Himachal Pradesh High Court
Phulamu Devi vs State Of H.P And Others on 12 March, 2026
( 2026:HHC:7141 )
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA.
CWPOA No.5019 of 2020
Decided on: 12th March, 2026
Phulamu Devi .......Petitioner
.
versus
State of H.P and others ...Respondents
Coram
Hon'ble Mr.Justice Jiya Lal Bhardwaj, Judge.
of
Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes
For the petitioner: Mr.Anil Chauhan, Advocate.
For the respondents: rt Mr.Rupinder Singh, Additional
Advocate General with
Mr.Sikander Bhushan, Deputy
Advocate General.
Jiya Lal Bhardwaj, Judge (Oral)
By way of present petition, the petitioner being
widow of deceased Ranjha Ram, who was working with the
respondents-Department and resigned from service w.e.f.
13.08.2003, has prayed for grant of the following substantive
reliefs:-
“a). That the respondent may be directed to release/grant
the family pension to the applicant.
b) That the direction may kindly be issued to the
respondents that all the pensionary benefits due from
the date the pension is payable to the husband of the
applicant may be released to the applicant with interest
etc. in the interest of justice and fair play.
c) That this Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue
writ in the nature of Mandamus, thereby directing the1 Whether the reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
::: Downloaded on – 13/03/2026 20:37:47 :::CIS
( 2026:HHC:7141 )
2
respondents to grant the applicant/petitioner
compassionate allowances as admissible to him as per
the law.”
2. Shorn of unnecessary details, the key facts of the
.
case are that the husband of the applicant was appointed
with the respondents-State as Helper. As per pleadings in the
petition, he had worked with the respondents-State w.e.f.
of
01.11.1983 to 30.12.1996. Thereafter, he was conferred work
charge status w.e.f. 01.01.1997 vide office order dated
22.05.1998
rt
3. The husband of the petitioner had resigned from
service on 13.08.2003, which resignation was accepted vide
letter dated 17.11.2003 w.e.f. 13.08.2003 (Annexure R-1).
4. The applicant being the widow had filed the
present petition seeking the relief that since the husband of
the applicant had worked for 13 years as daily waged Helper
and thereafter for seven years on work charge basis, her
husband was entitled to pension. However, the respondents-
State did not take any call on his requests. After his death,
the petitioner made repeated verbal and written requests for
grant of family pension to her, but till date nothing has been
done by the respondents in writing and they verbally told her
that she is not entitled to pension. The action on the part of
::: Downloaded on – 13/03/2026 20:37:47 :::CIS
( 2026:HHC:7141 )
3
the respondents not to grant her pension is highly illegal,
arbitrary and against the principles of natural justice and not
.
sustain in the eyes of law.
5. The respondents filed reply to petition and have
admitted that the husband of the petitioner was conferred
with the work charge status w.e.f. 01.01.1997. However, his
of
resignation was accepted on 17.11.2003 with effect from the
date of tendering resignation i.e. on 13.08.2003. It has been
rt
averred that the husband of the petitioner had rendered only
6 years, 7 months and 13 days of regular service, including
work charge service, which is less than required 10 years of
regular service, including work charge service as per CCS
(Pension) Rules, 1972 for becoming entitled to pension. It has
further been averred that the husband of the petitioner had
tendered his resignation with the Executive Engineer and,
therefore, as per provisions of Rule 26 of the CCS (Pension)
Rules, 1972, once an employee tenders his resignation from
service or a post, unless it is allowed to be withdrawn in the
public interest by the appointing authority, entails forfeiture
of past service. Hence, the petitioner’s husband was not
entitled for benefit of subsequent changes in law as well as
policy.
::: Downloaded on – 13/03/2026 20:37:47 :::CIS
( 2026:HHC:7141 )
4
6. I have heard Mr.Anil Chauhan, learned counsel
representing the petitioner and Mr.Sikander Bhushan,
.
learned Deputy Advocate General for the State and carefully
perused the record.
7. Before adverting to the facts of the case, it would
be relevant to quote Rule 26 of the CCS (Pension) Rules,
of
1972, under which the case of the petitioner is to be
adjudicated. Rule 26 reads as under:-
rt
“26. Forfeiture of service on resignation(1) Resignation from a service or a post, unless it
is allowed to be withdrawn in the public interest
by the Appointing Authority, entails a forefeiture of
past service..”
8. Learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently
argued that since the husband of the petitioner had rendered
services with the respondents and further as per law laid
down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sunder Singh’s case,
he was entitled to pension, once he had rendered 6 years, 7
months and 13 days services with the respondents. Learned
counsel for the petitioner has submitted that in the case of an
employee whose services were dismissed, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court had granted the compassionate allowance
and, therefore,the petitioner being the legal heir, be also
granted the same benefits. He placed heavy reliance upon the
::: Downloaded on – 13/03/2026 20:37:47 :::CIS
( 2026:HHC:7141 )
5
judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sheel Kumar
Jain vs. New India Assurance Company Limited and
.
others, (2011) 12 SCC 197, Asger Ibrahim Amin vs. Life
Insurance Corporation of India, (2016) 13 SCC 797 as
well as judgment passed by the Delhi High Court in Mukul
Sanwal vs. Union of India (2019) 4 SCT 167.
of
9. In the judgment of Sheel Kumar Jain‘s case
(supra), referred by Mr.Anil Chauhan, the Hon’ble Supreme
rt
Court had held that the 1995 Pension Scheme was framed
and notified in the year 1995, yet the same was made
applicable to the employees also who had left the service
before 1995 and when employee had served the letter on
16.09.1991 for resignation, the scheme was not in existence.
Thus, the said judgment is not applicable to the facts of the
present case.
10. Another judgment referred by learned counsel for
the petitioner in Asger Ibrahim Amin‘s case (supra), no doubt
the Hon’ble Supreme Court had held that the appellant in
that case ought not to have been deprived of pension benefits
merely because of his resignation. However, both the above
judgments rendered by Hon’ble two-Judge Benches were
considered later on by Hon’ble three-Judge Bench in Senior
::: Downloaded on – 13/03/2026 20:37:47 :::CIS
( 2026:HHC:7141 )
6
Divisional Manager, Life Insurance Corporation of India
and others vs. Shree Lal Meena, (2019) 4 SCC 479 wherein
.
it was held that once an employee tenders resignation, he
forfeits his services and is not entitled for the pensionary
benefits. The relevant paras 19 to 27 and 31 to 37 of the
judgment are reproduced hereinbelow:-
of
“19. What is most material is that the employee in this
case had resigned. When the Pension Rules are
applicable, and an employee resigns, the consequences
are forfeiture of service, under Rule 23 of the Pension
Rules. In our view, attempting to apply the Pension
rt
Rules to the respondent would be a self-defeating
argument. As, suppose, the Pension Rules wereapplicable and the employee like the respondent was in
service and sought to resign, the entire past service
would be forfeited, and consequently, he would not
qualify for pensionary benefits. To hold otherwise would
imply that an employee resigning during the currency ofthe Rules would be deprived of pensionary benefits,
while an employee who resigns when these Rules were
not even in existence, would be given the benefit of
these Rules.
20. Now turning to the discussion of the judicial
pronouncements in this behalf, we are of the view that
any judgment has to be read for the law it lays down,
by reference given to a factual matrix. Lines orsentences here and there should not be read in absolute
terms, de hors the factual matrix in the context of which
those observations were made.
21. The judgment in JK Cotton Spinning & Weaving
Mills Co. Ltd., Kanpur has, thus, to be considered in
that context. What was the issue in that case? The first
paragraph of the judgment itself clarifies that aspect.
Whether determination of an employer-employee
relationship amounted to retrenchment, within the
meaning of the provisions of the Act applicable is what
was being looked into. We have already noticed, while
referring to the facts of that case hereinbefore, that the
employee in question tried to act clever by half. He
::: Downloaded on – 13/03/2026 20:37:47 :::CIS
( 2026:HHC:7141 )
7
firstly resigned. The resignation was accepted and the
consequent monetary benefit flowed to him. Thereafter,
he sought to bring his resignation within the meaning of
‘retrenchment’ under Section 2(s) read with Section 6N
of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The
.
definition of ‘retrenchment’ itself clearly excluded
voluntary retirement of the workman. The employee,
having voluntarily resigned, the termination of
relationship of employer and employee could not come
within the meaning of ‘retrenchment’. This Court
analysed the difference between the meaning of
resignation and retrenchment. The resignation was
voluntary. It is in this context that it was observed that
of
a voluntary tendering of resignation would be similar to
voluntary retirement and not retrenchment. Nothing
more and nothing less. Thus, in our view, the High
Court, both the learned Single Judge and the Division
Bench, appeared to have read much more into this
rt
judgment than the legal proposition which it sought to
propound.
22. The principles in the context of the controversy
before us are well enunciated in the judgment of this
Court in Reserve Bank of India &Anr. v. Cecil Dennis
Solomon & Anr.8 On a similar factual matrix, the
employees had resigned some time in 1988. The RBI
Pension Regulations came in operation in 1990. The
employees who had resigned earlier sought
applicability of these Pension Regulations to
themselves. The provisions, once again, had a similar
clause of forfeiture of service, on resignation or
dismissal or termination. The relevant observations are
as under:-
“10. In service jurisprudence, the expressions
“superannuation”,”voluntary retirement”,
“compulsory retirement” and “resignation” convey
different connotations. Voluntary retirement and
resignation involve voluntary acts on the part of
the employee to leave service. Though both involve
voluntary acts, they operate differently. One of the
basic distinctions is that in case of resignation it
can be tendered at any time, but in the case of
voluntary retirement, it can only be sought for
after rendering prescribed period of qualifying
service. Other fundamental distinction is that in
case of the former, normally retiral benefits are
denied but in case of the latter, the same is not::: Downloaded on – 13/03/2026 20:37:47 :::CIS
( 2026:HHC:7141 )
8denied. In case of the former, permission or notice
is not mandated, while in case of the latter,
permission of the employer concerned is a
requisite condition. Though resignation is a
bilateral concept, and becomes effective on.
acceptance by the competent authority, yet the
general rule can be displaced by express
provisions to the contrary. In Punjab National
Bank v. P.K. Mittal [AIR 1989 SC 1083] oninterpretation of Regulation 20(2) of the Punjab
National Bank Regulations, it was held that
resignation would automatically take effect from
the date specified in the notice as there was noof
provision for any acceptance or rejection of the
resignation by the employer. In Union of India v.
Gopal Chandra Misra [(1978) 2 SCC 301] it was
held in the case of a judge of the High Court
having regard to Article 217 of the Constitution
rt
that he has a unilateral right or privilege to resign
his office and his resignation becomes effectivefrom the date which he, of his own volition,
chooses. But where there is a provision
empowering the employer not to accept the
resignation, on certain circumstances e.g.
pendency of disciplinary proceedings, theemployer can exercise the power.
11. On the contrary, as noted by this Court in
Dinesh Chandra Sangma v. State of Assam[(1977) 4 SCC 441] while the Government reserves
its right to compulsorily retire a governmentservant, even against his wish, there is a
corresponding right of the government servant to
voluntarily retire from service. Voluntaryretirement is a condition of service created by
statutory provision whereas resignation is an
implied term of any employer-employee
relationship.”
23. In our view, the aforesaid principles squarely apply
in the facts of the present case and the relevant legal
principles is that voluntary retirement is a concept read
into a condition of service, which has to be created by a
statutory provision, while resignation is the unilateral
determination of an employer-employee relationship,
whereby an employee cannot be a bonded labour.
::: Downloaded on – 13/03/2026 20:37:47 :::CIS
( 2026:HHC:7141 )
9
24. In UCO Bank &Ors. v. Sanwar Mal, once again, in
the case of a similar pension scheme, the observations
were made as under:
“6. To sum up, the Pension Scheme embodied in
.
the regulation is a selfsupporting scheme. It is a
code by itself. The Bank is a contributor to the
pension fund. The Bank ensures availability of
funds with the trustees to make due payments tothe beneficiaries under the Regulations. The
beneficiaries are employees covered by Regulation
3. It is in this light that one has to construe
Regulation 22 quoted above. Regulation 22 dealsof
with forfeiture of service. Regulation 22(1) states
that resignation, dismissal, removal or termination
of an employee from the service of the Bank shall
entail forfeiture of his entire past service and
consequently shall not qualify for pensionary
rt
benefits. In other words, the Pension Scheme
disqualifies such dismissed employees andemployees who have resigned from membership of
the fund. The reason is not far to seek. In a self-
financing scheme, a separate fund is earmarked
as the Scheme is not based on budgetary support.
It is essentially based on adequate contributionsfrom the members of the fund. It is for this reason
that under Regulation 11, every bank is required
to cause an investigation to be made by an
actuary into the financial condition of the fundfrom time to time and depending on the deficits,
the Bank is required to make annual contributionsto the fund. Regulation 12 deals with investment
of the fund whereas Regulation 13 deals with
payment out of the fund. In the case of retirement,voluntary or on superannuation, there is a nexus
between retirement and retiral benefits under the
Provident Fund Rules. Retirement is allowed only
on completion of qualifying service which is not
there in the case of resignation. When such a
retiree opts for self financing Pension Scheme, he
brings in accumulated contribution earned by him
after completing qualifying number of years of
service under the Provident Fund Rules whereas a
person who resigns may not have adequate credit
balance to his provident fund account (i.e. bank’s
contribution) and, therefore, Regulation 3 does not
cover employees who have resigned. Similarly, in
the case of a dismissed employee, there may be::: Downloaded on – 13/03/2026 20:37:47 :::CIS
( 2026:HHC:7141 )
10forfeiture of his retiral benefits and consequently
the framers of the Scheme have kept out the
retirees (sic resigned) as well as dismissed
employees vide Regulation. Further, the pension
payable to the beneficiaries under the Scheme.
would depend on income accruing on investments
and unless there is adequate corpus, the Scheme
may not be workable and, therefore, Regulation
22 prescribes a disqualification to dismissedemployees and employees who have resigned.
Lastly, as stated above, the Scheme contemplated
pension as the second retiral benefit in lieu of
employers’ contribution to contributory providentof
fund. Therefore, the said Scheme was not a
continuation of the earlier scheme of provident
fund. As a new scheme, it was entitled to keep out
dismissed employees and employees who have
resigned.
rt
7. In the light of our above analysis of the scheme,
we now proceed to deal with the arguments
advanced by both the sides. It was inter alia
urged on behalf of the appellant bank that under
Regulation 22, category of employees who have
resigned from the service and who have beendismissed or removed from the service are not
entitled to pension, that the pension scheme
constituted a separate fund to be regulated on self
financing principles, that prior to the introductionof the pension scheme, there was in existence a
provident fund scheme and the present schemeconferred a second retiral benefit to certain
classes of employees who were entitled to become
the members/beneficiaries of the fund, that themembership of the fund was not dependent on the
qualifying service under the pension scheme, that
looking to the financial implications, the scheme
framed mainly covered retirees because retirement
presupposed larger number of years of service,
that in the case of resignation, an employee can
resign on the next day of his appointment whereas
in the case of retirement, the employee is required
to put in a certain number of years of service and
consequently, the scheme was a separate code by
itself, that the High Court has committed manifest
error in decreeing the suit of the respondent
inasmuch as it has not considered the relevant
factors contemplated by the said scheme and that::: Downloaded on – 13/03/2026 20:37:47 :::CIS
( 2026:HHC:7141 )
11the pension scheme was introduced in terms of the
settlement dated 29.10.1993 between the IBA and
All-India Bank Employees’ Association, which
settlement also categorically rules out employees
who have resigned or who have been.
dismissed/removed from the service.”
xxx xxx xxx xxxx xxx
“9. We find merit in these appeals. The words
“resignation” and “retirement” carry different
meanings in common parlance. An employee can
resign at any point of time, even on the second
day of his appointment but in the case ofof
retirement he retires only after attaining the age of
superannuation or in the case of voluntary
retirement on completion of qualifying service. The
effect of resignation and retirement to the extent
that there is severance of employment (sic is the
rt
same) but in service jurisprudence both the
expressions are understood differently. Under theRegulations, the expressions “resignation” and
“retirement” have been employed for different
purpose and carry different meanings. The
Pension Scheme herein is based on actuarial
calculation; it is a self-financing scheme, whichdoes not depend upon budgetary support and
consequently it constitutes a complete code by
itself. The Scheme essentially covers retirees as
the credit balance to their provident fund accountis larger as compared to employees who resigned
from service. Moreover, resignation brings aboutcomplete cessation of master-and-servant
relationship whereas voluntary retirement
maintains the relationship for the purposes ofgrant of retiral benefits, in view of the past service.
Similarly, acceptance of resignation is dependent
upon discretion of the employer whereas
retirement is completion of service in terms of
regulations/rules framed by the Bank.
Resignation can be tendered irrespective of the
length of service whereas in the case of voluntary
retirement, the employee has to complete
qualifying service for retiral benefits. Further,
there are different yardsticks and criteria for
submitting resignation vis-Ã -vis voluntary
retirement and acceptance thereof. Since the
Pension Regulations disqualify an employee, who
has resigned, from claiming pension, the
::: Downloaded on – 13/03/2026 20:37:47 :::CIS
( 2026:HHC:7141 )
12
respondent cannot claim membership of the fund.
In our view, Regulation 22 provides for
disqualification of employees who have resigned
from service and for those who have been
dismissed or removed from service. Hence, we do
.
not find any merit in the arguments advanced on
behalf of the respondent that Regulation 22 makes
an arbitrary and unreasonable classification
repugnant to Article 14 of the Constitution by
keeping out such class of employees. The view we
have taken is supported by the judgment of this
Court in the case of Reserve Bank of India v. Cecil
Dennis Solomon &Anr. (supra). Before concluding
of
we may state that Regulation 22 is not in the
nature of penalty as alleged. It only disentitles an
employee who has resigned from service from
becoming a member of the fund. Such employees
have received their retiral benefits earlier. The
rt
Pension Scheme, as stated above, only provides
for a second retiral benefit. Hence, there is no
question of penalty being imposed on such
employees as alleged. The Pension Scheme only
provides for an avenue for investment to retirees.
They are provided avenue to put in their savings
and as a term or condition which is more in the
nature of an eligibility criterion, the Scheme
disentitles such category of employees as are out
of it.”
25. We may only note that in the above discussed
judgment, an argument assailing the Regulation for
forfeiture of service, based on Article 14 of the
Constitution of India was repelled. The provisions under
the new Regulations were held not to be in the nature of
penalty, but a disentitlement, as a consequence of
having resigned from service and, thus, being
disentitled from having become a member of the fund.
There are other judgments also in the same line, but not
laying down any additional principles and, thus, it
would suffice to just mention them, i.e. M.R. Prabhakar
&Ors. v. Canara Bank & Ors. and J.M. Singh v. Life
Insurance Corporation of India &Ors.
26. There are some observations on the principles of
public sectors being model employers and provisions of
pension being beneficial legislations. We may, however,
note that as per what we have opined aforesaid, the
issue cannot be dealt with on a charity principle. When
::: Downloaded on – 13/03/2026 20:37:47 :::CIS
( 2026:HHC:7141 )
13
the Legislature, in its wisdom, brings forth certain
beneficial provisions in the form of Pension Regulations
from a particular date and on particular terms and
conditions, aspects which are excluded cannot be
included in it by implication. The provisions will have to
.
be read as they read unless there is some confusion or
they are capable of another interpretation. We may also
note that while framing such schemes, there is an
important aspect of them being of a contributory nature
and their financial implications. Such financial
implications are both, for the contributors and for the
State. Thus, it would be inadvisable to expand such
beneficial schemes beyond their contours to extend
of
them to employees for whom they were not meant for by
the Legislature.
27. We are, thus, of the view that the impugned orders
in this case cannot be sustained and are liable to be set
rt
aside, and the writ petition filed by the respondent
consequently stands dismissed.
28 to 30. xxxx xxxx xxx
31. The last relevant aspect is that the 1995 Scheme
provided in clause 22 as under:
“22. Forfeiture of service – Resignation or
dismissal or removal or termination or
compulsory retirement of an employee from theservice of the Corporation or a Company shall
entail forfeiture of his entire past service andconsequently shall not qualify for pensionary
benefits.”
32. Thus, once again, there is this clause of forfeiture of
service in case of resignation.
33. In order to elucidate the legal principle further, we
may note that Sheel Kumar Jain took note of the
judgment of the three Judges’ Bench in Sudhir Chandra
Sarkar v. Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. & Ors. An
uncovenanted employee of respondent-Company, paid
on a monthly basis, sought to recover a sum as gratuity,
for continued service rendered over 29 years, under the
Retiring Gratuity Rules, 1937, after having resigned
from service. The employee was paid the provident fund
dues. The High Court of Patna opined against the
employee. When the matter reached this Court, one of
::: Downloaded on – 13/03/2026 20:37:47 :::CIS
( 2026:HHC:7141 )
14
the contentions raised by the respondent Company was
that the employee had resigned and not retired from
service. It was noticed that Rule 1(g) defines ‘retirement’
as “the termination of service by reason of any cause
other than removal by discharge due to misconduct.”
.
The employee had not been removed by discharge due
to misconduct. The termination of service, being on
account of resignation, it was held to qualify within the
definition of ‘retirement’ under the Rules. The rest of the
judgment, dealing with the principles as to how gratuity
should be treated, is not relevant.
34. We, thus, notice that all that was opined by the
of
three Judges’ Bench in the aforesaid case was based
on the definition of ‘retirement’ as per the Retiring
Gratuity Rules, 1937, which was expansive and all
inclusive, excluding only the removal by discharge due
to misconduct. Thus, nothing more could have been read
rt
into this judgment.
35. We may also add that there are some observations
in the aforesaid case that pension and gratuity are both
retiral benefits and an employee, with long years of
service should be assured social security to some
extent, in the form of either pension or gratuity or
provident fund, whichever retiral benefit is operative in
the industrial establishment. In the given facts of the
appeal before us, the benefit of provident fund has been
given as that was the scheme applicable at the relevant
stage of time. The principle laid down is not that all of
them should be simultaneously be granted, but that, at
least one of them should be granted, though there is no
prohibition against more than one being granted.
36. In view of what we have discussed aforesaid, all
three aspects stated by us are relevant and disentitle
the appellant to any relief. We have already explained
the difference between resignation and voluntary
retirement. Mere categorisation by the appellant himself
of his resignation as “premature retirement” is of no
avail. The same principle discussed aforesaid, of
forfeiture of service, would be applicable here and the
appellant did not have the requisite age when he
resigned even were the 1976 Scheme to be made
applicable.
37. We may also find that the appellant remained silent
for years together and that this Court, taking a
::: Downloaded on – 13/03/2026 20:37:47 :::CIS
( 2026:HHC:7141 )
15
particular view subsequently, in Sheel Kumar Jain,
would not entitle stale claims to be raised on this
behalf, like that of the appellant. In fact the appellant
slept over the matter for almost a little over two years
even after the pronouncement of the judgment.”
.
11. Learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently
argued that similar preposition had come before the High
Court of Delhi, wherein the Court has considered the similar
provisions and held that a person who is dismissed or
of
removed from service and found guilty of mis-conduct, cannot
be said to be on better footing than the person who tenders
rt
his resignation, even if the Government would disclose
reasons denying the pension, his case for grant of
compassionate allowance, which cannot exceed two-third of
retiral benefits, would have been considered.
12. Once the Hon’ble Supreme Court had occasion to
deal with similar preposition of law, this Court is not
persuaded to agree with the view taken by the Delhi High
Court. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case BSES
Yamuna Power Ltd. vs. Ghanshyam Chand Sharma and
another, (2020) 3 SCC 346, had again the occasion to deal
with the issue of grant of pension after acceptances of
resignation and held that there is material distinction
between the concept of resignation and voluntary retirement
::: Downloaded on – 13/03/2026 20:37:47 :::CIS
( 2026:HHC:7141 )
16
and further the view taken by the Court in Asger Ibrahim
Amin‘s case (supra) was disapproved and the Court held that
.
the provisions providing for voluntary retirement would not
apply retrospectively by implication, where an employee has
resigned from service, there arises no question of whether he
has in fact ‘voluntarily retired’ or ‘resigned’. After considering
of
the provisions of Rule 26 of the Central Civil Service Pension
Rules, 1972, returned the findings that if the Court was to re-
rt
classify his resignation as a case of voluntary retirement, this
would obfuscate the distinction between the concepts of
resignation and voluntary retirement inasmuch as the very
import of Rule 26 would be negated and such an approach
cannot be adopted. The relevant paras 10 to 17 of the
judgment are reproduced hereunder:-
“10. In Shree Lal Meena II, upholding the interpretation in
Shree Lal Meena I, Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul speaking
for the three judge Bench, noted that the retrospective
application of the provision on voluntary retirement in theLIC Pension Rules would lead to an absurd result:
“19. What is most material is that the employee in
this case had resigned. When the Pension Rules are
applicable, and an employee resigns, the
consequences are forfeiture of service, under Rule 23
of the Pension Rules. In our view, attempting to
apply the Pension Rules to the respondent would be
a self-defeating argument. As, suppose, the Pension
Rules, were applicable and the employee like the
respondent was in service and sought to resign,
the entire past service would be forfeited, and
consequently, he would not qualify for
pensionary benefits. To hold otherwise would::: Downloaded on – 13/03/2026 20:37:47 :::CIS
( 2026:HHC:7141 )
17imply than an employee resigning during the
currency of the Rules would be deprived of
pensionary benefits, while an employee who resigns
when the Rules were not even in existence, would be
given the benefit of these Rules.”
.
(Emphasis supplied)
11. The Court noted that, if the approach followed in Asger
Ibrahim Amin was adopted in interpreting the LIC Pension
Rules, an employee who resigned after the enactment of
the rules would not be entitled to pensionary benefits but
an employee who had resigned when the rules were not in
force, but had completed the prescribed period of service
for voluntary retirement, would be entitled to
of
pensionary benefits. Such an outcome could not be
countenanced and would render nugatory the provision
which stipulated that upon resignation, past service stood
forfeited.
rt
12. The Court in Shree Lal Meena II elucidated the
distinction between resignation and voluntary retirement in
the following terms:
“22. . [quoting RBI v Cecil Dennis Solomon (2004) 9
SCC 461].
“10. In service jurisprudence, the expressions
“superannuation”,voluntary retirement”,”compulsory ret
irement” and “resignation” convey different
connotations.Voluntary retirement and resignation
involve voluntary acts on the part of the employee toleave service. Though both involve voluntary acts,
they operate differently. One of the basic distinctions isthat in case of resignation it can be tendered at
any time, but in the case of voluntary retirement, it can
only be sought for after rendering the prescribed period
of qualifying service. Another fundamental distinctionis that in case of the former, normally retiral benefits
are denied but in case of the latter, the same is not
denied. In case of the former, permission or notice is
not mandated, while in the case of the latter,
permission of the employer concerned is a requisite
condition. Though resignation is a bilateral concept,
and becomes effective on acceptance by the competent
authority, yet the general rule can be displaced
by express provisions to the contrary.”
The above observations highlighted the material distinction
between the concept of resignation and
voluntary retirement. The Court also observed that while
pension schemes do form beneficial legislation in a
::: Downloaded on – 13/03/2026 20:37:47 :::CIS
( 2026:HHC:7141 )
18
delegated form, a beneficial construction cannot run
contrary to the express terms of the provisions:
“26. There are some observations on the principles of
public sectors being model employers and provisions.
of pension being beneficial legislations (S.D. vs. CBI)
(see Asger Ibrahim Amin v LIC). We may, however,
note that as per what we have opined aforesaid, the
issue cannot be dealt with on a charity principle.
When the legislature, in its wisdom, brings forthcertain beneficial provisions in the form of Pension
Regulations from a particular date and on particular
terms and conditions, aspects which are excluded
cannot be included in it by implication.”
of
13. The view in Asger Ibrahim Amin was disapproved and
the court held that the provisions providing for
voluntary retirement
rt would not apply
retrospectively by implication. In this view, where an
employee has resigned from service, there arises no
question of whether he has in fact “voluntarily retired” or
“resigned”. The decision to resign is materially distinct from
a decision to seek voluntary retirement. The decision to
resign results in the legal consequences that flow from a
resignation under the applicable provisions. These
consequences are distinct from the consequences flowing
from voluntary retirement and the two may not be
substituted for each other based on the length of an
employee’s tenure.
14. In the present case, the first respondent resigned on 7
July 1990 with effect from 10 July 1990. By resigning, the
first respondent submitted himself to the legal
consequences that flow from a resignation under the
provisions applicable to his service. Rule 26 of the Central
Civil Service Pension Rules 1972 [CCS Pension Rules]
states that:
“26. Forfeiture of service on resignation
(1) Resignation from a service or a post, unless it is
allowed to be withdrawn in the public interest by the
Appointing Authority, entails a forfeiture of past
service…”
Rule 26 states that upon resignation, an employee forfeits
past service. We have noted above that the approach
adopted by the court in Asger Ibrahim Amin has been held
to be erroneous since it removes the important distinction
between resignation and voluntary retirement. Irrespective
::: Downloaded on – 13/03/2026 20:37:47 :::CIS
( 2026:HHC:7141 )
19
of whether the first respondent had completed the
requisite years of service to apply for voluntary retirement,
his was a decision to resign and not a decision to seek
voluntary retirement. If this court were to re-classify his
resignation as a case of voluntary retirement, this would
.
obfuscate the distinction between the concepts of
resignation and voluntary retirement and render the
operation of Rule 26 nugatory. Such an approach cannot be
adopted. Accordingly, the finding of the Single Judge that
the first respondent “voluntarily retired” is set aside.
15. We now turn to the question of whether the first
respondent had completed twenty years in service. During
the present proceedings, our attention was drawn to the
of
fact that the first respondent had applied for
voluntary retirement on 14 February 1990. By a letter
dated 25 May 1990 the appellant denied the first
respondent’s application for voluntary retirement on the
ground that the first respondent had not completed
rt
twenty years of service. It was thus urged that the
appellant’s decision to deny the first respondent
voluntary retirement was illegal as the first respondent had
completed twenty years of service.
16. This argument cannot be accepted. Even if he was
denied voluntary retirement on 25 May 1990, the first
respondent did not challenge this decision but resigned, on
7 July 1990. The denial of voluntary retirement does not
mitigate the legal consequences that flow from resignation.
No evidence has been placed on the record to show that the
first respondent took issue with the denial of
voluntary retirement between 25 May 1990 and 7
July 1990. To the contrary, in the legal notice dated 1
December 1992 sent by the first respondent to the
appellant, the first respondent admitted to having resigned.
The first respondent’s writ petition was instituted
thirteen years after the denial of voluntary retirement and
eventual resignation. In the light of these circumstances,
the denial of voluntary retirement cannot be invoked before
this Court to claim pensionary benefits when the first
respondent has admittedly resigned.
17. On the issue of whether the first respondent has served
twenty years, we are of the opinion that the question is of
no legal consequence to the present dispute. Even if the
first respondent had served twenty years, under Rule 26 of
the CCS Pension Rules his past service stands forfeited
upon resignation. The first respondent is therefore
not entitled to pensionary benefits.”
::: Downloaded on – 13/03/2026 20:37:47 :::CIS
( 2026:HHC:7141 )
20
13. In the present case, the resignation tendered by
the husband of the petitioner was accepted by the respondent
.
authorities on 17.11.2003 w.e.f. 13.08.2003. The petitioner
being the widow of deceased had filed the petition in the year
2018. There is no murmur in the entire petition that why the
petitioner did not come to the Court earlier. No document has
of
been placed on record that during the lifetime of the husband
of the petitioner, he had ever approached the competent
rt
Court of law. The petition was filed by the petitioner under
Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 before
the Tribunal and as per provisions contained under the
Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, the specific period is
provided to institute the application for redressal of
grievances. If the representation made is not decided within a
period of six months, an employee can file original application
within one year from the date of said period of six months.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court has also considered this aspect
in the judgment in Shree Lal Meena‘s case (supra) and has
given specific findings that stray claims cannot be raked up.
14. Therefore, in view of the aforesaid position of law,
once the petitioner had resigned from service and his
resignation was accepted, the petitioner is not entitled for any
::: Downloaded on – 13/03/2026 20:37:47 :::CIS
( 2026:HHC:7141 )
21
relief as claimed in the writ petition, firstly, on the point of
law and secondly, the claim being stale claim.
.
15. Consequently, the writ petition being devoid of
merit as well as on account of delay and laches is dismissed.
However, with no orders as to cost.
16. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed
of
of.
( Jiya Lal Bhardwaj )
March 12, 2026 rt Judge
(naveen)
::: Downloaded on - 13/03/2026 20:37:47 :::CIS
