Madras High Court
Padmavathi vs K.Raman on 17 July, 2026
S.A.(MD)No.573 of 2019
BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT
RESERVED ON : 17.06.2026
DELIVERED ON : 17.07.2026
CORAM:
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P.B.BALAJI
S.A.(MD)No.573 of 2019
and
C.M.P.(MD)Nos.13675 of 2025 & 11563 of 2019
1.Padmavathi
2.Subha ... Appellants
Vs.
K.Raman ... Respondent
PRAYER: Second Appeal filed under Section 100 of the Civil
Procedure Code, praying to set aside the judgment and decree
dated 12.10.2018 passed in A.S.No.19 of 2014 on the file of the
learned Principal District Judge, Madurai, confirming the judgment
and decree dated 28.02.2014 passed in O.S.No.214 of 2011 on the
file of the learned Principal Sub Judge, Madurai.
For Appellants : Mr.T.Arul
for Mr.M.P.Senthil
For Respondent : Mr.K.Ravi Anantha Padmanathan,
Senior Counsel for Mr.M.Paraloga Vignesh
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S.A.(MD)No.573 of 2019
JUDGMENT
The defendants, in a suit for specific performance, having
suffered concurrent findings before the Trial Court as well as the
First Appellate Court are the appellants. The Second Appeal was
admitted by this Court on 29.11.2019, on the following three
substantial questions of law:
“(A) Whether the Courts below committed
a serious error in law in granting the equitable
and discretionary relief of specific performance
in favour of the respondent without adverting to
the very scope and purport of Sections 16 & 20
of the Specific Relief Act, especially the suit has
been laid on the last date of limitation for filing
the suit and more so, no plausible explanation
was offered for the delay?
(B) Have not Courts below committed an
error in granting the discretionary equitable
relief of specific performance without adverting
that the suit has been laid on the last date of
limitation ie., After 36 months from the date of
performance and 33 months from the date of
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S.A.(MD)No.573 of 2019issuance of legal notice, under Ex.A.2, especially
the time fixed for performance under Ex.A.1 is
only three months?
(C) Whether the Courts below are right in
rejecting the defence as well as the evidence of
the appellants / defendants relating to the
circumstances under which Ex.A.1, the sale
agreement was executed, merely relying on
Section 92 of the Evidence Act even without
adverting to the very proviso to the said section
which clearly permits as party to a contract to
contend that the agreement entered was
intended only as a security for the loan
transaction and not actually a sale agreement?”
2.I have heard Mr.T.Arul, for Mr.M.P.Senthil, learned Counsel
appearing for the appellants and Mr.K.Ravi Anantha Padmanathan,
learned Senior Counsel for Mr.M.Paraloga Vignesh, learned
Counsel appearing for the respondent.
3.For the sake of convenience, the parties are described as
per their rank before the trial Court.
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S.A.(MD)No.573 of 2019
4.Pending Second Appeal, C.M.P.(MD)No.13675 of 2025, had
been taken out by the respondent / plaintiff, for adducing additional
evidence. The additional documents which are sought to be
produced are pertaining to a similar agreement entered into by the
first defendant in respect of the southern portion of the suit
property and to drive home the fact that the first defendant
suffered an ex-parte decree in a suit for specific performance filed
by the agreement holder in respect of the said southern portion and
that not only sale deed came to be executed, but possession was
also taken over by the said purchaser / agreement holder and that
the attempts to set aside the ex-parte decree were also
unsuccessful upto this Court. The said application was also taken
up for arguments along with the Second Appeal.
5.The brief facts that are necessary for adjudicating the
substantial questions of law framed by this Court as extracted
hereinabove are as follows:
5.1.The suit property was originally belonging to the husband
of the first defendant, one Raju, he having purchased the same on
09.08.1985, in and by registered sale deed. He died intestate
leaving behind the defendants, who are his wife and daughter, who
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S.A.(MD)No.573 of 2019became entitled to the suit property absolutely and equally. The
first defendant, for herself and as guardian of the minor second
defendant entered into the sale agreement with the plaintiff on
07.08.1997, for selling the suit property for a consideration of Rs.7
Lakhs. A sum of Rs.4,50,000/- was paid by the plaintiff as advance.
Three months time was fixed for completion of the sale transaction.
The plaintiff, contending that despite repeated requests, the first
defendant did not come forward to execute the sale deed and that
even when the entire balance sale consideration of Rs.2,50,000/-
was tendered on 01.02.1998, the first defendant refused to receive
the same and instead demanded an additional consideration of Rs.3
Lakhs, which was not agreeable to the plaintiff. According to the
plaintiff, the plaintiff has always been ready and willing to perform
his part of the contract.
5.2.It is also the case of the plaintiff that he deposited the
balance sale consideration of Rs.2,50,000/- in his bank account on
03.02.1998 and since, the defendant did not come forward to
complete the transaction, he withdrew the said amount deposited
by him. The plaintiff thereafter, issued a lawyer’s notice on
10.02.1998, calling upon the first defendant to come forward to
execute the sale deed. The first defendant admittedly, did not send
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any reply to the said notice. It is claimed by the plaintiff that the
first defendant met the plaintiff at his house and promised to
complete the sale deed within six months. However, the first
defendant did not come forward to execute the sale deed despite
expiry of six months and therefore, in the month of February, 1999,
the plaintiff along with one Sahadevan, personally met the first
defendant and requested for the first defendant to come forward to
complete the sale transaction.
5.3.According to the plaintiff, the first defendant informed
the plaintiff that she will fix a convenient date for registration.
However, even after several months, no such date was proposed by
the first defendant and the first defendant being a young widow
and also burdened with the duty of bringing up her minor second
defendant daughter, waited patiently and again met the first
defendant in November 1999. According to the plaintiff, the first
defendant requested six months time for completion of the sale
transaction, but however, in May 2000, the first defendant
demanded an additional amount of Rs.5 lakhs. Thus, the plaintiff
filed the suit for specific performance, alleging that the first
defendant is attempting to dispose of the suit property for higher
sale consideration and reiterating that the plaintiff has always been
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S.A.(MD)No.573 of 2019
ready and willing to perform his part of the agreement of sale,
including deposit of the balance sale consideration as and when
directed by the Court.
5.4.The second defendant attained majority pending the suit
and defendants filed a written statement contending that the suit is
barred by limitation and that the plaintiff has never been ready and
willing to perform his part of the contract. The first defendant
further claimed that the parties never intended to agree to sell the
property and the agreement was a nominal document, executed
only for the purposes of security, for securing a sum of Rs.1 Lakh,
borrowed by the first defendant from the plaintiff. According to the
first defendant, the plaintiff is a money lender and the first
defendant, besides the agreement had also executed a blank
promissory note in favour of the plaintiff.
5.5.It is the further case of the first defendant that despite
the first defendant tendering the principal amount, together with
interest, the plaintiff refused to receive the same and demanded
Rs. 2 Lakhs for full discharge and that the first defendant issued
two cheques for Rs.1 Lakh each, drawn on Central Bank of India
bearing Nos.033033341033342. It is the further case of the first
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S.A.(MD)No.573 of 2019
defendant that despite the cheques being handed over, the plaintiff
did not hand over the blank promissory note and further contended
that the cheques were sent for collection on 21.07.1997 and as the
first defendant did not have sufficient funds to meet the cheque
amounts, the cheques were returned and the plaintiff started
threatening the the first defendant that he would take criminal
proceedings against her and it is only at this juncture that the
plaintiff insisted the first defendant to execute a sale agreement as
security for payment of said Rs.2 Lakhs. It is therefore, the case of
the first defendant that only under such circumstances, she signed
the agreement of sale dated 07.08.1997.
5.6.It is further contended that the first defendant paid a sum
of Rs.2 Lakhs on 10.09.1997 and got back the two cheques from
the plaintiff. However, the plaintiff did not come forward to cancel
the sale agreement and has misused the said agreement by filing
the present suit, to knock off the very valuable property of the
defendants. It is also contended by the first defendant that at the
time of sale agreement, the second defendant was a minor and no
Court permission was obtained for entering into the sale agreement
and the alleged advance mentioned in the sale agreement was also
not received by the defendants.
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5.7.As regards not replying to the pre-suit notice, it is
contended by the first defendant that she met the plaintiff in person
and that the plaintiff assured that he would not proceed legally and
the sale agreement would be left to be lapsed by efflux of time. It is
also contended by the first defendant that the market value of the
suit property is more than Rs.30 lakhs and that the plaintiff is not
entitled to the equitable relief of specific performance.
5.8.Before the Trial Court, the plaintiff examined himself as
P.W.1 and one Rajendran was examined as P.W.2 and exhibits A.1 to
A.6 were marked on the side of the plaintiff. The first defendant
was examined as D.W.1 and exhibits B.1 to B.5 were marked on the
side of the defendants.
5.9.The Trial Court, after considering the oral and
documentary evidence, held that the suit is not barred by
limitation. Further, addressing an objection that the suit was
initially filed without proper court fee, which was made up at a
much later point of time, the trial Court held that Section 149 of
CPC permits deficit court fee being made up and being a
discretionary order, the same cannot be called in question at a later
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stage, by the defendants. The Trial Court also drew an adverse
inference against the defendants for not replying to the pre-suit
notice and also taking note of the fact that the balance sale
consideration had been deposited on 06.06.2005 vide Court
Challan No.71, pursuant to an ex-parte decree initially passed in
the suit, the Trial Court decreed the suit.
5.10.The defendants preferred an appeal in A.S.No.19 of
2014. The First Appellate Court affirmed the findings of the Trial
Court, with regard to making up of the deficit court fee and that it
was not fatal to the case of the plaintiff and the first defendant,
having entered into an agreement which was also proved by
examination of P.W.2 and also noticing that D.W.1 had admitted to
the execution of the sale agreement also, which was a registered
document, the First Appellate Court confirmed the findings of the
Trial Court and dismissed the first appeal.
6.Arguments of Mr.T.Arul for Mr.M.P.Senthil, learned
Counsel appearing for the appellants:
6.1.The learned Counsel appearing for the appellants would
firstly contend that the suit is hopelessly barred by limitation and
even going by the covenants in the suit sale agreement, only three
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S.A.(MD)No.573 of 2019months time was fixed for performance of the contract and the
plaintiff has been laid back and approached the Court belatedly, at
his convenience and thereby, he is disentitled to the equitable and
discretionary relief of specific performance. Learned Counsel
would also point out to various dates and events to contend that by
his own showing, the plaintiff has failed to establish that he was
always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract at all
relevant points of time, when alone he can become entitled to a
decree for specific performance.
6.2.It is also the submission of the learned Counsel for the
appellants that even after the issuance of the pre-suit notice and
despite there being no reply, admittedly, to the said notice, the
plaintiff did not approach the Court immediately and there has
been a considerable delay in filing the suit. Further, the suit
according to the learned Counsel for the appellants was also
improperly filed without necessary court fee. Therefore, the
presentation of the suit itself was bad in the eye of law and
consequently, according to Mr.T.Arul,on the ground of limitation,
the Courts ought to have dismissed the suit as not maintainable
and barred. As regards the additional documents and the
agreement with regard to sale of the southern portion, learned
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S.A.(MD)No.573 of 2019Counsel for the appellants would contend that only on technical
grounds, the appellants were non-suited and they did not even file
a written statement in the said suit for specific performance and
unfortunately, they lost their right to defend the suit on the ground
of delay and therefore, according to learned Counsel for the
appellants, the various proceedings and orders relating to the
southern portion of the property would be totally irrelevant to the
facts of the present case and the said documents are not required
to be taken on record as additional evidence.
6.3.It is further contended by the learned Counsel for the
appellants that insofar as the present suit as well, though initially
the defendants were set ex-parte and subsequently, after passing of
the decree alone, the plaintiff deposited the balance sale
consideration, the appellant’s application for setting aside the ex-
parte decree came to be allowed, pursuant to which they were
given an opportunity to defend the suit and therefore, the
proceedings with regard to a different property even though, it may
be adjoining, would have no relevance to the facts of the present
case. Learned Counsel therefore, prays for the Second Appeal
being allowed and also for dismissal of the CMP.
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6.4.In support of his submissions, learned Counsel for the
appellants has relied on the following judgments:
1) Ogirala Gouri Sankar and another Vs. Siri Konda
Veera Sameera Kumar Deve and another, reported in 1996
SCC Online AP 607.
2) K.S.Vidyanadam and others Vs. Vairavan, reported in
1997 (1) CTC 628.
3) Govind Das Purushotham Das and another Vs. Shaw
Wallace and Co. Ltd., Madras and 4 others, reported in 2001
(1) CTC 601.
4) Kamireddi Sattiaraju and others Vs. Kandamuri
Boolaeswari, reported in 2007 (1) LW 309.
5) Munusamy Vs. Nava Pillai, reported in 2008 (3) LW
252.
6) Renuka Vs. Cenakeasavalu Naidu, reported in 2008
(4) LW 504.
7) Vimal Chand Ghervarchan Jain and others Vs.
Ramakant Eknath Jadoo, reported in 2009 (5) SCC 730.
8) Lakshmi and others Vs. Muthusamy, reported in 2012
(1) CTC 53.
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S.A.(MD)No.573 of 2019
9) P.Arumugam Vs. M.Shanmugam Pillai, reported in
2013 (3) MWN (Civil) 110.
10) V.P.Murugesan Vs. P.Shiek Mideen, reported in 2016
(1) LW 332.
11) P.Vaidyanathan Vs. K.Sundaram, reported in 2017 (1)
MWN (Civil) 187.
12) Jayakantham and others Vs. Abaykumar, reported in
2017 (2) CTC 647.
13) G.Subramanian Vs. V.T.Patilingam, reported in 2020
(1) CTC 540.
14) Atma Ram Vs. Charanjit Singh, reported in 2020 (2)
CTC 118.
15) Prabakaran Vs. Geetha, reported in 2022 (3) CTC
650.
16) S.Duraivelu (Deceased) and others Vs.
N.Thangamani and another reported in 2022 (3) LW 18.
17) J.Dhanapal Vs. V.Manimala, reported in 2023 (1) CTC
298.
18) G.Nagaraj Vs. R.J.Anandmul and another, reported in
2023 (4) LW 520.
19) T.K.T.G.Srinivasan Vs. A.Murthy, reported in 2024 (1)
CTC 595.
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20) Mahaveer Hemanth Bhandhari and Sons Vs.
P.Srinivasalu, reported in 2024 (2) CTC 204.
21) Rajesh Kumar Vs. Anand Kumar and others,
reported in 2024 SCC Online SC 981.
22) Palanivel Vs. Balasubramanian, reported in 2025 (1)
MWN (Civil) 623.
23) Selvaraj Vs. Pappathi, reported in 2025 (2) CTC 79.
24) C.Kuppusamy Vs. P.Vijaya, reported in 2025 (3) MLJ
437.
25) Dr.Mohammed Thaslim (Died) and another Vs.
E.Abdul Naseer in A.S.No.514 of 2011 dated 02.06.2025.
26) Kannan Vs. Venkatesan, reported in 2025 MHC 1257.
27) A.Shahul Hameed Vs. N.Mallgarjuna, reported in
2025 (3) LW 577.
7.Arguments of Mr.K.Ravi Anantha Padmanathan
learned Senior Counsel for Mr.M.Paraloga Vignesh, learned
Counsel appearing for the respondent:
7.1.Per contra, Mr.Ravi Anantha Padmanaban, learned Senior
Counsel would firstly contend that the defendants had come to
Court with a false case as if the agreement of sale was executed
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S.A.(MD)No.573 of 2019only for securing an alleged amount of Rs.2 Lakhs agreed to be
paid by the first defendant to the plaintiff. The said plea was not
established by adducing any credible evidence and in fact, the
Courts below had rightly held that the agreement of sale was in
fact executed only by the first defendant only for sale of the
property to the plaintiff, to meet family necessities and also to
educate the minor second appellant. It is therefore, the submission
of Mr.Ravi Anantha Padmanaban, learned Senior Counsel that the
defence taken by the appellants having not been established, it was
not open to the appellants to contend that the plaintiff has not been
ready and willing and on that score, they should not be granted the
relief of specific performance.
7.2.As regard the arguments with regard to limitation,
Mr.Ravi Anantha Padmanaban, learned Senior Counsel would
contend that Article 54 of the Limitation Act refers to two parts.
When there is a definite date specified for performance of the
contract, then limitation would be three years from the said date
fixed for performance. However, in terms of second part of Article
54, when no date was fixed for performance, then the plaintiff can
take the benefit of notice of refusal by the defendants and file a suit
within a period of 3 years from the date of noticing refusal to
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S.A.(MD)No.573 of 2019
perform the contract. In any event, it is the contention of Mr.Ravi
Anantha Padmanaban, learned Senior Counsel that the suit
agreement being executed on 07.08.1997 and the suit having been
filed on 06.11.2000, the suit was very much in time and cannot be
held to be barred on the ground of limitation.
7.3.With regard to the arguments of the learned Counsel for
the appellants that suit was filed without proper court fee and
therefore, it should not amount to proper filing, to account the
period of limitation and bring the suit within time, Mr.Ravi Anantha
Padmanaban, learned Senior Counsel would contend that an
application was taken out under Section 149 of CPC and the same
having been allowed by the Court, the delay in payment of deficit
court fee has been condoned and the said order will relate back to
the date of filing of the suit and therefore, the said argument of the
learned Counsel for the appellants is of no avail. That apart, he
would also state that admittedly, there was a protest by the stamp
vendors and necessary court fee was not available on the date of
filing of the suit and in such circumstances alone, the suit was filed
without applicable court fee and in any event, accepting the
reasons assigned by the plaintiff, the Court had also extended the
time for payment of Court fee, which order has become final.
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7.4.It is the further submission of Mr.Ravi Anantha
Padmanaban, learned Senior Counsel that the period of three
months fixed in the agreement Ex.A.1 was qualified in the sense
that three months period would run only from the date on which
the first defendant was ready to execute the sale deed. He would
therefore, state that it cannot be construed as a specific date being
fixed for performance of the contract and in such circumstances,
the plaintiff can certainly, take the benefit of part 2 of Article 54
and bring the suit within the period of limitation, after noticing
refusal of the first defendant to complete the sale transaction.
7.5.As regards readiness and willingness, learned Senior
Counsel would state that the financial capacity of the plaintiff was
never questioned and even according to the defendants, the
plaintiff was a money lender and he had in fact lent money to the
first defendant. Further, the plaintiff had shown his readiness by
depositing the entire sale consideration in his bank account and
further, after the ex-parte decree as well, in compliance with the
directions of the Trial Court, the entire balance sale consideration
was also deposited. He would therefore, state that the plaintiff had
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S.A.(MD)No.573 of 2019
clearly established both readiness and willingness and was
certainly entitled to the discretionary and equitable relief of
specific performance.
7.6.As regards the minor’s interest involved, Mr.Ravi Anantha
Padmanaban, learned Senior Counsel would contend that even
pending trial of the suit, the second defendant has become major
and in fact, written statement came to be filed only after the
second defendant attained the age of majority and the agreement
entered into by her mother and natural guardian was never
questioned by the second defendant. More so, when the agreement
itself clearly indicated that the sale was for the betterment and
welfare of the minor and for her education and career
advancement, it is not open to the second respondent to belatedly
take a plea that Court permission was not obtained and therefore,
the agreement of sale has to fail.
7.7.Mr.Ravi Anantha Padmanaban, learned Senior Counsel
would also state that the plaintiff had paid almost 2/3rd of the total
sale consideration even on the date of the agreement of sale and
the delay was only on account of the conduct of the first defendant,
who kept changing the date of execution of the sale and for
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showing indulgence to the first defendant being a young widow, the
plaintiff should not be made to suffer.
7.8.As regards the additional evidence, Mr.K.Ravi Anantha
Padmanathan, learned Senior Counsel would contend that the
conduct of the first defendant is equally relevant in a suit for
specific performance and therefore, when the first defendant had
entered into an agreement of sale in respect of the southern
portion of the very same property, originally forming a larger
extent, the defence taken by the first defendant was clearly
improbable and exposes the malafide intentions of the defendants.
He would therefore, state that the additional evidence should be
taken on record to notice the conduct of the appellants /
defendants.
7.9.Learned Senior Counsel in support of his submissions has
relied on the following decisions.
1) Mothlal Jain Vs. Ramdasi Devi (Smt), reported in
(2000) 6 SCC 420.
2) Narinderjit Singh Vs. North Star Estate Promoters
Limited, reported in (2012) 5 SCC.
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3) R.Lakshmikantham Vs. Devaraji reported in (2019) 8
SCC 62.
4) A.Shahul Hameed Vs. N.Malligarjuna and others,
reported in 2026 INSC 573.
5) A.Prabhakar Vs. R.Vijaya, in S.A.(MD)No.82 of 2026
dated 09.03.2026.
6) Madina Begum and another Vs. Shiv Murti Pandey
and others reported in (2017) 4 CTC 99.
7) Shri Manik Chand and another Vs. Shri
Ramachandra son of Chawiraj reported in (2000) 6 SCC 420.
8) Puvaneswary Balachandran and others Vs.
Vijayalakshmi and others, in A.S.No.183 of 2016 dated
19.04.2023.
8.I have carefully considered the submissions advanced by
the learned Counsel on either side.
9.Firstly, I will take up the defence raised by the defendants
and also the requirement of any additional evidence to decide the
substantial questions of law that have been framed by this Court, in
view of the C.M.P.(MD)No.13675 of 2025, taken out by the
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S.A.(MD)No.573 of 2019
respondent / plaintiff. The case of the first defendant is that she
had borrowed a sum of Rs.1 Lakh from the plaintiff in respect of
which, she had signed a promissory note and despite paying the
amounts due the plaintiff, he demanded Rs.2 Lakhs in full quits and
the first defendant agreed to pay the sum of Rs.2 Lakhs, for which
she issued two cheques, for one lakh each. She was not in a
position to honour the said cheques and cheques were dishonoured
and the plaintiff, according to the first defendant, threatened to
launch criminal prosecution. At that juncture, in order to avoid
criminal prosecution, the first defendant claims that she agreed to
the plaintiff’s request to enter into a sale agreement for sale of the
suit property for a sum of Rs.7 lakhs and it is her definite case that
the sale agreement was a nominal document not intended to be
acted upon, but executed only as a security for the amount of Rs.2
Lakhs.
10. If really the first defendant has executed the agreement
as a security for repayment of a sum of Rs.2 lakhs, there was no
necessity for the first defendant to agree to sell the suit property
for a sum of Rs.7 lakhs and that too, claim that an advance of Rs.
4,50,000/- had been paid. It is a farfetched story to be bought. The
Courts below have rightly held that such defence was not tenable
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S.A.(MD)No.573 of 2019
and more so, the first defendant, while being examined as D.W.1
has also candidly admitted to the agreement of sale and in the said
circumstances, the findings that the registered sale agreement in
Ex.A.1 was indeed a sale agreement, intended to be acted upon and
not executed for the purpose of security are perfectly in order and
do not call for any interference.
11.However, in a suit for specific performance, the plaintiff,
even in the absence of any defence on the side of the vendor, has to
satisfy the mandatory requirements of Section 16(c) and Section 20
of the Specific Relief Act, before becoming entitled to a decree of
specific performance. In this regard, I proceed to examine the facts
of the present case. It is not in dispute that the property originally
belonged to one Raju, the husband of the first defendant and father
of the second defendant. The Ex.A.1 agreement was entered into
and registered on 07.08.1997. It has been agreed that the
transaction would be completed within a period of three months. At
this juncture, it would be relevant to address the arguments
advanced by Mr.K.Ravi Anantha Padmanathan, learned Senior
Counsel appearing for the respondent / plaintiff. He would point out
to the covenants in the agreement which reads as follows:
“Mifahy; ehsJ njjp Kjy; 3 K:d;W khj
tha;jhtpw;Fs; ,jd; Kfg;gpy; Fwpg;gpl;lgo
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S.A.(MD)No.573 of 2019fPH;f;fhZk; brhj;ij ek;kpy; 2tJ ghh;l;o Rj;jf;
fpiuak; bra;J bfhLf;f jahuhtJk;> ek;kpy; 1tJ
ghh;l;oapd; brhe;jr; brytpy; 1tJ ghh;l;o bgahpnyh
my;yJ mth; Fwpg;gpLk; egh; bgahpnyh fpiuaf;
gj;jpuk; jahh;bra;J bfhz;L i\ gj;jpug; gzg;gw;W
tptug;go ghf;fpf; fpiuaj; bjhif U:gha;
2>50>000/- (U:gha; ,uz;L yl;rj;J Ik;gjhapuk;)
kl;Lk; bfhLg;gij 2tJ ghh;l;o bgw;Wf;bfhz;L i\
fpiuag; gj;jpuj;ij gjpt[bra;J bfhLf;f
ntz;oabjd;Wk; ……”
12.Relying on the said clause, Mr.K.Ravi Anatha
Padmanathan, learned Senior Counsel would contend that the time
period fixed namely three months cannot be assumed from the date
of the agreement, since the parties have contemplated three
months from the date on which the first defendant got ready for
registration. Though such an argument appears to be attractive at
first blush, on a reading of the entire agreement, I am unable to
make out any special reason for such a covenant, regarding
execution of the sale deed within three months from the date of the
first defendant getting ready for registration. In fact, in the very
same agreement, at Page No.2, it is agreed as follows:
“kidtPL tifawhtpy; tlg[uk;
gFjpahd ,jdoapw; fz;l brhj;ij vt;tpj tpy;yq;fKk;
ghj;jpaf;Fiwt[k; ,y;yhky; brhj;jpd; RthjPdk;
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kw;Wk; Mjut[ j];jhntR rfpjk; ehsJ njjp Kjy; 3
K:d;W khj tha;jhtpw;Fs; ek;kpy; 1tJ ghh;l;of;F
2tJ ghh;l;o U:gha; 7>00>000/- (U:gha; VG
yl;rj;J)f;F fpiuak; bra;Jju ……”
13.Ex.A.1 agreement has to be read as a whole and it clearly
indicates that the parties had fixed a period of three months from
the date of execution of the agreement of sale. Nothing remained to
be executed or done on the part of the vendors, namely first
defendant, for herself or as guardian for her minor daughter, to
give any weightage or importance to the later part of the
agreement stating that three months period would commence from
when the first defendant gets ready for registration. It is in this
context that the filing of the suit on 06.11.2000 and the arguments
with regard to deficit court fee assumes significance. Admittedly,
the date on which the suit has been filed is the last date for filing
the suit, taking into account the date of agreement of sale. If the
suit was not properly presented, then as contended by learned
Counsel for the appellants, certainly the plaint cannot be brought
within the period of limitation. However, an application has been
taken out under Section 149 of CPC, to condone the delay in
payment of deficit Court fee, citing a reason that stamp vendors
were on strike and Court fee could not be procured in order to file
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the suit with proper and applicable fee on the said date.
14.Though it is contended by learned Counsel for the
appellants that they have brought on record the evidence to show
that on the very same day, court fees were very much available in
the vicinity, since the order passed in Section 149 application has
been allowed and has become final, I am not inclined to now
reopen this issue and delve deeper into the question whether the
suit was properly presented or not and whether the suit was barred
by limitation. Therefore, giving the benefit of doubt to the plaintiffs
to hold that the suit had been admittedly filed within the period of
limitation. In a suit for specific performance, even though a period
of limitation is prescribed for enabling the plaintiff to come to
Court seeking relief, merely because the suit is in time, it does not
in any manner further the cause of the plaintiff. The plaintiff has to
satisfy the requirements of Section 16(c) and Section 20 of the
Specific Relief Act. In other words, unless the plaintiff shows
“readiness and willingness” to perform his obligations at all
relevant points of time, he will not be entitled to the relief of
specific performance.
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15.In this context, certain dates assume significance. The suit
sale agreement was entered into on 07.08.1997, fixing a period of
three months. Therefore, the plaintiff should have taken effective
steps to pay the balance sale consideration and conclude the sale
transaction by 06.11.1997. The plaintiff, as seen from the plaint,
offered to pay the balance sale consideration only on 01.02.1998.
However, according to the plaintiff, the first defendant refused to
receive the same and in fact, demanded an additional sale
consideration of Rs.3 lakhs. Therefore, according to the plaintiff, in
order to record his readiness and willingness, he deposited the
balance sale consideration in his bank account on 03.02.1998 and
called upon the first defendant to execute the sale deed by issuing
a lawyer’s notice on 10.02.1998.
16.Admittedly, there was no reply to the said lawyer’s notice
dated 10.02.1998. Even thereafter, the plaintiff has not taken any
steps to seek specific performance of the agreement of sale. It was
the first instance when the plaintiff had noticed that the defendant
was evading the execution of the sale deed. Surprisingly, it is
alleged by the plaintiff that in May 1998, the first defendant met
the plaintiff at his house and promised to execute the sale deed
within six months. Even assuming such a contention can be taken
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into account, the plaintiff did not take any steps immediately after
expiry of the six months period, but claims to have met the first
defendant again along with one Sahadevan in February 1999 and
even at that point of time, the first defendant had expressed to the
plaintiff that she will inform a convenient date for the execution of
the sale deed. It is thereafter, only in November, 1999, that the
plaintiff along with P.W.2 once again approached the first
defendant, when it is again claimed that the first defendant wanted
a further six months time. Thereafter, the plaintiffs’ version is that
in May 2000, the plaintiff, along with P.W.2, met the first defendant,
at which point of time, the first defendant demanded an additional
sum of Rs.5 Lakhs. Atleast then, the plaintiff should have
immediately rushed to Court, but the suit was filed only on
06.11.2000, alleging that the defendants were not coming forward
to perform their part of the contract.
17.Having not taken steps to have the agreement specifically
performed, despite the expiry of three months and having chosen to
issue a lawyer’s notice on 10.02.1998, after the expiry of three
months from the time fixed for performance and even thereafter,
not filing the suit for a period of 2 years and 9 months, the conduct
of the plaintiff clearly smacks of not being ready and willing. The
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story weaved by the plaintiff as if the first defendant being a widow,
the plaintiff was very patient and indulgent cannot be believed, for
the simple reason that atleast in February, 1998, the plaintiff had
noticed refusal of the first defendant to come forward to execute
the sale agreement. In fact, it is alleged by the plaintiff himself that
the first defendant refused to receive the balance sale
consideration on 01.02.1998 and insisted on an additional amount
of Rs.3 Lakhs. The plaintiff had the benefit of legal advise even in
February, 1998, while issuing a pre-suit notice and it is totally
strange and unbelievable that when the first defendant had refused
to receive the balance sale consideration and instead demanded
additional sale consideration, the plaintiff still believed the first
defendant and kept waiting for months together.
18.As already pointed out, even assuming the plaintiff’s
theory that the first defendant kept postponing the date and never
refused to come forward to execute the sale deed can be true, still
it has already been seen, as discussed above, that the plaintiff has
never been adhering to the time lines even according to his own
version. Even assuming that the plaintiff is a man of means and
even prior to the commencement of trial, he has deposited the
entire balance sale consideration on 06.06.2005, that alone will not
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entitle the plaintiff to the relief of specific performance, which
requires the plaintiff to establish not only readiness but also
willingness. Financial readiness may have been proved by the
plaintiff in the present case, however, the mental element of
willingness has been totally lacking and in such circumstances, the
plaintiff is not entitled to the relief of specific performance.
19.Insofar as CMP for additional evidence is concerned, I do
not see any requirement to permit production of additional
documents at this Second Appellate Stage, since both the Courts
have firstly disbelieved the defence taken by the first defendant
that the suit sale agreement was only a security for borrowing and
therefore, I do not see how documents pertaining to the adjacent
portion of the property and proceedings relating to the same would
have any bearing in the present case. I do not therefore, find the
said documents required to be received as additional evidence.
Accordingly, C.M.P.(MD)No.13675 of 2025 stands dismissed.
20.Coming to the decisions that have been relied on by the
learned Counsel for the appellants, in T.K.T.G.Srinivasan’s case it
has been held that when the plaintiff does not take appropriate
steps within the period stipulated in the agreement, then the plaint
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is hit by the embargo under Section 16 of the Specific Relief Act
and not entitled to the relief of specific performance. The Court in
T.K.T.G.Srinivasan’s case have also held that when the pre-suit
notice itself came to be issued after the expiry of time stipulated in
the sale agreement, that by itself would show that the plaintiff is
not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract.
21.In Selvaraj’s case, this Court held that mere deposit of
balance sale consideration after obtaining an ex-parte decree would
by itself not sufficient to establish readiness and willingness.
22.In Prabakaran‘s case, this Court held that readiness and
willingness of the plaintiff should be continuous at all stages, right
from the date of agreement, till the date of decree in the suit.
23.In G.Subramanian’s case, Atma Ram‘s case and
Prabakaran‘s case, it has been held that the filing of the suit for
specific performance beyond the agreement period and at the fag
end of the limitation period of three years establishes lack of
readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff.
24.In Shahul Hameed’s case, this Court held that even if
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there is no specific plea raised by the defendant, yet the plaintiff
has to prove the readiness and willingness to perform his part of
the contract.
25.In Palanivel’s case and Selvaraj’s case, it has been held
that the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to establish readiness
and willingness. In Mahaveer Hemanth Bhandhari’s case, this
Court held that mere possession of funds to meet the balance sale
consideration would not imply readiness and willingness. In
Selvaraj’s case, this Court held that mere factum of non-replying
to the pre-suit notice will not absolve the plaintiff to establish
readiness and willingness. In Jayakantham‘s case, this Court held
that the Court is not bound to grant the relief of specific
performance merely because it is lawful to do so, if it is hit by
embargo under Section 20.
26.In Kannan’s case, P.Vaidyanathan‘s case and Selvaraj’s
case, the Courts held that the conduct of the plaintiff and all
attendant circumstances will have to be considered, while deciding
the defence taken that the agreement was a security for a loan
transaction.
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27.In Govind Das Purushotham Das‘s case and Ogirala
Gouri Shankar’s case, Courts held that the mother cannot enter
into a sale agreement in respect of a minor daughter’s share,
without prior permission of the Court.
28.In Atma Ram‘s case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held
that dubious plaint without paying proper stamp duty will not save
limitation.
29.In Munusamy‘s case and S.Duraivelu’s case, Courts
held that if the agreement is surrounded by suspicious
circumstances, specific performance cannot be granted.
30.In C.Kuppusamy‘s case, Lakshmi‘s case, Renuka’s
case, V.P.Murugesan‘s case, Dr.Mohammed Thaslim’s case,
Vimal Chand Ghervarchan Jain‘s case and Kamireddi
Sattiaraju‘s case, Courts have held that if the agreement was
brought about by exercising undue influence or fraud, then such an
agreement cannot be specifically enforced.
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31.Coming to the decisions that have been relied on by the
learned Counsel for the respondents, in Mothlal Jain‘s case, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the payment of 2/3rd of sale
consideration on the date of agreement of sale establishes
readiness on the part of the plaintiff to pay the balance sale
consideration.
32.In Narinderjit Singh‘s case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court
held that readiness and willingness will have to be determined from
the facts and circumstances of the case, evidence on record and
conduct of both parties.
33.In R.Lakshmikantham‘s case, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court held that mere filing of the suit towards the fag end of the
limitation period cannot be put against the plaintiff and it would
not by itself imply lack of readiness and willingness.
34.In Shahul Hameed’s case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court
held that when substantive defence of loan transaction has been
concurrently found to be not proved, the High Court could not
interfere and refuse specific performance and merely because
notice was sent after the agreement period will not militate against
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the plaintiff and imply lack of readiness and willingness, especially
when such notice was not replied to. In Shahul Hameed’s case, in
fact, the Hon’ble Supreme Court set aside the decision of this Court
reported in 2025 3 L.W. 577, which has been relied on by the
learned Counsel for the appellants as well.
35.In Prabhakar‘s case, I held that a purchaser is not under
any obligation to deposit the balance sale consideration, to show
readiness on his part.
36.In Madina Begum‘s case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court,
interpreting the ‘date fixed’ under Article 54 Schedule I of the
Limitation Act, held that the expression ‘date fixed for the
performance’ is a crystalized notion. When a date is fixed, it means
that there is a definite date fixed for doing a particular act and only
in the absence of a specific date being fixed for performance, the
second part of Article 54 would come into play and the plaintiff is
entitled to bring up a suit within three years from the date on
which he has noticed that performance is refused.
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37.In Shri Manik Chand‘s case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court
held that natural guardian is entitled to enter into a contract on
behalf of the minor as long as the sale is for necessity and for the
benefit of the minor.
38.In Puvaneswary Balachandran‘s case, the Division
Bench of this Court to which I was a party, held that a minor has to
necessarily repudiate the contract entered into on the minor’s
behalf, if aggrieved by the same.
39.Having discussed the propositions for which the various
decisions have been relied on, there is no quarrel with regard to
the fact that insofar as limitation, the plaintiff cannot be non-suited
citing Article 54 of the Limitation Act. The suit was admittedly filed
within three years, in fact, on the last date available to the plaintiff.
The only contention to take it out of the period of limitation is that
the suit was filed without proper Court fees. If at all the application
under Section 149 CPC had not been entertained or allowed by the
Trial Court, there is some merit in the arguments of the learned
Counsel for the appellants to contend that mere filing of the suit on
the last date to save the limitation without proper Court fee, the
same would not give the benefit of limitation to the plaintiff.
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However, admittedly, the application under Section 149 of CPC has
been entertained and allowed by this Court and the order has also
become final. In such circumstances, I do not see any ground to
hold that the suit is barred by limitation.
40.Even with regard to the entering into the agreement of
sale by the mother on behalf of the minor daughter, the agreement
clearly indicates that the sale was for the benefit of the minor,
especially, to meet her educational expenses and in such
circumstances, as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, there is no
requirement for any Court permission to enter into the agreement
of sale on behalf of the minor. However, the minor herself did not
repudiate the act of the mother in agreeing to sell the minor’s
share as well, by bringing any suit, challenging the agreement of
sale. Therefore applying the ratio laid down in the relevant cases
discussed hereinabove, I do not see this ground also being available
to the appellants.
41.This leaves us with “readiness and willingness” on the
part of the plaintiff. I have already discussed elaborately as to how
the plaintiff has not been in a position to establish readiness and
willingness, despite alleging that the first defendant never refused
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to perform her part of the contract and was only evading the
plaintiff and postponing the date for registration. The plaintiff’s
version that even after issuance of lawyer’s notice and demand of
additional sale consideration on two occasions, to expect a bonafide
purchaser to contend that he waited patiently, on account of the
vendor being a young widow is clearly unacceptable and
unsustainable. Though, a recent decision of this Court in Shahul
Hameed’s case has been reversed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court,
recently in May 2026, that was a case where the Hon’ble Supreme
Court found that the pre-suit notice was issued within four [4]
months from the time stipulated in the agreement and in such
circumstances, held that by itself it cannot lead to an inference that
the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform the contract.
42.Even in the facts of this case, very similar to the facts of
the present case, plaintiff had pleaded that he approached the
defendants for completion of the transaction and that the
defendant sought for further time and after noticing in December
2010, that defendants became evasive and demanded additional
money as in the present case, the plaintiff issued lawyer’s notice on
01.02.2011 and suit came to be filed immediately thereafter, in
O.S.No.35 of 2011, before the Subordinate Court, Hosur. This
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conduct was held to be demonstrating continuous willingness of the
plaintiff to perform his part of the contract. Therefore, in the said
case, there was no delay after issuance of the pre-suit notice and
the suit came to be filed immediately, since there was no reply.
However, in the present case, there has been an inordinate delay
even after issuance of the lawyer’s notice, which was issued after
the expiry of the time period stipulated in the sale agreement.
Therefore, I do not see how this decision can be applied to the facts
of the present case.
43.In all the cases that have been relied on by Mr.K.RAvi
Anantha Padmanathan, learned Senior Counsel, where the Courts
leaned in favour of the plaintiff, I am able to notice that the delay
was very short and that was not put against the plaintiff. However,
in the present case, at every stage, I have found that the plaintiff
has not been diligent and despite several opportunities for filing of
the suit for specific performance, the plaintiff only chose to plead
that he met the first defendant and that the first defendant
expressed readiness to conclude the contract and therefore, the
plaintiff again started waiting patiently. Such a fanciful version
pleaded by the plaintiff has to be totally disbelieved, considering
the case pleaded by the plaintiff himself, that too, after noticing not
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only refusal on the part of first defendant, but also there being a
demand for additional sale consideration after the lawyer’s notice
came to be issued, the plaintiff ever has not been able to
demonstrate “readiness and willingness” by approaching the Court
at the earliest possible time.
44.Further, one another compelling reason for me to
interfere with the concurrent findings rendered by the trial Court is
that both the Trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court have
merely proceeded to reject the contentions of the defendants with
regard to the defence raised by them that the agreement was a
security for the loan transaction and that the suit was not filed
properly and therefore, barred by limitation and had not proceeded
to render a finding, leave alone the findings with regard to
readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff. Readiness and
willingness is the foremost consideration for entitling a plaintiff to
the relief of specific performance. For all the above reasons, I am
compelled to interfere with the judgment of the Courts below.
Accordingly, the substantial questions of law are answered in
favour of the appellants.
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45. Accordingly, this Second Appeal stands allowed, with
costs and the judgment and decree of the First Appellate Court in
A.S.No.19 of 2014 dated 12.10.2018, on the file of the Principal
District Judge, Madurai, confirming the judgment and decree in
O.S.No.214 of 2011 dated 28.02.2014, on the file of the Principal
Sub-Judge, Madurai, are set aside and the suit in O.S.No.214 of
2011, stands dismissed. C.M.P.(MD)No.13675 of 2025, stands
dismissed. C.M.P.(MD)No.11563 of 2019 is closed.
17.07.2026
Index : Yes / No
NCC : Yes / No
MR
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To
1.The Principal District Judge,
Madurai.
2.The Principal Sub-Judge,
Madurai.
3.The Section Officer,
VR Section,
Madurai Bench of Madras High Court,
Madurai.
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P.B.BALAJI, J.
MR
PRE-DELIVERY JUDGMENT MADE IN
S.A.(MD)No.573 of 2019
17.07.2026
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