Supreme Court – Daily Orders
Poonam Dabas vs The State Of Nct Of Delhi on 13 July, 2026
ITEM NO.41 COURT NO.11 SECTION II-D
S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No(s). 17149/2025
[Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 03-12-2024
in CRLMC No. 4459/2022 passed by the High Court of Delhi at New
Delhi]
POONAM DABAS Petitioner(s)
VERSUS
THE STATE OF NCT OF DELHI & ANR. Respondent(s)
IA No. 122459/2025 - PERMISSION TO APPEAR AND ARGUE IN PERSON
IA No. 122460/2025 - PERMISSION TO FILE ADDITIONAL
DOCUMENTS/FACTS/ANNEXURES
Date : 13-07-2026 This matter was called on for hearing today.
CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANOJ MISRA
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIJAY BISHNOI
For Petitioner(s) : Petitioner-in-person
For Respondent(s) :
Mr. Gagan Gupta, Sr. Adv.
Mr. V.P. Rana, Adv.
Mr. Rajat Rana, Adv.
Mr. Rishab Singh, Adv.
Mr. Sandeep Singh, AOR
Mr. Mukesh Kumar Maroria, AOR
Mr. Davinder Pal Singh, A.S.G.
Mr. Mukul Singh, Adv.
Mr. Udit Dediya, Adv.
Mr. Raman Yadav, Adv.
Mr. Padmesh Mishra, Adv.
Mr. S.N. Terdal (AOR), Adv.
UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
O R D E R
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
CHETAN ARORA
Date: 2026.07.14
1. We have heard petitioner-in-person and Mr. Gagan Gupta,
17:40:48 IST
Reason:
learned senior counsel for the second respondent.
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2. The petitioner seeks leave to impugn judgment and order
of the High Court1 dated 03.12.2024 passed in Criminal M.C.
4459/2022, Criminal M.A. 18191/2022 and Criminal M.A.
4675/2023.
3. The second respondent (Vijay Dev Dabas) applied for
mutation in the revenue records on death of his father
claiming himself to be the sole legal heir of his father. As
he had surviving sisters (one of them is the petitioner), a
complaint was made that the second respondent had made a
false statement in an affidavit before the Revenue Court to
seek mutation. The said complaint, though titled as one under
Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 19732, was
treated as one under Section 156(3) of CrPC and, vide order
dated 31.07.2021, the learned Magistrate directed Station
House Officer of the Police Station concerned to register a
First Information Report (“FIR”) and proceed accordingly.
4. Pursuant to the order dated 31.07.2021, FIR No. 605 of
2021 came to be registered at P.S. Bawana for offences
punishable under Sections 193/199 of the Indian Penal Code,
18603. The concerned police thereafter carried out
investigation and submitted a police report under Section 173
of CrPC on 04.10.2021.
5. Based on the said police report, on 28.06.2022,
Metropolitan Magistrate (Vth), North District, Rohini Courts,
Delhi took cognizance and summoned the second respondent.
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The High Court of Delhi at New Delhi
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CrPC
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IPC
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6. Aggrieved therewith, the second respondent filed a
Criminal Revision before the Sessions Court. Simultaneously,
the second respondent invoked the jurisdiction of the High
Court under Section 482 of CrPC seeking the following
reliefs:
"a) Quash the FIR No.605/2021 dated
06.08.2021 under Section 193/199 of the
Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) Police
Station Bawana, District North, Delhi and
final report dated 03.10.2021 under Section
173 of Cr.P.C. submitted by the police of
the said FIR and;
b) Quash the summoning order dated
28.06.2022 and proceedings in Criminal Case
No.8969/2021 pending before MM-05, North
District Rohini Courts Delhi; and/or
c) Pass such other or further order or
direction this Hon’ble Court in view of the
facts and circumstances of the present case
and in the interest of justice deems fit
and proper.”
7. The argument advanced before the High Court on behalf
of the second respondent was that offences punishable under
Sections 193/199 of IPC are non-cognizable offences; and no
court can take cognizance of those offences in absence of a
complaint of the competent court in view of the provisions of
Section 195(1)(b)(i) of CrPC. As there was no formal
complaint of the court before which the alleged false
affidavit was filed, the cognizance was barred by law.
8. The High Court examined the matter and came to the
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conclusion that the offences alleged were non-cognizable;
cognizance of those offences could have been taken only on a
complaint made by the court concerned; there was no such
complaint on record; therefore, the order of cognizance as
well as all consequential proceedings were bad in law.
Accordingly, by the impugned order, the High Court quashed
the proceedings emanating from FIR No. 605/2021.
9. Aggrieved by the order of the High Court, the
petitioner in-person has submitted as follows:
(i) The view taken by the High Court that there was no
complaint under Section 195(1)(b)(i) of CrPC is against
the record inasmuch as the learned Magistrate before
whom the proceedings of mutation were initiated, vide
order dated 18.06.2016, had opined that the accused is
guilty of offence punishable under Sections 193/199 IPC
and it had accordingly directed the police to lodge an
FIR against the second respondent. It is the case of
the petitioner that assuming that the order dated
18.06.2016 is not in the requisite form of a complaint,
it can very well be treated as a complaint, and
cognizance can be taken based thereupon; and
(ii) The other submission is that having invoked the
revisional jurisdiction of the Sessions Court, the
second respondent could not have simultaneously invoked
the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482
of CrPC.
10. Per contra, the learned counsel for the second
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respondent submitted that for filing a complaint, as
envisaged under Section 195(1)(b)(i) of CrPC, a procedure is
prescribed by Section 340 of CrPC, which contemplates a
preliminary inquiry and, thereafter, the court has to record
its satisfaction, return a finding and then make a complaint
in writing, which is to be sent to the competent Magistrate
having jurisdiction. In the case on hand, such procedure has
not been followed and, therefore, the alleged order dated
18.06.2016 can at best be treated as an administrative order
to the police and not a complaint to the court. Therefore, no
proceedings can be initiated thereupon.
11. On the issue of invoking the inherent powers of the
High Court, the learned counsel for the second respondent
submitted that there is no legal embargo on the High Court in
exercising its inherent powers under Section 482 of CrPC to
quash such proceedings which, on the face of it, are barred
by law and would amount to abuse of the process of court. In
such circumstances, learned counsel submitted that there is
no merit in the petition and the same be, accordingly,
dismissed.
12. We have perused the record and have accorded due
consideration to the submissions made before us.
13. It is not in dispute that offences punishable under
Sections 193/199 IPC are non-cognizable offences and,
therefore, cognizance of those offences could be on a
complaint. No doubt, a police report in a non-cognizable
offence can be treated as a complaint in view of Explanation
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to Section 2(d) of CrPC. In the case on hand, by virtue of
the provisions of Section 195(1)(b)(i) of CrPC, the complaint
ought to have been by the Court (i.e., the Revenue Court)
before whom the alleged affidavit(s) was/were submitted in
accordance with the procedure prescribed under Section 340 of
CrPC.
14. The order dated 18.06.2016, which the petitioner claims
to be a compliant, or a sanction for the complaint, is not a
complaint as envisaged under Section 340 of CrPC. As per
Section 2(d) of CrPC a ‘complaint’ means any allegation made
orally or in writing to a Magistrate regarding commission of
an offence by some person, known or unknown. The complaint on
which the petitioner places reliance is not addressed to a
competent Magistrate and is in shape of an order by which the
learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate has directed lodging of an
FIR against the second respondent. In such circumstances, the
High Court was correct in its view that this cannot be
treated as a complaint under Section 340 for the purposes of
lifting the bar under Section 195(1)(b)(i) of CrPC.
15. The other submission of the petitioner that the second
respondent could not have invoked inherent powers of the High
Court once it had taken recourse to the revisional
jurisdiction of the Sessions Court, is also not acceptable.
Ordinarily, revisional powers are exercised in the context of
an order passed by a court subordinate to the Court whose
revisional powers are invoked. Inherent powers are much wider
and may be invoked to quash the entire proceedings
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continuance of which would amount to the abuse of the process
of the Court. Besides, inherent powers of the High Court
under Section 482 of CrPC are not subservient to the
revisional powers of a Sessions Court. No doubt, the inherent
powers are discretionary in nature and, therefore, the High
Court may decline to exercise those powers in view of
pendency of revisional proceedings. However, once the High
Court chooses to exercise the power to quash a proceeding
which in its view is barred by law, the exercise of such
power under section 482 of CrPC cannot be faulted.
16. We, therefore, do not find any merit in this petition.
The Special Leave Petition is, accordingly, dismissed.
17. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed
of.
(CHETAN ARORA) (SAPNA BANSAL)
ASTT. REGISTRAR-cum-PS COURT MASTER (NSH)
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