Himachal Pradesh High Court
Paras Ram vs State Of H.P on 24 March, 2026
( 2026:HHC:8492 )
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. Appeal No. 245 of 2022
Reserved on: 26.02.2026
.
Date of Decision: 24.03.2026.
Paras Ram ...Appellant
Versus
State of H.P. ...Respondent
of
Coram
Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
rt
Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes.
For the Appellant : Mr N.K. Thakur, Senior Advocate
with Mr Karanveer Singh,
Advocate.
For the Respondent : Mr Prashant Sen, Deputy Advocate
General. Mr.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The present appeal is directed against the judgment
of conviction and order of sentence dated 01.07.2022, passed by
learned Special Judge, Chamba, HP (learned Trial Court) in
Sessions Trial No. 673 of 2018, vide which the appellant (accused
before the learned Trial Court) was convicted of the commission
of an offence punishable under Section 20(b)(ii)(B) of the
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1984 (NDPS
1
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
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Act) and was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for
eight years, pay a fine of ₹ 80,000/- (₹ Eighty Thouand only),
.
and in default of payment of fine to undergo further rigorous
imprisonment for one year. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to
in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial
Court for convenience.)
of
2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present
appeal are that the police presented a challan before the learned
rt
Trial Court against the accused for the commission of an offence
punishable under Section 20(b)(ii)(B) of the NDPS Act. It was
asserted that S.I. Babu Ram (PW-5), HHC Manohar Lal (PW-2),
Constable Sunila Kumar (PW-3) and Constable Dalip Kumar (not
examined) had set up a naka near Dunali on Chamba-Bharmour
road on 03.04.2017 at about 4.00 P.M. A vehicle bearing
registration No. HP-73-6672 came from Chamba, which was
signalled to stop. The driver identified himself as Ramesh
Kumar (PW-1). When the police were checking the documents
of the vehicle the accused came from Dunali towards Chamba
carrying a backpack. The accused returned after seeing the
police. The police became suspicious. He fell while running,
and the police apprehended him. He identified himself as Paras
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Ram. The police checked the carry bag and recovered a purple
carry bag containing 800 grams of charas. The police put the
.
charas in a cloth parcel, and sealed the parcel with six
impressions of seal ‘SB’. NCB-I form (Ex. PW5/A) was filled in
triplicate, and the seal impression ‘SB’ was put on the NCB-I
form. The specimen of seal impression (Ex.PW1/A) was taken
of
on a separate piece of cloth. The seal, after its use, was handed
over to Ramesh Kumar.
rt The parcel was seized vide memo
(Ex.PW1/B), and a copy of the seizure memo was supplied to the
accused free of cost. Rukka (Ex.PW3/A) was prepared and sent
to the police station, where FIR (Ex.PW14/A) was registered. S.I.
Babu Ram (PW5) investigated the matter. He prepared a spot
map (Ex.PW5/B). ASI Mohinder Singh (PW13) further
investigated the matter. The documents and the accused were
handed over to him vide memo (Ex.PW2/A). ASI Mohinder Singh
recorded the statements of the witnesses as per their version
and arrested the accused. He produced the accused and the
cloth parcel before Inspector/SHO Dharam Singh (PW-14), who
checked the seals and resealed the parcel with five impressions
of seal “BH”. He obtained the specimen of seal ‘BH’
(Ex.PW14/C) on a separate piece of cloth and the NCB-I form. He
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handed over the seal to H.C. Chaman Lal (PW-15) after its use.
He prepared the resealing memo (Ex.PW 6/A) and handed over
.
the case property and the documents to H.C. Lucky Kumar (PW-
6), who made the entry in the malkhana register at serial No. 64
(Ex.PW6/B) and deposited the parcel in the malkhana. On
05.04.2017, he handed over the cloth parcel, a sample of seal and
of
NCB-I forms to HHC Mohinder Singh (PW-12) with directions to
carry them to SFSL, Junga vide R.C. No. 28/2017 (Ex.PW6/C).
rt
HHC Mohinder Singh (PW-12) deposited all the articles in safe
condition with SFSL, Junga and handed over the receipt to H.C.
Lucky Kumar on his return. Special report (Ex.PW8/A) was
prepared and was handed over to Dy. Superintendent of Police
Beer Bahadur, who made the endorsement on the special report
and handed it over to HHC Joginder (PW-8), his Reader, who
made an entry at serial No. 22 in the receipt register (Ex.PW8/C)
and retained the special report on record. The result of the
analysis (Ex. PX) was issued, in which it was opined that the
exhibit was an extract of cannabis and a sample of charas, which
contained 10.88 % w/w purified resin in it. HHC Padam Nath
(PW-9) brought the result of the analysis and case property and
handed them over to MHC Lucky Kumar, who deposited the case
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property in Malkhana. He handed over the case property to ASI
Ashwani Kumar (PW-11) for certifying the correctness of the
.
inventory. Ashwani Kumar produced the case property and the
certificate before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chamba,
on 13.10.2017, along with the application (Ex. PW11/A) for
drawing the samples of 25 grams each of the case property.
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Learned Chief Judicial Magistrate passed an order (Ex.PW11/B)
and separated two samples of charas weighing 25 grams each.
rt
He sealed the parcel and sample parcel with three seals of
impression, CJM Cba, and issued a certificate (Ex.PW11/C).
Photographs (Ex.PW11/D-1 to PW11/D-4) of the proceedings
were taken. Certificate (Ex. PW11/E) was issued, and a sample of
seal (Ex.PW11/F) was prepared on a separate piece of cloth. The
case property was deposited with H.C. Lucky Kumar (PW-6). He
handed over the case property to SHO Dharam Singh on
09.02.2018 for destroying the case property. He deposited the
empty parcel of the bulk parcel and two sealed parcels with
Lucky Kumar, which were sent by him to District Malkhana
Chamba vide R.C. No. 137 of 2018 through H.C. Kishan Chand.
The statements of the witnesses were recorded as per their
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version. After completion of the investigation challan was
prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court.
.
3. The learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to
summon the accused. When the accused appeared, he was
charged with the commission of an offence punishable under
Section 20 (b) (ii) (B) of the NDPS Act, to which he pleaded not
of
guilty and claimed to be tried.
4.
rt
The prosecution examined 20 witnesses to prove its
case. Ramesh Kumar (PW-1) is the independent witness who
has not supported the prosecution’s case. HHC Manohar Lal
(PW-2), Constable Sunil Kumar (PW-3), Inspector Babu Ram
(PW-5), and ASI Mohinder Singh (PW-13) were the members of
the police party that had effected the recovery. Constable Raj
Kumar (PW4) handed over the special report to Dy.
Superintendent of Police, Chamba. H.C. Lucky Kumar (PW-6)
was working as MHC with whom the case property was
deposited. H.C. Sanjeev Kumar (PW-7) was working as a Reader
to whom the rukka was handed over. HHC Joginder (PW-8) was
posted as Reader to Dy. Superintendent of Police Headquarters,
to whom the special report was handed over. HHC Padam Nath
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(PW-9) brought the case property and the result from the SFSL,
Junga. LHC Upinder Chona (PW10) proved the entry in the daily
.
diary. ASI Ashwani Kumar (PW-11) produced the case property
before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chamba, for
certification and taking the samples. Constable Mohinder Singh
(PW-12) carried the case property and other articles to SFSL,
of
Junga. Inspector Dharam Singh (PW-14) was posted as SHO,
who signed the FIR and resealed the parcel. H.C. Chaman (PW-
rt
15) is the witness to the resealing proceedings. Daleep Kumar
(PW-16) was a member of the raiding party. ASI Ashwani
Kumar (PW-17) was associated during the process of
certification. Joginder Singh (PW-18) developed the
photographs of the Court proceedings. Sher Khan (PW-19)
developed the photographs and the C.D. H.C. Lucky Kumar (PW-
20) proved the entries in the daily diary.
5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section
313 of Cr.P.C., denied the prosecution’s case in its entirety. He
claimed that he was innocent and was falsely implicated. He did
not produce any evidence in his defence.
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6. Learned Trial Court held that the testimonies of the
witnesses to the recovery were consistent. The statement of an
.
independent witness could not be discarded simply because he
was declared hostile. The police had effected a chance recovery,
and the non-association of other independent witnesses was
not possible. The minor contradictions in the statements of the
of
official witnesses were not sufficient to discredit the
prosecution’s case.
rt The statements of the official witnesses
could not be discarded because of their status. The procedure as
required under the law was followed. Provisions of Sections 52,
55 and 57 were duly complied with. Integrity of the case
property was duly established. The report of the analysis proved
that the substance recovered on the spot was charas. The
defence taken by the accused regarding the false implication was
not believable. Hence, the learned trial Court convicted and
sentenced the accused as aforesaid.
7. Being aggrieved by the judgment of conviction and
order of sentence passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused
has filed the present appeal asserting that the prosecution has
failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The
testimony of Ramesh Kumar (PW-1) discredited the
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prosecution’s case. Arrest memo (Ex. PW13/D) suggests that
Payar Singh, the younger brother of the accused, was present on
.
the spot, but he was not associated. Statements of official
witnesses contradicted each other on material aspects, which
made their testimonies doubtful. Statements of Inspector
Dharam Singh (PW-14) and MHC Lucky Kumar (PW20)
of
regarding the deposit of the case property were contradicted by
malkhana register.
rt There was overwriting in the names of
investigating officers in the arrest memo (Ex.PW13/D) and
personal search memo (Ex.PW13/C), which made the
prosecution’s case doubtful. Therefore, it was prayed that the
present appeal be allowed, and the judgment and order passed
by the learned Trial Court be set-aside.
8. I have heard Mr N.K. Thakur, learned Senior
Advocate, assisted by Mr Karanveer Singh, Advocate, learned
counsel for the appellant/accused and Mr Prashant Sen, learned
Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent/State.
9. Mr N.K. Thakur, learned Senior Advocate for the
appellant/accused, submitted that the statements of the
prosecution witnesses contradicted each other on material
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aspects. The prosecution had not complied with the
requirements of Section 52-A of the NDPS Act, which is fatal to
.
the prosecution’s case. The abstract of malkhana register made
the prosecution’s case doubtful. There was no entry of taking
the case property to the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate for
certification of the inventory. The Inventory proceedings were
of
also not conducted properly by the learned Chief Judicial
Magistrate. The independent witness had also not supported
rt
the prosecution’s case. All these circumstances made the
prosecution’s case doubtful, and the learned Trial Court had
erred in convicting and sentencing the accused. Hence, he
prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment of
conviction and order of sentence passed by the learned Trial
Court be set aside.
10. Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General
for the respondent/State, submitted that the learned Trial Court
had rightly held that the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses corroborated each other. The plea taken by the
accused regarding false implication was not believable and was
rightly discarded by the learned Trial Court. The mere fact that
independent persons had not supported the prosecution’s case
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was not material. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal
be dismissed.
.
11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
12. Ramesh Kumar (PW-1) stated that nothing had
of
happened in his presence, nor did he know anything about this
case. He was permitted to be cross-examined. He admitted in
rt
his cross-examination by the learned Public Prosecutor that he
was driving a pickup bearing registration No. HP-73- 6672 from
Dharwala to Kuner on 3.07.2017. He admitted that he had
arrived at Dunali at about 4.00 P.M., where a nakka was set up by
the police. He admitted that he was stopped by the police. He
denied that the police were checking documents when the
accused came from Dunali carrying a backpack in his right hand.
He denied that the accused got perplexed after seeing the police,
and he ran away. He denied that the accused had fallen and
sustained injuries. He denied that the accused had identified
himself as Paras Ram. He denied that the search of the carry bag
was conducted, and a purple carry bag containing charas was
recovered during the search. He denied that charas was
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weighed, and its weight was found to be 800 grams. He
admitted his signature on the specimen of seal (Ex. PW1/A). He
.
also identified his signature on the seizure memo (Ex.PW1/B).
He volunteered to say that he was made to sign blank papers. He
admitted that he was visible in photographs (Ex P-1 and Ex P-2).
He admitted his signature on the empty parcel (Ex. P-1). He
of
stated that he does not put signatures on blank papers. He
volunteered to say that he was told by the police that his vehicle
rt
would be challaned. He had not made any complaint to anyone
regarding signatures on blank papers. He admitted that he was
visible in photographs but stated that no proceedings took place
in his presence. He denied the previous statement recorded by
the police.
13. Mohinder Singh (PW-13) stated that he had recorded
Ramesh Kumar’s statement (Ex.PW13/B) as per his version. This
part of his testimony was not challenged in the cross-
examination, and no question was asked about the statement of
Ramesh Kumar recorded by him. Hence, this part of his
testimony is to be accepted as correct. Therefore, Ramesh Kumar
is shown to have made two inconsistent statements on two
different occasions, one before the police that the recovery was
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effected in his presence and all the formalities were conducted in
his presence, and the other before the Court that no recovery
.
was effected in his presence and no proceedings after recovery
were conducted in his presence. Thus, his credit has been
impeached under Section 155 (3) of the Indian Evidence Act. It
was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sat Paul v. Delhi
of
Admn., (1976) 1 SCC 727 that where a witness has been
thoroughly discredited by confronting him with the previous
rt
statement, his statement cannot be relied upon. However, when
he is confronted with some portions of the previous statement,
his credibility is shaken to that extent, and the rest of the
statement can be relied upon. It was observed:
“52. From the above conspectus, it emerges clearly that
even in a criminal prosecution, when a witness is cross-
examined and contradicted with the leave of the court by
the party calling him, his evidence cannot, as a matter of
law, be treated as washed off the record altogether. It isfor the Judge of fact to consider in each case whether, as a
result of such cross-examination and contradiction, the
witness stands thoroughly discredited or can still be
believed regarding a part of his testimony. If the Judge
finds that in the process, the credit of the witness has not
been completely shaken, he may, after reading and
considering the evidence of the witness, as a whole, with
due caution and care, accept, in the light of the other
evidence on the record, that part of his testimony which
he finds to be creditworthy and act upon it. If in a given
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impugned, and in the process, the witness stands squarely
and totally discredited, the Judge should, as a matter of
prudence, discard his evidence in toto.”
.
14. This Court also took a similar view in Ian Stilman
versus. State 2002(2) ShimLC 16 wherein it was observed:
“12. It is now well settled that when a witness who has
been called by the prosecution is permitted to be cross-
examined on behalf of the prosecution, such a witnessof
loses credibility and cannot be relied upon by the defence.
We find support for the view we have taken from the
various authorities of the Apex Court. In Jagir Singh v. The
State (Delhi Administration), AIR 1975 Supreme Court 1400,
rt
the Apex Court observed:
“It is now well settled that when a witness, who has
been called by the prosecution, is permitted to be
cross-examined on behalf of the prosecution, the
result of that course being adopted is to discreditthis witness altogether and not merely to get rid of a
part of his testimony.
15. Thus, the testimony of Ramesh Kumar (PW-1) will
not discredit the prosecution’s case.
16. It was laid down by this Court in Ashok alias Dangra
Jaiswal versus State of Madhya Pradesh, (2011) 5 SCC 123, that
independent witnesses turning hostile is no reason to discard
the prosecution version. It was observed:
“The seizure witness turning hostile may not be very
significant by itself, as it is not an uncommon
phenomenon in criminal trial particularly in cases
relating to the NDPS Act.”
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17. Therefore, the accused cannot be acquitted merely
because the independent witness has turned hostile.
.
18. Learned Trial Court had rightly pointed out that this
witness admitted his signature on the documents and the bulk
parcel. He has not provided any explanation for the same. He
admitted that he does not put signatures on blank papers, and
of
he had not made any complaint to the police. It was observed by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Raveen Kumar v. State of H.P.,
rt
(2021) 12 SCC 557, that where a witness admitted his signature
on the spot, his oral testimony to the contrary could not be
believed. It was observed at page 566:
“21. Although declared hostile by the prosecution, Nam
Singh (PW 1) admits to being literate and having signedhis statement on the spot. During cross-examination, he
admits to having duly perused the contents of these doc-
uments before having signed them, and of not being un-
der any form of police pressure, thus seriously under-
mining any oral statement to the contrary. His deposition
independently establishes that the Maruti van of the ap-
pellant had indeed been stopped, the appellant’s consent
was taken, a search had been conducted, certain items
were seized, and some substance had been weighed and
sealed. Although PW 1 claimed not to have specifically
witnessed the seizure of the charas, but he has not denied
so either. He submits that he had gone back to his shop to
attend to some customers at that stage of the search.
However, he admits to having been shown the extracted
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16 ( 2026:HHC:8492 )court. Thus, far from undermining the prosecution ver-
sion, PW 1’s statement broadly corroborates and
strengthens the seizure of contraband substance from the
possession of the appellant.”
.
19. Therefore, the prosecution’s case cannot be
discarded because Ramesh Kumar has not supported the
prosecution’s case.
of
20. The police officials have consistently deposed about
their visit on the spot and apprehension of the accused based on
rt
suspicion and recovery from him. It was submitted that there
are various contradictions in the prosecution’s case, which
made it highly doubtful. The following contradictions were
highlighted:
(i) The police officials stated that they had a mega light
with them. Constable Sunil Kumar (PW-3) stated in
his cross-examination that the proceedings were
conducted in the headlights of the private vehicle.
(ii) Inspector Babu Ram (PW-5) stated in his cross-
examination that the personal search of the accused
was not conducted. However, Constable Daleep
Kumar (PW-16) deposed in his cross-examination
that Babu Ram had conducted the personal search of
the accused.
(iii) Constable Sunil Kumar (PW-3) stated in his cross-
examination that he had taken photographs of the
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proceedings through the mobile phone of Babu Ram,
whereas Inspector Babu Ram (PW-5) stated in his
examination-in-chief that Sunil Kumar had taken
.
the photographs from a private camera.
(iv) HHC Mohinder Singh (PW-12) stated in his
examination-in-chief that he had deposited the case
property in the FSL on 06.04.2017, whereas the case
property was received on 07.04.2017 as per the report
of
of the analysis.
(v) H.C. Lucky Kumar (PW-6) stated in his cross-
rt
examination that the case property was deposited
with Him by SHO Dharam Singh (PW14); however,
the abstract of malkhana register (Ex.PW6/B)
mentions the name of depositor as ASI Mohinder
Singh in column No.3.
21. Before adverting to these contradictions, it is to be
noticed that the recovery was effected on 03.04.2017, statements
of HHC Manohar Lal (PW-2) and Constable Sunil Kumar (PW-3)
were recorded on 12.12.2018, statement of Inspector Babu Ram
(PW-5) was recorded on 07.03.2019, statement of ASI Mohinder
Singh (PW-13) was recorded on 31.07.2019, and the statement of
Daleep Kumar (PW-16) was recorded on 14.12.2020. Thus, a
considerable time had elapsed between the date of the incident
and the recording of the statements. Human memory fades with
time, and minor contradictions are bound to come with the
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passage of time. Hon’ble Supreme Court held in Rajan v. State of
Haryana, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1952, that the discrepancies in the
.
statements of the witnesses are not sufficient to discard the
prosecution case unless they shake the core of the testimonies.
It was observed: –
“32. The appreciation of ocular evidence is a hard task.
of
There is no fixed or straitjacket formula for the
appreciation of the ocular evidence. The judicially evolved
principles for the appreciation of ocular evidence in a
rt
criminal case can be enumerated as under:
“I. While appreciating the evidence of a witness, the
approach must be whether the evidence of the witness,
read as a whole, appears to have a ring of truth. Once
that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary
for the Court to scrutinize the evidence moreparticularly keeping in view the deficiencies,
drawbacks and infirmities pointed out in the evidence
as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it isagainst the general tenor of the evidence given by the
witness and whether the earlier evaluation of theevidence is shaken as to render it unworthy of belief.
II. If the Court before whom the witness gives evidencehad the opportunity to form the opinion about the
general tenor of evidence given by the witness, the
appellate court which had not this benefit will have to
attach due weight to the appreciation of evidence by
the trial court and unless there are reasons weighty
and formidable it would not be proper to reject the
evidence on the ground of minor variations or
infirmities in the matter of trivial details.
III. When an eye-witness is examined at length, it is
quite possible for him to make some discrepancies. But
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discrepancies in the evidence of a witness are so
incompatible with the credibility of his version that the
court is justified in jettisoning his evidence.
.
IV. Minor discrepancies on trivial matters not touching
the core of the case, a hyper-technical approach by
taking sentences torn out of context here or there from
the evidence, attaching importance to some technical
error committed by the investigating officer, not going
to the root of the matter, would not ordinarily permit
rejection of the evidence as a whole.
of
V. Too serious a view to be adopted on mere variations
falling in the narration of an incident (either as
between the evidence of two witnesses or as between
rt
two statements of the same witness) is an unrealistic
approach for judicial scrutiny.
VI. By and large, a witness cannot be expected to
possess a photographic memory and to recall the
details of an incident. It is not as if a videotape is
replayed on the mental screen.
VII. Ordinarily, it so happens that a witness is
overtaken by events. The witness could not have
anticipated the occurrence, which so often has an
element of surprise. The mental faculties, therefore,
cannot be expected to be attuned to absorb the details.
VIII. The powers of observation differ from person to
person. What one may notice, another may not. An
object or movement might emboss its image on one
person’s mind, whereas it might go unnoticed on the
part of another.
IX. By and large, people cannot accurately recall a
conversation and reproduce the very words used by
them or heard by them. They can only recall the main
purport of the conversation. It is unrealistic to expect a
witness to be a human tape recorder.
X. In regard to the exact time of an incident, or the time
duration of an occurrence, usually, people make their
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estimates by guesswork on the spur of the moment at
the time of interrogation. And one cannot expect
people to make very precise or reliable estimates in
such matters. Again, it depends on the time sense of
.
individuals, which varies from person to person.
XI. Ordinarily, a witness cannot be expected to recall
accurately the sequence of events that take place in
rapid succession or in a short time span. A witness is
liable to get confused or mixed up when interrogated
later on.
of
XII. A witness, though wholly truthful, is liable to be
overawed by the court atmosphere and the piercing
cross-examination by counsel and, out of nervousness,
rt
mix up facts, get confused regarding the sequence of
events, or fill in details from imagination on the spur of
the moment. The subconscious mind of the witness
sometimes operates on account of the fear of looking
foolish or being disbelieved, though the witness is
giving a truthful and honest account of the occurrence
witnessed by him.
XIII. A former statement, though seemingly
inconsistent with the evidence, need not necessarily be
sufficient to amount to a contradiction. Unless the
former statement has the potency to discredit the latter
statement, even if the latter statement is at variance
with the former to some extent, it would not be helpful
to contradict that witness.” [See Bharwada
Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat (1983) 3 SCC
217: 1983 Cri LJ 1096: (AIR 1983 SC 753) Leela Ram v.
State of Haryana (1999) 9 SCC 525: AIR 1999 SC 3717
and Tahsildar Singh v. State of UP (AIR 1959 SC 1012)”
22. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Karan Singh v. State of U.P., (2022) 6 SCC 52 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri)
479: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 253 that the Court has to examine the
evidence of the witnesses to find out whether it has a ring of
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truth or not. The Court should not give undue importance to
omissions, contradictions and discrepancies which do not go to
.
the heart of the matter. It was observed at page 60: –
“38. From the evidence of Mahender Singh, PW 4, it
appears that no specific question was put to him as to
whether the appellant was present at the place of
occurrence or not. This Court in Rohtash Kumar v. State ofof
Haryana [Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2013) 14 SCC
434: (2014) 4 SCC (Cri) 238] held: (SCC p. 446, para 24)
“24. … The court has to examine whether the evidence
read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. Once
rt
that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary
for the court to scrutinise the evidence more,particularly keeping in view the deficiencies,
drawbacks, and infirmities pointed out in the evidence
as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is
against the general tenor of the evidence given by thewitnesses and whether the earlier evaluation of the
evidence is shaken, as to render it unworthy of belief.
Thus, the court is not supposed to give undueimportance to omissions, contradictions and
discrepancies which do not go to the heart of thematter and shake the basic version of the prosecution
witness.”
39. Referring to Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of
Maharashtra [Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of
Maharashtra, (2000) 8 SCC 457: 2000 SCC (Cri) 1546], Mr
Tyagi argued that minor discrepancies caused by lapses in
memory were acceptable, contradictions were not. In this
case, there was no contradiction, only minor
discrepancies.
40. In Kuriya v. State of Rajasthan [Kuriya v. State of
Rajasthan, (2012) 10 SCC 433: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 202], this
Court held: (SCC pp. 447-48, paras 30-32)
::: Downloaded on – 24/03/2026 20:34:34 :::CIS
22 ( 2026:HHC:8492 )
“30. This Court has repeatedly taken the view that the
discrepancies or improvements which do not
materially affect the case of the prosecution and are
insignificant cannot be made the basis for doubting
.
the case of the prosecution. The courts may not
concentrate too much on such discrepancies or
improvements. The purpose is to primarily and clearly
sift the chaff from the grain and find out the truth
from the testimony of the witnesses. Where it does not
affect the core of the prosecution case, such a
of
discrepancy should not be attached undue
significance. The normal course of human conduct
would be that while narrating a particular incident,
there may occur minor discrepancies. Such
rt
discrepancies may even, in law, render credentials to
the depositions. The improvements or variations must
essentially relate to the material particulars of the
prosecution case. The alleged improvements and
variations must be shown with respect to the material
particulars of the case and the occurrence. Every such
improvement, not directly related to the occurrence, is
not a ground to doubt the testimony of a witness. The
credibility of a definite circumstance of the
prosecution case cannot be weakened with reference
to such minor or insignificant improvements.
Reference in this regard can be made to the judgments
of this Court in Kathi Bharat Vajsur v. State of Gujarat
[Kathi Bharat Vajsur v. State of Gujarat, (2012) 5 SCC
724 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 740], Narayan Chetanram
Chaudhary v. State of Maharashtra [Narayan Chetanram
Chaudhary v. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 8 SCC 457:
2000 SCC (Cri) 1546], Gura Singh v. State of Rajasthan
[Gura Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (2001) 2 SCC 205: 2001
SCC (Cri) 323] and Sukhchain Singh v. State of Haryana
[Sukhchain Singh v. State of Haryana, (2002) 5 SCC 100:
2002 SCC (Cri) 961].
31. What is to be seen next is whether the version
presented in the Court was substantially similar to::: Downloaded on – 24/03/2026 20:34:34 :::CIS
23 ( 2026:HHC:8492 )what was said during the investigation. It is only when
exaggeration fundamentally changes the nature of the
case the Court has to consider whether the witness was
stating the truth or not. [Ref. Sunil Kumar v. State (NCT.
of Delhi) [Sunil Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2003) 11
SCC 367: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1055]].
32. These are variations which would not amount to
any serious consequences. The Court has to accept the
normal conduct of a person. The witness who is
watching the murder of a person being brutally beaten
of
by 15 persons can hardly be expected to state a
minute-by-minute description of the event.
Everybody, and more particularly a person who is
known to or is related to the deceased, would give all
rt
his attention to take steps to prevent the assault on the
victim and then to make every effort to provide him
with medical aid and inform the police. The
statements which are recorded immediately upon the
incident would have to be given a little leeway with
regard to the statements being made and recorded
with utmost exactitude. It is a settled principle of law
that every improvement or variation cannot be treated
as an attempt to falsely implicate the accused by the
witness. The approach of the court has to be
reasonable and practicable. Reference in this regard
can be made to Ashok Kumar v. State of Haryana [Ashok
Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2010) 12 SCC 350: (2011) 1
SCC (Cri) 266] and Shivlal v. State of Chhattisgarh
[Shivlal v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2011) 9 SCC 561: (2011)
3 SCC (Cri) 777].”
41. In Shyamal Ghosh v. State of W.B. [Shyamal Ghosh v.
State of W.B., (2012) 7 SCC 646: (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 685], this
Court held: (SCC pp. 666-67, paras 46 & 49)
“46. Then, it was argued that there are certain
discrepancies and contradictions in the statements of
the prosecution witnesses inasmuch as these
witnesses have given different timings as to when they
had seen the scuffling and strangulation of the
::: Downloaded on – 24/03/2026 20:34:34 :::CIS
24 ( 2026:HHC:8492 )
deceased by the accused. … Undoubtedly, some minor
discrepancies or variations are traceable in the
statements of these witnesses. But what the Court has
to see is whether these variations are material and
.
affect the case of the prosecution substantially. Every
variation may not be enough to adversely affect the
case of the prosecution.
***
49. It is a settled principle of law that the court should
examine the statement of a witness in its entirety and
of
read the said statement along with the statements of
other witnesses in order to arrive at a rational
conclusion. No statement of a witness can be read in
rt
part and/or in isolation. We are unable to see any
material or serious contradiction in the statement of
these witnesses which may give any advantage to the
accused.”
42. In Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana [Rohtash Kumar
v. State of Haryana, (2013) 14 SCC 434: (2014) 4 SCC (Cri)
238], this Court held: (SCC p. 446, para 24)
“24. … The court has to examine whether the evidence
read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. Once
that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary
for the court to scrutinise the evidence more,
particularly keeping in view the deficiencies,
drawbacks, and infirmities pointed out in the evidence
as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is
against the general tenor of the evidence given by the
witnesses and whether the earlier evaluation of the
evidence is shaken, as to render it unworthy of belief.
Thus, the court is not supposed to give undue
importance to omissions, contradictions and
discrepancies which do not go to the heart of the
matter and shake the basic version of the prosecution
witness.”
::: Downloaded on – 24/03/2026 20:34:34 :::CIS
25 ( 2026:HHC:8492 )
23. Similar is the judgment in Anuj Singh v. State of Bihar,
2022 SCC OnLine SC 497: AIR 2022 SC 2817, wherein it was
.
observed: –
“17. It is not disputed that there are minor contradictions
with respect to the time of the occurrence or injuries
attributed on hand or foot, but the constant narrative of
the witnesses is that the appellants were present at theof
place of occurrence, armed with guns, and they caused
the injury on informant PW-6. However, the testimony of
a witness in a criminal trial cannot be discarded merely
because of minor contradictions or omissions, as
rt
observed by this court in Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary &
Anr. Vs. State of Maharashtra, 2000 8 SCC 457. This Court,while considering the issue of contradictions in the
testimony while appreciating the evidence in a criminal
trial, held that only contradictions in material particulars
and not minor contradictions can be grounds to discreditthe testimony of the witnesses. The relevant portion of
para 42 of the judgment reads as under:
“42. Only such omissions which amount to a
contradiction in material particulars can be used to
discredit the testimony of the witness. Theomission in the police statement by itself would not
necessarily render the testimony of the witnessunreliable. When the version given by the witness
in the court is different in material particulars from
that disclosed in his earlier statements, the case of
the prosecution becomes doubtful and not
otherwise. Minor contradictions are bound to
appear in the statements of truthful witnesses as
memory sometimes plays false, and the sense of
observation differs from person to person. The
omissions in the earlier statement, if found to be of
trivial details, as in the present case, the same
would not cause any dent in the testimony of PW 2.
::: Downloaded on – 24/03/2026 20:34:34 :::CIS
26 ( 2026:HHC:8492 )
Even if there is a contradiction of a statement of a
witness on any material point, that is no ground to
reject the whole of the testimony of such witness.”
.
24. Therefore, in view of the binding precedents of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court, the statements of the witnesses cannot
be discarded due to omissions, contradictions, or discrepancies.
The Court must consider whether the discrepancies negatively
of
affect the prosecution’s case and whether they pertain to the
core of the case rather than the details.
rt
25. Constable Sunil Kumar (PW-3) stated that there was
no source of light on the spot at the time of his return. He
volunteered to say that the proceedings were conducted in the
light of a private vehicle. Thus, he was deposing about the
proceedings conducted after his return. The recovery was
effected at about 4.00 P.M. Rukka (Ex. PW3/A) was sent to the
police station at about 6.20 P.M. Constable Sunil Kumar
returned to the spot at 10.20 P.M. Battery of the mega light
would not have survived for such a long time and the statement
of Constable Sunil Kumar that there was no light at 10.20 P.M.
and the proceedings were conducted in the light of private
vehicle will not make the prosecution’s case doubtful.
::: Downloaded on – 24/03/2026 20:34:34 :::CIS
27 ( 2026:HHC:8492 )
26. Daleep Kumar (PW-16) stated in his cross-
examination that the personal search of the accused was
.
conducted by SI Babu Ram, and an option was given to him
whether he wanted to be searched by the police or a Gazetted
Officer. He did not remember whether any document was
prepared by the investigating officer or not. Babu Ram (PW-5),
of
stated in his cross-examination, that he had not conducted the
personal search of the accused. Learned Trial Court had rightly
rt
held that this contradiction can occur because of the failure of
memory with time. Further, no recovery was effected from the
personal search, and any contradictions regarding the personal
search will not make the prosecution’s case doubtful.
27. Contradictions regarding taking the photographs and
use of a mobile phone are contradictions related to the detail,
which can occur with the passage of time, and will not make the
prosecution’s case susceptible. Similarly, the contradiction
regarding the date of deposit of the case property is also
relatable to the failure of memory because of the passage of time
and will not make the prosecution’s case doubtful, especially
when the report of analysis shows that seals were intact.
::: Downloaded on – 24/03/2026 20:34:34 :::CIS
28 ( 2026:HHC:8492 )
28. The contradictions regarding the name of the officer,
who had deposited the case property with the MHC is also not
.
material because the integrity of the case property was
established by the fact that the seals were found intact in the
laboratory. Further, the statement of H.C. Lucky Kumar (PW-6)
shows that Inspector Dharam Singh (PW-14), H.C. Chaman
of
(PW15), ASI Mohinder Singh (PW-13) and H.C. Lucky Kumar
(PW6) were present during the resealing proceedings. The case
rt
property was handed over after the resealing process was over.
Thus, any discrepancy regarding the name of the person who
had handed over the case property to the MHC will not make the
prosecution’s case doubtful.
29. The testimonies of the police officials corroborated
each other on material aspects. Nothing was suggested in their
cross-examination that they had any motive to falsely depose
against the accused. Learned Trial Court had rightly pointed out
that the statements of official witnesses cannot be discarded
because they happened to be police officials. It was laid down by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kripal Singh v. State of Rajasthan,
(2019) 5 SCC 646: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 680: 2019 SCC OnLine SC
::: Downloaded on – 24/03/2026 20:34:34 :::CIS
29 ( 2026:HHC:8492 )
207 that the testimonies of the police officials cannot be ignored
because they are police officials. It was observed at page 656:
.
“21. The submission of the learned Senior Counsel for the
appellant that recovery has not been proved by any
independent witness is of no substance for the reasonthat, in the absence of an independent witness to support
the recovery, in substance cannot be ignored unless
proved to the contrary. There is no such legal propositionof
that the evidence of police officials, unless supported by
an independent witness, is unworthy of acceptance or that
the evidence of police officials can be outrightly
disregarded.”
rt
30. It was laid down by this Court in Budh Ram Versus
State of H.P. 2020 Cri.L.J.4254 that the testimonies of the police
officials cannot be discarded on the ground that they belong to
the police force. It was observed:
“11. It is a settled proposition of law that the sole
testimony of the police official, which if otherwise is
reliable, trustworthy, cogent and duly corroborated byother admissible evidence, cannot be discarded only on
the ground that he is a police official and may beinterested in the success of the case. There is also no rule
of law, which lays down that no conviction can be
recorded on the testimony of a police officer even if such
evidence is otherwise trustworthy. The rule of prudence
may require more careful scrutiny of their evidence.
Wherever the evidence of a police officer, after careful
scrutiny, inspires confidence and is found to be
trustworthy and reliable, it can form the basis of a
conviction, and the absence of some independent witness
of the locality does not in any way affect the
creditworthiness of the prosecution case. No infirmity::: Downloaded on – 24/03/2026 20:34:34 :::CIS
30 ( 2026:HHC:8492 )attaches to the testimony of the police officers merely
because they belong to the police force.”
31. Similar is the judgment in Karamjit Singh versus State,
.
AIR 2003 S.C 3011, wherein it was held:
“The testimony of police personnel should be treated in
the same manner as the testimony of any other witness,
and there is no principle of law that without
corroboration by independent witnesses, their testimonyof
cannot be relied upon. The presumption that a person
acts honestly applies, as much in favour of police
personnel as of other persons, and it is not a proper
judicial approach to distrust and suspect them without
rt
good grounds. It will all depend upon the facts and
circumstances of each case, and no principle of generalapplication can be laid down.” (Emphasis supplied)
32. This position was reiterated in Sathyan v. State of
Kerala, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 986, wherein it was observed:
22. Conviction being based solely on the evidence of
police officials is no longer an issue on which the jury is
out. In other words, the law is well settled that if theevidence of such a police officer is found to be reliable and
trustworthy, then basing the conviction thereupon
cannot be questioned, and the same shall stand on firmground. This Court in Pramod Kumar v. State (Govt. of NCT
of Delhi) 2013 (6) SCC 588, after referring to State of U.P. v.
Anil Singh [1988 Supp SCC 686: 1989 SCC (Cri) 48], State
(Govt. of NCT of Delhi) v. Sunil [(2001) 1 SCC 652: 2001 SCC
(Cri) 248] and Ramjee Rai v. State of Bihar [(2006) 13 SCC
229 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 626] has laid down recently in
Kashmiri Lal v. State of Haryana [(2013) 6 SCC 595: AIR 2013
SCW 3102] that there is no absolute command of law that
the police officers cannot be cited as witnesses and their
testimony should always be treated with suspicion.
Ordinarily, the public at large shows their disinclination
::: Downloaded on – 24/03/2026 20:34:34 :::CIS
31 ( 2026:HHC:8492 )
to come forward to become witnesses. If the testimony of
the police officer is found to be reliable and trustworthy,
the court can definitely act upon the same. If, in the
course of scrutinising the evidence, the court finds the
.
evidence of the police officer as unreliable and
untrustworthy, the court may disbelieve him, but it
should not do so solely on the presumption that a witness
from the Department of Police should be viewed with
distrust. This is also based on the principle that the
quality of the evidence weighs over the quantity of
of
evidence.
23. Referring to State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) v. Sunil 2001
(1) SCC 652, in Kulwinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2015) 6
SCC 674, this court held that: —
rt
“23. … That apart, the case of the prosecution cannot
be rejected solely on the ground that independent
witnesses have not been examined when, on the
perusal of the evidence on record, the Court finds that
the case put forth by the prosecution is trustworthy.
When the evidence of the official witnesses is
trustworthy and credible, there is no reason not to rest
the conviction on the basis of their evidence.”
24. We must note that in the former it was observed: —
“21… At any rate, the court cannot start with the
presumption that the police records are
untrustworthy. As a proposition of law, thepresumption should be the other way around. That
official acts of the police have been regularly
performed is a wise principle of presumption and
recognised even by the legislature… If the court has
any good reason to suspect the truthfulness of such
records of the police, the court could certainly take
into account the fact that no other independent person
was present at the time of recovery. But it is not a
legally approvable procedure to presume the police
action as unreliable to start with, nor to jettison such
action merely for the reason that police did not collect::: Downloaded on – 24/03/2026 20:34:34 :::CIS
32 ( 2026:HHC:8492 )signatures of independent persons in the documents
made contemporaneous with such actions.”
25. Recently, this Court in Mohd. Naushad v. State (NCT of
.
Delhi) 2023 SCC OnLine 784 had observed that the
testimonies of police witnesses, as well as pointing out
memos, do not stand vitiated due to the absence of
independent witnesses.
26. It is clear from the above propositions of law, as
reproduced and referred to, that the testimonies of
of
official witnesses cannot be discarded simply because
independent witnesses were not examined. The
correctness or authenticity is only to be doubted on “any
good reason” which, quite apparently, is missing from
rt
the present case. No reason is forthcoming on behalf of
the Appellant to challenge the veracity of the testimonies
of PW – 1 and PW – 2, which the courts below have found
absolutely to be inspiring in confidence. Therefore,
basing the conviction on the basis of testimony of the
police witnesses as undertaken by the trial court and
confirmed by the High Court vide the impugned
judgment, cannot be faulted with.”
33. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had rightly held
that the statements of the police officials corroborated each
other and they were to be accepted as correct.
34. It was submitted that no independent witness was
joined, which made the prosecution’s case doubtful. Reliance
was placed on the arrest information, (ExPW13/D), in which the
endorsement was made by Payar Singh that he was informed of
the arrest of his brother, Paras Ram, in support of this
submission. This submission will not help the accused. The
::: Downloaded on – 24/03/2026 20:34:34 :::CIS
33 ( 2026:HHC:8492 )
arrest memo mentions in the handwriting of the accused that he
wanted to inform his brother Payar Singh about the arrest on his
.
mobile No. xxxx-xx007. It clearly shows that Payar Singh was
not present on the spot, which is why the accused had expressed
his desire to inform his brother telephonically. There was no
need to telephonically inform Payar Singh had he been present
of
on the spot. Thus, the contents of the arrest memo do not show
that Payar Singh was present on the spot.
rt
35. Learned Trial Court had rightly pointed out that the
police did not have any prior information regarding the
transportation of the charas. They saw the accused on the spot,
who ran away after seeing the police, which made the police
suspicious.
36. It was submitted that no efforts were made to
associate any independent witness, and it is fatal to the
prosecution’s case. This submission is not acceptable. The
statements of prosecution witnesses show that the police were
checking the vehicles and the people. The accused ran away after
seeing the police, and the police apprehended him based on
suspicion. A search of the backpack was conducted, during
::: Downloaded on – 24/03/2026 20:34:34 :::CIS
34 ( 2026:HHC:8492 )
which one carry bag containing cannabis was found. It was laid
down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kashmira Singh Versus
.
State of Punjab 1999 (1) SCC 130 that the police party is under no
obligation to join independent witnesses while going on
patrolling duty, and the association of any person after effecting
the recovery would be meaningless. It was observed:
of
“3. Learned counsel for the appellant has taken us
through the evidence recorded by the prosecution, as also
rt
the judgment under appeal. Except for the comment that
the prosecution is supported by two police officials and
not by any independent witness, no other commentagainst the prosecution is otherwise offered. This
comment is not of any value since the police party was on
patrolling duty, and they were not required to take alongindependent witnesses to support recovery if and when
made. It has come in the evidence of ASI Jangir Singh that
after the recovery had been effected, some people hadpassed by. Even so, obtaining their counter-signatures on
the documents already prepared would not have lent anyfurther credence to the prosecution’s version.”
37. In similar circumstances, it was laid down by this
Court in Chet Ram Vs State Criminal Appeal No. 151/2006, decided
on 25.7.2018, that when the accused was apprehended after he
tried to flee on seeing the police, there was no necessity to
associate any person from the nearby village. It was observed:-
“(A)appellant was intercepted, and a search of his bag
was conducted on suspicion, when he turned back and
tried to flee, on seeing the police. Police officials did not::: Downloaded on – 24/03/2026 20:34:34 :::CIS
35 ( 2026:HHC:8492 )
have any prior information, nor did they have any reason
to believe that he was carrying any contraband. They
overpowered him when he tried to run away and
suspected that he might be carrying some contraband in
.
his bag. Therefore, the bag was searched, and Charas was
recovered. After the recovery of Charas, there was hardly any
need to associate any person from the nearby village because
there was nothing to be witnessed.
It is by now well settled that non-association of
independent witnesses or non-support of the
of
prosecution’s version by independent witnesses where
they are associated, by itself, is not a ground to acquit an
accused. It is also well-settled that the testimony of
official witnesses, including police officials, carries the
rt
same evidentiary value as the testimony of any other
person. The only difference is that Courts have to be
more circumspect while appreciating the evidence of
official witnesses to rule out the possibility of false
implication of the accused, especially when such a plea is
specifically raised by the defence. Therefore, while
scrutinising the evidence of official witnesses, in a case
where independent witnesses are not associated,
contradictions and inconsistencies in the testimony of
such witnesses are required to be taken into account and
given due weightage unless satisfactorily explained. Of
course, it is only the material contradictions and not the
trivial ones, which assume significance.” (Emphasis
supplied)
38. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of
India in Raveen Kumar v. State of H.P., (2021) 12 SCC 557: (2023) 2
SCC (Cri) 230: 2020 SCC OnLine SC 869 that non-association of
the independent witnesses will not be fatal to the prosecution
::: Downloaded on – 24/03/2026 20:34:34 :::CIS
36 ( 2026:HHC:8492 )
case. However, the Court will have to scrutinise the statements
of prosecution witnesses carefully. It was observed at page 566:
.
“(C) Need for independent witnesses
19. It would be gainsaid that the lack of independent
witnesses is not fatal to the prosecution’s case. [KalpnathRai v. State, (1997) 8 SCC 732: 1998 SCC (Cri) 134: AIR 1998
SC 201, para 9] However, such omissions cast an added
duty on courts to adopt a greater degree of care whileof
scrutinising the testimonies of the police officers, which,
if found reliable, can form the basis of a successful
conviction.”
39.
rt
This position was reiterated in Rizwan Khan v. State
of Chhattisgarh, (2020) 9 SCC 627: 2020 SCC OnLine SC 730,
wherein it was observed at page 633:
“12. It is settled law that the testimony of the official
witnesses cannot be rejected on the grounds of non-
corroboration by independent witnesses. As observed andheld by this Court in a catena of decisions, examination of
independent witnesses is not an indispensablerequirement and such non-examination is not
necessarily fatal to the prosecution’s case [see Pardeep
Kumar [State of H.P. v. Pardeep Kumar, (2018) 13 SCC 808:
(2019) 1 SCC (Cri) 420]].
13. In the recent decision in Surinder Kumar v. State of
Punjab [Surinder Kumar v. State of Punjab, (2020) 2 SCC
563: (2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 767], while considering somewhat
similar submission of non-examination of independent
witnesses, while dealing with the offence under the NDPS
Act, in paras 15 and 16, this Court observed and held as
under: (SCC p. 568)
“15. The judgment in Jarnail Singh v. State of
Punjab [Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab, (2011) 3 SCC 521:
::: Downloaded on – 24/03/2026 20:34:34 :::CIS
37 ( 2026:HHC:8492 )
(2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 1191], relied on by the counsel for the
respondent State, also supports the case of the
prosecution. In the aforesaid judgment, this Court has
held that merely because the prosecution did not.
examine any independent witness would not
necessarily lead to a conclusion that the accused was
falsely implicated. The evidence of official witnesses
cannot be distrusted and disbelieved merely on
account of their official status.
16. In State (NCT of Delhi) v. Sunil [State (NCT of
of
Delhi) v. Sunil, (2001) 1 SCC 652: 2001 SCC (Cri) 248], it
was held as under: (SCC p. 655)
‘It is an archaic notion that actions of the police
rt
officer should be approached with initial distrust. It
is time now to start placing at least initial trust in
the actions and the documents made by the police.
At any rate, the court cannot start with the
presumption that the police records are
untrustworthy. As a proposition of law, the
presumption should be the other way around. That
official acts of the police have been regularly
performed is a wise principle of presumption and
recognised even by the legislature.'”
40. Similar is the judgment of this Court in Balwinder
Singh & Anr. Vs State of H.P., 2020 Criminal L.J. 1684, wherein it
was held: –
“3. (iii) Learned defence counsel contended that in the
instant case, no independent witness was associated by
the Investigating Officer; therefore, the prosecution case
cannot be said to have been proved by it in accordance
with provisions of the Act. Learned defence counsel, in
support of his contention, relied upon the titled Krishan
Chand versus State of H.P.,2017 4 CriCC 531
3(iii)(d). It is by now well settled that a prosecution case::: Downloaded on – 24/03/2026 20:34:34 :::CIS
38 ( 2026:HHC:8492 )cannot be disbelieved only because the independent
witnesses were not associated.”
41. This position was reiterated in Kallu Khan v. State of
.
Rajasthan, (2021) 19 SCC 197: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1223, wherein it
was held at page 204: –
“17. The issue raised regarding conviction solely relying
upon the testimony of police witnesses, withoutof
procuring any independent witness, recorded by the two
courts, has also been dealt with by this Court in Surinder
Kumar [Surinder Kumar v. State of Punjab, (2020) 2 SCC 563
: (2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 767] holding that merely because
rt
independent witnesses were not examined, the
conclusion could not be drawn that the accused wasfalsely implicated. Therefore, the said issue is also well
settled and in particular, looking at the facts of the
present case, when the conduct of the accused was found
suspicious, and a chance recovery from the vehicle usedby him is made from a public place and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt, the appellant cannot avail any benefit
on this issue. In our view, the concurrent findings of thecourts do not call for interference.”
42. A similar view was taken in Kehar Singh v. State of
H.P., 2024 SCC OnLine HP 2825, wherein it was observed:
16. As regards non-association of the independent
witnesses, it is now well settled that non-association of
the independent witnesses or non-supporting of the
prosecution version by independent witnesses itself is not
a ground for acquittal of Appellants/accused. It is also
well-settled that the testimonies of the official witnesses,
including police officials, carry the same evidentiary
value as the testimony of any other person. The only
difference is that the Court has to be most circumspect
while appreciating the evidence of the official witnesses::: Downloaded on – 24/03/2026 20:34:34 :::CIS
39 ( 2026:HHC:8492 )to rule out the possibility of false implication of the
accused, especially when such a plea is specifically raised
by the defence. Therefore, while scrutinising the evidence
of the official witnesses, in cases where independent.
witnesses are not associated, contradictions and
inconsistencies in the testimonies of such witnesses are
required to be taken into account and given due
weightage unless satisfactorily explained. However, the
contradiction must be a material and not trivial one,
which alone would assume significance.
of
17. Evidently, this is a case of chance recovery; therefore,
the police party was under no obligation to join
independent witnesses while going on patrolling duty,
and the association of any person after effecting the
rt
recovery would be meaningless.
Xxxx
19. A similar reiteration of law can be found in the
judgment rendered by the learned Single Judge of this
Court in Avtar @ Tarri v. State of H.P., (2022) Supreme HP
345, wherein it was observed as under: —
“24. As regards the second leg of the argument raised
by learned counsel for the appellant, it cannot be saidto be of much relevance in the given facts of the case.
The fact situation was that the police party had laid the‘nakka’ and immediately thereafter had spotted the
appellant at some distance, who got perplexed andstarted walking back. The conduct of the appellant was
sufficient to raise suspicion in the minds of police
officials. At that stage, had the appellant not been
apprehended immediately, the police could have lost
the opportunity to recover the contraband. Looking
from another angle, the relevance of independent
witnesses could be there when such witnesses were
immediately available or had already been associated
at the place of ‘nakka’. These, however, are not
mandatory conditions and will always depend on the
fact situation of each and every case. The reason is that::: Downloaded on – 24/03/2026 20:34:34 :::CIS
40 ( 2026:HHC:8492 )once the person is apprehended and is with the police,
a subsequent association of independent witnesses
may not be of much help. In such events, the
manipulation, if any, cannot be ruled out.”
.
Xxxx
22. A similar reiteration of law can be found in a very
recent judgment of the Coordinate Bench of this Court
in Cr. A. No. 202 of 2020, titled Dillo Begum v. State of H.P.,
decided on 27.03.2024.”
of
43. Thus, in view of the binding precedents of this Court
and the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the non-association of
rt
independent witnesses is not fatal, and the prosecution’s case
cannot be discarded due to the non-association of independent
witnesses. However, the Court will have to carefully scrutinise
the testimonies of the police officials.
44. The case property was produced along with the
accused before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate on
04.04.2017. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate found that
the parcel was sealed with six seals of the Investigating Officer,
having seal impression ‘SB’, and five reseal impressions having
seal impression ‘BH’. The seals were intact. The Investigating
Officer had shown his intention to take the entire case property
for analysis, and there was no need to take samples. The case
property was weighed with a weighing machine, and
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41 ( 2026:HHC:8492 )
photographs were taken, and the case property was handed over
to the Investigating Officer. The learned Chief Judicial
.
Magistrate had not opened the case property and weighed the
parcel to determine the weight of the charas. It was submitted
that this violated Section 52A of the NDPS Act. This submission
will not help the accused because the whole of the case property
of
was sent to FSL. It was laid down by this Court in Narayan Singh
Vs. State of H.P. 2023 HHC 9715 that the provisions of Section 52-
rt
A of the NDPS Act will not apply when the samples were not
drawn, and the entire contraband was sent to the FSL for
analysis. It was observed:-
19. After going through the aforesaid judgments, we are
of the considered view that the same does not apply to thefacts of the instant case. It would be noticed that in all the
earlier judgments, the Hon’ble Court was dealing withcases where samples had been drawn from the bulk and
then samples had been sent for chemical analysis, and the
residue or bulk sample remained with the investigatingagency. However, this is not the fact obtaining situation
in the instant case. Here, the entire contraband had been
sent for chemical analysis, and that too on the very next
date of its recovery. In such circumstances, there could be
no better and primary evidence for the purpose of the
trial.
45. Similarly, it was laid down in Sandeep Kumar Vs State
of H.P., 2022 Law Suits (HP) 149, that the provisions of Section
52A of the NDPS Act is not mandatory and non-compliance with
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42 ( 2026:HHC:8492 )
Section 52-A of the NDPS Act is not fatal to the prosecution case.
It was observed: –
.
“24. It has also been strenuously argued on behalf of the
appellants that the investigating agency had failed to
comply with the provisions of Section 52-A of the NDPSAct and thus cast a shadow of doubt on its story. The
contention raised on behalf of the appellants is that the
rules framed for investigations under the NDPS Act areof
mandatory and have to be strictly followed. Neither the
required sample was taken on the spot, nor were the
samples preserved by complying with Section 52-A of the
Act. It has been argued that compliance with Section 52-A
rt
of the Act is mandatory…..
xxxxxx
27. The precedent relied upon on behalf of the appellants,
however, did not lay down the law that non-compliance
with Section 52-A of the Act is fatal to the prosecution’scase under the NDPS Act. On the other hand, in State of
Punjab vs. Makhan Chand, 2004 (3) SCC 453, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court, while dealing with the question of theeffect of non-compliance of Section 52-A, has held as
under: –
10. This contention too has no substance for two
reasons. Firstly, Section 52A, as the marginal noteindicates, deals with the “disposal of seized
narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances”.
Under Sub-section (1), the Central Government, by
notification in the Official Gazette, is empowered to
specify certain narcotic drugs or psychotropic
substances having regard to the hazardous nature,
vulnerability to theft, substitution, constraints of
proper storage space and such other relevant
considerations, so that even if they are material
objects seized in a criminal case, they could be
disposed of after following the procedure
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43 ( 2026:HHC:8492 )
prescribed in Sub-sections (2) & (3). If the
procedure prescribed in Sub-sections (2) & (3) of
Section 52A is complied with and upon an
application, the Magistrate issues the certificate
.
contemplated by Subsection (2), then Sub-section
(4) provides that, notwithstanding anything to the
contrary contained in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872
or the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, such
inventory, photographs of narcotic drugs or
substances and any list of samples drawn under
of
Sub-section (2) of Section 52A as certified by the
Magistrate, would be treated as primary evidence in
respect of the offence. Therefore, Section 52A(1)
does not empower the Central Government to lay
rt
down the procedure for the search of an accused but
only deals with the disposal of seized narcotic drugs
and psychotropic substances.
11. Secondly, when the very same standing orders
came up for consideration in Khet Singh v. Union of
India, 2002 (4) SCC 380, this Court took the view
that they were merely intended to guide the officers
to see that a fair procedure is adopted by the
Officer-in-Charge of the investigation. It was also
held that they were not inexorable rules, as there
could be circumstances in which it may not be
possible for the seizing officer to prepare the
mahazar at the spot if it is a chance recovery, where
the officer may not have the facility to prepare the
seizure mahazar at the spot itself. Hence, we do not
find any substance in this contention.”
46. Thus, the prosecution’s case cannot be doubted
because the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate had not opened the
parcel to certify the correctness of the inventory.
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44 ( 2026:HHC:8492 )
47. The report of the analysis shows that the seals were
intact, which indicates that there was no tampering with the
.
case property. It was held in Baljit Sharma vs. State of H.P 2007
HLJ 707, that where the report of analysis shows that the seals
were intact, the case of the prosecution that the case property
remained intact is to be accepted as correct. It was observed:
of
“A perusal of the report of the expert Ex.PW8/A shows
that the samples were received by the expert in a safe
rt
manner, and the sample seal was separately sent and
tallied with the specimen impression of a seal taken
separately. Thus, there was no tampering with the seal,and the seal impressions were separately taken and sent
to the expert also.”
48. Similar is the judgment in Hardeep Singh vs State of
Punjab 2008(8) SCC 557, wherein it was held:
“It has also come on evidence that till the date the
parcels of the sample were received by the ChemicalExaminer, the seal put on the said parcels was intact.
That itself proves and establishes that there was no
tampering with the previously mentioned seal in thesample at any stage, and the sample received by the
analyst for chemical examination contained the same
opium, which was recovered from the possession of the
appellant. In that view of the matter, a delay of about 40
days in sending the samples did not and could not have
caused any prejudice to the appellant.”
49. In State of Punjab vs Lakhwinder Singh 2010 (4) SCC
402, the High Court had concluded that there could have been
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45 ( 2026:HHC:8492 )
tampering with the case property since there was a delay of
seven days in sending the report to FSL. It was laid down by the
.
Hon’ble Supreme Court that case property was produced in the
Court, and there was no evidence of tampering. Seals were found
to be intact, which would rule out the possibility of tampering. It
was observed:
of
“The prosecution has been able to establish and prove
that the aforesaid bags, which were 35 in number,
rt
contained poppy husk, and accordingly, the same were
seized after taking samples therefrom which were
properly sealed. The defence has not been able to provethat the aforesaid seizure and seal put in the samples were
in any manner tampered with before it was examined by
the Chemical Examiner. There was merely a delay of aboutseven days in sending the samples to the Forensic
Examiner, and it is not proved as to how the aforesaid
delay of seven days has affected the said examination,when it could not be proved that the seal of the sample
was in any manner tampered with. The seal having beenfound intact at the time of the examination by the
Chemical Examiner and the said fact having been
recorded in his report, a mere observation by the HighCourt that the case property might have been tampered
with, in our opinion, is based on surmises and conjectures
and cannot take the place of proof.
17. We may at this stage refer to a decision of this Court in
Hardip Singh v. State of Punjab reported in (2008) 8 SCC 557
in which there was a delay of about 40 days in sending the
sample to the laboratory after the same was seized. In the
said decision, it was held that in view of cogent and
reliable evidence that the opium was seized and sealed
and that the samples were intact till they were handed
over to the Chemical Examiner, the delay itself was held::: Downloaded on – 24/03/2026 20:34:34 :::CIS
46 ( 2026:HHC:8492 )
to be not fatal to the prosecution’s case. In our considered
opinion, the ratio of the aforesaid decision squarely
applies to the facts of the present case in this regard.
.
18. The case property was produced in the Court, and there
is no evidence to show that the same was ever tampered
with.”
50. Similar is the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Surinder Kumar vs State of Punjab (2020) 2 SCC 563,
of
wherein it was held:-
“10. According to learned senior counsel for the appellant,
rt
Joginder Singh, ASI, to whom Yogi Raj, SHO (PW-3),
handed over the case property for producing the samebefore the Illaqa Magistrate and who returned the same to
him after such production was not examined, as such, link
evidence was incomplete. In this regard, it is to be noticed
that Yogi Raj, SHO, handed over the case property toJoginder Singh, ASI, for production before the Court. After
producing the case property before the Court, he returned
the case property to Yogi Raj, SHO (PW-3), with the sealsintact. It is also to be noticed that Joginder Singh, ASI, was
not in possession of the seals of either the investigatingofficer or Yogi Raj, SHO. He produced the case property
before the Court on 13.09.1996 vide application Ex.P-13.
The concerned Judicial Magistrate of First Class, afterverifying the seals on the case property, passed the order
Ex.P-14 to the effect that since there was no judicial
malkhana at Abohar, the case property was ordered to be
kept in safe custody, in Police Station Khuian Sarwar till
further orders. Since Joginder Singh, ASI, was not in
possession of the seals of either the SHO or the
Investigating Officer, the question of tampering with the
case property by him did not arise at all.
11. Further, he has returned the case property, after
production of the same, before the Illaqa Magistrate, with
the seals intact, to Yogi Raj, SHO. In that view of the::: Downloaded on – 24/03/2026 20:34:34 :::CIS
47 ( 2026:HHC:8492 )matter, the Trial Court and the High Court have rightly
held that the non-examination of Joginder Singh did not,
in any way, affect the case of the prosecution. Further, it is
evident from the report of the Chemical Examiner, Ex.P-10,.
that the sample was received with seals intact and that the
seals on the sample tallied with the sample seals. In that view
of the matter, the chain of evidence was complete.”
(Emphasis supplied)
51. Therefore, the prosecution’s version is to be accepted
of
as correct that the case property remained intact till its analysis
at FSL, Junga.
52.
rt
It was submitted that the abstract of malkhana
register mentions the colour of the carry bag as “moongia”,
whereas the result of analysis (Ex. PX) mentions the green carry
bag. Thus, there is a discrepancy in the colour. This submission
will not help the accused, as the colour ‘moongia’ is also dark
green, and there is no discrepancy in the colour.
53. The report of analysis shows that the substance
analysed was charas; hence, there is no infirmity in the findings
recorded by the learned Trial Court that the accused was found
in possession of 800 grams of charas and he was rightly
convicted of the commission of an offence punishable under
Section 29(b)(ii)(B) of the NDPS Act.
54. The learned Trial Court has sentenced the accused to
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48 ( 2026:HHC:8492 )
undergo rigorous imprisonment of eight years, pay a fine of
₹80,000/-, and in default of payment of fine, to undergo further
.
rigorous imprisonment for one year. This is not excessive. A
person possessing 1 Kg of charas can be punished to undergo
rigorous imprisonment for a period of 10 years, and if the
principle of proportionality is applied, the sentence of eight
of
years for possessing 800 grams of charas is proportionate, and
no interference is required with the sentence imposed by the
rt
learned Trial Court.
55. No other point was urged.
56. In view of the above, the present appeal fails and it is
dismissed.
57. Records of the learned Trial Court be sent down
forthwith along with copy of this judgment.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
24 March, 2026
(jai)
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