Delhi High Court
Ram Nath vs M/S Hindustan Unilever Ltd on 28 March, 2026
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* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Reserved on: 20.02.2026
Date of decision: 28.03.2026
Uploaded on: 28.03.2026
+ W.P.(C) 7000/2015
RAM NATH .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Avadh Bihari Kaushik, Adv.
versus
M/S HINDUSTAN UNILEVER LTD. .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Sandeep Prabhakar, Sr. Adv. with
Mr. Vikas Mehta, Adv.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE SHAIL JAIN
JUDGMENT
SHAIL JAIN, J.
1. The present writ petition has been filed by the Petitioner/Workman,
Shri Ram Nath, under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, inter
alia, seeking setting aside of the order dated 29.11.2014 (hereinafter referred
to as the “Impugned Order”) passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Labour
Court-IX, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi in LCA No. 01/2014, whereby the
claim of the Petitioner under Section 33C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ) for computation and recovery of
alleged dues was dismissed as not maintainable on the ground that the
entitlement itself was disputed and required adjudication.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
2. The Petitioner/Workman, Shri Ram Nath, claims to have been initially
appointed as an Accounts Assistant with M/s Kwality Ice Cream Company
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in or about the year 1987. The Respondent/Management, however, asserts
that the Petitioner was appointed as a Clerk on 16.03.1988 on probation and
his services were subsequently confirmed on 01.10.1998. It is not in dispute
pursuant to a Strategic Alliance Agreement dated 30.12.1994 between KIC
Food Products Ltd. and Brooke Bond Lipton India Ltd. (BBLIL), the
business operations relating to ice cream including the sales, distribution and
marketing functions, were transferred and the services of the employees
engaged therein, including the Petitioner, stood transferred to BBLIL for all
purposes. Though there is a divergence in the exact date and designation of
appointment, the factum of employment and continuity of service is not in
dispute.
3. Thereafter, BBLIL came to be merged with Hindustan Lever Limited
(now Hindustan Unilever Limited) in or about 1995-1996, and the Petitioner
continued in service under the Respondent. It is also not in dispute that upon
such takeover, the services of the Petitioner stood transferred to Hindustan
Lever Limited (now Hindustan Unilever Limited) without any break in
service. During the course of his employment, the Petitioner was transferred
from time to time, including from Marshal House to Punjabi Bagh in or
about September 2000 and subsequently to Alipur in the year 2008, while his
service continued without break and with continuity of service.
4. It is an admitted position that a long-term Settlement dated 14.04.2001
was entered into between the Respondent and the permanent workmen of
Kwality Ice Cream Company represented through the Hotel Workers Union,
wherein the name of the Petitioner finds mention. It is further borne out from
the record that an earlier wage revision/ settlement was also entered into in or
about the year 1997, which was implemented in respect of the Petitioner.
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Upon the expiry of the said settlement, a subsequent long-term Settlement
dated 26.02.2004 was executed between the same parties, governing the
service conditions of the said category of workmen. According to the
Respondent, the said settlement dated 26.02.2004 continues to remain
operative and binding, there being no material on record to show that it was
terminated in accordance with law.
5. Subsequently, the Respondent entered into further wage settlements
dated 05.07.2006 and 23.03.2011 with employees represented by the All
India Brooke Bond Employees Federation. The case of the Petitioner is that
he is entitled to the benefits arising out of the said subsequent settlements.
The Respondent, however, disputes the aforesaid claim and asserts that the
Petitioner continued to be governed exclusively by the settlements dated
14.04.2001 and 26.02.2004 entered into with workmen represented by the
Hotel Workers Union. It is the stand of the Respondent that the settlements
dated 05.07.2006 and 23.03.2011 were applicable only to employees
represented by the All India Brooke Bond Employees Federation and, since
the Petitioner was not a member thereof, he is not entitled to claim any
benefit thereunder. It is further the stand of the Respondent that the Petitioner
had already reached the ceiling of the applicable pay scale under the
settlement dated 26.02.2004 and was, therefore, not entitled to further
increments as claimed.
6. In the aforesaid backdrop, the dispute between the parties centres
around the entitlement of the Petitioner to claim benefits under the
subsequent settlements dated 05.07.2006 and 23.03.2011.
7. The Petitioner raised a demand vide notice dated 25.11.2013 claiming
arrears of wages and other consequential benefits on the basis of the
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aforesaid subsequent settlements. It is further the case of the Petitioner that
he had addressed multiple representations and complaints to the
management and the Labour Authorities prior to initiating the present
proceedings. The said demand was denied by the Respondent vide reply
dated 26.12.2013, and the dispute remained unresolved.
8. Thereafter, the Petitioner filed an application under Section 33C(2) of
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 before the Labour Court seeking
computation and recovery of alleged dues amounting to Rs.21,83,885/-
along with interest for the period from April 2007 to December 2013.
9. The Respondent contested the said application, inter alia, on the
ground that the claim was not maintainable under Section 33C(2) of the Act,
as the entitlement of the Petitioner was disputed and had neither been
previously adjudicated nor otherwise recognised.
10. The Labour Court, by the impugned order dated 29.11.2014, held that
the claim involved determination of disputed entitlement, which could not be
adjudicated in proceedings under Section 33C(2) of the Act, the said
provision being in the nature of an execution proceeding. The application
was, accordingly, dismissed as not maintainable.
11. Aggrieved thereby, the Petitioner has filed the present writ petition.
12. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER
I. Learned counsel for the Petitioner submits that the present writ
petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India assails the order
dated 29.11.2014 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Labour
Court-IX, whereby the Petitioner’s application under Section 33C(2)
of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 has been dismissed as not
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maintainable on the ground of absence of any prior adjudication or
admission of entitlement. It is contended that the Labour Court has
misapplied the scope of Section 32C (2) of the Act by erroneously
treating the claim as involving adjudication of entitlement.
II. It is submitted that the Petitioner was initially appointed with M/s
Kwality Restaurant & Ice Cream Company on 12.06.1987 and,
pursuant to a Strategic Alliance dated 30.12.1994, his services stood
transferred to M/s Brooke Bond Lipton India Limited, which
subsequently got merged with Hindustan Unilever Limited on
23.04.1996, where after he continued in uninterrupted service under
the Respondent.
III. Learned counsel submits that during the course of employment,
successive wage settlements were entered into, including settlements
dated 14.04.2001 and 26.02.2004, followed by further wage revisions
in or around 2006/2007 and 2011 with the All India Brooke Bond
Employees Federation. It is contended that despite such subsequent
revisions, the Petitioner was denied corresponding benefits, including
revision of wages, increments and other service benefits such as leave
encashment, loans and incentives.
IV. It is submitted that the Petitioner quantified his dues for the period
April 2007 to December 2013 at Rs.21,83,885/-, with further accruals,
and, upon failure of the Respondent to redress his grievance despite
repeated representations, invoked Section 33C(2) of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 seeking computation and recovery of the said
amount.
V. Learned counsel submits that the Respondent opposed the claim on
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the ground that the Petitioner was governed exclusively by the
settlement dated 26.02.2004 and that the subsequent settlements were
applicable only to employees represented by the All India Brooke
Bond Employees Federation, of which the Petitioner was not a
member. It was further contended that
proceedings under Section 33C (2), being in the nature of execution,
cannot be invoked in the absence of a pre-existing or admitted right.
The Petitioner further contends that the subsequent settlements are in
continuation of earlier wage revisions and denial of benefits
thereunder is arbitrary
VI. It is submitted that the Labour Court accepted the aforesaid
objection and held that the applicability of the subsequent settlements
to the Petitioner involved determination of entitlement and, therefore,
fell outside the scope of Section 33C (2), resulting in dismissal of the
application without adjudicating the claim on merits.
VII. Learned counsel submits that the said approach is erroneous in
law, inasmuch as the settlement dated 26.02.2004 stood expired on
31.03.2007 and the subsequent settlements were in continuation
thereof, and that denial of benefits on the basis of union membership is
arbitrary and unsupported by the record. On these grounds, it is
submitted that the impugned order is liable to be set aside.
13. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT
I. Per contra, learned counsel for the Respondent submits that the
present writ petition is devoid of merit, as the claim filed by the
Petitioner under Section 33C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
was not maintainable. It is contended that the Petitioner sought
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issuance of a recovery certificate on the basis of wage settlements
dated 2007 and 2011 entered into between the Management and the All
India Brooke Bond Employees Federation, despite admittedly not
being a member thereof and, therefore, not entitled to any benefit under
the said settlements.
II. It is submitted that the Petitioner was initially appointed with M/s
Kwality Ice Cream Company and, upon restructuring and merger,
continued under the Respondent. During his service, long-term
settlements dated 14.04.2001 and 26.02.2004 were entered into
between the Management and workmen represented by the Hotel
Workers Union, which governed the service conditions of the
Petitioner, and under which he has admittedly been granted all benefits.
It is further contended that the settlement dated 26.02.2004 continues
to bind the parties in the absence of its termination in accordance with
law. The Petitioner, therefore, cannot claim benefits under separate
settlements entered into with another union representing a different
class of employees.
III. Learned counsel submits that the settlements relied upon by the
Petitioner are bilateral settlements within the meaning of Section 18(1)
read with Section 2(p) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and are
binding only on the parties thereto. Accordingly, the settlements
entered into with the All India Brooke Bond Employees Federation are
applicable only to its members and cannot be extended to the
Petitioner, who belongs to a different bargaining unit.
IV. It is further submitted that the claim raised by the Petitioner
involves disputed questions relating to entitlement, applicability of
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settlements, and alleged parity with other employees, all of which
require adjudication. Proceedings under Section 33C(2), being in the
nature of execution proceedings, are confined to computation of
pre-existing or admitted rights and cannot be invoked to determine
such disputes. Where the very basis of the claim or entitlement is
disputed and there is no prior adjudication or recognition thereof, the
Labour Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the claim or to first
determine entitlement and thereafter compute the benefit.
V. Learned counsel submits that any such claim involving adjudication
of rights could only be raised by way of an industrial dispute under
Section 10 of the Act and not by invoking Section 33C (2). It is,
therefore, contended that the learned Labour Court, having relied upon
settled legal principles, has rightly dismissed the application as not
maintainable, and no interference is warranted in exercise of writ
jurisdiction. It is further the stand of the Respondent that the said
settlements are bilateral in nature within the meaning of Section 18(1)
of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and are binding only on the parties
thereto, and that any claim involving adjudication of entitlement could
only be raised by way of an industrial dispute under Section 10 of the
Act.
14. ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION
Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record, the
principal issue that arises for consideration is:
(i) Whether the application filed by the Petitioner under Section 33C(2) of
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was maintainable, or whether the claimSignature Not Verified
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raised therein involved adjudication of disputed entitlement beyond the
scope of the said provision?
(ii) Whether the impugned order dated 29.11.2014 passed by the learned
Labour Court declining jurisdiction under Section 33C(2) of the Act
warrants interference in exercise of writ jurisdiction?
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
15. Having considered the rival submissions advanced by learned counsel
for the parties and upon perusal of the record, this Court finds that the issue
in the present case lies in a narrow compass. At the outset, it is well settled
that the jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the
Constitution of India is supervisory and not appellate in nature. This Court
does not sit in appeal over the findings recorded by the Labour Court, nor
does it re-appreciate evidence or substitute its own view merely because
another view may be possible. Interference is warranted only where the
adjudicating authority has acted without jurisdiction, in excess of
jurisdiction, or where the impugned order suffers from patent illegality,
perversity, or misapplication of settled principles of law. So long as the
findings are based on a plausible appreciation of the material on record, no
interference is called for in exercise of writ jurisdiction.
16. A perusal of the Impugned Order shows that the Labour Court has not
entered into the merits of the Petitioner’s claim regarding alleged entitlement
to monetary benefits arising out of subsequent wage settlements. Rather, the
adjudication has been confined to the preliminary issue of maintainability of
the application under Section 33C (2) of the Act, 1947. The Labour Court
has, thus, declined to examine the question of entitlement and has dismissed
the application on the ground that the claim involves disputed questions
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requiring prior adjudication and, therefore, falls beyond the limited scope of
proceedings under Section 33C(2) of the Act, 1947.
17. In light of the above, the record further shows that, before the Labour
Court, the Petitioner/workman asserted alleged entitlement to wages and
consequential benefits in terms of the subsequent wage settlements of the
years 2007 and 2011 entered into by the Respondent/Management with its
employees. It was contended that, despite being an employee of the same
establishment, such benefits were not extended to him. On this basis, the
Petitioner claimed that arrears of wages and other benefits for the period
from April 2007 to December 2013, quantified at Rs.21,83,885/-, were due
and recoverable under Section 33C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
18. Per contra, the Respondent/Management opposed the claim, inter alia,
on the ground that the Petitioner was governed by the long-term settlement
dated 26.02.2004 entered into with the Hotel Workers Union, under which
all admissible benefits had already been extended to him. It was further
contended that the subsequent settlements of 2007 and 2011 were entered
into with a distinct category of employees represented by the All India
Brooke Bond Employees Federation, and were not applicable to the
Petitioner, who was not a member thereof. The Respondent also raised a
preliminary objection that the claim involved disputed questions relating to
entitlement and applicability of settlements, which could not be adjudicated
in proceedings under Section 33C (2) of the Act,1947, the said provision
being confined to computation of benefits arising from pre-existing or
admitted rights. It was further contended that the said settlements are
bilateral in nature within the meaning of Section 18(1) of the Act and that
any claim involving adjudication of entitlement could only be raised by way
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of an industrial dispute under Section 10 thereof.
19. The Impugned Order reflects that the Labour Court examined the claim
from the standpoint of maintainability under Section 33C (2) of the Act,
1947. Upon noticing that the Petitioner had claimed monetary benefits on the
basis of subsequent settlements of 2007 and 2011, while the management
had categorically denied both the applicability of the said settlements and
any liability thereunder, the Labour Court held that there was neither any
admission of entitlement nor any prior adjudication in favour of the
workman. It further observed that the relief sought could not be computed
without first determining the Petitioner’s entitlement to the benefits claimed,
which involved disputed questions relating to applicability of settlements
and conditions of service.
20. The operative portion of the Impugned order dated 29.11.2014,
whereby the Labour Court returned its finding on the issue of
maintainability, reads as under:
16. The workman in the present case has claimed an
amount of Rs.21,83,885/- along with 18% interest w.e.f.
April 2007 onwards till December 2013 against the
management of M/s Hindustan Unilever Limited. On
the other hand, the management in its written statement
has stated that the workman has already been paid all
the benefits under the Long Term Settlement dated
26.02.2004, which is applicable and binding on the
claimant till date. Therefore, it is clear that nothing has
been admitted by the management, nor is there any fact
which can be computed without adjudicating the rights
of the parties first, particularly the relief aspect. The
reliefs which the workman has sought for in the
present claim are not calculable without a trial, and
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since it has been proved on record that the rights of
the parties have not been adjudicated upon so far, this
Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the present
claim under Section 33C (2) of the Industrial Disputes
Act. Keeping in view the law points cited by the Ld. AR
for management and also keeping in view that the
proceedings under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial
Disputes Act are in the nature of execution
proceedings, this Court holds that the present claim of
the workman under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial
Disputes Act is not maintainable and the same is
hereby dismissed. As far as the notification of the
Ministry of Labour and Employment dated 15.09.2010,
as relied upon by the Ld. AR for the workman, is
concerned, the same does not assist the workman, as in
the present case no award/order/settlement has been
passed so far in favour of the workman by any
competent authority.”
21. In the aforesaid backdrop, the limited question which arises for
consideration is whether the Labour Court was justified in declining to
entertain the Petitioner’s application under Section 33C (2) of the Act, 1947
on the ground of maintainability. It is clarified that this Court is not
concerned with the merits of the Petitioner’s claim, but only with the
jurisdictional issue as to whether such a claim could be examined within the
scope of proceedings under Section 33C (2) of the Act,1947.
22. Before examining the merits of the case, it is relevant to examine the
scope and ambit of Section 33C (2) of the Act, 1947, which reads as under:
33C. Recovery of money due from an employer–
(1) Where any money is due to a workman from an
employer under a settlement or an award or under the
provisions of 6[Chapter VA or Chapter VB], the workman
himself or any other person authorised by him in writing in
this behalf, or, in the case of the death of the workman, hisSignature Not Verified
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assignee or heirs may, without prejudice to any other mode
of recovery, make an application to the appropriate
Government for the recovery of the money due to him, and
if the appropriate Government is satisfied that any money
is so due, it shall issue a certificate for that amount to the
Collector who shall proceed to recover the same in the
same manner as an arrear of land revenue: Provided that
every such application shall be made within one year from
the date on which the money became due to the workman
from the employer: Provided further that any such
application may be entertained after the expiry of the said
period of one year, if the appropriate Government is
satisfied that the applicant had sufficient cause for not
making the application within the said period.
(2) Where any workman is entitled to receive from the
employer any money or any benefit which is capable of
being computed in terms of money and if any question
arises as to the amount of money due or as to the amount
at which such benefit should be computed, then the
question may, subject to any rules that may be made
under this Act, be decided by such Labour Court as may
be specified in this behalf by the appropriate
Government; 1[within a period not exceeding three
months:]
[Provided that where the presiding officer of a Labour
Court considers it necessary or expedient so to do, he
may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, extend such
period by such further period as he may think fit.
23. A plain reading of Section 33C (2) of the Act, 1947 indicates that the
Jurisdiction of the Labour Court thereunder is limited to the computation of
money due or of benefits capable of being quantified in monetary terms,
provided such entitlement is founded upon a pre-existing right. The
provision proceeds on the basis that the entitlement is not in serious dispute
and only requires computation or incidental interpretation, and that only its
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quantification remains to be determined. It does not confer upon the Labour
Court the authority to adjudicate upon the very existence of such right in the
first instance. The proceedings contemplated under Section 33C(2) of the
Act,1947 are thus in the nature of execution, wherein the Labour Court is
empowered to enforce or compute a benefit already crystallised by virtue of
an award, settlement, or otherwise recognised entitlement, but is precluded
from entering into or deciding disputed questions that go to the root of the
claim itself.
24. The legal position in this regard is no longer res integra and stands
authoritatively settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. It is well settled that
proceedings under Section 33C (2) of the Act, 1947 are in the nature of
execution proceedings, wherein the Labour Court is confined to computation
of benefits flowing from a pre-existing right and cannot assume the role of an
adjudicatory authority to determine such right in the first instance.
25. In view of the aforesaid statutory framework, it becomes necessary to
examine the judicial exposition governing the scope and ambit of
proceedings under Section 33C (2) of the Act,1947.
26. Consistent with the above, the scope of jurisdiction under Section 33C
(2) of the Act, 1947 has been clearly explained by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court, which has consistently held that the Labour Court, while exercising
powers under Section 33C (2), cannot decide disputed questions of
entitlement and is confined only to the computation and enforcement of an
existing right. In Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. v. The
Workmen, (1974) 4 SCC 696, the Hon’ble Supreme Court considered the
nature and extent of jurisdiction under Section 33C (2) of the Act,1947 and
held that proceedings thereunder are in the nature of execution proceedings,
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wherein the Labour Court is empowered to compute the amount of money
due to a workman or quantify a benefit capable of being expressed in
monetary terms. It was further held that such computation must necessarily
be founded upon an existing right, that is, a right which has been previously
adjudicated upon or otherwise duly recognised. The Hon’ble Supreme Court
clarified that the Labour Court cannot arrogate to itself the functions of an
Industrial Tribunal so as to adjudicate upon questions relating to the
workman’s entitlement, and that determination of such entitlement is not
incidental to computation but falls outside the scope of proceedings under
Section 33C (2) of the Act. The relevant observations are as under:
“12. It is now well-settled that a proceeding under
Section 33C (2) is a proceeding, generally, in the
nature of an execution proceeding wherein the Labour
Court calculates the amount of money due to a
workman from his employer, or if the workman is
entitled to any benefit which is capable of being
computed in terms of money, the Labour Court
proceeds to compute the benefit in terms of money. This
calculation or computation follows upon an existing
right to the money or benefit, in view of its being
previously adjudged, or, otherwise, duly provided for.
In Chief Mining Engineer East India Coal Co. Ltd. v.
Rameswar, it was reiterated that proceedings under
Section 33C (2) are analogous to execution
proceedings and the Labour Court called upon to
compute in terms of money the benefit claimed by
workmen is in such cases in the position of an
executing court. It was also reiterated that the right to
the benefit which is sought to be computed must be an
existing one, that is to say, already adjudicated upon
or provided for and must arise in the course of and in
relation to the relationship between an industrial
workman and his employer.”
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(Emphasis Supplied)
27. In the U.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Birendra Bhandari,
(2006) 10 SCC 211, the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated the scope of
jurisdiction under Section 33C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 while
dealing with a claim for monetary benefits arising out of Pay Commission
recommendations. It was held that the benefit which can be enforced under
Section 33C (2) must be a pre-existing benefit or one flowing from a
pre-existing right. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further observed that the
distinction between a pre-existing right or benefit and a claim which is
considered just and fair is vital, and that only the former falls within the
jurisdiction of the Labour Court under Section 33C (2) of the Act, while the
latter would require adjudication in appropriate proceedings. The Court held
thus:
“8. The principles enunciated in the decisions referred
by either side can be summed up as follows:
Whenever a workman is entitled to receive from his
employer any money or any benefit which is
capable of
being computed in terms of money and which he is
entitled to receive from his employer and is denied
of such benefit can approach Labour Court under
Section 33-C(2) of the Act. The benefit sought to be
enforced under Section 33-C(2) of the Act is
necessarily a pre-existing benefit or one flowing
from a pre-existing right. The difference between a
pre-existing right or benefit on one hand and the
right or benefit, which is considered just and fair
on the other hand is vital. The former falls within
jurisdiction of Labour Court exercising powers
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does not.”
28. The decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Municipal Corporation
of Delhi v. Ganesh Razak, (1995) 1 SCC 235, is directly applicable to the
present case. In the said decision, the workmen had sought computation of
wages at par with regular employees by invoking Section 33C (2) of the Act,
1947, while the employer had disputed both the basis of the claim and the
entitlement of the workmen. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that in the
absence of any prior adjudication or recognition of such entitlement,
proceedings under Section 33C (2) of the Act, 1947, were not maintainable,
as the claim itself required determination in the first instance.
29. In the present case, the Petitioner similarly seeks computation of
monetary benefits on the basis of subsequent settlements of 2007 and 2011,
the applicability whereof is disputed by the Respondent/Management. The
claim of entitlement is neither founded upon any prior adjudication nor
recognised by the employer. In such circumstances, the issue of entitlement
cannot be treated as incidental to computation and would fall outside the
scope of Section 33C (2) of the Act,1947, as held by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Ganesh Razak (supra). The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as
under:
12. The High Court has referred to some of these
decisions but missed the true import thereof. The ratio
of these decisions clearly indicates that where the very
basis of the claim or the entitlement of the workmen to
a certain benefit is disputed, there being no earlier
adjudication or recognition thereof by the employer,
the dispute relating to entitlement is not incidental to
the benefit claimed and is, therefore, clearly outside
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Act. The Labour Court has no jurisdiction to first
decide the workmen’s entitlement and then proceed to
compute the benefit so adjudicated on that basis in
exercise of its power under Section 33-C(2) of the Act.
It is only when the entitlement has been earlier
adjudicated or recognised by the employer and
thereafter for the purpose of implementation or
enforcement thereof some ambiguity requires
interpretation that the interpretation is treated as
incidental to the Labour Court’s power under Section
33-C (2) like that of the Executing Court’s power to
interpret the decree for the purpose of its execution.
13. In these matters, the claim of the
respondent-workmen who were all daily-rated/casual
workers, to be paid wages at the same rate as the
regular workers, had not been earlier settled by
adjudication or recognition by the employer without
which the stage for computation of that benefit could
not reach. The workmen’s claim of doing the same
kind of work and their entitlement to be paid wages at
the same rate as the regular workmen on the principle
of “equal pay for equal work” being disputed, without
an adjudication of their dispute resulting in
acceptance of their claim to this effect, there could be
no occasion for computation of the benefit on that
basis to attract Section 33-C(2).
(Emphasis Supplied)
The aforesaid principle squarely applies to the present case, where the
Petitioner’s entitlement under the subsequent settlements is itself in dispute
and has not been previously adjudicated or recognised, thereby placing the
claim beyond the scope of Section 33C (2) of the Act.
30. The Respondent has also rightly placed reliance upon Bombay
Chemical Industries v. Deputy Labour Commissioner (Civil Appeal No.
813 of 2022, decided on 04.02.2022), wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court
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reiterated that jurisdiction under Section 33C (2) of the Act,1947 is confined
to computation of benefits flowing from a pre-existing and undisputed right
and does not extend to adjudication of entitlement. It was held that where the
very basis of the claim is disputed and unadjudicated, the Labour Court lacks
jurisdiction under Section 33C (2) of the Act. The said principle squarely
applies to the present case.
31. Thus, the consistent judicial view of the Hon’ble Supreme Court is that
where the very entitlement to the benefit is disputed and has not been
previously adjudicated or recognised, the Labour Court cannot assume
Jurisdiction under Section 33C(2) of the Act,1947.
32. Applying the aforesaid principles, in the present case, it is not in dispute
that the Petitioner was an employee of the Respondent and was governed by
the settlement dated 26.02.2004. The claim raised, however, is founded upon
subsequent settlements of 2007 and 2011, stated to have been entered into
between the Respondent/Management and employees represented by the All
India Brooke Bond Employees Federation, the applicability whereof is
specifically disputed by the Respondent. It is the stand of the Respondent
that the said settlements were entered into with a different union and are not
applicable to the Petitioner, who continues to be governed by the settlement
dated 26.02.2004, which, according to the Respondent, has not been
terminated in accordance with law and continues to operate between the
parties.
33. In view of the aforesaid stand of the Respondent, the very basis of the
Petitioner’s claim is contested. In the absence of any prior adjudication or
clear recognition of such entitlement in accordance with law, the Petitioner
cannot be said to possess any pre-existing or enforceable right under the said
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settlements. It is also not borne out from the record that the settlement dated
26.02.2004 stood superseded or replaced by any subsequent settlement
governing the Petitioner. In the absence of such crystallised entitlement, the
claim would fall outside the limited scope of Section 33C (2) of the Act,
which proceeds on the existence of an undisputed or pre-determined right.
34. The contention of the Petitioner that the settlement dated 26.02.2004,
stated to be valid up to 31.03.2007, did not continue to govern the parties
thereafter does not advance his case. Even if such contention is accepted, the
applicability of the subsequent settlements to the Petitioner remains a
disputed issue requiring adjudication. The dispute raised by the Respondent
is not a mere bald denial, but pertains to the very applicability of the said
settlements and is founded on identifiable legal and factual grounds.
35. In this context, the dispute involves determination of the following
aspects, all of which go to the root of the Petitioner’s entitlement:
(i) the applicability of the subsequent settlements of 2007 and 2011 to
the Petitioner;
(ii) the binding nature of settlements entered into with a different union,
to which the Petitioner is stated not to belong, having regard to Section
18(1) of the Act;
(iii) the existence of any enforceable entitlement in favour of the
Petitioner in the face of a categorical denial by the Respondent; and
(iv) the plea of parity or discrimination with other employees, which
would require examination of factual and legal aspects.
All the aforesaid aspects are not incidental to computation but go to the very
root of entitlement and necessarily require adjudication, which is beyond the
scope of proceedings under Section 33C(2) of the Act.
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36. The contention that the subsequent settlements would automatically
apply to the Petitioner, in the absence of any prior adjudication or recognised
entitlement, is misconceived, as it presupposes the existence of a right which
itself is in dispute and cannot be determined in proceedings under Section
33C (2) of the Act.
37. In view of the aforesaid, this Court is of the considered opinion that the
Labour Court rightly declined to assume jurisdiction under Section 33C(2) of
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as the claim raised involves disputed
questions going to the root of the Petitioner’s entitlement. It is settled law that
proceedings under Section 33C(2) of the Act are in the nature of execution
and are confined to computation of benefits flowing from a pre-existing and
recognised right; the jurisdiction may incidentally involve interpretation, but
cannot extend to adjudication of the very basis of entitlement. Where such
entitlement itself is in dispute and has neither been previously adjudicated nor
recognised, the Labour Court lacks jurisdiction to determine the same, and the
appropriate remedy lies under Section 10 of the Act.
38. Even otherwise, it may also be observed that the Petitioner’s claim
does not satisfy the requirements of Section 33C(1) of the Act. The said
provision applies where money is due under a binding settlement, award, or
statutory provision and the entitlement is not in dispute. In the present case,
the entitlement itself is seriously contested, and there is no binding settlement
or award under which the claimed amount can be said to be due. The claim,
therefore, does not meet the requirements of Section 33C(1) of the Act, much
less those of Section 33C(2) of the Act.
39. The impugned order reflects that the Labour Court has applied the
governing principles under Section 33C (2) and relied upon binding
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precedents, including Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ganesh Razak,
(1995) 1 SCC 235, Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. v.
The Workmen, (1974) 4 SCC 696, as well as decisions of this Court in MCD
v. Sham Lal & Ors., 104 (2003) DLR 507 and Standard Chartered Bank
Ltd. v. Kewal Krishan Mutneja, W.P. (C) 1526/2000, Delhi High Court.
These authorities make it clear that where entitlement itself is in dispute and
has not been previously adjudicated or recognised, the claim falls outside the
scope of Section 33C(2). Applying the said position, the Labour Court rightly
held the claim to be not maintainable. The view so taken is a plausible and
legally tenable view based on the material on record and does not warrant
interference under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India.No
jurisdictional error, perversity, or illegality is demonstrated so as to warrant
interference in exercise of writ jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
40. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court finds that the impugned
order passed by the Labour Court does not suffer from any infirmity,
illegality, perversity, or jurisdictional error warranting interference under
Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. The view taken by the
Labour Court, holding that the Petitioner’s claim is not maintainable under
Section 33C (2) of the Act, 1947, is a plausible and legally sustainable view in
consonance with the settled position of law.
41. It is clarified that this Court has not examined the merits of the
Petitioner’s claim and that the observations made herein are confined solely
to the issue of maintainability under Section 33C (2) of the Act. Accordingly,
the present writ petition is dismissed.
42. It is, however, clarified that dismissal of the present petition shall not
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preclude the Petitioner from seeking appropriate remedy in accordance with
law, including by raising an industrial dispute under Section 10 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, if so advised. There shall be no order as to
costs.
SHAIL JAIN
JUDGE
MARCH 28, 2026/RM
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