Chattisgarh High Court
Praveen Chandrakar vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 1 May, 2026
Author: Ramesh Sinha
Bench: Ramesh Sinha
1
2026:CGHC:20402-DB
Digitally signed
SAGRIKA by SAGRIKA
AGRAWAL
AGRAWAL Date: 2026.05.04
10:40:26 +0530 NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
CRMP No. 1695 of 2025
1 - Praveen Chandrakar S/o Dharamraj Chandrakar Aged About 39 Years R/o
Village And Post Bodtara (Khurd) Police, Station Pandatarai District -
Kabirdham (C.G.) - 491559
2 - Dharamraj Chandrakar S/o Late Firanta Chandrakar Aged About 64 Years
R/o Village And Post Bodtara (Khurd) Police, Station Pandatarai District -
Kabirdham (C.G.) - 491559
3 - Meena Chandrakar W/o Dharamraj Candrakar Aged About 58 Years R/o
Village And Post Bodtara (Khurd) Police, Station Pandatarai District -
Kabirdham (C.G.) - 491559
... Petitioner(s)
versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Home Department,
Mantralaya Mahanadi Bhawan, Nawa Raipur District - Raipur (C.G.)
2 - Superintendent Of Police Raipur District - Raipur (C.G.)
3 - Station House Officer , Police Station Mahila Thana, Raipur District -
Raipur (C.G.)
4 - Megha Rani Chandrakar W/o Praveen Chandrakar Aged About 39 Years
R/o Flat No. 203, Block - 1a, Police Colony Amlidih, Raipur District - Raipur
(C.G.)
... Respondent(s)
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Sumit Singh Rathore, Advocate
For State : Mr. S.S. Baghel, Govt. Advocate
For Respondent No. 4 : Mr. Shubhank Tiwari, Advocate
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Division Bench:
Hon’ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Hon’ble Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge
Order on BoardPer Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
01.05.2026
1. Heard Mr. Sumit Singh Rathore, learned counsel for the petitioners as
well as Mr. S. S. Baghel learned Govt. Advocate, for the
State/Respondent No. 1 to 3 and Mr. Shubhank Tiwari, learned counsel
for Respondent No. 4/ complainant.
2. The present petition under Section 528 of BNSS has been filed by the
petitioners with the following prayer :-
“It is, therefore, prayed that, this Hon’ble Court may kindly be
pleased to quash the impugned chargesheet No.117/2024 filed
on 06-12-2024 along with the order dated 25-02-2025 (along
with the proceeding) passed by the Learned Judicial
Magistrate First Class, Raipur District Raipur (C.G) in Criminal
Case No.2040/2025 (State of CG Vs Praveen Chandrakar and
Others) arising out of the Crime/FIR No.70/2024 registered
before the Police Station Mahila Thana, Raipur, District Raipur
(C.G) on 12-06-2024, in the interest of justice.”
3. The present case arises out of a matrimonial dispute between
petitioner No.1 (husband) and respondent No.4 (wife), a head
constable in the Chhattisgarh Police, who were married on 11.12.2020
and resided together for about one year. Thereafter, disputes arose,
and the respondent began living separately from December 2021. On
28.02.2024, after a delay of about 2.5 years, respondent No.4 lodged a
complaint at Mahila Thana, Raipur, alleging dowry demand, physical
and mental harassment, leading to registration of FIR dated
12.06.2024 under Section 498A IPC initially against petitioner No.1,
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and later, upon filing of charge sheet dated 06.01.2025, petitioner
Nos.2 and 3 (in-laws) were also implicated along with addition of
Sections 377 and 34 IPC. The petitioners contend that the allegations
are vague, delayed, and motivated, arising out of financial and
matrimonial disputes relating to property and monetary contributions,
and assert misuse of legal provisions by respondent No.4, who
allegedly pressured for divorce and threatened false implication, while
also highlighting procedural lapses such as non-compliance of Section
41-A CrPC and absence of specific instances of alleged harassment in
the complaint and charge sheet.
4. Learned counsel for the State, in his reply, would submit that the FIR in
Crime No. 70/2024 was registered on the basis of a written complaint
disclosing cognizable offences under Sections 498-A, 377 and 34 IPC,
and upon due investigation, the involvement of the petitioners was
found, culminating in filing of charge-sheet dated 06.12.2024. The
learned Judicial Magistrate has rightly taken cognizance, and prima
facie material exists on record including statements of the complainant
and other witnesses corroborating allegations of cruelty, harassment,
and unlawful conduct. It is settled law that inherent jurisdiction for
quashing is to be exercised sparingly and only in exceptional cases
where no offence is made out on the face of record; however, in the
present case, disputed questions of fact and appreciation of evidence
are involved, which can only be adjudicated during trial. The petitioners
have an efficacious alternative remedy to raise all their defenses at the
stage of framing of charge and during trial, and cannot seek pre-trial
adjudication by invoking extraordinary jurisdiction. There is no
procedural illegality, arbitrariness, or abuse of process demonstrated
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warranting interference by this Court. Hence, the present petition
deserves to be dismissed in limine.
5. Learned counsel for the Respondent No. 4/ complainant, in his reply,
would submit that the FIR and subsequent charge-sheet clearly
disclose specific and serious allegations of cruelty, dowry demand,
physical and mental harassment, and unnatural offences committed by
the petitioners, which are duly supported by statements of the
complainant and other witnesses recorded during investigation. The
respondent No.4, despite making sincere efforts to preserve the
matrimonial relationship, was subjected to continuous ill-treatment,
coercion for money and property, and physical abuse, compelling her
to lodge a complaint. The existence of a similar pattern of conduct in
the petitioner’s previous marriage further substantiates the allegations.
It is a settled principle of law that at the stage of considering a petition
for quashment, the defence of the accused cannot be examined and if
a prima facie case is made out, the proceedings ought not to be
interfered with. The learned trial Court has rightly taken cognizance
based on sufficient material on record, and no case of abuse of
process or legal infirmity is made out warranting interference under
Section 528 of BNSS. Hence, the present petition deserves to be
dismissed with costs.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has reiterated in the rejoinder, that
the present criminal proceedings are the result of a false, fabricated,
and motivated complaint, and the reply filed by the State as well as
Respondent No.4 fails to address the specific grounds raised by the
petitioners or produce any cogent material in support of the allegations.
The petitioners contend that the mandatory procedural safeguards and
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guidelines governing investigation in matrimonial disputes, including
those issued by Police Headquarters, Chhattisgarh, have not been
followed, and the charge-sheet is devoid of essential particulars such
as specific dates, time, place, or credible evidence of alleged
harassment or dowry demand. It is further submitted that the
allegations are vague, contradictory, and materially inconsistent,
particularly with respect to financial transactions, and are rooted in
personal and monetary disputes rather than any criminal conduct. The
petitioners have approached this Court with clean hands, having
disclosed all relevant facts including prior matrimonial history, which
has no bearing on the present case but has been unnecessarily
dragged by Respondent No.4 to prejudice the proceedings. It is also
contended that the complainant has misused legal provisions and her
official position, and that the material on record, even if taken at face
value, does not disclose the commission of offences alleged. Reliance
is placed on settled legal principles and recent judicial pronouncements
to submit that mere filing of a charge-sheet does not bar this Hon’ble
Court from exercising its inherent jurisdiction where no prima facie
case is made out and continuation of proceedings would amount to
abuse of process of law. Hence, the petitioners pray that the charge-
sheet and consequential proceedings be quashed in the interest of
justice.
7. In support of his submission, he would rely upon the judgments of the
Supreme Court in the matters of Geeta Mehrotra and another v.
State of Uttar Pradesh and another1, Preeti Gupta and another v.
State of Jharkhand and another2, Swapnil v. State of Madhya
1 (2012) 10 SCC 741
2 (2010) 7 SCC 667
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Pradesh3, Rashmi Chopra v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another4
(Para-24), Rajesh Sharma and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and
Another5, Kahkashan Kausar alias Sonam and others v. State of
Bihar and others6 and Abhishek v. State of Madhya Pradesh7.
8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their
rival submissions made hereinabove and also went through the
records with utmost circumspection.
9. At the outset, it would be appropriate to consider the scope of
interference in charge-sheet filed by the police against accused in
extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 528 of BNSS.
10. In the matter of Pepsi Foods Ltd. and another v. Special Judicial
Magistrate and others8, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the
accused can approach the High Court either under Section 482 of the
CrPC or under Article 227 of the Constitution of India to have the
proceeding quashed against him when the complaint does not make
out any case against him.
11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of State of Haryana and
others v. Bhajan Lal and others 9 laid down the principles of law
relating to the exercise of extraordinary power under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India to quash the first information report and it has
been held that such power can be exercised either to prevent abuse of
the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. In
3 (2014) 13 SCC 567
4 2019 SCC OnLine SC 620
5 (2018) 10 SCC 472
6 (2022) 6 SCC 599
7 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1083
8 (1998) 5 SCC 749
9 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335
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paragraph 102 of the report, their Lordships laid down the broad
principles where such power under Article 226 of the
Constitution/Section 482 of the CrPC should be exercised, which are
as under: –
“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various
relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and
of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a
series of decisions relating to the exercise of the
extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent
powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have
extracted and reproduced above, we give the following
categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such
power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the
process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of
justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any
precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and
inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an
exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such
power should be exercised.
(1)Where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even if they
are taken at their face value and accepted in
their entirety do not prima facie constitute any
offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2)Where the allegations in the first information
report and other materials, if any, accompanying
the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence,
justifying an investigation by police officers
under Section 156(1) of the Code except under
an order of a Magistrate within the purview of
Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3)Where the uncontroverted allegations made
in the FIR or complaint and the evidence
collected in support of the same do not disclose
the commission of any offence and make out a
case against the accused.
(4)Where, the allegations in the FIR do not
constitute a cognizable offence but constitute
only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation
is permitted by a police officer without an order
8of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section
155(2) of the Code.
(5)Where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint are so absurd and inherently
improbable on the basis of which no prudent
person can ever reach a just conclusion that
there is sufficient ground for proceeding against
the accused.
(6)Where there is an express legal bar engrafted
in any of the provisions of the Code or the
concerned Act (under which criminal proceeding
is a instituted) to the institution and continuance
of the proceedings and/or where there is a
specific provision in the Code or the concerned
Act, providing efficacious redress for the
grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7)Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
attended with mala fide and/or where the
proceeding is maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the
accused and with a view to spite him due to
private and personal grudge.
103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the
power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be
exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and
that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not
be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the
reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations
made in the FIR or the complaint and that the
extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an
arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its
whim or caprice.”
12. The principle of law laid down in Bhajan Lal‘s case (supra) has been
followed recently by the Supreme Court in the matters of Google India
Private Limited v. Visaka Industries10, Ahmad Ali Quraishi and
another v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another11 and Dr Dhruvaram
Murlidhar Sonar. v. State of Maharashtra and others 12″. The
10 (2020) 4 SCC 162
11 (2020) 13 SCC 435
12 (2019) 18 SCC 191
9
Supreme Court in Google India Private Limited (supra), explained
the scope of dictum of Bhajan Lal‘s case (supra) that the power of
quashing a criminal proceeding be exercised very sparingly and with
circumspection and “that too in the rarest of rare cases” as indicated in
paragraph 103 therein of the report.
13. Having noticed the scope of interference by this Court in the petition
relating to quashment of FIR/charge-sheet, reverting to the facts of the
present case, it is quite vivid that in the impugned charge-sheet, four
petitioners have been charged for offences under Sections 498-A/34 of
the IPC.
14. Chapter XXA of the IPC deals with offence of cruelty by husband or
relatives of husband. Section 498A of the IPC defines the offence of
cruelty as under:-
“498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman
subjecting her to cruelty – Whoever, being the husband or
the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such
woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a
term which may extend to three years and shall also be
liable to fine.
Explanation.- For the purpose of this section, “cruelty”
means-
(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to
drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury
or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical)
of the woman; or
(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is
with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to
meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable
security or is on account of failure by her or any person
related to her to meet such demand.”
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15. A careful perusal of the aforesaid provision would show that in order to
establish offence under Section 498A of the IPC, the prosecution must
establish,
(i) That, woman must be married:
(ii) She has been subjected to cruelty or harassment and
(iii) Such cruelty or harassment must have been shown
either by husband of the woman or by relative of her
husband.
16. The word ‘cruelty’ within the meaning of Section 498A of the IPC has
been explained in Explanation appended to Section 498A of the IPC. It
consists of two clauses namely clause (a) and clause (b). To attract
Section 498A of the IPC, it must be established that cruelty or
harassment to the wife to coerce her or cause bodily injury to herself or
to commit suicide or the harassment was to compel her to fulfill illegal
demand for dowry. It is not every type of harassment or cruelty that
would attract Section 498A of the IPC. Explanation (b) to Section 498A
of the IPC contemplates harassment of woman to coerce or any
relation of her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or
valuable security. The complainant if wants to come within the ambit of
Explanation (b) to Section 498A of the IPC, she can succeed if it is
proved that there was an unlawful demand by the husband or any of
his relatives with respect to money or of some valuable security.
17. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Priya Vrat Singh and
others v. Shyam Ji Sahai13 considered the issue of delay in lodging
the complaint as well as role that has been ascribed to the accused
therein and quashed the complaint holding the delay of two years in
13 (2008) 8 SCC 232
11
lodging FIR to be fatal and further held that no role has been ascribed
to the petitioner/accused therein. It was observed as under:-
“8. Further it is pointed out that the allegation of alleged
demand for dowry was made for the first time in December,
1994. In the complaint filed, the allegation is that the dowry
torture was made some times in 1992. It has not been
explained as to why for more than two years no action was
taken.
9. Further, it appears that in the complaint petition. apart
from the husband, the mother of the husband, the
subsequently married wife, husband’s mother’s sister,
husband’s brother in law and Sunita’s father were impleaded
as party. No role has been specifically ascribed to anybody
except the husband and that too of a dowry demand in
February 1993 when the complaint was filed on 6.12.1994
i.e. nearly after 22 months. It is to be noted that in spite of
service of notice, none has appeared on behalf of
Respondent No.1.”
18. Similarly, in the matter of Sunder Babu and others v. State of Tamil
Nadu14 delay in filing complaint against accused therein was taken
note of by their Lordships of the Supreme Court holding the case to be
covered by Category Seven of para-102 highlighted in Bhajan Lal’s
case (supra), the prosecution for offence under Section 498A of the
IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was quashed.
19. Similarly, in the matter of Geeta Mehrotra (supra), the Supreme Court
held that casual reference to the family member of the husband in FIR
as co-accused particularly when there is no specific allegation and
complaint did not disclose their active involvement. It was held that
cognizance of matter against them for offence under Sections 498-A,
323, 504, 506 and 304- B of the IPC would not be justified as
cognizance would result in abuse of judicial process.
14 (2009) 14 SCC 244
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20. In the matter of K. Subba Rao and others v. State of Telangana
represented by its Secretary, Department of Home and others 15
their Lordships of the Supreme Court delineated the duty of the
criminal Courts while proceeding against relatives of victim’s husband
and held that the Court should be careful in proceeding against distant
relatives in crime pertaining to matrimonial disputes and dowry deaths
and further held that relatives of husband should not be roped in on the
basis of omnibus allegations, unless specific instances of their
involvement in offences are made out.
21. Recently, in the matter of Rashmi Chopra (supra) it has been held by
their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court relying upon the principle
of law laid down in Bhajan Lal‘s case (supra) that criminal proceedings
can be allowed to proceed only when a prima facie offence is disclosed
and further held that judicial process is a solemn proceeding which
cannot be allowed to be converted into an instrument of oppression or
harassment and the High Court should not hesitate in exercising the
jurisdiction to quash the proceedings if the proceedings deserve to be
quashed in line of parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court
in Bhajan Lal‘s case (supra) and further held that in absence of
specific allegation regarding anyone of the accused except common
and general allegations against everyone, no offence under Section
498A IPC is made out and quashed the charges for offence under
Section 498A of the IPC being covered by category seven as
enumerated in Bhajan Lal‘s case (supra) by holding as under:-
“24. Coming back to the allegations in the complaint
pertaining to Section 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act. A15 (2018) 14 SCC 452
13perusal of the complaint indicates that the allegations against
the appellants for offence under Section 498A and Section
3/4 of D.P. Act are general and sweeping. No specific
incident dates or details of any incident has been mentioned
in the complaint. The complaint having been filed after
proceeding for divorce was initiated by Nayan Chopra in
State of Michigan, where Vanshika participated and divorce
was ultimately granted. A few months after filing of the
divorce petition, the complaint has been filed in the Court of
C.J.M., Gautam Budh Nagar with the allegations as noticed
above. The sequence of the events and facts and
circumstances of the case leads us to conclude that the
complaint under Section 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act
have been filed as counter blast to divorce petition
proceeding in State of Michigan by Nayan Chopra.
25. There being no specific allegation regarding any one of
the applicants except common general allegation against
everyone i.e. “they started harassing the daughter of the
applicant demanding additional dowry of one crore” and the
fact that all relatives of the husband, namely, father, mother,
brother, mother’s sister and husband of mother’s sister have
been roped in clearly indicate that application under Section
156(3) Cr.P.C. was filed with a view to harass the
applicants…..”
22. Having noticed the legal position qua quashing the FIR and charge-
sheet, the question would be whether taking the contents of the FIR
and charge-sheet as it is, offence under Section 498-A/34 of the IPC is
made out against the petitioners?
23. It is the case of the prosecution that the marriage of the
complainant/respondent No.4 with petitioner No.1 was solemnized on
11/12/2020 as per Hindu rites and rituals, and thereafter she was
subjected to cruelty and harassment by her husband and his family
members in connection with demand of dowry and other disputes. On
28/02/2024, the respondent No.4 lodged a written complaint before
Mahila Thana, Raipur alleging physical, mental and economic
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harassment, pursuant to which counselling proceedings were
conducted but failed. Thereafter, on the basis of the said complaint,
FIR bearing Crime No. 70/2024 was registered on 12/06/2024 at Police
Station Mahila Thana, Raipur for offences punishable under Sections
498-A, 377 and 34 of IPC against the petitioners. During investigation,
statements of the complainant and other witnesses were recorded and
allegations were found prima facie substantiated, and upon completion
of investigation, charge-sheet No. 117/2024 dated 06/12/2024 was filed
before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Raipur, who took
cognizance and registered Criminal Case No. 2040/2025 against the
petitioners.
24. In the complaint so made, the complainant has only made omnibus and
general allegations against the petitioners No. 2 and 3without being full
particulars about date and place that all the petitioners No. 2 and 3
treated her with cruelty for not bringing sufficient dowry at the time of
marriage. There is no specific allegation regarding petitioners No. 2
and 3 except common and general allegations against the petitioners
No. 2 and 3 that they have demanded cash amount and household
articles. However, there is specific allegation against the petitioner No.
1/ husband in the complaint made by complainant that petitioner No. 1
i.e. her husband was used to harass her and committed marpeet her
for demand of dowry. An amount of Rs. 1,51,000/- has been transferred
by her brother in the bank account of petitioner No. 1. There is specific
allegation in the written complaint that her husband used to torture her
when she conceived pregnancy and he used to purchase the property
in his own name by sanctioning personal loan in her name. She also
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got sanctioned a personal loan from SBI Bank, Mana, Raipur and UCO
Bank and gave the cash amount to the petitioner No. 1. She also gave
cash amount to her husband to purchase a plot in twin city but has
purchased the plot in his own name. From perusal of the entire
complaint made by her, there is specific allegation against the
petitioner No. 1/ husband.
25. Considering the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties,
material available on record, perusing the FIR in which no specific
allegations have been made and only bald and omnibus allegations
have been made against the petitioners No. 2 and 3, we are of the
considered opinion that prima-facie no offence under Section 498A/34
of the IPC is made out for prosecuting petitioner Nos. 2 to 3 for the
above-stated offences and the prosecution against them for the
aforesaid offence is covered by Category 1, 3 & 7 of para-102 of the
judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in Bhajan Lal‘s case (supra)
and as such, liable to be quashed.
26. As a fallout and consequence of the above-stated legal analysis and
also in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Criminal Case No.
2040/2025 pending before the court of Judicial Magistrate, First Class,
Raipur arising out of Crime No. 70 of 2024 registered at Police Station,
Mahila Thana, Raipur, Dist- Raipur for the offence under Section 498-
A/34 is hereby quashed to the extent of Petitioner No. 2 (Dharamraj
Chandrakar), Petitioner No. 3 (Meena Chandrakar). The prosecution
against her husband i.e. petitioner No. 1- Praveen Chandrakar, S/o
Dharamraj Chandrakar shall continue.
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27. It is made clear that all the observations made in this order are for the
purpose of deciding the petition filed by the petitioners hereinabove
and this Court has not expressed any opinion on merits of the matter
and concerned trial Court will decide criminal case pending against
Praveen Chandrakar strictly in accordance with law without being
influenced by any of these observations made hereinabove.
28. The petition under Section 528 of BNSS is allowed to the extent
indicated hereinabove. No cost(s).
Sd/- Sd/-
(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha)
Judge Chief Justice
sagrika
