Rajasthan High Court – Jaipur
Pratap Singh Hada vs Rajkumar Jhamb (2026:Rj-Jp:10140) on 10 March, 2026
[2026:RJ-JP:10140]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 18360/2016
Pratap Singh Hada S/o Shri Chandra Singh Hada, 64, Shopping
Centre, Kota Raj.
----Applicant/Landlord/Petitioner
Versus
Rajkumar Jhamb S/o Late Shri Ramlal Jhamb, Vallabh Nagar,
Kota, Firm M/s Sunrise Scooter Centre (Auto Parts), 64,
Shopping Centre, Kota
----Non-Applicant/Tenant/Respondent
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Sangram Singh Solanki
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Saransh Saini with
Mr. Vinod Kumar Sharma &
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE BIPIN GUPTA
Judgment
Reportable
Date of hearing and conclusion of arguments 23.02.2026
Date on which the judgment was reserved 23.02.2026
Whether the full judgment or only the operative Full Judgment
part is pronounced
Date of pronouncement 10.03.2026
1. The present writ petition has been preferred assailing the
judgment dated 06.10.2016, passed by learned Appellate Rent
Tribunal, Kota, in Rent Appeal No. 75/2015, whereby the learned
Rent Appellate Tribunal, while allowing the appeal preferred by the
respondent-tenant, quashed and set aside the judgment dated
22.09.2015, passed by learned Rent Tribunal, Kota, in Rent
Application No. 299/2005 (810/2014), whereby, the application
filed under Section 9 of the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001
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(hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act of 2001’) by the
petitioner-landlord was allowed.
2. Brief facts giving rise to the present writ petition are that the
petitioner-landlord had filed an eviction petition under Section 9 of
the Act of 2001, against the respondent-tenant, seeking eviction
from the disputed shop on the ground of default, bonafide
requirement, availability of alternative premises, sub-letting,
nuisance and material alteration. It was contended that the
premises were bonafidely required as the petitioner had two sons,
namely Raghuraj Singh and Raghunandan Singh, who intended to
start a business of auto parts and computer hardware from the
disputed shops.
3. The respondent-tenant filed a reply therein and denied the
averments of the eviction petition inter alia stating that he had
been the tenant of the disputed property since 16.07.1986, and
was paying a monthly rent of Rs.3,200/- at the time of filing of the
suit. It was further contended that on the ground of alleged
bonafide requirement, the petitioner had already got the
basement vacated from the respondent, where his son Raghuraj
Singh was operating an STD/PCO booth. Further, in lieu of the
basement, the respondent was let out a room situated on the
northern side of the disputed shop. With regard to the necessity of
other son namely Ragunandan Singh, it was submitted that he
was still pursuing his studies. Thus, according to the respondent,
the alleged requirement was neither bonafide nor reasonable.
4. The learned Rent Tribunal vide judgment dated 22.09.2015,
allowed the eviction petition and passed eviction certificate on the
ground of bonafide necessity of Raghuraj Singh. However, the
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issues relating to default, sub-letting, material alteration, nuisance
and availability of alternative premises were decided against the
petitioner-landlord.
5. Aggrieved by the judgment dated 22.09.2015, the
respondent-tenant preferred an appeal before the learned
Appellate Rent Tribunal, which came to be allowed vide judgment
dated 06.10.2016 and consequently, the eviction petition filed by
the petitioner-landlord was dismissed.
6. Aggrieved by the judgment dated 06.10.2016, the petitioner-
landlord preferred the present writ petition.
7. Learned counsel for the petitioner at the outset submitted
that the impugned judgment dated 06.10.2016, is patently illegal
and arbitrary; thus, deserves to be quashed and set aside. It was
contended that the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal committed a
serious illegality while reversing the finding on the issue of
bonafide necessity by observing that the petitioner had sold three
shops to one Pramod Agarwal prior to filing of the suit, whereas
the said shops were sold in the year 2003 on occasion of marriage
of his daughter. Later, in 2005, the need arose on account of the
fact that the petitioner’s son Raghuraj Singh was in requirement of
operating a business of hardware and auto parts in the disputed
shop.
7.1 Learned counsel for the petitioner further argued that no
cross-examination was conducted by the respondent regarding the
marriage of the petitioner’s daughter and the consequent sale of
shops. Moreover, the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal completely
misread the evidence with the regard to the fact of STD/PCO being
operated by the son of petitioner whereas the same was being
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operated by his daughter in law Smt. Nihal Kanwar in a 3ft. x 10ft.
shop.
7.2 Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that admittedly
a suit was filed by him for eviction against one Dinesh Kumar
Agarwal and M/s Asra Enterprise on ground of default in payment
of rent. However, the arrears of rent were deposited and
therefore, the suit was dismissed on account of compromise.
Consequently, the tenants continued in possession of the
premises. Thus, learned Appellate Rent Tribunal committed grave
illegality while drawing adverse inference that the petitioner had
earlier filed a suit for eviction and if he bonafidely required the
shops, he would not have entered in a compromise.
7.3 Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the
petitioner had not concealed any material facts from the Court and
that the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal wrongly observed that the
petitioner had filed another suit against one Smt. Leelavati which
had already been decided. It was clarified that the respondent
himself was a tenant of Smt. Leelavati in another shop situated
near the disputed premises and the petitioner had only taken the
plea that an alternative premises was available to the respondent.
7.4 Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the
petitioner had obtained possession of another shop which had
earlier been in occupation of one Shailendra, and the said shop
was being used by the petitioner’s son Raghunandan for running
an ice-cream parlor. He contended that the need for eviction was a
bonafide one as his other son was desirous to open a hardware
and auto-part shop and the same could not be operated jointly
with an ice-cream Parlor. He, thus, submitted that there existed a
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bonafide requirement of the petitioner and the judgment dated
06.10.2016 deserves to be quashed and set aside.
7.5 Learned counsel for the petitioner to support his arguments
relied upon the following judgments:
(i) Hukum Chandra (Dead) Through Legal
Representatives vs Nemi Chand Jain and Others;
(2019) 13 SCC 363.
(ii) Kanahaiya Lal Arya vs MD. Ehshan & Ors.; 2025
INSC 271.
(iii) Jyoti Sharma vs Vishnu Goyal & Anr.; 2025
INSC 1099.
(iv) Chain Singh Gehlot vs Sushila Parihar; S.B. Civil
Writ Petition No. 7177/2023 {Rajasthan High Court,
Bench Jodhpur}.
(v) Rajani Manohar Kuntha & Ors. vs Parshuram
Chunilal Kanojiya & Ors.; Civil Appeal. No. 014510/
2025 arising out of SLP (c) No. 30407/2024 (decided on
02.12.2025).
8. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent submitted
that the petitioner has not approached the Court with clean hands
as the pleadings in the petition are selective, incomplete and
suppress the material documentary evidence which were duly
produced and exhibited before the learned Rent Tribunal as Ex-A/1
to Ex-A/36. The controversy in the present matter is confined to
Issue No.2 relating to alleged bonafide necessity as on all the
other issues, the learned Rent Tribunal itself recorded a finding
against the petitioner.
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8.1 Learned counsel for the respondent further argued that the
eviction petition was allowed solely on the ground of alleged
bonafide necessity despite rejecting the grounds of default,
nuisance, and material alteration and recording a finding adverse
to the petitioner regarding availability of alternative
accommodation. Since, the finding on bonafide necessity was
contrary to the documentary evidence and suffered from material
irregularity, therefore, the learned Appellate Rent tribunal rightly
set aside the finding of the learned Rent Tribunal.
8.2 Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the
learned Appellate Rent Tribunal, vide a detailed and reasoned
judgment, has rightly reversed the finding of the learned Rent
Tribunal regarding the bonafide necessity and dismissed the
eviction petition.
8.3 Furthermore, the absence of bonafide necessity is clearly
highlighted from the fact and certified copies of documents i.e. Ex-
A/31 to Ex-A/35, that the shop adjacent to the disputed shop was
vacated by the petitioner from one Shailendra Kumar, where his
younger son Raghunandan Singh, was carrying an ice-cream
parlor and was also serving in a private bank. Thus, the
availability of the adjacent shop demolishes the alleged urgent
requirement for starting auto parts business.
8.4 Additionally, Ex-A/14 clearly shows that eviction proceedings
were initiated against one Dinesh Kumar but were subsequently
compromised and the tenant was permitted to continue. This
conduct clearly shows inconsistency with a genuine and pressing
need of the petitioner-landlord.
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8.5 It was also argued that the documentary evidence i.e.
Ex-A/17 and Ex-A/18 clearly prove that three shops adjacent to
the shop in question were sold to one Pramod Kumar. It was
alleged that the shops were sold in 2003 to meet the expenditure
of petitioner’s daughter marriage. However, the marriage was
solemnized in the year 2005-2006. Thus, the explanation as given
by the petitioner was factually incorrect. Moreover, a landlord who
voluntarily alienates adjacent premise cannot simultaneously claim
a pressing bonafide need.
8.6 Learned counsel for the respondent further submitted that
the evidence on record clearly establish that the younger son of
the petitioner is employed in a private bank and runs ice-cream
parlor. The elder son, Raghuraj Singh, is operating STD/PCO from
the basement portion of the disputed shop. The ground floor space
towards the eastern side was also available and thus, alternative
suitable accommodation did exist.
8.7 Learned counsel for the respondent hence, submitted that
the cumulative effect of sale of adjacent shops, availability of
vacated premises, compromises with other tenants, employment
and existing business of sons and suppression of material facts
clearly establish that that the alleged requirement is neither
bonafide nor reasonable. Hence, the present writ petition may be
dismissed.
8.8 Learned counsel for the respondent also submitted that he
has filed an application under Order 41 Rule 27 of the CPC for
taking subsequent events on record. He stated that the petitioner,
Pratap Singh Hada, has filed a suit against his son Raghunandan
Singh Hada seeking cancellation of the license and a decree of
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mandatory injunction. It was argued that since Pratap Singh Hada
himself has filed a suit against his son, the need alleged in the
rent petition for establishing his son Raghunandan Singh Hada
was artificial and not a bonafide requirement. Therefore, the
respondent prayed that the application filed under Order 41 Rule
27 CPC be allowed.
8.9 Learned counsel for the respondent relied on the following
judgments to buttress his arguments:
(i) M/s Rahabhar Production Pvt. Ltd. vs Rajendra
K. Tandon; AIR 1998 SC 1639.
AIR 1999 SC 2507.
(iii) Ram Dass vs Ishwar Chander and Ors.; AIR
1988 SC 1422.
9. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
material available on record.
10. Before adverting to the issue involved in the present case,
this Court deems it appropriate to first decide the pending
application filed by the respondent under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC.
By way of the said application, the respondent has sought to place
on record a copy of the plaint filed by Pratap Singh Hada against
his son Raghunandan Singh Hada and daughter-in-law Sarita.
Learned counsel for the respondent-tenant submitted that these
documents are necessary for the proper adjudication of the
present writ petition.
11. Learned counsel for the petitioner filed a reply to the said
application and submitted that the aforesaid suit does not relate to
the property in dispute. He, further, submitted that the said
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dispute is also not in respect of the place where Raghunandan
Singh Hada is carrying on his business. According to the petitioner,
the said suit was filed only in relation to a residential property
and, therefore, the same is neither material nor relevant for the
purpose of adjudication of the present dispute. Learned counsel
for the petitioner further averred that the said suit was ultimately
withdrawn by the petitioner on 03.02.2025.
12. This Court finds that the issue involved in the present case
relates to the bonafide need claimed by the petitioner-landlord for
his sons, namely Raghunandan Singh Hada and Raghuraj Singh
Hada. Furthermore, the dispute in respect of the residential
premises between Pratap Singh Hada and Raghunandan Singh
Hada is not relevant for the purpose of deciding the eviction
petition based on the bonafide need of the petitioner-landlord.
Therefore, this Court finds that the document sought to be placed
on record by the respondent is neither relevant nor necessary for
the adjudication of the present dispute. Consequently, the
application filed by the respondent under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC is
dismissed.
13. So far as the controversy involved in the present case is
concerned, the issue to be decided by this Court is that whether
the finding recorded by the learned Rent Tribunal regarding the
bonafide need was rightly set aside by the learned Appellate Rent
Tribunal, or whether the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal
committed perversity and illegality while reversing the finding of
the learned Rent Tribunal.
14. A bare perusal of the rent application filed by the
petitioner-landlord before the learned Rent Tribunal demonstrates
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that the petitioner had claimed a bonafide requirement for his two
sons, namely Raghunandan Singh Hada and Raghuraj Singh Hada.
15. This Court further on perusal of the record finds that the
learned Rent Tribunal observed that one shop had come into the
possession of the petitioner after it was vacated by a tenant and
the said shop was given to his son Raghunandan Singh Hada for
carrying on the business of an ice-cream parlor. Therefore, the
learned Rent Tribunal held that the need of Raghunandan Singh
Hada stood satisfied. However, the bonafide need of Raghuraj
Singh Hada still remained and was duly proved by the petitioner-
landlord, and accordingly the learned Rent Tribunal passed a
decree of eviction on the ground of bonafide requirement.
16. However, this Court finds that the learned Appellate Rent
Tribunal, merely on account of the fact that the need of one of the
sons stood satisfied, and the requirement had been claimed jointly
for both the sons, reversed the finding recorded by the learned
Rent Tribunal.
17. This Court is of the firm opinion that if the requirement is
pleaded for two sons for carrying on business and, during the
pendency of the suit, one of the sons gets an alternative premises,
it cannot be presumed that the requirement of the other son
automatically stands satisfied.
18. More so, in the facts of the present case, it was proved that
the shop which became available during the pendency of the suit,
was utilized by Raghunandan Singh Hada, who started running an
ice-cream parlor. The learned Appellate Rent Tribunal has nowhere
recorded a finding that both the sons were carrying on the
business of an ice-cream parlor in the said shop which became
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available during the pendency of the suit. Once it is found that
only one son is carrying on business in the shop which became
available during the pendency of the suit, the requirement of the
other son could not have been said to have been satisfied.
Therefore, this Court finds that the finding recorded by the learned
Appellate Rent Tribunal is perverse and illegal and the same
deserves to be set aside.
19. The learned Appellate Rent Tribunal has also reversed the
finding on account of the fact that the petitioner-landlord had sold
three shops and, on that basis, raised a doubt regarding the
bonafide need of the petitioner-landlord. However, it is not in
dispute that the said shops were admittedly sold in the year 2003,
whereas the present eviction petition was filed in the year 2005,
i.e., on 01.08.2005. Thus, the sale which had taken place prior to
the institution of the suit could not have been made a ground to
doubt the bonafide requirement of the plaintiff.
20. There may be several circumstances where the owner of a
property may sell his property for various reasons. A tenant
cannot dictate the landlord that he should not sell his property.
In the present case, the shops were sold in the year 2003 itself,
and not during the pendency of the suit as well as the appeal.
Therefore, the said fact could not have been relied upon by the
learned Appellate Rent Tribunal to disbelieve the bonafide need of
the plaintiff.
21. This Court also finds that the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal
has misread the pleadings and the evidence available on record
while observing that the petitioner-landlord had filed a suit
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against one of the tenants, namely Leelavati, and had concealed
the fact that the said suit had already been decided.
22. During the course of arguments, learned counsel for the
respondent fairly conceded that the said finding is incorrect, as the
suit in question was filed by Leelavati against the tenant
Rajkumar. Thus, it was admitted that the finding recorded by the
learned Appellate Rent Tribunal in this regard is erroneous.
23. This Court, therefore, finds that the reasons recorded by the
learned Appellate Rent Tribunal while reversing the findings of the
learned Rent Tribunal are incorrect and are based on a misreading
of the facts available on record. It appears that the learned
Appellate Rent Tribunal, without due application of mind and
without proper appreciation of the pleadings and evidence, has
passed the impugned order dated 06.10.2016.
24. The learned Appellate Rent Tribunal has also relied upon the
fact that the petitioner-landlord had entered into a compromise
with another tenant against whom a suit had been filed and, on
that basis, doubted the bonafide need of the petitioner-landlord.
However, this Court finds that the said suits against other tenants
were not based on the ground of bonafide requirement. Therefore,
the compromise entered into in those proceedings could not have
been made a ground to disbelieve the bonafide need of the
petitioner-landlord in the present case. Consequently, the finding
recorded by the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal in this regard also
deserves to be quashed and set aside.
25. It is not in dispute that in those cases, once the tenants had
deposited the rent, the suits were compromised between the
landlord and the tenants. As a consequence, those properties did
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not become available to the landlord. Even otherwise, it is well
settled that a tenant cannot dictate the landlord as to where and
in what manner he should carry on his business. The
respondent-tenant has also failed to place any material on record
to prove that the petitioner-landlord has other suitable
accommodation available for meeting the alleged requirement.
Therefore, this Court finds that merely on the basis of the
compromises entered into in other proceedings, the bonafide need
of the petitioner cannot be termed as artificial, as has been held
by the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal.
26. This Court further finds that the rights of the tenant are
otherwise sufficiently protected in law in case a decree of eviction
is granted on the ground of bonafide requirement.
27. This Court therefore, deems it appropriate to quote the
provision of Section 9 (i) of the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001,
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act of 2001’) along with its proviso,
which reads are under:
“(i) the premises are required reasonably and
bona fide by the landlord for the use or occupation of
himself or his family or for the use or occupation, of
any person for whose benefit the premises are held :
Provided that where decree of eviction from any
premises is sought by the landlord under clause (i), he
shall be prohibited from letting out the same to any
other person within a period of three years and in case
the premises are let-out, the tenant shall be entitled
for restoration of possession on a petition moved by
him before the Rent Tribunal and the Rent Tribunal
shall dispose of such petition expeditiously and the
procedure as laid down in section 16 shall mutatis
mutandis apply; or”
28. The provision thus clearly safeguards the interest of the
tenant inasmuch as if a landlord obtains a decree of eviction on
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the ground of bonafide requirement and, if within three years, lets
out the property to another person, the tenant is entitled to seek
restoration of possession in accordance with law.
29. It is also well settled that the requirement of the landlord
need not be a dire or pressing necessity. The Hon’ble Supreme
Court has consistently held in catena of judgments that even if the
requirement is not a dire one, eviction can still be granted
provided the requirement is genuine and bonafide.
30. This Court finds that based on the evidence, the learned Rent
Tribunal had found the need of one son Raghuraj Singh Hada to be
bonafide and therefore, had granted a decree. The learned
Appellate Rent Tribunal committed gross illegality and perversity
and had misread the evidence on record and has arrived at a
different conclusion by reversing the well-reasoned findings
recorded by the learned Rent Tribunal.
31. Thus, the findings recorded by the learned Appellate Rent
Tribunal being perverse, are liable to be set aside by exercising
powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Accordingly,
the present writ petition is allowed; order dated 06.10.2016
passed by learned Appellate Rent Tribunal is set aside and the
order dated 22.09.2015, passed by the learned Rent Tribunal is
restored.
32. In the interest of justice, this Court deems it appropriate to
grant six months’ time to the respondent-tenant to vacate the
premises in terms of the proviso to Section 15(8) of the Act of
2001, which prohibits the execution of the certificate issued in
favour of the landlord for a period of six months in case of
premises is rented for commercial use.
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33. All pending applications stand disposed of.
(BIPIN GUPTA),J
Sudha/
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