Jharkhand High Court
Premlata Devi vs Madhur Kumar Singh on 17 July, 2026
Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad
Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad, Sanjay Prasad
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
First Appeal No.235 of 2026
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Premlata Devi .... .... Appellant
Versus
Madhur Kumar Singh ..... .... Respondent
CORAM : HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY PRASAD
——
For the Appellant : Mr. Manoj Kr. Sah, Advocate
For the Respondent :
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03/Dated: 17.07.2026
I.A. No.12061 of 2025
1. The present interlocutory application has been filed under
section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 for condonation of delay of
541 days in preferring the instant appeal.
2. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant has submitted
that delay of 541 days has been caused in filing the appeal on
the ground that the appellant is a poor lady and she is
dependent upon her parents. The appellant has obtained
certified copy of judgment dated 05.12.2023 in the first week of
May, 2025 and the appellant did not come immediately before
this Court for filing the appeal.
3. It has also been submitted that somehow, she has arranged
some money, thereafter, the appellant consulted to the counsel.
4. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the appellant
that the delay in filing the present appeal is not intentional rather
the circumstance as stated above compelled her not to file first
appeal within time.
5. It has also been contended that the reason which has been
shown in the instant interlocutory application to condone the
delay of 541 days is, therefore, sufficient for the purpose of
condoning the aforesaid delay.
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6. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant and gone
through the pleadings made in the instant interlocutory
application.
7. This Court now is proceeding to enumerate the cause which has
been shown in causing the delay as has been stated in the said
interlocutory application.
8. The reason herein has been shown in causing delay of 541 days
on the ground that the appellant is a poor lady and she is
dependent upon her parents. The appellant has obtained
certified copy of judgment dated 05.12.2023 in the first week of
May, 2025 and the appellant did not come immediately before
this Court for filing the appeal. Somehow, she has arranged
some money then thereafter, the appellant consulted to the
counsel.
9. Since we are dealing with the issue of limitation of 541 days in
filing the instant appeal and there is no dispute in position of law
that irrespective of period of delay, the delay is to be condoned
in exercise of power conferred under section 5 of the Limitation
Act depending upon the sufficient cause if shown by the party
seeking condonation of delay.
10. It also needs to refer herein that what is the meaning of
‘sufficient cause’. The consideration of meaning of ‘sufficient
cause’ has been made in Basawaraj & Anr. Vrs. Spl. Land
Acquisition Officer, [(2013) 14 SCC 81], wherein, it has been
held by the Hon’ble Apex Court at paragraphs 9 to 15
hereunder:-
“9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the defendant could
not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word
“sufficient” is “adequate” or “enough”, inasmuch as may be
necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the
word “sufficient” embraces no more than that which provides a
platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the
purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a
case, duly examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable
standard of a cautious man. In this context, “sufficient cause”
means that the party should not have acted in a negligent
manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of
the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged
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that the party has “not acted diligently” or “remained inactive”.
However, the facts and circumstances of each case must
afford sufficient ground to enable the court concerned to
exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the court
exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The
applicant must satisfy the court that he was prevented by any
“sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case, and unless a
satisfactory explanation is furnished, the court should not allow
the application for condonation of delay. The court has to
examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a
device to cover an ulterior purpose. (See Manindra Land and
Building Corpn. Ltd. v. Bhutnath Banerjee [AIR 1964 SC 1336]
, Mata Din v. A. Narayanan [(1969) 2 SCC 770 : AIR 1970 SC
1953] , Parimal v. Veena [(2011) 3 SCC 545 : (2011) 2 SCC
(Civ) 1 : AIR 2011 SC 1150] and Maniben Devraj Shah v.
Municipal Corpn. of Brihan Mumbai [(2012) 5 SCC 157 :
(2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 24 : AIR 2012 SC 1629] .
10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar [AIR 1964 SC 993] this
Court explained the difference between a “good cause” and a
“sufficient cause” and observed that every “sufficient cause” is
a good cause and vice versa. However, if any difference exists
it can only be that the requirement of good cause is complied
with on a lesser degree of proof than that of “sufficient cause”.
11. The expression “sufficient cause” should be given a liberal
interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but
only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides
cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not
sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the
facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is
possible. (Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal [(2002) 1 SCC 535 : AIR
2002 SC 100] and Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao [(2002) 3
SCC 195 : AIR 2002 SC 1201] .
12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may
harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all
its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no
power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds.
“A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A
court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it
considers a distress resulting from its operation.” The statutory
provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular
party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full
effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which
means “the law is hard but it is the law”, stands attracted in
such a situation. It has consistently been held that,
“inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered while
interpreting a statute.
13. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim
being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud
and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It
seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated
unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale.
According to Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol. 28, p. 266:
“605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.–The courts have
expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the
existence of statutes of limitations namely, (1) that long
dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2)
that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a
stale claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of actions3
should pursue them with reasonable diligence.”
An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and
uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or
deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and
justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a
party’s own inaction, negligence or laches. (See Popat and
Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Assn. [(2005) 7 SCC 510] ,
Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh [(1973) 2 SCC 705 : AIR 1973
SC 2537] and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project
[(2008) 17 SCC 448 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 907] .)
14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka [(2002) 4
SCC 578 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 830 : AIR 2002 SC 1856] this Court
held that judicially engrafting principles of limitation amounts to
legislating and would fly in the face of law laid down by the
Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak
[(1992) 1 SCC 225 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 93 : AIR 1992 SC 1701] .
15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that
where a case has been presented in the court beyond
limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was
the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough
reason which prevented him to approach the court within
limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want
of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the
case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained
inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the
delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an
inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The
application is to be decided only within the parameters laid
down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In
case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to
approach the court on time condoning the delay without any
justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to
passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it
tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.”
11. Thus, it is evident that the sufficient cause means that the
party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a
want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and
circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has
“not acted deliberately” or “remained inactive”. However, the facts
and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to
enable the Court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason
that whenever the Court exercises discretion, it has to be
exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the Court that he
was prevented by any “sufficient cause” from prosecuting his
case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the
Court should not allow the application for condonation of delay.
The Court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or
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was merely a device to cover the ulterior purpose as has been
held in Manindra Land and Building Corporation Ltd. Vrs.
Bhootnath Banerjee & Ors., AIR 1964 SC 1336, Lala Matadin
Vrs. A. Narayanan, (1969) 2 SCC 770, Parimal Vrs. Veena @
Bharti, (2011) 3 SCC 545 and Maniben Devraj Shah Vrs.
Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157.
12. It has further been held in the aforesaid judgments that the
expression ‘sufficient cause’ should be given a liberal
interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only
so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be
imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause
has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular
case and no straitjacket formula is possible, reference in this
regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble
Apex Court in Ram Nath Sao @ Ram Nath Sahu & Ors. Vrs.
Gobardhan Sao & Ors., (2002) 3 SC 195, wherein, at
paragraph-12, it has been held as hereunder:-
“12. Thus it becomes plain that the expression
“sufficient cause” within the meaning of Section 5 of
the Act or Order 22 Rule 9 of the Code or any other
similar provision should receive a liberal construction
so as to advance substantial justice when no
negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is
imputable to a party. In a particular case whether
explanation furnished would constitute “sufficient
cause” or not will be dependent upon facts of each
case. There cannot be a straitjacket formula for
accepting or rejecting explanation furnished for the
delay caused in taking steps. But one thing is clear
that the courts should not proceed with the tendency
of finding fault with the cause shown and reject the
petition by a slipshod order in over-jubilation of
disposal drive. Acceptance of explanation furnished
should be the rule and refusal, an exception, more so
when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides
can be imputed to the defaulting party. On the other5
hand, while considering the matter the courts should
not lose sight of the fact that by not taking steps within
the time prescribed a valuable right has accrued to the
other party which should not be lightly defeated by
condoning delay in a routine-like manner. However, by
taking a pedantic and hyper technical view of the
matter the explanation furnished should not be
rejected when stakes are high and/or arguable points
of facts and law are involved in the case, causing
enormous loss and irreparable injury to the party
against whom the lis terminates, either by default or
inaction and defeating valuable right of such a party to
have the decision on merit. While considering the
matter, courts have to strike a balance between
resultant effect of the order it is going to pass upon the
parties either way.”
13. Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Ramlal, Motilal and
Chhotelal Vrs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., (1962) 2 SCR 762, has
held that merely because sufficient cause has been made out in
the facts of the given case, there is no right to the appellant to
have delay condoned. At paragraph-12, it has been held as
hereunder:
“12. It is, however, necessary to emphasise that even after
sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to
the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right.
The proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for
the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the
court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing
further has to be done; the application for condoning delay
has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient
cause is shown then the court has to enquire whether in
its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of
the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all
relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the
party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the
scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary
power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be
limited only to such facts as the court may regard as
relevant. It cannot justify an enquiry as to why the party
was sitting idle during all the time available to it. In this
connection we may point out that considerations of bona
fides or due diligence are always material and relevant
when the court is dealing with applications made under
Section 14 of the Limitation Act. In dealing with such
applications the court is called upon to consider the effect6
of the combined provisions of Sections 5 and 14.
Therefore, in our opinion, considerations which have been
expressly made material and relevant by the provisions of
Section 14 cannot to the same extent and in the same
manner be invoked in dealing with applications which fall
to be decided only under Section 5 without reference to
Section 14. In the present case there is no difficulty in
holding that the discretion should be exercised in favour of
the appellant because apart from the general criticism
made against the appellant’s lack of diligence during the
period of limitation no other fact had been adduced
against it. Indeed, as we have already pointed out, the
learned Judicial Commissioner rejected the appellant’s
application for condonation of delay only on the ground
that it was appellant’s duty to file the appeal as soon as
possible within the period prescribed, and that, in our
opinion, is not a valid ground.”
14. Thus, it is evident that while considering the delay
condonation application, the Court of Law is required to consider
the sufficient cause for condonation of delay as also the approach
of the litigant as to whether it is bona fide or not as because after
expiry of the period of limitation, a right is accrued in favour of the
other side and as such, it is necessary to look into the bona fide
motive of the litigant and at the same time, due to inaction and
laches on its part.
15. This Court adverting to the ground taken in the instant
interlocutory application as also to come to the consideration as
to whether the ground shown for condoning the delay of 541 days
can be said to be sufficient cause or not.
16. Expression ‘sufficient cause’ has been dealt with which
means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner
or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts
and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party
has “not acted deliberately” or “remained inactive”.
17. It has been stated in paragraph nos.5, 6 and 7 of the instant
interlocutory application that the appellant is a poor lady and she
is dependent upon her parents. The appellant has obtained
certified copy of judgment dated 05.12.2023 in the first week of
May, 2025 and the appellant did not come immediately before
this Court for filing the appeal. Somehow, she has arranged some
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money. Thereafter, she consulted her lawyer for filing an appeal
and thus, delay of 541 days occurred. For ready reference,
paragraph nos.5, 6 & 7 are being quoted as hereunder:
“5. That it is stated and submitted that the appellant is a
poor lady and she is dependent upon her parents.
6. That it is stated and submitted that so the appellant
obtained certified copy of judgment dated 05.12.2023 in
the first week of may, 2025 and the appellant also did
not come immediately before this Hon’ble Court for
filing first appeal.
7. That it is stated and submitted that the anyhow
arranged some money then the appellant came
25.08.2025 and consulted to counsel for the appellant
Mr. Manoj Kumar Sah, Advocate and accordingly first
appeal alongwith present limitation appellant are being
filed.”
18. We are considering the issue of matrimonial dispute and as
per the law laid down for condoning the delay that the issue of
limitation is to be taken liberally and not to be taken in hyper
technical manner.
19. This Court, on the basis of the discussions, as have been
made hereinabove, is of the view that the cause which has been
shown by the appellant in the instant interlocutory application is
sufficient one to condone the delay.
20. This Court, considering the reason assigned in paragraph
nos. 5, 6 & 7 of the instant interlocutory application, is of the view
that the same is sufficient cause for the purpose of condoning the
delay of 541 days in filing the appeal.
21. Accordingly, I.A. No. 12061 of 2025 is allowed.
22. Consequently, the delay of 541 days in filing the present
appeal is hereby condoned.
23. Accordingly, I.A. No.12061 of 2025 stands allowed.
First Appeal No.235 of 2026
24. Notice had been issued vide order dated 05.05.2026. The
steps have been taken.
25. As per office note dated 13.07.2026, based upon the service
report as available at flag-“B”, wherefrom, it is evident that notice
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has been received personally.
26. We have seen flag-“B” and found that the notice has been
received by the respondent-Madhur Kumar Singh on 08.06.2026
but as yet there is no appearance.
27. Flag-“C” which is the tracking report also reflects that the notice
has been delivered to the addressee.
28. Considering the aforesaid fact that the service is complete but
there is no appearance on behalf of the respondent.
29. Admit.
30. Let fresh steps for service of notice be taken through ordinary
process, for which, requisites etc. must be filed within two weeks.
31. Call for the Trial Court Records.
(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)
(Sanjay Prasad, J.)
17.07.2026
Rohit/-
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