Madhya Pradesh High Court
Pradeep Kumar Sharma vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 20 July, 2026
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:21645
1 WP. No. 18585 of 2022
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT G WA L I O R
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ANAND SINGH BAHRAWAT
ON THE 20th OF JULY, 2026
WRIT PETITION No. 18585 of 2022
PRADEEP KUMAR SHARMA
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Bhupendra Singh Dhakad - Advocate for petitioner.
Shri B.M. Patel - learned Government Advocate for respondent/State.
ORDER
This petition, under Article 226 of Constitution of India, has been filed
seeking the following relief (s):-
“A. That, charge sheet Annexure P/1 and Letter/order Annexure P/2
issued by the respondent no. 2 and respondent no.3 may kindly be
quashed in the interest of justice.
B. That, any other relief doing justice including cost of litigation
may kindly be ordered in favour of petitioner.”
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: MOHD AHMAD
Signing time: 7/20/2026
7:19:25 PM
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:21645
2 WP. No. 18585 of 2022
2. Learned counsel for petitioner submits that petitioner is a municipal
employee and his substantive post is that of Revenue Sub-Inspector. It is further
submitted that the services of the petitioner are governed by the Madhya Pradesh
Municipal Employees (Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1968.
Learned counsel further submits that vide order dated 10.07.2020, respondent
No. 2 issued a charge-sheet to the petitioner alleging that he had committed
financial embezzlement while posted as In-charge Chief Municipal Officer
(CMO), Nagar Palika Parishad, Sabalgarh, District Morena.
3. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent/State submits that the
controversy involved in the present case has already been decided by a
Coordinate Bench of this Court at the Indore Bench in IKrar Ahmed v. State of
M.P. and Others, vide order dated 28.03.2019 passed in W.P. No. 600/2018. It is
submitted that after considering the provisions contained in Sections 89 and 90 of
the M.P. State Municipal Service (Executive) Rules, 1973, the Coordinate Bench
held that the Additional Commissioner had the jurisdiction to issue a charge-
sheet to the petitioner, who, at the relevant time, was working as In-charge CMO.
4. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
5. The Co-ordinate Bench of this Court at Indore in the case of Ikrar Ahmed
v. State of M.P. and others [W.P. No.600/2018 decide on 28.3.2019] has held as
under:
3/ This writ petition has been filed by petitioner challenging the
charge sheet dated 21/9/2017 issued by Additional Commissioner
Urban Administration and Development as also the communicationsSignature Not Verified
Signed by: MOHD AHMAD
Signing time: 7/20/2026
7:19:25 PM
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:216453 WP. No. 18585 of 2022
dated 16/11/2017 sent by Additional Commissioner to the Collector
and 27/12/2017 sent by Incharge officer for Collector to the Chief
Municipal Officer Talen.
4/ Learned counsel for petitioner submits that substantive appointment
of petitioner is on the post of Revenue Inspector, therefore, the
Commissioner Urban Administration and Development is not the
competent authority to issue the chargesheet to petitioner. She submits
that petitioner being the revenue inspector is not a member of State
Municipal Services, therefore, the disciplinary power vests with
Municipal Council. In this regard she has referred to Section 94 & 95
of Municipalities Act, 1961 and Rule 2(e) of 2(f) of MP Municipal
Employees (Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1968 as
also Rule 32 of MP State Municipal Service (Executive) Rules 1973.
She has further submitted that in terms of Rule 56(3) of Rules of 1968
appeal lies to Commissioner, therefore, commissioner cannot issue the
charge sheet.
5/ As against this learned counsel for respondents have supported the
impugned action by submitting that petitioner during the relevant time
was posted as Chief Municipal Officer and therefore, the
Commissioner is competent to issue chargesheet in view of the
provisions contained in Sections 89, 90 and 90(4) of Municipalities
Act. They have further submitted that the issue involved in the present
case is covered by the judgment of the Division Bench.
6/ I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the
record.
7/ The petitioner was initially appointed as Private Secretary in the
Municipal Council and on abolition of said post vide order dated
29/7/97 he was appointed by Collector and Administrator Municipal
council Raghogadh as revenue inspector. The petitioner thereafter was
posted as Incharge Chief Municipal Officer Rajgadh and vide order
dated 14/7/2012 he was posted as Incharge Chief Municipal Officer
Talen and thereafter vide order dated 6th September 2013 he was
transferred and posted as Incharge CMO Biaora and subsequently heSignature Not Verified
Signed by: MOHD AHMAD
Signing time: 7/20/2026
7:19:25 PM
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:216454 WP. No. 18585 of 2022
was posted as Chief Municipal Officer Vidisha and said order was
modified by order dated 3rd August 2015 transferring and posting him
as Incharge CMO Rajgadh. The charge in the charge sheet issued to
petitioner relates to the year 2013 when the petitioner was working as
Incharge Chief Municipal Officer in the municipal council.
8/ The question relating to competency of Commissioner to take
disciplinary action against the Incharge Chief Municipal Officer
(substantive post Revenue Inspector) has been considered by the
Division Bench of this court in the matter of Anand Sharma Vs. State
of MP and others reported in (2007) 5 MPHT 85. The Division Bench
after considering Sections 89, 90 and specially sections 89 (1A) and
90(4) of MP Municipalities Act 1961 has held that State Government
exercises control over the Incharge Chief Municipal Officer and the
Commissioner has jurisdiction over the Incharge Chief Municipal
Officer for all purposes including disciplinary action and suspension.
9/ Division Bench in case of Anand Sharma (supra)has held as under:
“7. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, we
have also perused the factual aspect of the matter as well
as the provisions cited by the learned counsels for the
parties. Relevant provisions of Section 89 and 90 of the
M.P. Municipalities Act, 1961 are being reproduced
below :
“89. Appointment to State Municipal Service pending
constitution thereof etc.
(1) Pending the constitution of the State Municipal
Service under sub-section (1) of Section 86 or when no
member of such service is available for appointment as
Chief Municipal Officer. Health Officer or Engineer, as
the case may be, the State Government may depute an
officer of Government or appoint any person qualified to
be a member of such service to act as Chief Municipal
Officer, Health Officer or Engineer, as the case may be.
(1-A) The State Government shall have powers of control
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: MOHD AHMAD
Signing time: 7/20/2026
7:19:25 PM
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:21645
5 WP. No. 18585 of 2022
over the persons appointed under sub-section (1) and
may transfer any person appointed thereunder from one
council to another.
(2) *** *** *** ***
90 Arrangement during leave of absence of Chief
Municipal Officer.-
(1) The State Government may grant leave of absence to
the Chief Municipal Officer.
(2) During any absence on leave of the Chief Municipal
Officer for a period of not exceeding thirty days at a time
the State Government may appoint a person to act as the
Chief Municipal Officer.
(3) During any absence on leave of the Chief Municipal
Officer for a period not exceeding thirty days at a time,
the State Government may make such local arrangement
for carrying on the duties and functions of the Chief
Municipal Officer as may be necessary.
(4) Every person appointed under sub-section (2) or (3)
shall exercise all powers conferred and perform the
duties imposed on the Chief Municipal Officer by or
under this Act or by or under any enactment for the time
being in force and shall be subject to the same liabilities,
restrictions and conditions to which the Chief Municipal
Officer is liable.
8. On bare perusal of the aforesaid provisions of Sections
89 (1-A) and 90 (4) of the Act of 1961, it is clear that
Section 89 provides powers to the State Government that
when no member of such service is available for
appointment as Chief Municipal Officer, the State
Government may depute an officer of Government or
appoint any person qualified to be a member of such
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: MOHD AHMAD
Signing time: 7/20/2026
7:19:25 PM
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:21645
6 WP. No. 18585 of 2022
service to act as Chief Municipal Officer, as the case may
be. Sub-section (1-A) of Section 89 of the Act of 1961
further provides that the State Government shall have
powers of control over the persons appointed under sub-
section (1) and may transfer any person appointed
thereunder from one council to another. Section 90 (1) of
the Act of 1961 provides for making arrangements during
leave of absence of Chief Municipal Officers and in that
case, the State Government may grant leave of absence
to the Chief Municipal Officer and sub-section (4)
provides that every person appointed under sub section
(2) or (3) shall exercise all powers conferred, and
perform the duties imposed on the Chief Municipal
Officer by or under this Act or by or under any enactment
for the time being in force and shall be subject to the
same liabilities, restrictions and conditions to which the
Chief Municipal Officer is liable. Therefore, on the plain
reading of Section 89 specifically provides power to the
State Government to appoint any person as Chief
Municipal Officer and to exercise the powers of control
over him and Section 90 clearly provides that in any
contingency when a regular person is on leave of
absence, the State Government can appoint any other
person to perform the duties of the C.M.O. imposed by or
under this Act or by or under any enactment for the time
being in force and shall also exercise all powers
conferred on him and in that case, he shall be subject to
the same liabilities, restrictions and conditions to which
the Chief Municipal Officer is liable.
9. The words “powers of control” have been used in
subsection (1-A) of Section 89 of the Act of 1961. In
common parlance the meaning of word “control: is also
to govern, to dominate, to rule and direct and to have
under command and authority over, to have authority
over the particular matter. In the case of Bharat Bhushan
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: MOHD AHMAD
Signing time: 7/20/2026
7:19:25 PM
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:21645
7 WP. No. 18585 of 2022
v. Cinema and City Magistrate reported in AIR 1956
Allahabad 99, the Division Bench of Allahabad High
Court has held that :
“The word “control” is not confined to mere
regulation. It is more comprehensive and includes
domination or command over an inferior. No doubt,
the State Government can lay down general rules or
instructions for the guidance of the District
Magistrate in the exercise of his discretion. But the
“control” envisaged in the section is not confined to
the issuing of mere general directions; it includes an
interference on the part of the State Government with
the individual decision of a particular case by the
District Magistrate.”
In the case of Corporation of the City of Nagpur v.
Ramchandra G. Modak reported in AIR 1984 SC 626,
it was held by the Supreme Court that:
“The term “control” is of a very wide connotation and
amplitude and includes a large variety of powers
which are incidental or consequential to achieve the
powers vested in the authority concerned. Section 59
(3) (b) of the City of Nagpur Corporation Act of
1950, in express terms authorises and clothes the
Municipal Commissioner with the power to exercise
supervision and control over the acts of Municipal
Officers and servants. It was held that the
Commissioner, Municipal Corporation functions the
power to suspend Municipal employee pending
departmental enquiry. The Supreme Court has held
that when the words “control” and “vests” are read
together, they are storing terms which convey an
absolute control in the authority in order to effectuate
the policy underlying the rules and makes the
authority concerned the sole custodian of the controlSignature Not Verified
Signed by: MOHD AHMAD
Signing time: 7/20/2026
7:19:25 PM
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:216458 WP. No. 18585 of 2022
of the servants and officers of the Municipal
Corporation. The term “control” is of a very wide
connotation and amplitude and includes a large
variety of powers which are incidental or
consequential to achieve the powers vested in the
authority concerned. Suspension form service
pending disciplinary enquiry falls within the ambit of
the word “control”.
In the case of State of West Bengal v. Nripendra Nath
Bagehi reported in AIR 1966 SC 467 while interpreting a
similar language employed in Article 235 of the
Constitution of India which confers control by the High
Court over District Courts, the Supreme Court held that
the word “Control” would include the power to take
disciplinary action and all other incidental or
consequential steps to effectuate this end. In the light of
Article 235 of the Constitution of India, in which the
word “control” has been used, it was held that the High
Court is made the sole custodian of the control over the
subordinate judiciary, therefore, is not merely the power
to arrange the day to day working of the court but
contemplate disciplinary jurisdiction over the Presiding
Judge. Again in the case of Chief Justice of High Court
of Andhra Pradesh v. VVS. Krishnamurthy reported in
1979 SC Page 193, the Supreme Court has held that:
The word “control” included the passing of an order
of suspension and that the power of control was
comprehensive and effective in operation. In this
connection Sarkaria, J. speaking for the Court,
observed that under Article 235, control of the High
Court is exclusive in nature, comprehensive in extent
and effective in operation. It comprehends a wide
variety of matters. Among others, it includes : (a)
Disciplinary jurisdiction and a complete control, andSignature Not Verified
Signed by: MOHD AHMAD
Signing time: 7/20/2026
7:19:25 PM
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:216459 WP. No. 18585 of 2022
in exercising of this control, the High Court can hold
inquiries against a member of the subordinate
judiciary, impose punishment other than dismissal or
removal.
While considering the meaning of the word “control”
under Article 235, the Hon’ble Supreme Court again in
the case of Baradakanta Mishra v. High Court of Orissa
reported in AIR 1976 SC 1899 has held that:
“The word “control” means something in addition to
that mere superintendence of the Courts. The control
is over the conduct and discipline of Judges. The
High Court can make enquiries into the disciplinary
conduct under the power of control.”
Therefore, according to the aforesaid interpretation, it is
clear that the meaning of word “control” implies not only
a dominant or controlling the management, but it is
exercised by superior authority in exercise of its superior
powers which clearly mean to regulate and to hold and to
enquire disciplinary jurisdiction.
10. Admittedly, in this case, there is no dispute about the
facts of the case. Vide order dated 18.5.05, the appellant
was made as Incharge C.M.O. of Nagar Panchayat,
Phoopkalan, and he was continuously working on that
post and performing the duties and exercising all powers
of C.M.O.; and for committing some irregularities, he
was placed under suspension vide order dated 19.7.2006,
i.e., after a period of 14 months, which also clearly
indicates that his additional charge was not of a
temporary in nature for a particular period, but he was
continuously enjoying the powers of Chief Municipal
Officer. As has been argued by the learned counsel for
the appellant, the question in this case is whether, under
these circumstances, the order passed by the
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: MOHD AHMAD
Signing time: 7/20/2026
7:19:25 PM
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:21645
10 WP. No. 18585 of 2022
Commissioner-cum-Secretary for placing him under
suspension can be covered within the provisions of
subsection (1-A) of Section 89 under the power of
control and sub-section (4) of Section 90 of the Act of
1961. Though Snri M.P.S. Raghuwanshi vehemently
argued, but considering the aforesaid provisions and
background of the facts, and the clear meaning of word
“power of control” we are also of the same view that if an
officer though not promoted under the cadre of C.M.O.,
but if he was given additional charge or was made
Incharge C.M.O. and was exercising the powers of the
post, was under the “control” of the State Government as
provided in sub-section (1-A) of Section 89 read with
sub-section (4) of Section 90 of the Act of 1961.
Subsection (1-A) of Section 89 provides the powers to
the State Government to “control over” the person and
the person so appointed shall exercise all the powers and
perform the duties imposed on him under the Act and he
shall be subject to the same liabilities, restrictions and
conditions to which the Chief Municipal Officer is liable.
The plain and simple interpretation of the aforesaid
provisions is that if a person is exercising the powers and
performing the duties, the State Government shall have
the powers to control over the person, therefore, at this
stage, he cannot argue that his suspension is illegal or
without jurisdiction. In fact, power of suspension is
included in power to control. Admittedly, the order
Annexure P/2 for posting him as an Incharge C.M.O. has
been passed by the State Government and during that
period he was under the control of the Government,
therefore, for committing irregularities the
Commissioner-cum-Secretary of the Urban
Administration & Development M.P. was fully
competent not only to recall the aforesaid order but to
place him under suspension because when the order was
passed by the State Government to permit him to perform
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: MOHD AHMAD
Signing time: 7/20/2026
7:19:25 PM
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:21645
11 WP. No. 18585 of 2022
the duties as a C.M.O., the order was under same
liabilities, restrictions and conditions and in that case it
cannot be argued that the State Government shall have no
powers to suspend him and for that purpose looking to
his original cadre or the original post it is the only Nagar
Panchayat which can pass orders. Though the learned
counsel for the respondents could not point out whether
the order was approved by the President or not nor any
such order has been filed or placed on record before us,
but even otherwise even if the order is not approved by
the President or by Nagar Panchayat, Phoopkalan, the
order passed by the Commissioner-cum-Secretary will
not be illegal and without jurisdiction because he, for that
purpose when, he was working on the post of Incharge
CMO, was directly under the control of the State
Government for all purposes including for disciplinary
action and suspension.
10. In view of the above, we hold that when appellant
was holding the charge of the post of C.M.O. on the
orders passed by the State Government, he shall be under
the control of the State Government and the State
Government shall have powers to control his services
and for taking disciplinary action against him including
suspension. Consequently, we do not find any scope for
interference in this writ appeal filed by the learned
counsel for the appellant. Consequently, this appeal fails
and is hereby dismissed.”
10/ Hence the issue which the petitioner has raised in the present case
is squarely covered by aforesaid Division Bench judgment against the
petitioner.
11/ In view of this petitioner is not entitled to the benefit of Single
Bench orders dated 4/12/17 in WP No. 2889/17 in the matter of
Maksood Ali Sayyed Vs. State of MP & connected writ petitions;
23/2/18 passed in WP No. 5699/17 in the matter of Pradeep Kumar
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: MOHD AHMAD
Signing time: 7/20/2026
7:19:25 PM
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:21645
12 WP. No. 18585 of 2022
Sharma Vs. State of MP ; 3/1/18 passed in WP No. 3755/17 in the
matter of Sanjay Kanungo Vs. State of MP & others; 18/12/17 passed
in WP No. 5578/17 & 5669/17 in the matter of Ravindra Borde Vs.
The State of MP and others; 15/5/12, passed in WP No. 13847/10 in
the matter of Sujjet Kumar Nigam Vs. State of MP and others; Jagdish
Chandra Vs. Collector District Dewas reported in 2007(2) MPHT 449;
12/ Learned counsel for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgments
of the Supreme court in the matters of Municipal Corporation of Delhi
Vs. Gurnam Kaur reported in (1989) 1 SCC 101; Arnit Das Vs. State
of Bihar reported in (2000) 5 SCC 488; Divisional Controller KSRTC
Vs. Mahadeva Shetty and another reported in (2003) 7 SCC 197 and
has made an unsuccessful attempt to contend that observation made
by Division Bench in case of Anand Sharma (supra) are obiter and
relevant rules of 1968 and 1973 have not been considered.
13/ The Division Bench has duly examined the scheme of the Act and
power of state government to take action against the incharge CMO in
the light of the provisions contained in Sections 89 and 90 of Act. The
conclusion so arrived at by the the Division Bench after analyzing the
legal position is not an obiter, therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to
the benefit of aforesaid judgments.
14/ Having regard to the above analysis, I am of the opinion that
Additional Commissioner has committed no error in issuing the
impugned charge sheet to petitioner who during the relevant time was
working as incharge Chief Municipal Officer.
15/ It is worth noting that no other arguments have been advanced
before this court.
16/ Hence I do not find any merit in these writ petitions which are
accordingly dismissed. Signed order has been kept in the file of WP
no. 600/18 and a copy thereof has been placed in the record of
connected writ petition.
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: MOHD AHMAD
Signing time: 7/20/2026
7:19:25 PM
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:21645
13 WP. No. 18585 of 2022
6. The Division Bench in the case of Mahesh Kumar Wore vs. State of M.P.
& Others (W.A. No.1213/2019 decided on 10.12.2019) has held as under:
“The aforesaid order makes is very clear that even in case a person is
serving as in-charge of CMO or is holding additional charge of the
post of CMO,he is under the control of State Government and
therefore, once he is under the Control of State Government, the
Commissioner was well within his power to pass the order of
punishment. This Court does not find any reasoning to interfere with
the order passed by the learned Single Judge. The admission is
declined.
The petitioner shall certainly be free to avail alternate remedy. The
observations made in the present order as well as in the order passed
by the learned Single Judge, will not come in way of the appellant, in
case appeal is preferred before the appellate Authority.
The appellate Authority shall decide the appeal on merits in case
appeal is prefer within 30 days from the date of this order. With the
aforesaid, the appeal stands disposed of.”
7. In view of the foregoing discussion and taking into consideration the entire
facts and circumstances of the present case, this Court is of the considered view
that no case is made out warranting interference.
8. Ex. Consequenti, petition fails and is hereby dismissed.
(Anand Singh Bahrawat)
Judge
Ahmad
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: MOHD AHMAD
Signing time: 7/20/2026
7:19:25 PM
