Page No.# 1/7 vs The Union Of India on 16 March, 2026

    0
    48
    ADVERTISEMENT

    Gauhati High Court

    Page No.# 1/7 vs The Union Of India on 16 March, 2026

    Author: Parthivjyoti Saikia

    Bench: Parthivjyoti Saikia

                                                                                  Page No.# 1/7
    
    GAHC010195912025
    
    
    
    
                                                                         2026:GAU-AS:1770
    
                                THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
       (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
    
                                Case No. : Bail Appln./2870/2025
    
                N ARUN SINGH
                SON OF NAOREM JADUMANI SINGH
                R/O TORBUNG
                BANGLA, P.O., P.S. AND DIST. CHURACHANDPUR-795128, MANIPUR.
    
    
    
                VERSUS
    
                THE UNION OF INDIA
                (DRI) REP. BY THE PP, ASSAM
    
    
    
    Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. S C BISWAS, MS. S. CHANDA,MS. K L R YANTHAN,MS. R
    DEVI,MS. J GHOSH,MR. A DASGUPTA
    
    Advocate for the Respondent : SC, DRI,
    
    
    
    
                                             :: BEFORE ::
                    (HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PARTHIVJYOTI SAIKIA)
    
    
                 Advocate(s) for the Petitioner             :      Mr. S.C. Biswas,
                                                                   Advocate.
    
    
                 Advocate(s) for the Opposite Party       :        Mr. S.C. Keyal,
                                                                   S.C., D.R.I.
                                                                                Page No.# 2/7
    
    
    
    
                  Date on which judgment is reserved :           10.02.2026.
    
                  Date of pronouncement of judgment :            16.03.2026.
    
    
                  Whether the pronouncement is of the
                  operative part of the judgment?       :        YES.
    
    
                  Whether the full judgment has been
                  pronounced?                               :    YES.
    
    
    
                                    J U D G M E N T (CAV)
    

    Heard Mr. S.C. Biswas, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner. Also
    heard Mr. S.C. Keyal, the learned Standing Counsel, D.R.I.

    2. This is an application under Section 483 of the BNSS, 2023, whereby the
    petitioner N. Arun Singh who was arrested in connection with D.R.I. Silchar Seizure
    Case No.01/CL/NDPS/DRI/SIL/2024-2025 under Sections 21(c)/29 & 43(a) of the
    N.D.P.S. Act.

    SPONSORED

    3. Commercial quantity of Amphetamine/Methamphetamine tablets commonly
    known as “Yaba” tablets worth ₹10 crore was recovered from the possession of the
    petitioner.

    4. Mr. Biswas has submitted that the contraband goods were recovered from the
    driver’s cabin of a TATA Truck, not from the possession of the present petitioner,
    though he was driving the truck.

    5. I have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel of both sides.

    6. In State of Kerala v. Rajesh, (2020) 12 SCC 122, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has
    Page No.# 3/7

    held as under:

    “18. This Court has laid down broad parameters to be followed while considering the
    application for bail moved by the accused involved in the offences under the NDPS Act.
    In Union of India v. Ram Samujh [Union of India v. Ram Samujh, (1999) 9 SCC 429 : 1999
    SCC (Cri) 1522] , it has been elaborated as under:

    “7. It is to be borne in mind that the aforesaid legislative mandate is required to be
    adhered to and followed. It should be borne in mind that in a murder case, the
    accused commits murder of one or two persons, while those persons who are dealing
    in narcotic drugs are instrumental in causing death or in inflicting death-blow to a
    number of innocent young victims, who are vulnerable; it causes deleterious effects
    and a deadly impact on the society; they are a hazard to the society; even if they are
    released temporarily, in all probability, they would continue their nefarious activities of
    trafficking and/or dealing in intoxicants clandestinely. Reason may be large stake and
    illegal profit involved. This Court, dealing with the contention with regard to
    punishment under the NDPS Act, has succinctly observed about the adverse effect of
    such activities in Durand Didier v. State (UT of Goa) [Durand Didier v. State (UT of
    Goa), (1990) 1 SCC 95 : 1990 SCC (Cri) 65] as under: (SCC p. 104, para 24)
    ’24. With deep concern, we may point out that the organised activities of the
    underworld and the clandestine smuggling of narcotic drugs and psychotropic
    substances into this country and illegal trafficking in such drugs and substances
    have led to drug addiction among a sizeable section of the public, particularly the
    adolescents and students of both sexes and the menace has assumed serious and
    alarming proportions in the recent years. Therefore, in order to effectively control
    and eradicate this proliferating and booming devastating menace, causing
    deleterious effects and deadly impact on the society as a whole, Parliament in its
    wisdom, has made effective provisions by introducing this Act 81 of 1985 specifying
    mandatory minimum imprisonment and fine.’

    8. To check the menace of dangerous drugs flooding the market, Parliament has
    provided that the person accused of offences under the NDPS Act should not be
    Page No.# 4/7

    released on bail during trial unless the mandatory conditions provided in Section 37,
    namely,

    (i) there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of such
    offence; and

    (ii) that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail

    are satisfied. The High Court has not given any justifiable reason for not abiding by the
    aforesaid mandate while ordering the release of the respondent-accused on bail.
    Instead of attempting to take a holistic view of the harmful socio-economic
    consequences and health hazards which would accompany trafficking illegally in
    dangerous drugs, the court should implement the law in the spirit with which
    Parliament, after due deliberation, has amended.”

    7. In Union of India v. Mohd. Nawaz Khan, (2021) 10 SCC 100, the Supreme Court
    has held as under:

    “19. With regard to the grant of bail for offences under the NDPS Act, in Union of
    India v. Shiv Shanker Kesari [Union of India
    v. Shiv Shanker Kesari, (2007) 7 SCC 798 :

    (2007) 3 SCC (Cri) 505] this Court observed that bail may be cancelled if it has been
    granted without adhering to the parameters under Section 37 of the NDPS Act.

    Further, in Union of India v. Prateek Shukla [Union of India v. Prateek Shukla, (2021) 5
    SCC 430 : (2021) 2 SCC (Cri) 597] , one of us (D.Y. Chandrachud, J.), speaking for a
    two-Judge Bench, noted that non-application of mind to the rival submissions and the
    seriousness of the allegations involving an offence under the NDPS Act by the High
    Court are grounds for cancellation of bail.

    This extract is taken from Union of India v. Mohd. Nawaz Khan, (2021) 10 SCC 100 :

    (2021) 3 SCC (Cri) 721 : 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1237 at page 110

    20. Section 37 of the NDPS Act regulates the grant of bail in cases involving offences
    under the NDPS Act. Section 37 reads as follows:

    “37. Offences to be cognizable and non-bailable .–(1) Notwithstanding anything
    contained in the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (2 of 1974),–

    (a) every offence punishable under this Act shall be cognizable;

    Page No.# 5/7

    (b) no person accused of an offence punishable for offences under Section 19
    or Section 24 or Section 27-A and also for offences involving commercial
    quantity shall be released on bail or on his own bond unless —

    (i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the
    application for such release, and

    (ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the court is
    satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty
    of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail .
    (2) The limitations on granting of bail specified in clause ( b) of sub-section (1) are
    in addition to the limitations under the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (2 of 1974)
    or any other law for the time being in force on granting of bail.”
    (emphasis supplied)

    21. Under Section 37(1)(b)(ii), the limitations on the grant of bail for offences
    punishable under Sections 19, 24 or 27-A and also for offences involving a commercial
    quantity are:

    (i) The Prosecutor must be given an opportunity to oppose the application for bail;
    and

    (ii) There must exist “reasonable grounds to believe” that : ( a) the person is not
    guilty of such an offence; and ( b) he is not likely to commit any offence while on
    bail.

    22. The standard prescribed for the grant of bail is “reasonable ground to believe” that
    the person is not guilty of the offence. Interpreting the standard of “reasonable
    grounds to believe”, a two-Judge Bench of this Court in Shiv Shanker Kesari [Union of
    India v. Shiv Shanker Kesari
    , (2007) 7 SCC 798 : (2007) 3 SCC (Cri) 505] , held that :

    (SCC pp. 801-02, paras 7-8 & 10-11)
    “7. The expression used in Section 37(1)(b)(ii) is “reasonable grounds”. The
    expression means something more than prima facie grounds. It connotes
    substantial probable causes for believing that the accused is not guilty of the
    offence charged and this reasonable belief contemplated in turn points to existence
    of such facts and circumstances as are sufficient in themselves to justify recording
    Page No.# 6/7

    of satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of the offence charged.

    8. The word “reasonable” has in law the prima facie meaning of reasonable in
    regard to those circumstances of which the actor, called on to act reasonably,
    knows or ought to know. It is difficult to give an exact definition of the word
    “reasonable”.

    ‘7. … Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary, 4th Edn., p. 2258 states that it would be
    unreasonable to expect an exact definition of the word “reasonable”. Reason
    varies in its conclusions according to the idiosyncrasy of the individual, and the
    times and circumstances in which he thinks. The reasoning which built up the
    old scholastic logic sounds now like the jingling of a child’s toy.’

    [See MCD v. Jagan Nath Ashok Kumar [MCD v. Jagan Nath Ashok Kumar, (1987) 4
    SCC 497] , SCC p. 504, para 7 and Gujarat Water Supply & Sewerage
    Board v. Unique Erectors (Gujarat) (P) Ltd. [Gujarat Water Supply & Sewerage
    Board
    v. Unique Erectors (Gujarat) (P) Ltd., (1989) 1 SCC 532] ]

    ***

    10. The word “reasonable” signifies “in accordance with reason”. In the ultimate
    analysis it is a question of fact, whether a particular act is reasonable or not
    depends on the circumstances in a given situation. (See Municipal Corpn. of
    Greater Mumbai v. Kamla Mills Ltd. [Municipal Corpn. of Greater Mumbai
    v. Kamla
    Mills Ltd., (2003) 6 SCC 315] )

    11. The court while considering the application for bail with reference to Section 37
    of the Act is not called upon to record a finding of not guilty. It is for the limited
    purpose essentially confined to the question of releasing the accused on bail that
    the court is called upon to see if there are reasonable grounds for believing that the
    accused is not guilty and records its satisfaction about the existence of such
    grounds. But the court has not to consider the matter as if it is pronouncing a
    judgment of acquittal and recording a finding of not guilty.”
    (emphasis supplied)”

    8. The standard prescribed for the grant of bail is “reasonable ground to believe”

    Page No.# 7/7

    that the person is not guilty of the offence. The court while considering the application
    for bail with reference to Section 37 of the Act is not called upon to record a finding of
    not guilty. It is for the limited purpose essentially confined to the question of releasing
    the accused on bail that the court is called upon to see if there are reasonable
    grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty and records its satisfaction about
    the existence of such grounds.

    9. In the case in hand, there are elements of a prima facie case against the present
    petitioner. Therefore, there is no reasonable ground to believe that the petitioner is
    not guilty. For this reason, the bail application is rejected and disposed of accordingly.

    JUDGE

    Comparing Assistant

    [ad_1]

    Source link

    LEAVE A REPLY

    Please enter your comment!
    Please enter your name here