Pukhraj Rajmal Bora vs The State Of Maharashtra And Another on 8 May, 2026

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    Bombay High Court

    Pukhraj Rajmal Bora vs The State Of Maharashtra And Another on 8 May, 2026

    2026:BHC-AUG:21889
                                                                              APPLN-1101-2026.odt
    
    
    
    
                         IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                                   BENCH AT AURANGABAD
    
                             CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 1101 OF 2026
    
              PUKHRAJ RAJMAL BORA
              Age: 68 years, Occu: Retired,
              R/o: Flat No.----, 180 Greens,
              Opposite Kamalnayan Bajaj Hospital,
              Beed Bypass, Chhatrapati Sambhajinagar                    ...Applicant
    
                    VERSUS
    
              1.    STATE OF MAHARASHTRA
                    Through Police station officer,
                    Dhule City Police station, Dhule
    
              2.    MADHUKAR MADHAVRAO PATIL
                    Age: Major, Occu: Retired,
                    R/o: C/o Dhule City Police Station, Dhule           ...Respondents
    
                                                      ***
              • Mr. S. S. Bora, Advocate for the Petitioner
              • Mr. A. B. Girase, PP for the Respondent No.1/State
                                                      ***
                                        CORAM                  : S. G. CHAPALGAONKAR, J
                                        RESERVED ON            : APRIL 30, 2026
                                        RESERVED ON            : MAY 08, 2026
              JUDGMENT :

    1. The present Application is filed with following prayer clauses B &

    C:

    SPONSORED

    b. The entire criminal proceedings in pursuance of the First
    Information Report dated 22.11.1993 bearing CR
    No.480/1993 registered with Dhule City Police Station, Dhule
    so also the entire charge sheet for offences punishable U/sec.
    143, 147, 148, 323, 324, 332, 351, 353, 427 of Indian Penal
    Code
    and Section 68/140 Of Maharashtra Police Act, may
    kindly be quashed and set aside.

    c. The Order of issuance of process dated 15-02-1994 passed

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    APPLN-1101-2026.odt

    by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Dhule in Regular
    Criminal Case no. 66/1994, for offences punishable U/sec.
    143, 147, 148, 323, 324, 332, 351, 353, 427 of Indian Penal
    Code
    and Section 68/140 Of Maharashtra Police Act against
    the present applicant, may kindly be quashed and set aside.

    2. The investigation was set in motion on basis of report given by

    Respondent No. 2 alleging that on 22.11.1993, a public protest/public

    condemnation was arranged on account of death of a tribal person from village

    Chinchkheda in pursuance to Narmada Bachao Andolan led by Smt. Medha

    Patkar. The police authorities intercepted procession by installing barricades.

    They requested protesters/ delegates to refrain from their activities, instead send a

    delegation to Collector for discussion. There was scuffle amongst protesters and

    police officers. Some of them had suffered injuries. Eventually, FIR came to be

    lodged against as many as 175 protesters for offences punishable under Sections

    143, 144, 147, 148, 323, 324, 332, 353, 427 of Indian Penal Code & Section

    60/140 of Maharashtra Police Act.

    3. The Applicant is named as one of accused, being participant of

    public protest. In deference to registration of FIR, Applicant had approached

    Sessions Court vide Criminal Misc. Application No. 699 of 1993 for grant of

    pre-arrest bail. On 11th January 1994, application was allowed thereby extending

    protection as prayed. Since then, Applicant was never called by investigating

    machinery. No attempt was made to arrest him or he was never directed to

    furnish bail bond. Till year 2025, he never received summons from Court.

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    APPLN-1101-2026.odt

    Recently, Applicant received information from Mr. Hemant Madane that he is

    implicated as one of accused in the charge sheet no. 32 of 1994, which was

    submitted in Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class in year 1994. The Applicant

    came to know that learned Magistrate has issued non-bailable warrant against

    him. Immediately, he approached to Court seeking cancellation of non-bailable

    warrant and furnished bail. On 12th January 2026, Magistrate committed case to

    Sessions Court at Dhule, which is registered as Sessions Case No. 30 of 2026.

    4. In this backdrop applicant seeks quashment of FIR, charge sheet

    and proceedings in Sessions Case No. 30 of 2026, being violative of right to

    speedy trial recognized and guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of

    India.

    5. Mr. Bora, learned Advocate appearing for Applicant, took this

    Court through charge sheet and documents appended thereto and submits that

    although FIR is registered in year 1993 and charge sheet is submitted in year

    1994, till 2025, no effective steps were taken by prosecution. After 33 long years,

    order of committal is passed. He would further submit that Applicant was

    practicing advocate at Dhule and regularly attended Court proceedings till he

    joined judicial services in the year 2000. He discharged his services in public

    domain while presiding over prestigious judicial assignments. However, till year

    2025, he was never served with summons. He would further submit that for no

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    APPLN-1101-2026.odt

    fault on part of Applicant, for 33 long years, criminal prosecution was kept in

    dormant condition. The right to speedy trial in all criminal prosecution is an

    inalienable right under Article 21 of Constitution of India. Such right is not

    restricted to actual criminal proceedings in Court, but also includes within its

    sweep all stages from very inception till its conclusion. He would submit that

    even otherwise, except statement in FIR that Applicant was one of leader of

    public protest, no attributions of overt-act are discernible against him either from

    contents of FIR or statement of witnesses. In support of his contentions, he relied

    upon observation of Supreme Court in case of Abdul Rehman Antulay and Ors

    vs. R. S. Nayak and Ors, AIR 1992 SC 1701, Hussainara Khatoon and Ors vs.

    Home Secretary, State of Bihar, Patna, AIR 1979 Supreme Court 1360 , Lokesh

    Kumar Jain vs. State of Rajasthan, (2013) 11 SCC 130 and Robert

    Lalchungnunga Chongthu vs. State of Bihar, 2025 INSC 1339.

    6. Per contra, Mr. Girase, learned Public Prosecutor, submits that

    Applicant is named in FIR. The process is delayed because securing presence of

    large number of accused persons was a difficult task. The prosecution cannot be

    blamed for said delay. However, learned PP graciously concedes that Applicant

    was a practicing Advocate at Dhule. He rendered judicial services in public

    domain and there is no fault on his part that led to delay in criminal prosecution.

    7. In light of aforesaid factual background, it is apposite to refer to

    certain propositions/guidelines laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of
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    APPLN-1101-2026.odt

    Abdul Rehman Antulay and Ors (supra), which reads thus:

    54. In view of the above discussion, the following propositions
    emerge, meant to serve as guidelines. We must forewarn that
    these propositions are not exhaustive. It is difficult to foresee all
    situations. Nor is it possible to lay down any hard and fast rules.

    These propositions are:

    1. Fair, just and reasonable procedure implicit in Article 21
    of the Constitution creates a right in the accused to be tried
    speedily. Right to speedy trial is the right of the accused.

    The fact that a speedy trial is also in public interest or that it
    serves the societal interest also, does not make it any-the-
    less the right of the accused. It is in the interest of all
    concerned that the guilt or innocence of the accused is
    determined as quickly as possible in the circumstances.

    2. Right to Speedy Trial flowing from Article 21
    encompasses all the stages, namely the stage of
    investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and retrial.
    That is how, this Court has understood this right and there
    is no reason to take a restricted view.

    3. The concerns underlying the Right to speedy trial from
    the point of view of the accused are:

    (a) the period of remand and pre-conviction detention
    should be as short as possible. In other words, the
    accused should not be subjected to unnecessary or
    unduly long incarceration prior to his conviction;

    (b) the worry, anxiety, expense and disturbance to his
    vocation and peace, resulting from an unduly prolonged
    investigation, inquiry or trial should be minimal; and

    (c) undue delay may well result in impairment of the
    ability of the accused to defend himself, whether on
    account of death, disappearance or non-availability of
    witnesses or otherwise.

    It can be gathered from aforesaid guidelines that Article 21 of

    Constitution of India not only creates right in accused to be tried speedily, but

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    APPLN-1101-2026.odt

    such right subserves public and societal interest. The Article 21 encompasses all

    stages of investigation, inquiry, trial and not restricted to trial before Court. The

    Court observes that delay results into worry, anxiety, expense and disturbance to

    vocation and even peace. It results impairing of ability to defend himself. The

    aforesaid exposition of law has been reiterated by Supreme Court of India in

    numerous cases. In case of Vakil Prasad Singh Vs. State of Bihar, (2009) 3 SCC

    355, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed in paragraph 24 as under:

    24. It is, therefore, well settled that the right to speedy trial in
    all criminal persecutions (sic prosecutions) is an inalienable
    right under Article 21 of the Constitution. This right is
    applicable not only to the actual proceedings in court but also
    includes within its sweep the preceding police investigations as
    well. The right to speedy trial extends equally to all criminal
    prosecutions and is not confined to any particular category of
    cases. In every case, where the right to speedy trial is alleged to
    have been infringed, the court has to perform the balancing act
    upon taking into consideration all the attendant circumstances,
    enumerated above, and determine in each case whether the
    right to speedy trial has been denied in a given case.”

    8. In light of legal position that emerges from a series of judgments

    referred above, if prosecution against Applicant is permitted after 33 years of

    registration of FIR, particularly when he was a practicing Advocate at Sessions

    Court at Dhule and then efficiently served judiciary till he demited office from

    constitutional post, it would lead to violation of fundamental rights guaranteed

    under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. As rightly pointed out by Mr. Bora,

    defending a trial after 33 long years would result in impairing the ability of

    Applicant-Accused to defend himself.

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    APPLN-1101-2026.odt

    9. Even on factual backdrop, there appears no case against Applicant

    so as to permit prosecution. FIR simply states that Applicant was one of leaders

    in protest arranged by Narmada Bachao Andolan Association. However,

    participation of applicant in protest/march or any scuffle with police officer or

    any sort of violation of public order is not discernible from record. The charge

    sheet contains statement of witnesses, however, Applicant is not named for any

    overt-act or even participation in so-called unlawful assembly that turned violent

    causing injuries to police officers.

    10. There is absolutely no explanation from prosecution for inordinate

    delay caused in taking necessary steps for speedy trial. Issue process order appears

    to have been passed on 15th February 1994. There is nothing to show that

    Applicant was served with summons at any point of time although he was

    regularly attending court as an advocate and then served judiciary. The committal

    order appears to have been passed on 12th January 2026. The police could not

    secure attendance of accused numbers 1 to 172 and 174 and 175. The Applicant

    was only accused who was present before Court when committal order was

    passed. There is nothing on record to demonstrate that applicant was anyway

    responsible or contributed to cause delay in committal of case. It is primarily for

    prosecution to justify and explain delay, but no satisfactory explanation is coming

    forward to justify inordinate delay of 33 years in taking steps for committal of

    case to sessions case. The applicant can not be denied fundamental right and
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    APPLN-1101-2026.odt

    made to face trial at this stage because of failure of prosecuting agencies and

    executive to act and turning blind eye at securing expeditious and speedy trial. In

    this backdrop, this Court finds that this is a fit case for exercise of inherent powers

    to secure ends of justice coupled with constitutional right of Applicant

    guaranteed under Article 21.

    11. In result, Criminal Application is allowed in terms of prayer clauses

    B & C.

    (S. G. CHAPALGAONKAR, J.)
    Umesh

    PAGE 8 OF 8



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