act by which the the act by which the death is
death is caused is caused is done –
done
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(a) with the intention (1) with the intention of
of causing death; or causing death; or
(b) with the intention (2) with the intention of
of causing such causing such bodily injury as
bodily injury as is the offender knows to be
likely to cause death; likely to cause the death of
or the person to whom the harm
is caused; or
(3) With the intention of
causing bodily injury to any
person and the bodily injury
intended to be inflicted is
sufficient in the ordinary
course of nature to cause
death; or
KNOWLEDGE
(c) with the (4) with the knowledge that
knowledge that the the act is so imminently
act is likely to cause dangerous that it must in all
death. probability cause death or
such bodily injury as is likely
to cause death, and without
any excuse for incurring the
risk of causing death or such
injury as is mentioned above.
12. Clause (b) of Section 299 corresponds with
clauses (2) and (3) of Section 300. The
distinguishing feature of the mens rea
requisite under clause (2) is the knowledge
possessed by the offender regarding the
particular victim being in such a peculiar
condition or state of health that the internal
harm caused to him is likely to be fatal,
notwithstanding the fact that such harm would
not in the ordinary way of nature be sufficient
to cause death of a person in normal health or
condition. It is noteworthy that the ‘intention
to cause death’ is not an essential requirement
of clause (2). Only the intention of causing the
bodily injury coupled with the offender’s
knowledge of the likelihood of such injury
causing the death of the particular victim, is
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[2026:RJ-JP:15879-DB] (15 of 19) [CRLAD-305/2018]of this clause. This aspect of clause (2) is
borne out by illustration (b) appended to
Section 300.
13. Clause (b) of Section 299 does not
postulate any such knowledge on the part of
the offender. Instances of cases falling under
clause (2) of Section 300 can be where the
assailant causes death by a fist blow
intentionally given knowing that the victim is
suffering from an enlarged liver, or enlarged
spleen or diseased heart and such blow is
likely to cause death of that particular person
as a result of the rupture of the liver, or
spleen or the failure of the heart, as the case
may be. If the assailant had no such
knowledge about the disease or special frailty
of the victim, nor an intention to cause death
or bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary
course of nature to cause death, the offence
will not be murder, even if the injury which
caused the death, was intentionally given. In
clause (3) of Section 300, instead of the
words ‘likely to cause death’ occurring in the
corresponding clause (b) of Section 299, the
words “sufficient in the ordinary course of
nature to cause death” have been used.
Obviously, the distinction lies between a
bodily injury likely to cause death and a bodily
injury sufficient in the ordinary course of
nature to cause death. The distinction is fine
but real and if overlooked, may result in
miscarriage of justice. The difference between
clause (b) of Section 299 and clause (3) of
Section 300 is one of the degree of probability
of death resulting from the intended bodily
injury. To put it more broadly, it is the degree
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of probability of death which determines
whether a culpable homicide is of the gravest,
medium or the lowest degree. The word
‘likely’ in clause (b) of Section 299 conveys
the sense of probable as distinguished from a
mere possibility. The words “bodily
injury…….sufficie ufficient in the ordinary
course of nature to cause death” mean that
death will be the “most probable” result of the
injury, having regard to the ordinary course of
nature.”
From the aforesaid authoritative pronouncements, it is
apparent that whether an offence would fall under Section 302 IPC
or, under Section 304 Part-I or, Part-II IPC, would depend on
multiple factors including intention/knowledge of the accused,
whether it was premeditated or the incident occurred on spur of
the moment, the nature of weapon used, the intensity and gravity
of the blow, the body part which received the injury, repetition of
blows, his criminal antecedents etc.
In the conspectus of aforesaid analysis of the material
available on record, we are of the considered view that a
possibility cannot be ruled out that the incident occurred on spur
of the moment without any premeditation on account of falling of
the common wall in between the houses of the parties, it was a
case of free fight in which person from both the sides received
injuries and the injuries on the person of the accused remained
unexplained by the prosecution, there was no previous enmity
between the parties and it is doubtful as to whose blow; whether
that of appellant or that of Kanhaiya Lal, was fatal and in the
backdrop of aforesaid precedential law, conviction of the appellant
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deserves to be altered from Section 302 IPC to Section 304 Part-I
IPC.
So far as sentence part is concerned, we find from the
custody certificate submitted along with the status report dated
14.04.2026 that the appellant has already served the actual
sentence of 12 years 4 months and a day till 14.04.2026 and the
total sentence, including remission, for a period of 15 years 1
month and a day. It is also reflected that he has successfully
availed the benefit of four paroles and in view of his satisfactory
jail conduct, at present, he is in open air camp. From the report
dated 14.04.2026 furnished by Gram Panchayat Kherali, District
Baran, it is revealed that he has a wife and two sons and are living
in the state of penury.
Their Lordships have, in the case of Nawabuddin Vs. State
of Uttarakhand: MANU/SC/0165/2022, held as under:
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However, the punishment provided for the offence
under Section 6, as it stood prior to its amendment and at
the time of commission of the offence in the instant case
for aggravated penetrative sexual assault was rigours
imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than ten
years but which may extend to imprisonment for life and
shall also be liable to fine. Now as per the amended Section
6 with effect from 16.08.2019, the minimum punishment
provided is twenty years and which may extend to
imprisonment for life, which shall mean imprisonment for
the remainder of natural life of that person, and shall also
be liable to fine, or with death. Therefore, at the relevant
time the minimum punishment provided for the offence
Under Section 6 of the POCSO Act,2012 was ten years RI
and which may extend to imprisonment for life. It is
reported that today the Accused is aged 70-75 years of age
and it is also reported that he is suffering from Tuberculosis(Uploaded on 23/04/2026 at 12:28:39 PM)
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[2026:RJ-JP:15879-DB] (18 of 19) [CRLAD-305/2018](TB). Therefore, considering such mitigating circumstances
we are of the opinion that if the life sentence is converted
to fifteen years RI and the fine imposed by the Trial Court
confirmed by the High Court to be maintained, it can be
said to be an adequate punishment commensurate with the
offence committed by the accused.”
(emphasis supplied)
In the aforesaid factual scenario as also in the backdrop of
aforesaid precedential law, we think that ends of justice would be
served if the substantive sentence awarded to the appellant is
reduced to the period already undergone.
Resultantly, this criminal appeal is partly allowed in following
terms:
1. The conviction of the appellant, recorded by
the learned Special Judge, SC/St (Prevention of
Atrocities) Cases, Baran vide judgement dated
04.08.2018 in Sessions Case No.304/2016 CIS
No.293/2016 under Section 302 IPC is altered
to the conviction under Section 304 Part I IPC.
2. The substantive sentence awarded to him is
reduced to the period already undergone.
Since, the appellant is in jail, he shall be set at
liberty forthwith if not required to be detained
in any other case.
3. The appellant is granted three months’ time
to deposit the fine, if not already deposited. In
case of default, learned trial Court shall ensure
that he serves the default sentence imposed
vide impugned judgment dated 04.08.2018.
In view of the provisions of Section 437-A CrPC (Section 481
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023), the appellant namely
Ram Prakash @ Prakash S/o Gopal is directed to furnish a
personal bond in the sum of Rs.25,000/- and a surety in the like
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[2026:RJ-JP:15879-DB] (19 of 19) [CRLAD-305/2018]
amount within four weeks before the Registrar (Judl.) of this Court
which shall be effective for a period of six months with the
stipulation that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed
against the judgement or on grant of leave, the appellant
aforesaid, on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the
Hon’ble Supreme Court.
Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of
accordingly.
(BHUWAN GOYAL),J (MAHENDAR KUMAR GOYAL),J
DIKSHA /45
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