Andhra Pradesh High Court – Amravati
Ponna Roja vs The State Of Andhra Pradesh on 14 July, 2026
APHC010104832026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI [3601]
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
TUESDAY, THE 14th DAY OF JULY 2026
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE PURUSHOTTAM KUMAR
CHINTALAPUDI
WRIT PETITION NO: 5684/2026
Between:
1. PONNA ROJA,, W/O BIKKI NARENDRA BABU, AGE 30YRS, OCC
HOUSEWIFE, R/O D.NO 6-36/A, SCOT SPINE INTERNATIONAL
SCHOOL ROAD, KANURU (V), PENAMALURU (M), KRISHNA
DISTRICT-520007
...PETITIONER
AND
1. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, REP. BY ITS PRINCIPAL
SECRETARY REVENUE (EXCISE.LL) DEPARTMENT, A.P.
SECRETARIAT, VELAGAPUDI, AMARAVATI, GUNTUR DISTRICT -
522503.
2. THE COMMISSIONER OF POLICE AND ADDITIONAL DISTRICT
MAGISTRATE, NTR DISTRICT - 520004.
3. THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE, , GOVERNORPET POLICE STATION,
NTR POLICE COMMISSIONERATE, NTR DISTRICT - 520003.
4. THE SUPERINTENDENT, CENTRAL PRISON,
RAJAMAHENDRAVARAM, EAST GODAVARI DISTRICT -533101
...RESPONDENT(S):
Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying that in the
circumstances stated in the affidavit filed therewith, the High Court may be
pleased tomay be pleased to issue a writ order or direction more particularly
2
(RNT,J & PKC,J
W.P. NO.5684 OF 2026)
one in nature of Writ of Habeas Corpus directing the 4th Respondent to
produce Bikki Narendra Babu who is now detained in Central Prison
Rajamahendravaram and he may be ordered to be released after declaring
the detention order vide G.O.Rt.No 1314 dated 29-10-2025 and also
confirmed Detention order vide G.O.Rt.No 69 dated 12-01-2026, issued by
the 1St Respondent, as illegal, unconstitutional and violative of Articles 14,
21 and 22 of the Constitution of India and set aside the same and to pass
such
Counsel for the Petitioner:
1. NUTHAKKI SAARASA RAGA VARSHINI
Counsel for the Respondent(S):
1. GP FOR REVENUE
2. THE ADVOCATE GENERAL
The Court made the following:
3
(RNT,J & PKC,J
W.P. NO.5684 OF 2026)
ORDER:
:-(per Hon‟ble Sri Justice Ravi Nath Tilhari)
Heard Ms.Nuthakki Saarasa Raga Varshini, learned counsel for the
petitioner and Sri Kirthi Teja Kondaveeti, learned Government Pleader,
attached to the office of the learned Additional Advocate General, appearing
for respondent Nos.2 to 4, and perused the material on record.
2. This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India
has been filed for a writ of Habeas Corpus by the wife of the detenu, by name
Sri Bikki Narendra Babu @ Vicky Chowdary @ Pushpa, S/o Kumar.
3. An order of preventive detention was passed against the detenu
by the State vide G.O.Rt.No.1314, Revenue (Excise.II) Department, dated
29.10.2025, under Section 3(1) of the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 (for short, “the PIT NDPS
Act“). The detention order was passed based on seven criminal cases
pending against the detenu. List of those cases is as under :-
Sl. Cr.No., Sec of law & Ganja Seized Stage of the
No Name of the Police Station (in Kg‟s case
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1. Cr.No.315/2018 U/s 20(B) of NDPS 20 Kg Pending in Trail
Act- 1985 of Hennur PS, Banaswadi
Sub- Division, Bengaluru City.
2. Cr.No.382/2019 U/s 20(b) (ii)(C) of 2.4 Kg, 1 Pending in Trail
NDPS Act & 27-A,28 Drugs & Gram
Cosmetics Act of II Town PS, MDMA, 2-
Visakhapatnam City. LSD Blots,
Alprazolan
Tablets- 30(2
sheets)
4
(RNT,J & PKC,J
W.P. NO.5684 OF 2026)
3. Cr.No.64/2021 U/s 20(b) (ii) (B) r/w 144 Kg Pending in Trail
8(c),25 of NDPS Act-1985 of
Hukumpeta PS, Visakhapatnam
District.
4. Cr.No.716/2021 U/s 8(c) r/w 20(b)(ii)(A) 0.9 Kg Pending in Trail
of NDPS Act. -1985 of Penamaluru PS,
Krishna District.
5. Cr.No.11/2023 U/s 8(c) r/w 20(b)of 93.15 Kg Pending in Trail
NDPS Act -1985, 417,420,419 r/w
120(b) r/w 34 IPC & 12(1) (A) of
Passport Act of V.Sataram PS, SPS
Nellore District
6. Cr.Nο. 107/2023U3 ΒIe) τ/w 20(b) 0.6 Kg Pending in Trail
(ii)(A) of NDPS Act -1985 of Tenali
Rural PS, Guntur District.
7. Cr.No.52/2025 U/s 8(c) r/w 20(b)(ii)(C) 41.58 Kg Under
of NDPS Act -1985 of Governorpet PS, investigation
NTR Police Commissionerate, NTR
District.
4. The detention order was confirmed by the State vide
G.O.Rt.No.69, Revenue (Excise.II) Department, dated 12.01.2026, for a
period of twelve months from the date of detention.
5. Challenging the detention order, the learned counsel for the
petitioner submits that the proposal for the order of detention was made on
29.08.2025 by respondent No.3-the Inspector of Police, Governorpet Police
Station, who forwarded the proposal for preventive detention to the 2nd
respondent, the Commissioner of Police, NTR Police Commissionerate,
Vijayawada. Thereafter, on 30.08.2025, the 2nd respondent-the
5
(RNT,J & PKC,J
W.P. NO.5684 OF 2026)Commissioner of Police, forwarded the proposal to the 1st respondent-the
Principal Secretary to the State Government, who passed the order of
detention against the detenu on 29.10.2025. As per Circular No.3 of 2018,
dated 28.03.2018, by the Narcotics Control Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs,
paragraph No.3, for time line of the proposal, the Rule of live should be
kept in mind. There should not be a long gap between the event of NDPS
Act and date of proposal. The proposal should be sent as soon as possible
ideally within 15 days of the event. The proposal was made on 29.08.2025.
The event of NDPS pertains to the years 2018, 2019, 2021, and 2023, i.e.,
the criminal cases in Ground Nos.1 to 6 respectively. The Crime No.52 of
2025, in Ground No.7 occurred on 12.06.2025. The timeline was not adhered
and the proposal was made long after 15 days. There being no live and
proximate link, the proposal should not have been accepted and the order
of detention should not have been passed. The order of detention is vitiated
and the detenu is entitled to be set free. Reliance has been placed in
Sushanta Kumar Banik v. State of Tripura and Others 1.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the circulars
issued are binding on the authorities, which are required to adher to the
prescribed timeline, and any failure to adhere to the timeline, and so delay in
passing the order of detention, shall enure to the benefit of the detenu in
ordering the release of the detenu..
1
2022 SCC OnLine SC 1333
6
(RNT,J & PKC,J
W.P. NO.5684 OF 2026)
7. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the
detenu was granted bail in all the seven (07) criminal cases. Except in
Ground No.4, the bail order was not considered while passing the order of
detention. It vitiates the order of detention for non-consideration of the
relevant material.
8. Learned Government Pleader submits that any ground with
respect to the delay in submission of the proposal has not been taken in the
writ petition. He submits that ‘rule of live and proximate link’ has been
stated, but, it is with respect to the order of detention having been passed
after many years from the occurrence of the crimes under NDPS. He
submits that there is no log gap and while passing the order of detention,
previous criminal cases the old one as well, could be taken into consideration
and the last case is of the year 2025.
9. Learned Government Pleader submits that the bail orders were
forwarded to the detaining authority along with the proposal. Except in one
case, as in Ground No.4, the bail orders in the other criminal cases in
grounds appear not to have been taken into consideration as those bail
orders are not reflected from the detention order. In the criminal case under
Ground No.4, the bail was granted after the order of detention. So, there was
no question to either mention in the proposal or to consider the same in the
order of detention.
7
(RNT,J & PKC,J
W.P. NO.5684 OF 2026)
10. Learned Government Pleader further submits that in view of
Section 6(1) of the PIT NDPS Act, if the order of detention can be sustained
even on a single ground, that one ground would be sufficient to maintain the
detention order, as it is deemed to be a separate order on each such
separate ground. He submits that the order of detention can be sustained, in
any case, on Ground No.4. He has placed reliance in Dunga Kumari v.
State of Andhra Pradesh and Others2.
11. We have considered the aforesaid submissions advanced by the
learned counsels for the parties, and perused the material on record.
12. So far as the argument on time line of 15 days under the Circular
mentioning rule of live is concerned, the order of detention has been passed
taking into consideration, , as many as seven criminal cases ranging from the
years 2018 to 2025. The proposal was made on 29.08.2025. As per Circular
No.3 of 2018, dated 28.03.2018 “the proposal should be sent as soon as
possible, ideally within 15 days of the event,” . The Circular Point No.3 of
Narcotics Control Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs, West Block No.1, Wing
No.V, R.K.Puram, New Delhi-66, prescribed 15 days time from the date of
the event i.e., criminal case, as the ideal period for forwarding the proposal,
which is reproduced hereunder :
“3. When:
2
W.P.No.23639 of 2025
8
(RNT,J & PKC,J
W.P. NO.5684 OF 2026)For timing of the proposal, Rule of live-link
should be kept in mind, which means there
should not be long gap between even of
NDPS Act and date of proposal. The
proposal should be sent as soon as
possible-ideally within 15 days of the event.
This will reduce paper work and ensure live
nexus between the event(s) and detention.
If there is a gap between event and the
proposal the same must be explained in the
proposal.”
13. In Commissioner of Central Excise and Service Tax, Rohtak
vs. Merino Panel Product Limited3, the Hon‟ble Apex Court held that the
department and the departmental authorities cannot be permitted to take a
stand contrary to the instructions issued. The department‟s stand cannot be
against its own circular, and while the department‟s hands are tied with
regard to its Circulars, no such prohibition operates on Courts and Tribunals.
It is incumbent upon the adjudicatory bodies to ascertain the correct position
of law unencumbered by the departments interpretation as crystallized in its
administrative directions. The position of law is that the department is at
liberty to issue circulars on the interpretation or application of different
provisions but the Courts and the Tribunals would give effect to the law of
land which shall be binding.
14. Paragraph Nos.17 to 25 of Merino Panel Product Limited
(supra) under head are reproduced as under:
3
(2023) 2 SCC 597
9
(RNT,J & PKC,J
W.P. NO.5684 OF 2026)“C. ANALYSIS C.1. BINDING NATURE OF CIRCULARS ISSUED BY
THE DEPARTMENT
17. On first blush, it appears that the arguments from the
Appellant-Revenue and Respondent-Assessee are on two separate
footings. While the former assails the specific reasoning given by the
CESTAT for setting aside the show cause notice in terms of invocation
of an incorrect part of the CEVR, the latter is more concerned with the
binding nature of the CBEC Circular issued by the Revenue itself.
18. It is clear that the latter question goes to the heart of the matter,
rather than the issue of whether the show cause notice becomes legally
untenable for failure to expressly mention that the valuation of the goods
is to be done under Rule 11 read with Rule 9 of the CEVR. On the legal
proposition advanced by learned ASG, we readily affirm that citation of
an incorrect source of power does not vitiate the exercise of the power
itself provided the power vests in the authority to begin with.
19. However, what needs to be additionally ascertained is whether the
Appellant acted in contravention of its own Circular. The reason for this
is that while citation of an incorrect provision may not, by itself, lead to
an invalidation of the show cause notice, but contravention of a binding
circular that mandates a particular methodology to be followed might.
The power under the CEA for issuance of such administrative/executive
directions is contained in Section 37B.10 The binding nature of such
Circulars has long been acknowledged by this Court.
20. In The Paper Products Ltd. v. CCE ((1999) 7 SCC 84), the
settled position on this point of law was noted in the following passage:
“4. The question for our consideration in these appeals is: what is
the true nature and effect of the Circulars issued by the Board in
exercise of its power under Section 37-B of the Central Excise
Act, 1944? This question is no more res integra in view of the
various judgments of this Court. This Court in a catena of
decisions has held that the Circulars issued under Section 37-B
of the said Act are binding on the Department and the
Department cannot be permitted to take a stand contrary to the
instructions issued by the Board. These judgments have also held
that the position may be different with regard to an assessee who
can contest the validity or legality of such instructions but so far
as the Department is concerned, such right is not available.”
21. The rationale behind the requirement for the Revenue to abide by its
own administrative directions and interpretation of different parts of the CEA
and CEVR, was commented upon in Ranadey Micronutrients & Ors. v.
Collector of Central Excise ((1996) 10 SCC 387):
10
(RNT,J & PKC,J
W.P. NO.5684 OF 2026)“15. There can be no doubt whatsoever, in the circumstances,
that the earlier and later circulars were issued by the Board under
the provisions of Section 37B, and the fact that they do not so
recite does not mean that they do not bind Central Excise officers
or become advisory in character. There can be no doubt
whatsoever that after 21st November, 1994, Excise duty could be
levied upon micronutrients only under the provisions of heading
31.05 as “other fertilisers”. If the later circular is contrary to the
terms of the statute, it must be withdrawn. While the later circular
remains in operation the Revenue is bound by it and cannot be
allowed to plead that it is not valid.
16. We reject the submission to the contrary made by learned
counsel for the Revenue and in the affidavit by M.K. Gupta,
working as Director in the Department of Revenue, Ministry of
Finance. One should have thought that an officer of the Ministry
of Finance would have greater respect for circulars such as these
issued by the Board, which also operates under the aegis of the
Ministry of Finance, for it is the Board which is, by statute,
entrusted with the task of classifying excisable goods uniformly.
The whole objective of such circulars is to adopt a uniform
practice and to inform the trade as to how a particular product will
be treated for the purposes of Excise duty. It does not lie in the
mouth of the Revenue to repudiate a circular issued by the Board
on the basis that it is inconsistent with a statutory provision.
Consistency and discipline are of far greater importance than the
winning or losing of court proceedings.”
22. Thus, the starting point of our analysis on this question is that
the CBEC Circular of 01.07.2002 is binding on the Revenue. If the show
cause notice issued by the Revenue is found to be contrary to the
Circular, it would prima facie result in abrogation of the uniformity and
consistency which is strongly emphasized upon in Ranadey
Micronutrients (Supra). It goes without saying that the Revenue‟s stance
against its own circular can potentially lead to a chaotic situation where,
with one hand, the Revenue would lay down instructions on how to
interpret the relevant statutes and rules, and with the other hand, it
would promptly disobey those very directions. Maintaining predictability
in taxation law is of utmost importance and, for this reason, the Court
should not accept an argument by the Revenue that waters down its
own Circular as this would fall squarely within the contours of the
prohibition outlined in Paper Products (Supra).
C.2. CONFLICT BETWEEN A CIRCULAR, AND A JUDGMENT
AND/OR THE STATUTE.
23. While the Department‟s hands are tied with regard to its
Circulars, no such prohibition operates on Courts and Tribunals. It is
11
(RNT,J & PKC,J
W.P. NO.5684 OF 2026)
incumbent upon the adjudicatory bodies to ascertain the correct position
of law unencumbered by the Revenue‟s interpretation as crystallized in
its administrative directions. A Constitution Bench of this Court in
Collector of Central Excise, Vadodara v. Dhiren Chemicals Industries
while interpreting an exemption notification issued under the CEA, had
noted in Para 11 of its judgment that
“11….regardless of the interpretation that we have placed on
the said phrase [“appropriate”], if there are circulars which
have been issued by the Central Board of Excise and Customs
which place a different interpretation upon the said phrase,
that interpretation will be binding upon the Revenue.”
24. Dhiren Chemicals (Supra) subsequently led to some uncertainty, as
the paragraph reproduced above was interpreted to mean that Circulars
issued by the Revenue would remain binding even if they went against
the ratio of decisions by this Court. However, the true intention behind
the passage, as recounted above, was clarified in Kalyani Packaging
Industry v. Union of India14 by observing that:
“6. We have noticed that Para 9 (para 11 in SCC) of Dhiren Chemical‘s case is
being misunderstood. It therefore becomes necessary to clarify Para 9 of
Dhiren Chemical‘s case. One of us (Variava, J.) was a party to the Judgment
of the Dhiren Chemical‘s case and knows what was the intention in
incorporating Para 9. It must be remembered that law laid down by this Court
is law of the land. The law so laid down is binding on all Courts/Tribunals and
Bodies. It is clear that circulars of the Board cannot prevail over the law laid
down by this Court. However, it was pointed out that during hearing of Dhiren
Chemical‘s case because of circulars of the Board in many cases the
Department had granted benefits of exemption Notifications. It was submitted
that on the interpretation now given by this Court in Dhiren Chemical‘s case,
the Revenue was likely to reopen cases. Thus Para 9 was incorporated to
ensure that cases where benefits of exemption Notification had already been
granted, the Revenue would remain bound. The purpose was to see that such
cases were not reopened. However, this did not mean that even in cases
where Revenue/Department had already contended that the benefit of an
exemption Notification was not available, and the matter was sub-judice before
a Court or a Tribunal, the Court or Tribunal would also give effect to circulars
of the Board in preference to a decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court.
Where as a result of dispute the matter is sub-judice a Court/Tribunal is, after
Dhiren Chemical‘s case, bound to interpret as set out in that judgment. To hold
otherwise and to interpret in the manner suggested would mean that
Courts/Tribunals have to ignore a judgment of this Court and follow circulars of
the Board. That was not what was meant by Para 9 of Dhiren Chemical’s
case.”
25. Following this, the position of law which materialized was that the
Revenue was at liberty to issue Circulars on the interpretation or
12
(RNT,J & PKC,J
W.P. NO.5684 OF 2026)
application of different provisions, but Courts and Tribunals would give
effect to the decisions of the Supreme Court as the law of the land.
Another Constitution Bench of this Court in Commissioner of Central
Excise, Bolpur v. Ratan Melting and Wire Industries ((2004) 6 SCC 719)
drew a line in the sand with regard to any future confusion on this point,
in definitive terms and held as follows:
“7. Circulars and instructions issued by the Board are no doubt
binding in law on the authorities under the respective statutes, but
when the Supreme Court or the High Court declares the law on
the question arising for consideration, it would not be appropriate
for the Court to direct that the circular should be given effect to
and not the view expressed in a decision of this Court or the High
Court. So far as the clarifications/circulars issued by the Central
Government and of the State Government are concerned they
represent merely their understanding of the statutory provisions.
They are not binding upon the court. It is for the Court to declare
what the particular provision of statute says and it is not for the
Executive. Looked at from another angle, a circular which is
contrary to the statutory provisions has really no existence in law.”
15. The PIT NDPS Act does not lay down, any time limit for making
proposal to the detaining authority. However, for executive functioning of the
department in passing the detention order circular has been issued. The
circular issued by the department may be binding on the department and the
officers working in the department, in the course of business. But that does
not bind the Tribunal or the Courts with respect to any interpretation of the
circular as given by the department and it is open for the Court to consider
the effect of time line in the Circular and the interpretation made by the
Courts would bind all.
16. We shall therefore consider whether the time line in the Circular
for sending proposal within 15 days is mandatory and whether proposal
cannot be sent beyond 15 days and if sent beyond 15 days its legal aspect
13
(RNT,J & PKC,J
W.P. NO.5684 OF 2026)
on such proposal for consideration by the detaining authority as also on the
order of detention.
17. The significant expression used in paragraph No.3 of the
Circular, is “as soon as possible.” So, the proposal has to be forwarded as
soon as possible from the event i.e., the occurrence of the criminal case.
18. In General Insurance Council and others vs. State of
Andhra Pradesh and others4, the Hon‟ble Apex Court held that the use of
the expression “as soon as” implies that there has to be promptitude in
action. To do a thing “as soon as possible” means to do it within a
reasonable time, with an understanding to do it within the shortest possible
time. “As and When” and “as soon as” are almost synonymous. Whenever
these expressions are used in respect of time and place, they denote
contemporaneous notion. “As soon as” and “forthwith” both are to be
normally understood as allowing reasonable time, but latter is more
peremptory than the former. But urgency is the hallmark of both expressions.
Expression “as soon as” may be stretched to mean “as soon as” practicable.
The proposal has to be forwarded with promptitude.
19. Though, 15 days time line has been prescribed, but the same
appears to us not a mandatory time line, beyond which proposal cannot be
made. It is only set up as an ideal period. The time line may vary for the
proposals, depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The
4
(2007) 12 SCC 354,
14
(RNT,J & PKC,J
W.P. NO.5684 OF 2026)
departmental circulars may be binding on the authorities and may have been
issued with the object to take prompt action, but any violation of the time line
or no-strict-adherence thereto, in the absence of any consequences provided
under the Circular and such time line also not having being prescribed under
the PIT NDPS Act, it cannot be said that after the timeline under the Circular,
the proposal cannot be forwarded or the order of detention cannot be passed
merely because the proposal was made after 15 days of the event.
20. However, at the same time, it does not mean that the rule of
live and proximate link is not to be followed and the order of detention can
be passed on stale criminal cases or there being no necessity of detention for
unreasonable delay defeating the very purpose of the preventive detention.
21. In Rajinder Arora v. Union of India and Others 5, the
Hon‟ble Apex Court has held that the delay in issuing the order of detention
is a valid ground for quashing the order of detention. The Hon‟ble Apex Court
referred to T.A. Abdul Rahman v. State of Kerala and Others 6 in
which it was held that there should be a proximity of time between the
prejudicial activities and the purpose of detention. However, no hard-and-fast
rule can be laid down which may be applicable to the facts and
circumstances of each case. The test of proximity is not a rigid or mechanical
test by counting the number of months between the offending acts and the
5
(2006) 4 SCC 796
6
(1989) 4 SCC 741
15
(RNT,J & PKC,J
W.P. NO.5684 OF 2026)
order of detention. It has to be examined whether the causal connection has
been broken in the circumstances of each case.
22. Paragraph No.21 of Rajinder Arora (supra) reads as under :
“21. The question as regards delay in issuing the order of detention has been
held to be a valid ground for quashing an order of detention by this Court in T.A.
Abdul Rahman v. State of Kerala [(1989) 4 SCC 741 : 1990 SCC (Cri) 76 : AIR
1990 SC 225] stating: (SCC pp. 748-49, paras 10-11)“10. The conspectus of the above decisions can be summarised
thus: The question whether the prejudicial activities of a person
necessitating to pass an order of detention is proximate to the time
when the order is made or the live-link between the prejudicial
activities and the purpose of detention is snapped depends on the
facts and circumstances of each case. No hard-and-fast rule can be
precisely formulated that would be applicable under all
circumstances and no exhaustive guidelines can be laid down in
that behalf. It follows that the test of proximity is not a rigid or
mechanical test by merely counting number of months between the
offending acts and the order of detention. However, when there is
undue and long delay between the prejudicial activities and the
passing of detention order, the court has to scrutinise whether the
detaining authority has satisfactorily examined such a delay and
afforded a tenable and reasonable explanation as to why such a
delay has occasioned, when called upon to answer and further the
court has to investigate whether the causal connection has been
broken in the circumstances of each case.
11. Similarly when there is unsatisfactory and unexplained delay
between the date of order of detention and the date of securing the
arrest of the detenu, such a delay would throw considerable doubt
on the genuineness of the subjective satisfaction of the detaining
authority leading to a legitimate inference that the detaining
authority was not really and genuinely satisfied as regards the
16
(RNT,J & PKC,J
W.P. NO.5684 OF 2026)necessity for detaining the detenu with a view to preventing him
from acting in a prejudicial manner.”
23. In Khaja Bilal Ahmed v. State of Telangana and
Others7, the Hon‟ble Apex Court held that only those activities so far back in
the past can be considered as furnishing a cause for preventive detention in
the present, which lead to the conclusion that he is likely to engage in such
activities in the immediate future. Paragraphs 21 & 22 of Khaja Bilal
Ahmed (supra) read as under :
“21. In Sama Aruna v. State of Telangana (2018) 12 SCC 150, this Court
while construing the provisions of the Telangana Offenders Act, 1986 held :
(SCC pp. 157-58, para 16)
“16. Obviously, therefore, the power to detain, under the 1986 Act can be
exercised only for preventing a person from engaging in, or pursuing or
taking some action which adversely affects or is likely to affect adversely
the maintenance of public order; or for preventing him from making
preparations for engaging in such activities. There is little doubt that the
conduct or activities of the detenu in the past must be taken into account
for coming to the conclusion that he is going to engage in or make
preparations for engaging in such activities, for many such persons follow a
pattern of criminal activities. But the question is how far back? There is no
doubt that only activities so far back can be considered as furnish a cause
for preventive detention in the present. That is, only those activities so far
back in the past which lead to the conclusion that he is likely to engage in
or prepare to engage in such activities in the immediate future can be taken
into account. In Golam Hussain v. State of W.B. [Golam Hussain v. State of
W.B., (1974) 4 SCC 530 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 566] this Court observed as
follows : (SCC p. 534, para 5)7
(2020) 13 SCC 632
17
(RNT,J & PKC,J
W.P. NO.5684 OF 2026)„5. … No authority, acting rationally, can be satisfied,
subjectively or otherwise, of future mischief merely
because long ago the detenu had done something evil.
To rule otherwise is to sanction a simulacrum of a
statutory requirement. But no mechanical test by
counting the months of the interval is sound. It all
depends on the nature of the acts relied on, grave and
determined or less serious and corrigible, on the length
of the gap, short or long, on the reason for the delay in
taking preventive action, like information of
participation being available only in the course of an
investigation. We have to investigate whether the
causal connection has been broken in the
circumstances of each case.‟
Suffice it to say that in any case, incidents which are said to have
taken place nine to fourteen years earlier, cannot form the basis for
being satisfied in the present that the detenu is going to engage in, or
make preparation for engaging in such activities.”
(emphasis supplied)
22. In the facts of that case, the Court held that the order of detention
was passed on stale grounds, which could not have been considered as
relevant for arriving at the subjective satisfaction that the detenu must be
detained. This Court held thus : (Sama Aruna case [Sama Aruna v. State
of Telangana, (2018) 12 SCC 150 : (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 441] , SCC p.
158, para 17)
“17. … The detention order must be based on a reasonable
prognosis of the future behaviour of a person based on his
past conduct in light of the surrounding circumstances. The
live and proximate link that must exist between the past
conduct of a person and the imperative need to detain him
must be taken to have been snapped in this case. A detention
order which is founded on stale incidents, must be regarded
as an order of punishment for a crime, passed without a trial,
though purporting to be an order of preventive detention. The
essential concept of preventive detention is that the detention
of a person is not to punish him for something he has done
but to prevent him from doing it. See G. Reddeiah v. State of
A.P. [G. Reddeiah v. State of A.P., (2012) 2 SCC 389 : (2012) 1
SCC (Cri) 881] and P.U. Iqbal v. Union of India [P.U. Iqbal v.
Union of India, (1992) 1 SCC 434 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 184] .”
(emphasis supplied)
18
(RNT,J & PKC,J
W.P. NO.5684 OF 2026)
24. In P.U.Iqbal v. Union of India and Others 8 , the
Hon‟ble Apex Court held that if there is unreasonable delay between
the date of the order of detention and the date of arrest of the detenu,
such delay unless satisfactorily explained throws a considerable doubt
on the genuineness of the requisite subjective satisfaction of the
detaining authority in passing the detention order and consequently
renders the detention order bad and invalid because the „live and
proximate link‟ between the grounds of the detention and the purpose of
detention is snapped in arresting the detenu. A question whether the
delay is unreasonable and stands unexplained depends on the facts
and circumstances of each case.
25. In Sushanta Kumar Banik (supra), the Hon‟ble Apex Court,
referred to the decision in Ashok Kumar vs. Delhi Administration and
others9 wherein it was held that the preventive detention is devised to afford
protection to society. The object is not to punish a man for having done
something but to intercept before he does it and to prevent him from doing.
With the said object of the preventive detention, it is very imperative on the
part of the detaining authority as well as the executing authorities to remain
vigilant and keep their eyes skinned but not to turn a blind eye in passing the
detention order at the earliest from the date of the proposal and executing the
detention, because any indifferent attitude on the part of the detaining
8
(1992) 1 SCC 434
9
(1982)2 SCC 403
19
(RNT,J & PKC,J
W.P. NO.5684 OF 2026)
authority or executing authority would defeat the very purpose of the
preventive action and turn the detention order as a dead letter and frustrate
the entire proceedings. The Hon‟ble Apex Court emphasized on the adverse
effect of delay in arresting a detenu observing that the rule is that
unreasonable and unexplained delay in securing a detenu and detaining him
vitiates the detention order. It was observed that the same principles would
apply even in the case of delay in passing the order of detention from the
date of the proposal and the common underlying principle in both situations
would be the “live and proximate link” between the grounds of detention and
the avowed purpose of detention.
26. In Sushanta Kumar Banik (supra), the Hon‟ble Apex Court,
held that if there is unreasonable delay from the date of the proposal and
passing of the order of detention such delay, unless satisfactorily explained
throws a considerable doubt on the genuiness of the requisite subjective
satisfaction of the detaining authority in passing the detention order and
consequently render the detention order bad and invalid because the “live
and proximate link” between the grounds of detention and the purpose of
detention is snapped in arresting the detenu. A question whether the delay is
unreasonable and stands unexplained depends on the facts and
circumstances of each case. In the said case, the detaining authority after
receipt of the proposal from the sponsoring authority was indifferent in
passing the order of detention with greater promptitude. The “live and
20
(RNT,J & PKC,J
W.P. NO.5684 OF 2026)
proximate link” between the grounds of detention and the purpose of
detention was held as stood snapped in arresting the detenu and as the
delay was not explained in any manner.
27. The Hon‟ble Apex Court, in Sushanta Kumar Banik (supra)
further held that the accused arrested under the NDPS Act, 1985, can be
ordered to be released on bail only after the court is satisfied that there are
reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of such
offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. If the
accused was ordered to be released on bail despite the rigrous of Section 37
of the NDPS Act, 1985, then the same is suggestive that the Court
concerned might not have found any prima facie case against the accused.
28. In Sushanta Kumar Banik (supra), the detaining authority did
not make any reference to the fact that the detenu therein was released on
bail. That fact was not brought to the notice of the detaining authority in the
proposal. The Hon‟ble Apex Court held that had this fact been brought to the
notice of the detaining authority, then it would have influenced the mind of the
detaining authority one way or the other on the question whether or not to
make an order of detention. The case of Asha Devi v. Additional Chief
Secretary to the Government of Gujarat and another 10 was referred in
which it was held that if material or vital facts which would influence the
minds of the detaining authority one way or the other on the question whether
10
1979 Crl LJ 203
21
(RNT,J & PKC,J
W.P. NO.5684 OF 2026)
or not to make the detention order, are not placed before or are not
considered by the detaining authority it would vitiate its subjective satisfaction
rendering the detention order illegal. The case of Sk. Nizamuddin vs. State
of West Bengal11, was also referred, in which it was held that the fact that a
criminal case is pending against the accused who is sought to be proceeded
by way of preventive detention is a very material circumstance which ought to
be placed before the detaining authority. The circumstances might quite
possible have an impact on his decision whether or not to make an order of
detention. It was not altogether unlikely that the detaining authority in a given
case may take the view that since a criminal case is pending against the
person sought to be detained, no order of detention should be made for the
present, but the criminal case should be allowed to run its full course and
only if it fails to result in conviction, then preventive detention should be
resorted to. It was most unfair to the person sought to be detained not to
disclose the pendency of a criminal case against him to the detaining
authority.
29. Paragraph Nos.23, 26 to 28 of Sushanta Kumar Banik (supra)
are being reproduced as under:
“23. A plain reading of the aforesaid provision would indicate that the accused
arrested under the NDPS Act, 1985 can be ordered to be released on bail only
if the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the
accused is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any
offence while on bail. If the appellant herein was ordered to be released on bail11
(1975) 3 SCC 395
22
(RNT,J & PKC,J
W.P. NO.5684 OF 2026)despite the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985, then the same is
suggestive that the Court concerned might not have found any prima facie
case against him. Had this fact been brought to the notice of the detaining
authority, then it would have influenced the mind of the detaining authority one
way or the other on the question whether or not to make an order of detention.
The State never thought to even challenge the bail orders passed by the
special court releasing the appellant on bail.”
* * * * * * * * * * *
“26. From the above decisions, it emerges that the requisite subjective
satisfaction, the formation of which is a condition precedent to passing of a
detention order will get vitiated if material or vital facts which would have
bearing on the issue and weighed the satisfaction of the detaining authority
one way or the other and influence his mind are either withheld or suppressed
by the sponsoring authority or ignored and not considered by the detaining
authority before issuing the detention order.
27. It is clear to our mind that in the case on hand at the time when the
detaining authority passed the detention order, this vital fact, namely, that the
appellant detenu had been released on bail by the Special Court, Tripura
despite the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985, had not been brought
to the notice and on the other hand, this fact was withheld and the detaining
authority was given to understand that the trial of those criminal cases was
pending.
28. The preventive detention is a serious invasion of personal liberty and the
normal methods open to a person charged with commission of any offence to
disprove the charge or to prove his innocence at the trial are not available to
the person preventively detained and, therefore, in prevention detention
jurisprudence whatever little safeguards the Constitution and the enactments
authorizing such detention provide assume utmost importance and must be
strictly adhered to.”
30. In Rushikesh Tenaji Bhoite vs. State Maharashtra and
others 12 the Hon‟ble Apex Court held that In a case where detenu is
released on bail and is enjoying his freedom under the order of the court at
12
2012(2) SCC 72
23
(RNT,J & PKC,J
W.P. NO.5684 OF 2026)
the time of passing the order of detention, then such order of bail, must be
placed before the detaining authority to enable him to reach at the proper
satisfaction. The non-placing and non-consideration of the material, as vital
as the bail orders vitiated the subjective decision of the detaining authority.
31. In Dunga Kumari vs. The State of Andhra Pradesh and
others, (W.P.No.23639 of 2025 decided on 08.07.2026) it was held, after
referring inter alia to Champion R. Sangma v. State of Meghalaya and
Another13, that even if the detenu is in jail in connection with some criminal
cases there is no prohibition in law to pass the detention order, however,
certain aspects have to be borne in mind by the detaining authority and the
satisfaction on those aspects is to be arrived at while passing the detention
order. Those factors, were restated being; (1) If the authority passing the
order is aware of the fact that the detenu is actually in custody; (2) If he has
reason to believe on the basis of reliable material placed before him (a) that
there is a real possibility of his being released on bail, and (b) that on being
so released he would in all probability indulge in prejudicial activity; and (3) if
it is felt essential to detain him from so doing.
32. Paragraph Nos.12,13, 15 and 16 of Dunga Kumari (supra) are
being reproduced as under:
“12. In Champion R. Sangma (supra), the Hon‟ble Apex
Court has held that even if the detenu is in jail in connection with
some criminal cases, there is no prohibition in law to pass the
13
(2015) 16 SCC 253
24
(RNT,J & PKC,J
W.P. NO.5684 OF 2026)detention order. However, there are certain aspects which have to
be borne in mind by the detaining authority and satisfaction on those
aspects is to be arrived while passing the detention order. Referring
to the case in Kamarunnissa v. Union of India 14 those three
factors were re-stated; (1) If the authority passing the order is aware
of the fact that the detenu is actually in custody; (2) If he has reason
to believe on the basis of reliable material placed before him (a) that
there is a real possibility of his being released on bail, and (b) that
on being so released he would in all probability indulge in prejudicial
activity; and (3) if it is felt essential to detain him from so doing. The
Hon‟ble Apex Court held that if the authority passes an order after
recording his satisfaction on these aspects, such an order cannot be
struck down on the ground that the proper course for the authority
was to oppose the bail and if bail is granted notwithstanding such
opposition, to question it before a higher Court.
13. Paragraphs 9, 10 and 11 of Champion R. Sangma
(supra) are reproduced as under:
“9. Coming to the ground on which we intend to allow this appeal, we may point out
that even if the appellant is in jail in connection with some criminal case(s) there is no
prohibition in law to pass the detention order. Law on this aspect is well settled and
stands crystallised by a plethora of judgments of this Court. However, a reading of those
very judgments also clarifies that there are certain aspects which have to be borne in
mind by the detaining authority and satisfaction on those aspects is to be arrived at
while passing the detention order.
10. There are three such factors which were restated
in Kamarunnissa v. Union of India [Kamarunnissa v. Union of India, (1991) 1
SCC 128 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 88] : (SCC pp. 140-41, para 13)
“13. From the catena of decisions referred to above it seems clear to us that
even in the case of a person in custody a detention order can validly be passed (1)
if the authority passing the order is aware of the fact that he is actually in custody;
(2) if he has reason to believe on the basis of reliable material placed before him14
(1991) 1 SCC 128
25
(RNT,J & PKC,J
W.P. NO.5684 OF 2026)
(a) that there is a real possibility of his being released on bail, and (b) that on
being so released he would in all probability indulge in prejudicial activity; and
(3) if it is felt essential to detain him to prevent him from so doing. If the authority
passes an order after recording his satisfaction in this behalf, such an order cannot
be struck down on the ground that the proper course for the authority was to
oppose the bail and if bail is granted notwithstanding such opposition, to question
it before a higher court. What this Court stated in Ramesh Yadav [Ramesh
Yadav v. District Magistrate, Etah, (1985) 4 SCC 232 : 1985 SCC (Cri) 514] was
that ordinarily a detention order should not be passed merely to pre-empt or
circumvent enlargement on bail in cases which are essentially criminal in nature
and can be dealt with under the ordinary law. It seems to us well settled that even
in a case where a person is in custody, if the facts and circumstances of the case
so demand, resort can be had to the law of preventive detention. This seems to be
quite clear from the case law discussed above and there is no need to refer to the
High Court decisions to which our attention was drawn since they do not hold
otherwise. We, therefore, find it difficult to accept the contention of the counsel
for the petitioners that there was no valid and compelling reason for passing the
impugned orders of detention because the detenus were in custody.”
11. The aforesaid dicta is reiterated in subsequent judgments as well. Some of
which are as under:
(i) T.V. Sravanan v. State [T.V. Sravanan v. State, (2006) 2 SCC 664 : (2006)
1 SCC (Cri) 593] ,
(ii) K.K. Saravana Babu v. State of T.N. [K.K. Saravana Babu v. State of T.N.,
(2008) 9 SCC 89 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 679] ,
(iii) Huidrom Konungjao Singh v. State of Manipur [Huidrom Konungjao
Singh v. State of Manipur, (2012) 7 SCC 181 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 956] .”
15. The other cited judgments of Syed Mohiyuddin
(supra), Cheemparthi Parvin (supra) and V. Adi Lakshmi (supra)
as in para-7 (supra) also hold the same relying upon the Hon‟ble
Apex Court judgment in Champion R. Sangma (supra). But, the
question is whether the Order of Detention would be vitiated on the
aforesaid submissions and grounds and the detenu entitled to be
set free.
26
(RNT,J & PKC,J
W.P. NO.5684 OF 2026)
16. The aforesaid law is by now well settled. When tested
on the triple tests as in Champion R. Sangma (supra) the Order of
Detention satisfied only the first test, i.e., the detaining authority was
aware that the detenu was in custody in Cr.No.42 of 2025 (Ground
No.6). However, the other two tests are not satisfied. While
considering the Ground No.6, the Principal Secretary to
Government has not recorded its satisfaction; (1) that the authority
had reason to believe on the basis of reliable material placed before
him, (a) that there was a real possibility of the detenu being
released on bail, and (b) that on being so released he would in all
probability indulge in prejudicial activity; and (2) if it was felt
essential to prevent him from so doing, with respect to the aforesaid
case. So, the Order of Detention cannot stand on Ground No.6.”
33. In Dunga Kumari (supra), this Court also considered Section 6
of PIT NDPS Act according to which, where a person has been detained in
pursuance of an order of detention under sub-section (1) of section 3, which
has been made on two or more grounds, such order of detention shall be
deemed to have been made separately on each of such grounds. So, if the
order of preventive detention cannot be sustained on any one or more
grounds but can be sustained on some ground on which the order of
detention, has been passed, the order of preventive detention shall be valid
and not invalid, as the order of preventive detention under the PIT NDPS Act
is considered a separate order on each and every ground. So, unless all the
grounds are unsustainable, the order of preventive detention would not be
invalid. The detenu in that case shall not be entitled to be set free.
27
(RNT,J & PKC,J
W.P. NO.5684 OF 2026)
34. Paragraphs 19, 20 to 26 of Dunga Kumari (supra) are being
reproduced as under:
“19. Section 6 of PIT NDPS Act provides as under:
“6. Grounds of detention severable.-Where a person has been
detained in pursuance of an order of detention under sub-section (1) of
section 3 which has been made on two or more grounds, such order of
detention shall be deemed to have been made separately on each of
such grounds and accordingly-
(a) such order shall not be deemed to be invalid or inoperative
merely because one or some of the grounds is or are-
(i) vague,
(ii) non-existent,
(iii) not relevant,
(iv) not connected or not proximately connected with such
person, or
(v) invalid for any other reason whatsoever, and it is not
therefore possible to hold that the Government or officer making such
order would have been satisfied as provided in sub-section (I) of section
3 with reference to the remaining ground or grounds and made the
order of detention;
(b) the Government or officer making the order of detention
shall be deemed to have made the order of detention under the said
sub-section (I) after being satisfied as provided in that sub-section with
reference to the remaining ground or grounds.”
20. A bare perusal of Section 6 of PIT NDPS Act shows
that where a person has been detained in pursuance of an order of
detention under sub-section (1) of Section 3 which has been made
on two or more grounds, such order of detention shall be deemed
to have been passed separately on each of such grounds, and
accordingly, (a) such order shall not be deemed to be invalid or
28
(RNT,J & PKC,J
W.P. NO.5684 OF 2026)
inoperative merely because one or some of the grounds is or are;
(i) vague, (ii) non-existent, (iii) not relevant, (iv) not connected or
not proximately connected with such person, or (v) invalid for any
other reasons whatsoever, and it is not therefore possible to hold
that the Government or Officer making such order would have
been satisfied as provided in sub-section (1) of Section 3 with
reference to the remaining ground or grounds and make the order
of detention. Clause (b) makes it more clear that the Government
or Officer making the order of detention shall be deemed to have
made the order of detention under the sub-section (1) of Section 3
after being satisfied as provided in that sub-section with reference
to the remaining ground or grounds.
21. In Mortuza Hussain Choudhary v. State of
15
Nagaland the Hon‟ble Apex Court observed and held that
Section 6 of PIT NDPS Act, 1988 provides that grounds of
detention are severable and an order of detention shall not be
deemed to be invalid or inoperative merely because one or some
of the grounds are either found to be vague, nonexistent, irrelevant
or not connected with such persons or is invalid for any other
reason. The Hon‟ble Apex Court further observed that Section 6
specifically records that where a person has been detained
pursuant to an order of detention under Section 3 (1), which has
been made on two or more grounds, such order shall be deemed
to have been made separately on each ground. Paragraph-7 of
Mortuza Hussain Choudhary (supra) reads as under:
“7. It would be apposite at this stage to take note of the statutory
regime of the Act of 1988. Section 3(1) thereof empowers the authorized
officers, either of the Central Government or of a State Government, to
detain any person with a view to prevent him/her from engaging in illicit
traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. Section
3(2) requires a State Government that passes such a detention order to
forward a report of the same to the Central Government within ten
days. Section 3(3) mandates communication of the grounds on which the
detention order has been made to the detenu as soon as may be after
the detention, but ordinarily not later than five days and in exceptional
circumstances and for reasons to be recorded in writing, not later than15
2025 SCC OnLine SC 502
29
(RNT,J & PKC,J
W.P. NO.5684 OF 2026)fifteen days from the date of detention. The sub-section records that this
requirement is for the purposes of Article 22(5) of the Constitution,
which mandates such communication as soon as may be. Section 6 of
the Act of 1988 provides that the grounds of detention are severable and
an order of detention shall not be deemed to be invalid or inoperative
merely because one or some of the grounds is either found to be vague,
non- existent, irrelevant or not connected with such persons or is invalid
for any other reason. Section 6 specifically records that where a person
has been detained pursuant to an order of detention under Section 3(1),
which has been made on two or more grounds, such order shall be
deemed to have been made separately on each ground. This indicates
that the order of detention must be accompanied by the ‘grounds of
detention’ made by the detaining authority itself. Section 11 of the Act
of 1988 speaks of the maximum period of detention and states that the
same may be extended up to 2 (two) years from the date of detention.”
22. In Prakash Chandra Mehta v. Commissioner and
16
Secretary. Government of Kerala where under
consideration was Section 5-A of Conservation of Foreign
Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act
(COFEPOSA Act) which is on the same lines as Section 6 of
PIT NDPS Act, the Hon‟ble Apex Court held that Section 5-A
stipulates that when the detention order has been made on
two or more grounds, such order of detention shall be
deemed to have been made separately on each of such
grounds and accordingly if one irrelevant or one inadmissible
ground had been taken into consideration that would not
make the detention order bad.
23. Paragraphs 70 & 71 of Prakash Chandra Mehta
(supra) read as under:
“70. Section 5-A of the said Act which was introduced by
amendment in 1975 reads as follows:
“5-A. Grounds of detention severable.–Where a person has
been detained in pursuance of an order of detention under sub-
section (1) of Section 3 which has been made on two or more
grounds, such order of detention shall be deemed to have been
made separately on each of such grounds and accordingly–
16
1985 SCC OnLine SC 316
30
(RNT,J & PKC,J
W.P. NO.5684 OF 2026)
(a) such order shall not be deemed to be invalid or inoperative
merely because one or some of the grounds is or are–
(i) vague,
(ii) non-existent,
(iii) not relevant,
(iv) not connected or not proximately connected with such
person, or
(v) invalid for any other reason whatsoever,
and it is not therefore possible to hold that the Government or
officer making such order would have been satisfied as provided in
sub-section (1) of Section 3 with reference to the remaining ground
or grounds and made the order of detention;
(b) the Government or officer making the order of detention
shall be deemed to have made the order of detention under the said
sub-section (1) after being satisfied as provided in that sub-section
with reference to the remaining ground or grounds.”
71. Section 5-A stipulates that when the detention order has
been made on two or more grounds, such order of detention shall be
deemed to have been made separately on each of such grounds and
accordingly that if one irrelevant or one inadmissible ground had
been taken into consideration that would not make the detention
order bad.”
24. In Vashisht Narain Karwaria v. State of U.P17 the same
principle has been laid down by the Hon‟ble Apex Court that in
view of the specific provision even a single ground for detention if
found to be material may be the basis of the detention order.
Paragraph-11 of Vashisht Narain Karwaria (supra) reads as under:
“11. …………. What Section 5-A provides is that where
there are two or more grounds covering various activities
of the detenu, each activity is a separate ground by itself
and if one of the ground is vague, non-existent, not
relevant, not connected or not proximately connected
with such person or invalid for any other reason17
(1990) 2 SCC 629
31
(RNT,J & PKC,J
W.P. NO.5684 OF 2026)whatsoever, then that will not vitiate the order of
detention.”
25. In view of the statutory provision of Section 6 of PIT
NDPS Act, the Order of Detention passed under Section 3 (1) of
PIT NDPS Act 1988 when passed on two or more grounds, such
Order of Detention shall be deemed to have been passed
separately on each of such grounds. In the present case, the
impugned Order of Detention has been passed on six grounds i.e.,
two or more grounds. Such Order of Detention shall be deemed to
have been passed separately on each of such grounds from
Ground Nos.1 to 6. So, even if it be taken that the Order cannot be
sustained on Ground No.6, for non-consideration of three
requirements with respect to the detenu being in judicial custody, it
cannot be held that the detaining authority had not satisfied on the
other grounds, only because of no satisfaction recorded relating to
Ground No.6. It shall be deemed that the State Government or the
detaining authority had made the Order of Detention after being
satisfied on the remaining grounds.
26. Order of Detention shall not be deemed to be invalid
for the remaining grounds and it shall be deemed that the Order of
Detention has been made under Section 3 (1) of PIT NDPS Act
1988 after being satisfied with reference to the remaining 5
grounds. Simply because the Order of Detention cannot be
sustained on Ground No.6, it cannot be said that the Order of
Detention cannot be sustained on Ground Nos.1 to 5. It cannot be
that the Order of Detention has to go. Notwithstanding that the
Order of Detention cannot stand on Ground No.6, it is still a valid
Order on Ground Nos.1 to 5. As already mentioned (supra), the
only ground of challenge raised before us was to the Ground
No.6.”
35. In the present case, the petitioner‟s specific case is that the
detenu was granted bail, but the bail orders were not considered in the order
32
(RNT,J & PKC,J
W.P. NO.5684 OF 2026)
of preventive detention. The petitioner has made a specific statement in para
3 of the affidavit about the grounds i.e., the criminal cases, in which, the bail
was granted, and that the order of preventive detention does not show
consideration of those bail orders. In paragraph No.12 of the counter affidavit
the stand taken by the State, is that all the bail orders passed by the High
Court of Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka High Court and the competent Special
Courts were examined by the detaining authority with the case records and
other material upon which it came to a subjective satisfaction that the
activities of the detenu were prejudicial to the maintenance of public order
and same needed to be prevented by an order of preventive detention.
However, a perusal of the preventive detention order does not show
consideration of the bail orders in the cases, in which bail was granted. There
is no whisper even about the bail orders under Ground Nos.1 to 3, 5 & 6, that
the accused/detenu was granted bail.
36. In ground No.4 i.e Crime No.716 of 2021 under Section
20(b)(ii)(B) of NDPS Act, 1985 of Penumaluru P.S., Krishna District, it is
mentioned that the detenu (A2), was granted anticipatory bail and thereafter
the procedure under Section 41-A of Cr.P.C was followed, eventually
Section35(b) Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) notice was
served to A.2. Learned Government Pleader submits that the order of
preventive detention can be sustained on ground No.4, and deserves not to
be set aside. So far as this ground No.4 is concerned, in that criminal case,
33
(RNT,J & PKC,J
W.P. NO.5684 OF 2026)
the incident occurred on 08.08.2021. The order of preventive detention for
that case, violates the „rule of live and proximity link‟. The proposal was
forwarded in the year 2025 after almost four years and that too after the
detenu was granted anticipatory bail to follow the procedure under Section
41-A of Cr.P.C which procedure was followed. There is nothing mentioned in
the order of the preventive detention that the detenu was not complying with
the notice. The order of preventive detention is a separate order on each
ground under Section 6 of the PIT NDPS Act. So, it cannot stand on ground
No.4. The subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority is based on a
stale case having no casual connection. There was no necessity to pass the
order of preventive detention after four years of the incident. The casual
connection between the incident and need to detain in present is not
established.
37. In ground No.7, also which relates to Crime No.52/2025 under
Section 8(c) read with 20(d)(ii)(C) of NDPS Act, 1985 of Governorpet P.S.,
NTR Police Commissionerate, NTR District, the bail was granted which was
not considered by the authority. Even if the bail was granted after the order of
preventive detention and so the detenu even if in judicial custody, the
detaining authority was required to apply the triple test and only on being
satisfied of such test could have passed the order of preventive detention
based on that criminal case in ground No.7. We do not find any such
consideration. The triple test as laid down in Champion R.Sangma
34
(RNT,J & PKC,J
W.P. NO.5684 OF 2026)
(supra) not having been considered, it cannot be said that the detaining
authority had recorded its subjective satisfaction based on legal
consideration. The order of preventive detention cannot stand even on
ground No.7.
38. The detention order has been passed after 139 days of the
proposal. There is no explanation of the delay for such a long period. It
reflects that the detaining authority was indifferent in passing the order of
preventive detention which is further indicative of the fact that there was no
causal connection with the incidents and to detain the detenu to achieve the
objective of the preventive detention. The satisfaction recorded is therefore
not the subjective satisfaction based on relevant considerations.
39. The prevention detention order also mentions five more cases,
but the order of preventive detention has not been passed on those grounds.
40. We have already observed that with respect to the rest of the
grounds 1 to 3, 5 & 6, the order cannot be sustained. It violates the „rule of
live and proximity link‟, and the bail orders were also not considered. So, the
order of preventive detention cannot be sustained on any of the grounds, it
has been passed.
41. In view of the aforesaid, we hold that the impugned order of
detention and the order of confirmation cannot be sustained. The continued
35
(RNT,J & PKC,J
W.P. NO.5684 OF 2026)
detention of the detenu pursuant to those orders, is illegal, and he is entitled
to be released.
42. The writ petition is allowed, setting aside the impugned order of
preventive detention by the State by G.O.Rt.No.1314, Revenue (Excise.II)
Department, dated 29.10.2025, passed against the detenu, and the order of
confirmation by the State by G.O.Rt.No.69, Revenue (Excise.II) Department,
dated 12.01.2026. The detenu by name Sri Bikki Narendra Babu @ Vicky
Chowdary @ Pushpa, S/o Kumar, Age 34 years, Post Office Back side,
Tadigadapa (V), Penamaluru (M), Krishna District, Andhra Pradesh, shall be
released/set free forthwith, if not required in any other case.
No order as to costs.
As a sequel thereto, miscellaneous petitions, if any pending, shall also
stand closed.
____________________
RAVI NATH TILHARI, J
_____________________________________
PURUSHOTTAM KUMAR CHINTALAPUDI, J
Date :14.07.2026.
Note :- L.R. Copy to be marked.
B/o
RPD.
36
(RNT,J & PKC,J
W.P. NO.5684 OF 2026)
96
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE PURUSHOTTAM KUMAR
CHINTALAPUDI
(ALLOWED)
WRIT PETITION NO: 5684 of 2026
Date : 14.07.2026
Note :- L.R. Copy to be marked.
B/o
RPD.
37
(RNT,J & PKC,J
W.P. NO.5684 OF 2026)
* THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI
* THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE PURUSHOTTAM KUMAR
CHINTALAPUDI
+ WRIT PETITION NO: 5684 OF 2026
% 14.07.2026
# Ponna Roja.
……Petitioner
And:
$ The State of Andhra Pradesh and others
….Respondents.
!Counsel for the Petitioner : Ms.Nuthakki Saarasa Raga Varshini
^Counsel for the respondents : Sri Kirthi Teja Kondaveeti
Learned Government Pleader attached to the
office of learned Advocate General<Gist:
>Head Note:
? Cases referred:
1. 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1333
2. W.P.No.23639 of 2025
3. (2023) 2 SCC 597
4. (2007) 12 SCC 354
5. (2006) 4 SCC 796
6. (1989) 4 SCC 741
7. (2020) 13 SCC 632
8. (1992) 1 SCC 434
9. (1982)2 SCC 403
10. 1979 Crl LJ 203
11. (1975) 3 SCC 395
12. 2012(2) SCC 72
13. (2015) 16 SCC 253
14. (1991) 1 SCC 128
15. 2025 SCC OnLine SC 502
16. 1985 SCC OnLine SC 316
17. (1990) 2 SCC 629
38
(RNT,J & PKC,J
W.P. NO.5684 OF 2026)HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI
****
WRIT PETITION NO: 5684 OF 2026
DATE OF JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED: 14.07.2026
SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL:
THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI
&
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE PURUSHOTTAM KUMAR
CHINTALAPUDI
1. Whether Reporters of Local newspapers Yes/No
may be allowed to see the Judgments?
2. Whether the copies of judgment may be Yes/No
marked to Law Reporters/Journals
3. Whether Your Lordships wish to see the fair Yes/No
copy of the Judgment?
____________________
RAVI NATH TILHARI,J
______________________________________
PURUSHOTTAM KUMAR CHINTALAPUDI, J
39
(RNT,J & PKC,J
W.P. NO.5684 OF 2026)
