Uttarakhand High Court
Pratap Singh vs State Of Uttarakhand on 15 July, 2026
Author: Ravindra Maithani
Bench: Ravindra Maithani
UKHC010035472019
2026:UHC:5825-DB
HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL
Criminal Appeal No.95 of 2019
Pratap Singh .............Appellant
Versus
State of Uttarakhand ............Respondent
Present:- Mr. Akhil Kumar Sah, Advocate for the appellant.
Mr. Siddhartha Bisht, AGA for the State.
JUDGMENT
Coram : Hon'ble Ravindra Maithani. J.
Hon'ble Siddhartha Sah, J.
Hon'ble Ravindra Maithani, J. (Oral)
The challenge in this appeal is made to the judgment and
order dated 24.12.2018/08.01.2019, passed in Special Sessions
Trial No.35 of 2018, State of Uttarakhand Vs. Shri Pratap Singh, by
the court of Special Judge (POCSO), Almora. By it, the appellant
has been convicted under Section 376(2) IPC and Sections 3/4 of
the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (“the
POCSO Act“) and sentenced for life imprisonment, which mean
imprisonment for the remainder of the appellant’s natural life with
a fine of Rs.50,000/- under Section 376(2) IPC, and in default of
payment of find, to undergo further imprisonment for six months.
2. The prosecution case as unfolded in the FIR is as follows.
On 09.07.2018 at 10:00 in the morning, the victim, a young girl of
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14 years had gone to fetch water. From that date, she started
withdrawing from everyone and spent her time all alone. She was
questioned by the family members. On 11.07.2018, she revealed
that on 09.07.2018, when she had gone to fetch water from a tank,
the appellant put a sack on her, took her in his kitchen and did
Galat Kaam with her. Her mother PW2 got a report recorded by
PW3 and lodged an FIR at Police Station Daniya on 11.07.2018 at
07:52 pm, based on which, Case Crime No.11 of 2018 under
Sections 376 and 506 IPC and Section 3 read with Section 4 of the
POCSO Act was registered against the appellant. The FIR is Ex. A-4
and chik FIR is Ex. A-8. The extract of General Diary entry is Ex. A-
9. The victim’s statement was recorded under Section 164 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“the Code”) on 12.07.2018,
which is Ex.A-2. The Investigating Officer prepared the site plan at
the instance of the victim, which is Ex. A-3. On 11.07.2018, at
10:35 pm, the victim was medically examined by PW5 Dr. Hema
Rawat. Medical report is Ex. A-5, in which the statement of PW1,
the victim has also been recorded by the doctor. The Investigating
Officer conducted the investigation and collected the date of birth
certificate of the victim from the school which she last attended.
The Principal of the school has given a certificate regarding date of
birth of PW1, the victim, which is marked as Ex. A-16. The
appellant was arrested. Certain articles were sent for forensic
examination. The pathological examination does not support the
prosecution case. After investigation, charge-sheet was submitted
against the appellant under Sections 376(2) and 506 IPC and
Sections 3/4 of the POCSO Act, which is basis of the case.
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3. On 06.09.2018, charges under Sections 376(2) and 506
IPC and Sections 3/4 of the POCSO Act were framed against the
appellant, to which, he denied and claimed trial.
4. In order to prove its case, the prosecution examined as
many as seven witnesses namely, PW1 the victim, PW2 the mother
of the victim, PW3 Ganesh Pandey, PW4 Rajesh Verma, PW5 Dr.
Hema Rawat, PW6 Keshav Dutt Joshi and PW7 SI Nikhilesh Singh
Bisht, the Investigating Officer.
5. After examination of the prosecution witnesses, the
appellant was examined under Section 313 of the Code. According
to him, he has been falsely implicated.
6. After hearing the parties, vide judgment and order dated
24.12.2018/08.01.2019, the appellant has been convicted and
sentenced as stated hereinbefore.
7. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
record.
8. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the
prosecution has utterly failed to prove its case beyond reasonable
doubt, therefore, while acquitting the appellant the appeal deserves
to be allowed. He also raised the following arguments:-
(a) PW1 the victim has not stated that any kind of
penetration was done to her by the appellant. Reference
has been made to the statement of PW1 the victim, in para
5. It is argued that at the most, it may be an offence under
Section 354 IPC.
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(b) The date of birth of the victim has not been proved. The
formal proof of date of birth certificate issued by the
school has been dispensed with by the appellant. It is
argued that per se it does not prove the age of the victim,
as recorded. He would submit that according to the victim,
her date of birth is 26.11.2004, whereas according to this
certificate, her date of birth is 26.12.2004.
(c) The date of birth recorded in the school register is not
proof of it unless it is proved as to at whose behest the
date of birth was recorded in the school register.
9. In support of his contention learned counsel for the
appellant placed reliance on the principle as laid down by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Alamelu and another Vs.
State, (2011)2 SCC 385 with connected matters, Birka Shiva Vs.
State of Telangana 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1454; Manak Chand @
Mani Vs. State of Haryana, (2024)20 SCC 561 and Birad Mal
Singhvi Vs. Anand Purohit, 1988 Supp SCC 604.
10. In the case of Alamelu (Supra), the Hon’ble Supreme
Court inter alia held that the date of birth recorded in the school
register is admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Evidence
Act, 1872. But, proof of age is something different. In para 44 of
the judgment in the case of Alamelu (Supra), the Hon’ble Supreme
Court observed as follows:-
“44. In our opinion, the aforesaid burden of proof has not been
discharged by the prosecution. The father says nothing about the
transfer certificate in his evidence. The Headmaster has not been
examined at all. Therefore, the entry in the transfer certificate cannot
be relied upon to definitely fix the age of the girl.”
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11. In the case of Birka Shiva (Supra), the Hon’ble Supreme
Court has interpreted the effect of entry in the public or official
register. In para 8, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observes as under:-
“8. The evidentiary value of such an entry made in public or official
registers may be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of
the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. However, admissibility is distinct from
probative value. While such documents may be admitted into
evidence, their evidentiary weight depends on proof of their
authenticity and the source of the underlying information. Mere
production and marking of a document as exhibited by the Court
does not amount to proof of its contents. Its execution has to be
proved by leading substantive evidence, that is, by the ‘evidence of
those persons who can vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue’.
[See : Narbada Devi Gupta v. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal] We may refer
to a few judicial pronouncements of this Court in this regard:
8.1. This Court, in Birad Mal Singhvi v. Anand Purohit, held that the
entries contained in the school register are relevant and admissible
but have no probative value unless the person who made the entry or
provided the date of birth is examined. ……………………………………..
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………”
(emphasis supplied)
12. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Birka Shiva
(Supra) further observed as follows:-
“12. Well, suffice it to say that Courts of law cannot make a
determination of guilt in thin air, based on estimations. In the
present facts and circumstances, the proof submitted by the
prosecution in the form of Ex.P11 (birth certificate issued by the
school) was not sufficient to arrive at a finding that the prosecutrix
was less than sixteen/eighteen years of age, especially when such a
document was not sufficiently corroborated. Therefore, it was neither
safe nor fair to convict the appellant based on it, particularly in the
context where the age of the victim was such a pivotal factor.”
(emphasis supplied)
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13. In the case of Birad Mal Singhvi (Supra), the Hon’ble
Supreme Court inter alia observed that ” An entry relating to date
of birth made in the school register is relevant and admissible
under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 but the
entry regarding the age of a person in a school register is of
not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the person in
the absence of the material on which the age was recorded.”
14. In the case of Manak Chand @ Mani (Supra), the law with
regard to date of birth has been discussed and in paras 15 to 18,
the Hon’ble Court observed as follows:-
“15. There are two aspects which ought to have been considered by
the trial court and the High Court in greater detail than what has
been done. The first is the age of the prosecutrix. The age of the
prosecutrix has an extremely crucial bearing in the case. The only
evidence relied by the court for holding the prosecutrix as a minor
(less than sixteen years of age), is the school register of Government
Girls High School, which was placed in the Court by the clerk of the
school, Ram Sahay (PW 2).
16. Undoubtedly, the date of birth in the school register is 4-4-1987
which makes the prosecutrix less than sixteen years of age at the
time of the incident. But it has also come in the evidence of Ram
Sahay (PW 2) that this date of birth was recorded not on the
statement of the parents of the prosecutrix, but by some other person
and more importantly, it was based on the transfer certificate of
Government Primary School where the date of birth was recorded as
4-4-1987. All the same, this transfer certificate, on the basis of which
the date of birth was recorded, was never produced in the Court.
17. Yet, both the trial court and the High Court have relied upon the
veracity of the school register. It is the same school register which
marks the presence of the prosecutrix on 12-9-2000 in the school.
This is also the date when the prosecutrix was allegedly raped for the
first time, in the house of the appellant in Village Sanwat Khera,
whereas the school is at another place called Dabwali Mandi. The
trial court discards the evidence in the same school register, as not
being authentic, when the defence had raised the apparent
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contradictions on the prosecutrix being in school and at the Sanwat
Khera Village at the same time. This is not a fair appreciation of
evidence, to say the least, as same school register is the only basis for
the determination of the age of the prosecutrix!
18. This Court in Birad Mal Singhvi v. Anand Purohi [Birad Mal
Singhvi v. Anand Purohi, 1988 Supp SCC 604] had observed that the
date of birth in the register of a school would not have any evidentiary
value without the testimony of the person making the entry or the
person who gave the date of birth: (SCC p. 618, para 14)
“14. … The date of birth mentioned in the scholar’s register
has no evidentiary value unless the person who made the entry or
who gave the date of birth is examined. The entry contained in the
admission form or in the scholar’s register must be shown to be made
on the basis of information given by the parents or a person having
special knowledge about the date of birth of the person concerned. If
the entry in the scholar’s register regarding date of birth is made on
the basis of information given by parents, the entry would have
evidentiary value but if it is given by a stranger or by someone else
who had no special means of knowledge of the date of birth, such an
entry will have no evidentiary value.””
15. It is also argued that the documents pertaining to the
date of birth have not been put to the appellant under Section 313
of the Code and in the absence of it such documents may not be
read against the appellant.
16. On the other hand, learned State Counsel submits that
the prosecution has been able to prove its case beyond reasonable
doubt. It is submitted that the victim has stated as to what has
been done with her by the appellant and it is a case of rape.
17. With regard to the date of birth, it is argued that the date
of birth certificate issued by the school has been admitted by the
defence. Its genuineness has been admitted, therefore, this
document may be read into evidence as genuine. Learned State
Counsel has placed reliance on the principle of law as laid down by
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the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Akhtar and others Vs.
State of Uttaranchal, (2009)13 SCC 722.
18. In the case of Akhtar (Supra), the injury report and post-
mortem report’s genuineness was admitted by the defence when it
was argued that non examination of medical officer shall be fatal to
the prosecution. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that, in fact, if
the genuineness of any document filed by a party is not disputed by
the opposite party it can be read as substantive evidence under
sub-section (3) of Section 294 CrPC. In para 21, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court observed as follows:-
“21. It has been argued that non-examination of the medical officers
concerned is fatal for the prosecution. However, there is no denial of
the fact that the defence admitted the genuineness of the injury
reports and the post-mortem examination reports before the trial
court. So the genuineness and authenticity of the documents stands
proved and shall be treated as valid evidence under Section 294
CrPC. It is settled position of law that if the genuineness of any
document filed by a party is not disputed by the opposite party it can
be read as substantive evidence under sub-section (3) of Section 294
CrPC. Accordingly, the post-mortem report, if its genuineness is not
disputed by the opposite party, the said post-mortem report can be
read as substantive evidence to prove the correctness of its contents
without the doctor concerned being examined.”
19. Before arguments are appreciated it would be apt to
examine, as to what the witnesses have stated.
20. PW1 is the victim. According to her, on the date of
incident, she was studying in Class VII and her date of birth is
26.11.2004. According to her on 09.07.2018, at 10:00 in the
morning she had gone to fetch from a tank. The appellant’s house
is adjoining the tank. On that day when the victim was returning
9
after getting water, the appellant put a sack on her, covered her
face and took her alone in his kitchen. When in the room the
appellant removed the sack, the victim identified the appellant.
Thereafter, the appellant did badtameeji with her, opened her
Pajama and inserted his Pisaab (“urine”) into her Pisaab. He had
also shown her Rs.500/- currency note, which she did not take.
According to PW1 the victim, while the appellant inserted his
Pisaab to her Pisaab, she felt a lot of pain. Thereafter, the appellant
released her. The victim could not reveal this incident to anyone
due to threat extended to her by the appellant. On 11.07.2018, she
revealed the incident to her mother as she had a lot of pain in her
stomach. She has proved her thumb impression. She has also
proved her statement recorded under Section 164 of the Code,
which is Ex. A-2. According to her, the police prepared site plan in
her presence, on which she also signed. She has proved her
signature in site plan, Ex. A-2.
21. It may be noted that in this case, on a same document
multiple exhibits have been recorded as per the witnesses to prove
their signatures on those documents.
22. PW2 is the mother of the victim. She has corroborated the
statement of the victim. According to her, when the victim revealed
her that the appellant did that act with her she got the report
lodged from PW3 Ganesh Pandey. She has proved her signature on
the FIR, which is Ex. A-4. It is also stated that she went along with
the victim for medical examination. She proved her signature on
that part, which is Ex. A-6. She has also proved her signature on
the site plan, Ex. A-7.
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23. PW3 Ganesh Pandey is a person, who was a para legal
Volunteer in District Legal Services Authority. According to him, he
met the victim and her mother at Police Station. There at the
request of the mother of the victim he wrote the FIR.
24. PW4 Constable Rajesh Verma is formal witness. He has
lodged the Chik FIR and made the entry in the General Diary of the
Police Station.
25. PW5 Dr. Hema Rawat was the doctor, who medically
examined the victim on 11.07.2018 at 10:35 p.m. She has proved
the medical examination report as Ex. A-13. This witness has also
stated that at the time of medical examination the victim revealed
the history which she has recorded in the medical examination
report, according to which, on the date of the incident when the
victim had gone to fetch water from a tank, the appellant put a
sack on her head and took her in his kitchen, removed her paijama,
tied her hands and inserted his penis in her lower part and also
inserted his penis in her mouth and subsequently threatened her.
She was made to swear in the name of God and family members
that she will not reveal it to anyone. She was slapped and sent
back, due to which, she kept silent. The witness PW5 Dr. Hema
Rawat has proved the medical examination and other documents as
well.
26. PW6 Keshav Dutt Joshi is the owner of the hotel from
where the appellant was arrested. He has proved documents
relating to it.
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27. PW7 SI Nikhilesh Singh Bisht is the Investigating Officer,
who investigated the case. He has stated about the steps taken by
him during investigation. He prepared the site plan, which is Ex. A-
21. According to him, he took the date of birth certificate of PW1,
the victim, which was given to him by PW2, the mother of the
victim. He arrested the appellant from a hotel; sent some articles
for forensic examination and finally he submitted charge sheet.
This witness has proved the documents.
28. According to the victim, she was studying in Class VII at
the relevant time and on the date of incident i.e. 09.07.2018, she
had gone to fetch water from a tank near the residence of the
appellant, while the appellant put a sack on her, took her inside
and inserted his Pisaab in her Pisaab. These are the words, which
the victim has stated in para 5 of her statement. At the cost of
repetition, it may be stated that in para 5 of her statement PW1, the
victim stated that when the appellant inserted his Pisaab to her
Pisaab, she felt a lot of pain. Considering this word “Pisaab” and
“Pisaab”, it is argued that it indicates that it is insertion of penis in
the urethra of the victim, which is not possible because had it been
done, there would have been multiple injuries on the victim.
29. The evidence may not be read in isolation. It should be
read in totality. The FIR records that on the date of incident, the
appellant took the victim in his room and did Galat Kaam with her.
The victim was examined under Section 164 of the Code on
12.07.2018. She has been categorical that on the date of incident
the appellant took her inside the room and tied her hands and feet
and kissed her cheeks and inserted the organ by which he
12
urinates into the organ by which the victim urinates, due to which,
she cried. Statement under Section 164 of the Code is not only
used for contradiction, but it is also used for corroboration. As held
by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of R. Shaji Vs. State of
Kerala, (2013)14 SCC 266.
30. In order to understand the words spoken by the victim in
the court, her statement recorded under Section 164 of the Code
may definitely be recorded. Here the victim’s statement under
Section 164 of the Code categorically establishes that, in fact, the
appellant inserted his penis in the vagina of the victim. These are
two parts of male and female through which they urinate.
31. Not only this, the victim was examined on 11.07.2018 at
10:35 p.m. by PW5 Dr. Hema Rawat. She has categorically stated
that she recorded what was stated by the victim to her about the
incident. There it is recorded that the appellant inserted his penis
in the lower part of the victim. In all the statements of the victim,
which are given at a different time along with the statement given in
the court she has stated that the appellant inserted his penis into
the vagina of the victim.
32. PW1 the victim did not reveal the incident immediately to
anyone, she was scared. According to PW1 the victim, the appellant
has extended threat to her. She withdrew from everyone and
started spending time all alone. It was on 11.07.2018, when she
had stomach pain, she was questioned and then she revealed the
incident. On the same date, she was medically examined. As stated,
there also, she stated the history. Her hymen were found ruptured.
13
It is argued that there was no medical opinion with regard to the
offence of rape.
33. In the cases of sexual assault like the instant one, it is the
statement of the victim that has to be given weightage. If it inspires
confidence, perhaps no corroboration with the other evidence is
required. However, in some cases corroboration with some
pathological evidences, etc. may be required.
34. Having considered the statement of PW1, the victim, this
Court is of the view that her statement is totally reliable in
evidence. She has proved that on 09.07.2018, when she had gone
to fetch water from a tank, the appellant inserted his penis into her
vagina.
35. The question is, as to what offence has been committed
by the appellant because specific charges have been framed against
the appellant keeping in view the age of the victim. The prosecution
has relied on Ex. A-16, according to which, the date of birth of the
victim is 26.12.2004.
36. PW1 the victim herself has been examined. She has not
corroborated the date of birth as recorded as Ex. A-16. According to
PW1 the victim, her date of birth is 26.11.2004.
37. PW2 is the mother of the victim, she has not stated the
age of the victim. She has also not stated that she got the victim
admitted in a school when she got the date of birth recorded. The
only document is Ex. A-16 and it is stated that it also contradicts
14
the date of birth as stated by PW1 the victim in her examination
before the court.
38. First and foremost, it is admitted that this document was
not put to the appellant under Section 313 of the Code. Law on this
point is well settled. If any material is not put to an accused under
Section 313 of the Code, such material may not be taken into
consideration. But then, there are methods to do the way with that.
What would be that?
39. In the case of Nar Singh Vs. State of Haryana, (2015)1
SCC 496, the Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down the procedure in
some cases, which is as follows:-
“30. Whenever a plea of omission to put a question to the accused on
vital piece of evidence is raised in the appellate court, courses
available to the appellate court can be briefly summarised as under:
30.1. Whenever a plea of non-compliance with Section 313 CrPC is
raised, it is within the powers of the appellate court to examine and
further examine the convict or the counsel appearing for the accused
and the said answers shall be taken into consideration for deciding
the matter. If the accused is unable to offer the appellate court any
reasonable explanation of such circumstance, the court may assume
that the accused has no acceptable explanation to offer.
30.2. In the facts and circumstances of the case, if the appellate
court comes to the conclusion that no prejudice was caused or no
failure of justice was occasioned, the appellate court will hear and
decide the matter upon merits.
30.3. If the appellate court is of the opinion that non-compliance with
the provisions of Section 313 CrPC has occasioned or is likely to have
occasioned prejudice to the accused, the appellate court may direct
retrial from the stage of recording the statements of the accused from
the point where the irregularity occurred, that is, from the stage of
questioning the accused under Section 313 CrPC and the trial Judge
may be directed to examine the accused afresh and defence witness,
if any, and dispose of the matter afresh.
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30.4. The appellate court may decline to remit the matter to the trial
court for retrial on account of long time already spent in the trial of
the case and the period of sentence already undergone by the convict
and in the facts and circumstances of the case, may decide the
appeal on its own merits, keeping in view the prejudice caused to the
accused.”
40. What should be the option to be exercised in this case, it
will be examined at a later stage.
41. On behalf of the appellant it has been argued that even if
the Ex. A-16 is read as an evidence it does not prove the date of
birth as 26.12.2004 because the date of birth recorded in the
school register is admissible, but its evidentiary value is quite
distinct.
42. Reference has been made in the case of Alamelu (Supra),
Birka Shiva (Supra), Manak Chand @ Mani (Supra) and Birad Mal
Singhvi (Supra), the extracts of some of these judgments have
already been quoted hereinabove. These case laws have been
distinguished by learned State Counsel referring to the judgment in
the case of Akhtar (Supra). In the case of Akhtar (Supra), a similar
question had arisen when the genuineness of documents were
admitted under Section 294 of the Code. It was argued that post-
mortem report and injury report cannot be read into evidence
without examination of doctor and that argument was rebutted by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court while holding that if genuineness of any
document filed by the parties is not disputed by the opposite party,
it can be read as substantive evidence under Sub Section (3) of
Section 294 of the Code.
16
43. Learned counsel for the appellant has distinguished the
judgment in the case of Akhtar (Supra). According to him, in the
case of Akhtar (Supra), the documents were authored by the doctor,
who prepared the post-mortem report and injury report. Therefore,
their contents value could have been read in that case. But, it is
argued that in the instant case, Ex. A-16 is the date of birth
certificate issued by the Principal. The date of birth was not in the
knowledge of the Principal. It must have been borrowed or given by
someone to the school authority. That would have been the
substantive evidence and in the absence of the source of the date of
information, as recorded in Ex. A-16, it cannot be said the date of
birth has been proved by the prosecution as 26.12.2004.
44. Section 294 of the Code reads as follows:-
“294. No formal proof of certain documents.–(1) Where
any document is filed before any Court by the prosecution
or the accused, the particulars of every such document
shall be included in a list and the prosecution or the
accused, as the case may be, or the pleader for the
prosecution or the accused, if any, shall be called upon to
admit or deny the genuineness of each such document.
(2) The list of documents shall be in such form as be
prescribed by the State Government.
(3) Where the genuineness of any document is not
disputed, such document may be read in evidence in
inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code without
proof of the signature of the person to whom it purports to
be signed:
Provided that the Court may, in its discretion, require such
signature to be proved.”
45. A bare reading of it, it makes it abundantly clear that
the genuineness of any document may be read into evidence.
17
Undoubtedly, Ex. A-16 shall be read into evidence. But, does it mean that
the date of birth recorded in the certificate, shall be the date of birth of the
victim? Had the Principal been examined by the prosecution to prove Ex.
A-16, the date of birth certificate, that could have been the best situation
for the prosecution. In such cases, when those documents are proved by
the school authority, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that it does not
prove the date of birth. It only proves that a particular date of birth was
recorded in a school register. In the case of Manak Chand (Supra), the
Hon’ble Supreme Court while relying on the judgment of Birad Mal Singhvi
(Supra) has held that the age of the prosecutrix in the form of the school
register was not sufficient to arrive at a finding that the prosecutrix was
less than sixteen years of age.
46. In the instant case, prosecution has not proved, as to what is the
basis of date of birth recorded in Ex. A-16. The source is not proved.
Therefore, merely on the basis of Ex. A-16 it cannot be said that the victim
was below 14 years of age on the date of incident. The prosecution has not
been able to prove the date of birth of the victim. In view of this finding
now no new exercise is to be undertaken for examination of the appellant
under Section 313 of the Code qua this document.
47. This Court has already held that the prosecution has been
able to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. On 09.07.2018 in
the morning when PW1 the victim had gone to fetch the water and
while she was returning, the appellant took her in a room and
raped her. The prosecution has not been able to prove that the
victim was below 14 years of age. Her age has not been proved.
Therefore, this Court is of the view that the appellant is
liable to be convicted under Sections 376(1) and he is liable to be
18
acquitted of the charges under Sections 376(2) IPC and Sections 3/4
of the POCSO Act.
48. The appellant is acquitted of the charges under Sections
376(2) IPC and Sections 3/4 of the POCSO Act.
49. However, the appellant is convicted under Section 376(1)
IPC.
50. Learned counsel for the appellant during the course of
hearing argued that the appellant is 76 years of age. He has been in
jail for 08 years. He has no criminal record. The prosecution has
not been able to prove the age of the victim. Hence, the minimum
sentence should be awarded to the appellant.
51. To impose an adequate sentence is one of the toughest
exercises that a criminal court has to undertake. Varieties of
reasons are taken into consideration while awarding the sentence.
It includes the offence, its gravity, its impact, the offender, the
social condition of injured and the other attending circumstances,
etc. Here the victim was admittedly a school going girl. Her age is
not been proved by the prosecution. The appellant did commit a
very serious offence with her.
52. Having considered the entirety of the facts, we are of the
view that the interest of justice would be served if the appellant is
sentenced 12 years rigorous imprisonment under Section 376(1)
IPC.
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53. The appellant is sentenced to twelve years rigorous
imprisonment and a fine of Rs.50,000/- under Section 376(1) IPC.
In default of payment of fine, he shall undergo further
imprisonment for six months.
54. The impugned judgment and order dated
24.12.2018/08.01.2019, passed in Special Sessions Trial No.35 of
2018, State of Uttarakhand Vs. Shri Pratap Singh, by the court of
Special Judge (POCSO), Almora is modified to the extent as
aforesaid.
55. The appeal is partly allowed accordingly.
(Siddhartha Sah, J.) (Ravindra Maithani, J.)
15.07.2026
Sanjay
SANJAY
Digitally signed by SANJAY KANOJIA
DN: c=IN, o=HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND,
ou=HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND,
2.5.4.20=e50e50b49596520698eff87e0a08bbd5
04686df4d1afc60f54a287831dec46fe,
KANOJIA
postalCode=263001, st=UTTARAKHAND,
serialNumber=26EEB7122ED0DD23233A255DD
8EC450A84B515A087CAEFD1B3179A7DEAE406
99, cn=SANJAY KANOJIA
Date: 2026.07.21 10:19:59 +05’30’
