Chattisgarh High Court
Piyush Mishra vs Union Of India on 6 April, 2026
1
AFR
Digitally
VISHAKHA signed by
BEOHAR VISHAKHA
BEOHAR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WPS No. 13990 of 2025
Order Reserved on 17.03.2026
Order Delivered on 06.04.2026
1 - Piyush Mishra S/o Shri G.K. Mishra, Aged About 33 Years
Presently Working As Aee/trs/secr, R/o Infront Of Parihar Petrol
Pump, Village- Barbaspur, Post- Barbaspur, Tehsil- District-
Anuppur, Madhya Pradesh- 484224.
... Petitioner(s)
versus
1 - Union Of India Through The General Manager, South East
Central Railway, New Gm Building, Bilaspur C.G. 495004.
2 - The Secretary, Railway Board, Ministry Of Railways, Rail
Bhawan, Raisena Road, Rafi Marg, New Delhi- 110001.
3 - The Principal Chief Electrical Engineer, South East Central
Railway, New Gm Building, Bilaspur- 495004.
4 - The Chief Personnel Officer, Personnel Department, South East
Central Railway, Gm Office, Bilaspur- 495004.
... Respondents
(Cause-title taken from the Case Information System)
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For Petitioner :- Mr. Jitendra Pali, Advocate
For Respondents:- Mr. Ramakant Mishra, DSG alongwith Mr.
Palash Tiwari, Advocate
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Division Bench : Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay S. Agrawal
& Hon'ble Shri Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad
CAV Order
Per, Amitendra Kishore Prasad, J.
1. The petitioner has preferred the present writ petition under
Articles 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the judgment
and final order dated 12.11.2025 passed by the Hon’ble Central
Administrative Tribunal, Jabalpur Bench at Circuit Sitting, Bilaspur,
in O.A. No. 203/669/2023, whereby the learned Tribunal has
dismissed the claim of the petitioner in a mechanical and arbitrary
manner without proper appreciation of the factual matrix, applicable
statutory rules, and the settled principles of natural justice.
2. Subject matter in brief is that the present petition arises out of
denial of a fair opportunity to the petitioner, a Railway officer with
an unblemished record, in a departmental inquiry initiated pursuant
to a Central Bureau of Investigation trap case. The petitioner’s
request to engage a suitable Defence Assistant, particularly a
retired Railway employee, has been repeatedly rejected by the
respondents in a mechanical and arbitrary manner without
recording any reasons. Despite subsequent developments and the
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coming into force of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal)
(Second Amendment) Rules, 2024, which expressly permit such
assistance subject to reasoned consideration, the respondents
failed to reconsider the petitioner’s request and proceeded with the
inquiry. This has caused serious prejudice to the petitioner and
amounts to violation of the principles of natural justice, leading to
filing of the present petition.
3. The petitioner has prayed for following reliefs in the present
writ petition:-
“i. To kindly call for the entire original record
pertaining to the impugned proceedings and
the orders passed by the respondent
authorities, for the kind perusal of this
Hon’ble Court;
ii. To kindly quash and set aside the
judgment and order dated 12.11.2025
passed by the Hon'ble Central
Administrative Tribunal, Jabalpur Bench at
Circuit Sitting: Bilaspur in O.A. No.
203/669/2023, and allow the Original
Application filed by the petitioner;
iii. To kindly direct the respondents to
conduct and conclude the departmental
inquiry strictly in accordance with law, only
after providing the petitioner a fair,
reasonable, and effective opportunity of
4defence, including permission to engage the
Defence Assistant of his choice.
iv. To kindly pass any other or further
order(s) as may be deemed fit, proper, and
just by this Hon’ble Court in the facts and
circumstances of the case, including an
order awarding costs in favour of the
petitioner.”
4. Facts of the case, in a nutshell, are that the petitioner, a
dedicated Railway officer serving as ADEE (O.P.)/RIG/SECR with
an unblemished service record, was arrested on 01.08.2015 in a
Central Bureau of Investigation trap case, which allegation he has
consistently denied. Thereafter, a charge memorandum dated
03.08.2016 was issued initiating major penalty proceedings against
him. During the course of the departmental inquiry, the petitioner
was denied a fair opportunity to defend himself, as his request to
engage an experienced retired Railway officer, Shri M.V.D.
Satyanarayana, as Defence Assistant was arbitrarily rejected. The
said request was also not accepted by the Central Administrative
Tribunal in the year 2019 on a narrow interpretation of the
applicable rules. It is further the case of the petitioner that
subsequent developments revealed that retired Railway employees
had been permitted to act as Defence Assistants in other
departmental proceedings. Despite repeated representations
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submitted by the petitioner from the year 2022 onwards seeking
reconsideration of his request, the same were mechanically
rejected without assigning any reasons. Meanwhile, the inquiry was
continued in haste, compelling the petitioner to participate without
effective defence assistance, thereby causing serious prejudice to
him. It is further submitted that even after the coming into force of
the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) (Second
Amendment) Rules, 2024, which liberalized the provision relating
to engagement of Defence Assistant and required reasoned
consideration of such requests, the respondents failed to apply the
amended provisions and continued to deny the petitioner his
legitimate right. Ultimately, the learned Central Administrative
Tribunal, by order dated 12.11.2025, dismissed the Original
Application preferred by the petitioner in a mechanical manner,
giving rise to the present writ petition.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned
order passed by the Learned Central Administrative Tribunal is
wholly unsustainable in law as well as on facts and is liable to be
set aside. It is contended that the Tribunal has committed a grave
error in invoking the principle of res judicata, as the present
proceedings arise out of fresh and independent causes of action,
including subsequent rejection orders passed in the years 2022
and 2023, as well as the significant statutory development brought
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about by the amendment dated 16.07.2024 to Rule 9(13)(a) of the
Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968. It is further
submitted that the said amendment has substantially liberalised the
provision relating to engagement of Defence Assistant and casts a
mandatory obligation upon the authorities to consider such
requests by recording reasons in writing. However, despite the
amendment being in force and fully applicable, the respondent
authorities failed to consider the petitioner’s request in light of the
amended rule and continued to reject the same in a mechanical
and arbitrary manner, thereby violating statutory mandate and
principles of natural justice. It is further contended that the
petitioner has a fundamental and statutory right to a reasonable
opportunity of defence under Article 311(2) of the Constitution of
India, which includes the right to be assisted by a competent
Defence Assistant, particularly in a complex and technical inquiry
arising out of a CBI trap case. The denial of permission to engage
an experienced Defence Assistant, namely Shri M.V.D.
Satyanarayana, has caused serious prejudice to the petitioner and
has vitiated the entire inquiry proceedings. It is submitted that the
respondents have failed to demonstrate any prejudice or
administrative difficulty in permitting the said Defence Assistant,
especially when he has been allowed to act in similar proceedings
in other Railway units, thereby rendering the denial arbitrary and
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discriminatory. Learned counsel further submits that the Tribunal
has failed to appreciate that RBE No. 177/1990 is merely
illustrative and not restrictive in nature, and cannot be interpreted
to curtail the petitioner’s right to seek appropriate assistance. It is
also submitted that the Tribunal has overlooked the fact that the
respondents proceeded with the inquiry despite pending
representations of the petitioner, thereby compelling him to defend
himself without adequate assistance, which is in clear violation of
the principles of natural justice. In view of the aforesaid, it is prayed
that this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to set aside the impugned
order and grant appropriate relief to the petitioner.
6. Learned counsel for the respondents submits that the present
writ petition is devoid of merits and is liable to be dismissed at the
threshold, as the issues raised herein stand conclusively
adjudicated by the Learned Central Administrative Tribunal in
earlier as well as subsequent proceedings. It is contended that the
petitioner, while serving as ADEE (OP)/RIG, was caught red-
handed by the CBI on 31.07.2015 while demanding and accepting
illegal gratification and was arrested on 01.08.2015, pursuant to
which a major penalty charge-sheet was issued on 03.08.2016,
and departmental proceedings were initiated strictly in accordance
with law. During the inquiry, the petitioner sought permission to
engage a particular Defence Assistant of his choice, which was
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duly considered and rejected in terms of the prevailing rules and
administrative instructions, and the said rejection was specifically
upheld by the Learned Tribunal in O.A. No. 203/224/2017 vide
order dated 11.01.2019, thereby attaining finality. It is further
submitted that despite the issue having been conclusively decided,
the petitioner continued to file repeated and successive
representations on identical grounds with the sole intention of
creating artificial and fresh causes of action and delaying the
departmental proceedings. The respondents, however, considered
such representations and rejected them in accordance with law,
while simultaneously affording the petitioner full and adequate
opportunity to participate in the inquiry proceedings. It is contended
that the petitioner has, in fact, been regularly attending the inquiry,
and the allegation of denial of reasonable opportunity is wholly
baseless and an afterthought. Learned counsel further submits that
the subsequent Original Application being O.A. No. 669/2023 was
rightly dismissed by the Learned Tribunal vide order dated
12.11.2025 on the ground of res judicata, as the issue regarding
appointment of Defence Assistant had already been adjudicated
and could not be reopened. In this regard, reliance is placed upon
the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in M. Nagabhushana
v. State of Karnataka and others AIR 2011 SC 1113, wherein it has
been held that not only issues actually raised but also those
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which ought to have been raised earlier are barred by the
principles of res judicata and constructive res judicata, and such
principles apply with full force even to writ proceedings. It is further
submitted that the reliance placed by the petitioner on the Railway
Servants (Discipline and Appeal) (Second Amendment) Rules,
2024 is wholly misconceived and legally untenable, inasmuch as
the disciplinary proceedings in the present case were initiated in
the year 2016 and the issue regarding appointment of Defence
Assistant had already attained finality by virtue of the Tribunal’s
order dated 11.01.2019. The said amendment does not operate
retrospectively and cannot be invoked to reopen settled issues or
to unsettle judicial findings that have attained finality. Even
otherwise, the petitioner cannot claim any vested right to insist
upon a particular Defence Assistant, and the competent authority
has the discretion to regulate such appointment in accordance with
applicable rules. It is also contended that permitting the petitioner
to repeatedly agitate the same issue would amount to abuse of the
process of law and would defeat the very purpose of disciplinary
proceedings, particularly in a case involving serious allegations of
corruption. The conduct of the petitioner clearly demonstrates a
deliberate attempt to prolong and delay the inquiry proceedings by
raising untenable objections, filing repetitive representations, and
making unfounded allegations against the Inquiry Officer and
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authorities. The record would show that the inquiry has been
prolonged for several years primarily due to such obstructive
tactics adopted by the petitioner. In view of the aforesaid
submissions, it is prayed that this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to
dismiss the present writ petition, as the same is barred by the
principles of res judicata, and devoid of any merit.
7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused
the material available on record.
8. From a bare perusal of the record, it appears that the
petitioner was issued a charge memorandum dated 03.08.2016
proposing initiation of major penalty proceedings in a departmental
enquiry. During the course of the enquiry, the petitioner submitted
an application seeking assistance of a defence assistant of his
choice. However, the said application came to be rejected by the
competent authority on the basis of the interpretation of Railway
Board Circular RBE No. 177/1990, according to which the
delinquent employee cannot claim appointment of a specific
defence assistant of his own choice, particularly when such person
is a retired railway employee and is not otherwise permissible
under the applicable rules.
9. It is not in dispute that a retired enquiry officer has already
been appointed in the matter and the departmental proceedings
are continuing. The record further reflects that earlier also the
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petitioner had approached the competent forum raising
substantially similar grievance regarding appointment of a
particular defence assistant, and such original application was
dismissed. Therefore, merely by reiterating the same grievance
through subsequent representations, no fresh cause of action can
be said to have arisen.
10. The material available on record further indicates that after
rejection of his request, the petitioner submitted multiple
representations raising repetitive and untenable grounds, which
were duly considered and rejected by the competent authority from
time to time. Such repeated representations, founded on the same
cause, cannot be permitted to reopen an issue that has already
attained finality.
11. It is also evident that the petitioner is regularly participating in
the departmental enquiry and has been afforded full and adequate
opportunity of hearing. However, instead of availing such
opportunity and cooperating in expeditious conclusion of the
proceedings, the petitioner appears to be insisting upon
appointment of a particular defence assistant of his own choice,
which is not a vested right under the governing service rules. The
insistence upon a specific individual, despite clear rejection under
the applicable circular, indicates an attempt to prolong the
proceedings rather than facilitate fair adjudication.
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12. This Court also finds substance in the submission advanced
on behalf of the respondents that for one reason or another, the
petitioner has succeeded in delaying the departmental enquiry for a
considerable period of time. The charge-sheet was issued as far
back as in the year 2016 and even after lapse of nearly ten years,
the enquiry has not attained finality. Such prolonged pendency
adversely affects disciplinary administration and frustrates the very
purpose of departmental proceedings.
13. Since the earlier application seeking substantially identical
relief had already been considered and rejected, the subsequent
application raising the same grievance would clearly attract the
principles analogous to res judicata. The learned Central
Administrative Tribunal has rightly taken note of the fact that earlier
proceedings had already culminated and directions were issued
only to decide the petitioner’s representation, which representation
also stood rejected thereafter. Filing successive applications on
identical grounds, after rejection of earlier claims, cannot be
permitted in law.
14. In this regard, reference may aptly be made to the judgment
of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in M. Nagabhushana v. State of
Karnataka and Others reported in AIR 2011 SC 1113, wherein it
has been held that repeated litigation on the same cause after
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adjudication is impermissible and cannot be allowed to create
recurring causes of action.
15. This Court is also of the considered opinion that the scope of
interference in matters arising from interlocutory stages of
departmental proceedings is extremely limited. Unless it is
demonstrated that the proceedings suffer from patent lack of
jurisdiction, violation of mandatory statutory provisions, or manifest
denial of natural justice resulting in serious prejudice, interference
under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India is not
ordinarily warranted.
16. In Union of India v. Kunisetty Satyanarayana 2006 (12) SCC
28, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has categorically held that
ordinarily no writ petition should be entertained against a charge-
sheet or during pendency of disciplinary proceedings, as the
delinquent employee has adequate opportunity to raise all
permissible objections before the disciplinary authority itself, and
premature judicial interference would unnecessarily obstruct the
disciplinary process.
17. Likewise, in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Brahm Datt Sharma
1987 (2) SCC 179, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that
repeated representations in respect of an issue already decided do
not furnish a fresh cause of action, nor can they revive a stale or
concluded claim.
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18. In the present case, the grievance regarding appointment of a
particular Defence Assistant had already been examined and
adjudicated in earlier proceedings. The petitioner, instead of
permitting the disciplinary proceedings to attain their logical
conclusion, continued to submit successive representations and
initiate fresh rounds of litigation on substantially identical grounds.
19. The plea raised on behalf of the petitioner that the
subsequent amendment in the Railway Servants (Discipline and
Appeal) Rules, 2024 creates a fresh enforceable right also does
not merit acceptance. A statutory amendment, unless expressly
made retrospective, cannot reopen an issue that has already
attained finality by judicial adjudication. More particularly, the
amendment does not confer an absolute right upon a delinquent
employee to insist upon appointment of any specific individual as
Defence Assistant.
20. In this regard, the principle laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Crescent Dyes and Chemicals Ltd. v. Ram Naresh Tripathi
(1993) 2 SCC 115 squarely applies, wherein it has been held that
representation in disciplinary proceedings through a chosen person
is not an unrestricted right and remains subject to statutory
regulation.
21. The record further demonstrates that the petitioner has been
participating in the enquiry proceedings and no material has been
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brought on record to establish that any actual prejudice has been
caused so as to vitiate the enquiry itself. Mere refusal to permit a
preferred Defence Assistant cannot ipso facto amounts to denial of
reasonable opportunity when other lawful means of defence remain
available to the delinquent employee.
22. This Court also cannot lose sight of the fact that the charge
memorandum was issued on 03.08.2016 and despite lapse of
considerable time, the enquiry has remained pending.
Departmental proceedings, particularly in matters involving
allegations of corruption, are required to be concluded within a
reasonable period so that administrative discipline is maintained
and public confidence in institutional processes is preserved.
23. Delay tactics adopted by a party cannot be permitted to
defeat the course of justice and deserve to be deprecated, as held
by the Supreme Court of India in (2019) 8 SCC 134 State Bank of
India and Others vs. Atindra Nath Bhattacharyya and Another. It
has been held that once adequate opportunity has been granted, a
party who fails to avail the same cannot seek repeated
opportunities on the pretext of justice, as such indulgence would
amount to rewarding delay and obstructing finality of proceedings.
Relevant paragraph is quoted hereinbelow:-
“11. The learned Single Bench has set aside the
order of punishment as well as the penalty order
directing the employer to serve a notice before
16imposing penalty. The respondent avoided
availing the said opportunity when offered on 24-
3-2016, 7-4-2016 and 22-4-2016. Once
opportunity has been granted to the respondent,
he is not entitled to another opportunity on the
ground of compassion. The only reasoning given
by the Division Bench [Atindra Nath
Bhattacharyya v. SBI, 2017 SCC OnLine Cal
2559 : (2017) 2 CLR 385] is “justice demands”
that the respondent be given one last opportunity
to place his version. The respondent has lost his
chance to put his version before the competent
authority when called upon by the authority to do
so. Time and again opportunity of hearing cannot
be granted on the pretext of justice. The delaying
tactics cannot be rewarded in such a manner.
Once the respondent has failed to avail of the
opportunity of hearing granted, the Bank cannot
be directed to give another opportunity for the
sake of justice. Therefore, we find that the
directions contained in para 18 of the judgment
passed by the Division Bench [Atindra Nath
Bhattacharyya v. SBI, 2017 SCC OnLine Cal
2559 : (2017) 2 CLR 385] are not sustainable
and the same are set aside.”
24. The principle of res judicata is equally applicable to
departmental and administrative proceedings once an issue has
been finally adjudicated between the parties and has attained
finality. The Supreme Court of India in Puja Ferro Alloys P. Ltd. v.
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State of Goa and Others, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 326, reiterated
that the doctrine of res judicata is founded on public policy to
ensure finality in litigation and to prevent re-agitation of issues
already decided, holding that the same principle extends even to
administrative proceedings and proceedings under Article 226 of
the Constitution. Relevant paragraphs are quoted hereinbelow:-
“22. For the principle of res judicata to be
applied in the subsequent proceeding, it must be
between the same parties and the cause of
action of the subsequent proceeding must be
the same as in the previous proceeding. The
Supreme Court in the case of Satyadhyan
Ghosal v. Deorajin Debi15 has succinctly noted
that the principle of res judicata is essential in
giving a finality to judicial decisions by observing
as under:
“The principle of res judicata is based on
the need of giving a finality to judicial
decisions. What it says is that once a res is
judicata, it shall not be adjudged again.
Primarily it applies as between past
litigation and future litigation. When a
matter — whether on a question of fact or
a question of law — has been decided
between two parties in one suit or
proceeding and the decision is final, either
because no appeal was taken to a higher
court or because the appeal was
dismissed, or no appeal lies, neither party
18will be allowed in a future suit or
proceeding between the same parties to
canvass the matter again. This principle of
res judicata is embodied in relation to suits
in Section 11 of the Code of Civil
Procedure; but even where Section 11
does not apply, the principle of res judicata
has been applied by courts for the purpose
of achieving finality in litigation. The result
of this is that the original court as well as
any higher court must in any future
litigation proceed on the basis that the
previous decision was correct.
The principle of res judicata applies also
as between two stages in the same
litigation to this extent that a court, whether
the trial court or a higher court having at an
earlier stage decided a matter in one way
will not allow the parties to re-agitate the
matter again at a subsequent stage of the
same proceedings. …”
24. It is now well settled that the principle of res
judicata applies even to petitions arising for
decision in the writ jurisdiction under Article 226
of the Constitution. If any authority is required
one may profitably refer to the decision in T.P.
Moideen Koya v. State of Kerala17.
25. In the instant case, we are convinced that
the writ petitions before the High Court were hit
by res judicata in view of its previous decision in
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GR Ispat (supra) which, when challenged
before this Court, was upheld with the further
observation that a balanced view of the matter
had been taken and no interference was called
for. The appellant-companies were all parties
and are bound by the decision in GR Ispat
(supra). Having failed up to this Court, the
appellant-companies could not have adopted a
stand different from the one taken in the first
round of litigation. They sought to challenge the
demand notices by re-opening the litigation and
arguing that they are entitled to the benefit for
five years, which they would have been entitled
to had they availed the supply of power within
the time that the notification dated 30.09.1991
was in force.”
25. The learned Tribunal has rightly appreciated that once earlier
relief stood declined and such order attained finality, the
subsequent Original Application raising identical grievance was not
maintainable and was rightly rejected.
26. The learned Tribunal, therefore, committed no error in
rejecting the petitioner’s application vide the impugned order dated
12.11.2025. The reasoning assigned by the Tribunal is in
consonance with settled legal principles and does not suffer from
perversity, illegality, or jurisdictional error warranting interference in
exercise of writ jurisdiction.
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27. In light of the aforesaid, this Court does not find much less
sufficient ground, to entertain the present petition. It appears that
the petitioner is unnecessarily delaying the departmental enquiry
and obstructing its logical conclusion.
28. Consequently, the writ petition being devoid of merit deserves
to be and is accordingly dismissed.
29. No order as to cost(s).
sd/- sd/-
(Sanjay S. Agrawal) (Amitendra Kishore Prasad)
Judge Judge
Vishakha
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HEAD-NOTE
“The principle of res judicata applies equally to writ
petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India. Once an issue has been finally adjudicated
between the same parties and affirmed up to the
higher Courts of India, the same cannot be
reopened in a subsequent writ petition by adopting
a different stand. Re-litigation of an issue already
concluded is impermissible.”