Orissa High Court
Prasanta Behera vs Union Of India And Ors. …. Opposite … on 17 April, 2026
Author: Sanjeeb K Panigrahi
Bench: Sanjeeb K Panigrahi
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT,
CUTTACK
Date: 20-Apr-2026 17:51:42
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
W.P.(C) No.9200 of 2015
(In the matter of an application under Articles 226 and 227 of the
Constitution of India, 1950).
Prasanta Behera .... Petitioner(s)
-versus-
Union of India and Ors. .... Opposite Party (s)
Advocates appeared in the case through Hybrid Mode:
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. G.R. Mohapatra, Adv.
For Opposite Party (s) : Mr. B.S. Rayaguru,
Sr. Panel Counsel
(for O.P.1)
Mr. S.D. Das, Sr.Adv.
Along with associate
(for O.P.3)
CORAM:
DR. JUSTICE SANJEEB K PANIGRAHI
DATE OF HEARING:-09.04.2026
DATE OF JUDGMENT:-17.04.2026
Dr. Sanjeeb K Panigrahi, J.
1. In this Writ Petition, the petitioner seeks a direction from this Court to
quash the order of termination dated 04.05.2015 passed by the Bharat
Petroleum Corporation Limited terminating the petitioner’s retail outlet
dealership, and to restrain the Corporation from continuing to operate
the outlet on the basis of the lease executed by the petitioner’s mother in
favour of the Corporation.
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I. FACTUAL MATRIX OF THE CASE:
2. The brief facts of the case are as follows:
(i) The petitioner is the son of Panchanan Behera, and his mother, Aparna
Kumari Khatua, is the recorded owner of land situated in Mouza
Bhubaneswar Sahar Unit No. 32, Rajarani, under Khata No. 17, Plot
Nos. 115 and 116, with a total area of Ac. 0.209 decimals. The land is
stated to be a compact plot abutting Lewis Road, Bhubaneswar, a
prominent road connecting Kalpana Square and the National Highway
leading to Puri.
(ii) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited invited applications for
establishment of a petrol and diesel retail outlet at Lewis Road,
Bhubaneswar, under a scheme where persons having suitable land,
either owned or available on long lease, could be considered for
dealership. The advertisement also stated that if the land was found
suitable, dealership could be granted to the landowner subject to
fulfilment of the required eligibility conditions.
(iii) The petitioner applied for the dealership on the basis of the land owned
by his mother. BPCL later issued a communication dated 23.11.2004
asking for submission of a fresh application in the prescribed format
along with affidavit, while clarifying that the land details already
submitted would continue to be treated as valid.
(iv) The petitioner’s mother filed affidavits undertaking that if the
dealership was granted to her son, she would execute a lease deed in
favour of BPCL in respect of the schedule property. Thereafter, the
petitioner was granted dealership by BPCL under letter dated
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24.12.2004, and a lease deed in respect of the land was executed by the
petitioner’s mother in favour of BPCL.
(v) The petitioner thereafter operated the retail outlet for several years. On
02.11.2012, BPCL issued a show cause notice alleging that the
provisional graduation certificate said to have been submitted by the
petitioner was forged and that the dealership had been obtained
fraudulently. After exchange of replies, BPCL terminated the dealership
by letter dated 04.05.2015.
(vi) The present dispute arises out of the termination of the petitioner’s
dealership and the petitioner’s challenge to the said action. BPCL, on
the other hand, has maintained that after termination of the dealership,
it appointed another dealer on ad hoc basis to run the outlet and that
the lease in favour of BPCL continued independently of the dealership
arrangement.
II. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER:
3. Learned counsel for the Petitioner earnestly made the following
submissions in support of his contentions:
(i) The petitioner contends that the dealership granted in his favour was a
land linked dealership, and that the very basis of his selection was the
availability of his mother’s land for the retail outlet. According to him,
the correspondence issued by BPCL before grant of dealership, the
terms of the selection letter, and the affidavits furnished by his mother
clearly show that the lease of land and the award of dealership were
inseparably connected.
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(ii) It is the petitioner’s case that the lease deed executed by his mother
cannot be viewed in isolation from the surrounding circumstances in
which it came to be executed. He asserts that the lease was not an
independent commercial arrangement, but was executed only because
BPCL had granted the dealership to him under the land linked scheme.
Therefore, once the dealership is cancelled, the continuation of the lease
in favour of BPCL would be unjust and contrary to the very foundation
of the transaction.
(iii) The petitioner further contends that he was the only candidate for the
land linked dealership and, therefore, the real issue was only whether
he satisfied the required eligibility conditions. He submits that even if
the disputed graduation certificate is left out of consideration and he is
treated only as an intermediate pass candidate, he would still secure
marks above the minimum qualifying benchmark prescribed under the
applicable selection criteria.
(iv) According to the petitioner, the show cause notice itself indicates that
the real consequence of disregarding the graduation qualification would
only be a marginal reduction in marks, and not total disqualification.
He argues that BPCL has incorrectly calculated the marks by treating 39
out of 65 as the minimum qualifying benchmark, whereas the actual
brochure required assessment on a broader criterion and only required
60 percent in total. On his own calculation, he claims entitlement to 72.5
marks and submits that his selection would remain valid even without
any graduation qualification.
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(v) The petitioner also questions the very circumstances in which the
allegation of forged graduation certificate surfaced. He alleges that one
Smt. Pushpanjali Kar, whose connection with the dealership is unclear,
initiated the complaint, and suggests that interested persons, in
collusion with certain staff members, manipulated records and inserted
the disputed certificate so as to create a ground for his removal.
(vi) The petitioner contends that BPCL’s reliance on the lease deed as a
stand-alone document is misconceived and overly formalistic. He
submits that the Court should consider the totality of the circumstances
leading to execution of the deed, the low rent accepted by his mother
only because of the expectation of dealership benefits, and the severe
financial prejudice caused to the family by both loss of dealership
income and continuation of the lease at a rent far below market value.
(vii) Finally, the petitioner contends that although BPCL has since allowed
another person to operate the outlet, the subsequent arrangement itself
is subject to the result of the present case. On that basis, he seeks
restoration of the dealership in his favour and setting aside of the order
of termination.
III. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE OPPOSITE PARTIES:
4. The Learned Counsel for the Opposite Parties earnestly made the
following submissions in support of his contentions:
(i) BPCL contends that the writ petition is not maintainable in its present
form because the matter arises out of contractual arrangements and
involves disputed questions of fact. According to BPCL, the petitioner
seeks adjudication of factual controversies relating to the application,
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Date: 20-Apr-2026 17:51:42documents submitted by him, and the basis of his selection, which
cannot properly be resolved in writ jurisdiction.
(ii) The opposite parties submit that the petitioner applied for dealership by
representing himself as a graduate and by submitting a provisional
graduation certificate purportedly issued by Utkal University. They
state that this declaration was made not only in the original application
but also in the later application submitted pursuant to the new
guidelines, and that the petitioner relied upon the graduation
qualification as part of the selection process.
(iii) BPCL’s specific case is that the selection process allotted marks for
various criteria, and educational qualification was one such criterion
carrying 15 marks. The petitioner was awarded marks on the footing
that he was a graduate. According to BPCL, the interview marks were
assessed out of 65, the remaining 35 being separately earmarked for
land and infrastructure. For an open category candidate, the minimum
qualifying mark was 39 out of 65. If the petitioner’s graduation claim is
removed and marks are awarded only on the basis of his actual
qualification, he would fall below this threshold and become ineligible.
(iv) The opposite parties further submit that after receipt of a complaint,
BPCL verified the petitioner’s graduation certificate from Utkal
University, and the University categorically informed BPCL that no
such name existed in its records. On that basis, BPCL issued a show
cause notice, considered the petitioner’s replies, found them
unsatisfactory, and ultimately terminated the dealership by order dated
04.05.2015. According to BPCL, the termination was therefore lawful,
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Date: 20-Apr-2026 17:51:42reasoned, and based on suppression and submission of false
information.
(v) BPCL disputes the petitioner’s version that he had submitted a later
application describing himself merely as a +2 pass candidate. It alleges
that no acknowledgement had been issued for such alleged application,
that the petitioner subsequently created a fresh document to suit his
defence, and that the handwriting in the admitted applications matched
each other whereas the handwriting in the allegedly later application
did not. BPCL therefore contends that the petitioner’s attempt to
disown the graduate declaration is an afterthought.
(vi) On the issue of lease, BPCL firmly contends that the lease agreement
and dealership agreement are two distinct and independent contracts
executed between different parties for different purposes. The lease was
executed by the petitioner’s mother in favour of BPCL on mutually
agreed rent and created legal rights in favour of the Corporation
independent of the dealership granted to the petitioner. BPCL asserts
that even after termination of the dealership, it remains entitled to
retain possession under the lease and to appoint another dealer or
sublet in accordance with law.
(vii) The opposite parties also rely on judicial precedent to argue that
termination of dealership does not automatically bring the lease to an
end and that the lessor cannot resist BPCL’s possession during the
subsistence of the lease. Their stand is that the petitioner, having been
found ineligible due to submission of a forged document, cannot claim
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continuation or restoration of dealership merely because the land of his
mother had been taken on lease for the outlet.
IV. JUDGMENT AND ANALYSIS:
5. Heard Learned Counsel for the parties and perused the documents
placed before this Court.
6. The respondent, Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited, is a public
sector undertaking engaged in distribution and sale of petroleum
products. Its actions are amenable to judicial review when the challenge
discloses a public law element such as arbitrariness, unfairness, or
breach of natural justice.
7. At the same time, it is well settled that merely because a party to a
contract is the State or an instrumentality, every dispute arising out of
such relationship does not become justiciable in writ jurisdiction. Where
the controversy is essentially about enforcement of contractual terms,
computation of contractual benefits, or other matters in the realm of
private law, the ordinary remedy is before the civil court or through
arbitration, if provided. To this effect, the Supreme Court in State of
U.P. and Ors. v. Bridge and Roof Co. (India) Ltd.1, held as follows:
“There is yet another substantial reason for not entertaining
the writ petition. The contract in question contains a clause
providing inter alia for settlement of disputes by reference to
arbitration [Clause 67 of the Contract]. The Arbitrators can
decide both questions of fact as well as questions of law.
When the contract itself provides for a mode of settlement of
disputes arising from the contract, there is no reason why
the parties should not follow and adopt that remedy and1
(1996) 6 SCC 22Page 8
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Date: 20-Apr-2026 17:51:42invoke the extra-ordinary jurisdiction of the High Court
under Article 226. The existence of an effective alternative
remedy, in this case, provided in the contract itself, is a good
ground for the court to decline to exercise its extra-ordinary
jurisdiction under Article 226. The said Article was not
meant to supplant the existing remedies at law but only to
supplement them in certain well-recognised situations. As
pointed out above, the prayer for issuance of a writ of
mandamus was wholly misconceived in this case since the
respondent was not seeking to enforce any statutory right of
theirs nor was it seeking to enforce any statutory obligation
cast upon the appellants. Indeed, the very resort to Article
226, whether for issuance of mandamus or any other writ,
order or direction, was misconceived for the reasons
mentioned supra.”
8. The law is also clear that writ jurisdiction is not excluded in matters
pertaining to contract. However, the High Court exercises self-imposed
restraint and interferes only to test the legality of the decision making
process. It does not sit as an appellate forum to reappreciate evidence or
to substitute its own assessment on merits. The Supreme Court in LIC
of India v. Escorts Ltd.2, held as under:
“If the action of the State is related to contractual
obligations or obligations arising out of the tort, the court
may not ordinarily examine it unless the action has some
public law character attached to it. Broadly speaking, the
court will examine actions of State if they pertain to the
public law domain and refrain from examining them if they
pertain to the private law field. The difficulty will lie in
demarcating the frontier between the public law domain and
the private law field. It is impossible to draw the line with
precision and we do not want to attempt it. The question
must be decided in each case with reference to the particular2
(1986) 1 SCC 264Page 9
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Date: 20-Apr-2026 17:51:42action, the activity in which the State or the instrumentality
of the State is engaged when performing the action, the
public law or private law character of the action and a host
of other relevant circumstances. When the State or an
instrumentality of the State ventures into the corporate
world and purchases the shares of a company, it assumes to
itself the ordinary role of a shareholder, and dons the robes
of a shareholder, with all the rights available to such a
shareholder. There is no reason why the State as a
shareholder should be expected to state its reasons when it
seeks to change the management, by a resolution of the
company, like any other shareholder.”
9. Hence, disputed questions of fact do not, by themselves, bar writ
jurisdiction. Yet, where the dispute is of a complex nature requiring oral
evidence, cross examination, or a full trial, the writ court may decline to
adjudicate and relegate the parties to appropriate remedies.
10. Tested on the above parameters, the writ petition, insofar as it
challenges the decision of the Corporation to terminate the dealership
on the ground of alleged fraud and submission of a forged certificate,
can be examined in a limited manner to see whether the Corporation
acted on relevant material and followed fair procedure. To that extent,
this Court does not non suit the petitioner at the threshold.
11. However, the relief sought by the petitioner, insofar as it seeks to treat
the land lease as inseparably linked and to thereby invalidate the
subsisting leasehold rights of the Corporation, travels predominantly
into a contractual and property domain, involving privity, construction
of the lease instrument and surrounding circumstances, and issues not
suitable for resolution in writ jurisdiction on affidavits.
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12. In the facts and contentions placed before this Court, the following
issues arise for consideration:
a) The first issue is whether the impugned termination of dealership
suffers from illegality, procedural impropriety, perversity, or
arbitrariness warranting interference under Article 226.
b) The second issue is whether, assuming the termination is
sustainable, the petitioner can yet obtain a writ to terminate or
restrain the Corporation from continuing in possession under the
lease executed by the petitioner’s mother, on the plea that the
dealership and the lease were inseparably connected.
c) The third issue concerns the nature of relief that can be granted in
writ jurisdiction in a dealership arrangement even where
termination is found invalid, in the light of settled law that
dealership and distributorship contracts are ordinarily
determinable and the usual remedy is damages rather than
specific performance.
A. ALLEGATION OF A FORGED GRADUATION CERTIFICATE AND THE LEGAL
EFFECT OF FRAUD:
13. The gravamen of the Corporation‘s case is that the petitioner
represented himself as a graduate and submitted a provisional
graduation certificate stated to be issued by Utkal University, and that
upon verification, the University reported that no such record existed,
leading to initiation of show cause proceedings and termination.
14. In law, fraud is not a matter of mere technicality. The Supreme Court
has repeatedly held that fraud vitiates all solemn acts and that a person
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who secures an advantage by deceit cannot claim equity or indulgence
from the court.
15. Where entry into a privileged position is obtained on the basis of a false
certificate or fraudulent representation, the foundation of such status
collapses. The Supreme Court in R. Vishwanatha Pillai v. State of
Kerala3, treated appointment based on a false certificate as void from
inception, and emphasised that a person cannot take advantage of his
own fraud. While that decision arose in the public employment context,
the principle that a benefit secured by fraud is voidable and does not
generate enforceable equities applies with equal force to allotments and
dealerships involving public resources and public dealing. The Supreme
Court observed as follows:
“It cannot be said that the said void appointment would
enable the appellant to claim that he was holding a civil post
within the meaning of Article 311 of the Constitution of
India. As appellant had obtained the appointment by
playing a fraud he cannot be allowed to take advantage of
his own fraud in entering the service and claim that he was
holder of the post entitled to be dealt with in terms of Article
311 of the Constitution of India or the Rules framed
thereunder. Where an appointment in a service has been
acquired by practising fraud or deceit such an appointment
is no appointment in law, in service and in such a situation
Article 311 of the Constitution is not attracted at all.”
16. Importantly, once the action is founded on fraud, the argument of delay
in initiation loses much of its force. In Bank of India v. Avinash D.
Mandivikar4, the Supreme Court observed that when an action is
3
(2004) 2 SCC 105
4
(2005) 7 SCC 690
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founded on fraud, the question of any reasonable period for initiation
becomes immaterial. The Court held as under:
“When an action is founded on fraud the question of any
reasonable period for initiation of action is clearly
immaterial. By granting protection of the respondent No. 1-
employee the High Court has in essence nullified the object
for which scrutiny of the caste claim is made and the
purpose for which reservation has been made for Scheduled
Caste and the Scheduled Tribes.
…
When fraud is perpetrated the parameters of consideration
will be different. Fraud and collusion vitiate even the most
solemn proceedings in any civilised system of jurisprudence.
…
Therefore, mere delayed reference when the foundation for
the same is alleged fraud does not in any way affect legality
of the reference.”
17. The petitioner’s argument that even excluding graduation marks he
would still satisfy the benchmark, even if assumed for a moment,
cannot by itself neutralise the allegation that he submitted a forged
certificate. Apart from the possibility that marks and ranking could
have been different, the submission of a forged document to secure
benefit is itself a grave infraction and strikes at the integrity of the
selection. The writ court cannot place a premium on such conduct by
treating the matter as a harmless error in scoring.
B. SCRUTINY OF THE CORPORATION’S DECISION-MAKING PROCESS:
18. This Court reminds itself that judicial review under Article 226 is
concerned with the manner in which the decision was made and not
with a reappraisal of the merits as if this Court were a court of appeal.
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The Supreme Court in Tata Cellular v. Union of India5, explained that
judicial review is not an appeal, and that the court’s duty is to confine
itself to legality, including whether relevant material was considered
and whether natural justice was followed. The Court formulated the
principle as follows:
“The duty of the court is to confine itself to the question of
legality. Its concern should be: 1. Whether a decision-
making authority exceeded its powers? 2. Committed an
error of law, 3. committed a breach of the rules of natural
justice, 4. reached a decision which no reasonable tribunal
would have reached or, 5. abused its powers. Therefore, it is
not for the court to determine whether a particular policy or
particular decision taken in the fulfilment of that policy is
fair. It is only concerned with the manner in which those
decisions have been taken.”
19. In the present case, the record as summarised before this Court
indicates that the Corporation issued a show cause notice on 02.11.2012,
the petitioner responded, and the Corporation proceeded to terminate
by order dated 04.05.2015. On the face of it, therefore, the Corporation
did not act without notice or without affording opportunity.
20. The petitioner’s challenge, in substance, asks this Court to accept that
the disputed certificate was inserted or manipulated by third parties in
collusion with staff, and that the petitioner never relied upon it or that
he later applied as a plus two candidate. Such assertions involve
disputed questions of fact, including issues of authorship of documents,
5
(1994) 6 SCC 651
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handwriting, and the chain of custody of records, which are not
amenable to conclusive determination on affidavits.
21. Conversely, the Corporation’s reliance on verification from the
University, and the consequential conclusion that the certificate was not
genuine, constitutes relevant material in the decision making process.
Unless the petitioner demonstrates that such material was wholly
irrelevant, that the process was mala fide on proven material, or that the
conclusion is so perverse that no reasonable authority could reach it,
interference is not warranted.
22. This Court also notes that the petitioner has not shown, at least within
the constraints of writ pleadings, any unimpeachable contemporaneous
material from the University establishing that he in fact held the
graduation qualification or that the certificate was genuine. In a matter
involving allegation of fraud, the burden to at least prima facie dislodge
the verification report cannot be shifted by mere suspicion against
unnamed staff or by conjecture about interested persons.
23. In view of the above, this Court is satisfied that the Corporation’s
decision to terminate was taken on relevant considerations and after
affording opportunity. The impugned termination does not call for
interference in exercise of writ jurisdiction.
C. LAND LINKED DEALERSHIP AND THE CONTINUING LEASE:
24. The petitioner’s second plank is that the dealership was land linked and
therefore the lease executed by the petitioner’s mother must be treated
as inseparable from the dealership, with the consequence that
termination of dealership should automatically undo the lease.
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25. This Court is unable to accept such submission in the limited writ
jurisdiction invoked. The lease is a distinct juristic instrument executed
between the landowner and the Corporation, creating rights and
obligations governed by its terms and by ordinary law. Disputes as to
whether the lease was conditional, whether it was induced by a
collateral assurance, whether consideration failed, or whether equity
warrants termination, are matters requiring pleading and proof in
appropriate proceedings. They are not amenable to summary
adjudication under Article 226.
26. Further, the petitioner is not the lessor. Even on the petitioner’s own
showing, the recorded owner is his mother, Aparna Kumari Khatua.
The lease deed is said to have been executed by her in favour of the
Corporation. The petitioner cannot, in his own right, seek a writ
effectively to rewrite or terminate a subsisting lease to which he is not a
party, particularly when such relief would affect proprietary rights and
obligations of a person who is not before this Court as the principal
claimant in respect of the lease.
27. The petitioner’s reliance on pre grant correspondence and affidavits to
contend that the lease and dealership were inseparable, even if assumed
to exist, would still involve interpretation of contractual instruments
and surrounding circumstances.
28. The petitioner also seeks to challenge the Corporation’s continuation
through an ad hoc dealer after termination. In Bharat Petroleum
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Corporation Limited v. Chembur Service Station6, the Supreme Court
recognised that upon termination of the dealership, the ex-dealer cannot
obstruct the running of the outlet by the corporation directly or through
another dealer, including an ad hoc arrangement, and that even where
termination is found invalid, the appropriate remedy is compensation
rather than restoration coupled with possession. The Court summarised
the principle in the following terms:
“A person appointed by the appellant, as its dealer to sell the
petroleum products supplied by the appellant through the
company retail outlet premises under the terms of a
Dispensing Pump and Selling Licence (DPSL) agreement,
on termination of the selling agreement and cessation of
supplies ceases to be a dealer. Consequently he can neither
sell any petroleum products in the retail outlet premises, nor
use the appellant’s retail outlet premises or facilities for any
other purpose, nor create any obstruction to the running of
the retail outlet by the appellant directly or through another
dealer — regular or ad hoc. Even if the termination of the
dealership is invalid, the only relief that could be claimed by
the ex-dealer/agent is award of compensation. A court could
not therefore grant temporary injunction requiring the
appellant to maintain status quo, thereby permitting the
respondent to hold on to the petrol pump premises and
prevent the use thereof by the appellant in the manner it
deems fit.”
29. Likewise, in Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. Amritsar Gas Service7, the
Supreme Court held in the distributorship context that where the
contract is determinable, the remedy ordinarily is compensation and not
6
(2011) 3 SCC 710
7
(1991) 1 SCC 533
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a direction tantamount to specific performance. The Court observed as
follows:
“”It is in this sense that the award describes the
Distributorship Agreement as one for an indefinite period,
that is, till terminated in accordance with clauses 27 and 28.
The finding in the award being that the Distributorship
Agreement was revokable and the same being admittedly for
rendering personal service, the relevant provisions of the
Specific Relief Act were automatically attracted. Sub-section
(1) of Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act specifies the
contracts which cannot be specifically enforced, one of which
is ‘a contract which is in its nature determinable’.
…
The grant of relief of restoration of the distributorship even
on the finding that the breach was committed by the
appellant-Corporation is, therefore, contrary to the mandate
in Section 14(1) of the Specific Relief Act and there is an
error of law apparent on the face of the award which is
stated to be based on the reasons given therein.
…
Consequently, the remedy of the respondent No. 1 for the
wrongful termination is only by way of compensation for
the period of notice, namely, of 30 days.”
30. These principles reinforce that the petitioner cannot, by invoking writ
jurisdiction, compel restoration of dealership or restrain the
Corporation from operating the outlet through another arrangement,
especially after a termination founded on fraud.
31. It follows that the petitioner’s challenge to the Corporation’s
continuance in possession under the lease and its arrangement to
operate the outlet through another dealer cannot be granted in this writ
petition. Such issues, if at all available, lie in appropriate civil
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CUTTACK
Date: 20-Apr-2026 17:51:42
proceedings by the competent party, subject to the lease terms and
applicable law.
V. CONCLUSION:
32. For the reasons recorded above, this Court finds no ground to interfere
with the termination order dated 04.05.2015 in exercise of writ
jurisdiction. The writ petition is dismissed.
33. Interim order, if any, passed earlier stands vacated.
(Dr. Sanjeeb K Panigrahi)
Judge
Orissa High Court, Cuttack,
Dated 17th April, 2026/
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