Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Utpadan Nigam … vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 13 July, 2026

July 14, 2026

Chattisgarh High Court

Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Utpadan Nigam … vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 13 July, 2026

For Petitioner : Mr. Abhishek Sinha, Senior Advocate with Mr.
Anshuman Shrivastava, Mr. Abhijeet Shrivastava
(Video Conferencing), Ms. Krati Dubey, Ms. Selina
Raj Mevati, Ms. Ananya Sahu, Ms. Amisha Sinha,
Ms. Jasleen Kaur Gulati, Advocates.

For Respondents No.1 to 6 : Mr. Rahul Tamaskar, Government Advocate.
For Respondent No.7 : Mr. Ramakant Mishra, Deputy Solicitor General of
India and Mr. Rishabh Dev Singh, Advocate.

Single Bench: –

Hon’ble Shri Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal

C.A.V. Order

For the sake of exposition, this Order is divided in following parts:-

   S.No.                         Particulars                         Page Nos.

     1.    Challenge in the Writ Petition                                3

     2.    Writ Petition on behalf of the Petitioner                     3

     3.    Return on behalf of the State of Chhattisgarh                10

     4.    Rejoinder on behalf of the Petitioner                        11

     5.    Impugned Order passed by the Collector of Stamps             11

     6.    Submission on behalf of the Writ Petitioner                  14

     7.    Submission on behalf of the State of Chhattisgarh            17

     8.    Submission on behalf of the Union of India                   20

     9.    Questions for Determination of the Writ Petition             21

    10.    Re: Question No.2                                            22

    11.    Re: Question No.3                                            23

    12.    Re: Question No.1                                            25

The Indian Stamp Act, 1899 and Scheme of Section 49

13. Discussion and Analysis 28

14. Restitution under Section 65 of the Indian Contract Act 33

15. Payment of Interest on Stamp Duty and Cess on Stamp 38
Duty

16. Refund of Registration Fee 39

17. Conclusion 40

18. Relief 40
Page 3 of 40

(WPC No.2530/2020)

Challenge in the Writ Petition

1. Invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article

226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner, who is an

undertaking of the Government of Rajasthan engaged in the business

of generation and sale of electricity in the State of Rajasthan, has

filed this writ petition seeking quashment, amongst all, of the order

dated 25-11-2019 (Annexure P-46) passed by the Collector of Stamps,

Surguja, Ambikapur and consequently seeking refund of spoiled

stamp duty under Section 49(d)(1) of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, by

which the petitioner’s application for refund of spoiled stamp duty,

registration fees and cess on stamp duty, has been rejected by the

competent authority finding no merit.

Writ Petition on behalf of the Petitioner

2. The petitioner herein is a Company incorporated under the

provisions of the Companies Act, 1956 and is an undertaking of the

Government of Rajasthan engaged in the business of generation and

sale of electricity in the State of Rajasthan. The petitioner on

11.08.2006, vide Annexure P-2, applied for allocation of Parsa East

and Kanta Basan Coal Blocks (PEKB Coal Blocks) as per Section 3(3)

(a)(i) of the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1973 under the

Government Company dispensation route, on which the Union of

India allocated the said PEKB Coal Blocks to the petitioner vide its

letter dated 25.06.2007 (Annexure P-3) in terms of the aforesaid

provision of the Act of 1973 under the Government Company
Page 4 of 40

(WPC No.2530/2020)

dispensation route and the revised policy on Coal Mining of the State

Government, pursuant to which the petitioner applied for grant of a

mining lease vide application dated 31.03.2009 (Annexure P-4).

Thereafter, respondent No.5 passed order dated 26-5-2012

(Annexure P-5) approving the PEKB Coal Block mining lease in

favour of the petitioner for a period of 30 years and respondent No.2

Collector by its memo dated 28-5-2012 (Annexure P-6) requested the

Sub-Registrar, Ambikapur to determine stamp duty and registration

fee payable by the petitioner for execution of mining lease over

2,388.525 hectares, considering the annual royalty to be ₹ 62.16

crores in response to which the Sub-Registrar, Ambikapur, on the

same day, assessed stamp duty amounting to ₹ 15.54 crores, cess ₹

0.777 crores and registration fee ₹ 11.655 crores, thereby levying an

aggregate amount of ₹ 27.972 crores upon the petitioner for

execution of mining lease vide Annexure P-7. Thereafter, vide

Annexure P-8, mining lease for a period of 30 years from 30-5-2012

to 29-5-2042 was executed between respondent No.1 i.e.

Government of Chhattisgarh and the petitioner herein in respect of

PEKB Coal Block admeasuring 2,388.525 hectares situate in various

villages of Tehsil Udaipur, Police Station Premnagar, Sub-Division

Ambikapur, District Surguja. Pursuant to execution and registration

of mining lease, the petitioner paid an aggregate amount of ₹ 27.972

crores towards stamp duty, cess and registration fee to the Revenue

Department, State of Chhattisgarh, as determined by the Sub-

Registrar on 28-5-2012.

Page 5 of 40

(WPC No.2530/2020)

3. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of Manohar

Lal Sharma v. Principal Secretary and others 1 (first case)

(paragraphs 163 to 164) by its judgment dated 25-8-2014 considering

the issue, held that “the entire allocation of coal block as per

recommendations made by the Screening Committee from 14-7-1993

in 36 meetings and the allocation through the Government

Dispensation Route suffers from the vice of arbitrariness and legal

flaws” and, therefore, declared such allocations to be illegal. Their

Lordships further held that though the object of allocation of coal

blocks through Government Dispensation Route is, however,

laudable, but the same is also illegal since it is impermissible as per

the scheme of the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1973.

Consequently, as per the petitioner, the allocation of PEKB Coal

Blocks in favour of the petitioner stood de-allocated, the allocation

letter became void ab initio and the mining lease deed dated 30-5-

2012 became void and unenforceable in law.

4. Thereafter, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of

Manohar Lal Sharma v. Principal Secretary and others 2

(second case) dated 24-9-2014 held that the cancellation will take

effect only after six months from today, which is with effect from 31-

3-2015 (para 37).

5. In exercise of the powers conferred under Section 6(1) of the Coal

Mines (Special Provisions) Ordinance, 2014, the Central Government

1 (2014) 9 SCC 516
2 (2014) 9 SCC 614
Page 6 of 40

(WPC No.2530/2020)

vide notification dated 29-10-2014 (Annexure P-9), appointed

respondent No.7 as the nominated authority for the purpose of

allocation of coal mines. The said respondent No.7 – nominated

authority, Government of India, vide order dated 17-2-2015

(Annexure P-10), invited applications for auction and allotment of

various coal blocks including the PEKB Coal Blocks allocated to the

petitioner on the earlier occasion to which the petitioner also

submitted application vide Annexure P-11 and by memo dated 24-3-

2015 (Annexure P-12), respondent No.7 declared the petitioner as the

successful allottee of the PEKB Coal Mines. On 26-3-2015, the

petitioner entered into a Clock Block Allotment Agreement with

respondent No.7 vide Annexure P-13. Pursuant to clause 4 of the

Allotment Agreement dated 26-3-2015, respondent No.7 issued an

Allotment Order of the said Coal Block in favour of the petitioner and

pending execution of the fresh mining lease, the petitioner was

authorised to continue mining operations under the provisions of the

Coal Mines (Special Provisions) Ordinance, 2014, as substituted by

the Coal Mines (Special Provisions) Act, 2015. Thereafter, in terms

of clause 5.3 of the Allotment Agreement, on 30-4-2015 vide

Annexure P-14, the petitioner submitted an application in the

prescribed form along with the prescribed fee to the State

Government for grant of fresh mining lease in respect of the PEKB

Coal Blocks. The petitioner also requested for allowance of

adjustment of the already paid stamp duty, cess and registration fee

amounting to ₹ 27.972 crores towards the execution of mining lease
Page 7 of 40

(WPC No.2530/2020)

dated 30-5-2012 in respect of the same PEKB Coal Blocks, which had

become void pursuant to the de-allocation of the coal block

consequent to the judgment in Manohar Lal Sharma (first case)

(supra) and reiterated the same by memo dated 11-9-2015.

6. Ultimately, after series of correspondences, by order dated 28-10-

2015, vide Annexure P-15, respondent No.4 Inspector General of

Stamp and Registration, in response to the petitioner’s letter dated

11-9-2015, rejected the petitioner’s request for allowance of

adjustment/refund, stating that there is no provision for adjustment

or refund after the execution and registration of an instrument. By

letter dated 2-11-2015 (Annexure P-16) addressed to respondent

No.2 Collector, respondent No.5 Secretary, Department of Mineral

Resources, issued an order for grant of a fresh mining lease in favour

of the petitioner in respect of the same PEKB Coal Blocks and the

same land for which the earlier mining lease dated 30-5-2012 had

been executed, stamped and registered. Respondent No.2 was

directed to ensure execution of mining lease within six months from

the date of the said order. Respondent No.2 vide letter dated 25-1-

2016 (Annexure P-17), requested respondent No.6 District Registrar,

Ambikapur, Surguja, to determine stamp duty and registration fee

payable for execution of fresh mining lease in respect of the PEKB

Coal Blocks for a period of 30 years and respondent No.6 vide letter

dated 9-2-2016 (Annexure P-18) intimated respondent No.2 that for

execution of fresh mining lease, stamp duty of ₹ 36,75,00,000/-; cess

of ₹ 1,83,75,000/-; and registration fee of ₹ 27,56,25,125/-,
Page 8 of 40

(WPC No.2530/2020)

aggregating to ₹ 66,15,00,125/- were payable by computing the

tenure of mining lease for 30 years from 30-5-2012 to 29-5-2042.

7. Number of correspondences were going on between the parties and

ultimately, aggrieved by the refusal of the respondents to consider

the request for adjustment of unutilised/spoiled stamp duty paid

towards execution of the mining lease dated 30-5-2012 against the

stamp duty payable for execution of fresh mining lease, the petitioner

filed WPC No.65/2017 (Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Utpadan Nigam

Limited v. State of Chhattisgarh and others) in which interim order

dated 17-2-2017 was passed by this Court that the stamp duty earlier

paid by the petitioner for registration of mining lease, which had

been declared void pursuant to the orders of the Supreme Court, and

the claim for refund thereof, shall remain subject to the final

outcome of the writ petition. It was further held by this Court in the

said writ petition that in the event the petitioner succeeds in the writ

petition, the State may be directed to refund the said amount to the

petitioner. It is the case of the petitioner that since the extended

period of one month for execution of fresh mining lease was coming

to an end, pressure tactics were exerted upon the petitioner by the

respondents for execution of fresh mining lease during the pendency

of the writ petition and therefore the petitioner under protest paid ₹

44,65,12,500/- on 27-3-2017 & 24-4-2017 vide Annexures P-39 & P-

40 and accordingly, fresh mining lease was executed on 19-4-2017

vide Annexure P-41 between the petitioner and the concerned
Page 9 of 40

(WPC No.2530/2020)

respondent over the same area and PEKB Coal Blocks as covered

under under the earlier mining lease dated 30-5-2012.

8. Finally, on 25-11-2019, the Collector of Stamps, Surguja vide

Annexure P-46 rejected the petitioner’s claim referring to Sections

50(2) & (3) of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 and held that the

petitioner’s claim was not acceptable because, on the date when the

earlier mining lease was executed, it was valid and effective and

further held that the earlier registered mining lease had undisputedly

remained effective and getting the same mining lease executed again

would not make it useless so as to entitle the petitioner to refund or

allowance in accordance with law. It was also held by the Collector of

Stamps that the stamp duty had been used for the purpose for which

they were purchased and the provisions of Section 49 of the Indian

Stamp Act, 1899 apply to spoiled stamps and not to stamps which

have already been used. Now, being aggrieved and dissatisfied with

the order dated 25-11-2019 (Annexure P-46), the petitioner has filed

this writ petition seeking quashment of that order.

9. In sum and substance, the petitioner claims stamp duty of ₹

15,54,00,000/-, cess @ 5 % of the stamp duty of ₹ 77,70,000/- and

registration fee of ₹ 11,65,50,000/-, and a further stamp duty of ₹

6,91,74,000/-, as ₹ 6,91,74,000/- was demanded (total ₹

34,88,94,000/-) pursuant to audit objection and was duly paid.

10. The aforesaid challenge has been made on the ground that the

petitioner is entitled to spoiled stamp under Section 49(d)(1) & (6) of
Page 10 of 40

(WPC No.2530/2020)

the Indian Stamp Act, 1899. The Supreme Court in Manohar Lal

Sharma (first case) (supra) had already declared the allotment to be

illegal and void from the beginning since judicial declarations

operate retrospectively. It is the case of the petitioner that spoiled

stamp under Section 49(d) and the refusal to grant such allowance is

based on wholly unsustainable grounds and also on the principle of

restitution, the petitioner is entitled for refund of the entire amount

of ₹ 34,88,94,000/-. As such, appropriate writ in the nature of

mandamus be issued in favour of the petitioner and against

respondents No.1 to 6 directing refund of the said amount.

Return on behalf of the State of Chhattisgarh

11. Return has been filed on behalf of the State Government/

respondents No.1 to 6 stating inter alia that the entire writ petition is

based on surmises and conjectures without there being any

substantive material to justify the claim raised by the petitioner

seeking refund of the stamp duty already paid qua execution of

mining lease deed on 30-5-2012. It is the further case of the

respondent State that pursuant to the mining lease deed dated 30-5-

2012, the petitioner was engaged in the mining activity and carried

out its operations on the strength of the mining lease deed executed

in its favour. It was further stated in the return that against the order

Annexure P-6 passed by the Collector of Stamps, the petitioner has

an efficacious alternative remedy of preferring appeal under Section

56(4) of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 before the Chief Revenue
Page 11 of 40

(WPC No.2530/2020)

Controlling Authority and the instant writ petition is not

maintainable for the said reason and is liable to be dismissed. It was

also stated that a mining lease deed having been executed for a

period of 30 years in favour of the petitioner was an instrument in

terms of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (for short, ‘the Act of 1899’) as

defined under Section 2(14) and was thus liable to be duly stamped

and registered in accordance with the provisions of law. The

petitioner got mining lease registered on 30-5-2012 and conducted

the mining activity on the strength of the said mining lease deed for a

fairly long time. The case of the petitioner is not covered under

Section 49(d)(1) of the Act of 1899 and the facts of the present case

do not fall under Section 49(d)(1) of the Act. The mining lease deed

dated 30-5-2012 executed by the petitioner after payment of

requisite stamp duty and registration fee, was duly acted upon by the

parties and, therefore, the petitioner cannot claim any refund under

Section 49 of the Act of 1899. As such, the writ petition deserves to

be dismissed with cost having no substance.

Rejoinder on behalf of the Petitioner

12. Rejoinder on behalf of the petitioner has been filed denying the

statement made in the return stating inter alia that Section 56(4) of

the Act of 1899 (Madhya Pradesh Amendment) is not attracted.

Impugned Order passed by the Collector of Stamps

13. The Collector of Stamps, Surguja, Ambikapur, on the application of

the petitioner has passed following order dated 25-11-2019
Page 12 of 40

(WPC No.2530/2020)

(Annexure P-46) which is impugned herein and which states as

under: –

U;k;ky; dysDVj vkWQ LVkEil~ ljxqtk vfEcdkiqj ¼N-x-½
jk0iz0dz0@35,@c&132@19&20
N-x- ‘kklu………..fo:)
,0ds0 vxzoky lqizhUVsafMax bathfu;j
jktLFkku fo|qr mRiknu fuxe fyfeVsM
vkns’k
¼ikfjr fnukad 25-11-2019½
vkosnd ,0ds0 vxzoky lqizhUVsafMax bathfu;j jktLFkku fo|qr mRiknu
fuxe fyfeVsM }kjk vkj0ds0 xkSaM + fMIVh baftfu;j ¼ih0ih0lh0,.M ,Q½
jktLFkku fo|qr mRiknu fuxe fyfeVsM }kjk Qzsfdax ds ek/;e ls fnukad 30-
05-2012 dks dz; Qzsfdax LVkEi dh jkf’k 163170000@& :i;s ,o a ml
nLrkost es a fn; s iath;u ‘kqYd dh jkf’k 116550000@& :i;s dqy
279720000@& :i;s rFkk pkyku }kjk tek dh xbZ jkf’k
6]9174000@& :i;s dh okilh ds fy;s vkosnu i= ds lkFk iz’uk/khu ewy
Qzsfdax LVkEi izLrqr fd;k x;k gSA
laf{kIr es a izdj.k dh :ijs[kk fuEukuqlkj gS& vkj0ds0 xkSaM + fMIVh
baftfu;j ¼ih0ih0lh0,.M ,Q½ jktLFkku fo|qr mRiknu fuxe fyfeVsM }kjk
Qszfdax ds ek/;e ls Qsfdax LVkEi dh jkf’k 163170000@& :i;s fnukad 30-
05-2012 dks ekbZfuax yht MhM ds iath;u gsrq dz; dj mi iath;d dk;kZy;
vfEcdkiqj esa fnukad 30-05-2012 dks iath;u gsrq izLrqr fd;k x;k gSA mi
iath;d vfEcdkiqj }kjk mDr ekbZfuax yht MhM dk nLrkost dzekad 1086
iath;u fnukad 30-05-2012 dk fof/kor iath;u dj iath;u ‘kqYd
116550000@& :i;s tek djkdj ewy nLrkost okil fd;k x;k gSA
[kfut foHkkx ds vkWfMV esa vkWfMV }kjk ekbZfuax yht MhM esa 6-
9174000@& :i;s dk deh eqnzkad ‘kqYd ik;s tkus ij izdj.k bl U;k;ky;
esa /kkjk 48 [k ds rgr iathc) izdj.k dzekad 1@ch&103@48
[k@2016&17 }kjk ntZ dj vkWfMV ny }kjk fu/kkZfjr deh ‘kqYd dh jkf’k
69174000@& :i;s esa jktLFkku jkT; fo|qr mRiknu fy- }kjk pkyku dzekad
60 ,oa 63 fnukad 30-3-2017 }kjk tek dj ewy pkyku dk;kZy; esa izLrqr
djus ij izdj.k lekIr fd;k x;k gSA muds }kjk nLrkost dzekad 1086
iath;u fnukad 30-05-2012 dks ekbZfuax yht MhM es a fn;s x;s LVkEi ‘kqYd
163170000@& :i;s ,oa iath;u ‘kqYd 116520000@& dqy
279720000@& :i;s ,oa pkyku dzekad 60 ,o 63 fnukad 30-03-2017 }kjk
jkf’k 69174000@& :i;s dks okilh gsrq fnukad 28-5-2019 dks Hkkjrh; LVkEi
vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 49 ¼?k½ ¼1½ ,oa ¼6½ ds rgr vkosnu i= bl dk;kZy; esa
izLrqr fd;k x;k gSA
esjs }kjk vkosnd ,0ds0 vxzoky lqizhUVsafMax bathfu;j jktLFkku fo|qr
mRiknu fuxe fyfeVsM }kjk LVkEi vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 49 ds varxZr fnukad
28-5-2019 dks LVkEi okilh gsrq izLrqr vkosnu i= ,o a LVkEi dk
Page 13 of 40

(WPC No.2530/2020)

voyksdu ,oa ifj’khyu fd;k x;kA LVkEi dh /kkjk 50 ¼2½¼3½ ds izko/kku
vuqlkj [kjkc@vuqi;qDr gq, LVkEi ds okilh dh le; lhek 6 ekg fu/kkZfjr
gSA vkosnd }kjk /kkjk 49 ¼?k½ ¼1½ ds rgr izLrqr rF; fd fu”ikfnr fdlh
fyf[kr ds fy, mi;ksx esa yk;k x;k LVkEi tks rRi’pkr~ izkjaHk ls gh fof/k dh
n`”Vh ls iw.kZ :i ls ‘kqU; ikbZ xbZ gS& dks vekU; fd;k tkrk gS D;ksafd ftl
fnukad dks ekbZfuax yht MhM dk fu”iknu gqvk ml fnukad dks og ekU; Fkk
rFkk izHkko esa FkkA /kkjk 49 ¼?k½ ¼6½ ds vuqlkj mlds }kjk izHkkoh fd;s tkus
ds fy, vk’kf;r ,sls lO;ogkj ds ifj.kkeLo:i tks mUgha i{kdkjks a ds chp
fdlh vU; fy[kr }kjk izHkkoh gqvk gS vuqi;ksxh gks tkrk gS vkSj ftl ij
mlls de ewY; ds LVkEi ugha gS&dks ekU; ;ksX; ugha gS D;ksafd vkosnd }kjk
iwoZ esa iath;u djk;s x;s ekbZfuax yht MhM] fu”iknu fnukad dks izHkkoh Fkk
bl ckr ls budkj ugha fd;k tk ldrk gSA
vkosnd }kjk dqN o”kZ O;rhr gks tkus ds ckn mlh yht MhM dks
nqckjk iath;u djk;s tkus ds iwoZ iathd`r yht MhM vuqi;ksxh gS dks vekU;

dj mles fn;s x;s eqnzkad ,oa iath;u ‘kqYd dh jkf’k dks fjQUM fd;k tkuk
fof/kuqdqy izrhr ugha gksrk gSA vkosnd }kjk fnukad 30-5-2012 dks
163170000@& :i;s ds LVkEi ij fyf[kr fy[kk;k tkdj fn”iknu i’pkr~
iath;u djk;k x;k gSA pqafd iath;u vf/kfu;e 1908 ds izko/kku vuqlkj
vkosnd }kjk izLrqr nLrkost dk iath;u djk;k tk pqdk gSA ,slh fLFkfr esa
vkosnd }kjk izLrqr LVkEi dk mi;ksx esa yk;k tk pqdk gS] vkosnd }kjk ftl
mn~ns’; ds fy, LVkEi dk dz; fd;k x;k Fkk og ml mn~ns’; ds fy, dke
esa yk;k tk pqdk gSA LVkEi vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 49 ds izko/kku vuqi;qDr gq,
LVkEi ‘kqYd ds okilh ds laca/k esa gS u fd mi;ksx esa yk;s tk pqds LVkEi ds
laca/k esa gSA bl izdkj vkosnd }kjk izLrqr LVkEi dks mi;ksx es a yk;k tk
pqdk gSA vr% LVkEi vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 49 ,oa 50 ds izko/kku ykxw ugha gksus
ls LVkEi okilh fd;k tkuk laHko ugha gSA vr% vkosnd dk vkosnu i=
[kkfjt dj izdj.k lekIr fd;k tkrk gSA
Sd/-

¼vk’kqrks”k dqekj dksf’kd½
dysDVj vkWQ LVkEil~
ljxqtk

14. In sum and substance, the Collector of Stamps has held that on the

date when the mining lease was executed between the petitioner and

the State, it was valid and effective and further held that the mining

lease deed has already been executed between the parties and it was

put to use by the petitioner for more than 3 years and moreover, the

object for which the lease deed was executed has already been carried

out and as such, Section 49(d)(1) of the Act of 1899 would not be
Page 14 of 40

(WPC No.2530/2020)

attracted, as it has been used and consequently, the application is

rejected which is sought to be challenged in the writ petition.

Submission on behalf of the Writ Petitioner

15. Mr. Abhishek Sinha, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of

the petitioner, would submit as under: –

1. Undisputedly, allotment of the PEKB Coal Blocks by the

Government of India in exercise of powers under Section 3(3)(a)

(i) of the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1973 has been held to

be arbitrary, suffering from legal flaws and illegality by their

Lordships of the Supreme Court in Manohar Lal Sharma (first

case) (supra) and therefore it has become unenforceable in law

and stood rendered void. The mining lease dated 30-5-2012,

being a consequence of the said allotment, also became absolutely

void in law from the beginning by virtue of the decision of the

Supreme Court in Manohar Lal Sharma (first case) (supra).

2. The prayer for saving the allocation on the ground that production

had already commenced did not find favour with by their

Lordships of the Supreme Court and the allocations were

nevertheless cancelled, having been held to be illegal and

arbitrary, and it has been made effective from 31-3-2015 by virtue

of the decision of the Supreme Court in Manohar Lal Sharma

(second case) (supra). This would clearly establish that the rights

flowing from the coal block allotment and the consequential

mining lease became unenforceable in law, rendering the mining
Page 15 of 40

(WPC No.2530/2020)

lease absolutely void in law from the beginning. Since the very

substratum of the mining lease was held to be illegal, all

consequential actions including the execution of the mining lease,

were also rendered absolutely void. Reliance has been placed

upon the decision of the Allahabad High Court in the matter of

Rakesh Kumar v. Deputy Commissioner Stamp and

others3.

3. Section 49(d)(1) of the Act of 1899 is squarely attracted to the

facts of the present case and the petitioner would be entitled for

full refund of spoiled stamp duty, cess on the stamp duty and

registration fees total amounting to ₹ 34,88,94,000/- in the

following term: –

                    Stamp Duty                      ₹ 15,54,00,000/-
                    Cess @ 5% of the Stamp Duty        ₹ 77,70,000/-
                    Registration Fees               ₹ 11,65,50,000/-
                    Further Stamp Duty               ₹ 6,91,74,000/-
                                              Total ₹ 34,88,94,000/-

4. Also on the ground of restitution, the petitioner is entitled for all

stamp duty, cess on the stamp duty and registration fees under the

principle contained in Section 65 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872.

Reliance has further been placed upon the decisions of the

Supreme Court in the matters of Loop Telecom and Trading

Limited v. Union of India and another 4 and Kuju

Collieries Ltd. v. Jharkhand Mines Ltd. and others 5.

3 2013 SCC OnLine All 13471
4 (2022) 6 SCC 762
5 (1974) 2 SCC 533
Page 16 of 40

(WPC No.2530/2020)

Judicial declarations operate retrospectively unless expressly

made prospective. A judicial declaration that a contract or

agreement is void operates retrospectively and relates back to the

very inception of the agreement. All judicial decisions are

retrospective in operation unless in a particular case the Court

makes its judgment prospective and consequently the voidness

which attaches to an agreement upon judicial declaration relates

back to its very inception and the expression “discovered to be

void” in Section 65 of the Contract Act comprehends a situation

where parties entered into an agreement honestly believing it to

be perfectly valid and it is only subsequently discovered to be void,

in such a case the agreement is void from its inception and the

discovery occurs at a later date i.e. parties are not in pari delicto.

Technical plea and bar under Section 49 of the Act of 1899 cannot

be invoked by the State to defeat a citizen’s rightful and just claim

where the citizen is without any fault. Reliance has also been

placed upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in the matters of

Bano Saiyed Parwaz v. Chief Controlling Revenue

Authority and Inspector General of Registration and

Controller of Stamps and others6 and Harshit Harish Jain

and another v. State of Maharashtra and others7.

5. When doctrine of restitution is attracted, interest should follow.

Reliance has finally been placed upon the decision of the Supreme

6 (2025) 2 SCC 201
7 (2025) 3 SCC 365
Page 17 of 40

(WPC No.2530/2020)

Court in the matter of Dr Poornima Advani and another v.

Government of NCT and another8.

As such, Mr. Sinha, learned Senior Counsel, would finally submit

that the writ petition be allowed and the refund of ₹ 34,88,94,000/-

be granted in favour of the petitioner along with interest on the

above-stated amount.

Submission on behalf of the State of Chhattisgarh

16. Mr. Rahul Tamaskar, learned Government Advocate appearing on

behalf of the State/respondents No.1 to 6, would submit that

efficacious alternative remedy is available to the petitioner in terms

of Section 56(4) of the Act of 1899, therefore, the writ petition as

framed and filed is not maintainable and the petitioner be relegated

to the remedy of appeal before the appellate authority and on this

ground, the writ petition be dismissed. He would further submit that

Section 49(d)(1) of the Act of 1899 is not attracted at all in the

present case and the petitioner is not entitled to claim such refund.

He would also submit that the Supreme Court in Manohar Lal

Sharma (first case) (supra) has only cancelled the mining lease

dated 30-5-2012 to avoid further complications. As a consequence of

the order passed by the Supreme Court, the Parliament in exercise of

power conferred under Entry 54 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to

the Constitution has enacted the Coal Mines (Special Provisions) Act,

2015 (for short, ‘the Act of 2015’), which came into force with effect

from 21-10-2014. The Act of 2015 and the Rules made thereunder
8 (2025) 7 SCC 269
Page 18 of 40

(WPC No.2530/2020)

were framed to take immediate action to allocate coal mines to

successful bidders and allottees. Under the Act of 2015, allottees like

the petitioner have been defined. Clause (n) of sub-section (1) of

Section 3 of the Act of 2015 defines “prior allottee”. Section 6 of the

Act of 2015 provides for Central Government to act through

nominated authority, Section 9 provides for priority of disbursal of

proceeds and Section 16 provides for valuation of compensation for

payment to prior allottee. Section 16(1) of the Act of 2015 provides

that the quantum of compensation for the land in relation to

Schedule I coal mines shall be as per the registered sale deeds lodged

with the nominated authority in accordance with such rules as may

be prescribed, together with 12% simple interest from the date of

such purchase or acquisition, till the date of the execution of the

vesting order or the allotment order, as the case may be. Section

16(2) states that the quantum of compensation for the mine

infrastructure in relation to Schedule I coal mines shall be

determined as per the written down value reflected in the statutorily

audited balance sheet of the previous financial year in accordance

with such rules and in such manner as may be prescribed. Therefore,

the petitioner’s case will not fall under the provisions of the Act of

1899, but will fall under the provisions of the Act of 2015, where the

claim for compensation had to be submitted before the nominated

authority appointed under Section 6 of the Act of 2015. The Act of

2015 being a special Act enacted to cater to exigencies arising out of

cancellation of coal blocks by the judgment of the Supreme Court, it
Page 19 of 40

(WPC No.2530/2020)

will have precedence over the Act of 1899. Therefore, in terms of

Rule 14 of the Coal Mines (Special Provisions) Rules, 2014, any

compensation as a consequence of cancellation of allocation of coal

block in favour of the petitioner is to be routed through the

nominated authority following the procedure prescribed under the

Act of 2015 and the Rules made thereunder and not under any other

Act including the Indian Stamp Act, 1899. Mr. Tamaskar, learned

State counsel, would further contend that the Supreme Court has

cancelled the allocation with effect from 31-3-2015, therefore, to

interpret that the Court had intended to declare the allocation void

ab initio from a future date would be preposterous. As such, Section

49(d)(1) of the Act of 1899 will have no application, as the Surpeme

Court did not declare the mining leases void ab initio and inference is

being drawn only to bring the case within the ambit of Section 49(d)

(1) of the Act of 1899. He would also contend that Section 49(6) of

the Act of 1899 has also no application to the facts of the present

case, as in the instant case, stamp duty was paid for execution of

mining lease dated 30-5-2012 and the allocation stood cancelled with

effect from 31-3-2015. The submission of the petitioner that since

mining lease was subsequently granted for the same land and for

period of 30 years, and more stamp duty is paid while executing the

mining lease dated 19-4-2017, the case falls under Section 49(6)of

the Act of 1899, is misplaced, as the earlier lease was for period

starting 30-5-2012 ending 29-5-2042, whereas the subsequent

mining lease is for period starting 1-4-2015 ending 31-3-2045.
Page 20 of 40

(WPC No.2530/2020)

Therefore, it cannot be said that stamp became useless on account of

mining lease dated 19-4-2017. The mining lease dated 30-5-2012

was duly executed and cancelled by the order passed by the Supreme

Court. As such, rejection of claim of the petitioner by the impugned

order is completely just and proper. Lastly, he would contend that

the petitioner has raised claim for allowance of both stamp duty as

well as registration fees and cess, whereas, applicability of Section 49

of the Act of 1899 is limited to allowance of impressed stamps which

stood spoiled. Impressed stamp has been explained as amount

mentioned in the Certificate of the Collector under Section 32 of the

Act of 1899. There is no provision for allowance of registration fees

under Section 49 of the Act of 1899. As such, the writ petition

deserves to be dismissed.

Submission on behalf of the Union of India

17. Mr. Ramakant Mishra, learned Deputy Solicitor General of India

appearing on behalf of the Union of India/respondent No.7, would

submit that the petitioner has the remedy of raising claim before the

nominated authority under Section 16(1) of the Act of 2015 and the

rules made thereunder and as such, the writ petition as framed and

filed, deserves to be dismissed.

18. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their

rival contentions made herein-above and also gone through the

record with utmost circumspection.

Page 21 of 40

(WPC No.2530/2020)

Questions for Determination of the Writ Petition

19. In order to resolve the dispute arisen between the parties, the

following questions arise for determination of this writ petition: –

1. Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case, the mining

lease deed dated 30-5-2012 executed between the petitioner and

the State of Chhattisgarh/ Respondent No.1 herein was absolutely

void in law from beginning in terms of Section 49(d)(1) of the

Indian Stamp Act, 1899 and consequently, refund of the value of

stamp affixed on the instrument (mining lease deed) and cess in

question can be allowed?

2. Whether relief as claimed above can be denied on the ground of

availability of alternative remedy under Section 56(4) of the

Indian Stamp Act, 1899 as amended by the Indian Stamp

(Madhya Pradesh Amendment) Act, 1990?

3. Whether the above stated relief (1) as claimed can also be denied

on the ground of remedy available under Section 16(1)(2) of the

Coal Mines (Special Provisions) Act, 2015 read with the Rules

made thereunder (before the nominated authority by making

claim for compensation) along with interest?

20. It would be appropriate to address questions No.2 & 3 above at the

first instance, one by one, before deciding question No.1, as it goes to

the root of the matter.

Page 22 of 40

(WPC No.2530/2020)

Re: Question No.2

21. The State has raised the plea of alternative remedy as available to the

petitioner under Section 56(4) of the Act of 1899 against the order

dated 25-11-2019 (Annexure P-46) passed by the Collector of Stamps.

Section 56(4) was inserted by the Madhya Pradesh Legislature by

way of the Indian Stamp (Madhya Pradesh Amendment) Act, 1990

(Act No.24 of 1990) with effect from 27 th November, 1990, which

states as under: –

“(4) The Chief Controlling Revenue Authority may, on its own
motion or on the application by any party, at anytime for the
purpose of satisfying it self as to the amount with which the
instrument is chargeable with duty, call for and examine the
record of any case disposed of by the Collector and may pass
such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit:

Provided that it shall not vary or reverse any order
unless notice has been served on the party concerned and
opportunity given to him for being heard:

Provided further that no application for revision shall
be-

(i) entertained against an order appealable under this Act;

(ii) entertained unless presented within ninety days from
the date of order and in computing the period aforesaid,
the time requisite for obtaining copy of the said order shall
be excluded.”

22. A careful perusal of sub-section (4) of Section 56 of the Act of 1899 as

amended by the Act of 1990 would show that sub-section (4) would

be attracted when the dispute is as to the amount with which the

instrument is chargeable with duty, which the Chief Controlling

Revenue Authority on its own motion or on the application by any

party, at any time for the purpose of satisfying itself, may call for and
Page 23 of 40

(WPC No.2530/2020)

examine the record of any case disposed of by the Collector and may

pass such order in reference thereto as he thinks fit, and shall have

the jurisdiction for determining as to the amount with which the

instrument is chargeable with duty.

23. In the instant case, the duty payable on mining lease dated 30-5-

2012 is not in dispute and, therefore, Section 56(4) of the Act of 1899

against the order dated 25-11-2019 is not attracted at all.

Consequently, the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the State

is hereby rejected and question No.2 is answered accordingly.

Re: Question No.3

24. The State of Chhattisgarh during the course of argument has raised

the plea that in view of the provisions contained in Section 16(1) &

(2) of the Act of 2015 and the Rules made thereunder, remedy of the

petitioner is to file claim for compensation before the nominated

authority appointed under Section 6(1) of the Act of 2015 and the

writ petition as framed and filed is not maintainable. Surprisingly,

this plea has not been taken expressly by the State in the return filed

before this Court and for the first time, this plea has been raised

before this Court at the time of argument by taking the other party to

surprise. Section 16(1) & (2) of the Act of 2015 states as under: –

“16. Valuation of compensation for payment to prior
allottee.–(1) The quantum of compensation for the land in
relation to Schedule I coal mines shall be as per the registered
sale deeds lodged with the nominated authority in accordance
with such rules as may be prescribed, together with twelve per
cent. simple interest from the date of such purchase or
Page 24 of 40

(WPC No.2530/2020)

acquisition, till the date of the execution of the vesting order
or the allotment order, as the case may be.

(2) The quantum of compensation for the mine infrastructure
in relation to Schedule I coal mines shall be determined as per
the written down value reflected in the statutorily audited
balance sheet of the previous financial year in accordance
with such rules and in such manner as may be prescribed.”

25. A careful perusal of sub-section (1) of Section 16 of the Act of 2015

would reveal that the quantum of compensation for the land in

relation to Schedule I coal mines shall be as per the registered sale

deeds lodged with the nominated authority in accordance with such

rules as may be prescribed along with interest. However, in this case,

the petitioner has not claimed any quantum of compensation for the

land in question in relation to Schedule I coal mines. Therefore,

Section 16(1) of the Act of 2015 is not attracted in the present case.

26. Similarly, sub-section (2) of Section 16 of the Act of 2015 provides

that the quantum of compensation for the mine infrastructure in

relation to Schedule I coal mines shall be determined as per the

written down value reflected in the statutorily audited balance sheet

of the previous financial year in accordance with such rules and in

such manner as may be prescribed. The term “mine infrastructure”

has been defined in clause (j) of sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act

of 2015, which states as under and which is not the case of the

petitioner herein:-

“(j) “mine infrastructure” includes mining infrastructure such
as tangible assets used for coal mining operations, being civil
works, workshops, immovable coal winning equipment,
foundations, embankments, pavements, electrical systems,
communication systems, relief centres, site administrative
Page 25 of 40

(WPC No.2530/2020)

offices, fixed installations, coal handling arrangements,
crushing and conveying systems, railway sidings, pits, shafts,
inclines, underground transport systems, hauling systems
(except movable equipment unless the same is embedded in
land for permanent beneficial enjoyment thereof), land
demarcated for afforestation and land for rehabilitation and
resettlement of persons affected by coal mining operations
under the relevant law;”

27. As such, this ground of availability of remedy under Section 16(1) &

(2) of the Act of 2015 is neither available on merits nor it was raised

in the return. Even otherwise, for the first time, the respondent State

cannot be allowed to take this new ground at the time of argument

(see B.S.N. Joshi & Sons Ltd. v. Nair Coal Services Ltd. and

others9). As such, for both the reasons i.e. non-availability of the

ground on merits as well as not having been raised in the return, this

preliminary objection is also hereby over ruled and question No.3 is

answered accordingly.

Re: Question No.1

The Indian Stamp Act, 1899 and Scheme of Section 49

28. The Indian Stamp Act, 1899 is an Act to consolidate and amend the

law relating to Stamps. The Stamp Act is a fiscal measure enacted to

secure revenue for the State on certain classes of instruments: It is

not enacted to arm a litigant with a weapon of technicality to meet

the case of his opponent. (See Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. Dilip

Construction Company10.)

9 (2006) 11 SCC 548
10 (1969) 1 SCC 597
Page 26 of 40

(WPC No.2530/2020)

29. Furthermore, the Supreme Court in the matter of Ramesh Chand

Bansal and others v. District Magistrate/Collector

Ghaziabad and others11 has held that the object of the Indian

Stamp Act is to collect proper stamp duty on an instrument or

conveyance on which such duty is payable. It is a purely fiscal

regulation and is intended to secure ‘revenue’ for the State (see

Thiruvengadam Pillai v. Navaneethammal and another 12).

30. The Bombay High Court in the matter of Gautam Landscapes

Pvt. Ltd., Mumbai v. Shailesh S. Shah and another 13 has

discussed the scope and object of the Stamp Act, and observed as

under: –

“48. The Stamp Act admittedly is a fiscal enactment. The
primary object of which is to ensure payment of stamp duty
on the documents on which stamp duty is required to be paid.

49. In the case of J.M.A. Raju v. K. Bhatt, AIR 1976 Gujarat
72 FB, Full Bench of the Gujarat High Court held that the
Court has to consider the provisions of the Stamp Act as a
fiscal measure, the principal object of which is to secure
revenue for the State. The object of the enactment is not to
enable parties to raise technical objections to meet the case of
their opponent.

50. In the case of Jagdish Narain v. Chief Controlling
Revenue, AIR 1994 All 371, the Allahabad High Court held, in
the context of Indian Stamp Act which is an enactment pari
materia to the Maharashtra Stamp Act, that the sole object of
the Indian Stamp Act is to increase revenue and its provisions
must be construed as having in view only the protection of
revenue.”

31. As such, the primary object of the Indian Stamp Act is to ensure

payment of stamp duty on documents on which stamp is required to
11 (1999) 5 SCC 62
12 (2008) 4 SCC 530
13 2019 SCC OnLine Bom 563
Page 27 of 40

(WPC No.2530/2020)

be paid and it is purely a fiscal legislation intended to secure revenue

for the State.

32. Section 49(d)(1) and (6) of the Act of 1899, which deals with

allowance for spoiled stamps, states as under: –

“49. Allowance for spoiled stamps.–Subject to such
rules as may be made by the State Government as to the
evidence to be required or, the enquiry to be made, the
Collector may, on application made within the period
prescribed in section 50, and if he is satisfied as to the facts,
make allowance for impressed stamps spoiled in the cases
hereinafter mentioned, namely:–

(a) to (c) xxx xxx xxx

(d) the stamp used for an instrument executed by any party
thereto which–

(1) has been afterwards found to be absolutely void in
law from the beginning;

(2) to (5) xxx xxx xxx

(6) become useless in consequence of the transaction
intended to be thereby effected being effected by
some other instrument between the same parties
and bearing a stamp of not less value;

(7) & (8) xxx xxx xxx”

33. Under Section 49 of the Act of 1899, individuals who have purchased

impressed stamp papers can claim an allowance if the paper is

inadvertently ruined, damaged, or rendered unfit for use either

before or after a transaction. To seek this relief, the claimant must

file an application before the Collector within the strict timelines

prescribed under Section 50 of the Act. This provision applies to

impressed stamp papers that are unintentionally spoiled before

execution, such as through writing errors or physical damage. It also
Page 28 of 40

(WPC No.2530/2020)

extends to specific instances after execution where the transaction

fails to materialise, including cases where the instrument is legally

void from the outset (void ab initio) or is rendered unfit due to an

error or mistake.

34. Section 50 of the Act of 1899 mandates strict timelines for claiming a

refund on spoiled stamp papers under Section 49. Generally,

applications must be made to the Collector within six months from

when the stamp paper was spoiled (if unexecuted) or from its date of

execution (if signed but the transaction failed).

Discussion and Analysis

35. Now, question No.1 as framed would be, whether the petitioner is

entitled for refund of stamp duty etc. as claimed before the Collector

of Stamps, which was not found favour with by the Collector and the

petitioner’s application stood rejected by order dated 25-11-2019 vide

Annexure P-46.

36. Admittedly and undisputedly, mining lease was executed between

the petitioner and the State Government for a period of 30 years

starting from 30-5-2012 to 29-5-2042 and stamp duty amounting to

₹ 15,54,00,000/-, cess @ 5% of the stamp duty amounting to ₹

77,70,000/- and registration fees amounting to ₹ 11,65,50,000/-,

and additional stamp duty amounting to ₹ 6,91,74,000/- was paid by

the petitioner to the State. However, the Supreme Court in

Manohar Lal Sharma (first case) (supra), cancelled the entire

allocation of coal blocks including the PEKB Coal Blocks by holding
Page 29 of 40

(WPC No.2530/2020)

that there was no fair and transparent procedure in granting so, all

resulting in unfair distribution of the national wealth and observed in

paragraphs 163 to 166 as under: –

“163. To sum up, the entire allocation of coal block as per
recommendations made by the Screening Committee from 14-
7-1993 in 36 meetings and the allocation through the
Government Dispensation Route suffers from the vice of
arbitrariness and legal flaws. The Screening Committee has
never been consistent; it has not been transparent; there is no
proper application of mind; it has acted on no material in
many cases; relevant factors have seldom been its guiding
factors; there was no transparency and guidelines have
seldom guided it. On many occasions, guidelines have been
honoured more in their breach. There was no objective
criteria, nay, no criteria for evaluation of comparative merits.
The approach had been ad hoc and casual. There was no fair
and transparent procedure, all resulting in unfair distribution
of the national wealth. Common good and public interest
have, thus, suffered heavily. Hence, the allocation of coal
blocks based on the recommendations made in all the 36
meetings of the Screening Committee is illegal.

164. The allocation of coal blocks through Government
Dispensation Route, however laudable the object may be, also
is illegal since it is impermissible as per the scheme of the
CMN Act. No State Government or public sector
undertakings of the State Governments are eligible for mining
coal for commercial use. Since allocation of coal is
permissible only to those categories under Sections 3(3) and
(4), the joint venture arrangement with ineligible firms is also
impermissible. Equally, there is also no question of any
consortium/leader/association in allocation. Only an
undertaking satisfying the eligibility criteria referred to in
Section 3(3) of the CMN Act viz. which has a unit engaged in
the production of iron and steel and generation of power,
washing of coal obtained from mine or production of cement,
is entitled to the allocation in addition to the Central
Government, a Central Government company or a Central
Government corporation.

165. In this context, it is worthwhile to note that the 1957
Act has been amended introducing Section 11-A w.e.f. 13-2-

2012. As per the said amendment, the grant of
Page 30 of 40

(WPC No.2530/2020)

reconnaissance permit or prospecting licence or mining lease
in respect of an area containing coal or lignite can be made
only through selection through auction by competitive
bidding even among the eligible entities under Section 3(3)(a)

(iii), referred to above. However, the government companies,
government corporations or companies or corporations,
which have been awarded power projects on the basis of
competitive bids for tariff (including Ultra Mega Power
Projects) have been exempted of allocation in favour of them
is not meant to be through the competitive bidding process.

166. As we have already found that the allocations made,
both under the Screening Committee Route and the
Government Dispensation Route, are arbitrary and illegal,
what should be the consequences, is the issue which remains
to be tackled. We are of the view that, to this limited extent,
the matter requires further hearing.”

37. Thereafter, again, in Manohar Lal Sharma (second case) (supra),

in view of the submissions made, their Lordships of the Supreme

Court have held that the cancellation will come into effect from 31-3-

2015 and observed as under: –

“37. In view of the submissions made, although we have
quashed the allotment of 42 out of these 46 coal blocks, we
make it clear that the cancellation will take effect only after
six months from today, which is with effect from 31-3-2015.
This period of six months is being given since the learned
Attorney General submitted that the Central Government and
CIL would need some time to adjust to the changed situation
and move forward. This period will also give adequate time to
the coal block allottees to adjust and manage their affairs.
That CIL is inefficient and incapable of accepting the
challenge, as submitted by the learned counsel, is not an issue
at all. The Central Government is confident, as submitted by
the learned Attorney General, that CIL can fill the void and
take things forward.”

38. As such, it appears that mining lease was cancelled with immediate

effect by judgment dated 25-8-2014, but considering the submissions

of the parties, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in paragraph 37
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(WPC No.2530/2020)

of the judgment dated 24-9-2014, have held that the cancellation will

take effect only after six months from the date of judgment i.e. 24-9-

2014. The period of six months was given on the request of the

learned Attorney General to adjust to the changed situation and

move forward and to facilitate the coal block allottees to adjust and

manage their affairs.

39. In the matter of Harnathkuar v. Indar Bahadur14, it has been

held by the Privy Council that the agreement would be manifestly

void from its inception because its subject matter was incapable of

being bound in the manner stipulated. In that case it was further

held that the transfer was inoperative, as the vendor at the date of the

execution of the document had no interest capable of transfer but

merely an expectancy. The Privy Council also held that the plaintiff

was entitled to recover under Section 65 of the Contract Act. This

was followed by the Madras High Court in the matter of Chief

Controlling Revenue Authority-Board of Revenue, Madras

v. B.P. Eswaran (died) and others15.

40. In Rakesh Kumar (supra), the question before the Allahabad High

Court was, whether in view of cancellation of the lease by the State

Government any allowance or refund is permissible in view of

Section 49(d) of the Act of 1899? In that case, lease was executed for

a period of five years, it was cancelled by the State Government after

the petitioner operated the mining lease for a period of about one

14 AIR 1922 PC 403
15 AIR 1970 Mad 349 (FB)
Page 32 of 40

(WPC No.2530/2020)

year and few days. The Allahabad High Court allowed refund of

stamp duty holding that the petitioner therein is covered by Section

49(d)(2) of the Act of 1899 and observed as under: –

“16. The above provision stipulates that the Collector on an
application and on being satisfied that the stamp used for an
instrument executed on it being found to be void or unfit, by
reason of any error or mistake may make an order for return
of the stamp duty. The lease in question has been cancelled
by the State Government vide order dated 2.7.1996 not on
account of any mistake of the petitioner but for the reason
that it was in violation of some order of the High Court. Thus,
frustrating the purpose of making the lease in favour of the
petitioner. The lease, as such, was found to be unfit for the
reason of mistake committed by the State Government in
granting the same.

17. Accordingly, as the instrument of lease after execution
has been found unfit for the purpose it was executed by
reason of mistake on part of the State Government in
executing it, the petitioner became entitle in law for
consideration of his application for allowance on spoiled
stamps as per the provisions of section 49 of the Act. The case
of the petitioner is covered by Clause (d) (2) of section 49 of
the Act. The authorities below have not considered the
application of the petitioner in the light of provisions of
section 49 (d) (2) of the Act.”

41. As such, from the judgments of the Supreme Court in Manohar Lal

Sharma (first case and second case) (supra), it would appear that

coal block/mining lease was cancelled by their Lordships by their

judgment, but considering the submissions of parties, their

Lordships have held that the cancellation will take effect only after

six months. It is apparent that the period of six months was given on

the request of the learned Attorney General to adjust to the changed

situation and move forward and to facilitate the coal block allottees

to adjust and mange their affairs. Therefore, it cannot be held that
Page 33 of 40

(WPC No.2530/2020)

coal block/mining lease was not cancelled in law from the beginning,

though it was given effect from 31-3-2015. The period of operation of

mining lease has no relevance for refund of stamp duty and

contentions raised in this behalf by the State is hereby rejected. As

such, by virtue of Section 41(d) of the Act of 1899, the petitioner is

entitled for refund of stamp duty along with cess on stamp duty.

Restitution under Section 65 of the Contract Act

42. The petitioner has also pressed into service refund of stamp duty in

alternative or in addition, on the principle of restitution as statutorily

recognised in Section 65 of the Contract Act, where, after a benefit

has been received, the agreement is discovered to be void, or when

the contract becomes void, viz, as provided under Section 32 or 56 of

the Contract Act. Section 65 of the Contract Act provides as under: –

“65. Obligation of person who has received advantage
under void agreement, or contract that becomes
void.–When an agreement is discovered to be void, or when
a contract becomes void, any person who has received any
advantage under such agreement or contract is bound to
restore it, or to make compensation for it to the person from
whom he received it.”

43. The section which is based on the law of restitution aims at

preventing unjust enrichment (see Allahabad Bank v. Bengal

Paper Mills Co. Ltd.16). The object is to prevent a party from

avoiding an agreement and retaining the benefits received under it;

section 65 is “compensatory in principle” and meant for “prevention

of unjust enrichment”. The basis of the section is the doctrine of

16 (2004) 8 SCC 236
Page 34 of 40

(WPC No.2530/2020)

restitutio in integrum. It does not make a new contract between the

parties, but only provides for restitution of the advantage taken by a

party under the contract. This section is also said to embody the

principles of quantum meruit.

44. The Supreme Court in Loop Telecom and Trading Limited

(supra) considering Section 65 of the Contract Act has held that the

application of Section 65 has to be limited to those cases where the

party claiming restitution itself was not in pari delicto. Further, their

Lordships also held that when the party claiming restitution is

equally or more responsible for the illegality of a contract, they are

considered in pari delicto. Finally, it has been observed as under: –

“69. Hence, in adjudicating a claim of restitution under
Section 65 of the Contract Act, the court must determine the
illegality which caused the contract to become void and the
role the party claiming restitution has played in it. If the
party claiming restitution was equally or more responsible for
the illegality (in comparison to the defendant), there shall be
no cause for restitution. This has to be determined on the
facts of each individual case.”

45. Similarly, in Kuju Collieries Ltd. (supra), the Supreme Court

considering the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the

matter of Sivaramakrishnaiah v. Narahari Rao17 has held that

the party is only seeking to be restored to the status quo ante, and

held as under: –

“9. A Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in
its decision in Sivaramakrishnaiah v. Narahari Rao17 held
that:

17 AIR 1960 AP 186
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(WPC No.2530/2020)

In order to invoke Section 65 the invalidity of the
contract or agreement should be discovered subsequent
to the making of it. This cannot be taken advantage of
by parties who knew from the beginning the illegality
thereof. It only applies to a case where one of the
parties enters into an agreement under the belief that it
was a legal agreement, i.e. without the knowledge that
the agreement is forbidden by law or opposed to public
policy and as such illegal. The effect of Section 65 is
that, in such a situation, it enables a person not in pari
delicto to claim restoration since it is not based on an
illegal contract but dissociated from it. That is
permissible by reason of the section because the section
is not founded on dealings which are contaminated by
illegality. The party is only seeking to be restored to the
status quo ante. Section 65 also does not recognise the
distinction between a contract being illegal by reason of
its being opposed to public policy or morality or a
contract void for other reasons. Even agreements, the
performance of which is attended with penal
consequences, are not outside the scope of Section 65.

At the same time, courts will not render assistance to
persons who induce innocent parties to enter into
contracts of that nature by playing fraud on them to
retain the benefit which they obtained by their wrong.”

They also referred with approval to the earlier decision of the
Hyderabad High Court in Budhulal v. Deccan Banking Co.
Ltd.18.”

46. In Harshit Harish Jain (supra), a three-Judge Bench of the

Supreme Court relying upon its earlier decision in Bano Saiyed

Parwaz (supra) and also relying upon its earlier decision in the

matter of Committee-GFIL v. Libra Buildtech Private

Limited and others19 has held that the limitation provision in

stamp law (to seek refund of stamp duty) should not be enforced so

as to oust the remedy when the applicant is otherwise not

blameworthy.

18 AIR 1955 Hyd 69 (FB) : ILR 1955 Hyd 101
19 (2015) 16 SCC 31
Page 36 of 40

(WPC No.2530/2020)

47. In Libra Buildtech Private Limited‘s case (supra), auction-

purchasers had deposited the entire sale consideration along with

stamp duty in connection with a court-monitored sale. The

transaction subsequently failed for reasons entirely beyond the

control of the parties, the very court that had monitored the auction

cancelled the transaction. The State rejected the applications for

refund of stamp duty on the ground of limitation. Their Lordships of

the Supreme Court set aside the rejection on three cumulative

grounds and held that the petitioner therein is entitled for the entire

stamp duty amounting to ₹ 6.22 crores spent by the petitioner

therein for purchasing stamp duty for execution of sale deeds in

relation to the properties in question, but the said refund was

granted without interest, and observed as under: –

“24. In our considered opinion, keeping in view the
undisputed facts mentioned above, the applicants are also
entitled to claim the refund of entire stamp duty amount of Rs
6.22 crores from the State Exchequer, which they spent for
execution of sale deeds in their favour in relation to the
properties in question. This we say for the following reasons.

25. In the first place, admittedly the transaction originally
intended between the parties i.e. sale of properties in question
by GFIL Committee to the applicants was not accomplished
and failed due to reasons beyond the control of the parties.
Secondly, this Court after taking into consideration all facts
and circumstances also came to the conclusion that it was not
possible for the parties to conclude the transactions originally
intended and while cancelling the same directed the seller
(GFIL Committee) to refund the entire sale consideration to
the applicants and simultaneously permitted the applicants to
claim refund of stamp duty amount from the State
Government by order dated 26-9-2012 20. Thirdly, as a result
of the order of this Court, a right to claim refund of amount

20 Committee-GFIL v. Libra Buildtech (P) Ltd., 2012 SCC OnLine SC 1125
Page 37 of 40

(WPC No.2530/2020)

paid towards the stamp duty accrued to the applicants.
Fourthly, this being a court-monitored transaction, no party
was in a position to take any steps in the matter without the
permission of the Court. Fifthly, the applicants throughout
performed their part of the contract and ensured that
transaction in question is accomplished as was originally
intended but for the reasons to which they were not
responsible, the transaction could not be accomplished.
Lastly, the applicants in law were entitled to claim restoration
of all such benefits/advantages from the State once the
transaction was cancelled by this Court on 26-9-2012 in the
light of the principle contained in Section 65 of the Contract
Act which enable the party to a contract to seek restoration of
all such advantage from other party which they took from
such contract when the contract is discovered to be void or
becomes void. This was a case where contract in question
became void as a result of its cancellation by order of this
Court dated 26-9-2012 which entitled the applicants to seek
restitution of the money paid to the State for purchase of
stamp papers.”

48. As such, flowing from Section 65 of the Contract Act as held in Loop

Telecom and Trading Limited (supra), Kuju Collieries Ltd.

(supra) and Harshit Harish Jain (supra), furthermore, the

petitioner is not in pari delicto, as the lawful mining lease was

entered into between the parties, but it was cancelled by the Supreme

Court and the respondent State has received advantage and stamp

duty refund to the extent of ₹ 23,23,44,000/- including cess, the

period of operation of mining lease for few years has no relevance for

payment of stamp duty by virtue of the principle contained in Section

65 of the Contract Act. Accordingly, the petitioner is entitled for

spoiled stamp duty to the following extent: –

                 Stamp Duty                            ₹ 15,54,00,000/-
                 Cess @ 5% of the Stamp Duty              ₹ 77,70,000/-
                 Further Stamp Duty                     ₹ 6,91,74,000/-
                                               Total   ₹ 23,23,44,000/-
                                   Page 38 of 40

                              (WPC No.2530/2020)

Payment of Interest on Stamp Duty and Cess on Stamp

Duty

49. The petitioner in the writ petition did not pray for any relief on

interest on the amount of stamp duty and cess on stamp duty sought

to be refunded, however, at the time of final hearing, claimed interest

on the aforesaid amount stating that since the doctrine of restitution

is attracted, interest, as a consequence, would follow relying upon the

decision of the Supreme Court in Dr Poornima Advani (supra).

However, this Court is of the considered opinion that such an interest

cannot be granted for the following reasons: –

1. In the writ petition filed before this Court, the petitioner did

not pray for relief of interest on the stamp duty and cess on the

stamp duty and as such, the relief which is not sought for in the

writ petition cannot be granted. (See National Board of

Examinations v. G. Anand Ramamurthy21, Rajasthan

Art Emporium v. Kuwait Airways22, Ranbir Singh v.

Executive Engineer23 and State of W.B. v. W.B.

Registration Copywriters Assn.24.)

2. Section 49 of the Act of 1899 does not statutorily and expressly

provide for grant of interest while granting refund of spoiled

stamp duty. Since the Act does not provide for grant of

21 (2006) 5 SCC 515
22 (2024) 2 SCC 570
23 (2011) 15 SCC 453
24 (2009) 14 SCC 132
Page 39 of 40

(WPC No.2530/2020)

interest, it would be inappropriate to grant interest on the said

amount of refund to the petitioner.

3. The legal maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit – An act of

the Court shall prejudice no man, squarely applies to the facts

of the present case, as the mining lease was cancelled by the

Supreme Court. This maxim was founded upon justice and

good sense; and afforded a safe and certain guide for the

administration of the law. The maxim was applied with

approval by the Supreme Court in the matter of Mohd. Gazi

v. State of M.P.25.

4. The Supreme Court in Libra Buildtech Private Limited’s

case (supra) while granting refund of stamp duty invoking the

doctrine of restitution under Section 65 of the Contract Act, did

not grant any interest in favour of the petitioner therein on

refund of stamp duty of ₹ 6.22 crores.

As such, interest on stamp duty cannot be granted to the petitioner

herein for the aforesaid reasons.

Refund of Registration Fee

50. The petitioner has also claimed refund of registration fee. However,

Section 49 of the Act of 1899 is confined to allowance of impressed

stamps which were spoiled. There is no provision for refund of

registration fee. No other provision was pointed to this Court in the

Registration Act or in any other provision to seek refund of

25 (2000) 4 SCC 342
Page 40 of 40

(WPC No.2530/2020)

registration fee. As such, refund of registration fee after registration

of the instrument cannot be granted and it is hereby refused.

Conclusion

51. For the foregoing reasons, it is held that the petitioner is entitled for

spoiled stamp and cess on stamp duty in the following terms, but

without interest: –

                        Stamp Duty Paid                 ₹ 15,54,00,000/-
                        Cess @ 5% of the Stamp Duty       ₹ 77,70,000/-
                        Additional Stamp Duty Paid       ₹ 6,91,74,000/-
                                                 Total ₹ 23,23,44,000/-

          Relief

52. The order impugned dated 25-11-2019 (Annexure P-46) passed by

the Collector of Stamps to the extent of refusing stamp duty and cess

on stamp duty is hereby set aside and the petitioner is entitled for an

amount of ₹ 23,23,44,000/- without interest, however, refusing

registration fee is hereby upheld. Accordingly, a writ of mandamus

be issued in favour of the petitioner and against respondents No.1 to

6 to make payment of the said amount within a period of four weeks

from today.

53. The writ petition is allowed to extent sketched herein-above. No

order as to the costs.

Sd/-

(Sanjay K. Agrawal)
Judge
Soma

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Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Utpadan Nigam … vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 13 July, 2026

Chattisgarh High Court