Gujarat High Court
Rajavir Pravinchandra Upadhyaya vs State Of Gujarat on 22 July, 2026
Author: Sunita Agarwal
Bench: Sunita Agarwal
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/SCA/13097/2017 JUDGMENT DATED: 22/07/2026
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 13097 of 2017
With
CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR DIRECTION) NO. 1 of 2018
In R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 13097 of 2017
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MRS. JUSTICE SUNITA AGARWAL
and
HONOURABLE MS. JUSTICE NISHA M. THAKORE
==========================================================
Approved for Reporting Yes No
✔
==========================================================
RAJAVIR PRAVINCHANDRA UPADHYAYA
Versus
STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS.
==========================================================
Appearance:
MR RAMKRISHNA B DAVE(3404) for the Petitioner(s) No. 1
MS. HETAL PATEL, ASSISTANT GOVERNMENT PLEADER/PP for the
Respondent(s) No. 1
MR ANKIT SHAH(6371) for the Respondent(s) No. 2
NOTICE SERVED for the Respondent(s) No. 1,3
==========================================================
CORAM:HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MRS. JUSTICE SUNITA
AGARWAL
and
HONOURABLE MS. JUSTICE NISHA M. THAKORE
Date : 22/07/2026
ORAL JUDGMENT
(PER : HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MRS. JUSTICE SUNITA AGARWAL)
The petitioner herein seeks to challenge the validity of Rule
32 and 81 of the Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 being ultra
vires to the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. A further relief has been
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sought in the writ petition to issue direction to the respondent
No.3, namely the Regional Transport Authority, Ahmedabad not to
recover any amount towards additional fee over and above the
regular fee.
2. At the outset, it is submitted by Mr. Ramakrishna Dave, the
learned advocate appearing for the petitioner, that in view of the
amendment brought in Rule 32 of the Rules, 1989 by the GSR w.e.f.
29th December, 2016, the challenge to the validity of the said
provision is hereby withdrawn, i.e. the petitioner does not want to
press the challenge to the validity of Rule 32 of the Central Motor
Vehicles Rules, 1989.
3. However, sustaining the challenge to the Rule 81 to the
extent of additional fee of fifty rupees for each day delay after
expiry of certificate of fitness in the matter of grant or renewal of
certificate of fitness of motor vehicle, it was sought to be submitted
that the concept of levy of fee is that it can be charged for the
services provided, on the principle of quid pro quo. For the delay in
applying for grant or renewal of certificate of fitness for motor
vehicle, no fee can be charged, in the name of additional fee,
beyond Rs. 200/- which is being charged for grant or renewal of
certificate of fitness for motor vehicle. Item No.11 in the table
appended to the second proviso of Rule 81 has been placed before
us, which reads as under :-
Sr. Purpose Amount Rule Section
No.
11 Grant or renewal of Two Hundred 62(2)
certificate of fitness for rupees.
motor vehicle Note.-Additional fee
of fifty rupees for
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each day of delay
after expiry of
certificate of fitness
shall be levied
4. It is submitted that power to prescribe fee for grant or
renewal may be related to Rule 62(2) of the Central Motor Vehicles
Rules, 1989., which reads that:-
“The fee for the grant or renewal of a certificate of fitness shall be
specified in rule 81”
5. It is submitted that Rule 62 provides the procedure for grant
or renewal of certificate of fitness. Sub-rule(2) of Rule 62 provides
that for the grant or renewal of certificate of fitness fee shall be
specified in Rule 81. Sub-rule(3) of Rule 62 further states that fee
for testing of a vehicle when tested by the Inspecting Officer or
authorised testing station, other than the Inspecting Officer in the
office of the registering authority, shall be specified in Rule 81.
Sub-rule (4) further provides the period of moving application for
renewal of certificate of fitness, which may not be more than 60
days before the date of expiry of the certificate of fitness. Sub-rule
(5) further provides that once renewal is granted, it shall be
effective from the date of grant of fitness.
6. It is argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the
challenge to the provisions of Rule 81 of the Central Motor Vehicles
Rules, 1989 was brought before three High Courts. The first one
being the Madras High Court, which vide judgment and order
dated 03.04.2017 passed in W.P. No. 1598 of 2017 and other
cognate writ petitions has held that levy of additional fee under
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various heads as per the impugned notification is without authority
of law and such levy of additional fee is liable to be struck down.
The impugned notification of the Central Government amending
Rule 81 of the Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 to the extent of
imposition of additional fee, has been declared void and has been
struck down. It was observed therein that as per the settled
proposition of law, no substantive levy of fee can be without
backing of the charging provisions in that regard. It was observed
that the notification for amendment in Section 81 for levy of
additional fee was based on the report of the Committee
constituted to consider of revision of fee prescribed under the
Rules. The Committee suggested increase in fee noticing that the
fee prescribed for various purposes were last revised vide
amendment notification GSR 221(E) dated 28.03.2001 and there
had been no revision since then, and further on account of the
significant increase in the cost of infrastructure, fee is required to
be revised.
7. It is noted by the Madras High Court therein that the
suggestion of the Committee for the levy of fee, however, was made
subject to the amendment of the Act or the Rules to provide such a
levy. The purpose behind the suggestion of levy of additional fee
was that it would deter plying of vehicles without required
documentation and compliances Such purpose would, however,
have to be achieved taking recourse to the available methods. The
proposal for levy of fine, in the shape of additional fee, is clearly
without the requisite authority. It was observed in paragraph No.
’15’ that:-
“15. The Motor Vehicles Act has been enacted to take into account
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and provide for road transport technology, pattern of passenger
and freight movements, development of road net work in the
country and improved techniques in motor vehicle management.
The power extended to Government in terms of sec.211 of the Act
is for the levy of a fee as a quid pro quo for services offered by
officers or authorities under the Act. The fee prescribed is thus
designed to be commensurate to the service rendered by the
authority. We fail to see any justification for the levy of an
additional fee in the nature of the penalty when there is no change
in the nature of service rendered by the authority under the Act
particularly in the absence of any statutory backing for the same.
The purpose, as is apparent from the recommendation of the
committee is the fond hope that such levy would act as a deterrent
for non-compliance of various provisions. Such non-compliance is
however, a matter to be addressed using such powers as have been
extended to the authorities. The Motor Vehicles Act and the
Central Motor Vehicles Rules at present, only contain a provision
authorizing the levy of a fee and nothing more. In this connection,
we may refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in re. State of
U.P. and others Vs. Vam Organic Chemicals Ltd and others (AIR
2003 Supreme Court 4650) wherein there was a challenge to the
levy of a fee on denaturalisation of alcohol. The Bench, quashing
the levy, states as follows:
44. The question is (to borrow the language in Synthetics)
whether in the garb of regulations a legislation, which is in
pith and substance, as we look upon the instant legislation, a
fee or levy which has no connection with the cost or
expenses administering the regulation, can be imposed
purely as a regulatory measure, Judged by the pith and
substance of the impugned legislation, we are definitely of
the opinion that these levies cannot be treated as part of
regulatory measures.”
8. The opinion of the Madras High Court has been followed by
the High Court of Karnataka in Writ Petition No. 9176 of 2022
(MV), which was filed by an Association registered under the
Karnataka Societies Registration Act, 1960 for the welfare of lorry
owners across the State. The challenge therein was to the
notification bearing No. GSR-714E dated 04.10.2021 published in
the Extraordinary Gazette on 01.04.2022, pursuant to the
intimation by the respondents therein prescribing fee and penalty
in respect of vehicles enumerated therein, for belated renewal of
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fitness certificate and renewal of registration certificate.
9. The Karnataka High Court following the above noted view of
the Madras High Court in the judgment and order dated
03.04.2017, has set aside the levy of additional fee vide notification
dated 04.10.2021.
10. The Rajasthan High Court has followed the suit in a writ
petition filed by the transport operators ( D.B. Civil Writ Petition
No. 14258 of 2024) assailing the constitutional validity and vires of
the provisions contained in Rule 81 of the Central Motor Vehicles
Rules, 1989 as amended vide notification dated 04.10.2021 to the
extent it seeks to levy “additional fee of fifty rupees for each day of
delay after expiry of certificate of fitness”. On the question of levy
of additional fee being ultra vires rule making power of the Central
Government providing for levy of fee in the matter of issuance and
renewal of fitness certificates for motor vehicles including the
transport motor vehicles, it was noted in paragraph Nos. ’18’ to
’23’ as under :-
“18. Unquestionably, Section 64, Clause (o) of the Act of 1988 read
with Rule 81 of the Rules of 1989 empowers the Central
Government to frame the rules providing for levy of fee in the
matter of issuance and renewal of fitness certificates for motor
vehicles including transport motor vehicles. In that context, the
provisions contained in Rule 81 of the Rules of 1989, in various
columns, referred to hereinabove, prescribe fee for grant or
renewal of certificate of fitness for motor vehicles older than 15
years as provided under newly inserted Clause 11A to Rule 81 of
the Rules of 1989. However, in the note appended to Clause 11A, it
has been provided that an additional fee of fifty rupees for each
day of delay after expiry of certificate of fitness shall be levied. This
means that in case where a certificate of fitness of transport
[2024:RJ-JP:50573-DB] (302 of 328) [CW-14258/2024] motor
vehicle has expired and the same has not been renewed before its
expiry, the levy in the nature of additional fee of rupees fifty for
each day of delay is provided. Therefore, the question which arisesPage 6 of 26
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for consideration is whether charging additional levy of fee for
delay in seeking renewal after expiry of the validity of certificate of
fitness is in the nature of fee or an impost in the nature of fine or
penalty.
19. Normally, when an application for grant or renewal of
certificate of fitness of motor vehicle is presented, the provisions
contained in Section 64, Clause (o) of the Act of 1988 clearly
empowers the Central Government that the fee could be levied for
issuance of certificate of fitness. This would include renewal also.
But where the owner of a transport vehicle fails to get the
certificate of fitness renewed before expiry of its validity, whether
it empowers the Central Government to levy a fee only for
rendering services or for issuance of certificate of fitness upon
failure to seek renewal of certificate of fitness before expiry of its
validity and can it be said that the Central Government has acted
beyond its rule making authority to levy a fee for a purpose not
otherwise enumerated under Section 64, Clause (o) or under any
other provisions of the Act of 1988.
20. In a recent authoritative pronouncement in the case of Gaurav
Kumar Vs. Union of India & Others (supra), dealing with
competence of the Bar Council of India towards charging of fee by
framing rules in exercise of power of delegated legislation, their
Lordships in the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that although
delegated legislation enjoys the presumption of constitutionality, it
does not enjoy the same immunity as the parent legislation.
Referring to settled legal position laid down in plethora of
decisions including Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) (P) Ltd.
Vs. Union of India 21, it was declared by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court that delegated legislation can be challenged on the following
grounds:
“28. ………..:
(i) lack of legislative competence to make delegated
legislation;
(ii) violation of fundamental rights guaranteed under the
Constitution;
(iii) violation of any provision of the Constitution;
(iv) failure to conform to the statute under which it is made
or exceeding the limits of authority conferred by the
enabling Act;
(v) repugnance to any other enactment; and
(vi) manifest arbitrariness.”
Challenge to the impugned rule to the extent it provides for levy of
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additional fee for delay in applying for renewal after expiry of
validity period of certificate of fitness of motor vehicle is under
challenge in present petitions on the ground of failure to conform
to the statute under which it is made or that it exceeds the limits of
authority conferred by the enabling Act, i.e., the Act of 1988.
21. The constitutional and legal position with regard to power to
levy fee also fell for consideration of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
the case of Gaurav Kumar Vs. Union of India & Others (supra). In
the above decision, reference was made to three Judge Bench
decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of CIT Vs.
McDowell & Co. Ltd.22 which enunciated the principles for
interpreting Article 265 read with Article 266(28) of the
Constitution of India as below:
“31. ……….
21. “Tax”, “duty”, “cess” or “fee” constituting a class
denotes various kinds of imposts by State in its
sovereign power of taxation to raise revenue for the
State. Within 21 (1985) 1 SCC 641 22 (2009) 10 SCC
755 [2024:RJ-JP:50573-DB] (304 of 328) [CW-
14258/2024] the expression of each specie each
expression denotes different kinds of impost depending
on the purpose for which they are levied. This power
can be exercised in any of its manifestations only under
any law authorising levy and collection of tax as
envisaged under Article 265 which uses only the
expression that no “tax” shall be levied and collected
except authorised by law. It in its elementary meaning
conveys that to support a tax legislative action is
essential, it cannot be levied and collected in the
absence of any legislative sanction by exercise of
executive power of State under Article 73 by the Union
or Article 162 by the State.”
It was further enunciated as below:
“32. The Seventh Schedule to the Constitution
differentiates between taxing entries and general
entries. Subjects pertaining to the levy of taxes must be
traced to specific taxing entries enumerated in either
List I or List II. In addition, Parliament has the
residuary power under Article 248 read with Entry 97
of List I to legislate on matters not enumerated in List
II or List III, including on matters of taxation. The
power of the legislature to levy fees is dealt with under
separate heads: (i) Entry 96 of List I empowers
Parliament to levy fees in respect of any matters in List
I; (ii) Entry 66 of List II empowers the State legislatures
to levy fees in respect of any matters in List II and (iii)
Entry 47 of List III empowers both Parliament and the
State legislatures (subject to Article 254) to levy feesPage 8 of 26
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for any matter enumerated in List III.
Parliament has prescribed an enrolment fee under Section
24(1)(f) of the Advocates Act under Entry 96 of List I.”
22. The principle with regard to levy of fee generally was also
discussed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as below:
“33. The legislature can delegate its power to levy fees.
Since a fee is an impost and a compulsory exaction of
money, the power of a delegate to levy fees must flow
from the express authority of law. In Ahmedabad Urban
Development Authority v. Sharadkumar Jayantikumar
Pasawalla this Court observed:
“7.[…] In our view, such power of imposition of tax
and/or fee by delegated authority must be very
specific and there is no scope for implied authority for
imposition of such tax or fee. It appears to us that the
delegated authority must act strictly within the
parameters of the authority delegated to it under the
Act and it will not be proper to bring the theory of
implied intent or the concept of incidental and
ancillary power in the matter of exercise of fiscal
power.”
34. The principles that flow from the above discussion
are: (i) a fee is an impost in terms of Article 366(28);
(ii) the expression “tax” occurring in Article 265
means all imposts, including fees and therefore any
fee must be levied by the authority of a valid law; (iii)
fees being a compulsory exaction of money, the power
to levy fees cannot be implied; (iv) delegation of the
power to levy fees to a delegate of the legislature
should be specifically provided for under the parent
legislation and (v) the delegate must strictly act within
the parameters of the legislative policy laid down by
the parent legislation when levying fees and taxes.”
23. The nature of impost as regulatory fee was discussed and
explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court with reference to earlier
decisions as below:
“35. Article 110 of the Constitution, though in a
different context, recognizes that that fees imposed
under the authority of law may include (i) fees forPage 9 of 26
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licences; and (ii) fees for service. In Commissioner,
Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri
Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, a
Constitution Bench explained the concept of licence
fees thus:
“47. […] In the first class of cases, the Government
simply grants a permission or privilege to a person to
do something, which otherwise that person would not
be competent to do and extracts fees either heavy or
moderate from that person in return for the privilege
that is conferred. A most common illustration of this
type of cases is furnished by the licence fees for motor
vehicles. Here the costs incurred by the Government
in maintaining an office or bureau for the granting of
licences may be very small and the amount of
imposition that is levied is based really not upon the
costs incurred by the Government but upon the
benefit that the individual receives. In such cases,
according to all the writers on public finance, the tax
element is predominant, and if the money paid by the
licence-holders goes for the upkeep of roads and other
matters of general public utility, the licence fee
cannot but be regarded as a tax”
In Shirur Mutt (supra), it was held that a fee is money taken
by the Government “as the return for the work done or
services rendered.” Therefore, a fee was characterised by an
element of quid pro quo between the payer and the public
authority.
36. In a series of subsequent decisions, this Court held that a
levy can be regarded as a fee if it has a “reasonable
relationship” with services rendered by the public authority.
The traditional view that there must be an actual quid pro
quo for a fee has not been applied in the strict sense in
subsequent decisions of this Court. It has been held that the
relationship between the levy of a fee and services rendered
is one of general character and not of mathematical
exactitude.
37. In Corporation of Calcutta v. Liberty Cinema, a
Constitution Bench observed that licence fees are not
necessarily charged in return for services rendered. This
Court referred to a Privy Council decision which inter alia
held that licence fees could be charged to defray the costs of
administering the local regulations. In Secunderabad
Hyderabad Hotel Owners’ Association v. Hyderabad
Municipal Corporation, this Court observed that licence fees
could broadly be classified as either regulatory or
compensatory. It was observed that licence fees are
regulatory when the activities for which a licence is given
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are required to be regulated or controlled. It was further
held that the fees charged for regulation of activities could
be validly classified as fees although no service is rendered.
A regulatory fee such as a licence fee enables authorities to
supervise, regulate, and monitor the activity related to which
the licence has been issued and to secure proper
enforcement of the legal provisions.”
11. It was observed in paragraph No. ’24’ that it is abundantly
clear that since a fee is an impost and in a given case, a compulsory
exaction of money, the power of a delegate to levy fee must flow
from the express authority of law. Such power of imposition of tax
and/or fee by delegated authority must be very specific and there is
no scope for implied authority for imposition of such tax or fee. The
delegated authority must act strictly within the parameters of the
authority delegated to it under the Act and there is no scope to
bring the theory of implied intent or the concept of incidental and
ancillary power in the matter of exercise of fiscal power. It was
further noted in para Nos. ’25’ to ’28’ as under :-
“25. It is also settled principle that the fee imposed under the
authority of law may include (i) fee for licence and (ii) fee for
service. In case of levy of fee for licence, the Government simply
grants a permission or privilege to a person to do something, which
otherwise that person would not be competent to do and extracts
fees either heavy or moderate from that person in return for the
privilege that is conferred. Levy of fee for issuance of licence for
motor vehicles is an incidence of such regulatory fee. The costs
incurred by the Government in maintaining an office or bureau for
the granting of licences may be very small and in case the amount
of imposition that is levied is based really not upon the costs
incurred by the Government but upon the benefit that the
individual receives, in such cases, the tax element is predominant,
and if the money paid by the licence-holders goes for the upkeep of
roads and other matters of general public utility, the licence fee
cannot but be regarded as a tax. (as held in the case of
Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri
Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt 23).
In was held in the aforesaid case that a fee is money taken by the
Government “as the return for the work done or services
rendered.” Therefore, a fee was characterised by an element of
quid pro quo between the payer and the public authority.
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26. However, in several decisions, the evolution of principle with
regard to quid pro quo as the feature characteristic of fee, it has
been held that a levy can be regarded as a fee if it has a
“reasonable relationship” with services rendered by the public
authority. The traditional view that there must be an actual quid 23
(1954) 1 SCC 412 [2024:RJ-JP:50573-DB] (308 of 328) [CW-
14258/2024] pro quo for a fee has not been applied in the strict
sense in subsequent decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and it
has been held that the relationship between the levy of a fee and
services rendered is one of general character and not of
mathematical exactitude. Further, in the case of H H Sudhindra
Thirtha Swamiar v. Commissioner for Hindu Religious and
Charitable Endowments24, it was observed that a levy in the
nature of a fee does not cease to be of that character merely
because there is an element of compulsion or coerciveness present
in it, nor is it a postulate of a fee that it must have direct relation to
the actual services rendered by the authority to each individual
who obtains the benefit of service. If with a view to provide a
specific service, levy is imposed by law and expenses for
maintaining the service are met out of the amounts collected there
being a reasonable relation between the levy and the expenses
incurred for rendering the service, the levy would be in the nature
of a fee and not in the nature of a tax.
27. In another Constitution Bench judgment of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the case of Corporation of Calcutta Vs. Liberty
Cinema25, it was observed that licence fees are not necessarily
charged in return for services rendered and licence fees could be
charged to defray the costs of administering the local regulations.
28. In the case of Secunderabad Hyderabad Hotel Owners’
Association & Others Vs. Hyderabad Municipal Corporation,
Hyderabad & Another (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court
observed that licence fees could broadly be classified as either 24
1963 Supp (2) SCR 302 25 1964 SCC OnLine SC 65 [2024:RJ-
JP:50573-DB] (309 of 328) [CW-14258/2024] regulatory or
compensatory. It was further observed that licence fees are
regulatory when the activities for which a licence is given are
required to be regulated or controlled. It was also held that the
fees charged for regulation of activities could be validly classified
as fees although no service is rendered.”
12. The question posed by the Rajasthan High Court therein as to
whether with reference to the statutory scheme of the Act, 1988,
particularly the provisions relating to levy of fee, levy of additional
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fee of fifty rupees for each day of delay after expiry of the validity
period of certificate of fitness is a fee either in the nature of being a
regulatory fee or in the nature of fee for rendering service on quid
pro quo basis, having reasonable relation with the services
rendered or it is in the nature of a fine or penalty for failing to
apply and not getting renewed the certificate of fitness before
expiry of its validity. While answering the said question, it was
noted in paragraph Nos. ’30’ to ’33’ that :-
“30. A motor vehicle cannot be allowed to operate on roads unless
various statutory compliances and regulatory measures as
provided under the Act of 1988 read with the Rules of 1989 are
fulfilled. Section 39 of the Act of 1988 declares that no person shall
drive any motor vehicle and no owner of a motor vehicle shall
cause or permit the vehicle to be driven in any public place or in
any other place unless the vehicle is registered in accordance with
the Chapter IV of the Act of 1988 and the certificate of registration
of the vehicle has not been suspended or cancelled and the vehicle
carries a registration mark displayed in the [2024:RJ-JP:50573-DB]
(310 of 328) [CW-14258/2024] prescribed manner. Section 56 of
the Act of 1988 mandates that every transport motor vehicle to be
plied on road must carry a certificate of fitness as provided under
the law. It clearly provides that a transport motor vehicle shall not
be deemed to be validly registered for the purposes of section 39,
unless it carries a certificate of fitness in the manner prescribed
under the law. Thus, a conjoint reading of Sections 39 and 56 of
the Act of 1988 makes it clear that if a transport motor vehicle
does not carry a certificate of fitness as required under the law, the
vehicle shall not be deemed to be validly registered and, therefore,
plying of that vehicle on the road would be prohibited under
Section 39 of the Act of 1988.
31. The provisions contained in Section 56 of the Act of 1988 are
regulatory in nature as it regulates plying of a transport motor
vehicle on road only when the vehicle is otherwise certified to be fit
in all respects under the norms provided in the law. A certificate of
fitness may be issued either by the prescribed authority or by
authorised testing station. Moreover, it provides that such
certificate shall remain effective for such period as may be
prescribed by the Central Government. The prescribed authority
has been empowered to cancel a certificate of fitness at any time if
it is satisfied that the vehicle, to which it relates, no longer
complies with all the requirements made under the Act of 1988 and
the rules made thereunder and on such cancellation, the certificate
of registration shall also be deemed to be suspended until a newPage 13 of 26
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certificate of fitness is obtained.
32. In exercise of its rule making power, the Central Government
has made provisions in the Rules of 1989 providing for issuance
and renewal of a certificate of fitness. Rules 62 to 73 of the Rules
of 1989 deal with the procedure and regulatory mechanism of
certificate of fitness. Rule 62 of the Rules of 1989, provides for
issuance of certificate of fitness or renewal thereof for a period in
different situations. It further provides that renewal of a fitness
certificate shall be made only after an inspecting officer or
authorised testing station has carried out tests specified as per the
Rules of 1989. It contains number of details and check lists which
are required to be verified. There are provisions which regulate
and control operation of authorised testing stations also.
33. It is, thus, clear that in the matter of issuance of certificate of
fitness, an element of service is involved. Issuance of certificate of
fitness confers a benefit on certificate holder to ply the vehicle on
road.
Levy of fee for issuance of fitness certificate as provided under
Rule 81 of the Rules of 1989, therefore, appears to have reasonable
correlation with the services rendered and satisfies the
requirement of quid pro quo.
13. It was, thus, held that in the matter of issuance of certificate
of fitness, an element of service is involved. Issuance of certificate
of fitness confers a benefit on certificate holder to ply the vehicle
on road. Levy of fee for issuance of fitness certificate as provided
under Rule 81 of the Rules of 1989, therefore, appears to have
reasonable correlation with the services rendered and satisfies the
requirement of quid pro quo.
14. However, in the provisions impugned, an additional charge of
fifty rupees under the nomenclature of “additional fee” is leviable
for each day after expiry of validity of certificate of fitness,
declaring it to be case of delay. Charge of additional fifty rupees
does not bear any correlation with the services rendered, nor there
is anything under the provisions of the Act of 1988 or relevant rules
relating to issuance of certificate of fitness to reveal that if
application for renewal is not filed before expiry of the period of
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fitness certificate, any additional exercise, over and above what is
required to be undertaken while granting or renewing a fitness
certificate before expiry of its validity, would be required to be
undertaken. There is conscious use of the word, “delay”, which
denotes that according to rule making authority, there is a mandate
under the law to get the certificate of fitness renewed before its
expiry. However, such a provision cannot be found in Section 56 of
the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, Rule 62 to 73 of the Rules, 1989
framed thereunder, which oblige the owner of the transport vehicle
to get the certificate of fitness renewed before expiry of the validity
period, much less any penal consequences flowing from such
failure to get the certificate of fitness renewed before its expiry.
15. There is no punitive provision contained even in Chapter XIII
of the Act of 1988 which deals with offences, penalties and
procedure. In absence of any punitive provision in the Act which
declares that if such certificate of fitness is not renewed before its
expiry, delay will invite any penalty or fine or that the delay would
constitute any offence, no such penalty that too in the shape of fee
can be levied. It was also observed that the residuary power
reserved with the Central Government under Section 211 can be
taken recourse to levy any other regulatory/compensatory fee. The
aforesaid provision, however, does not constitute a source of
authority to levy anything which is not in the nature of fee.
16. Rather, in view of the provisions contained in Section 39 and
56, in absence of a valid fitness certificate, that transport vehicle
shall not be deemed to be validly registered and without valid
registration, plying of vehicle on road is prohibited under Section
39 of the Act of 1988. It was, thus, concluded that in absence of
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any provisions under the Act, 1988, mandating renewal of
certificate of fitness before expiry, or penalty or fine provided
under the substantive law in the event of failure to seek renewal of
fitness certificate before expiry, provisions in the rules charging
additional fee, would be ultra vires.
17. It was concluded that :-
“39. There is no provision under the Act of 1988 mandating
renewal of certificate of fitness before expiry, nor penalty or fine
has been provided under the substantive law, in the event of failure
to seek renewal of fitness certificate before expiry.
Under the rule making power, as conferred under Section 64 or
Section 65 of the Act of 1988, neither the Central Government, nor
the State Government have been conferred any power to levy fine
or penalty for not getting fitness certificate renewed before its
expiry. Therefore, charging additional fee of fifty rupees for each
day after expiry of validity of fitness certificate does not bear any
correlation with rendering services but it seeks to penalise the
transport owner for his failure in getting the certificate of fitness
renewed before its expiry. Use of the word, “delay” has to be
understood in this context. Therefore, additional charge for every
day after the expiry of the fitness certificate is punitive and
partakes the nature of fine or penalty.
40. One could understand that non-renewal before expiry of the
certificate of fitness is declared to be in contravention inviting fine
or penalty under the substantive law and the power conferred on
the Central Government to prescribe the rate of fine or penalty as
delegate of Legislature through rule making exercise. However,
there is no express authority conferred under Section 64 of the Act
of 1988 on the Central Government to levy something in the nature
of fine or penalty in a contingency where an owner of transport
vehicle fails to get fitness certificate renewed before its expiry.”
18. The Rajasthan High Court also delineated on the settled legal
position that the delegate of Legislature in exercise of its rule
making power, cannot travel beyond the express authority
conferred on it by the Legislature and noted in paragraph No. ’41’
that :-
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“41. We have dealt with the settled legal position that the
Government acts as a delegate of Legislature in exercise of its rule
making power and it cannot travel beyond the express authority
conferred on it by the Legislature. In the case of Gaurav Kumar Vs.
Union of India & Others (supra), The Hon’ble Supreme Court, while
dealing with the power of the Bar Council of India to levy fee in
exercise of power of delegated legislation, relying upon its decision
in the case of Kunj Behari Lal Butail Vs. State of H.P.26, held thus:
“58. While acting as a delegate of Parliament, the SBCs
and the BCI can frame rules under the Advocates Act.
However, any rule enacted by the SBCs is only ancillary
and cannot be so exercised to bring into existence
substantive rights, obligations or disabilities not
contemplated by the provisions of the parent
enactment. Further, the rules must align with the
object and purpose of the Advocates Act, namely, the
creation of a common bar and regulation of legal
practitioners and their qualifications, enrolment, right
to practice, and discipline.”
In the above case of Gaurav Kumar Vs. Union of India & Others
(supra), it has been further explained by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court as below:
“59. A legislation can confer the power to make subordinate
legislation upon a delegate. In conferring such powers, the
legislation has to specifically law down the policy, principles,
and standards that will guide the subordinate authority. The
legislative policy can be determined from the preamble and
the provisions of an enactment. The delegate derives its
legislative powers from the parent statute. Unlike the
Legislature, which has sovereign legislative powers derived
from the Constitution, the delegated authority is conferred
powers by the parent enactment. Therefore, delegated
authority must strictly conform to the provisions of the
statute under which it is framed. A delegate cannot alter or
change the legislative policy. A delegate cannot override the
provisions of the parent enactment either by exceeding the
legislative policy or making provisions inconsistent with the
enactment.”.
19. Further observations in paragraph Nos. ’42’ to ’52’ are
relevant to be noted hereinunder :-
“42. Therefore, by charging additional fee of fifty rupees for each
day of delay in seeking renewal after expiry of the validity period of
fitness certificate, something in the nature of fine or penalty isPage 17 of 26
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sought to be imposed that too without any valid authority of law
and in the garb of power to levy fee. Levy of additional fee for each
day of delay does not bear any correlation or connection with
expenses in administering the regulations to say that the fee could
be levied purely as a regulatory measure. Therefore, it cannot even
be treated as a part of regulatory measure. In the case of [2024:RJ-
JP:50573-DB] (318 of 328) [CW-14258/2024] State of U.P. & Others
vs. Vam Organic Chemicals Ltd. & Others27, the aforesaid legal
position was explained thus:
“44. The question is (to borrow the language in Synthetics)
whether in the garb of regulations a legislation which is in
pith and substance, as we look upon the instant legislation, a
fee or levy which has no connection with the cost or
expenses administering the regulation, can be imposed
purely as a regulatory measure. Judged by the pith and
substance of the impugned legislation, we are definitely of
the opinion that these levies cannot be treated as part of
regulatory measures.” The State has not produced any
material to show that it was incurring any additional cost for
any further regulation of denatured spirit. Any trace of a
lingering doubt as to the propriety of the levy under R. 3(a)
must be taken to have been noted off effectively with the
order passed by three-Judges of this Court in the writ
petition filed by Synthetics challenging the same levy as we
have noted earlier. That order has resulted in granting
Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. relief from payment under R.
3(a). The only distinction between the present respondents’
cases and Synthetics was that the respondents chose to
challenge the levy before the High Court. That could be no
rational basis for denying the respondents who are
otherwise identically situated, the same relief. (See Anil
Kumar Neotia v. Union of India (1998) 2 SCC 587). In the
absence of any such correlation the fee under R. 3 is not a
fee at all levied for the purpose of additional regulation or
for any service rendered but is really a tax in the garb of a
fee.”
43. What, therefore, the provision of levy of additional fee seeks to
do is to adopt a punitive measure for not getting fitness certificate
renewed before its expiry. A provision of late fee is in the nature of
fine or penalty. In the case of Union of India Vs. Association of
Unified Telecom Service Providers of India & Others (supra), a
provision of late fee, in case a customer fails to pay the bill within
due date, was treated as penalty. Following pertinent observations
were made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court:
“146. Late fee is a penalty charged by the licensee in case
customer fails to pay the bill within the due date. Sometimes
late fee is waived off by the licensee as a 27 AIR 2003 SC
4650 [2024:RJ-JP:50573-DB] (319 of 328) [CW-14258/2024]Page 18 of 26
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goodwill gesture at the time of payment. The submission
raised on behalf of the licensee is that the licence fee should
be payable on the realised revenue. What has not been
realised, cannot form part of revenue.”
44. In fact, the reply/counter affidavit filed by the respondent-
Union of India in the case of Raja Ram & Others Vs. Union of India
& Others (D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 6428/2024) states that the
proposed action of imposing additional fee was considered
necessary, amongst other things, as a deterrent against delaying
the renewal process. The relevant extracts of the reply filed in the
above writ petition are reproduced hereinabelow:
“……. (ii) the proposed action of imposing additional fees was
necessary in a democratic society for a legitimate aim, as
described as under:
a) Timely Renewal: The primary objective of imposing
additional fees is to encourage vehicle owners to renew their
Fitness Certificates on time. Timely renewal ensures that
vehicles on the roads are legally registered and meet the
necessary regulatory and safety requirements. This helps in
maintaining an up-to-date database of active vehicles, which
is essential for effective traffic management and law
enforcement.
b) Promoting Compliance: The imposition of additional fees
acts as a deterrent against delaying the renewal process. It
encourages the vehicle owners to comply with the legal
requirements of renewing their RCs within the specified time
frame. This helps in reducing the number of vehicles
operating with expired registrations, which can pose safety
risks and lead to legal complications.
c) Enforcement of Rules: The imposition of additional fees
helps in enforcing the Central Motor Vehicles Rules relating
to vehicle registrations. It sends a clear message that non-
compliance of the Rules will not be tolerated and that there
will be consequences of non-renewing the Fitness Certificate
on time.”
45. From the reply filed by the respondent-Union of India, the
policy behind levy of additional fee which includes as one of its
objectives as deterrent object itself makes the provision punitive.
In the absence of there being a legislative policy under the Act of
1988 mandating renewal of fitness certificate before its expiry,
what has been stated as objective behind levying additional fee
shows that the rule making authority has gone beyond its rule
making power to insist on renewal before expiry of the certificate
of fitness.
As we have already held hereinabove that non-renewal before
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expiry of fitness certificate by itself does not result in
contravention of the provisions of law, but it is only when a vehicle
without registration certificate is plied on road, the violation of law
takes place.
46. Learned Additional Solicitor General of India has laid much
emphasis on the provisions contained in Section 210C(c) and
Section 211 of the Act of 1988 to firstly submit that in view of wide
powers conferred on the Central Government under Section 211 of
the Act of 1988 to levy any other fee for the purposes of the Act,
challenge to levy of additional fee for delay in renewal of fitness
certificate could not be sustained on the ground that the levy is
ultra vires Section 64 of the Act of 1988. Alternative submission of
learned Additional Solicitor General of India is that even if the levy
is punitive in nature, as a measure of deterrent, in any case after
insertion of Section 110C, which finds place in Chapter XIII of the
Act of 1988 relating to offences, penalties and procedure, the
power of the Central Government extends to making such a
provision as a deterrent measure to ensure that owners of the
transport vehicles get fitness certificates renewed before expiry.
Placing reliance on the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
the cases of M. Rathinaswami & Others Vs. State of Tamil Nadu &
Others(supra); Government of [2024:RJ-JP:50573-DB] (321 of 328)
[CW-14258/2024] Andhra Pradesh & Others Vs. P.Laxmi Devi
(Smt.) and Dharmendra Kirthal Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh &
Another(supra), it is contended that harmonious interpretation of
the provisions contained in Sections 64, 210C and 211 of the Act of
1988 has to be drawn which empower the Central Government to
make such provision.
47. True it is that Section 211 of the Act of 1988 is couched in very
wide words and is a source of residuary power in the hands of the
Central Government to levy fee in exercise of the rule making
power notwithstanding the absence of any express provision to that
effect in any other provision of the Act of 1988. However, the
controlling and qualifying clause in Section 211 of the Act of 1988
makes it clear that such wide power can be exercised for levy of
such fees in respect of applications, amendments of documents,
issue of certificates, licences, permits, tests, endorsements,
badges, plates, countersignatures, authorisation, supply of
statistics or copies of documents or orders and for any other
purpose or matter involving rendering of any service by the officers
and authorities under the Act of 1988 or any other rule made
thereunder as may be considered necessary. Therefore, the power,
howsoever wide it can be, has to be exercised for the purpose of
levy a fee. We have already referred to hereinabove the
interpretation placed on Section 211 of the Act of 1988 by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of M.P. & Others Vs.
Rakesh Sethi & Anr. (supra) wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court
held that the Parliament intended that contingencies not covered
by a specific power to levy fees or [2024:RJ-JP:50573-DB] (322 of
328) [CW-14258/2024] amounts, which entailed some activity on
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the part of the State, including rendering of any service could be
legitimately charged or subjected to the levy of fees or amounts.
That means, impost has necessarily to be in the nature of fee.
Section 211 of the Act of 1988 is not a source of authority for
levying any punitive charge or fine or penalty on the basis of any
failure to do something which otherwise is not provided under the
scheme of the Act of 1988.
48. We are unable to countenance the submission based on the
provisions contained in Section 210C(c) of the Act of 1988. The
aforesaid provision was introduced by an Amendment Act (No. 32
of 2019) with effect from 01.10.2020. The aforesaid provision
forms part of statutory scheme of offences, penalties and
procedure provided under Chapter XIII of the Act of 1988. Section
210C of the Act of 1988 confers power on the Central Government
to make rules for the purposes enumerated in clause
(a), (b) and (c) thereof. Substantive provisions relating to penalty
are contained in Sections 177 to 198A and Section 200 of the Act
of 1988. Sections 199 and 199A and 200 of the Act of 1988 provide
for offences and composition of certain offences. Section 199B of
the Act of 1988 provides for revision of fines. Section 202 of the
Act of 1988 provides for power to arrest without warrant. Sections
203 and 204 of the Act of 1988 provide for breath test and
laboratory test. Section 205 of the Act of 1988 deals with
presumption of unfitness to drive. Power has been conferred on the
police to impound document and detain a vehicle used without
certificate of registration, permit etc. under Sections 206 and 207
of the Act of 1988. Section 208 of the Act of 1988 deals with
summary disposal of cases by the court upon taking a cognizance.
Section 210A of the Act of 1988 deals with power of the State
Government to increase penalties whereas Section 210B of the Act
of 1988 provides that any authority that is empowered to enforce
the provisions of the Act, if such authority commits an offence
under the Act, shall be liable for twice the penalty corresponding to
that offence under the Act of 1988.
Close reading and analysis of various provisions contained in
Chapter XIII of the Act of 1988 relating to offences, penalties and
procedure reveals the legislative scheme that the Legislature has
consciously not delegated any power to either Central Government
or State Government to levy a new fine or penalty for any
particular kind of contravention or violation of any provisions of the
Act of 1988. But, wherever the Legislature found it necessary, it
has specified as to which kind of contravention would attract
punitive consequences in the nature of fine or penalty or even
offences. To begin with, the Legislature has also laid down the
amount of fee or penalty leviable or contraventions which attract
fine or penalty. A limited power has been delegated to the
Governments to revise or multiply the fine already specified in that
Chapter. Section 199B of the Act of 1988 provides for revision of
fines by such amount not exceeding ten percent in value of the
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existing fines, on an annual basis on 1st day of April of each year
from the date of commencement of the Motor Vehicles
(Amendment) Act, 2019, as may be notified by the Central
Government. Similarly, Section 210A of the Act of 1988 provides
[2024:RJ-JP:50573-DB] (324 of 328) [CW-14258/2024] that subject
to the conditions made by the Central Government, a State
Government, shall, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify a
multiplier, not less than one and not greater than ten, to be applied
to each fine under the Act and such modified fine, shall be in force
in such State and different multipliers may be applied to different
classes of motor vehicles as may be classified by the State
Government for the purpose of that Section.
Therefore, it is not within the domain of the Central Government or
the State Government to levy a new fine other than those provided
under Chapter XIII of the Act of 1988 but the obligation is only to
the extent of revision or increase in the manner prescribed under
the provisions as stated hereinabove.
Section 210C of the Act of 1988 empowers the Central Government
to make rules for design, construction and maintenance standards
for national highways; such other factors as may be taken into
account by the court under sub-section (3) of Section 198A and any
other matter which is, or has to be, prescribed by the Central
Government. Therefore, the power to frame rules under Section
210C(c) of the Act of 1988, though broad and general in nature,
has to be exercised as delegate of the Legislature in respect of any
matter which is or has to be prescribed by the Central Government
under the scheme of the provisions contained in Chapter XIII of the
Act of 1988 relating to offences, penalties and procedure. We could
not find any provision under Chapter XIII relating to penalties
which empowers the Central Government to levy fine or penalty
only on the basis that owner of a transport vehicle has failed to get
fitness certificate [2024:RJ-JP:50573-DB] (325 of 328) [CW-
14258/2024] renewed before expiry of the same. Penalties, which
have been specified under the provisions of Chapter XIII of the Act
of 1988, amongst other things, provide for penal consequences for
using a motor vehicle without registration. As we have already
discussed hereinabove, a conjoint reading of Sections 39 and 56 of
the Act of 1988 would show that where the fitness certificate of a
transport vehicle expires, its registration is deemed to be not
validly registered and, therefore, it cannot be operated and plied
on the road. In such an eventuality, where without getting the
fitness certificate renewed, a transport vehicle is plied on road, it
would invite penal consequences under Section 192 of the Act of
1988. In such an eventuality, the Central Government could frame
appropriate rules in exercise of powers under Section 210C(c) of
the Act of 1988 providing appropriate mechanism for imposition of
fine provided under the law. The rule making power is only
ancillary to the substantive provisions contained in the enabling
Act and in the garb of rule making power, no punitive measures
can be taken for something which is not declared to be in
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contravention of the provisions of the law inviting any punitive
measure by imposition of fine or penalty. If the substantive
provisions contained in the Act of 1988 do not provide for any
penal consequence for not getting the fitness certificate renewed
before expiry of its validity period, a punitive provision for failure
to get the fitness certificate renewed before expiry could not be
provided in the garb of rule making power. The argument based on
harmonious construction relying upon several decisions, therefore,
must fail.
49. In the case of Gaurav Kumar Vs. Union of India & Others
(supra), the principles with regard to limitation of rule making
power were clearly delineated, as held in Para 58 and 59 thereof,
quoted hereinabove. Rule making power is only ancillary and
cannot be so exercised to bring into existence substantive rights,
obligations or disabilities not contemplated by the provisions of the
parent enactment and the rules must align with the object and
purpose of the Act. It has been highlighted that the delegate
derives its legislative powers from the parent statute. Unlike the
Legislature, which has sovereign legislative powers derived from
the Constitution, the delegated authority is conferred powers by
the parent enactment and, therefore, delegated authority must
strictly conform to the provisions of the statute under which it is
framed. A delegate, therefore, cannot alter or change the
legislative policy. A delegate cannot override the provisions of the
parent enactment either by exceeding the legislative policy or
making provisions inconsistent with the enactment.
In the garb of additional fee, a legislative policy of fine has been
introduced in the absence of there being any such scheme of fine
on failure to apply for renewal of fitness certificate before its
expiry.
50. Learned counsel for the petitioners have placed heavy reliance
upon the decision of Madras High Court in the case of Chennai City
Auto Ootunargal Sangam Vs. The Secretary, Ministry of Road
Transport & Highways & Others(supra). In that case, amendment
made in Rule 81 of the Rules of 1989 in the [2024:RJ-JP:50573-DB]
(327 of 328) [CW-14258/2024] year 2016 levying additional fee of
fifty rupees for each day of delay after expiry of certificate of
fitness was under challenge mainly on the ground that such levy
was in the nature of a fine or penalty over and above the
prescribed fee whereas the provisions of the Act of 1988 and the
Rules of 1989 do not authorise such punitive levy. While examining
the challenge to the validity, observations and recommendations of
a Committee constituted to consider the revision of fee was taken
into consideration which recorded that as there is no fine
prescribed for non-renewal of fitness certificate before its expiry,
there is likelihood of such vehicles plying on expired certificates of
fitness. Therefore, to curb that tendency, it was considered
necessary to levy a fine for non- renewal of fitness certificate in
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time.
That constituted principal basis for the Madras High Court to come
to the conclusion that the levy was punitive. The contents of the
reply/counter affidavit filed by the respondent-Union of India in
Raja Ram & Others Vs. Union of India & Others (D.B. Civil Writ
Petition No. 6428/2024), if juxtaposed with the recommendations/
observations of the Committee, as considered in para 13 of the
decision by Madras High Court in the case of Chennai City Auto
Ootunargal Sangam Vs. The Secretary, Ministry of Road Transport
& Highways & Others(supra), it would be clear that the objective
remains one and the same even for continuing the scheme of levy
of additional fee impugned in these petitions. Therefore, the impost
undoubtedly is punitive in nature.
51. In view of our discussions, analysis and conclusion, with utmost
humility, we are unable to subscribe to the view taken by [2024:RJ-
JP:50573-DB] (328 of 328) [CW-14258/2024] the Bombay High
Court in the case of ‘K’ Savakash Auto Rickshaw Sangha
represented through its Trustee Mr. Pradeep Shankar Bhalerao Vs.
Union of India through Ministry of Road Transport and Highways &
Others (supra).
52. In the result, we declare that the note appended to Serial No.
11A of Rule 81 of the Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 is ultra
vires Section 64(o) read with Section 211 of the Motor Vehicles
Act, 1988 and the same is, therefore, declared inoperative in law.
In the matter of consideration of application for renewal of fitness
certificate filed by the petitioners, the respondents shall not levy
any additional fee for each day of delay after expiry of validity
period of fitness certificate.”
20. Having gone through the erudite judgment of the Rajasthan
High Court in the matter of challenge of levy of additional fee
under Rule 81 of the Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 we find
ourselves in complete agreement with the opinion drawn by the
Rajasthan High Court. We see no reason to deviate from the
aforesaid view taken by three High Courts in the matter of Rule 81
being ultra vires to the extent it seeks to levy additional fee of
rupees fifty “for each day of delay after expiry of certificate of
fitness”.
21. We, therefore, deem it fit and proper to allow the present
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petition, in the same terms and conditions, adopting the detailed
observations of the Rajasthan High Court in the judgment and
order dated 19.12.2024 in D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 14258 of
2024.
22. However, before parting, we find it useful to note the
judgment of the Apex Court in Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v/s.
Union of India and Another [(2004) 6 SCC 254], wherein it
was observed that if passing of a Legislation gives rise to cause of
action, writ petition questioning constitutionality thereof can be
filed in any High Court of the country subject to the Court must
have the requisite territorial jurisdiction. However, an order
passed on writ petition questioning constitutionality of an
Parliamentary Act whether interim or final keeping in view the
provisions contained in Clause(2) of Article 226 of the Constitution
of India will have effect throughout the territory of India subject of
course to the applicability of the Act. Having gone through the said
decision, we may simply note that the challenge in the present
petition is to the validity of the provisions of the Central Motor
Vehicles Rules, 1989 framed under the Central Parliamentary
Legislation namely the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. In our
considered opinion, the decision of the Apex Court in Kusum
Ingots (supra) provide adequate guidance to follow the law laid
down by the other High Courts in their territorial jurisdiction.
Moreover, we do not find any reason to deviate from the view taken
by three High Courts noted in their decisions discussed
hereinbefore.
23. In so far as the challenge to the judgment and order dated
03.04.2017 passed by the High Court of Madras, before the Apex
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NEUTRAL CITATION
C/SCA/13097/2017 JUDGMENT DATED: 22/07/2026
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Court, suffice it to say that while granting Leave to Appeal vide
order dated 04.09.2017, the effect and operation of the decision of
the Madras High Court has not been stayed. Moreover, on a query
made by the Court, none of the learned advocates for the parties
would submit that there is no challenge to the decision of the
Rajasthan High Court, which has been referred to and relied on by
us to form our opinion.
24. In view of the above, the present petition stands allowed
holding Rule 81 of the Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 being
ultra vires to the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, which is hereby struck
down to the extent of the challenge herein.
25. Civil Application for directions stands disposed of,
accordingly.
(SUNITA AGARWAL, CJ )
(NISHA M. THAKORE,J)
C.M. JOSHI
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