Andhra Pradesh High Court – Amravati
Pragallapati Chaitanya vs P Raghsnendra Rahhu Ram on 22 June, 2026
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Date of pronouncement :
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APHC010405982019
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI [3521]
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
MONDAY, THE 22nd DAY OF JUNE 2026
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO
CRIMINAL REVISION CASE NO: 1263/2019
Between:
1. PRAGALLAPATI CHAITANYA, W/O RAGHAVENDRA RAGHU RAM,
HINDU, AGED ABOUT 26 YEARS, R/O D NO 5-53-31, 6/17
BRODIPET, GUNTUR.
...PETITIONER
AND
1. P RAGHSNENDRA RAHHU RAM, S/O. VEERABHADRA RAO, AGED
ABOUT 29 YEARS, R/O. VENKATAGIRI 2, PIDIMGOYYAL
PANCHAYAT, RAJAHMUNDRY RURAL, EAST GODAVARI DISTRICT.
2. PRAGALLAPATI RAMA LAKSHMI, W/O. VEERABHADRA RAO, AGED
ABOUT 48 YEARS, R/O. VENKATAGIRI 2, PIDIMGOYYAL
PANCHAYAT, RAJAHMUNDRY RURAL, EAST GODAVARI DISTRICT.
3. PRAGALLAPATI VEERABHADRA RAO, S/O. VENKATA RATNAM,
AGED ABOUT 58 YEARS, R/O. VENKATAGIRI 2, PIDIMGOYYAL
PANCHAYAT, RAJAHMUNDRY RURAL, EAST GODAVARI DISTRICT.
4. PRAGALLAPATI PRAVEEN, S/O. VEERABHADRA RAO, AGED
ABOUT 25 YEARS, R/O. VENKATAGIRI 2, PIDIMGOYYAL
PANCHAYAT, RAJAHMUNDRY RURAL, EAST GODAVARI DISTRICT.
5. THE STATE SHO, ARUNDELPET POLICE STATION, REPRESENTED
BY ITS PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA
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Dr.YLR, J
Crl.R.C.No.1263 of 2019
Dated 22.06.2026
PRADESH AT AMARAVATHI.
...RESPONDENT(S):
Counsel for the Petitioner:
1. KRISHNA KISHORE BHATRAJU
2. GOLLAMUDI NAGASATYANARAYANA
Counsel for the Respondent(S):
1. DONDAPPAGARI SAI SIDDI SRIKHAR
2. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR (AP)
3.
The Court made the following:
ORDER:
The present Criminal Revision Case has been preferred under Sections
397 and 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for brevity, “the
Cr.P.C.”), challenging the judgment dated 11.07.2019 passed in Crl.A. No.57
of 2016, whereby the learned Appellate Court confirmed the judgment dated
30.11.2015 passed by the learned V Additional Junior Civil Judge, Guntur, in
C.C. No.276 of 2014, acquitting Respondent Nos.1 to 4 of the charges
punishable under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 3 and
4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (for brevity, “the D.P. Act“).
2. Sri G. Naga Satyanarayana, learned Legal Aid Counsel for the
Petitioner, while reiterating the grounds urged in the revision, submits that the
judgment of the learned Appellate Court is not in accordance with the evidence
on record. He submitted that the impugned judgment is perverse and
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Crl.R.C.No.1263 of 2019
Dated 22.06.2026
unsustainable in law. He further therefore prayed that this Court interfere with
and set aside the impugned judgment and either remand the matter to the
Appellate Court for fresh disposal in accordance with law or pass such other
appropriate orders as this Court may deem fit.
3. Mr K. Sandeep, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor also argued that on
the similar lines and submits that appreciation of the evidence is not feasible in
exercising the revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 and 401 of ‘the
Cr.P.C.,’ inasmuch as the learned Trial Court having appreciated the evidence
of the witnesses of the prosecution on correct perspective disbelieved the
story of the prosecution and acquitted Respondent Nos.1 to 4 and urged to
dismiss the Criminal Revision Case.
4. Sri D.V.S. Siddi Srikar, learned Legal Aid Counsel for Respondent Nos.
1 to 4, concurred with the submissions made by the learned Assistant Public
Prosecutor and contended that the judgment confirming the acquittal of the
unofficial respondents is valid and in accordance with the principles governing
appreciation of evidence. He submitted that there is no perversity in the
findings recorded by the Courts below and no material irregularity warranting
interference. He therefore prayed for dismissal of the Criminal Revision Case.
He further submitted that the evidence of the prosecution witnesses cannot be
re-appreciated at the revisional stage unless the findings suffer from patent
illegality, perversity, or material irregularity.
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Crl.R.C.No.1263 of 2019
Dated 22.06.2026
5. Thoughtful consideration is bestowed on the arguments advanced by
the learned Counsel for both sides. I have perused the entire record.
6. Now the point for consideration is:
“Whether the judgment in C.C.No.276 of 2014 dated 30.11.2015,
passed by the learned V Additional Junior Civil Judge, Guntur, is correct,
legal, and proper with respect to its finding, sentence, or judgment, and
there are any material irregularities? And to what relief?”
7. While deciding a Criminal Revision Case filed against acquittal of
accused, it is apposite to refer the Hon’ble Apex Court in Bindeshwari
Prasad Singh v State of Bihar 1wherein at Paragraph No.13 it is held as
under:
“13. … In the absence of any legal infirmity either in the procedure
or in the conduct of the trial, there was no justification for the High Court
to interfere in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. It has repeatedly been
held that the High Court should not re-appreciate the evidence to reach
a finding different from the trial Court. In the absence of manifest
illegality resulting in grave miscarriage of justice, exercise of revisional
jurisdiction in such cases is not warranted.”
8. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in D Stephens v Nosibolla2 at Paragraph
No.10 held as under:
“The revisional jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under S.
439, Cr.P.C., is not to be lightly exercised, when it is invoked by a
private complainant against an order of acquittal, against which the
Govt. has o right of appeal under S. 417. It could be exercised only in
exceptional cases where the interests of public justice require
interference for the correction of a manifest illegality, or the prevention of
a gross miscarriage of justice. This jurisdiction is not ordinarily invoked
or used merely because the lower court has taken a wrong view of the
law or mis-appreciated the evidence on record.”
9. The Hon’ble Apex Court in K Chinnaswamy Reddy v State of AP3, at
Paragraph No.7 held as under:
1
(2002) 6 SCC 650
2
AIR 1951 SC 196
5
Dr.YLR, J
Crl.R.C.No.1263 of 2019
Dated 22.06.2026“7. It is true that it is open to a High Court in revision to set aside
an order of acquittal even at the instance of private parties, though the
State may not have thought fit to appeal; but this jurisdiction should in
our opinion be exercised by the High Court only in exceptional cases,
when there is some glaring defect in the procedure or there is a manifest
error on a point of law and consequently there has been a flagrant
miscarriage of justice. Sub-section (4) of S. 439 forbids a High Court
from converting a finding of acquittal into one of conviction and that
makes it all the more incumbent on the High Court to see that it does
not, convert the finding of acquittal into one of conviction by the indirect
method of ordering retrial when it cannot itself directly convert a finding
of acquittal into a finding of conviction. This places limitations on the
power of the High Court to set aside a finding of acquittal in revision and
it is only in exceptional cases that this power should be exercised. It is
not possible to lay down the criteria for determining such exceptional
cases which would cover all contingencies. We may, however, indicate
some cases of this kind which would in our opinion justify the High Court
in interfering with a finding of acquittal in revision. These cases may be:
where the trial court has no jurisdiction to try the case but has still
acquitted the accused, or where the trial court has wrongly shut out
evidence which the prosecution wished to produce. or where the appeal
court has wrongly held evidence which was admitted by the trial court to
be inadmissible, or where material evidence has been overlooked either
by the trial court or by the appeal court, or where the acquittal is based
on a compounding of the offence, which is invalid under the law. These
and other cases of similar nature can properly be held to be cases of
exceptional nature, where the High Court can justifiably interfere with an
order of acquittal; an in such a case it is obvious that it cannot be said
that the High Court was doing indirectly what it could not do directly in
view of the provisions of S. 439 (4). We have, therefore, to see whether
the order of the High Court setting aside the order of acquittal in this
case can be upheld on these principles.”
10. In Mahendra Pratap Singh v Sarju Singh4, at paragraph Nos.7 and 8
it is held as under:
“7. In revision, the learned Judge in the High Court went into the
evidence very minutely. He questioned every single finding of the
learned Sessions Judge and gave his own interpretation of the evidence
and the inferences to be drawn from it. He discounted the theory that the
weapon of attack was a revolver and suggested that it might have been
a shot gun or country made pistol which the villagers in the position of
Kuldip and Sarju could not distinguish from a revolver. He then took up
each single circumstance on which the learned Sessions Judge had
found some doubt and interpreting the evidence de novo held, contrary
to the opinion of the Sessions Judge that they were acceptable. All the
time he appeared to give the benefit of the doubt to the prosecution. The
only error of law which the learned Judge found in the Sessions Judge’s
3
AIR 1962 SC 1788
4
AIR 1968 SC 707
6
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Crl.R.C.No.1263 of 2019
Dated 22.06.2026judgment was a remark by the Sessions Judge that the defence
witnesses who were examined by the police before they were brought as
defence witness ought to have been cross-examined with reference to
their previous statements recorded by the police, which obviously is
against the provisions of the Code. Except for this error, no defect of
procedure or of law was discovered by the learned judge of the High
Court in his appraisal of the judgment of the Sessions Judge. As stated
already by us, he seems to have gone into the matter as if an appeal
against acquittal was before him making no distinction between the
appellate and the revisional powers exercisable by the High Court in
matters of acquittal except to the extent that instead of convicting the
appellant he only ordered his retrial. In our opinion, the learned judge
was clearly in error in proceeding as he did in a revision filed by a private
party against the acquittal reached in the Court of Session.
8.The practice on the subject has been stated by this Court on
more than one occasion, In D. Stephens v. Nosibolla, 1951 SCR 254 =
(AIR 1951 SC 196), only two grounds are mentioned by this Court as
entitling the High Court to set aside an acquittal in a revision and to
order a retrial. They are that there must exist a manifest illegality in the
judgment of the Court of Session ordering the acquittal or there must be
a gross miscarriage of justice. In explaining these two propositions, this
Court further states that the High Court is not entitled to interfere even if
a wrong view of law is taken by the Court of Session or if even there is
mis-appreciation of evidence. Again, in Logendranath Jha v. Polailal
Biswas, 1951 SCR 676 = (AIR 1951 SC 316), this Court points out that
the High Court is entitled in revision to set aside an acquittal if there is
an error on a point of law or no appraisal of the evidence at all. This
Court observes that it is not sufficient to say that the judgment under
revision is “perverse” or “lacking in true correct perspective”. It is pointed
out further that by ordering a retrial, the dice is loaded against the
accused, because however much the High Court may caution the
Subordinate Court, it is always difficult to re-weigh the evidence ignoring
the opinion of the High Court. Again in K Chinnaswamy Reddy v. State
of Andhra Pradesh, 1963 (3) SCR 412 = (AIR 1962 SC 1788), it is
pointed out that an interference in revision with an order of acquittal can
only take place if there is a glaring defect of procedure such as that the
Court had no jurisdiction to try the case or the Court had shut out some
material evidence which was admissible or attempted to take into
account evidence which was not admissible or had overlooked some
evidence. Although the list given by this Court is not exhaustive of all the
circumstances in which the High Court may interfere with an acquittal in
revision it is obvious that the defect in the judgment under revision must
be analogous to those actually indicated by this Court. As stated not one
of these points which have been laid down by this Court was covered in
the present case. In fact on reading the judgment of the High Court it is
apparent to us that the learned judge has re-weighed the evidence from
his own point of view and reached inferences contrary to those of the
Sessions judge on almost every point. This we do not conceive to be his
duty in dealing in revision with an acquittal when Government has not
chosen to file an appeal against it. In other words, the learned Judge in
the High Court has not attended to the rules laid down by this Court and
has acted in breach of them.”
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Crl.R.C.No.1263 of 2019
Dated 22.06.2026
11. In Kotaiah v. G. Venkateshwara5, at paragraph Nos.19, 20 & 21 it is
held as under:
“19. We are of the opinion that the entire approach made by
the High Court in dealing with the Criminal Revision filed against
acquittal by the private party is contrary to the principles laid down
in the decisions referred to above. Notwithstanding the fact that
sub-section (4) of Section 439 does not authorise the High Court
to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction, it has in fact
contravened this provision by recording a finding of guilt against
the accused and directing the Trial Court to convict them after a
retrial. There is no question of lack of jurisdiction in the Trial Court
to try the case; nor was any attack made that any evidence has
been shut out at the trial. Whether the dying declaration, Ext. P.
15, by Ratnababu can be taken into account regarding the attack
on Koteswara Rao, is a matter which the Trial Court was entitled
to decide one way or the other. If its view was wrong, the High
Court could have gone into that aspect and differed from this
opinion of the Sessions Court if the State had filed an appeal
against acquittal. Further the mere fact that the learned Trial
Judge held that this piece of evidence is not relevant, while
considering the attack on Koteswara Rao, does not amount to
shutting out of evidence at the trial. In fact that evidence had
already come on record. Therefore, in this case there has been no
shutting out at the trial of any evidence which the prosecution
wanted to adduce or the defence wanted to lead. All available
evidence has been let in by both the prosecution and the accused.
20. Nor can it be stated that there has been any glaring
defect in the procedure or a manifest error on a point of law and
consequently leading to a flagrant miscarriage of justice. As
mentioned earlier, sub-section (4) of Section 439 forbids a High
Court from converting a finding of acquittal into one of conviction
by an indirect method of ordering retrial when the High Court itself
cannot directly convert a finding of acquittal into a finding of
conviction. The High Court, in our opinion, has missed these very
important limitations on its power to set aside the finding of
acquittal in revision which could be done only in very exceptional
circumstances. In the case on hand, the High Court was not
justified in considering the evidence in such detail if it was really
going to order a retrial. Such a detailed consideration of evidence
and an expression of opinion about the guilt of the accused, in our
opinion, has really loaded the dice against the accused when the
case goes back for retrial. Much stress has been laid by the High
Court that though substantive charges had been framed against
the accused read with Section 34 or alternatively with Section 1495
AIR 1973 SC 1274
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Crl.R.C.No.1263 of 2019
Dated 22.06.2026I.P.C. the Trial Court has not recorded any finding in this regard.
Here again, the High Court’s view is erroneous. We have already
referred to the finding recorded by the Trial Court that in view of
the definite case of the prosecution and the nature of the
evidence, none of the accused can be held constructively liable. It
is on that ground that the Trial Court has not found the accused
constructively guilty.
21. We have indicated the reasons, which promoted the High
Court to order a retrial. The consequence of this will be to put
considerable strain on the accused who have already gone
through a trial at considerable stress and expense. After going
through the judgment of the learned Sessions Judge, we cannot
certainly say, particularly in view of the evidence on record that
either the acquittal of the twenty-two accused or the acquittal of
the eight convicted accused of the rest of the charges was not
justified. At any rate, it may be safely stated that the learned
Sessions Judge has taken into account all the relevant
circumstances. It may be that there are slight mistakes in some of
the reasons given by him but the judgment asa whole shows that
he has really applied his mind to the various pieces of evidence
before passing the order of acquittal in the manner he has done. In
the particular circumstances of this case, the interference in
revision by the High Court at the instance of the private party was
not justified. The two appeals filed by the convicted accused,
namely, Criminal Appeals Nos. 201 and 202 of 1969 have not
been dealt with by the High Court on merits. The appellants
therein have a right to have those appeals heard and disposed of
by the High Court according to law.”
12. In Amar Chand v. Shanti Bose 6 at Paragraph No.20 it is held as
under:
“20. Even assuming that the High Court was exercising
jurisdiction under Section 439, in our opinion, the present was not
a case for interference by the High Court. The Jurisdiction of the
High Court is to be exercised normally under Section 439, Criminal
Procedure Code, only in exceptional cases, when there is a
glaring defect in the procedure or there is a manifest error of point
of law and consequently there has been a flagrant miscarriage of
the justice. The High Court has not found any of these
circumstances to exist in the case before us for quashing the
charge and the further proceedings.”
6
AIR 1973 SC 799
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Crl.R.C.No.1263 of 2019
Dated 22.06.2026
13. In SatyendraNath v. Ram Narain 7 at Paragraph No.16 it is held as
under:
“16. The High Court has thus transgressed the narrow limits
of its revisional jurisdiction under Section 439 (4) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure. The judgment of the Sessions Court did not
suffer from any manifest illegality and the interests of justice did
not require the High Court to interfere with the order of acquittal
passed by the Sessions Court. Any fair assessment of the
evidence of the eye-witnesses would show that the acquittal of the
appellants led to no miscarriage of justice.”
14. In Pathumma v. Muhammad8 at Paragraph No.6 it is held as under:
“…We are afraid, the learned Judge of the High Court,
committed an error in making a re-assessment of the evidence
and coming to a finding that the appellant No. 2 was not the
illegitimate child of the respondent. We have ourselves considered
the evidence on record and we agree with the learned Magistrate,
who had taken much pains in analysing the evidence, that the
appellant No. 2 was the illegitimate child of the respondent. The
High Court in its revisional jurisdiction was not justified in
substituting its own view for that of the learned Magistrate on a
question of fact.”
15. Keeping in view of all the principles laid down in the judgments referred
supra, I shall proceed to decide this Revision Case without there being any
iota of re-appreciation of evidence by sitting like a Second Appellate Court.
Therefore, appreciation of the evidence is not practically possible and feasible.
16. On a careful perusal of the entire judgment of the learned Appellate
Court, there is no perversity. There is no flagrant miscarriage of justice and
there were no material irregularities. Therefore, the judgment of the learned
Appellate Court is required to be upheld by dismissing the Revision Case.
7
AIR 1975 SC 580
8
AIR 1986 SC 1436
10
Dr.YLR, J
Crl.R.C.No.1263 of 2019
Dated 22.06.2026
17. For the above reasons, the Criminal Revision Case fails and is,
accordingly, dismissed. No order as to costs.
As a sequel, interlocutory applications, if any pending, shall stand
closed.
_________________________
Dr. Y. LAKSHMANA RAO, J
Dt: 22.06.2026
KMS
Whether the order is :
Speaking Yes/No / Recorded Yes/No
Reportable Yes/No / Non-Reportable Yes/No
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Dr.YLR, J
Crl.R.C.No.1263 of 2019
Dated 22.06.2026220
THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO
CRIMINAL REVISION CASE NO: 1263/2019
Date: 22.06.2026
KMS
