Gauhati High Court
Page No.# 1/3 vs The Bikrampur Coop Societies Ltd And 3 … on 7 April, 2026
Page No.# 1/30
GAHC010084392025
2026:GAU-AS:5113-DB
THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
Case No. : WA/147/2025
ABHIJIT CHAKRABORTY
S/O ANATH BANDHU CHAKRABORTY, R/O VILL. AND P.O. BIHARA BAZAR,
P.S. KATIGORAH, DIST. CACHAR, ASSAM.
VERSUS
THE BIKRAMPUR COOP SOCIETIES LTD AND 3 ORS
REGN. NO S/7 OF 1973-74, P.O. BIHARA BAZAAR, DIST. CACHAR, ASSAM
(REPRESENTED BY BILLAL UDDIN BORBHUIYA, THE PRESENT
CHAIRMAN OF THE ABOVE SOCIETY)
2:THE STATE OF ASSAM
REPRESENTED BY THE PRINCIPAL SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM
COOPERATION DEPARTMENT
DISPUR
GUWAHATI-6
3:THE REGISTRAR OF COOP. SOCIETIES
ASSAM
KHANAPARA
GUWAHATI-22
4:THE ASSISTANT REGISTRAR OF COOPERATIVE SOCIETIES
CACHAR
SILCHAR
ASSA
Advocate for the Petitioner : MR R K MOUR, MS N BARUAH,MR P DAS,MR. R DUBEY
Advocate for the Respondent : SC, CO OP,
Page No.# 2/30
Linked Case : WA/174/2025
JISHU KUMAR NATH
S/O LATE PRANAY NATH
EX-SECRETARY
RAJYUSWARPUR COOPERATIVE SOCIETY LTD.
VILL. AND P.O. UMEDNAGAR
P.S. LALA
DIST. HAILAKANDI
ASSAM.
VERSUS
FOYZUL HOQUE MAZUMDER AND 12 ORS
S/O AJOB UDDIN MAZUMDER
R/O VILL. RAJYUSWARPUR
PT VII
P.O. KATAGAON
P.S. LALA
DIST. HAILAKANDI
ASSAM.
2:MD MOTIBUR RAHMAN MAZUMDER
S/O LATE ASMAN ALI MAZUMDER
R/O VILLAGE- RAJYUSWARPUR PT-VII
P.O. KATAGAON
P.S. LALA
DIST- HAILAKANDI
ASSAM
3:MINA BEGUM LASKAR
W/O MALIK USTAR LASKAR
R/O VILLAGE- RAJYUSWARPUR PT-VII
P.O. KATAGAON
P.S. LALA
DIST- HAILAKANDI
ASSAM
4:ASAB UDDIN LASKAR
S/O LATE TOSIR ALI LASKAR
R/O VILLAGE- RAJYUSWARPUR PT-IV
P.O. KATAGAON
P.S. LALA
DIST- HAILAKANDI
Page No.# 3/30
ASSAM
5:SIR RANJIT ROY
S/O RABINDRA ROY
R/O VILLAGE- RAJYUSWARPUR PT-V
P.O. KATAGAON
P.S. LALA
DIST- HAILAKANDI
ASSAM
6:SULTANA BEGUM LASAKR
W/O LATE MOSTAFA AHMED LASKAR
R/O VILLAGE- RAJYUSWARPUR PT-VII
P.O. KATAGAON
P.S. LALA
DIST- HAILAKANDI
ASSAM
7:ABDUL HALIM MAZUMDER
S/O ILLIAS ALI
R/O VILLAGE- RAJYUSWARPUR PT-VI
P.O. KATAGAON
P.S. LALA
DIST- HAILAKANDI
ASSAM
8:UBAIDULLA BARBHUIYA
W/O LATE MONFOR ALI BARBHUIYA
R/O VILLAGE- RAJYUSWARPUR PT-VII
P.O. KATAGAON
P.S. LALA
DIST- HAILAKANDI
ASSAM
9:MOHOMMOD ALI ZULFIKAR LASKAR
W/O ROJOB ALI LASKAR
R/O VILLAGE- RAJYUSWARPUR PT-VII
P.O. KATAGAON
P.S. LALA
DIST- HAILAKANDI
ASSAM
10:THE STATE OF ASSAM
TO BE REPRESENTED BY THE PRINCIPAL SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF
ASSAM
COOPERATION DEPARTMENT
DISPUR
GUWAHATI-6
Page No.# 4/30
11:THE REGISTRAR OF COOPERATIVE SOCIERIES
ASSAM
KHANAPARA
GUWAHATI-22
12:THE ZONAL JOINT REGISTRAR OF COOPERATIVE SOCIETIES
SILCHAR ZONE
SILCHAR-1
ASSAM.
13:THE ASSISTANT REGISTRAR OF COOPERATIVE SOCIETIES
HAILAKANDI
P.O. AND DISTRICT- HAILAKANDI
ASSAM
------------
Advocate for : MR. P K ROYCHOUDHURY
Advocate for : SC
CO OP appearing for FOYZUL HOQUE MAZUMDER AND 12 ORS
Linked Case : WA/120/2025
THE REGISTRAR OF CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETIES
ASSAM
KHANAPARA
GUWAHATI-22
2: THE ASSISTANT REGISTRAR OF CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETIES
CACHAR
SILCHAR
ASSAM
VERSUS
THE BIKRAMPUR CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETIES LTD.
BIHARA BAZAR
DIST-CACHAR
ASSAM (REP. BY BILLAL UDDIN BORBHUIYA
CHAIRMAN OF THE SAID SOCIETY)
2:BILLAL UDDIN BORBHUIYA
S/O-ABDUL RUP BORBHUIYA
R/O- VILL-SENTI PART-I
P.S- KATIGORAH
Page No.# 5/30
DIST-CACHAR
ASSAM
3:ABHIJIT CHAKRABORTY
S/O-ANATH BANDHU CHAKRABORTY
VILL AND P.O-BIHARA BAZAR
P.S- KATIGORAH
DIST-CACHAR
ASSAM
4:THE STATE OF ASSAM
REP. BY THE PRINCIPAL SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM
CO-OPERATION DEPARTMENT
DISPUR
————
Advocate for : MR. S K TALUKDAR
Advocate for : appearing for THE BIKRAMPUR CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETIES LTD.
Linked Case : WA/185/2025
THE REGISTRAR OF CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETIES
ASSAM
KHANAPARA
GUWAHATI 22
2: THE ZONAL JOINT REGISTRAR OF COOPERATIVE SOCIETIES
CACHAR
SILCHAR
ASSAM.
3: THE ASSISTANT REGISTRAR OF COOPERATIVE SOCIETIES
HAILAKANDI
ASSAM
VERSUS
FOYZUL HOQUE MAZUMDER AND 10 ORS
S/O LT. AJOB UDDIN MAZUMDER OF VILL. RAJYUSWARPUR PT. VII
P.O. KATAGAON
P.S. LALA
DIST. HAILAKANDI
ASSAM.
2:MD. MOTIUR RAHMAN MAZUMDER
S/O LT. ASMAN ALI MAZUMDER OF VILL. RAJYUSWARPUR PT. VIII
Page No.# 6/30
P.O.KATAGAON
P.S. LALA
DIST. HAILAKANDI
ASSAM.
3:MINA BEGUM LASKAR
W/O MALLIK USTAR LASKAR OF VILL. RAJYUSWARPUR PT. VII
P.O. KATAGAON
P.S. LALA
DIST. HAILAKANDI
ASSAM.
4:ASAB UDDIN LASKAR
S/O LT. TOSIR ALI LASKAR OF VILL. RAJYUSWARPUR PT.IV
P.O. KATAGAON
P.S. LALA
DIST. HAILAKANDI
ASSAM.
5:RANJIT ROY
S/O RABINDRA ROY
OF VILL. RAJYUSWARPUR PT. V
P.O. KATAGAON
P.S. LALA
DIST. HAILAKANDI
ASSAM.
6:SULTANA BEGUM LASKAR
W/O LT. MOSTAFA AHMED LASKAR OF VILL. RAJYUSWARPUR PT. VII
P.O. KATAGAON
P.S. LALA
DIST. HAILAKANDI
ASSAM.
7:ABDUL HALIM MAZUMDER
S/O ILIAS ALI
OF VILL. RAJYUSWARPUR PT VI
P.O. KATAGAON
P.S. LALA
DIST. HAILAKANDI
ASSAM.
8:UBAIDULLA BARBHUIYA
Page No.# 7/30
S/O LT. MONFOR ALI BARBHUIYA OF VILL. RAJYUSWARPUR PT. VII
P.O. KATAGAON
P.S. LALA
DIST. HAILAKANDI.
9:MOHAMMAD ALI ZULFIQUR LASKAR
S/O RAJOB ALI LASKAR OF VILL. RAJYUSWARPUR PT. VII
P.O. KATAGAON
P.S. LALA
DIST. HAILAKANDI.
10:JISHU KUMAR NATH
EX. SECRETARY RAJYUSWARPUR COOP. SOCIETY LTD. VILL. AND P.O.
UMEDNAGAR
P.S. LALA
DIST. HAILAKANDI
ASSAM.
11:THE STATE OF ASSAM
REPRESENTED BY THE PRINCIPAL SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM
CO OPERATION DEPTT.
DISPUR.
————
Advocate for : MR. S K TALUKDAR
Advocate for : MR B SINHA appearing for FOYZUL HOQUE MAZUMDER AND 10
ORS
BEFORE
HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN DEV CHOUDHURY
J UDGMENT & ORDER (CAV)
Date : 07-04-2026
(Arun Dev Choudhury, J)
1. All these four appeals have been taken up together for the
final hearing.
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2. The judgment and order dated 13.03.2025 passed in WP(C)
No.925/2022 has been assailed by the private respondents in
WA 147/2025 and by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies
in WA No.120/2025.
3. The judgment and order dated 09.05.2025 passed in WP(C)
No.6945/2024 is assailed in WA No.185/2025 by the Registrar
of Co-operative Societies, Assam and by the private
respondents in WA No.174/2025.
4. WP(C) 6945/2024 was delivered, applying the determination
made in the judgment dated 13.03.2025 passed in WP(C)
No. 925/2022.
5. Thus, the primary challenge in these appeals arise from the
judgment dated 13.03.2025 passed in WP(C) No.925/2022,
(hereinafter referred to as Bikarampur judgement), whereby
the learned Single Judge interfered with the order dated
10.01.2022, passed by Registrar of Co-operative Societies,
Assam and held that the Registrar lacked the jurisdiction to
examine the legality of the decision of the Board of Directors
of a Society in removing the appellant from the post of
Secretary/ Chief Executive.
6. The material facts of WA 147/2025 and WA 120/2025 are not
in dispute. The appellant was appointed as Secretary of the
Bikarampur Co-operative Society, pursuant to a Board of
Directors resolution dated 05.10.2021. Within a short span, the
Board, upon certain complaints, adopted a resolution dated
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01.12.2021, cancelling the appointment and initiating a fresh
recruitment process. The appellant approached the
Registrar invoking the statutory mechanism under Section
111 of the Assam Co-operative Societies Act, 2007
(hereinafter referred to as the Act, 2007). The Registrar, after
hearing the parties, recorded that the removal had been
effected without affording any opportunity of hearing, that
the decision-making process suffered from want of quorum
and that the statutory provisions governing the conduct of
meetings had been violated. On these findings, the
Registrar set aside the Board’s decision and restored the
appellant to the post, which was challenged before the
learned Single Judge.
7. The learned Single Judge, however, proceeded to set aside
the order of the Registrar on the ground that the dispute was
purely between an employer and the employee and
therefore, is outside the jurisdiction of the Registrar under
Section 111, 92 or 49 of the Act, 2007 and accordingly,
allowed the writ petition.
8. In WA 174/2025 and WA 185/2025, the facts in a nutshell are
that, to remove the Secretary from the Rajyuswarpur Co-
Operative Society, the Board decided to hold a meeting on
04.12.2014, to pass a resolution to that effect. By a resolution
taken on that day, the Board decided to terminate the
services of the respondent No.5/Secretary of the Society.
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The reasons assigned in the said resolution for the removal of
the Secretary were that a qualified secretary is required who
should be a graduate; but the incumbent was found to be
only a matriculate. Certain allegations were also made
against him in that resolution. The proceeding of the
meeting was approved by the Assistant Registrar of
Cooperative Societies.
Being aggrieved, the appellant/Secretary approached the
Registrar of Cooperative Societies by preferring an appeal
under Section 111(1) of the Act, 2007. Initially, there was a
stay of the impugned resolution dated 11.12.2024, which was
assailed before the learned Single Judge. The learned Single
Judge, applying the principle laid down in Bikrampur,
allowed the writ petition.
9. Therefore, primarily, this court has been called upon to
examine the correctness of the decision of the learned
Single Judge rendered in Bikrampur.
10. The learned Single Judge in Bikrampur, upon examining the
statutory scheme of the Assam Cooperative Societies Act,
2007 held that the Secretary/Chief Executive of a
Cooperative Society is essentially a full time employee of the
society within the meaning of Section 49(1)A and that
relationship between the Board and such Secretary is one of
the employer and employee governed by private law. It
was observed that the power to appoint and remove the
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Chief Executive is exclusively vested in the Board under
Section 38(2) of the Act, 2007, without any requirement of
approval or intervention of the Registrar.
11. On this premise, the learned Single Judge concluded that
the impugned dispute arose out of a contract of personal
service and did not partake the character of a statutory
dispute warranting intervention.
12. On the question of jurisdiction, the learned Single Judge
held that Section 111 was inapplicable, as it provides for
appeal only against the decision of government officers or
the liquidator appointed under Section 95, and not against
the resolution of the Board of Cooperative Society.
13. The court further held that Section 92, which deals with
settlements of disputes and reference thereof, could not be
invoked as the dispute related to the removal of an
employee and was therefore excluded from the ambit of
dispute within “touching the business of the society”,
particularly in view of the expressed exclusion of disciplinary
matters.
14. The contention that jurisdiction could be traced to Section
49(2)(I) was also rejected. The provision was construed as
limited to operational matters of the society, and not to
issues of appointment or termination.
15. In consequence, the learned Single Judge held that the
Registrar had acted without jurisdiction in entertaining the
Page No.# 12/30
appeals and setting aside the decision of the Board. The
order directing the reinstatement of the Secretary was found
to be impermissible both for want of statutory authority and
in the light of settled principles governing the personal
service.
16. The learned Single Judge also emphasized that the
autonomous character of Co-operative Societies, observing
that a registered society under the Act 2007, is not a
statutory body but a body corporate governed by provisions
of the statute. It was held that the state or its authorities do
not exercise deep and pervasive control over the internal
management of such societies, particularly in cases where
there is no government shareholding. On this reasoning, the
learned Judge concluded that interference by the Registrar
in matters relating to the appointment or removal of staff
would amount to an unwarranted intrusion into the
democratic functioning and internal administration of the
society.
17. The learned Single Judge further held that even if procedural
irregularities or violations of natural justice were alleged in
the decision-making process of the Board, such issues would
not confer jurisdiction on the Registrar in the absence of a
specific statutory prescription.
18. It was observed that jurisdiction must flow from the statute
and cannot be assumed on equitable considerations or
Page No.# 13/30
necessity. The court underscored that the registrar cannot
indirectly assume powers not expressly conferred, and that
what is not permissible directly cannot be achieved
indirectly by invoking general supervisory powers.
19. Lastly, the learned Single Judge rejected the contention that
the denial of jurisdiction rendered the aggrieved party
remediless. It was held that the appellant could avail of
remedies under ordinary civil law for damages, as there is no
scope for specific performance of the contract of
employment after termination, and that the absence of a
statutory forum does not justify the expansion of the
Registrar’s jurisdiction.
20. The Court thus concluded that the statutory scheme
deliberately excludes such service disputes from the domain
of the Registrar and that any interpretation to the contrary
would amount to judicial legislation, which is impermissible.
21. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants submits
that the impugned judgment proceeds on an erroneous
and restrictive construction of the Act 2007, by treating the
dispute as arising out of a purely private contract of
employment. It is contended that such an approach fails to
appreciate the statutory character of the office of the
Secretary/Chief Executive. Referring to Section 2(1)(s), 2(1)(l)
& 2(1)(x) of the Act 2007, it is urged that the Secretary is not
a mere employee simpliciter but occupies a dual position,
Page No.# 14/30
being both the office bearer and a full-time employee and is
vested with statutory functions under Section 49.
22. It is submitted that the learned Single Judge erred in
conflating this composite status to that of an ordinary
employee and consequently applied the principle of private
employment in a mechanical manner.
23. Developing such an argument, it is contended that the
removal of the Chief Executive has a direct bearing on the
governance and operational continuity of the society and
therefore, cannot be equated to a routine service dispute.
24. It is urged that Section 49(2)(l) is of wide amplitude and has
been wrongly construed by the learned Single Judge. The
expression “in any matter”, it is urged, must receive its plain
and natural meaning so as to include disputes relating to
removal from the office. However, the learned Single Judge
has applied a restrictive reading to the same, construing it as
relating to the concept of “course of business”.
25. It is further submitted that even if Section 111 in the strict
sense may not be attracted to the jurisdiction exercised by
the Registrar, it is nonetheless traceable to the combined
scheme of Sections 49 and 92. The appellant contends that
the Registrar, being vested with the supervisory authority
under the Act 2007, is competent to examine the legality of
the actions of the Board where such action suffers from
jurisdictional infirmity, such as violation of statutory provision,
Page No.# 15/30
absence of quorum and breach of principles of natural
justice, all of which are specifically available in the present
set of cases.
26. The appellant further assails the learned Single Judge’s
finding that the dispute falls outside the ambit of Section 92,
on the ground that it pertains to disciplinary action against
an employee.
27. The substantial plank of the appellant’s submission is founded
on the doctrine that a statute must not be construed in a
manner that renders a person remediless. It is urged that if
the view taken by the learned Single Judge is sustained, the
Chief Executive/Secretary would be left without any
efficacious remedy against an arbitrary order of removal.
According to them, the remedy of a civil suit is illusory.
28. While endorsing the aforesaid argument, the learned
standing counsel appearing for the State and the Registrar
of Cooperative Societies submit that the learned Single
Judge has failed to appreciate the true scope of statutory
supervision embedded in the Act, 2007.
29. It is contended that the Act, 2007, is not merely an enabling
statute but a regulatory framework in which the Registrar is
entrusted with supervisory, corrective, and adjudicatory
functions to ensure that Co-operative societies function in
accordance with law. It is urged that the Registrar’s
jurisdiction cannot be viewed in a compartmentalised
Page No.# 16/30
manner by isolating individual provisions; the provisions of
Sections 3, 49 and 92 must be read harmoniously, so as to
give effect to the legislative intent.
30. According to the learned standing counsel, even if the
appeals were filed under Section 111, the power exercised
by the Registrar is clearly traceable to the substantive
statutory framework, particularly Section 49(2)(l), which
confers authority upon the Registrar to render a decision in
cases of dispute between the Chief Executive and the
Board. The learned standing counsel, referring to the
definitions, reiterated that a Secretary is not merely an
employee but also an office bearer and the Principal
Executive functionary, responsible for the day-to-day
administration of the society. Therefore, disputes relating to
his removal cannot be equated with ordinary service dispute
of employees.
31. The learned standing counsel contends that the learned
Single Judge erred in applying the exclusion relating to
“disciplinary action against an employee” under Section 92
without appreciating that the secretary stands on a different
statutory footing. According to him, the expression ‘touching
the business of the society’ in Section 92 must receive a
purposive contextual interpretation. The removal of a Chief
Executive/Secretary, who is entrusted with management
and operational responsibilities under Section 49(2), directly
Page No.# 17/30
impacts the functioning of the society and therefore, falls
within the ambit of a dispute affecting the business and
management of the society. The narrow interpretation
adopted by the learned Single Judge, it is contended,
defeats the object of the Act and unduly restricts the
supervisory jurisdiction of the registrar.
32. A significant emphasis is placed on the consequences of
accepting the interpretation adopted by the learned Single
Judge. It is contended that such an interpretation would
render the Registrar powerless to correct even patent
illegality, thereby enabling arbitrary exercise of power by the
Board without any effective check. The learned standing
counsel submitted that the Act 2007 does not contemplate
such an unregulated domain and that the supervisory role of
the Registrar is integral to maintaining the integrity and
accountability of a cooperative institution.
33. On the aspect of remedy, it is submitted that relegating an
aggrieved secretary to a civil court is neither intended by
the statute nor efficacious in practice. The nature of the
dispute involving removal from a statutory office requires
prompt and effective adjudication, which is precisely what
the mechanism under Section 49(2)(l) provides. The
absence of such an interpretation would create a remedial
vacuum that cannot be attributed to a legislative intent.
34. In conclusion, the learned standing counsel argues that the
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order passed by the Registrar is well within the scope of
statutory authority, is based on findings of illegality in the
board’s decision-making process, and constitutes a proper
exercise of supervisory jurisdiction.
35. The interference by the learned Single Judge is premised on
a narrow and fragmented reading of the Act, which is
therefore unsustainable in law and calls for a correction by
this court, concludes Mr. Talukdar, learned standing counsel,
Cooperation Department, appearing for the Registrar of
Cooperative Societies.
36. Per contra, the learned counsels appearing for the
respondents support the judgments under appeal and
submit that the Act, 2007, clearly vests the power of
appointment and removal of the Chief Executive in the
Board under Section 38(2) without any requirement of prior
approval or subsequent ratification by the Registrar.
37. It is contended that once the statute expressly confers such
power on the Board, any interference by a Registrar would
constitute an unwarranted intrusion into the autonomy of the
cooperative society, which is intended to function as a
democratic institution governed by its elected
representatives.
38. It is further submitted that the Secretary, notwithstanding his
designation as an Office Bearer, is in essence a full-time
employee of the society as explicitly provided under Section
Page No.# 19/30
49(1)(a) and the relationship between the Board and the
Secretary is one of employer and employee.
39. The dispute arising from termination of such employment, as
it is urged, is a matter of private law and does not attract the
adjudicatory jurisdiction of the Registrar. Reliance is placed
on the principle that disputes relating to the contracts of
personal service are not specifically enforceable and that
courts ordinarily do not grant reinstatement in such matters.
40. The respondents contend that Section 111 is wholly
inapplicable as it provides for an appeal only against the
decision of the government officers or liquidator, and not
against the resolutions of the Board of a Co-operative
society.
41. It is urged that Section 92 expressly excludes disputes relating
to disciplinary action against employees and therefore, the
registrar cannot assume jurisdiction under that provision.
42. The attempt to invoke Section 49(2)(l), according to the
respondents, is equally misconceived as the said provision is
limited to disputes arising “in the course of business of a co-
operative society” enumerated in clause (a) to (l) and does
not extend to matters of appointment and removal.
43. It is submitted that any other interpretation would result in
rewriting the statute and diluting the autonomy of the
Board.
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44. It is contended that the Registrar in the present case has
acted beyond the bounds of his statutory authority in setting
aside the resolution of the Board and directing reinstatement
of the secretary, and in the other case, by staying such
resolution while admitting the appeal.
45. Lastly, it is urged that the apprehension of remedial vacuum
is misplaced as the aggrieved party is always at liberty to
seek redress before a competent civil court. The absence of
a statutory remedy, it is contended, cannot justify judicial
expansion of the jurisdiction of the Registrar beyond what is
expressly provided in the Act, 2007. On this ground, the
respondents submit that the judgment of the learned Single
Judge is sound in law and warrants no interference.
46. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and
perused the materials on record.
47. Section 2(l) defines the Chief Executive as an individual by
whatsoever designation called, who is appointed
/elected /nominated by the Board on payment or honorary,
who performs functions and exercises power under the Act
and the bylaws.
48. The use of the phrase “by whatsoever designation” is of
considerable significance. It indicates that the legislature
was consciously adopting a functional definition rather than
a titular one, thereby permitting different societies to
describe the same office by different designations, such as
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Secretary, etc., while retaining the common statutory
identity.
49. Even under Section 49, the statute emphasizes that the
society shall have Chief Executive, by whatsoever
designation called. The statute thus contemplates of a single
apex executive functionary, irrespective of the label
assigned.
50. Section 2 (x) of Chapter I defines “office bearers” and
expressly includes the Secretary within the category of office
bearers, along with the President, Vice President,
Chairperson, and Vice Chairperson of a co-operative
society.
51. However, the Act does not treat all office bearers alike. A
careful scrutiny of the scheme of the Act shows that a clear
internal differentiation are there; the President as
Chairperson presides over the governance, the Treasurer is
concerned with financial oversight; but the Chief Executive
by whatever designation called is the only functionary, who
is statutorily entrusted with the day to day management and
execution of the business of the society under Section 49(2).
52. Thus, while grouping these roles under the umbrella of
“Office Bearer”, the legislature has conferred a unique
statutory identity on the Chief Executive, which is not shared
by the other office bearers.
53. The Act does not define Secretary but specifically defines
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the Chief Executive in Section 2(l) and elaborately prescribes
his powers and functions in Section 49.
54. The legislature, instead of defining the Secretary,
deliberately chose to define the Chief Executive in
functional terms and to leave the nomenclature open.
55. Thus, the legal consequence is that if a Secretary performs
the functions enumerated in Section 49(2), he is, in law, the
Chief Executive, irrespective of the label, and the Secretary
does not remain merely an office bearer in such a situation.
In the case in hand, there is no dispute that the appellants
were performing the duties assigned to the Chief Executive
under Section 49 of the Act, 2007.
56. Thus, the definition of office bearer which includes within its
fold Secretary amongst the principal office bearers of the
society, if read with Section 49(1)(a) which treats the Chief
Executive as a full time employee (when appointed by the
Board), it becomes evident that the legislature has confined
the roles of Secretary and Chief Executive into a single
institutional office albeit with dual character, both
administrative and functional. Such understanding flows
directly from the phraseology “by whatever designation
called” and uniform assignment of powers and
responsibilities under Section 49(2).
57. Most importantly, in defining an “Employee” under Section
2(s) of Chapter I, the legislature has expressly excluded an
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“office bearer” from the definition of Employee, thereby
excluding the secretary as well. It defines “employee” as a
person employed by a society on remuneration, but
excluding an “office bearer”
58. Thus, when these provisions of definitions are read together
with Section 49(1)(a), it becomes evident that the statute
conclusively attributes a dual and composite character to
the office of the secretary and does not treat the secretary
as a mere employee in the ordinary sense.
59. The secretary is thus a full-time employee for administrative
purposes and yet an office bearer embedded in the
society’s governance structure.
60. In our opinion, this statutory duality is not accidental; it
reflects the centrality of the office of the Chief
Executive/Secretary in the functioning of the co-operative
society.
61. The powers and functions enumerated under Section 49(2)
reinforce such a position. The Chief Executive is entrusted
with the day-to-day management of the society like the
operation of the accounts, the maintenance of records, the
convening of meetings, the implementation of the decisions
of the Board, and the appointing authority for different posts
under the Society. In fact, it is the Chief Executive in whose
name the society can sue or can be sued.
62. The office is thus, is at the operational central point.
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63. Looking at the scheme of the Act 2007 from the aforesaid
perspective, a dispute concerning the removal of such a
functionary cannot be equated with a routine service
dispute of a subordinate employee. It bears a direct nexus
upon the management, continuity and functional integrity
of the society.
64. With all the humility at our command, in our opinion, the error
in reasoning of the learned Single Judge lies in conflating this
distinct statutory office into the category of a purely private
contract of employment and thereafter, applying the
principles which are applicable only to such contractual
employees.
65. Once the nature of the office is correctly appreciated, the
statutory scheme must be construed in a manner that
preserves the internal regulatory balance.
66. Coming back to Section 49(2)(l), it provides that, in the event
of a dispute between the Chief Executive and the Board “in
any matter”, the decision of the Registrar shall be binding on
the Board.
67. The expression “in any matter”, in our opinion, is of wide
amplitude and does not admit of an artificially created
construction, to confine it only to the matters enumerated
under clause (a) to (k) of Section 49(2) or else, it would
render the said clause otiose.
68. The provision, in our opinion, is intended to serve as a
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mechanism for resolving disputes between the
administrative head and the governing body of the society,
precisely because such disputes have the potential to
disrupt the functioning of the institution. A dispute
concerning the legality of removal from office squarely falls
within its ambit.
69. The reference of disputes to the Registrar under Section 92
and the exclusion of disciplinary action against an employee
therefrom cannot be pressed into service to oust the
jurisdiction of the Registrar. Such exclusion is based on the
assumption that the dispute concerns an ordinary employee
and not the Chief Executive.
70. In view of the statutory definition, which places the secretary
within the category of office bearers and excludes it from
the definition of employee, the dual character assigned to it,
and also in view of the functional role assigned to the Chief
Executive, the exclusion cannot be mechanically applied by
treating it as an employee under a private Board.
71. The contention that Section 111 is inapplicable may be
correct, as the provision contemplates an appeal against
the decision of the government officers/liquidators.
However, the matter cannot rest on the nomenclature of the
provisions invoked.
72. It is a settled principle that the exercise of statutory power is
not vitiated merely because the source of power is
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incorrectly quoted when such power exists in law.
73. In the present cases, the Registrar was approached by two
aggrieved Secretaries, who were admittedly performing the
functions of Chief Executives of the respective Societies, and
the Registrar exercised jurisdiction traceable to the
combined reading of Section 49(2)(l) and Section 92.
74. The substance of the jurisdiction exercised and not the label
attached to it is determinative.
75. A construction that denies such jurisdiction leads to
consequences that are both anomalous and
unacceptable.
76. It would render the decision of the Board in matters of
removal of the Chief Executive/Secretary effectively immune
from scrutiny, even where the decision is expressly arbitrary
or in breach of a statutory provision.
77. Here, Section 110 of the Act, 2007 assumes a critical
significance when the question of remedilessness is
examined within the statutory framework.
78. Section 110 operates as a jurisdictional bar, and its interplay
with Sections 92 and 49 becomes decisive in determining
whether an aggrieved party is left without an effective
remedy. Section 110, in substance, bars the jurisdiction of
the Civil Court in respect of matters for which provision is
made under the Act, 2007.
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79. Sub-Section 2 of Section 110 mandates that no order,
decision or award under the Act, 2007 or working of the
affairs of a Registered society shall be liable to be
challenged, set aside, modified, revised, declared void in
any court on any ground whatsoever, save as provided
under the Act, 2007.
80. The legislative intent of incorporation of such a provision is
well settled. Where a statute creates rights and liabilities and
simultaneously provides a mechanism for adjudication,
jurisdiction of the civil court is expressly excluded.
81. This is a familiar legislative pattern, intended to ensure that
disputes arising within a specialized statutory domain are
resolved by authorities possessing expertise in that domain.
82. Thus, Section 110 cannot be read in isolation. It is a part of a
self-contained code envisaged by the Act of 2007.
83. When the interpretation adopted excludes the operation of
Section 92 and Section 49(2)(l), as has been done by the
learned Single Judge and dispute relating to the removal of
the Chief Executive/Secretary, are held to be outside the
scope of Section 92, on the ground they do not “touch the
business of the society” and simultaneously, outside Section
49(2)(l) on a reading of the provision, the inevitable
consequence is that such dispute falls outside the statutory
adjudicatory framework altogether.
84. Once that happens, Section 110 assumes a prohibitory
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character; it prevents recourse to the civil courts in respect
of matters, more particularly, when it provides that no order,
decision or award under this Act or affairs of a registered
society shall be liable to be challenged, set aside, modified,
declared void in any court on any ground whatsoever.
85. The combined effect is that the aggrieved party is left in a
jurisdictional void.
86. In the opinion of this Court in this context, Section 110 must
be harmoniously construed with Section 92 & Section 49(2)(l).
87. The bar of Civil Court jurisdiction indicates that the legislature
intended the dispute to be resolved within the statutory
framework itself.
88. If Section 92 & Section 49 are interpreted in a manner so as
to exclude such a dispute while simultaneously giving full
effect to Section 110, the same would result in a self-
defeating statutory scheme, one that regulates rights but
provides no mechanism for their enforcement. Such a
construction must be avoided.
89. A purposive reading would then suggest that Section 110
reinforces rather than negates the jurisdiction of the
Registrar.
90. Seen in this light, Section 110 aligns with the arguments of
the appellant that the interpretation adopted by the
learned Single Judge cannot be sustained. If that
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interpretation prevails, it would not only unduly restrict the
scopes of Section 92 & Section 49, but would also render
Section 110 oppressive in operation by closing the doors of
the Civil Court without opening any effective statutory
alternative. Such a consequence would be antithetical to
the rule of law, which demands that every legal norm must
have a forum for redress.
91. For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the considered view that
the interpretation placed by the learned Single Judge on
the provisions of the Act 2007 is unduly restrictive.
92. The appeals are accordingly allowed.
93. The judgment dated 13.03.2025 passed in WP(C) No.925/2022
is set aside, and the order dated 10.01.2022 passed by the
Registrar relating to Bikrampur Co-operative Society is
restored.
94. It is needless to say that the respondents shall be at liberty to
assail the decision of the Registrar dated 10.01.2022 on merits
afresh, if so desired, on which we have made no
consideration, as the learned Single Judge has decided the
issue only on the point of jurisdiction, without entering into
the merits of the claim of the Parties.
95. The Judgment and order dated 09.05.2025, passed in WP(C)
No.6945/2024, stands set aside.
96. The Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Assam, shall
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expeditiously decide the appeal, and within an outer limit of
one month from the date of receipt of a certified copy of
this order, by giving reasonable opportunity of hearing to the
parties.
97. This disposes of the writ appeals.
98. Parties to bear their own costs.
JUDGE CHIEF JUSTICE Comparing Assistant
