Madras High Court
P.Murugesa Boopathi vs State Of Tamil Nadu Rep.By on 31 July, 2026
Author: G.K. Ilanthiraiyan
Bench: G.K. Ilanthiraiyan
Crl.R.C.No.2120 of 2024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
RESERVED ON : 21.07.2026
PRONOUNCED ON : 31.07.2026
CORAM
THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE G.K. ILANTHIRAIYAN
Crl.R.C.No.2120 of 2024
and
Crl.M.P.No.16844 of 2024
1.P.Murugesa Boopathi
2.Jansirani
3.Dinesh Kumar
4.Krithika … Petitioners/Accused Nos.1 to 4
vs.
State of Tamil Nadu
Rep. by the Deputy Superintendent of Police
Vigilance and Anti Corruption,
Special Investigation Cell,
Chennai – 600 016.
(V&AC Hqrs Crime No.1/AC/2018/HQ) … Respondents
PRAYER: Criminal Revision Petition is filed under Section 397 read with
Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973/Section 438 of
B.N.S.S, 2023, to call for the Records in Crl.M.P.No.479 of 2023 on the file
of the learned Special Judge, Special Court for cases under the Prevention of
Corruption Act, Chennai and set aside the Order dated 15.11.2024 passed by
1/34
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
Crl.R.C.No.2120 of 2024
the learned Special Judge, Special Court for cases under the Prevention of
Corruption Act, Chennai in Crl.M.P.No.479 of 2023 in C.C.No.1 of 2023
and consequently discharge the Petitioners from the case in C.C.No.1 of
2023.
For Petitioners : Mr.R.Shanmugasundaram
Senior Counsel
for M/s.A.G.Shakeena
For Respondent : Mr.R.Ganesh Kumar
Counsel for Government of Tamil Nadu
(Criminal Side)
ORDER
This Criminal Revision Case has been filed as against the order
dated 15.11.2024 passed in Crl.M.P.No.479 of 2023 in C.C.No.1 of 2023 on
the file of the learned Special Judge, Special Court for cases under the
Prevention of Corruption Act, Chennai, thereby dismissing the petition to
discharge the petitioners.
2. The petitioners are arrayed as Accused Nos.1 to 4. The petitioners
are charged for the offences punishable under Section 13(2) read with 13(1)
(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 read with Section 109 of
Indian Penal Code, in Crime No.V&AC Hqrs Cr.No.1/AC/2018/HQ.
2/34
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
Crl.R.C.No.2120 of 2024
3.(i) The case of the prosecution is that the 1 st accused entered into
Government Service as Deputy Agricultural Officer on 26.07.1972 and
subsequently, he was appointed as Assistant Professor on 01.02.1989 in the
Tamil Nadu Agricultural University, Coimbatore. Thereafter, he was
promoted to the post of Professor. While being so, he was appointed as
Special Personal Assistant to the Hon’ble Minister for Agriculture by
Government of Tamil Nadu for a period from 01.02.1990 to 31.01.1991,
from 15.05.1996 to 14.05.2001 and from 01.06.2006 to 03.06.2009. On the
date of attaining his age of superannuation (i.e., on 04.06.2009), he was
appointed as Vice Chancellor of Tamil Nadu Agricultural University by the
Governor of Tamil Nadu and he served in the said post till 31.08.2010.
Therefore, he is coming under the cadre of Public Servant under the
definition as contemplated under Section 2 (c) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988. Based on the enquiry report, the respondent registered
FIR in Crime No.V&AC Hqrs Cr.No.1/AC/2018/HQ for the offences
punishable under Section 13(2) read with 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988 read with Section 109 of IPC on 01.03.2018 as against
the petitioners/accused herein alleging that the 1 st accused, who served as
Special Personal Assistant to Hon’ble Minister for Agriculture for the period
from 01.06.2006 to 03.06.2009 had possessed assets and possession of
3/34
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
Crl.R.C.No.2120 of 2024
pecuniary resources and property in his name and in the name of his family
members, which are disproportionate to the known source of his income
during the Check Period from 01.06.2006 to 31.05.2009. After registration
of FIR, the respondent completed the investigation and filed final report
since there was sufficient materials available to prove the offences against
the accused persons.
3.(ii) The 1st accused has acquired assets in his name and in the name
of his family members namely Accused Nos.2 to 4 to the tune of
Rs.68,20,065/- during the check period from 01.06.2006 to 31.05.2009,
which is 145.84% disproportionate to his known source of income and that
of his family members. Therefore, the 1st accused is charged for the offences
punishable under Section 13(2) read with 13(1)(e) of Prevention of
Corruption Act and the accused 2 to 4 are charged for the offences
punishable under Section 13(2) read with 13(1)(e) of Prevention of
Corruption Act read with Section 109 of IPC. While pending the same for
framing charges, the petitioners/accused filed a petition to discharge on
several grounds. It was dismissed and aggrieved by the same, the petitioners
have filed the present criminal revision case.
4/34
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
Crl.R.C.No.2120 of 2024
4.(i) The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners
submits that while the 1st petitioner was working as a Professor, he was
appointed as Special Personal Assistant to the Hon’ble Minister for
Agriculture by Government of Tamil Nadu for a period from 01.06.2006 to
31.05.2009. Thereafter, on 04.06.2009, he was appointed as Vice Chancellor
of Tamil Nadu Agricultural University by the Governor of Tamil Nadu. In
order to prosecute the 1st accused, the respondent obtained sanction from the
Board of Management of the Tamil Nadu Agricultural University, as if it is
the Authority Competent to remove the 1 st accused. But, it is contrary to the
provisions of the Tamil Nadu Agricultural University Act, 1971. He further
submits that under Section 11 (1) of Tamil Nadu Agricultural University Act,
1971, every appointment of Vice Chancellor is made by the Chancellor and
under Section 11(3)(b) of the said Act, the Vice Chancellor may be removed
only by the Chancellor upon a resolution of the Board of Management by a
majority of the total members of that Board and by a majority of not less
than two-thirds of the members of that Board present and voting. Therefore,
the role played by the Board of Management is completely different from
the role played by the Chancellor.
5/34
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
Crl.R.C.No.2120 of 2024
4.(ii) While the Board may pass a resolution, the statutory power of
removal vests exclusively in the domain of the Chancellor. The Board of
Management is not the Competent Authority to remove the Vice Chancellor.
Hence, the person, who accorded sanction is not competent to accord
sanction for prosecuting the 1st accused. Admittedly, during the Check
Period from 01.06.2006 to 31.05.2009, the 1 st accused was working as
Special Personal Assistant to the Hon’ble Minister for Agriculture,
Government of Tamil Nadu. He was appointed by the Government of Tamil
Nadu and as such, the sanction has to be accorded by the Government of
Tamil Nadu, who is the appointing and removing authority of the Special
Personal Assistant to the Minister.
4. (iii) Even assuming that the Department of Agriculture is the
Competent Authority to accord sanction, the person who accorded sanction,
i.e., the Vice Chancellor of Tamil Nadu Agriculture University is not
Competent to accord sanction, since the 1st accused was retired as Vice
Chancellor. Therefore, the statutory power of removal vests within the
domain of Chancellor and as such, another Vice Chancellor cannot exercise
or authenticate any person to accord sanction to prosecute the 1 st accused,
6/34
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
Crl.R.C.No.2120 of 2024
who had hold the post of Vice Chancellor. Therefore, if the 1 st accused is
treated as the Vice Chancellor, the Competent Authority to accord sanction is
the Chancellor as contemplated under Section 11(3)(b) of the Tamil Nadu
Agricultural University Act, 1971. Even, if the 1st accused is treated as the
Special Personal Assistant to the Hon’ble Minister, the Competent Authority
to accord sanction is only the Government. Either the case, the Board of
Management does not possess the statutory competence to accord sanction.
Therefore, the entire proceedings itself is vitiated and cannot be sustained
for further course of proceedings.
4. (iv) He further submits that though the accused were charged for
the offences punishable under Section 109 of IPC, there is no sanction under
Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Therefore, the entire
proceedings cannot be proceeded without the sanction under Section 197 of
the Criminal Procedure Code. He further submits that the 2 nd accused is the
wife of the 1st accused, the 3rd accused is the son of the 1 st accused and the
4th accused is the daughter-in-law of the 1 st accused. The Accused Nos.3 and
4 are qualified Medical Practitioners and having independent source of
income. They are also residing independently at Chennai. However, the
prosecution clubbed the assets acquired by the Accused Nos.3 and 4 along
7/34
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
Crl.R.C.No.2120 of 2024
with the assets acquired by the Accused Nos.1 and 2 and initiated
prosecution for the charge of disproportionate assets. Further, the 1 st accused
only was given opportunity to submit his explanation and other accused
persons were not served with any notice to call upon them to file their
explanation. For purchase of the property in Chennai for the sale
consideration of Rs.46,28,000/-, the 1st accused categorically explained that
the 2nd accused had received a sum of Rs.40,00,000/- as advance towards the
sale of her property situated at Vadavalli, Coimbatore. It is also accounted
with her Income Tax Return for the Assessment Year 2009-2010, which was
filed on 09.03.2010. Therefore, there are absolutely no oral or material
evidence available to frame charge against the petitioners for the offences
punishable under Section13(2) read with 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act read with Section 109 of Indian Penal Code and the same is
liable to be quashed.
5. The respondent herein filed counter affidavit and the learned
Counsel for Government of Tamil Nadu (Criminal Side) appearing for the
respondent submits that the 1st petitioner was appointed as Special Personal
Assistant to the Hon’ble Minister for Agriculture by an order dated
15.11.2006. Before his appointment, he was working as a Professor in the
8/34
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
Crl.R.C.No.2120 of 2024
Tamil Nadu Agricultural University. Therefore, part of his employment was
under the Agricultural University and as such, the Board of Management is
the Competent Authority to accord sanction to prosecute the 1 st accused.
Further, the 1st petitioner was appointed under General Rules of the Tamil
Nadu State and Subordinate Services Rules. The General Rule 11 of the
Tamil Nadu State and Subordinate Services Rules, says about appointment
by agreements. The General Rule 11 (2) of the said Rules, says that a person
appointed under Sub Rule (1) of Rule 11, shall not be regarded as a member
of the service in which the post to which he is appointed is included and
shall not be entitled by reason only of such appointment to any preferential
claim to any other appointment in that or any other service. Therefore, the 1 st
accused cannot be treated as member of service, in which he was appointed
as Special Personal Assistant to the Hon’ble Minister for Agriculture. His
parent Department is only the Agricultural University. Therefore, the Board
of Management is the competent authority to accord sanction. Accordingly,
the Board of Management headed by its Chairman namely the Vice
Chancellor accorded sanction to prosecute the 1st accused. In support of his
contention, he relied upon the following judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court of India:-
9/34
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
Crl.R.C.No.2120 of 2024
5.(i) In State of Punjab vs. Labh Singh reported in (2014) 16 SCC
807, in which the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India held as follows:-
“9. In the present case the public servants in question
had retired on 13-12-1999 and 30-04-2000. The sanction to
prosecute them was rejected subsequent to their retirement i.e.
first on 13-9-2000 and later on 24-9-2003. The public servants
having retired from service there was no occasion to consider
grant of sanction under Section 19 of the PC Act. The law on
the point is quite clear that sanction to prosecute the public
servant for the offences under the PC Act is not required if the
public servant had already retired on the date of cognizance by
the court. In S.A. Venkataraman v. State while construing
Section 6(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 which
provision is in pari materia with Section 19(1) of the PC Act,
this Court held that no sanction was necessary in the case of a
person who had ceased to be the public servant at the time the
court was asked to take cognizance. The view taken in
S.A.Venkataraman was adopted by this Court in C.R. Bansi v.
State of Maharashtra and in Kalicharan Mahapatra v. State of
Orissa and by the Constitution Bench of this Court in K.
Veeraswamy v. Union of India. The High Court was not
therefore justified in setting aside the order passed by the
Special Judge insofar as charge under the PC Act was
concerned.
10. However as regards charges for the offences
punishable under the Penal Code, the High Court was
10/34https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
Crl.R.C.No.2120 of 2024absolutely right in setting aside the order of the Special Judge.
Unlike Section 19 of the PC Act, the protection under section
197 of CrPC is available to the concerned public servant even
after retirement. Therefore, if the matter was considered by the
sanctioning authority and the sanction to prosecute was
rejected first on 13-9-2000 and secondly on 24-9-2003, the
Court could not have taken cognizance insofar as the offences
punishable under the Penal Code are concerned. As laid down
by this Court in State of H.P. v. Nishant Sareen, the recourse in
such cases is either to challenge the order of the sanctioning
authority or to approach it again if there is any fresh material.
11. In the circumstances, in our view the order under
appeal passed by the High Court is correct insofar as charges
under IPC are concerned but must be set aside as regards
charge under PC Act is concerned.
12. Before we part, we must record that we do not
approve the stand taken by the appellant in the petition. The
prosecution cannot keep waiting till a public servant retires and
then choose to file charge-sheet against him after his
retirement, thereby setting at naught the protection available to
him under Section 19 of the PC Act. The appeal thus stands
allowed partly. No order as to costs.”
Therefore, it is clear that sanction to prosecute the public servant for theoffences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 is not required if the
public servant had already retired on the date of cognizance by the Court.
11/34
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
Crl.R.C.No.2120 of 2024
5.(ii) He also relied upon the judgment in State of Telangana vs.
Managipet Alias Mangipet Sarveshwar Reddy reported in (2019) 19 SCC
87, in which the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India held as follows:-
“34. Therefore, we hold that the preliminary inquiry
warranted in Lalita Kumari is not required to be mandatorily
conducted in all corruption cases. It has been reiterated by this
Court in multiple instances that the type of preliminary inquiry
to be conducted will depend on the facts and circumstances of
each case. There are no fixed parameters on which such inquiry
can be said to be conducted. Therefore, any formal and
informal collection of information disclosing a cognizable
offence to the satisfaction of the person recording the FIR is
sufficient.
35. We also do not find any merit in the argument that
there has been no sanction before the filing of the report. The
sanction can be produced by the prosecution during the course
of trial, so the same may not be necessary after retirement of
the accused officer. This Court in K. Kalimuthu v. State held as
under: (SCC p. 521, para 15)
“15. The question relating to the need of sanction under
Section 197 of the Code is not necessarily to be considered as
soon as the complaint is lodged and on the allegations
contained therein. This question may arise at any stage of the
proceeding. The question whether sanction is necessary or not12/34
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
Crl.R.C.No.2120 of 2024may have to be determined from stage to stage.”
36. The High Court has rightly held that no ground is
made out for quashing of the proceedings for the reason that
the investigating agency intentionally waited till the retirement
of the Accused Officer. The question as to whether a sanction is
necessary to prosecute the Accused Officer, a retired public
servant, is a question which can be examined during the course
of the trial as held by this Court in K. Kalimuthu. In fact, in a
recent judgment in Vinod Kumar Garg v. State (NCT of Delhi),
this Court has held that if an investigation was not conducted
by a police officer of the requisite rank and status required
under Section 17 of the Act, such lapse would be an
irregularity, however unless such irregularity results in causing
prejudice, conviction will not be vitiated or be bad in law.
Therefore, the lack of sanction was rightly found not to be a
ground for quashing of the proceedings.
37. Mr. Guru Krishna Kumar further refers to a Single
Bench judgment of the Madras High Court in M.
Soundararajan v. State to contend that amended provisions of
the Act as amended by Act 16 of 2018 would be applicable as
the amending Act came into force before filing of the charge-
sheet. We do not find any merit in the said argument. In the
aforesaid case, the learned trial court applied amended
provisions in the Act which came into force on 26-7-2018 and
acquitted both the accused from charge under Section 13(1)(d)
read with Section 13(2) of the Act. The High Court found that
13/34
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
Crl.R.C.No.2120 of 2024
the order of the trial court to apply the amended provisions of
the Act was not justified and remanded the matter back
observing that the offences were committed prior to the
amendments being carried out. In the present case, the FIR was
registered on 9-11-2011 much before the Act was amended in
the year 2018. Whether any offence has been committed or not
has to be examined in the light of the provisions of the statute
as it existed prior to the amendment carried out on 26-7-2018.”
Therefore, the sanction may not be necessary to prosecute the 1 st accused
herein, who is a retired public servant. The amended provisions in the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 came into force on 26.07.2018. During
the Check Period from 01.06.2006 to 31.05.2009, only the 1 st accused
amassed wealth and as such, the amended provisions are not applicable to
the case on hand. As per the old provisions, there is no need to obtain any
sanction for prosecuting the retired public servant.
5.(iii) He also relied upon the judgment in Central Bureau of
Investigation vs. Ramesh Chander Diwan reported in 2025 SCC OnLine
SC 871, in which the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India held as follows:-
“18. The concept of deputation was explained by this
Court in State of Punjab v. Inder Singh as follows:
18. The concept of “deputation” is well understood in
service law and has a recognised meaning. “Deputation” has a
14/34https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
Crl.R.C.No.2120 of 2024different connotation in service law and the dictionary meaning
of the word “deputation” is of no help. In simple words
“deputation” means service outside the cadre or outside the
parent department. Deputation is deputing or transferring an
employee to a post outside his cadre, that is to say, to another
department on a temporary basis. After the expiry period of
deputation the employee has to come back to his parent
department to occupy the same position unless in the
meanwhile he has earned promotion in his parent department
as per the Recruitment Rules. Whether the transfer is outside
the normal field of deployment or not is decided by the
authority who controls the service or post from which the
employee is transferred. There can be no deputation without the
consent of the person so deputed and he would, therefore, know
his rights and privileges in the deputation post. …
(emphasis ours)
…………
21. Insofar as disciplinary control over a deputationist
is concerned, such control generally vests with the appropriate
authority in the parent department in which the substantive
appointment is held. However, it cannot be gainsaid that by
statutory rules or by conditions contained in the order of
deputation, it can be provided that the deputationist, for the
period he is serving on deputation, will be subject to the
disciplinary control of the department to which he is deputed.
Should there be a provision in this behalf, the deputationist may
15/34
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
Crl.R.C.No.2120 of 2024
be proceeded against, if the occasion therefore arises, by the
appropriate authority in the receiving department. Although
generally an employee is supposed to have one master, in the
context of deputation there could be a plurality of masters.
Nonetheless, it is the statutory rules which would be the
deciding factor. If the rules indicate that disciplinary control is
retained by the parent department, the receiving department
would have no jurisdiction to exercise such control.
…………
24. Although the respondent’s initial appointment letter
is not on record, it has not been disputed before us (in view of
the additional documents placed on record by the respondent in
terms of an order dated 18th March, 2025) that the respondent
was initially appointed by the Government of Punjab. If not a
member of the State’s civil service, the respondent was most
certainly the holder of a civil post. It is further undisputed that
the respondent was sent on deputation to the Union Territory,
Chandigarh from the State of Punjab (P.W.D P.H Branch). Also,
it is not in dispute that vide an order of the Administrator,
Union Territory, Chandigarh dated 25th February, 2005, the
respondent was relieved to join a new assignment in the
Municipal Corporation, Chandigarh. From time to time, the
Governor of Punjab extended the deputation period of the
respondent with the Municipal Corporation, Chandigarh.
Orders dated 13th October, 2006 and 12th July, 2007 placed on
record by the respondent evince extension of the deputation
16/34
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
Crl.R.C.No.2120 of 2024
period of the respondent with the Municipal Corporation,
Chandigarh by none other than the Governor of Punjab for
specified periods. Effectively, what these orders did was to
temporarily place the respondent’s service at the disposal of the
Municipal Corporation, Chandigarh. It has not been
demonstrated before us by CBI that upon assignment of the
respondent on deputation with the Municipal Corporation,
Chandigarh, he was either absorbed in its services
Administrator resulting in severance of relationship with the
Government of Punjab or that, by any order validly made, the
respondent ceased to remain a Government servant once he left
the post under the Government he was serving prior to his
deputation.”
Therefore, the petitioner was appointed on contract basis as a Special
Personal Assistant to the Hon’ble Minister for Agriculture. Further, the 1 st
accused ceased to be a Government Servant, once he had retired from
service.
5 (iv). He further submits that an accused facing prosecution for the
offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 cannot claim any
immunity on the ground of want of sanction, if he ceased to be a public
servant on the date when the Court took cognizance of the offences under
the provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. He further submits
17/34
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
Crl.R.C.No.2120 of 2024
that the other grounds raised by the petitioners can be looked into before the
Trial Court during the trial by let in evidence. Hence, the Trial Court rightly
dismissed the petition to discharge the petitioners and it does not warrant
any interference by this Court.
6. Heard the learned counsel appearing on either side and perused the
materials available on record.
7. There are totally four accused in the present revision, in which the
petitioners were arrayed as Accused Nos.1 to 4. The crux of the allegation is
that the 1st accused amassed wealth in his name and also in the name of his
family members namely the Accused Nos.2 to 4 herein, which are
disproportionate during the Check Period from 01.06.2006 to 31.05.2009 to
his known source of income. The 2 nd accused is the wife of the 1 st accused,
the 3rd accused is the son of the 1st accused and the 4th accused is the wife of
3rd accused namely the daughter-in-law of the 1 st accused. The 1st accused
was originally appointed as Deputy Agricultural Officer in the Horticulture
Department, Coimbatore and he was promoted to the post of Professor.
While he was serving as Professor in the Tamil Nadu Agricultural
University, he was appointed as Special Personal Assistant to the Hon’ble
18/34
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
Crl.R.C.No.2120 of 2024
Minister for Agricultural Department by the Government of Tamil Nadu by
an order dated 15.11.2006.
8. Though the appointment order was issued on 15.11.2006, his
appointment as Special Personal Assistant to the Hon’ble Minister for
Agriculture was made on 01.06.2006 forenoon itself. Accordingly, he was
relieved from the University on 31.05.2006 afternoon and joined duty as
Special Personal Assistant to the Hon’ble Minister for Agriculture on
01.06.2006 forenoon. On the complaint, the respondent registered the FIR
alleging that during the period from 01.06.2006 to 31.05.2009, the 1 st
accused along with his family members amassed wealth, which is
disproportionate to their known source of income. The disproportionate
assets worth about Rs.68,20,065/-, which comes to 145.84%
disproportionate to their known source of income.
9. The point for consideration in this revision is that whether the
prosecution had obtained valid sanction to prosecute the 1 st accused. The
prosecution obtained sanction to prosecute the 1st accused from the Tamil
Nadu Agricultural University, dated 07.10.2022, thereby the Vice Chancellor
of University accorded sanction to prosecute the 1 st accused. Admittedly,
19/34
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
Crl.R.C.No.2120 of 2024
during the Check Period from 01.06.2006 to 31.05.2009, the 1st accused was
serving as Special Personal Assistant to the Hon’ble Minister for
Agriculture. He was appointed by the Government of Tamil Nadu to the post
of Special Personal Assistant.
10. The learned Counsel for Government of Tamil Nadu (Criminal
Side) appearing for the respondent vehemently contended that though the 1 st
accused was appointed as Special Personal Assistant to the Hon’ble Minister
for Agriculture, by the Government of Tamil Nadu, his parent Department is
the Agricultural University and as such, the Vice Chancellor who is the
Chairman of Board of Management accorded sanction to prosecute the 1 st
accused. Hence, the Vice Chancellor being the Chairman of Board of
Management is competent to accord sanction.
11. This contention cannot be countenanced for the simple reason
that during the Check Period, the 1 st accused was served as Special Personal
Assistant to the Hon’ble Minister for Agriculture. He was appointed by
Government of Tamil Nadu. The 1st accused was appointed under General
Rule 11 of the Tamil Nadu State and Subordinate Services Rules and it
stipulates that a person appointed under an agreement shall not be regarded
20/34
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
Crl.R.C.No.2120 of 2024
as a member of the service to which his appointment is included and shall
not be entitled by reason only of such appointment to any preferential claim
to any other appointment in any other service. It is relevant to extract the
General Rule 11 (1) and (2) of the Tamil Nadu State and Subordinate
Services Rules:-
“11. Appointment by agreements. -(1) When in the opinion
of State Government Special provisions inconsistent with any of
these rules or of any other rules made under the proviso to article
309 of the Constitution of India or continuing by Article 313 of that
Constitution (hereinafter referred to in this rule as the said rules)
are required in respect of conditions of service, pay and
allowances, pension, discipline and conduct with reference to any
particular post, or any of them, it shall be open to the State
Government to make an appointment to such post otherwise than in
accordance with these rules or the said rules and to provide by
agreement with the person so appointed for any of the matters in
respect of which in the opinion of the State Government special
provisions are required to be made and to the extent to which such
provisions are made in the agreement, nothing in these rules or the
said rules shall apply to any person so appointed in respect of any
matter for which provision is made in the agreement:
Provided that in every agreement, made in exercise of the
powers conferred by this rule it shall further be provided that in
respect of any matter in respect of which no provision has been
made in the agreement the provisions of these rules or of the said
21/34https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
Crl.R.C.No.2120 of 2024rules shall apply.
(2) A person appointed under sub-rule (1) shall not be
regarded as a member of the service in which the post to which he
is appointed is included and shall not be entitled by reason only of
such appointment to any preferential claim to any other
appointment in that or any other service.”
12. Therefore, the person, who is appointed under General Rule 11 of
the Tamil Nadu State and Subordinate Services Rules is not entitled to claim
any benefits only. That apart, even the specific case of the prosecution is that
the 1st accused amassed wealth while he was holding the post of Special
Personal Assistant to the Hon’ble Minister for Agriculture. Therefore, the
Competent Authority to accord sanction is the Government of Tamil Nadu
since the Government of Tamil Nadu only appointed the 1 st accused as
Special Personal Assistant to the Hon’ble Minister for Agriculture.
13. Further, the learned Counsel for Government of Tamil Nadu
(Criminal Side) appearing for the respondent specifically contended that on
the date of taking cognizance, the 1st accused is ceased to be a public servant
and as such, there is no need to obtain any sanction to prosecute the 1 st
accused. In support of his contention he also relied upon the above cited
judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India.
22/34
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
Crl.R.C.No.2120 of 2024
14. The order of sanction was accorded by the Vice Chancellor of the
Tamil Nadu Agricultural University as directed by Agricultural Production
Commissioner and Secretary to Government of Tamil Nadu by the
communication, dated 05.07.2022. In fact, the Board of Management of
Tamil Nadu Agricultural University has no absolute power or authority to
issue direction to accord sanction.
15. The 1st accused was appointed as Special Personal Assistant to
Hon’ble Minister for Agriculture, Government of Tamil Nadu from
01.06.2006 to 03.06.2009. On 04.06.2009, he was appointed as Vice
Chancellor of the Tamil Nadu Agricultural University by the Governor of
Tamil Nadu. Thereafter, he attained the age of superannuation and retired
from service on 31.08.2010 as Vice Chancellor. While being so, on receipt of
unanimous complaint, the respondent herein registered FIR in Crime
No.V&AC Hqrs Cr.No.1/AC/2018/HQ. Therefore, after a period of 12 years
from the beginning of Check Period, the FIR got registered against the
accused persons. Hence, there was a huge delay in registering FIR by the
respondent.
23/34
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
Crl.R.C.No.2120 of 2024
16. The specific case of the prosecution is that the first accused is a
public servant within the meaning of Section 2(c) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988, and is charged with offences punishable under Section
13(2) read with Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. Upon
completion of the investigation, the respondent filed the final report in the
year 2022, which was taken on file by the Trial Court in C.C. No. 1 of 2023.
It is true that, prior to the amendment to the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1988, there was no requirement to obtain previous sanction for prosecuting a
retired Government servant. In the present case, the FIR was registered on
01.03.2018, the final report was filed on 21.02.2022, and cognizance was
taken by the Trial Court only in the year 2023, i.e., very much the
amendment to the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 came into force on
26.07.2018.
17. Therefore, the amended provisions of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988 are squarely applicable to the present case. In terms of
Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, no Court shall take
cognizance of an offence punishable under Sections 7, 11, 13 or 15 alleged
to have been committed by a public servant except with the previous
sanction of the competent authority. Section 19(1)(b) of the Prevention of
24/34
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
Crl.R.C.No.2120 of 2024
Corruption Act, 1988 provides that, in the case of a person who is employed,
or who was, at the time of the commission of the alleged offence, employed
in connection with the affairs of a State and is not removable from office
save by or with the sanction of the State Government, previous sanction of
the State Government is mandatory.
18. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners/accused
contended that the Courts are prohibited from taking cognizance of any
offence punishable under Sections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988 against a public servant except with the previous
sanction of the competent authority. In support of the said contention, he
placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Nanjappa v. State of Karnataka [(2015) 14 SCC 186]. The relevant
paragraphs of the judgment are extracted hereunder:
“10. A plain reading of Section 19(1) (supra) leaves no
manner of doubt that the same is couched in mandatory terms
and forbids courts from taking cognizance of any offence
punishable under Sections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 against public
servants except with the previous sanction of the competent
authority enumerated in clauses (a), (b) and (c) to subsection
(1) of Section 19. The provision contained in subsection (1)
would operate in absolute terms but for the presence of sub-
25/34
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
Crl.R.C.No.2120 of 2024
section (3) to Section 19 to which we shall presently turn. But
before we do so, we wish to emphasise that the language
employed in sub-section (1) of Section 19 admits of no
equivocation and operates as a complete and absolute bar to
any court taking cognizance of any offence punishable under
Sections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 of the Act against a public servant
except with the previous sanction of the competent authority.
………
18. The above line of reasoning was followed by this
Court in State of Goa vs. Babu Thomas (2005) 8 SCC 130,
where this Court while dealing with a case under Section 19 of
the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 held that absence of a
valid sanction under Section 19(1) went to the very root of the
prosecution case having regard to the fact that the said
provision prohibits any Court from taking cognizance of any
offence punishable under Sections 7, 10, 13 and 15 against the
public servant, except with the previous sanction granted by the
competent authority in terms of clauses (a), (b) and (c) to
Section 19(1). This Court was in that case dealing with a
sanction order issued by an authority who was not competent to
do so as is also the position in the case at hand.
……..
20. What is important is that, not only was the grant of
a valid sanction held to be essential for taking cognizance by
the Court, but the question about the validity of any such order,
according to this Court, could be raised at the stage of final
26/34
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
Crl.R.C.No.2120 of 2024
arguments after the trial or even at the appellate stage.”
19. In view of the above, this Court accepts the contention of
the learned Senior Counsel that a sanction order accorded by an
incompetent authority would render the trial or the proceedings
against the accused a nullity. This Court also accepts the proposition
that the validity of a sanction order can be questioned at the very
inception of the proceedings or even at the appellate stage. There is no
dispute with regard to the said legal proposition.
20. That apart, the final report was taken cognizance of by the
Trial Court only in the year 2023, i.e., very much the amendment to
the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 came into force on
26.07.2018. Even assuming that the Vice-Chancellor, who accorded
sanction in the present case, was competent to grant sanction for
prosecuting the first accused, the Vice-Chancellor acted without
following the procedure contemplated under the provisions of the
Tamil Nadu Agricultural University Act, 1971.
27/34
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
Crl.R.C.No.2120 of 2024
21. Section 9(1) of the Tamil Nadu Agricultural University Act, 1971
provides that the Governor of Tamil Nadu shall be the Chancellor of the
University. Section 11(1) of the Tamil Nadu Agricultural University Act,
provides that every appointment of the Vice-Chancellor shall be made by the
Chancellor. Further, Section 11(3)(b) of the Tamil Nadu Agricultural
University Act, stipulates that the Vice-Chancellor may be removed from
office by the Chancellor upon a resolution of the Board passed by a majority
of the total members of the Board and by a majority of not less than two-
thirds of the members present and voting.
22. In the present case, the first accused retired from service as the
Vice-Chancellor of the Tamil Nadu Agricultural University. During the
check period, he did not hold the post of Professor in the University. A
perusal of the sanction order dated 07.10.2022 reveals that there is no
reference to any resolution having been passed by the Board of Management
by the requisite majority before according sanction for prosecution.
Therefore, the sanction order dated 07.10.2022 has been issued by an
incompetent authority without due application of mind. If the first accused is
treated as the Vice-Chancellor, the competent authority to accord sanction
would be the Chancellor, in terms of Section 11(3)(b) of the Tamil Nadu
28/34
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
Crl.R.C.No.2120 of 2024
Agricultural University Act, 1971. On the other hand, if the first accused is
treated as the Special Personal Assistant to the Hon’ble Minister for
Agriculture, the competent authority to accord sanction would be the
Government of Tamil Nadu. Since the sanction order dated 07.10.2022 is
non est in the eye of law, the prosecution cannot be sustained and is liable to
be quashed.
23. Further, the prosecution has also failed to obtain sanction under
Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for prosecuting the first
accused for the offence punishable under Section 109 of the Indian Penal
Code. The absence of such sanction constitutes a jurisdictional defect
affecting the very maintainability of the prosecution in respect of the offence
under the Indian Penal Code. Apart from this, accused Nos. 3 and 4 are
qualified medical practitioners having independent sources of income and
separate financial affairs. They are also residing independently at Chennai.
However, the prosecution has erroneously clubbed their assets with those of
the first accused.
29/34
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
Crl.R.C.No.2120 of 2024
24. Merely because the third accused is the son of the first accused
and the fourth accused is his daughter-in-law, the properties independently
acquired by the fourth accused during the check period cannot automatically
be included in the list of disproportionate assets of the first accused. In fact,
the prosecution did not call for any explanation from accused Nos. 2 to 4.
Solely on the basis of the explanation submitted by the first accused, the
investigation was completed and the prosecution concluded that the accused
had amassed assets disproportionate to their known sources of income.
25. A perusal of the prosecution records reveals that the second
accused had entered into an agreement for the sale of a property situated at
Vadavalli, Coimbatore, and received an advance amount of Rs.40,00,000/-.
The said amount was duly reflected in her Income Tax Return for the
Assessment Year 2009-2010. However, the prosecution failed to take the
said amount into account while assessing the assets of the accused. If the
said advance amount and the properties independently acquired by the fourth
accused are excluded from the computation, the remaining assets would not
constitute disproportionate assets in relation to the known sources of income
of the accused.
30/34
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
Crl.R.C.No.2120 of 2024
26. According to the prosecution, the accused were found to be in
possession of assets worth Rs.46,28,000/- during the check period from
01.06.2006 to 31.05.2009, as reflected in Statement No. VII, which were
allegedly disproportionate to their known sources of income. After excluding
the advance amount received by the second accused and the properties
acquired independently by the fourth accused, the value of the alleged
disproportionate assets would not amount to Rs.68,20,065/-. Further, the
Income Tax Returns of accused Nos. 2 and 3 disclose that, through their
Hindu Undivided Family (HUF) account, amounts of Rs.5,21,533/-,
Rs.17,17,448/- and Rs.14,50,000/-, aggregating to Rs.36,88,981/-, had been
advanced to sundry creditors. These amounts were subsequently recovered
and utilised for the purchase of properties during the check period. However,
the prosecution failed to treat the recovered amounts as a legitimate source
of income during the relevant period. The Income Tax Returns further
disclose that accused Nos. 3 and 4 had independent sources of income. They
are medical practitioners by profession and the fourth accused also belongs
to a financially well-established family. Thus, the prosecution has failed to
consider the explanations and supporting materials furnished by the accused
with due application of mind. Consequently, the prosecution suffers from
fundamental legal infirmities, both with regard to the validity of the sanction
31/34
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
Crl.R.C.No.2120 of 2024
for prosecution and the computation of the alleged disproportionate assets.
Accordingly, there are no sufficient materials to frame charges against the
accused for the offences punishable under Section 13(2) read with Section
13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 read with Section 109 of
the Indian Penal Code.
27. In view of the foregoing discussions, the order passed by the
learned Special Judge for Cases under the Prevention of Corruption Act,
Chennai, in Crl.M.P. No.479 of 2023 in C.C. No.1 of 2023, dated
15.11.2024, cannot be sustained and is accordingly set aside.
28. In the result, the Criminal Revision Case is allowed. The
petitioners are discharged from all the charges framed against them. No
costs. Consequently, the connected Criminal Miscellaneous Petition is
closed.
31.07.2026
Index :Yes / No
Speaking order :Yes / No
Neutral Citation :Yes / No
dm
32/34
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
Crl.R.C.No.2120 of 2024
To
1.The Special Judge, Special Court for cases
under the Prevention of Corruption Act, Chennai.
2.The Deputy Superintendent of Police
Vigilance and Anti Corruption,
Special Investigation Cell,
Chennai – 600 016.
3.The Public Prosecutor,
High Court of Madras,
Chennai.
33/34
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
Crl.R.C.No.2120 of 2024
G.K. ILANTHIRAIYAN, J.
dm
Pre-delivery order made in
Crl.R.C.No.2120 of 2024
31.07.2026
34/34
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
