Orissa High Court
Papun @ Satyanarayan Pradhan vs State Of Orissa on 29 July, 2026
Author: Sashikanta Mishra
Bench: Sashikanta Mishra
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
CRLA No.206 of 2016
(From judgment dated 18.1.2026 passed by the learned Sessions
Judge, Puri in Sessions Trial Case No.188 of 2013)
Papun @ Satyanarayan Pradhan
....... Appellant
-Versus-
State of Orissa .......Respondent
Advocates appeared in the case through hybrid mode:
For Appellant: Mr. B.C. Ghadei, Advocate
For Respondent: Miss Suvalaxmi Devi,
[Additional Standing Counsel]
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CORAM:
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE MANASH RANJAN PATHAK
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SASHIKANTA MISHRA
Date of Hearing:09.7.2026 Date of Judgment:29.7.2026
Sashikanta Mishra,J. The appellant faced trial in the Court of the
learned Sessions Judge, Puri in S.T. Case No.188/2013 being
charged for the offences under Sections 364/366/376/302/201
Page 1 of 22
of I.P.C. By judgment passed on 18.1.2016, he was acquitted ofthe charges under Sections 364/366/376 of I.P.C. but was
convicted under Sections 302 and 201 of I.P.C. As such, he was
sentenced to imprisonment for life and to pay fine of Rs.10,000/-,
in default to undergo further R.I. for six months under Section
302 of IPC and R.I. for five years under Section 201 IPC and to
pay fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default to undergo R.I. for further
period of three months. Both the sentences were directed to run
concurrently.
2. The prosecution case, briefly stated, is as follows:-
On 04.1.2013, an unidentified dead body of a female aged
about 17 to 18 years was found lying in a half-burnt position on
the Balanga-Haripur canal embankment road near Samarei
Sasan village forest. On a telephonic information given by one
Dijabar Mohapatra, A.S.I. of Police, Balanga P.S., a Station Diary
Entry was made and the O.I.C. of the said P.S. directed the said
A.S.I. to proceed to the spot and conduct inquiry. The A.S.I.
visited the spot and after observing the dead body and the
wearing apparels, suspected that some unknown culprit had
Page 2 of 22
committed the murder of the unidentified female on the previousnight and set her body on fire to cause disappearance of evidence.
On the written report submitted by the said A.S.I., Balanga P.S.
Case No.2/2013 was registered under Sections 302/201 of I.P.C,
followed by investigation.
In course of investigation, the dead body was identified as
that of Kumudini, the daughter of Surendra Swain. In course of
further investigation, it was found that the accused had travelled
from Bhubaneswar to Balanga on the night of 3.1.2013 and had
gone to the house of the victim. He, thereafter carried the victim
to Tarajanga, where he kept physical relationship with her. On
the same night, they went to Samarei Sasan, where he killed the
deceased and left the spot on his motor cycle. Since the
complicity of the appellant was fully established by the recovery of
the motor cycle and several other articles at his instance, charge
sheet was submitted against him under Sections
3. The accused took the plea of denial but admitted his
relationship with the deceased girl.
Page 3 of 22
4. To prove its case, the prosecution examined forty-five
witnesses and proved forty-six documents. Besides, prosecution
also proved twelve material objects. On the other hand, the
defence, though did not adduce any oral evidence, proved one
document from its side.
5. After analyzing the evidence on record, the trial Court held
that the dead body ceased from the spot was that of the deceased
and that she was present in her house till late night but was
absent after midnight. The trial Court also found that prior to the
incident, the accused and the deceased were in a love affair and
had physical relationship many times due to which the victim had
become pregnant. The matter went to the extent of aborting the
pregnancy. The trial Court also found that the accused and
deceased were moving together on the motor cycle of the accused.
The relationship between them was thus well proved. The trial
Court further held on the basis of evidence on record that the
accused and the deceased had conversed over phone. It did not
accept the defence objection regarding admissibility of the
electronic evidence as per the mandate of Section 65-B(2) of the
Page 4 of 22
Evidence Act by holding that it could be utilized as a
corroborative piece of evidence. Added to the above, the accused
and the deceased being found together on the night of the
occurrence and the fact that the accused did not give any
explanation as to under what circumstances the deceased died
and her half burnt dead body was found at the spot, the trial
Court accepted the prosecution evidence adduced with regard to
the recovery of incriminating articles at the instance of the
accused, while he was in police custody. The trial Court however,
did not find any evidence regarding the charges under Sections
364,366 and 376 of I.P.C. Ultimately, the trial Court held that the
accused with intention to cause death of the deceased had
strangulated her and burnt her body to cause disappearance of
evidence. The accused was thus convicted and sentenced as
already stated hereinbefore.
6. Heard Mr. B.C. Ghadei, learned counsel for the accused-
appellant and Miss Suvalaxmi Devi, learned Addl. Standing
Counsel for the State.
Page 5 of 22
7. To assail the order of conviction, Mr. Ghadei has put forth
the following grounds:-
(1) Even though the case rests on circumstantial evidence,
the chain is incomplete.
(2) The trial Court could not have referred to the so-called
electronic evidence as the same was inadmissible
without the mandatory certificate under Section 65-
B(4).
(3) Prosecution could not prove that the deceased was last
seen with the accused before recovery of her dead body.
(4) The evidence relating to discovery of certain articles
purportedly at the instance of the accused under
Section 27 of the Evidence Act lacks credibility for want
of any independent corroboration.
(5) There are serious contradictions regarding
identification of the dead body.
(6) Despite claiming that the accused and deceased were in
a love relationship, prosecution could not prove any
motive for the accused to kill her.
Page 6 of 22
8. Per contra, Miss Suvalaxmi, learned Addl. Standing Counsel
argues that the following circumstances clearly prove the guilt of
the accused:-
(i) The deceased and the accused were in love relationship
and owing to such relationship, the deceased once had
an abortion.
(ii) The marriage proposal given from the side of the
deceased was refused by the father of the accused.
(iii) The deceased went missing from her house on
3.1.2013 at around 12 O’ clock midnight.
(iv) Her brother received a call from the phone number of
the deceased on the next morning during which the
accused admitted to have eloped with her and residing
in Bhubaneswar.
(v) The half-burnt dead body found at the spot was
identified by her father and family members.
(vi) The Post-mortem report proved that the death was
homicidal in nature.
Page 7 of 22
(vii) The accused gave recovery of incriminating articles
under Section 27 of the Act.
(viii) Most importantly, the accused gave recovery of the
mobile phone belonging to the deceased from which the
accused had made a call to her brother.
(ix) The Call Detail Records (CDRs) of the accused phone
number showed his presence in Balanga. The accused
did not explain how the mobile of the deceased was in
his possession and how both of them were present near
Balanga at the relevant time.
(x) The accused did not explain as to under what
circumstances the deceased met with her death.
9. Having heard learned counsel for the parties at length and
having perused the evidence on record including the impugned
judgment, we find that, this is a case that rests on circumstantial
evidence. We are fully conscious of the settled position of law that
in such a case the circumstances put forth must be of a clinching
character and not admitting of any possibility other than the guilt
of the accused.
Page 8 of 22
10. We have gone through the evidence on record carefully. It is
clearly proved from the testimonies of P.Ws.16,17,29,30,36 and
32 that the accused and the deceased were in a love relationship.
In fact, the elder sister of the deceased had married in the village
of the accused to P.W.17 and used to visit the house of her sister
at times during which the relationship appears to have formed. It
is also borne out from the evidence of these witnesses that both of
them had physical relationship resulting in the deceased
becoming pregnant in the past, which had to be aborted. No
medical evidence was, however, adduced to support the claim of
abortion. What is important to note is the response of the accused
himself to certain questions put to him in his examination under
Section 313 of Cr.P.C. We extract the questions and answers
(translated into English) to question Nos.33 and 34.
“33. He further stated that his elder daughter Pratima got
married in your village Nuasahi and the deceased was
frequently going to the house of Pratima and during that time
your relationship developed. What have you got to say?
Ans. Pratima has married, but I had no relationship with
Kumudini.
34. He further stated that when he came to know about the
same you insisted to marry Kumudini therefore, he mooted the
proposal to your parents for your marriage with Kumudini, but
your parents did not accept the proposal stating that you were
Page 9 of 22
unemployed and after getting employment you would marry
her. What have you got to say?
Ans. Yes, my father was agreeable.”
The above answers, though apparently contradictory do
amount to admission that there existed an intimate relationship
between the accused and the deceased. So we have no doubt that
the accused and the deceased were in a relationship.
11. The second significant aspect is the evidence of the deceased
missing from her house on 03.1.2013. The evidence of her father
(P.W.16) is clear and credible in this regard. In fact, on the next
morning P.Ws.16 and 17 had lodged a missing report before
Balanga P.S. Of course, it is not forthcoming from the evidence
as to if the report was submitted in writing or not. Nevertheless,
fact remains that the deceased was not at home on the previous
night, at least after midnight.
12. The half-burnt dead body found at the spot was identified to
be that of the deceased at the DHH, Puri. Learned counsel for the
accused has forcefully argued that the evidence relating to
identification is full of contradictions. He refers to the evidence of
the autopsy surgeon (P.W.11), who admitted in cross-examination
Page 10 of 22
that he did not find nor record any specific mark of identification
such as tattoo mark or mehendi anywhere on the dead body of
the deceased. This contradicts the evidence of P.Ws.16 and 18
who claimed that they had identified the body looking at the
tattoo mark and earrings worn by the deceased.
We have carefully gone through the evidence of P.Ws.16 and
18 as also that of the doctor P.W.11. We are not much impressed
with the defence argument as noted above for the reason that
P.W.16 being the father is always expected to identify his
daughter from her features that were still identifiable. In fact, the
evidence shows that the dead body was not completely burnt but
only partially burnt and was identifiable. Only because the
autopsy surgeon, for whatever reason did not find or note any
special mark of identification cannot ipso facto lead to the
conclusion that the dead body belongs to somebody else and not
the deceased.
13. As regards the nature of death, we may once again refer to
the evidence of the autopsy surgeon who, after noting his findings
upon dissection, opined as follows:
Page 11 of 22
“4. After receipt of the P.M examination report the I.O made a
query about nature of death of the deceased. With reference to
the findings of our examination we gave our opinion that the
nature of death of deceased was homicidal and the
compression of neck was due to strangulation. This is our
opinion marked Ext 13 and Ext 13/1 is my signature and Ext
13/2 is the signature of Dr. Nandita Gupta.
5. In the said opinion we also informed the I.O that the burn
injuries sustained by the deceased were post mortem in nature
but not antemortem in nature.”
14. This clearly suggests that the deceased was first
strangulated to death and thereafter her body was set on fire,
evidently to cause disappearance of evidence. We therefore, find
nothing wrong in the finding of the trial Court that the death of
the deceased was homicidal in nature.
15. The case diary shows that the accused was arrested on
05.1.2013 from a house at Sudarpada, Bhubaneswar. While in
police custody, he confessed to his crime and agreed to lead the
police, in the presence of witnesses, to the spot of occurrence and
the place of concealment of match box, mobile phones, a bottle
used for drawing petrol, wearing apparels and the place where he
had physical relation with the deceased. On the next day, he led
the Police to an apartment at Sudarpada and gave recovery of a
black coloured bag containing two mobile sets, pen drive, sim
Page 12 of 22
card, plastic bottle, etc. He also gave recovery of a motor cycle
bearing registration no.0R-02-AP-6371 from the parking place of
the said Apartment which he allegedly used to travel from
Bhubaneswar to Balanga on 3.1.2013 night, to the house of the
deceased and carried her to Tarajanga., where he kept physical
relation with her. Thereafter, they moved by the same motor cycle
to Samarei Sasan, where he killed the deceased and left with the
same motor cycle.
16. Prosecution has cited two witnesses to the seizure of the
recovered articles namely, P.W.17 and P.W.43. P.W. No.43
turned hostile, but P.W.17 held his ground and completely
supported the prosecution story in all its particulars. We find
nothing in the cross-examination to even remotely discredit it.
On the contrary, we find that the defence elicited from his mouth
in the cross-examination the following:-
“From the house of the friend of the accused the red colour
pulsar motor cycle was seized. At the time of the seizure of
wearing apparels of the accused from his house the father of
the accused and other family members were present. The black
colour bag contained with mobile phone and other articles was
seized from the house of the friend of the accused at Hitech
colony. In my presence the seizure was made and I saw each of
the articles before its seizure. One Saroj Pradhan also
accompanied us at the time of seizure.”
Page 13 of 22
Thus, ex facie, we find nothing to disbelieve the testimony of
P.W.17. Learned counsel for the accused has, however,
questioned the acceptability of the version of P.W.17 on the
ground of interestedness inasmuch as he happens to be the
brother-in-law of the deceased. We do not accept the above
argument for the reason that there is no proposition of universal
application that the evidence of relatives cannot be accepted on
the ground of interestedness. In fact, the law is other way round
that being a relation, it would only be reasonable to hold that the
person would spare no efforts in speaking the truth rather than
deliberately speak falsehood which would result in screening the
actual offender. From what we have stated before, we reiterate
that the evidence of P.W.17 is credible and acceptable.
17. Having held so, we are of the view that the circumstances
enumerated hereinbefore still do not conclusively prove the guilt
of the accused. As already stated, there are no eye witnesses to
the occurrence and the case rests entirely on circumstantial
evidence. There is no evidence of anyone having seen the accused
with the deceased prior to the occurrence. Prosecution has made
Page 14 of 22
an attempt to link the accused to the crime by relying upon the
evidence of P.W.29 to the effect that on 4.1.2013 morning the
accused allegedly called him from the mobile phone of the
deceased bearing No.8984264708. P.W.29 has stated in cross-
examination that his mobile number is 789412245. The I.O.
seized two mobile phones from the Apartment in Bhubaneswar at
the instance of the accused. It is alleged that one of the seized
mobiles was the one used by the accused to call P.W.29 i.e.
8984264708. The I.O. (P.W. 44) stated that he sought permission
of the S.P. to obtain Call Detail Reports of four mobile phones
including the aforementioned mobile and one supposedly
belonging to the deceased. The CDRs were obtained from the
service provider and proved as Exts.37,38 and 39. Analyzing the
CDRs the I.O. (P.W.44) found that the accused was using the SIM
Card bearing Nos.9040105399 and 9668359665. Analyzing the
mobile No.9040105399, the I.O. found that the same was last
utilized on 03.1.2011 at 11.15 P.M. to make calls to
8984657067,which was registered in the name of one Rajesh
Kumar Sahoo of Village Osakana, Nuagaon, Jagatsinghpur.
Page 15 of 22
Again, P.W.44 placed requisition before the S.P. to move the
service provider for supply of mobile tower location corresponding
to the tower numbers mentioned in the CDR. The details were
provided by the service provider and proved as Ext.42. On such
basis, the I.O. claims that on 03.1.2013 the accused called mobile
No.8984264708 22 times between 8.50 A.M. and 10.43 P.M. He
has also described the usage of mobile No.9040105399 under
various telecom towers at different times. However, there is no
other evidence to conclusively show that mobile no.8984264708
belonged to the deceased and was actually used by the accused
on 04.1.2013 by him to call P.W.29 and inform him about his
elopement to Bhubaneswar with the deceased. The Sales Head of
TATA Tele Services Limited was examined as P.W.45. He stated
that the Call Detail Reports vide Exts.38,43 and 40 as well as the
details of tower locations vide Ext.42, were generated from their
office computer and supplied to the office of Superintendent of
Police, Puri on their requisition. But in cross-examination, he
admitted that no document is available with him to show in
whose name the mobile numbers were registered.
Page 16 of 22
18. Thus, even bereft of the secondary electronic evidence
adduced, vide Exts.38, 43 and 40, there is otherwise no evidence
to show that the mobile number used to call P.W.29 belonged to
the deceased or that the other mobile seized by the I.O. belonged
to the accused.
19. Turning to the secondary electronic evidence, we may briefly
refer to the law governing the field. It would be profitable to refer
to Section 65-B of the Evidence Act. Sub-Sections (1),(2) and (4)
being relevant are reproduced below;
“65B. Admissibility of electronic records. — (1) Notwithstanding
anything contained in this Act, any information contained in an
electronic record which is printed on a paper, stored, recorded
or copied in optical or magnetic media produced by a computer
(hereinafter referred to as the computer output) shall be deemed
to be also a document, if the conditions mentioned in this
section are satisfied in relation to the information and computer
in question and shall be admissible in any proceedings, without
further proof or production of the original, as evidence or any
contents of the original or of any fact stated therein of which
direct evidence would be admissible.
(2) The conditions referred to in sub-section (1) in respect of a
computer output shall be the following, namely: — (a) the
computer output containing the information was produced by
the computer during the period over which the computer was
used regularly to store or process information for the purposes
of any activities regularly carried on over that period by the
person having lawful control over the use of the computer; (b)
during the said period, information of the kind contained in the
electronic record or of the kind from which the information so
contained is derived was regularly fed into the computer in the
ordinary course of the said activities; (c) throughout the material
part of the said period, the computer was operating properly or,Page 17 of 22
if not, then in respect of any period in which it was not
operating properly or was out of operation during that part of
the period, was not such as to affect the electronic record or the
accuracy of its contents; and (d) the information contained in
the electronic record reproduces or is derived from such
information fed into the computer in the ordinary course of the
said activities.
(3) xx xx xx
(4) In any proceedings where it is desired to give a statement in
evidence by virtue of this section, a certificate doing any of the
following things, that is to say, — (a) identifying the electronic
record containing the statement and describing the manner in
which it was produced; (b) giving such particulars of any device
involved in the production of that electronic record as may be
appropriate for the purpose of showing that the electronic record
was produced by a computer; (c) dealing with any of the
matters to which the conditions mentioned in sub-section (2)
relate, and purporting to be signed by a person occupying a
responsible official position in relation to the operation of the
relevant device or the management of the relevant activities
(whichever is appropriate) shall be evidence of any matter
stated in the certificate; and for the purposes of this subsection
it shall be sufficient for a matter to be stated to the best of the
knowledge and belief of the person stating it.”
Thus, law permits admission of secondary electronic
evidence but in the manner provided by the statute. Admittedly,
no certificate as required under sub-section (4) of Section 65-B
was produced. In the case of Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer1, the
Supreme Court held that the certificate must accompany the
electronic record when produced in evidence. In a later case
1 (2014) 10 SCC 473
Page 18 of 22
namely, Harpal Singh v. State of Punjab2, the Supreme Court,
relying upon Anvar P.V. (supra) reiterated as follows:
“56. Qua the admissibility of the call details, it is a matter of
record that though PWs 24, 25, 26 and 27 have endeavoured to
prove on the basis of the printed copy of the computer
generated call details kept in usual ordinary course of business
and stored in a hard disc of the company server, to co-relate the
calls made from and to the cellphones involved including those,
amongst others recovered from the accused persons, the
prosecution has failed to adduce a certificate relatable thereto
as required under Section 65-B(4) of the Act. Though the High
Court, in its impugned judgment, while dwelling on this aspect,
has dismissed the plea of inadmissibility of such call details by
observing that all the stipulations contained under Section 65 of
the Act had been complied with, in the teeth of the decision of
this Court in Anvar P.V. [Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer, (2014) 10
SCC 473 : (2015) 1 SCC (Civ) 27 : (2015) 1 SCC (Cri) 24 : (2015)
1 SCC (L&S) 108] ordaining an inflexible adherence to the
enjoinments of Sections 65-B(2) and (4) of the Act, we are
unable to sustain this finding. As apparently the prosecution
has relied upon the secondary evidence in the form of printed
copy of the call details, even assuming that the mandate of
Section 65-B(2) had been complied with, in the absence of a
certificate under Section 65-B(4), the same has to be held
inadmissible in evidence.”
20. Again referring to Anvar P.V. (supra), the Supreme Court in
the case of Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao
Gorantyal3, observed as follows:-
“34. Quite obviously, the requisite certificate in sub-section (4)
is unnecessary if the original document itself is produced. This
can be done by the owner of a laptop computer, a computer
tablet or even a mobile phone, by stepping into the witness box
and proving that the device concerned, on which the original
information is first stored, is owned and/or operated by him. In2 (2017) 1 SCC 734
3 (2020) 7 SCC 1Page 19 of 22
cases where “the computer”, as defined, happens to be a part
of a “computer system” or “computer network” (as defined in
the Information Technology Act, 2000) and it becomes
impossible to physically bring such network or system to the
court, then the only means of proving information contained in
such electronic record can be in accordance with Section 65-
B(1), together with the requisite certificate under Section 65-
B(4). This being the case, it is necessary to clarify what is
contained in the last sentence in para 24 of Anvar P.V. which
reads as “… if an electronic record as such is used as primary
evidence under Section 62 of the Evidence Act …”. This may
more appropriately be read without the words “under Section
62 of the Evidence Act,…”. With this minor clarification, the law
stated in para 24 of Anvar P.V. does not need to be revisited. ”
By way of classification and disagreeing with Shafhi Mohd. v.
State of H.P.4, it was further observed:
“61. We may reiterate, therefore, that the certificate required
under Section 65-B(4) is a condition precedent to the
admissibility of evidence by way of electronic record, as
correctly held in Anvar P.V. , and incorrectly “clarified” in Shafhi
Mohammad. Oral evidence in the place of such certificate
cannot possibly suffice as Section 65-B(4) is a mandatory
requirement of the law. Indeed, the hallowed principle
in Taylor v. Taylor, which has been followed in a number of the
judgments of this Court, can also be applied. Section 65-B(4) of
the Evidence Act clearly states that secondary evidence is
admissible only if led in the manner stated and not otherwise.
To hold otherwise would render Section 65-B(4) otiose.
62. In view of the above, the decision of the Madras High Court
in K. Ramajayam , which states that evidence aliunde can be
given through a person who was in charge of a computer device
in the place of the requisite certificate under Section 65-B(4) of
the Evidence Act is also an incorrect statement of the law and
is, accordingly, overruled.”
21. In the present case, no certificate was granted by the service
provider. In the absence of the same, oral evidence adduced
4 (2018) 5 SCC 311
Page 20 of 22
through P.W.45 has no value. Secondary electronic evidence
adduced in the case must be held to be inadmissible. If the
electronic evidence is discarded, it creates a gap in the evidence.
In other words, there is a missing link in the chain of
circumstances projected by the prosecution against the accused.
For the reasons indicated, we are unable to rely only upon the
statement of P.W.29 that he had received the call from mobile
No.8984264708. Even accepting his statement as correct for a
moment, in the absence of clear evidence showing that the
aforesaid phone in fact belonged to the deceased, no link can be
established.
22. Reading of the impugned judgment reveals that the trial
Court has taken note of the law relating to admissibility of
electronic evidence but appears to have brushed aside the same
and relied upon other evidence to hold the accused guilty. We
may observe that the other incriminating circumstances, which
we have discussed in detail hereinbefore can only create a
suspicion that the accused may have been involved, but
suspicion is not proof. We are therefore, unable to concur with
Page 21 of 22
the findings of the trial Court that the circumstances arising from
the evidence form a complete chain proving the guilt of the
accused.
23. Thus, from a conspectus of the analysis of the evidence,
contentions raised and the position of law, we are of the
considered view that this is a case where there are reasonable
doubts in the evidence, the benefit of which ought to go in favour
of the accused. For such reasons therefore, the impugned
judgment cannot be sustained and warrants interference.
24. In the result, the appeal succeeds and is therefore, allowed.
The impugned judgment of conviction and sentence dated
18.1.2016 passed by Sessions Judge, Puri in S.T. Case
No.188/2013 is hereby set aside. The accused being on bail, is
discharged from his bail bonds.
…………………………………
(Sashikanta Mishra, J)
Manash Ranjan Pathak, J I agree.
…………………………………….
Signature Not Verified (Manash Ranjan Pathak, J)
Digitally Signed
SignedAshok Kumar
by: ASHOK Behera
KUMAR BEHERA
Reason: Authentication
Location: High Court of Orissa, Cuttack
Date: 30-Jul-2026 10:15:37
Page 22 of 22
