Punjab-Haryana High Court
Rajesh @ Raju @ Rajesh Kumar vs State Of Haryana on 30 March, 2026
CRM-M No.11712 of 2026 -1-
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
233
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CRM-M No.11712 of 2026
Date of decision : 30.3.2026
Date of uploading : 1.4.2026
Rajesh @ Raju @ Rajesh Kumar .............Petitioner
Versus
State of Haryana .......Respondent
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUMEET GOEL
Present: Mr. Raman Chawla, Advocate, for the petitioner
Mr. Deepak Grewal, DAG, Haryana
---
SUMEET GOEL, J. (ORAL)
1. Present 7th petition has been filed under Section 483 of the
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short ‘BNSS’) for grant of
regular bail to the petitioner in case FIR No.124 dated 21.3.2022, under
Sections 20/20-C/27-A/29/61/85 of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances Act, 1985, registered at Police Station Hansi Sadar, Police
District Hansi, District Hisar.
2. The gravamen of the FIR in question is that the petitioner is an
accused of being involved in an FIR pertaining to NDPS Act involving
150 grams of ganja, and the petitioner has been nominated, in this case,
on the disclosure of co-accused Surender, Ram Rati and Saroj.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has iterated that the petitioner
is in custody since 22.7.2022. Learned counsel for the petitioner has
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further submitted that the mandatory provisions of the NDPS Act have not
been complied with, and thus, the prosecution case suffers from inherent
defects. Learned counsel has further iterated that sole basis to array the
petitioner as an accused is the disclosure statement of co-accused, namely
Surender, Ram Rati and Saroj. Learned counsel has further argued that all
the co-accused have granted the concession of regular bail by a
Coordinate Bench of this Court. Learned counsel has further iterated that
the petitioner has suffered incarceration for more than 3 years and 7
months. Thus, regular bail is prayed for.
4. Learned State counsel has filed reply by way of affidavit of
Ravinder Singh, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Hansi in Court today.
The same be kept on record. Raising submissions in tandem with the said
reply, learned State counsel has opposed the present petition by arguing
that the allegations raised are serious in nature and thus the petitioner does
not deserve the concession of the regular bail. Learned State counsel
seeks to place on record custody certificate dated 29.3.2026 in the Court,
which is taken on record.
5. I have heard counsel for the rival parties and have gone through
the available records of the case.
6. The petitioner was arrested on 22.7.2022 whereinafter
investigation was carried out and challan qua him was presented on
14.9.2022. Total 35 prosecution witnesses have been cited, out of which
27 have been examined whereas 01 has been given up till date. The
petitioner has been implicated as an accused in the FIR in question solely
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on the basis of disclosure statement of co-accused- Surender, Ram Rati
and Saroj from whom 150 grams of ganja was allegedly recovered. As
per the prosecution version, there is no other material available to connect
the petitioner with the contraband except for the said disclosure statement.
It is pertinent to note that such disclosure statements, in the absence of
corroborative evidence hold limited evidentiary value and cannot be sole
basis for implicating the petitioner. The reliance on this unsubstantiated
statement raises serious doubts about the fairness and objectivity of the
investigation. It is not in dispute that the petitioner was not present at the
spot. The veracity and weightage required to be attached to the disclosure
statement made by the co-accused will be fully tested at the time of trial.
The rival contentions raised at Bar give rise to debatable issues, which
shall be ratiocinated upon during the course of trial. This Court does not
deem it appropriate to delve deep into these rival contentions, at this
stage, lest it may prejudice the trial. Nothing tangible has been brought
forward to indicate the likelihood of the petitioner absconding from the
process of justice or interfering with the prosecution evidence.
6.1. At this juncture, it would be apposite to refer to a judgment
passed by this Court in Anshul Sardana versus State of Punjab, passed
in CRM-M-65094-2024 (2025: PHHC:004198), wherein, after relying
upon the ratio decidendi of the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court
in Tofan Singh versus State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2020 Supreme Court
5592; Smt. Najmunisha, Abdul Hamid Chandmiya @ Ladoo Bapu versus
State of Gujrat, Narcotics Control Bureau, 2024 INSC 290; State by
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(NCB) Bengaluru vs. Pallulabid Ahmad Arimutta & Anr.’, 2022 (1) RCR
(Criminal) 762; and Vijay Singh vs. The State of Haryana, bearing
Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No.(s) 1266/2023, decided on 17.05.2023,
has held thus:
“6.3 It is a well established principle of law that a confession made
by a co-accused under Section 67 of the NDPS Act is inherently a very
weak piece of evidence. Such statement(s), by themselves, cannot form
the sole basis for the conviction of an individual and must be
scrutinized with utmost caution in conjunction with other substantive
evidence. Moreover, no recovery has been effected from the possession
of the petitioner, who has been subsequently implicated as an accused
solely on the basis of disclosure statement of the co-accused. However,
as regular bail pertains to life and liberty of individual, Courts are
obligated to strike a balance between safeguarding personal liberty
and ensuring the effective administration of justice as also
investigation. The final evidentiary value and admissibility of the
disclosure statement made by a co-accused fall within the domain of
the trial Court and are to be adjudicated during the course of the trial
in accordance with established principles of law. However, while
adjudicating a plea for regular bail, this Court cannot remain oblivious
to the circumstances under which the petitioner has been arraigned or
implicated, including the nature of the allegations, the evidence linking
the petitioner to the offence as well as the specific role attributed to the
petitioner in the commission of the alleged offence. A prima facie
examination of these factors is essential to ensure that the process of
law is not misused, abused or misdirected.”
6.2. Further, this Court in the case of Jaswinder Singh alias Kala
versus State of Punjab passed in CRM-M-33729-2025
(2025:PHHC:089161) has held thus:
“14. As a sequitur to above-said rumination, the following
postulates emerge:
(I) (i)A bail plea on merits; in respect of an FIR under NDPS Act
of 1985 involving offence(s) under Section 19 or Section 24 or
Section 27-A thereof and for offence(s) involving commercial
quantity; is essentially required to meet with the rigour(s) of
Section 37 of NDPS Act.
(ii) The rigour(s) of Section 37 of NDPS Act do not apply to a
bail plea(s) on medical ground(s), interim bail on account of
any exigency including the reason of demise of a close family
relative etc.
(iii)The rigour(s) of Section 37 of NDPS Act pale into oblivion
when bail is sought for on account of long incarceration in view
of Article 21 of the Constitution of India i.e. where the bail-
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procrastinating and folly thereof is not attributable to such bail-
applicant.
II. The twin conditions contained in Section 37(1)(b) of NDPS Act
are in addition to the conditions/parameters contained in
Cr.P.C./BNSS or any other applicable extant law.
III. The twin conditions contained in Section 37(1)(b) of NDPS Act
are cumulative in nature and not alternative i.e. both the
conditions are required to be satisfied for a bail-plea to be
successful.
IV. For consideration by bail Court of the condition stipulated in
Section 37(1)(b)(i) of NDPS Act i.e. “there are reasonable
grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence”:
(i) The bail Court ought to sift through all relevant
material, including case-dairy, exclusively for the
limited purpose of adjudicating such bail plea.
(ii) Such consideration, concerning the assessment of
guilt or innocence, should not mirror the same degree of
scrutiny required for an acquittal of the accused at the
final adjudication & culmination of trial.
(iii) Plea(s) of defence by applicant-accused, if any,
including material/documents in support thereof, may be
looked into by the bail-Court while adjudicating such
bail plea.
V. For consideration of the condition stipulated in Section
37(1)(b)(ii) i.e. ‘he is not likely to commit any offence while on
bail’:
(i) The word ‘likely’ ought to be interpreted as
requiring a demonstrable and substantial probability of
re-offending by the bail-applicant, rather than a mere
theoretical one, as no Court can predict future conduct
of the bail-applicant.
(ii) The entire factual matrix of a given case including
the antecedents of the bail-applicant, role ascribed to
him, and the nature of offence are required to be delved
into. However, the involvement of bail-applicant in
another NDPS/other offence cannot ipso facto result in
the conclusion of his propensity for committing offence
in the future.
(iii) The bail-Court may, at the time of granting bail,
impose upon the applicant-accused a condition that he
would submit, at such regular time period/interval as
may stipulated by the Court granting bail, an affidavit
before concerned Special Judge of NDPS Court/Illaqa
(Jurisdictional) Judicial Magistrate/concerned Police
Station, to the effect that he has not been involved in
commission of any offence after being released on bail.
In the facts of a given case, imposition of such condition
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may be considered to be sufficient for satisfaction of
condition enumerated in Section 37(1)(b)(ii).
VI. There is no gainsaying that the nature, mode and extent of
exercise of power by a Court; while satisfying itself regarding
the conditions stipulated in Section 37 of NDPS Act; shall
depend upon the judicial discretion exercised by such Court in
the facts and circumstances of a given case. No exhaustive
guidelines can possibly be laid down as to what would
constitute parameters for satisfaction of requirement under
Section 37 (ibid) as every case has its own unique
facts/circumstances. Making such an attempt is nothing but a
utopian endeavour. Ergo, this issue is best left to the judicial
wisdom and discretion of the Court dealing with such matter.”
6.3. In this view of the matter, the rigor imposed under Section 37 of
the NDPS Act stands diluted.
6.4. The trial is indeed procrastinating and folly thereof cannot be
saddled upon the petitioner. As per custody certificate dated 29.3.2026
filed by the learned State counsel, the petitioner has already suffered
incarceration for a period of 3 years, 7 month and 28 days. In this view of
the matter, the rigor imposed under Section 37 of the NDPS Act stands
diluted in light of the Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
6.5. This Court in a judgment titled as Kulwinder versus State of
Punjab passed in CRM-M-64074-2024 (2025:PHHC:002695); after
relying upon the ratio decidendi of the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Hussainara Khatoon vs. Home Secy., State of Bihar (1980) 1
SCC 81; Abdul Rehman Antulay vs R.S. Nayak (1992) 1 SCC 225; Javed
Gulam Nabi Shaikh vs. State of Maharashtra and another, 2024(3) RCR
(Criminal) 494; Mohd Muslim @ Hussain vs. State (NCT of Delhi)
reported as 2023 INSC 311; Criminal Appeal No.245/2020 dated
07.02.2020 titled as “Chitta Biswas Alias Subhas vs. The State of West
Bengal“; “Nitish Adhikary @ Bapan vs. The State of West Bengal”,
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Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No.5530-2022 dated 22.08.2022 titled as
“Mohammad Salman Hanif Shaikh vs. The State of Gujarat“; Criminal
Appeal No.1169 of 2022 dated 05.08.2022 titled as Gopal Krishna Patra
@ Gopalrusma vs. Union of India, and Ankur Chaudhary vs. State of
Madhya Pradesh, 2024(4) RCR (Criminal) 172; has held, thus:
“7.8. The right to a speedy and expeditious trial is not only a vital
safeguard to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration; to mitigate
anxiety and concern accompanying the accusation as well as to curtail
any impairment in the ability of an accused to defend himself, but there
is an overarching societal interest paving way for a speedy trial. This
right has been repeatedly actuated in the recent past and the ratio
decidendi of the above-referred to Supreme Court’s judgments have
laid down a series of decisions opening up new vistas of fundamental
rights. The concept of speedy trial is amalgamated into the Article 21
as an essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty,
guaranteed and preserved under our Constitution. The right to speedy
trial begins with the actual restraint imposed at the time of the arrest of
the accused and consequent incarceration which continues at all
stages, namely, the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal and
revision so that any possible prejudice that may result due to
impermissible and avoidable delay since the time of the commission of
the offence till the criminal proceedings consummate into a finality,
could be averted. The speedy trial, early hearing and quick disposal
are sine qua non of criminal jurisprudence. The overcrowded Court-
dockets, the heavy volume of work and the resultant pressure on the
prosecution and the Police, indubitably keeps the entire criminal
jurisprudential mechanism under stress and strain. However, this
cannot be an excuse for keeping the sword of Damocles hanging on the
accused for an indefinite period of time. It does not serve any credit to
the criminal justice system, rather it makes for a sad state of affairs.
The guarantee of a speedy trial is intended to avoid oppression and
prevent delay by imposing on the Court and the prosecution an
obligation to proceed with the trial with a reasonable dispatch. The
guarantee serves a threefold purpose. Firstly, it protects the accused
against oppressive pre-trial imprisonment; secondly, it relieves the
accused of the anxiety and public suspicion due to unresolved criminal
charges and lastly, it protects against the risk that evidence will be lost
or memories dimmed by the passage of time, thus, impairing the ability
of the accused to defend himself. It goes without saying that the
consequences of pre-trial detention are grave. Accused, presumed
innocent, till proven otherwise, are subjected to psychological and
physical deprivations of jail-life, usually under onerous conditions.
Equally important, the burden of detention of such an accused
frequently falls heavily on the innocent members of his family.
There is yet another aspect of the matter which deserves
consideration at this stage. The allegations in the present case relate to
accused being involved in an FIR relating to commercial quantity of
contraband under the NDPS Act, 1985. While considering a bail
petition in a case involving commercial quantity, the Court has to keep
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CRM-M No.11712 of 2026 -8-in mind the rigours enumerated under Section 37 of NDPS Act, 1985
which mandates that Courts can grant bail to an accused only after
hearing the public prosecutor and after having satisfied itself of twin
conditions which are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused
is not guilty of the offence charged/alleged and that, he is not likely to
commit any offence while on bail. The stringent rigours of Section 37
of the NDPS Act, 1985 must be meticulously scrutinized against the
backdrop of accused’s fundamental right to a speedy trial. The right to
life and personal liberty cannot be rendered nugatory by unwarranted
delays in the judicial process, particularly where such delay(s) is
neither attributable to the accused nor justified at the end of the
prosecution by cogent reasons. An individual cannot be kept behind
bars for an inordinate period of time by taking refuge in rigours laid
down in Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985. The legislature in its
wisdom, in order to ensure speedy and timely disposal of the cases
under the Act, has provided for the constitution of special Courts under
Section 36-A of the Act. However, this Court cannot turn Nelson’s eye
to the protracted delays and systematic inefficiency that frustrate this
legislative purpose. A Court of law is duty-bound to ensure that it does
not become complicit in violation of an individual’s fundamental rights,
notwithstanding anything contained in a statute. While dealing with
bail petition in a case governed by the rigours of Section 37 of the
NDPS Act, 1985, the Court must strike a judicious balance between the
legislative intent to curb the menace of drugs and the sacrosanct right
of the accused to a fair and expeditious trial. Prolonged incarceration,
without justifiable cause, risks transforming pre-trial detention into
punitive imprisonment, an outcome antithetical to the principle of
justice and equity.
Ergo, the unequivocal inference is that where the trial has
failed to conclude within a reasonable time, resulting in prolonged
incarceration, it militates against the precious fundamental rights of
life and liberty granted under the law and, as such, conditional liberty
overriding the statutory embargo created under Section 37 of the
NDPS Act, 1985 ought to be considered as per facts of a given case. In
other words, grant of bail in a case pertaining to commercial quantity,
on the ground of undue delay in trial, cannot be said to be fettered by
Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985.”
6.6. As per the said custody certificate, the petitioner is stated to be
involved in 2 more cases/FIRs. Indubitably, the antecedents of a person
are required to be accounted for while considering a regular bail petition
preferred by him. However, this factum cannot be a ground sufficient by
itself, to decline the concession of regular bail to the petitioner in the FIR
in question when a case is made out for grant of regular bail qua the FIR
in question by ratiocinating upon the facts/circumstances of the said FIR.
Reliance in this regard can be placed upon the judgment of the Hon’ble
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Supreme Court in Maulana Mohd. Amir Rashadi v. State of U.P. and
another, 2012 (1) RCR (Criminal) 586; a Division Bench judgment of
the Hon’ble Calcutta High Court in case of Sridhar Das v. State, 1998
(2) RCR (Criminal) 477 & judgments of this Court in CRM-M
No.38822-2022 titled as Akhilesh Singh v. State of Haryana, decided on
29.11.2021, and Balraj v. State of Haryana, 1998 (3) RCR (Criminal)
191.
6.7 Indubitably, the present petition is the 7th attempt by the
petitioner to secure regular bail. The last bail plea preferred by the
petitioner was dismissed as withdrawn on 11.8.2025. However, keeping
in view the entirety of the factual milieu of the case in hand, especially the
extended incarceration of the petitioner and no substantial progress in
trial, this Court is inclined to favourably consider the instant plea for bail.
A profitable reference, in this regard, can be made to a judgment of this
Court passed in CRA-S-2332-2023 titled as Rafiq Khan versus State of
Haryana and another; relevant whereof reads as under:
“10. As an epilogue to the above discussion, the following
principles emerge:
I. Second/successive regular bail petition(s) filed is
maintainable in law & hence such petition ought not to be
rejected solely on the ground of maintainability thereof.
II. Such second/successive regular bail petition(s) is
maintainable whether earlier petition was dismissed as
withdrawn/dismissed as not pressed/dismissed for non-
prosecution or earlier petition was dismissed on merits.
III. For the second/successive regular bail petition(s) to
succeed, the petitioner/applicant shall be essentially/pertinently
required to show substantial change in circumstances and
showing of a mere superficial or ostensible change would not
suffice. The metaphoric expression of seeking second/successive
bail plea(s) ought not be abstracted into literal iterations of
petition(s) without substantial, effective and consequential
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IV. No exhaustive guidelines can possibly be laid down as to
what would constitute substantial change in circumstances as
every case has its own unique facts/circumstance. Making such
an attempt is nothing but an utopian endeavour. Ergo, this
issue is best left to the judicial wisdom and discretion of the
Court dealing with such second/successive regular bail
petition(s).
V. In case a Court chooses to grant second/successive regular
bail petition(s), cogent and lucid reasons are pertinently
required to be recorded for granting such plea despite such a
plea being second/successive petition(s). In other words, the
cause for a Court having successfully countenanced/entertained
such second/successive petition(s) ought to be readily and
clearly decipherable from the said order passed.”
Suffice to say, further detention of the petitioner as an undertrial
is not warranted in the facts and circumstances of the case.
7. In view of above, the present petition is allowed. Petitioner is
ordered to be released on regular bail on his furnishing bail/surety bonds
to the satisfaction of the Ld. concerned CJM/Duty Magistrate. However,
in addition to conditions that may be imposed by the concerned
CJM/Duty Magistrate, the petitioner shall remain bound by the following
conditions:-
(i) The petitioner shall not mis-use the liberty granted.
(ii) The petitioner shall not tamper with any evidence, oral or
documentary, during the trial.
(iii) The petitioner shall not absent himself on any date before
the trial.
(iv) The petitioner shall not commit any offence while on bail.
(v) The petitioner shall deposit his passport, if any, with the trial
Court.
(vi) The petitioner shall give his cell-phone number to the
Investigating Officer/SHO of concerned Police Station and shall
not change his cell-phone number without prior permission of
the trial Court/Illaqa Magistrate.
(vii) The petitioner shall not in any manner try to delay the trial.
(viii) The petitioner shall submit, on the first working day of
every month, an affidavit, before the concerned trial Court, to
the effect that he has not been involved in commission of any
offence after being released on bail. In case the petitioner is
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CRM-M No.11712 of 2026 -11-found to be involved in any offence after his being enlarged on
bail in the present FIR, on the basis of his affidavit or otherwise,
the State is mandated to move, forthwith, for cancellation of his
bail which plea, but of course, shall be ratiocinated upon merits
thereof.
8. In case of breach of any of the aforesaid conditions and those
which may be imposed by concerned CJM/Duty Magistrate as directed
hereinabove or upon showing any other sufficient cause, the
State/complainant shall be at liberty to move cancellation of bail of the
petitioner.
9. Ordered accordingly.
10. Nothing said hereinabove shall be construed as an expression of
opinion on the merits of the case.
(SUMEET GOEL)
JUDGE
30.3.2026
Ashwanii
Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes/No
Whether reportable: Yes/No
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