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Pushpa Devi vs Union Of India Through The Chief … on 21 April, 2026

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Jharkhand High Court

Pushpa Devi vs Union Of India Through The Chief … on 21 April, 2026

Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad

Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad, Sanjay Prasad

                                           2026:JHHC:11585-DB



      IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
                 W.P.(S) No.5159 of 2018
                           -----
 Pushpa Devi, aged about 45 years, Wife of Late Shrawan
 Kumar (EX-T/S, Group-D), Residing of Village-Sindur,
 Siyari, Nawadih, P.O. + P.S.-Sindur, District-Hazaribag.
                               ...     ...      Petitioner
                            Versus
 1. Union of India through the Chief Postmaster General,
    Department of Post, Director, Postal Service at Ranchi,
    P.O.+P.S. Ranchi, District-Ranchi Jharkhand.
 2. The Director, Postal Service at Ranchi, P.O.+P.S. Ranchi,
    District-Ranchi, Jharkhand.
 3. The Superintendent of Postal, Post Office, Hazaribag
    Division Hazaribag, P.O.+P.S.+District- Hazaribag,
    Jharkhand.
 4. The Senior Postmaster, Hazaribag, P.O.+ P.S.+ District-
    Hazaribag, Jharkhand.            ...   ...    Respondents
                             -------
 CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
               HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY PRASAD
                             -------
 For the Petitioner      : Mr. Lalan Kumar Singh, Advocate
 For the Respondents : Mr. Prashant Pallav, A.S.G.I.
                         : Ms. Shivani Jaluka, AC to ASGI
                                ------

Order No. 16/Dated 21st April, 2026

 Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.

1. The instant writ petition under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India is directed against the order dated

SPONSORED

10.11.2017 passed in O.A. No.051/00146/2016 by the

learned Central Administrative Tribunal, Patna Bench,

Circuit Bench at Ranchi whereby and whereunder the claim

of the petitioner for death-cum-retiral benefits as well as

compassionate appointment has been rejected.

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2026:JHHC:11585-DB

Factual Matrix

2. The brief facts of the case as per the pleading made in the

writ petition, which are required to be enumerated, read as

under :-

The husband of the applicant Late Shrawan Kumar

was appointed as contingent paid part-time Waterman at

Hazaribagh Post Office w.e.f. 14.08.1987 vide memo dated

01.02.1989. On 27.08.1991 The husband of the applicant

submitted a representation stating that he was getting

allowance for only 5 hours. Therefore, he may be appointed

in the Canteen which will allow him to get payment on the

basis of 8 hours.

Thereafter, vide Memo dated 30.09.1991 of

Superintendent of Post Offices, Hazaribagh Division

intimated that in pursuance of Secretary, Posts, New Delhi

letter dated 16.08.1991 circulated vide Chief PMG, Bihar

Circle, Patna letter dated 16.09.1991, three contingent part

time Waterman including the applicant’s husband were

brought on the strength of full-time casual labourers w.e.f.

01.10.1991 and they were also granted temporary status

w.e.f. 01.10.19991 under the provisions laid down in DG,

Department of Posts, New Delhi letter No. 45-95/87-SPB I

dated 12.04.1991 communicated under the CPMG, Bihar

Circle, Patna R&E 47/RLG/CH2 dated 15.05.1991. This

letter also stated that 50% of the service rendered under

2
2026:JHHC:11585-DB

temporary status would be counted for the purpose of

retirement benefits after regularization as a regular Group

‘D’ official.

It was also mentioned that conferment of temporary

status does not automatically imply that they would be

appointed as a regular Group ‘D’ employee within a fixed

time frame. Appointment of Group ‘D’ vacancies would be

continued to be done as per the extant recruitment rules.

The letter further stated that after rendering three years

continuous service after conferment of temporary status they

would be treated at par with temporary Group ‘D’ employee

for the purpose of contribution of General Provident Fund,

Grant of Festival Advance etc.

Thereafter, vide the order dated 29.06.1998 the

applicant on three years continuous service as temporary

status was treated at par with temporary Group ‘D’ employee

to avail the benefits available under the terms and

conditions. The order mentions 10 employees, the name of

applicant’s husband figured at Sl. No. 5 in which it was

shown grant of temporary status as 01.10.1991 and date of

effect of treating at par with Group ‘D’ as 01.10.1994.

The husband of the writ petitioner, namely, Shrawan

Kumar, passed away on 31.07.2014 as a temporary status

employee. Thereafter, the applicant applied before the Chief

PMG stating that after grant of temporary status her

3
2026:JHHC:11585-DB

husband had rendered continuous service to the

Department for 23 years. Despite such a pretty long time he

was not absorbed in regular Group ‘D’ post. She has

requested that her husband should be treated as regular

Group ‘D’ employee and accordingly she be given

compassionate appointment. This prayer was rejected vide

order dated 10.02.2015 by the competent authority.

Being aggrieved by the order dated 10.02.2015, the

petitioner approached the Central Administrative Tribunal,

Patna Bench, Circuit Bench at Ranchi by filing original

application being O.A. No.146/2016 for setting aside the

order rejecting her claim for compassionate appointment and

death-cum-retiral benefit.

The respondents have appeared and filed their

written statement in which they have stated that the

applicant’s husband was given temporary status and

thereafter, after three years some benefits at par with

temporary Group ‘D’ employee only for specific purposes

mentioned in the letter.

The husband of the petitioner, namely, Shri Shrawan

Kumar died on 31.07.2014 as a temporary status employee

and he was not appointed as regular Group ‘D’ employee.

The respondents have further stated that

compassionate appointment is only applicable in case of

4
2026:JHHC:11585-DB

death of regular government servant and not for those

working on daily wages/casual/contract or ad-hoc basis.

It has been stated in the written statement that Late

Shrawan Kumar was at 5th position in the seniority list of

casual labour with temporary status. As per the year wise

vacancy Shri Gopal Kumar who was in the 4th position of the

seniority list in the Memo dated 29.06.1998 was engaged in

Group ‘D’ vacancy for the year 2015-16. Late Shrawan

Kumar would have been engaged in the Group ‘D’ for the

vacancy of 2016-17 but unfortunately, he died on

31.07.2014. Therefore, his case for compassionate

appointment could not be considered under the

departmental rules and regulations.

The learned Tribunal, after hearing the parties, has

dismissed the original application vide order dated

10.11.2017 against which the present writ petition has been

filed.

3. It is evident from the factual aspect that the deceased

employee, the husband of the writ petitioner, has been

inducted in service in the capacity of contingent employee on

14.08.1987 and while continuing as such, the deceased

employee had been conferred with the temporary status vide

office order dated 01.10.1991 holding him entitled to get the

benefit of retiral benefits in a situation when the deceased

employee would be regularized in service.

5

2026:JHHC:11585-DB

4. The decision of regularization has not been taken

although it was under consideration, as per the stand inter

alia taken by the respondent-Union of India and due to non-

availability of the vacancies, for the particular vacancy year,

as per the policy decision dated 27.01.2011.

5. The case of the deceased employee when was under

consideration awaiting the vacancy for the year 2016-17,

unfortunately the employee has died on 31.07.2014 and the

order of regularization has not been passed due to demise of

the employee.

6. The representation although was said to be given as

per the plea taken on behalf of the petitioner in the year 2011

for regularization of the deceased employee but no decision

has been taken and, in the meanwhile, the employee has

died.

7. The wife of the deceased employee, the writ

petitioner, has approached to the Tribunal by filing the

Original Application seeking therein the following reliefs :-

“(i) The application for a direction to the respondents for
setting aside the Order dated 10.02.2015 by which the claim
for death-cum-retiral benefits including compassionate
appointment of the applicant namely Smt. Pushpa Devi, w/o
late Shrawan Kumar (Ex-T/S- Group -D) has been refused on
the ground that, there is no provision of relaxation of
appointment in Temporary status Group-D cadre, whereas a
series of judgment in favour of the Applicant And further
direction upon the Respondents to appoint the applicant in
the place of her husband Late Shrawan Kumar (Ex- T/s,

6
2026:JHHC:11585-DB

Group D) who has worked continuously till the date of his
death, i.e. 31.07.2014 about 23 years of service continuously
without any break and further direction to release the retiral
benefits after treating as a regular employee, i.e. LTC, Leave
Encashment, Gratuity, Provisional as well as full pension,
Medical and Housing Allowance and all other legal dues with
the interest on the current market rate.

(ii) Directing the respondents to release the death-cum-retiral
dues, which were not paid to the Applicant with interest.

(iii) The cost of litigation may be awarded upon the
Respondents.”

8. The ground inter alia has been taken therein that the

temporary status although had been given way back in the

year 1991 but due to the laches on the part of the respondent

authorities, there was no regularization in service and in the

meanwhile, the employee, the husband of the writ petitioner,

has died.

9. The applicant, the writ petitioner herein, therefore,

while invoking the jurisdiction of the learned Tribunal, has

taken the ground that since there is no laches on the part of

the deceased employee, as such, if the decision would have

been taken by the respondent authorities in time, then the

deceased husband of the writ petitioner would have been

regularized and in such situation being widow, would have

got all the post death benefit including the employment on

compassionate ground and, therefore, the prayer has been

made before the learned Tribunal to treat the deceased

employee to be under the regular establishment and confer

the status of regular employee and thereafter provide

7
2026:JHHC:11585-DB

appointment on compassionate ground as also direction to

release the post death benefit including the family pension.

10. The respondents have appeared and contested the

case by filing written statement by taking the ground that in

view of the admitted fact that the deceased husband of the

writ petitioner was in the capacity of temporary status

having not been inducted in the regular establishment under

Group-D service and, as such, there cannot be appointment

on compassionate ground and there cannot be regularization

as also the writ petitioner, being the widow of the deceased

employee, cannot claim the benefit of family pension.

11. The learned Tribunal, on appreciating the stand inter

alia taken before it, has dismissed the original application

based upon the reason that so long as there is no

appointment in the substantive basis under the

establishment of the respondent, no right to get the family

pension.

12. So far as the issue of regularization is concerned, the

stand since was taken that under the scheme of 27.01.2011,

25% quota is only to be filled up by inducting the employee

having temporary status, and, therefore, having limitation

on the vacancies, the deceased husband of the writ

petitioner, being 5th in Serial Number, whose turn was to

come of the vacancy of the year 2016-17 but in the

meanwhile, he has died.

8

2026:JHHC:11585-DB

13. The learned Tribunal, on consideration of the

aforesaid aspect of the matter, has dismissed the original

application against which the present writ petition.

Submission of the learned counsel for the writ petitioner

14. Mr. Lalan Kumar Singh, learned counsel appearing

for the writ petitioner, has taken the following grounds in

assailing the order passed by the learned Tribunal:-

(i) The learned Tribunal has not appreciated the fact that

even though there was no laches on the part of the

deceased husband of the writ petitioner in getting the

service regularized even though he has been conferred

with the temporary status way back in the year 1991.

(ii) The plea which has been taken and having been

considered by the learned Tribunal that the turn of the

deceased husband of the writ petitioner was to be

considered for the vacancy of the year 2016-17, being

5th in Serial Number in the list of candidates for

inducting under the regular establishment, and in the

meanwhile, due to death of her husband, the order of

regularization could not have been passed which itself

is the admission on the part of the respondents

accepting the fact of temporary status way back in the

year 1991, her husband has not been regularized in

service.

9

2026:JHHC:11585-DB

(iii) Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has relied

upon the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in

the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka & Others

v. Uma Devi (3) and Others, (2006) 4 SCC 1 for the

purpose of strengthening his argument that the ratio

which has been laid down in the said case, particularly,

the observation so made in paragraph 53 thereof, the

case of the deceased husband of the writ petitioner

ought to have been taken into consideration the

moment he has completed the tenure of service and on

the date when the judgment was delivered in the case

of Secretary, State of Karnataka & Others v. Uma

Devi (3) and Others (Supra), i.e., on 01.07.2006, the

deceased husband of the writ petitioner has already

completed more than the period of 19 years from the

date of induction in service and 15 years from the date

when the deceased husband of the writ petitioner got

the temporary status. Therefore, submission has been

made that the learned Tribunal ought to have taken

into consideration the factum of applicability of the

judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case

of Secretary, State of Karnataka & Others v. Uma

Devi (3) and Others (Supra) and having not done so,

the order passed by the learned Tribunal suffers from

an error.

10

2026:JHHC:11585-DB

Submission of the learned counsel appearing for the
respondent-UOI:

15. Per contra, Mr. Prashant Pallav, learned Additional

Solicitor General of India, has taken the following grounds in

defending the impugned judgment :-

(i) It has been contended that the learned Tribunal has

gone into the fact of entitlement either of appointment

on compassionate ground or the family pension which

is only available to the employee if inducted in service

on substantive capacity.

(ii) It has been contended that herein the admitted fact is

that the deceased husband of the writ petitioner has

not been regularized in service and, as such, he was not

in the substantive service and by that way the writ

petitioner or the dependent of the employee cannot be

held entitled for appointment on compassionate ground

or even for the family pension.

(iii) So far as the issue of regularization is concerned, the

respondent authorities had acted upon on the basis of

the policy decision as available in communication dated

27.01.2011 wherein 25% quota of the total vacancies

has been decided to be filled up from the employee

having been conferred with temporary status and while

doing so, the name of the deceased husband of the writ

petitioner was figuring at Sl. No.5 and depending upon

11
2026:JHHC:11585-DB

the vacancy position, the case of the deceased husband

of the writ petitioner was expected to be considered for

the vacancy of the year 2016-17 but in the meanwhile,

he has died.

(iv) The fact remains that the deceased husband of the writ

petitioner was not regularized in service and, therefore,

the question of appointment on compassionate ground

or the family pension does not arise.

(v) The argument, therefore, has been advanced that

whatever has been considered by the learned Tribunal

that is based upon sound principle and coming to the

conclusion of entitlement of the writ petitioner for

regularization or the appointment on compassionate

ground or the family pension. The learned Tribunal is

correct in declining to pass positive direction in favour

of the writ petitioner.

(vi) Learned counsel for the respondents, to buttress his

argument, has relied upon the judgment rendered by

Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Indian Council of

Agricultural Research and Another v. Santosh

reported in (2006) 11 SCC 157.

16. Learned counsel, on the aforesaid premise, has

submitted that the order passed by the learned Tribunal

requires no interference.

12

2026:JHHC:11585-DB

Analysis

17. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, gone

through the order passed by the learned Tribunal and the

pleading made on behalf of the respective parties as available

on record.

18. The basic fact which requires consideration is –

(i) As to whether without being regularized in service, the

writ petitioner being widow of the deceased employee,

can be held entitled for family pension?

(ii) Whether in such circumstances the dependent of the

deceased employee can be held to be entitled for

appointment on compassionate ground?

(iii) Whether merely filing of a representation in 2011 and

if during pendency of the said representation, the

employee died who was yet to be regularized by

inducting in regular establishment, can any right be

conferred in favour of the writ petitioner being the

dependent of the deceased employee for getting all such

benefits like regularization, compassionate

appointment and the family pension etc.?

19. All the issues since are interlinked, as such, are

being taken up together. But before consideration of the said

issue, this Court needs to refer herein the jurisdiction which

is being exercised by this Court which is certainly under

Article 226 of the Constitution of India only in order to assess

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the legality and propriety of the order passed by the learned

Tribunal, by way of power of judicial review.

20. This Court is conscious that while exercising the

power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against

the order passed by the learned Tribunal, the power of

judicial review is to be exercised as per the ratio laid down in

the case of L. Chandra Kumar Vs. Union of India & Ors.

reported in (1997) 3 SCC 261 at paragraph 99 wherein it

has been held that the High Court is having power of judicial

review to look into the legality and propriety of the order of

the tribunal to the extent that if the order passed by the

tribunal suffers from any perversity or the order is passed

without following the principles of natural justice or there is

error apparent on the face of order. For ready reference,

paragraph 99 of the judgment is quoted as under:-

“99. In view of the reasoning adopted by us, we hold that
clause 2(d) of Article 323-A and clause 3(d) of Article 323-B,
to the extent they exclude the jurisdiction of the High Courts
and the Supreme Court under Articles 226/227 and 32 of the
Constitution, are unconstitutional. Section 28 of the Act and
the “exclusion of jurisdiction” clauses in all other legislations
enacted under the aegis of Articles 323-A and 323- B would,
to the same extent, be unconstitutional. The jurisdiction
conferred upon the High Courts under Articles 226/227 and
upon the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution
is a part of the inviolable basic structure of our Constitution.
While this jurisdiction cannot be ousted other courts and
Tribunals may perform a supplemental role in discharging the
powers conferred by Articles 226/227 and 32 of the
Constitution. The Tribunals created under Article 323-A and

14
2026:JHHC:11585-DB

Article 323- B of the Constitution are possessed of the
competence to test the constitutional validity of statutory
provisions and rules. All decisions of these Tribunals will,
however, be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the
High Court within whose jurisdiction the Tribunal concerned
falls. The Tribunals will, nevertheless, continue to act like
courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which
they have been constituted. It will not, therefore, be open for
litigants to directly approach the High Courts even in cases
where they question the vires of statutory legislations (except
where the legislation which creates the particular Tribunal is
challenged) by overlooking the jurisdiction of the Tribunal
concerned. Section 5(6) of the Act is valid and constitutional
and is to be interpreted in the manner we have indicated.”

21. The power of judicial review has also been deliberated

by the Hon’ble Apex Court, which is to be considered while

exercising the said power only to the extent that if any order

is being passed found to be having error on the face of the

order or without jurisdiction or suffers from perversity. The

error apparent on the face of the order means that if the

order appears on its face having with error, then only the

power of judicial review is to be exercised.

22. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of West Bengal

Central School Service Commission vs. Abdul Halim,

(2019) 18 SCC 39, has held at paragraph-30 that the power

of judicial review must be exercised by the Court after

determining that the impugned order is vitiated by an error

apparent on the face of the record and not the same has been

established by a process of reasoning. Paragraph-30 of the

aforesaid judgment is being referred as under:-

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“30. In exercise of its power of judicial review, the Court is to
see whether the decision impugned is vitiated by an apparent
error of law. The test to determine whether a decision is
vitiated by error apparent on the face of the record is whether
the error is self-evident on the face of the record or whether
the error requires examination or argument to establish it. If
an error has to be established by a process of reasoning, on
points where there may reasonably be two opinions, it cannot
be said to be an error on the face of the record, as held by this
Court in Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde v. Millikarjun
Bhavanappa Tirumale [Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde
v.
Millikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale, AIR 1960 SC 137] . —.”

23. It is evident that the power of judicial review is to be

exercised only in two situations, i.e., if there is any error on

the face of the order or the finding suffers from perversity.

24. The element of perversity has been raised. The

Hon’ble Apex Court in Arulvelu and Anr. vs. State

[Represented by the Public Prosecutor] and Anr., (2009)

10 SCC 206 while elaborately discussing the word perverse

has held that it is, no doubt, true that if a finding of fact is

arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by

taking into consideration irrelevant material or if the finding

so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of

irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then, the

finding is rendered infirm in law. Relevant paragraphs, i.e.,

paras-24, 25, 26 and 27 of the said judgment reads as

under:-

“24. The expression “perverse” has been dealt with in a
number of cases. In Gaya Din v. Hanuman Prasad [(2001) 1
SCC 501] this Court observed that the expression “perverse”

16

2026:JHHC:11585-DB

means that the findings of the subordinate authority are not
supported by the evidence brought on record or they are
against the law or suffer from the vice of procedural
irregularity.

25. In Parry’s (Calcutta) Employees’ Union v. Parry & Co.
Ltd.
[AIR 1966 Cal 31] the Court observed that “perverse
finding” means a finding which is not only against the weight
of evidence but is altogether against the evidence itself.

In Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. CCE [1994 Supp (3) SCC 665
: AIR 1994 SC 1341] the Court observed that this is not a
case where it can be said that the findings of the authorities
are based on no evidence or that they are so perverse that no
reasonable person would have arrived at those findings.

26. In M.S. Narayanagouda v. Girijamma [AIR 1977 Kant
58] the Court observed that any order made in conscious
violation of pleading and law is a perverse order.

In Moffett v. Gough [(1878) 1 LR 1r 331] the Court observed
that a “perverse verdict” may probably be defined as one that
is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether
against the evidence. In Godfrey v. Godfrey [106 NW 814] the
Court defined “perverse” as turned the wrong way, not right;
distorted from the right; turned away or deviating from what
is right, proper, correct, etc.

27. The expression “perverse” has been defined by various
dictionaries in the following manner:

1. Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary of Current English,
6th Edn.

“Perverse.–Showing deliberate determination to behave in a
way that most people think is wrong, unacceptable or
unreasonable.”

2. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English,
International Edn.

Perverse.–Deliberately departing from what is normal and
reasonable.

3. The New Oxford Dictionary of English, 1998 Edn.

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2026:JHHC:11585-DB

Perverse.–Law (of a verdict) against the weight of evidence or
the direction of the judge on a point of law.

4. The New Lexicon Webster’s Dictionary of the English
Language (Deluxe Encyclopedic Edn.)

Perverse.–Purposely deviating from accepted or expected
behavior or opinion; wicked or wayward; stubborn; cross or
petulant.

5. Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary of Words & Phrases, 4th Edn.

“Perverse.–A perverse verdict may probably be defined as one
that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether
against the evidence.”

25. This Court is now proceeding to examine the

propriety of the order passed by the learned Tribunal on the

basis of the pleading as available in the paper book having

been placed while arguing the case by learned counsel for

both the parties.

26. The admitted fact herein is that the deceased

husband of the writ petitioner has been inducted in service

as a contingent employee on 14.08.1987 and has got the

temporary status on 01.10.1991.

27. The decision so taken conferring the temporary

status has been made available in the communication dated

30.09.1991, for ready reference, the same is being referred

herein :-

“DEPARTMENT OF POSTS, INDIA
OFFICE OF THE SUPDT. OF POST OFFICES HAZARIBAGH
DIVISION.

Letter No.-A-1/Misc/Part time employee/ Ch III
Dtd. at H.Bagh the 30.09.91

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2026:JHHC:11585-DB

In pursuance of the Secretary Posts New letter No.-
45/37/91-SPB.I dtd. 16.8.91, Circulated under the Chief
P.M.G. Bihar Circle Patna letter No. EST/E-34/RS/VI/RLG
dtd. 16.9.91, the following contingent paid part time employee
brunt on the strength of full time Casual labourers will effect
from 1.10.01 with the clear understanding that the posts of
Hazaribagh takes eight hours duties from them daily.
Simultaneous they are herby granted temporary status w.e.f.
1.10.91 under to provisions as laid down in the D.G.
Department of Posts, New Delhi letter no. 45-95/87-SPB I dtd.
12.4.91, communicated under the C.I.M.G. Bihar Circle,
Patna letter No. R & E-47/Rl/ch II dtd. 15.5.91.

1. Sri Gopal Hazaribagh. Kumar Contingent paid part
time water man,

2. Sri Sharwan Kumar, Contingent paid part time water
man, Hazaribagh.

3. Sri Ramu Ram contingent paid part time water man,
Hazaribagh.

2. They are engaged for full working hours viz 8 hours
including 1/2 hours lunch time. They will be paid at daily
rates on the basis of the minimum of the pay scale for a
regular group ‘D’ official including DA and HRA.

3. Benefit of increment at the same rate as applicable to a
group ‘D’ employee would be taken into account for
calculating per month rate wage after completion of one year
of service from the date of conferment of temporary status.
Such increment will be taken into account after every one year
of service subject to performance of duty for at least 240 days
in the year.

4. Leave entitlement will be one day for every 10 days of work.
Casual leave or any other kind of leave will not be admissible.
No encashment of leave is permissible on termination of
services for any reason or on their quitting service.

5. 50% of the service rendered under temporary status would
be counted for the purpose of retirement benefits after
regularization as a regular group ‘D’ official.

6. Conferment of Temporary status does not automatically
imply that they would be appointed as a regular Group ‘D’
employee within any fixed time frame. Appointment to group

19
2026:JHHC:11585-DB

‘D’ vacancies will continue to be done as per the extend
recruitment rules, which stipulate preference to illegible ED
employees.

7. After rendering three years continuous service after
conferment of Temporary status, they would be treated at of
General Provident Fund. They would also further be eligible
conditions as are festival Advance/ Blood Advance on the
same provided they furnish two sureties from permanent
Govt. Servants at the Department.

8. Their entitlement to productivity Linked Bonus will
continue to be at the rate applicable to casual labourers.

9. Temporary status does not debar disposing with their
services after following the due procedure.

10. If they with Temporary status commit misconduct and the
same is proved in an enquiry after giving them reasonable
opportunities, their services will be dispensed with.

11. For purpose of appointment as a regular group ‘D’ official
they will be allowed age relaxation to the extort of service
rendered by them as contingent paid employees.

Sd/-

(A. Prasad)
Supdt. of Post Offices,
Hazaribagh Division

28. It is evident from the aforesaid communication that

the respondent has taken decision while conferring the

temporary status with a further decision that 50% of the

service rendered under temporary status would be counted

for the purpose of retirement benefits after regularization as

a regular group ‘D’ official.

29. The office order which has been issued as available

in the communication dated 27.01.2011 by which the

decision was taken for regularizing the services of one or the

other employee who have been conferred with temporary

status, reflects that 25% of the total vacancy of MTS (Group-

20

2026:JHHC:11585-DB

D) for each year to be filled up by appointment of casual

labourers conferred with temporary status, for ready

reference, the same is being referred herein :-

“MOST IMMEDIATE

No. 45-2/2011-SPB-1
Government of India
Ministry of Communications & IT
(Department of Posts)

Dak Bhavan, Sansad Marg,
New Delhi-110001
Dated 27th January, 2011.

To

1. All Chief Post Masters General.

2. CGM, PLI

Subject: Action to be taken to fill up the vacancies on the
basis of latest Recruitment Rules for the post of Multi
Tasking Staff.

Sir/Madam,

I am directed to forward herewith a copy of Recruitment Rules
for the posts of Multi Tasking Staff dated 16th December,
2010 gazette notified on 20th December 2010. It may be
observed that the notified Recruitment Rules provide to fill up
the vacancies as under (For full text please refer to the
recruitment Rules)

Vacancies in Circle and Administrative Offices:

1.(a) 25% by appointment of Casual Labourers conferred with
temporary status on the basis of Selection-cum-seniority
falling which by,

(b) Appointment of existing Casual labourers engaged on or
before 1.9.1993 working, for full hours viz. 8 hours, on the
basis of selection-cum-seniority failing which by.

(c) Appointment of existing part-time Casual Labourers,
engaged on or before 1.9 1993, on the basis of selection-cum-
seniority failing which by,

(d) Direct recruitment as per the scheme circulated by the
Department of Posts from time to time.

(e) 75% by direct recruitment as per the scheme circulated by
the Department of Posts from time to time.

Vacancies in Subordinate Offices:

i) 50% by direct recruitment from amongst Gramin Dak
Sevaks of the recruiting Division or Unit, on the basis of
Selection-cum seniority.

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2026:JHHC:11585-DB

ii) (a) 25% by direct recruitment on the basis of Competitive
Examination restricted to the Gramin Dak Sevaks of the
Division or Unit failing which by,

(b) Direct recruitment from amongst Gramin Dak Sevaks of
the recruiting Division or Unit, on the basis of Selection-cum-
seniority.

iii) (a)25% by appointment of Casual Laborers conferred with
temporary status on the basis of Selection-cum-seniority
failing which by,

(b) Appointment of Casual Laborers engaged on or before
01.09.1993, working for full hours viz. 8 hours a day, on the
basis of selection-cum-seniority, falling which by,

(c) Appointment of Casual Laborers conferred with temporary
status in the neighboring Division or unit on the basis of
selection-cum-seniority, falling which by.

(d) Appointment of Casual Laborers engaged on or before
1.9.1993, working for full hours viz 8 hours, of the
neighboring Division or unit on the basis of selection-cum-
seniority failing which by,

(e) Appointment of part-time Casual Labourers engaged on or
before 1.9.1993, of the recruiting Division or Unit on the basis
of selection-cum-Seniority failing which by.

(f) Direct recruitment from amongst Gramin Dak Sevaks on
the basis of their seniority in the Division or unit.
Failing (i), (ii) and (lii) above by direct recruitment from
open market.

2. In order to initiate action to fill up the vacancies of the
years 2009 and 2010 the Circles may work out the vacancies
falling under various modes of filling up as provided in the
Recruitment Rules. Wherever applicable the vacancies may be
assessed Division/Unit wise. The direct recruitment vacancies
of the erstwhile Group ‘D’ not cleared under Annual direct
Recruitment Plans of the years 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008
should not be taken in to consideration while assessing the
vacancies.

3. The vacancies so assessed may please be furnished to
the Directorate by 10th February, 2011 positively in the
enclosed proforma.

4. Once the Circles complete the process of identification
of vacancies to be filled up by various modes they may proceed
further to fill up the following vacancies:

(a) Vacancies in Circle and Administrative Offices:

25% of vacancies to be filled up by appointment of Casual
Labourers.

(b) Vacancies in Subordinate Offices:

i) 50% of vacancies to be filled up by direct
recruitment from amongst Gramin Dak Sevaks of the
recruiting Division or Unit, on the basis of Selection-cum
seniority.

ii) 25% of vacancies to be filled up by appointment of
Casual Laborers.

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2026:JHHC:11585-DB

5. The Circles are requested to process the above said
appointments in such time-frame so that the appointment
orders are issued by 29th March, 2011.

6. As regard the vacancies to be filled up by Departmental
examination and direct recruitment the Directorate is in the
process of finalizing the syllabus and scheme for examination.
The same will be conveyed to the Circles shortly to enable
them to fill up those posts also,

7. Receipt of this letter may be acknowledged.

Yours faithfully,

(Salim Haque)
Deputy Director General (P)
Tel. No. 23096093″

30. The case of the deceased husband of the petitioner

has been decided to be considered and he was found to be at

Sl. No.5. The turn of the candidate at Sl. No.5 will come for

the vacancy of the year 2016-17 but unfortunately the

deceased husband of the petitioner has died on 31.07.2014.

31. It has been claimed by the petitioner that her

deceased husband had represented before the authority for

his regularization but no action has been taken.

32. The reference of the judgment rendered in the case of

Secretary, State of Karnataka & Others v. Uma Devi (3)

and Others (Supra) has also been taken.

33. This Court, therefore, after referring the admitted fact

needs to refer herein the proposition which has been laid

down in the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka &

Others v. Uma Devi (3) and Others (Supra) and the

background thereof under which the said proposition has

been laid down as referred in paragraph 53 thereof.

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2026:JHHC:11585-DB

34. The background of the case of Secretary, State of

Karnataka & Others v. Uma Devi (3) and Others (Supra)

was to put restriction upon the backdoor entry which was

being made by inducting the person concerned in the daily

rated capacity which would be evident from paragraph 45 of

the said judgment which is being referred herein :-

“45. While directing that appointments, temporary or casual,
be regularised or made permanent, the courts are swayed by the
fact that the person concerned has worked for some time and in
some cases for a considerable length of time. It is not as if the
person who accepts an engagement either temporary or casual
in nature, is not aware of the nature of his employment. He
accepts the employment with open eyes. It may be true that he
is not in a position to bargain–not at arm’s length–since he
might have been searching for some employment so as to eke
out his livelihood and accepts whatever he gets. But on that
ground alone, it would not be appropriate to jettison the
constitutional scheme of appointment and to take the view that
a person who has temporarily or casually got employed should
be directed to be continued permanently. By doing so, it will be
creating another mode of public appointment which is not
permissible. If the court were to void a contractual employment
of this nature on the ground that the parties were not having
equal bargaining power, that too would not enable the court to
grant any relief to that employee. A total embargo on such
casual or temporary employment is not possible, given the
exigencies of administration and if imposed, would only mean
that some people who at least get employment temporarily,
contractually or casually, would not be getting even that
employment when securing of such employment brings at least
some succour to them. After all, innumerable citizens of our vast
country are in search of employment and one is not compelled
to accept a casual or temporary employment if one is not
inclined to go in for such an employment. It is in that context
that one has to proceed on the basis that the employment was
accepted fully knowing the nature of it and the consequences
flowing from it. In other words, even while accepting the
employment, the person concerned knows the nature of his

24
2026:JHHC:11585-DB

employment. It is not an appointment to a post in the real sense
of the term. The claim acquired by him in the post in which he
is temporarily employed or the interest in that post cannot be
considered to be of such a magnitude as to enable the giving up
of the procedure established, for making regular appointments
to available posts in the services of the State. The argument that
since one has been working for some time in the post, it will not
be just to discontinue him, even though he was aware of the
nature of the employment when he first took it up, is not one
that would enable the jettisoning of the procedure established
by law for public employment and would have to fail when tested
on the touchstone of constitutionality and equality of
opportunity enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution.”

35. But, the Hon’ble Apex Court, while taking the lenient

view, as also having concern with the administrative

function, has made an observation to regularize the services

of such employees who has been inducted in service in the

capacity of daily rated employees by way of one time exercise

on fulfilment of the condition of 10 years of continuous

service by one or the other employee without having aid of

any interim order passed by any court of law, for ready

reference, paragraph 53 of the judgment rendered in the case

of Secretary, State of Karnataka & Others v. Uma Devi

(3) and Others (Supra) is being referred herein :-

“53. One aspect needs to be clarified. There may be cases
where irregular appointments (not illegal appointments) as
explained in S.V. Narayanappa [AIR 1967 SC 1071] , R.N.
Nanjundappa [(1972) 1 SCC 409] and B.N.
Nagarajan [(1979) 4 SCC 507] and referred to in para 15
above, of duly qualified persons in duly sanctioned vacant
posts might have been made and the employees have
continued to work for ten years or more but without the
intervention of orders of the courts or of tribunals. The

25
2026:JHHC:11585-DB

question of regularisation of the services of such
employees may have to be considered on merits in the light
of the principles settled by this Court in the cases
abovereferred to and in the light of this judgment. In that
context, the Union of India, the State Governments and
their instrumentalities should take steps to regularise as
a one-time measure, the services of
such irregularly appointed, who have worked for ten years
or more in duly sanctioned posts but not under cover of
orders of the courts or of tribunals and should further
ensure that regular recruitments are undertaken to fill
those vacant sanctioned posts that require to be filled up,
in cases where temporary employees or daily wagers are
being now employed. The process must be set in motion
within six months from this date. We also clarify that
regularisation, if any already made, but not sub judice,
need not be reopened based on this judgment, but there
should be no further bypassing of the constitutional
requirement and regularising or making permanent, those
not duly appointed as per the constitutional scheme.”

36. The purpose of making reference of the judgment

rendered in the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka &

Others v. Uma Devi (3) and Others (Supra) on behalf of the

petitioner is that at the moment the judgment in the

aforesaid case has come, it was incumbent upon the

respondent authorities to issue the order of regularization

but having not done so, the duty which has been casted by

the Hon’ble Apex Court upon the respondents has not been

carried out.

37. This Court, while considering the aforesaid

submission, is of the view that there is no dispute that

Secretary, State of Karnataka & Others v. Uma Devi (3)

26
2026:JHHC:11585-DB

and Others (Supra) judgment has casted accountability

upon the respondents to undertake the exercise for

regularization by way of one-time exercise which even

though has not been taken on behalf of the respondent.

38. The judgment in Secretary, State of Karnataka &

Others v. Uma Devi (3) and Others (Supra) has been

rendered on 01.07.2006 and as is being submitted on behalf

of the petitioner that her deceased husband had already

completed as on 01.07.2006 the total service of 19 years

from the date he has entered into the service and 15 years

from the date he has got the temporary status. But it is also

admitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the

deceased husband of the petitioner has not questioned the

alleged lethargic approach by not acting upon on the basis

of the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court by

agitating such grievance before the appropriate forum.

39. The question, therefore, is that even accepting that

Secretary, State of Karnataka & Others v. Uma Devi (3)

and Others (Supra) judgment has come in the meanwhile

and when it was not being complied with, it was the bounden

duty of the deceased husband of the writ petitioner while he

was surviving and was in service to approach the court of

law to seek a direction for consideration of his case. But he

has chosen not to do so, rather, as has been submitted on

behalf of the writ petitioner that some representation was

27
2026:JHHC:11585-DB

filed in the year 2011, as has been appended as Annexure-

10 to the writ petition.

40. The law is well settled that merely filing of the

representation cannot be construed that the concerned

aggrieved party has chosen the appropriate forum, rather,

the duty casted upon the aggrieved party is to approach to

the court of law without waiting for the outcome of the

pending representation that too for unreasonable period.

Reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered

by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of K.V. Rajalakshmiah

Setty & Ors. Vs. State of Mysore & Anr., AIR 1967 SC

993, wherein it was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court that

representation would not be adequate explanation to take

care of delay. Same view was reiterated in State of Orissa

v. Pyari Mohan Samantaray, AIR 1976 SC 2617 and

State of Orissa vs. Arun Kumar Patnaik (1976) 3 SCC

579 and the said view has also been followed in the case

of Shiv Dass v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 2007 SC 1330.

41. The fact remains herein that the deceased husband

of the writ petitioner has not been regularized in service, as

such, in this pretext, whether any right has been accrued

upon the widow of the deceased employee to seek a direction

for regularization after death of the deceased employee and

the appointment on compassionate ground or the benefit of

28
2026:JHHC:11585-DB

family pension, being dependent upon the issue of

regularization.

42. Regularization presupposes the existence of an

employee in service. It cannot be granted after termination

from service, nor can it be extended posthumously after the

departure of life.

43. If any direction would be passed after termination of

an employee or after demise of the concerned employee, then

the question would be that who will be regularized. If a

person is not in service, then there is no question of

regularization reason being that regularization can only be

in the service of a person and if the person is not in service

where is the question of regularization. Likewise, if a person

concerned has died then who will be regularized.

44. There is no deeming fiction that merely because an

employee has completed the statutory period or the eligibility

criteria, such employee will be deemed to be regularized.

Regularization means actual regularization and cannot be a

deeming fiction.

45. This Court, having discussed the aforesaid thing, is

of the view that after death of the deceased employee, there

cannot be any direction for regularization and in absence of

order of regularization, the status of the deceased husband

of the petitioner being admitted of the temporary status and

the law is well settled as per the applicable rule also that

29
2026:JHHC:11585-DB

appointment on compassionate ground is depending upon

the scheme to be given only to the dependent of the employee

who has died in harness while discharging substantive

service under the regular establishment.

46. In the factum of admitted position that the deceased

husband of the petitioner since has died before

regularization and, as such, there cannot be any direction of

regularization and by that way since he has not been taken

under the regular establishment, the dependent has got no

right for consideration of appointment on compassionate

ground.

47. Similarly, the family pension is dependent upon the

accrual of right to get the pension by the employee

concerned. The pension is only admissible in favour of an

employee who has been found to be there in the substantive

service. It needs to refer herein that in Rule 49 of CCS

Pension Rules, 1972 the entitlement of pension has been

referred to be made entitled in favour of any employee who

has been found to be in substantive service and on

completion of qualifying service of 10 years.

48. The family pension is admissible to the widow of the

deceased employee or the minor children of the deceased

employee, as the case may be. The family pension is not

available under the statutory CCS (Pension)Rules, rather, it

depends upon the scheme. The scheme admittedly has been

30
2026:JHHC:11585-DB

formulated by the respondents but when the entitlement of

pension is not there, then where is the question of family

pension.

49. This Court, after having discussed the aforesaid

facts, based upon the legal position and adverting to the

order passed by the learned Tribunal, has found that the

learned Tribunal has taken into consideration that the

deceased husband of the petitioner has not been regularized

and, therefore, the dependent is not entitled for

compassionate appointment and similarly, the family

pension.

50. This Court, therefore, has found that there is no error

apparent on the face of the order and the order passed by

the learned Tribunal does not suffer from the element of

perversity, as such, this Court, in exercise of power of

judicial review, is of the view that the order impugned needs

no interference.

51. Accordingly, the writ petition fails and is dismissed.

(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)

(Sanjay Prasad, J.)

Dated : 21.04.2026

A.F.R.
Birendra/

31



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