Chattisgarh High Court
Rahul Kumar Mourya vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 1 April, 2026
Author: Ramesh Sinha
Bench: Ramesh Sinha
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2026:CGHC:15002-DB
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
CRA No. 1506 of 2024
Rahul Kumar Mourya S/o Benuram Mourya Aged About 21 Years R/o
Village Awari Kenvatpara, Police Station Doundi, District Balod
Chhattisgarh
... Appellant(s)
versus
State of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station Doundi District Balod
Chhattisgarh
...Respondent(s)
(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)
For Appellant : Mr. Bhupendra Singh, Advocate.
For Respondent/State : Mr. Shailendra Sharma, Panel Lawyer.
Hon’ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Hon’ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge
Judgment on Board
Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
01.04.2026
1. Heard Mr. Bhupendra Singh, learned counsel for the appellant.
Digitally
signed by
BRIJMOHAN
BRIJMOHAN MORLE
MORLE Date:
2026.04.06
17:52:07
Also heard Mr. Shailendra Sharma, learned Panel Lawyer, appearing for
+0530
the State/respondent.
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2. Today, though the criminal appeal has been listed for hearing on
I.A. No. 3 of 2024, application for suspension of sentence and grant of
bail to the appellant, however, with the consent of learned counsel for
the parties, the appeal is heard finally.
3. Accordingly, I.A. No. 3 of 2024, application for suspension of
sentence and grant of bail to the appellant, stands disposed off.
4. This criminal appeal filed by the appellant/accused under Section
415(2) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short,
‘BNSS’) is directed against the impugned judgment of conviction and
order of sentence dated 08.05.2024, passed by the learned Special
Judge (POCSO Act), Balod, District Balod (C.G.) in Special Sessions
Case No. 119 of 2022, whereby the appellant has been convicted and
sentenced as under:
Conviction under Section Sentence
Section 363 of the Indian Rigorous imprisonment (for short,
Penal Code (for short, 'IPC') 'R.I.') for 03 years and fine of
Rs.1,000/-, in default of payment of
fine, 01 year R.I. more.
Section 4(2) of the R.I. for 20 years and fine of
Protection of Children from Rs.3,000/-, in default of payment of
Sexual Offences Act, 2012 fine, 01 year R.I. more.
(for short, 'POCSO Act')
All the sentence shall run concurrently
5. The brief case of the prosecution is that the complainant, who is
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the mother of the victim (PW-6), appeared at Police Station Doundi on
08.11.2022 and submitted a written report stating that she is engaged in
agricultural work. On 07.11.2022, at about 2:00 p.m., upon returning
from the fields, her daughter (the victim) informed her that on
05.11.2022 (Saturday), at around 2:00 p.m., she was playing near a
Kusum tree in the lane outside their house. At that time, their neighbour
Rahul Kumar Mourya, who is related to her as an uncle, approached
her and, on the pretext of “bursting a cracker,” took her into a room in
his house. There, he removed her slacks and undergarments, made her
lie on a cot, opened his trousers, and placed his private part over her
private part. Thereafter, he threatened her not to disclose the incident to
anyone and asked her to go home. Upon returning home, the victim
narrated the incident to her mother and her aunt (wife of her paternal
uncle). When questioned as to why she had not disclosed the incident
earlier, the victim stated that she was afraid. Upon learning of the
incident, the complainant informed her husband that the accused had
committed a wrongful act with their daughter.
6. On the basis of the written report submitted by the complainant,
Police Station Doundi registered Crime No. 208/2022 against the
accused Rahul Kumar Mourya under Sections 363 and 376 AB of the
IPC and Sections 4 and 5(m) of the POCSO Act. The First Information
Report (FIR), marked as Ex.P/13, was duly registered and the matter
was taken up for investigation.
7. Upon completion of the investigation, the investigating agency
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found sufficient material indicating the involvement of the accused in the
commission of the aforesaid offences. Accordingly, a charge-sheet was
filed before the learned trial Court on 14.12.2022 against the accused
under Sections 363 and 376 AB of the IPC and Sections 4 and 5(m) of
the POCSO Act for trial.
8. In the present case, charges were framed against the accused
under Sections 363 and 376(2)(a)d) of the IPC and Section 3/4 of the
POCSO Act. The charges were read over and explained to the accused,
who denied the same and claimed trial.
9. In order to prove its case, the prosecution examined 10 witnesses
and exhibited 32 documents. The statement of the accused/appellant
was recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., wherein he denied all
incriminating circumstances put to him and pleaded false implication.
Upon appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence on record, the
learned trial Court convicted the appellant and sentenced him as
mentioned in paragraph 04 of the impugned judgment. Aggrieved
thereby, the present appeal has been preferred.
10. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the impugned
judgment of conviction and the consequent order of sentence passed by
the learned trial Court are unsustainable both in law and on facts. It is
contended that the prosecution has failed to establish the guilt of the
appellant beyond reasonable doubt, as the evidence on record is
neither cogent nor reliable. The entire case of the prosecution is stated
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to be based on conjectures and assumptions rather than on clear,
consistent, and legally admissible evidence. It is further submitted that
the conviction is primarily based on the testimony of the victim (PW-1),
which, according to the appellant, suffers from material inconsistencies,
contradictions, and improvements, thereby rendering it unreliable.
Learned counsel further argues that the testimonies of the material
witnesses, including the victim (PW-1), her mother (PW-6), her father
(PW-7), the medical officer Dr. Nishi Netam (PW-4), and the
Investigating Officer Kailash Chandra Marai (PW-10), are not wholly
consistent and contain material discrepancies that go to the root of the
prosecution case. It is further submitted that the FSL report (Ex.P/32) is
negative, and the medical evidence does not support the prosecution
version. The medical officer, Dr. Nishi Netam (PW-4), has opined that no
definite opinion can be given regarding the commission of sexual
intercourse with the victim. It is thus contended that these material
deficiencies in the prosecution evidence create serious doubt regarding
the veracity of the prosecution case, entitling the appellant to the benefit
of doubt. On these grounds, it is prayed that the appeal be allowed, the
impugned judgment of conviction and sentence be set aside, and the
appellant be acquitted of all charges.
11. Per contra, learned counsel for the State opposes the
submissions advanced on behalf of the appellant and contends that the
judgment of the learned trial Court is well-reasoned and based on
proper appreciation of evidence on record. It is submitted that the
testimony of the victim is reliable, consistent, and sufficient to sustain
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the conviction, and is duly corroborated by other prosecution evidence.
It is further contended that the alleged discrepancies are trivial in nature
and do not affect the core of the prosecution case. Accordingly, it is
urged that no interference is called for by this Court, and the appeal
deserves to be dismissed.
12. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered
their rival submissions made herein-above and also went through the
original records of the learned trial Court with utmost circumspection
and carefully as well.
13. The first question for consideration before this Court would
be, whether the learned trial Court has rightly held that on the date
of incident, the victim was minor?
14. When a person is charged for the offence punishable under the
POCSO Act, or for rape punishable in the Indian Penal Code, the age of
the victim is significant and essential ingredient to prove such charge
and the gravity of the offence gets changed when the child is below 18
years, 12 years and more than 18 years. Section 2(d) of the POCSO
Act defines the “child” which means any person below the age of
eighteen years.
15. In Jarnail Singh Vs. State of Haryana, reported in (2013) 7
SCC 263, the Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down the guiding principles
for determining the age of a child, which read as follows:
“22. On the issue of determination of age of a minor,
one only needs to make a reference to Rule 12 of the
7Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children)
Rules, 2007 (hereinafter referred to as the 2007
Rules). The aforestated 2007 Rules have been framed
under Section 68(1) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and
Protection of Children) Act, 2000. Rule 12 referred to
hereinabove reads as under :
“12. Procedure to be followed in
determination of Age.? (1) In every case
concerning a child or a juvenile in conflict with
law, the court or the Board or as the case may be
the Committee referred to in rule 19 of these rules
shall determine the age of such juvenile or child
or a juvenile in conflict with law within a period of
thirty days from the date of making of the
application for that purpose.
(2) The court or the Board or as the case may be
the Committee shall decide the juvenility or
otherwise of the juvenile or the child or as the
case may be the juvenile in conflict with law,
prima facie on the basis of physical appearance
or documents, if available, and send him to the
observation home or in jail.
(3) In every case concerning a child or juvenile in
conflict with law, the age determination inquiry
shall be conducted by the court or the Board or,
as the case may be, the Committee by seeking
evidence by obtaining –
(a) (i) the matriculation or equivalent
certificates, if available; and in the absence
whereof;
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(ii) the date of birth certificate from the school
(other than a play school) first attended; and
in the absence whereof;
(iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation
or a municipal authority or a panchayat;
(b) and only in the absence of either (i), (ii) or
(iii) of clause (a) above, the medical opinion
will be sought from a duly constituted
Medical Board, which will declare the age of
the juvenile or child. In case exact
assessment of the age cannot be done, the
Court or the Board or, as the case may be,
the Committee, for the reasons to be
recorded by them, may, if considered
necessary, give benefit to the child or juvenile
by considering his/her age on lower side
within the margin of one year.
and, while passing orders in such case shall, after
taking into consideration such evidence as may
be available, or the medical opinion, as the case
may be, record a finding in respect of his age and
either of the evidence specified in any of the
clauses (a)(i), (ii), (iii) or in the absence whereof,
clause (b) shall be the conclusive proof of the age
as regards such child or the juvenile in conflict
with law.
(4) If the age of a juvenile or child or the juvenile
in conflict with law is found to be below 18 years
on the date of offence, on the basis of any of the
conclusive proof specified in sub-rule (3), the
court or the Board or as the case may be the
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Committee shall in writing pass an order stating
the age and declaring the status of juvenility or
otherwise, for the purpose of the Act and these
rules and a copy of the order shall be given to
such juvenile or the person concerned.
(5) Save and except where, further inquiry or
otherwise is required, inter alia, in terms of
section 7A, section 64 of the Act and these rules,
no further inquiry shall be conducted by the court
or the Board after examining and obtaining the
certificate or any other documentary proof
referred to in sub-rule (3) of this rule.
(6) The provisions contained in this rule shall also
apply to those disposed off cases, where the
status of juvenility has not been determined in
accordance with the provisions contained in sub-
rule(3) and the Act, requiring dispensation of the
sentence under the Act for passing appropriate
order in the interest of the juvenile in conflict with
law.”
23. Even though Rule 12 is strictly applicable only to
determine the age of a child in conflict with law, we are
of the view that the aforesaid statutory provision
should be the basis for determining age, even for a
child who is a victim of crime. For, in our view, there is
hardly any difference in so far as the issue of minority
is concerned, between a child in conflict with law, and
a child who is a victim of crime. Therefore, in our
considered opinion, it would be just and appropriate to
apply Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules, to determine the age
of the prosecutrix VW-PW6. The manner of
determining age conclusively, has been expressed in
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sub-rule (3) of Rule 12 extracted above. Under the
aforesaid provision, the age of a child is ascertained,
by adopting the first available basis, out of a number
of options postulated in Rule 12(3). If, in the scheme
of options under Rule 12(3), an option is expressed in
a preceding clause, it has overriding effect over an
option expressed in a subsequent clause. The highest
rated option available, would conclusively determine
the age of a minor. In the scheme of Rule 12(3),
matriculation (or equivalent) certificate of the
concerned child, is the highest rated option. In case,
the said certificate is available, no other evidence can
be relied upon. Only in the absence of the said
certificate, Rule 12(3), envisages consideration of the
date of birth entered, in the school first attended by
the child. In case such an entry of date of birth is
available, the date of birth depicted therein is liable to
be treated as final and conclusive, and no other
material is to be relied upon. Only in the absence of
such entry, Rule 12(3) postulates reliance on a birth
certificate issued by a corporation or a municipal
authority or a panchayat. Yet again, if such a
certificate is available, then no other material
whatsoever is to be taken into consideration, for
determining the age of the child concerned, as the
said certificate would conclusively determine the age
of the child. It is only in the absence of any of the
aforesaid, that Rule 12(3) postulates the determination
of age of the concerned child, on the basis of medical
opinion.”
16. In the present case, as per the prosecution, the date of birth of the
victim is 08.10.2015. On this basis, she was aged about 07 years and
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27 days on the date of the incident. In order to establish the age of the
victim, the prosecution has produced the birth certificate (Article B-C) as
well as the Admission and Discharge Register (Article A-C) pertaining to
Class 1 of Government Primary School, Awari, Tehsil Doundi, District
Balod (C.G.). The said school record (Article A-C) has been duly proved
by PW-2, Lata Kange, who is the Head Teacher of the said school. In
her deposition, PW-2 has categorically stated that the victim was
admitted to Class 1 on 03.07.2021 and that her date of birth was
recorded in the school register as 08.10.2015.
17. The father of the victim (PW-7) has also supported the
prosecution case by deposing that the date of birth of the victim is
08.10.2015, which is in consonance with the birth certificate (Article B-
C) produced on record. Thus, the oral testimony of PW-7 stands
corroborated by the documentary evidence in the form of the birth
certificate and school records. On the basis of the aforesaid evidence,
the age of the victim, calculated from her date of birth i.e. 08.10.2015,
comes to approximately 7 years and 27 days on the date of the incident,
thereby clearly establishing that she was below 12 years of age at the
relevant time.
18. The defence has neither adduced any oral nor documentary
evidence to dispute or discredit the recorded date of birth of the victim.
There is also no material on record to indicate that the entries in the
birth certificate or the school register are incorrect or fabricated. In the
absence of any rebuttal evidence, the date of birth of the victim as
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recorded in the aforesaid documents deserves to be accepted.
Accordingly, we find no infirmity in the finding recorded by the learned
trial Court that the victim was aged about 07 years and 27 days at the
time of the incident and was, therefore, a minor below 12 years of age.
19. The next question for consideration before us is whether the
appellant has committed penetrative sexual assault by having
sexual intercourse with the victim, being a minor girl ?
20. In this regard, the victim (PW-1) deposed that the accused resides
in her neighborhood and is known to her. On the date of the incident,
while she was playing alone near a Kusum tree situated close to her
house, the accused approached her and lured her by saying that he
would give her crackers. Thereafter, he took her to his house, removed
the slacks she was wearing, and inserted his private part into her
private part. Thereafter, he threatened her not to disclose the incident to
anyone, failing which he would kill her, and gave her a firecracker, after
which she returned home. The victim initially disclosed the incident to
her neighborhood aunt. Thereafter, her mother and paternal aunt took
her for medical examination. The evidence on record establishes that
the victim was a minor girl aged about 7 years on the date of the
incident. Despite extensive cross-examination, her testimony remained
consistent and could not be materially contradicted. Her categorical
assertion that the accused lured her, removed her clothing, and
committed penetrative sexual assault remained unshaken.
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Considering her tender age, no presumption can reasonably be drawn
that she would falsely implicate the accused. No material contradictions
have emerged in her cross-examination so as to discredit her testimony.
Accordingly, the prosecution has succeeded in establishing that the
accused enticed the victim from lawful guardianship without consent
and committed rape and penetrative sexual assault upon her.
21. The victim’s mother (PW-6) deposed that the accused is a
resident of their village and that the victim is her elder daughter. On the
date of the incident, she had gone for paddy harvesting in a neighboring
field and returned at about 5:00 p.m., whereupon the victim’s aunt
informed her about the incident. Upon questioning, the victim disclosed
that the accused had taken her to a room in his house, made her lie
down, removed her clothes, and committed sexual assault, while also
threatening her against disclosure. The witness further stated that the
victim had been lured with crackers while playing near the Kusum tree.
Thereafter, she informed her husband and the villagers, and on the next
day lodged a written complaint, on the basis of which the FIR was
registered. She also handed over the victim’s undergarments to the
police and gave consent for her medical examination. The spot map
was prepared in her presence. Despite detailed cross-examination, her
testimony regarding the disclosure made by the victim remained intact.
Although certain details were not recorded verbatim in her police
statement, the overall tenor of her evidence clearly establishes the
prosecution case.
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22. The victim’s father (PW-7) corroborated the prosecution version
and stated that he was informed about the incident by his wife and
daughter. He deposed that the accused had lured the victim, removed
her clothes, and committed sexual assault. His testimony remained
unshaken in cross-examination and inspires confidence.
23. Independent witness Mangalu (PW-8) further corroborated the
prosecution case. He deposed that during a meeting convened by
village elders, the victim, upon being questioned, narrated that the
accused had taken her to his house and committed sexual assault upon
her. His testimony lends additional assurance to the version of the
victim and her parents.
24. Dr. Nishi Netam (PW-4), who examined the victim on 08.11.2022,
proved the medical report (Ex.P/8). She observed that the secondary
sexual characteristics of the victim were not developed; no external
injuries, abrasions, or bruises were found, and the hymen was intact.
She opined that a definite conclusion regarding recent sexual
intercourse could not be given without chemical examination. No visible
stains were found on the victim’s undergarments. Thus, from a purely
medical standpoint, a conclusive opinion regarding recent sexual
intercourse could not be established.
25. Dr. N.K. Thakur (PW-3), who examined the accused on
08.11.2022, proved his report (Ex.P/6) and stated that the accused was
a physically capable adult male. White stains were found on the
accused’s undergarments, which were sent for chemical examination.
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However, the doctor specifically noted that there was no clinical
evidence of recent sexual intercourse. Accordingly, this medical
evidence does not provide direct corroboration of the act alleged by the
prosecution.
26. In the Indian society refusal to act on the testimony of the victim of
sexual assault in the absence of corroboration as a rule, is adding insult
to injury. A girl or a woman in the tradition bound non-permissive society
of India would be extremely reluctant even to admit that any incident
which is likely to reflect on her chastity had ever occurred. She would be
conscious of the danger of being ostracized by the society and when in
the face of these factors the crime is brought to light, there is inbuilt
assurance that the charge is genuine rather than fabricated. Just as a
witness who has sustained an injury, which is not shown or believed to
be self-inflicted, is the best witness in the sense that he is least likely to
exculpate the real offender, the evidence of a victim of sex offence is
entitled to great weight, absence of corroboration notwithstanding. A
woman or a girl who is raped is not an accomplice. Corroboration is not
the sine qua non for conviction in a rape case. The observations of
Vivian Bose, J. in Rameshwar v. The State of Rajasthan, reported in
(AIR 1952 SC 54) were:
“The rule, which according to the cases has hardened
into one of law, is not that corroboration is essential
before there can be a conviction but that the necessity
of corroboration, as a matter of prudence, except
where the circumstances make it safe to dispense
with it, must be present to the mind of the judge….”
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27. Crime against women in general and rape in particular is on the
increase. It is an irony that while we are celebrating women’s rights in all
spheres, we show little or no concern for her honour. It is a sad
reflection on the attitude of indifference of the society towards the
violation of human dignity of the victims of sex crimes. We must
remember that a rapist not only violates the victim’s privacy and
personal integrity, but inevitably causes serious psychological as well as
physical harm in the process. Rape is not merely a physical assault – it
is often destructive of the whole personality of the victim. A murderer
destroys the physical body of his victim, a rapist degrades the very soul
of the helpless female. The Court, therefore, shoulders a great
responsibility while trying an accused on charges of rape. They must
deal with such cases with utmost sensitivity. The Courts should examine
the broader probabilities of a case and not get swayed by minor
contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of the
victim, which are not of a fatal nature, to throw out an otherwise reliable
prosecution case. If evidence of the victim inspires confidence, it must
be relied upon without seeking corroboration of her statement in
material particulars. If for some reason the Court finds it difficult to place
implicit reliance on her testimony, it may look for evidence which may
lend assurance to her testimony, short of corroboration required in the
case of an accomplice. The testimony of the victim must be appreciated
in the background of the entire case and the trial Court must be alive to
its responsibility and be sensitive while dealing with cases involving
sexual molestation. This position was highlighted in State of Punjab v.
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Gurmeet Singh, reported in (1996) 2 SCC 384.
28. A victim of a sex offence cannot be put on par with an accomplice.
She is in fact a victim of the crime. The Evidence Act nowhere says that
her evidence cannot be accepted unless it is corroborated in material
particulars. She is undoubtedly a competent witness under Section 118
and her evidence must receive the same weight as is attached to an
injured in cases of physical violence. The same degree of care and
caution must attach in the evaluation of her evidence as in the case of
an injured complainant or witness and no more. What is necessary is
that the Court must be conscious of the fact that it is dealing with the
evidence of a person who is interested in the outcome of the charge
levelled by her. If the Court keeps this in mind and feels satisfied that it
can act on the evidence of the victim. There is no rule of law or practice
incorporated in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short ‘Evidence Act‘)
similar to illustration (b) to Section 114 which requires it to look for
corroboration. If for some reason the Court is hesitant to place implicit
reliance on the testimony of the victim it may look for evidence which
may lend assurance to her testimony short of corroboration required in
the case of an accomplice. The nature of evidence required to lend
assurance to the testimony of the victim must necessarily depend on
the facts and circumstances of each case. But, if a victim is an adult and
of full understanding the Court is entitled to base a conviction on her
evidence unless the same is own to be infirm and not trustworthy. If the
totality of the circumstances appearing on the record of the case
discloses that the victim does not have a strong motive to falsely involve
18
the person charged, the Court should ordinarily have no hesitation in
accepting her evidence.
29. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Ranjit Hazarika v.
State of Assam, reported in AIR 1998 SC 635 has held that the
evidence of a victim of sexual assault stands almost on a par with the
evidence of an injured witness and to an extent is even more reliable. It
must not be overlooked that a woman or a girl subjected to sexual
assault is not an accomplice to the crime, but is a victim of another
person’s lust and it is improper and undesirable to test her evidence
with a certain amount of suspicion, treating her as if she were an
accomplice.
30. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Rai Sandeep @
Deenu v. State of NCT of Delhi, reported in (2012) 8 SCC 21 held as
under:-
“In our considered opinion, the ‘sterling witness’
should be of a very high quality and caliber whose
version should, therefore, be unassailable. The Court
considering the version of such witness should be in a
position to accept it for its face value without any
hesitation. To test the quality of such a witness, the
status of the witness would be immaterial and what
would be relevant is the truthfulness of the statement
made by such a witness. What would be more
relevant would be the consistency of the statement
right from the starting point till the end, namely, at the
time when the witness makes the initial statement and
ultimately before the Court. It should be natural and
19consistent with the case of the prosecution qua the
accused. There should not be any prevarication in the
version of such a witness. The witness should be in a
position to withstand the cross-examination of any
length and howsoever strenuous it may be and under
no circumstance should give room for any doubt as to
the factum of the occurrence, the persons involved, as
well as, the sequence of it. Such a version should
have co-relation with each and everyone of other
supporting material such as the recoveries made, the
weapons used, the manner of offence committed, the
scientific evidence and the expert opinion. The said
version should consistently match with the version of
every other witness. It can even be stated that it
should be akin to the test applied in the case of
circumstantial evidence where there should not be any
missing link in the chain of circumstances to hold the
accused guilty of the offence alleged against him.
Only if the version of such a witness qualifies the
above test as well as all other similar such tests to be
applied, it can be held that such a witness can be
called as a ‘sterling witness’ whose version can be
accepted by the Court without any corroboration and
based on which the guilty can be punished. To be
more precise, the version of the said witness on the
core spectrum of the crime should remain intact while
all other attendant materials, namely, oral,
documentary and material objects should match the
said version in material particulars in order to enable
the Court trying the offence to rely on the core version
to sieve the other supporting materials for holding the
offender guilty of the charge alleged.”
31. Upon a comprehensive evaluation of the entire evidence on
20
record, this Court finds that the prosecution has successfully
established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The
testimony of the victim (PW-1), who is a minor child, is cogent,
consistent, and trustworthy. Despite rigorous cross-examination, her
version has remained unshaken on all material particulars. Her
statement clearly establishes that the accused lured her, took her to his
house, and committed penetrative sexual assault. There is no reason to
disbelieve her testimony, particularly considering her tender age and
absence of any motive for false implication.
32. The statements of the victim’s mother (PW-6) and father (PW-7)
lend substantial corroboration to the version of the victim. The prompt
disclosure made by the victim to her family members and the
subsequent conduct of the witnesses further strengthen the prosecution
case. The independent witness (PW-8) also supports the prosecution
story, thereby providing additional assurance to the credibility of the
victim’s account.
33. Though the medical evidence does not conclusively establish
recent sexual intercourse, it is well-settled that absence of medical
corroboration is not fatal to the prosecution case, particularly where the
testimony of the victim is reliable and inspires confidence. In the present
case, the ocular evidence of the victim is of sterling quality and sufficient
to base conviction.
34. The defence has failed to elicit any material contradiction or
inconsistency in the prosecution evidence so as to create a reasonable
21
doubt. No plausible explanation has been offered by the accused, nor
has any evidence been led in rebuttal. The overall circumstances and
evidence on record form a complete chain pointing towards the guilt of
the accused.
35. In view of the settled principles of law and the consistent, reliable
testimony of the victim, this Court holds that the prosecution has proved
that the accused not only enticed the minor victim but also committed
penetrative sexual assault upon her. The findings recorded by the
learned trial Court are based on proper appreciation of evidence and do
not warrant any interference.
36. From the foregoing analysis, we are of the considered opinion that
the prosecution has successfully proved its case beyond reasonable
doubt, and the learned trial Court has not committed any legal or factual
error in recording the finding of guilt against the appellant/convict.
37. Accordingly, the appeal, being devoid of merit, is hereby
dismissed.
38. It is stated at the Bar that the appellant is presently in jail. He shall
serve out the sentence as awarded by the learned trial Court.
39. The Registry is directed to transmit the original record to the
concerned trial Court for necessary information and compliance. The
Registry shall also send a certified copy of this judgment to the
Superintendent of the Jail concerned, where the appellant is undergoing
sentence, for service upon the appellant, informing him that he is at
22
liberty to challenge the present judgment before the Hon’ble Supreme
Court with the assistance of the High Court Legal Services Committee
or the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha)
Judge Chief Justice
Brijmohan
